Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
from the time the claim is made judicially or EJ but when such certainty
cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made,
the interest shll begin to run only from the date of judgment of the
court is made.
FACTS
Two fiber drums were shipped owned by Eastern Shipping from
Japan. The shipment as insured with a marine policy. Upon arrival in
Manila unto the custody of metro Port Service, which excepted to one
drum, said to be in bad order and which damage was unknown the
Mercantile Insurance Company. Allied Brokerage Corporation received
the shipment from Metro, one drum opened and without seal. Allied
delivered the shipment to the consignees warehouse. The latter
excepted to one drum which contained spillages while the rest of the
contents was adulterated/fake. As consequence of the loss, the
insurance company paid the consignee, so that it became subrogated
to all the rights of action of consignee against the defendants Eastern
Shipping, Metro Port and Allied Brokerage. The insurance company filed
before the trial court. The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff an
ordered defendants to pay the former with present legal interest of
12% per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint. On appeal
by defendants, the appellate court denied the same and affirmed in
toto the decision of the trial court.
(3) The Court held that it should be computed from the decision
rendered by the court a quo.
ISSUE
(1) Whether the applicable rate of legal interest is 12% or 6%.
(2) Whether the payment of legal interest on the award for loss or
damage is to be computed from the time the complaint is filed from the
date the decision appealed from is rendered.
HELD
(1)
The Court held that the legal interest is 6% computed from
the decision of the court a quo. When an obligation, not constituting a
loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount
of damaes awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at
the rate of 6% per annum. No interest shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can
be established with reasonable certainty.
When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes
final and executor, the rate of legal interest shall be 12% per annum
from such finality until satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to
be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of money.
The interest due shall be 12% PA to be computed fro default, J or EJD.
(2)
From the date the judgment is made. Where the demand is
established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run
Dario Nacar filed a labor case against Gallery Frames and its owner
Felipe Bordey, Jr. Nacar alleged that he was dismissed without cause by
Gallery Frames on January 24, 1997. On October 15, 1998, the Labor
Arbiter (LA) found Gallery Frames guilty of illegal dismissal hence the
Arbiter awarded Nacar P158,919.92 in damages consisting of
backwages and separation pay.
Gallery Frames appealed all the way to the Supreme Court (SC). The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the
decision became final on May 27, 2002.
After the finality of the SC decision, Nacar filed a motion before the LA
for recomputation as he alleged that his backwages should be
computed from the time of his illegal dismissal (January 24, 1997) until
the finality of the SC decision (May 27, 2002) with interest. The LA
denied the motion as he ruled that the reckoning point of the
computation should only be from the time Nacar was illegally
dismissed (January 24, 1997) until the decision of the LA (October 15,
1998). The LA reasoned that the said date should be the reckoning
point because Nacar did not appeal hence as to him, that decision
became final and executory.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter is correct.
HELD: No. There are two parts of a decision when it comes to illegal
dismissal cases (referring to cases where the dismissed employee wins,
or loses but wins on appeal). The first part is the ruling that the
employee was illegally dismissed. This is immediately final even if the
employer appeals but will be reversed if employer wins on appeal.
The second part is the ruling on the award of backwages and/or
separation pay. For backwages, it will be computed from the date of
illegal dismissal until the date of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. But if
the employer appeals, then the end date shall be extended until the
day when the appellate courts decision shall become final. Hence, as a
consequence, the liability of the employer, if he loses on appeal, will
increase this is just but a risk that the employer cannot avoid when it
continued to seek recourses against the Labor Arbiters decision. This is
also in accordance with Article 279 of the Labor Code.
Anent the issue of award of interest in the form of actual or
compensatory damages, the Supreme Court ruled that the old case of
Eastern Shipping Lines vs CA is already modified by the promulgation
of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board Resolution No. 796
which lowered the legal rate of interest from 12% to 6%. Specifically,
the rules on interest are now as follows:
1. Monetary Obligations ex. Loans:
a. If stipulated in writing:
a.1. shall run from date of judicial demand (filing of the case)
a.2. rate of interest shall be that amount stipulated
b. If not stipulated in writing
b.1. shall run from date of default (either failure to pay upon extrajudicial demand or upon judicial demand whichever is appropriate and
subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code)
b.2. rate of interest shall be 6% per annum
2. Non-Monetary Obligations (such as the case at bar)
a. If already liquidated, rate of interest shall be 6% per annum,
INC., respondents.
Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez, Gatmaitan for petitioners.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private-respondent.
NOCON, J.:
Disgruntled over TransWorld Airlines, Inc.'s refusal to accommodate
them in TWA Flight 007 departing from New York to Los Angeles on
June 6, 1984 despite possession of confirmed tickets, petitioners filed
an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila, Branch 145. Advocating petitioner's position, the trial court
categorically ruled that respondent TransWorld Airlines (TWA) breached
its contract of carriage with petitioners and that said breach was
"characterized by bad faith." On appeal, however, the appellate court
found that while there was a breach of contract on respondent TWA's
part, there was neither fraud nor bad faith because under the Code of
Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board of the United States
of America it is allowed to overbook flights.
The factual backdrop of the case is as follows:
Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their
daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3) airline tickets from the
Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New
York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets of petitioners-spouses
were purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a
full fare ticket. All three tickets represented confirmed reservations.
While in New York, on June 4, 1984, petitioners received notice of the
reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight. On the appointed
date, however, petitioners checked in at 10:00 a.m., an hour earlier
than the scheduled flight at 11:00 a.m. but were placed on the wait-list
because the number of passengers who had checked in before them
had already taken all the seats available on the flight. Liana Zalamea
appeared as the No. 13 on the wait-list while the two other Zalameas
were listed as "No. 34, showing a party of two." Out of the 42 names on
the wait list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the
flight to Los Angeles, including petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The two
others, on the other hand, at No. 34, being ranked lower than 22, were
not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare tickets were given first
priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was
holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the
plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted
tickets were denied boarding. According to Mr. Zalamea, it was only
later when he discovered the he was holding his daughter's full-fare
ticket.
Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her
daughter, could not be accommodated because it was also fully
booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in another flight and
purchased two tickets from American Airlines at a cost of Nine Hundred
Eighteen ($918.00) Dollars.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for
upon which were written the name of the passenger and the points of
origin and destination, contained such a notice. An examination of
Exhibit I does not bear this out. At any rate, said exhibit was not
offered for the purpose of showing the existence of a notice of
overbooking but to show that Exhibit I was used for flight 007 in first
class of June 11, 1984 from New York to Los Angeles.
Moreover, respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its
passengers of its alleged policy of giving less priority to discounted
tickets. While the petitioners had checked in at the same time, and
held confirmed tickets, yet, only one of them was allowed to board the
plane ten minutes before departure time because the full-fare ticket he
was holding was given priority over discounted tickets. The other two
petitioners were left behind.
It is respondent TWA's position that the practice of overbooking and the
airline system of boarding priorities are reasonable policies, which
when implemented do not amount to bad faith. But the issue raised in
this case is not the reasonableness of said policies but whether or not
said policies were incorporated or deemed written on petitioners'
contracts of carriage. Respondent TWA failed to show that there are
provisions to that effect. Neither did it present any argument of
substance to show that petitioners were duly apprised of the
overbooked condition of the flight or that there is a hierarchy of
boarding priorities in booking passengers. It is evident that petitioners
had the right to rely upon the assurance of respondent TWA, thru its
agent in Manila, then in New York, that their tickets represented
confirmed seats without any qualification. The failure of respondent
TWA to so inform them when it could easily have done so thereby
enabling respondent to hold on to them as passengers up to the last
minute amounts to bad faith. Evidently, respondent TWA placed its selfinterest over the rights of petitioners under their contracts of carriage.
Such conscious disregard of petitioners' rights makes respondent TWA
liable for moral damages. To deter breach of contracts by respondent
TWA in similar fashion in the future, we adjudge respondent TWA liable
for exemplary damages, as well.
Petitioners also assail the respondent court's decision not to require the
refund of Liana Zalamea's ticket because the ticket was used by her
father. On this score, we uphold the respondent court. Petitioners had
not shown with certainty that the act of respondent TWA in allowing Mr.
Zalamea to use the ticket of her daughter was due to inadvertence or
deliberate act. Petitioners had also failed to establish that they did not
accede to said agreement. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that
both petitioners and respondent TWA agreed, albeit impliedly, to the
course of action taken.
The respondent court erred, however, in not ordering the refund of the
American Airlines tickets purchased and used by petitioners Suthira
and Liana. The evidence shows that petitioners Suthira and Liana were
constrained to take the American Airlines flight to Los Angeles not
because they "opted not to use their TWA tickets on another TWA
the decision of the trial court has not yet become final by reason of the
timely appeal interposed by him and no civil action for damages has
been instituted by petitioner against private respondent for the same
cause. Tan, on the other hand, contemplates of two actions, one
criminal and one civil, and the prosecution of the criminal case had
resulted in the acquittal of the accused, which is not the situation here
where the civil aspect was impliedly instituted with the criminal action
in accordance with Section 1, Rule 111, of the Rules of Court.
Private respondent for her part argues that the decision of the trial
court carries with it the final adjudication of her civil liability. Since
petitioner chose to actively intervene in the criminal action without
reserving his right to file a separate civil action for damages, he
assumed the risk that in the event he failed to recover damages he
cannot appeal from the decision of the lower court.
We find merit in the petition.
The issues confronting us in the instant petition is whether or not the
decision of the Second Municipal Trial Court of Sibalom, San-RemigioBelison, Province of Antique constitutes the final adjudication on the
merits of private respondent's civil liability; and whether or not
petitioner is entitled to an award of damages arising from the remarks
uttered by private respondent and found by the trial court to be
defamatory.
The decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court as affirmed by the
Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 1709 cannot be considered as
a final adjudication on the civil liability of private respondent simply
because said decision has not yet become final due to the timely
appeal filed by petitioner with respect to the civil liability of the
accused in said case. It was only the unappealed criminal aspect of the
case which has become final.
In the case of People vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287, we categorically
stated that from a judgment convicting the accused, two (2) appeals
may, accordingly, be taken. The accused may seek a review of said
judgment, as regards both civil and criminal actions; while the
complainant may appeal with respect only to the civil action, either
because the lower court has refused to award damages or because the
award made is unsatisfactory to him. The right of either to appeal or
not to appeal in the event of conviction of the accused is not
dependent upon the other. Thus, private respondent's theory that in
actively intervening in the criminal action, petitioner waived his right to
appeal from the decision that may be rendered therein, is incorrect and
inaccurate. Petitioner may, as he did, appeal from the decision on the
civil aspect which is deemed instituted with the criminal action and
such appeal, timely taken, prevents the decision on the civil liability
from attaining finality.
We tackle the second issue by determining the basis of civil liability
arising from crime. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses are
governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that
"(E)very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable," in
v. Uy Tieng Piao; 43 Phil. 896, that judicial action for the rescission of a
contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it may be
cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions. However,
even in the cited cases, there was at least a written notice sent to the
degeneration, informing him of the rescission. As stressed in University
of the Philippines v. Walfrido de los Angeles [35 SCRA 102] the act of a
party in treating a contract as cancelled should be made known to the
other....
xxx xxx xxx
In other words, resolution of reciprocal contracts may be made
extrajudicially unless successfully impugned in Court. If the debtor
impugns the declaration it shall be subject to judicial determination.
In this case, private respondent has denied that rescission is justified
and has resorted to judicial action. It is now for the Court to determine
whether resolution of the contract by petitioner was warranted.
We hold that resolution by petitioners of the contract was ineffective
and inoperative against private respondent for lack of notice of
resolution, as held in the U.P. v. Angeles case, supra.
xxx xxx xxx
The indispensability of notice of cancellation to the buyer was to be
later underscored in Republic Act No. 65856, entitled "An Act to Provide
Protection to Buyers of Real Estate on Installment Payments." which
took effect on September 14-15). when it specifically provided:
Sec. 3 (b) ... the actual cataract, of the contract shall take place thirty
days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or the
demand for rescission of the contract by a notarial act and upon full
payment of the cash surrender value to the buyer.
There is no denying that in the instant case the resolution or rescission
of the Contract to Sell was valid. Neither can it be said that the
cancellation of the contract was ineffective for failure of private
respondents to give petitioners notice thereof as petitioners were
informed cancelled private respondent that the contract was cancelled
in the letter dated April 6, 1967 (Exh. "D"). As R.A. No. 65856, was not
yet effective, the notice of cancellation need not be by notarial act,
private respondent's letter being sufficient compliance with the legal
requirement.
The facts of 'fee instant case should be distinguished from those in the
Palay Inc. case, as such distinction will explain why the Court in said
case invalidated the resolution of the contract. In said case, the
subdivision developer, without informing the buyer of the cancellation
of the contract, resold the lot to another person. The lot buyer in said
case was only informed of the resolution of the contract some six years
later after the developer, rejected his request for authority to assign his
rights under the contract. Such a situation does not obtain illness: the
instant case. In fact, petitioners were informed of the cancellation of
their contract in April 1967, when private respondent wrote them the
letter dated April 6, 1967 (Exh. "D"), and within a month they were able
to file a complaint against Private respondent.
While the resolution of the contract and the forfeiture of the amounts
already paid are valid and binding upon petitioners, the Court is
convinced that the forfeiture of the amount of P5.00 although it
includes the accumulated fines for petitioners' failure to construct a
house as required by the contract, is clearly iniquitous considering that
the contract price is only P6,173.15 The forfeiture of fifty percent (50%)
of the amount already paid, or P3,283.75 appears to be a fair
settlement. In arriving at this amount the Court gives weight to the fact
that although petitioners have been delinquent in paying their
amortizations several times to the prejudice of private respondent, with
the cancellation of the contract the possession of the lot review.... to
private respondent who is free to resell it to another party. Also, had
R.A. No. 65856, been applicable to the instant case, the same
percentage of the amount already paid would have been forfeited
[Torralba 3(b).]
The Court's decision to reduce the amount forfeited finds support in the
Civil Code. As stated in paragraph 3 of the contract, in case the
contract is cancelled, the amounts already paid shall be forfeited in
favor of the vendor as liquidated damages. The Code provides that
liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty,
shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable [Art.
2227.]
Further, in obligations with a penal clause, the judge shall equitably
reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or
irregularly complied with by the debtor [Art. 1229; Hodges v. Javellana,
G.R. No. L-17247, April 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 1228]. In this connection, the
Court said:
It follows that, in any case wherein there has been a partial or irregular
compliance with the provisions in a contract for special indemnification
in the event of failure to comply with its terms, courts will rigidly apply
the doctrine of strict construction and against the enforcement in its
entirety of the industry.' where it is clear from the terms of the contract
that the amount or character of the indemnity is fixed without regard to
the probable damages which might be anticipated as a result of a
breach of the terms of the contract; or, in other words, where the
indemnity provided for is essentially a mere penalty having for its
principal object the enforcement of compliance with the corporations;
(Laureano v. Kilayco, 32 Phil. 194 (1943).
This principle was reiterated in Makati Development Corp. v. Empire
Insurance Co. [G.R. No. L-21780, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 557] where
the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance reducing
the subdivision lot buyer's liability from the stipulated P12,000.00 to
Plaintiffs after finding that he had partially performed his obligation to
complete at least fifty percent (50%) of his house within two (2) years
from March 31, 1961, fifty percent (50%) of the house having been
completed by the end of April 1961.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED
as to the amount forfeited which is reduced to fifty percent (50%) of
judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan , C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.