20151211-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. To Daniel Andrews Premier Victoria - Re APPEAL-15-2502Re Request For Information-Details (FOI) - Etc-Supplement-01

Daniel Andrews Premier Victoria
daniel.andrews@parliament.vic.gov.au
Cc:
11-12-2015
Mr Martin Pakula, martin.pakula@parliament.vic.gov.au & attorney-general@justice.vic.gov.au
Ref; 20151211-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Daniel Andrews Premier Victoria -Re APPEAL-15-2502Re Request for information-details (FOI)-etcSupplement-01
Sir,
As I stated in my previous corresponssdence:;

QUOTE 20151209-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Daniel Andrews Premier Victoria -Re APPEAL-15-2502Re Request for information-details (FOI)etc
The above questions are not intended and must not be seen as including all issues of concern/questions but
considering the coming holiday period I view it better to at a later time, if needed, to provide a supplement to this
request, while at least you can engage in detailed respond.
Do not hesitate to provide additional details/information/documentation, etc, where you may consider this to be
relevant to the issues and questions I raised above.
END QUOTE 20151209-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Daniel Andrews Premier Victoria -Re APPEAL-15-2502Re Request for information-details
(FOI)-etc
Because issues I raised have been dragging on for years and what appears to be the conduct of those
involved is to disregard the proper conduct to attend to matters I will quote various correspondences,
some years back, and the obvious issue is that with a change of State government, what, if anything,
has been addressed regarding the concerns, etc, I complained about.
QUOTE 20150709-2013_14_report_infringements_sys
Of 469,093 internal reviews in 2013-14, infringement were confirmed in 55 per cent of cases, with 27 per cent of
infringements withdrawn and an official warning issued, and a further 18 per cent withdrawn without further action
following internal review. In the remaining 656 reviews, the matter was referred to court.
END QUOTE 20150709-2013_14_report_infringements_sys
It appears to me to be very clear that the Attorney-General reports proves that despite that I challenged
the constitutional validity of the Infringement Act 2006 it is so to say business as usual.
And this is where a Government becomes a terrorist organisation as it now is acting outside the rule of
law and so the Police, the Sheriff Office, VicRoads and other complicit to it all are also becoming part
of this terrorism.
A major problem is that even judges are dealing with matters upon their personal views rather than
upon what actually the law is about. His Honour Mullaly J on 30 October 2015 stating that the
Magistrates Court of Victoria doesnt need any evidence to make orders against an accused in ex parte
(criminal) proceedings. Clearly when a judge doesnt even understand what is constitutionally required
then what hope that an ordinary unlettered person have to succeed against this criminality of a terrorist
government?
My writings have been comprehensive at the very least and carefully setting out issues (as the quoted
correspondences below indicates) yet blatantly disregard by the Attorney-General and others.
As indicated by the quotation above a mere 656 matters out of 469,093 of which a review was
requested went to court. Albeit many was where a person requested a warning and so didnt go to
court but was held to be admitting guilt, which then could be used against a person if a similar
Infringement Notice was issued within a certain time period. A person may have economically
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Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.
INSPECTOR-RIKATI about the BLACK HOLE in the CONSTITUTION-DVD
A 1st edition limited special numbered book on Data DVD ISBN 978-0-9803712-6-0
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(financially) held that to accept a warning might be cheaper then to have a day in court that no
matter a persons innocence the likely hood to succeed would be about zero. After all people who have
mountains of work in their daily lives and employment hardly are able to research huge amount of
material to try to succeed in court. Yet, this neither should be required ass the legal processes should
be Innocent until proven guilty and this is basically no longer available and/or applicable when it
comes to Infringement Notices.
INFRINGEMENTS POLICY
Infringements policy in Victoria is built on three key principles:
Expediency the system is a means of dealing with high volume offences without requiring the
offender to appear in Court
Legitimacy the system preserves procedural fairness, and provides for strong enforcement, and
Efficiency the system effectively manages high volume offences.
The infringements system in Victoria is largely automated and this means not all offences are suitable to be
enforced by infringement. Traditionally, infringement offences are strict liability offences, where commission
of the offending conduct is evidence of the offence having occurred. There is no requirement to prove intent
or state of mind. It is important therefore, that careful consideration is given to the suitability of a particular
offence to be enforced using the infringements system. It is also important the infringements system operates
in accordance with principles of fairness and due process, members of the public have an awareness of their
rights and responsibilities, and the system is able to take account of individual circumstances.
The Infringements Standing Advisory Committee (ISAC) provides an opportunity to incorporate diverse
perspectives into infringements policy. During 201112, the membership of ISAC was reviewed, and expanded
to include additional views; some to strengthen existing representation from key stakeholder areas, others to
bring new contributions to the policy discussion.
How on earth can it be Legitimacy the system preserves procedural fairness considering what I
have set out in my original request and this supplement 1?
When did ISAC contact me or give me any feedback as to what it contemplated to do?
What did ISAC in fact do to address the issues I raised so extensively?
What did the Attorney-General do as to address the numerous issues I have raised?
How can there be a procedural fairness whereas I indicated the Copy of the Infringement Notice
that may be provided to the Infringement Registrar (or the details thereof) are not as what was stated
on the original Infringement Notice, issued to the accused?
How can there be procedural fairness if there is no way the accused is made aware of a hearing
date and/or how to object to the Infringement Registrar
What procedural fairness exist when I OBJEC TED TO THE JURISDICTION of any court to
deal with the Infringement Notice but nevertheless it was enforced by the Registrar with disregarding
the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION, and so never invoked jurisdiction in the first place to issue
any infringement order.
What procedural fairness existed where the Infringement Registrar dismissed my review request
against the Infringement Order where by Harris v Caldine he has no such powers to enforce his own
order by warrant issue the moment I objected to the Infringement Order?
What we seem to have is some handy crafting work by the Attorney-General as to pretend that it
entails procedural fairness where in fact I proved this not to be so at all.
Below a one sentence statement that is very important:
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QUOTE 130723-R Clark Attorney General & others-Re COMPLAINT

It is my understanding that the former Attorney General Rob Hulls and former Minister for Police and
Emergency Services Bob Cameron had no legal standing to engage in a "deed of charge" (14-8-2007) with Tenix
Solution IMES Pty Ltd which was intended for Tenix Solution IMES Pty Ltd to access Magistrates Court of
Victoria computer and/or other files for purporting civil and/or other enforcement of purported Infringement
Notices and related charges using the Victorian trademark Civic Compliance Victoria and/or other identities into a
non-registered entity also known as Civic Compliance Vic (Westpac Bank Account) instead of into consolidated
Funds of the State of Victoria, for so far any charges were to be deemed lawfully enforceable which is not conceded,
and use such terrorism and other conduct, including but not limited to extortion to force upon me and/or others to
pay monies, including but not limited to the issue of a warrant and threats of conduct which may and likely will
harm my person and/or others.
END QUOTE 130723-R Clark Attorney General & others-Re COMPLAINT
As set out below, the federation resulted that the States from having a sovereign Parliament now had
a constitutional Parliament, where the States were created from the former Colonies within Section
106 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) and by the letters Patent
published on 2-1-1901 in the Victorian Gazette the had to be an impartial administration of justice,
which means no longer could the Parliament interfere with the Courts. Because any reference of
legislative powers within s51(xxxvii) of the constitution was no more but that the commonwealth
could accept such refe3erence of legislative powers but in itself didnt provide any authority for the
States to refer legislative powers to the commonwealth, this as s51 is one to provide legislative
powers for the commonwealth and not that for the States. At most until the commonwealth
commenced to legislate on a subject matter the States could do so, whereas s52 was immediately
exclusive legislative powers for the Commonwealth upon federation.
It means that the Colonial Constitution Act of the State of Victoria ( as with all colonial constitutions)
became a State constitution subject to the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK).
Therefore the meaning of the following quotation very much is relevant:
HANSARD 10-03-1891 Constitution Convention Debates
QUOTE
Dr. COCKBURN: All our experience hitherto has been under the condition of parliamentary sovereignty.
Parliament has been the supreme body. But when we embark on federation we throw parliamentary
sovereignty overboard. Parliament is no longer supreme. Our parliaments at present are not only legislative,
but constituent bodies. They have not only the power of legislation, but the power of amending their
constitutions. That must disappear at once on the abolition of parliamentary sovereignty. No parliament
under a federation can be a constituent body; it will cease to have the power of changing its constitution at its
own will. Again, instead of parliament being supreme, the parliaments of a federation are coordinate bodiesthe main power is split up, instead of being vested in one body. More than all that, there is this difference:
When parliamentary sovereignty is dispensed with, instead of there being a high court of parliament, you
bring into existence a powerful judiciary which towers above all powers, legislative and executive, and which
is the sole arbiter and interpreter of the constitution.
END QUOTE
It means that any reference of legislative powers is in fact an amendment of the State legislative
boundaries and within s123 of the constitution requires a state referendum this also as any reference
of legislative powers will also result in stripping the Supreme Court of Victoria of its judicial powers
regarding the matter referred to the Commonwealth. Hence, it is ultimately for the State lectors to
decide by State Referendum if they desire to amend the constitution to allow legislative powers to be
transferred to the Commonwealth and by this also certain judicial powers.
The question therefore is when was there a State referendum to amend the State (former Colonial)
constitution (since federation) to refer legislative and so judicial powers from the state of Victoria to
the Commonwealth?
The question therefore is when was there a State referendum to amend the State (former Colonial)
constitution (since federation) to amend this former Colonial constitution (now subject to the
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK)) since 1901, including to enact the
purported Victorian Constitution Act 1975, the number of Members permitted in each House of the
Parliament, etc?
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We hear a lot about Australian citizenship which as a CONSTITUTIONALIST I published;

INSPECTOR-RIKATI on CITIZENSHIP
A book on CD about Australians unduly harmed.
ISBN 0-9580569-6-X
Therefore when one considers also what I successfully submitted and so unchallenged by all AttorneyGenerals (all served with an s78B NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS) on 19 July 2006
County Court of Victoria, Case numbers T01567737 & Q10897630 about the issue of CITIZENSHIP
then for all purposes and intend the State of Victoria (as any other State did) retained legislative
powers to define/declare citizenship. Hence the Commonwealth of Australia Australian Citizenship
laws are ULTRA VIRES because they are unconstitutional. The problem we are having is that by s109
Commonwealth legislation overrides State legislation, but only for so far the Commonwealth has
legislative powers on a subject matter. The Framers of the Constitution made clear that the High Court
of Australia had no judicial powers to amend the constitution by its judgments, but could merely
interpret the intentions of the Framers of the Constitution.
Because the Commonwealth has nevertheless legislated as to Australian Citizenship without having
any constitutional amendments having been at least to my knowledge permitted by Section 128
referendum the question is then: When, if ever at all did the State of Victoria and/or any other State
refer its legislative powers as to State Citizenship to the Commonwealth, and if so when was a State
referendum held to permit this?
Because State citizenship governs also who can or cannot have franchise (voting rights in any political
election) it cannot be argued that a State has no State citizenship laws, as if this were to be so then no
state political elections can be held to elect members to the State Parliament.
While it may be argued that the Victorian constitution act 1975 provides for this, as I indicated before
when was this purported Victorian Constitution Act 1975 approved by state electors? After all if there
was no State referendum to approve it then the purported Victorian Constitution Act 1975 is not worth
the paper it is written upon.
And this is not to be held to be deemed to be as like the Now Victorian Premier Daniel Andrews I
view stole the State election in 2014 by falsely/misleadingly claiming that the East West road project
was not worth the paper it was written upon as an estimated 1.1Billion dollars waste of taxpayers
monies for sure may underline why he is eager to persist with an unconstitutional Infringement Act
2006 as to try so to say to bleed citizens to pay for the monies so wasted. When it comes top monies
(taxation, etc) the States created within s106 of the constitution subject to this constitution are bound
to have all monies placed into Consolidated Revenue /Funds, and clearly w\hat we have seen is that in
the 2014 State election unlawfully, so it was reported, persons were used to electioneer for a political
party not entitled to do.
This, even so in my 20140304-G. H .Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Victorian Auditor General SOME 8
MONTHS BEFORE the Victorianst state election was held:
QUOTE 20140304-G. H .Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Victorian Auditor General
http://ag.ca.gov/ethics/accessible/misuse.php
QUOTE (DOWNLOADED 13-3-2010)
Ethics Orientation for State Officials
Misuse of Public Funds
Public Funds may not be Used for Personal Purposes

The starting point for any analysis concerning the misuse of public funds begins with the principle that
public funds must be expended for an authorized public purpose. An expenditure is made for a public
\
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purpose when its purpose is to benefit the public interest rather than private individuals or private
purposes.
Once a public purpose is established, the expenditure must still be authorized. A public official
possesses only those powers that are conferred by law, either expressly or impliedly.
The California Constitution and a variety of state statutes make it clear that public funds may not be
expended for purposes that are primarily personal. Such expenditures are neither for a public purpose
nor are they authorized.
The prohibition against using public funds for personal purposes does not mean that no personal
benefit may result from an expenditure of public funds.
For example, the payment of a public employees salary confers a personal benefit on the employee,
but it is an appropriate expenditure of public funds because it is procuring the services of the
employee for public purposes.
The misuse of public funds occurs when the personal benefit conferred by a public expenditure is not
merely incidental. The term public funds is not limited to money, but includes anything of value
belonging to a public agency such as equipment, supplies, compensated staff time, and use of
telephones, computers, and fax machines and other equipment and resources.
Examples of Misuse of Public Funds

1. In People v. Dillon, a city commissioner used official government discounts to purchase
items for himself and others. This was a misuse of public funds, even though those receiving
the discount paid for the items with personal funds.
2. In People v. Sperl, a county marshal furnished a deputy marshal and a county vehicle to
transport a political candidate, his staff and family.
3. In People v. Battin, a county supervisor used his county compensated staff to work on his
political campaign for Lieutenant Governor.
4. In People v. Harby, a city official used a city car, entrusted to him for use in connection with
official business, to take a pleasure trip from Los Angeles to Great Falls, Montana and back.
Violations of the laws prohibiting misuse of public funds may subject the violator to criminal and civil
sanctions.
These penalties may include imprisonment for up to four years and a bar from holding office.
State Agency Participation in Ballot Measure Elections

There is another issue involving the misuse of public funds that does not concern the personal use of
public funds. This issue concerns the use of public funds in connection with ballot measure
campaigns. Following is a list of what well cover in this section.
Stanson v. Mott
Endorsements and Informational Materials
Improperly Using Public Funds may Trigger Fines
Using Public Funds and Ballot Measure Campaigns

The California Supreme Court case of Stanson v. Mott is the cornerstone case concerning the
expenditure of public funds in election campaigns.
In Stanson v. Mott, a private citizen sued the Director of the California Department of Parks and
Recreation, challenging the directors expenditure of Department funds to support passage of a bond
act appearing on a statewide ballot. The Supreme Court unanimously found that the director had
acted unlawfully, concluding that in the absence of clear and explicit legislative authorization, a public
agency may not expend public funds to promote a partisan position in an election campaign.
Stanson v. Mott
The Supreme Court wrote in Stanson: A fundamental precept of this nations democratic electoral
process is that the government may not take sides in election contests or bestow an unfair
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advantage on one of several competing factions. A principal danger feared by our countrys founders
lay in the possibility that the holders of governmental authority would use official power improperly to
perpetuate themselves, or their allies, in office....
The Supreme Court further wrote in Stanson ...The selective use of public funds in election
campaigns, of course, raises the specter of just such an improper distortion of the democratic
electoral process.
Endorsements and Informational Materials: Subsequently, court cases have said that a
government agency may endorse a measure that is related to its expertise so long as it does not
expend funds to promote its passage.
Similarly, a government agency may draft legislation or a ballot measure related to its expertise, but
may not promote the passage of the measure in an election campaign.
Here is Jose Lopez discussing the findings in the Stanson case in regard to the agency participation
in ballot measure elections.
1. The Stanson Court also noted that if a state agency or department has authority to
disseminate information relating to its activities, it may spend funds to provide the public with
a fair presentation of relevant information.
2. The Court found that it would be contrary to the public interest to bar knowledgeable public
agencies from disclosing relevant information to the public, so long as such disclosure is full
and impartial and does not amount to improper campaign activity.
3. To be fair, a presentation must consider all important points and provide equal treatment to
both sides of the issue.
Improperly Using Public Funds may Trigger Fines: Improper use of public funds also may trigger
fines from the Fair Political Practices Commission for failing to report campaign contributions. In 1996,
Sacramento County paid a $10,000 fine to the Commission in connection with a utility bill insert
explaining the effect on the county of several ballot measures. The Commission ruled that the insert
advocated a position on the ballot measures and was not a neutral and fair presentation of the facts.
END QUOTE 20140304-G. H .Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Victorian Auditor General
It also would mean that those purportedly elected to the Parliament may not have been validly elected,
both because of the failure to have valid citizenship laws and the corruption/fraud involved in elections
as well as that the number of members of parliament is limited to what the former Colonial
Constitution Act that because a limited State constitution on 1-1-1901 permitted for!
.
Where is the fairness in procedure in the Infringement Act 2006 when the real criminals are in the
Parliament, many if not most not qualified for various reasons (Including that the number of Members
of Parliament in an office of profit in the Colonial Constitution that became a State constitution
doesnt permit as many Members of Parliament as the purported Victorian Constitution Act 1975
allows for.) to be a Member of Parliament?
Hence the question is then when was the Colonial Constitution Act that became upon federation a
State Constitution Act subject to the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK)
amended by State referendum, and to what, if any extend, this also as to reflect the provisions of the
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) of legislative powers being provided to the
Commonwealth of Australia?
It must be clear that because the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) prohibits
the states from raising an armed force without the consent of the commonwealth then the colonial
Constitution Act upon federation should have been appropriately amended to reflect this. Likewise so
as to other matters, whereas the much heralded s16 of the purported Victorian Constitution Act 12975
purports the State of Victoria to have all legislative powers.
.
Hansard 19-4-1897 Constitution Convention Debates
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QUOTE
Mr. CARRUTHERS:
This is a Constitution which the unlettered people of the community ought to be able to understand.
END QUOTE
.
Hansard 8-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National Australasian
Convention)
QUOTE Mr. ISAACS.We want a people's Constitution, not a lawyers' Constitution.
END QUOTE
What State legislation is in plain English that ordinary citizens (unlettered persons can understand and
comprehend the meaning and application of the legislations?
While often one is advised Consult a lawyer reality is that if doctors were to have as many patients
as lawyers lose cases then those doctors would be deemed to be Charlatans. As such a lawyer does no
more but give his opinion and far too often proved to be wrong. Where even lawyers and also judges
on appeals were found to have failed to apply the legislative provisions appropriately then what has the
State Government and so also the Parliament done to simplify the legislation that it is in plain English
and can even be understood not only by unlettered persons but also by lawyers/judges?
Clearly s16 of the purported Victorian Constitution Act 1975 is misleading and deceptive as it doesnt
indicate to a unlettered person the actual limitations of the constitution, and far too often in my
understanding is misused and abused by judges as to claim the State has the judicial powers because of
s16 this even so it may not exist in real constitutional terms.
The question therefore is on what legal basis does the Victorian government holds that the purported
Victorian Constitution Act 1975 is validly enacted as a constitution act?
When as was State referendum, if any, held that the electors approved of the Victorian Constitution
Act 1975 to be enacted as such?
Also Consider:
QUOTE ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2 (MY UNCONTEST APPEALS- BY ALL ATTONOR GENERALS!)
ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2

County Court of Victoria, Case numbers T01567737 & Q10897630
STANDARDS OF BURDEN OF PROOF;
In criminal matters, at least as I understand it, the Prosecutor

has the burden of proof of criminal standard to prove not only
his case but to disprove each and every element of the excuses
proffered by the accused, this, while the defendant has the civil
standard of proof.
END QUOTE ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2 (MY UNCONTEST APPEALS- BY ALL ATTONOR GENERALS!)
Where is the criminal standard of proof when an enforcement agency makes an allegation based
upon an invalid Fire prevention Notice and in violation of the legislative provisions and yet done so for
years on end and not even the courts/lawyers realised this to be so.
How on earth can there be a procedural fairness when an accused has issued against him/her a
warrant without any evidence but merely some allegations that may or may not have been known
to the accused?
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Electing to go to court
Individuals who receive an infringement notice can elect to go to court at any time prior to lodgement
of an infringement penalty with the Infringements Court. In 2013-14, there were 72,893 infringements
contested in court, compared to 60,676 in the previous year. Table 5 shows the number of elections to
court over time.
The majority of matters contested in court are for traffic and toll enforcement offences, which have
grown in volume from 47,649 in 2012-13 to 62,664 in 2013-14. This growth correlates with increases
in the number of elections to go to court in the last reporting period.
Table 1: Electing to go to court as proportion of infringements issued over time
Infringement
Activity
Elections to go
to Court
Percentage of
Infringements
Issued
2006-07
2007-08
2008-09
2009-10
2010-11
2011-12
2012-13
2013-14
19,796
25,898
28,614
32,806
37,994
44,592
60,676
72,893
0.5%
0.6%
0.6%
0.7%
0.8%
0.9%
1.0%
1.5%
What legal grounds exist to compel me to go to court if the enforcement agency itself holds that it
may not be a matter to go to court for?
And as I objected to the jurisdiction of any court then this includes the Infringement Court!
Why on earth should I elect to go to court when I view there is no legal validity in an Infringement
Notice issued against me and so I am entitled to disregard it as much as Mr Gould was held by the
High Court of Australia that he could ignore an unconstitutional court order?
.
Uniform Tax \case, 1942 (65CLR 373 at 408) 23-7-1942

QUOTE
Common expressions such as: 'The Courts have declared a statute invalid'," says Chief Justice Latham, "sometimes
lead to misunderstanding. A pretended law made in excess of power is not and never has been a law at all.
Anybody in the country is entitled to disregard it. Naturally, he will feel safer if he has a decision of a court in
his favor, but such a decision is not an element, which produces invalidity in any law. The law is not valid until a
court pronounces against it - and thereafter invalid. If it is beyond power it is invalid ab initio.
END QUOTE
Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally; Re Wakim; Ex parte Darvall; Re Brown; Ex parte Amann; Spi [1999] HCA 27 (17
June 1999)
QUOTE
For constitutional purposes, they are a nullity. No doctrine of res judicata or issue estoppel can prevail against the
Constitution. Mr Gould is entitled to disregard the orders made in Gould v Brown. No doubt, as Latham CJ said
of invalid legislation, "he will feel safer if he has a decision of a court in his favour". That is because those
relying on the earlier decision may seek to enforce it against Mr Gould.
END QUOTE
.
Here we have a Fire Prevention Notice issued year after year demanding all combustible materials
removed from land this meaning that even the property owner/occupant has to remove the residence
and content, the sheds/garage and content, the timber fencing, any firewood stacked for the winter and
even trees/bushes from the property during a declared fire danger period. This kind of idiotic demand
is then enforced by a Magistrates Court and lawyers do not even seem to understand the total absurdity
of such a Fire Prevention Notice which has nothing to do with Fire Prevention but more to do with
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extortion, abuse of the legal processes and in regard of the legislation to misuse and abuse the Country
Fire Authority Act 1958 legal provisions for ulterior purposes. Admittedly Parliament didnt exclude
trees/bushes, wooden fence poles and gates in the Country Fire Authority Act 1958 but the fact that a
Magistrates Court and lawyers cannot even grasp how ridiculous this Fire Prevention Notice was and
violating the legislative provisions which excludes residents and content and sheds and content then
the need to simplify legislation to plain English that even the Courts and lawyers appearing before it
can understand it certainly is proven to be necessarily.
Where the Fire Prevention Notice has this absurdity as a demand in violation to the legislative
provisions then clearly it is in valid and no court can invoke jurisdiction!
Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28 (28 April 1998)
Dawson J pointed out in Hunter Resources Ltd v Melville when discussing the statutory
provision in that case: "substantial compliance with the relevant statutory requirement
was not possible. Either there was compliance or there was not."
Again;
"substantial compliance with the relevant statutory requirement was not possible. Either
there was compliance or there was not."
As indicated I was the subject of an Infringement Notice where the enforcement agency Banyule
City council held that I had exceeded 3 hour parking by being recorded to have been parked there for 2
hours and 29 minutes. When you have what I consider morons issuing Infringement Notices not
because of an actual breach of law but because of the idiotic of a enforcement agency not capable to
understand that 2 hours and 29 minutes is less than 3 hours then how can the attorney-General hold
this is procedural fairness when a person is terrorised to pay a fine no matter the utter and sheer
nonsense if the Infringement Notice allegation? Even the review was dismissed by the enforcement
agencys legal advisors but then I pursued the matter further and made clear that so to say they were a
pack of idiots and finally they accepted that 2 hours 29minutes actually was less than 3 hours, as I had
all along maintained.
I have been subjected to numerous infringement notices who were used not for proper enforcement of
legal provisions but for an abuse that even police officers were sent by the chief commissioner on a
training course how to do a roadworthy. Where is the procedure fairness when I am constantly
having to defend myself against Infringement Notices without legal justification?
Take for example that I succeeded on 19 July 2009 against the commonwealth and all State attorneyGenerals were served with the s78B NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS of both appeals
in FAILING TO VOTE and I comprehensively defeated the conviction by a Magistrates Court and so
unchallenged by any of the Attorney-General, at which time Mr Rob Hull Attorney-0General for the
State of Victoria placed in writing that the State of Victoria would abide by the courts decision. Why
then is the Victorian electoral Commission now pursuing me for an Infringement Notice for FAILING
TO VOTE, where this clearly violates my rights/benefits obtained by the 19 July 2006 County court of
Victoria decision to uphold both appeals?
Why indeed are any Infringement Notices issued against anyone for FAILING TO VOTE when
clearly I succeeded that compulsory voting is unconstitutional?
Why indeed are any broadening of enforcement agencies permitted to issue Infringement Notices
where clear no court has overruled my objection that the Infringement Act 2006 it is unconstitutional
and so ULTRA VIRES?
As will be shown below I challenged the validity of the purported Infringement Act 2006 to be
ULTRA VIRES some years ago and to my knowledge no Court of competent jurisdiction has not
ruled against my OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION nor declared the Infringement Act 2006 to be
INTRA VIRES.
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Because I challenged the validity of the Infringement Act 2006 then it is ULTRA VIRES Ab Initio and
not just in relation to myself but in regard of anyone, as neither the constitution and/or the legislation is
not specifically enacted regarding my person, and as was clear in HCA 27 of 1999 Wakim the Court
held in that case that the Cross Vesting Act was unconstitutional and not just to the person objecting
against the Cross Vesting Act but in regard all people in the Commonwealth of Australia.
Considering my numerous writings (for the State of Victoria) to Premiers, Attorney-Generals, Police,
Civic Compliance Victoria, Sheriff Office, VicRoads, etc, when, if any at all, was there any request by
all and/or any of them to so to say actually sit down with me and work through the many issued I
raised in my various writings?
If indeed the Infringement Act 2006 is and remains to be ULTRA VIRES then how on earth can
anyone claim that there is procedure fairness when people subjected (victims) of the Infringement
system are having concealed this to be so and the enforcement agencies and the courts nevertheless
do as if it is Intra vires?
As shown below my writing to Inspector Stephen Mutton was without response. That proves that the
procedure fairness doesnt exist as they all carry on no matter they are in fact the criminals misusing
and abusing what is deemed valid legislation and blatantly disregard any set out otherwise.
How much money has been collected in regard of Infringement Notices (paid in regard of the
Infringement Notice and/or due to court orders by the Infringement Court and/or other courts) and
what part actually went to whom and where and what amounts? Including the amount that was
charged/kept by Tenix Solutions IMES Pty Ltd?
In regard of the various correspondences received from (allegedly) Victorian Police, VicRoads,
Sheriffs Office, etc, which one were generated by Tenix Solutions IMES Pty Ltd operating under
Civic Compliance Victoria?
Does Civic Compliance Victoria and/or Tenix Solutions IMES Pty Ltd have access to the Infringement
Court/Magistrates Court of Victoria data base, including its court records?
What, if any control is there in regard of monies paid to Civic Compliance Victoria and/or Tenix
Solutions IMES Pty Ltd is appropriately accounted for and placed in Consolidated Revenue Funds,
and not so to say monies are syphoned off as kick back to politicians and others?
I will now quote the various correspondences and other issues relevant to the above, including raising
additional issues and question!
QUOTE 130905-COMPLAINT Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Inspector Stephen Mutton-CONSTITUTIONAL issues etc
Inspector Stephen Mutton, from Melton police

C/o heidelberg.uni@police.vic.gov.au
Cc:
5-9-2013
Mr Jon Kaila jon.kaila@news.com.au

Mr Robert Clark MP Attorney-General robert.clark@parliament.vic.gov.au
Ken Lay Chief Commissioner, Victorian Police, C/o heidelberg.uni@police.vic.gov.au
Ian Grey Chief Magistrate, Magistrates Court of Victoria
233 William Street Melbourne Vic 3000, C/o help@magistratescourt.vic.gov.au
M Hoyle, Quality and client support Coordinator
Civic Compliance Victoria GPO Box 1916, Melbourne VIC 3001, Traffic_Inquiries@tenixsolutions.com
Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka, MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL
Email: mayJUSTICEalwaysPREVAIL@schorel-hlavka.com
Mr Brendan Facey Department of Justice

\
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Infringement management & Enforcement Services Brendan.Facey@justice.vic.gov.au

Your Ref: BC/15766
130905-COMPLAINT Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Inspector Stephen Mutton-CONSTITUTIONAL issues
etc
Sir,
as you may be aware of my 4 September 2013 correspondence to Mr Brendan Facey Department
of Justice Infringement management & Enforcement Services, I have been opposing the validity of
Infringement Notices for some 2 1/2 years.
As could be expected, albeit not to be taken as a valid excuse, my extensive writing has been ignored,
albeit this is no excuse. I intend however to sue those involved, not just Brendan Facey, but also the
Attorney-General, the Premier, the Chief Magistrate, the Chief Commissioner of Police, Civic
Compliance Victoria and others for their collective and individual harm they caused upon my person,
and so also upon my wife, by this. and were you in any way interfere with my freedoms as
constitutionally entitled upon I can assure you I wouldnt hesitate so to say to sue the pant of you also.
As a CONSTITUTIONALIST I hold that the constitution is the governing law and any legislation
that is in conflict with the constitution is without legal validity. If therefore, you nevertheless are
willing to so to say terrorise citizens that they will be risking to be imprisoned because of outstanding
warrants as to unpaid fines, this even so for some time now the Chief Commissioner of Police was
provided with copies of my writings that this is unconstitutional, as set out in a range of
correspondences, then I view you take it upon yourself to terrorise my person and/or others and should
suffer the legal consequences of this not only as a state official but also as a private person.
Any police officer who in defiance of the constitution acts to imprison a person should suffer the legal
consequences. It is no excuse not to know the law when as a police officer you purport to enforce the
law.
In case you may consider to be outside the bounds of being personally sued for any harm you may
inflict upon others, let me briefly quote some parts of a U.S.A. judgment, which for the record can be
used also as an Authority in Australian Courts, as the High Court of Australia itself is on record for
using for over 100 years American Authorities.I provide the webaddress also as to the entire Authority.
The same legal principles could be considered also with other matters, but in essence it is that this case
demonstrates that State officials can be sued for their conduct if this result to false imprisonment, etc.
As I challenged the validity of the Infringement Act 2006, since at least 2006, then any person seeking
nevertheless to enforce it against anyone, not just me, may be dumb enough to place himself in
personal risk to be sued. for some 2 1/2 years now the Chief Commissioner of Police could have
sought a declaration from a competent court of jurisdiction to declare the legislation INTRA VIRES,
however failing to do so is no excuse then to terrorise motorist and others (including the reported
thousands of innocent N.S.W. motorist) with fines, etc.
I am astounded that you seem to brag about the achievement of getting people to come to the police to
pay alleged fines, etc, or risk a possible imprisonment, despite my well published challenge to the
Infringement Act 2006, since at least 2011.
Did the Chief Commissioner of Police ever bothered to advise police officers that I challenged on
constitutional grounds the validity of the Infringement Act 2\006? Did the Attorney-General receiving
my correspondences bother to take appropriate steps to pursue the legislation to be declared, if that is
possible at all, to be INTRA VIRES as unless and until, if ever at all, this is declared INTRA VIRES it
remains ULTRA VIRES Ab Initio!
.
http://www.alternet.org/belief/atheist-jailed-when-he-wouldnt-participate-religious-parole-programnow-seeks-compensation
\
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http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2013/08/23/11-15354.pdf
QUOTE
The Supreme Court has explicitly held that when a defendant is found to have violated an individuals right to
procedural due process, the plaintiff is entitled to recover nominal damages, even without proof of actual injury.
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 26667 (1978). Our circuits case law makes clear that neither the judge nor the
jury has any discretion in this matter, and that the rule entitling a plaintiff to nominal damages applies with equal
force to violations of substantive constitutional rights. Floyd v. Laws, 929 F.2d 1390, 1402 (9th Cir. 1991); see also
Schneider v. Cnty. of San Diego, 285 F.3d 784, 79495 (9th Cir. 2002). Nominal damages must be awarded in cases
in which the plaintiff is not entitled to compensatory damages, such as cases in which no actual injury is incurred or
can be proven. Here, however, there was actual judges finding of liability establishes that Hazle suffered actual
injury when he was unconstitutionally incarcerated.
Given this undisputed finding that Hazles constitutional rights were violated, and applying the rule that the award
of compensatory damages is mandatory when the existence of actual injury is beyond dispute, we hold that the
district judge erred in refusing to hold that Hazle was, as a matter of law, entitled to compensatory damages. We
therefore reverse the district judges denial of Hazles motion for a new trial.
The Supreme Court has held that entitlement to compensatory damages in a civil rights action is not a matter of
discretion: Compensatory damages . . . are mandatory; once liability is found, the jury is required to award
compensatory damages in an amount appropriate to compensate the plaintiff for his loss. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S.
30, 52 (1983) (emphasis added).
END QUOTE
QUOTE
We are not alone in so concluding. As the Second Circuit has held, where the jury has found a constitutional
violation and there is no genuine dispute that the violation resulted in some [actual] injury to plaintiff, the plaintiff is
entitled to an award of compensatory damages as a matter of law. Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 124
(2d Cir. 2004). Kerman involved a plaintiff whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated when he was handcuffed
and detained for psychiatric evaluation. The Second Circuit held that its ruleregarding compensatory damages
applied with particular force to claims for loss of liberty, noting that where the plaintiff was indisputably deprived
of his liberty and the underlying conduct is unlawful, the plaintiff is entitled to compensatory, not merely nominal,
damages. Id. The court stated that such treatment was consistent with the traditional common-law principles
governing entitlement to damages for the tort of false imprisonment. Id. at 125. The Second Circuits holding is
consistent with decisions by other circuits rejecting awards of merely nominal damages for unlawful conduct
resulting in the loss of liberty. The Eleventh Circuit, for example, rejected an award of merely nominal damages to a
juvenile who was unlawfully placed in solitary confinement, and held that the plaintiff was entitled to compensatory
damages.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Our case law requires no more to establish proximate causation. In Crowe v. Cnty. of San Diego, for example, we
found police officers to be the proximate cause of a Miranda violation, even though they did not commit the
ultimate act that completed the constitutional violation.
608 F.3d 406, 43031 (9th Cir. 2010). We held that liability for a constitutional violation requires only that the
defendant set[] in motion a series of acts by others which the [defendant] knows or reasonably should know would
cause others to inflict the constitutional injury. Id. at 430 (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 74344 (9th
Cir.1978)).
Our conclusion is buttressed by our 2007 holding in Inouye, in which we concluded that a parolees right to be free
from coerced participation in a religious treatment program was a matter of uncommonly well-settled case law
that was enough for us to hold that the law was clearly established, sufficient to give notice to a reasonable parole
officer, in 2001. 504 F.3d at 716. Inouye leaves little room for Westcare to argue that constitutional injuries of the
sort suffered by Hazle were not a foreseeable result of its actions.
END QUOTE
p12
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http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/law-order/individuals-wanted-by-police/story-fni0fee21226706923074
QUOTE
Insp Mutton said if people didn't voluntarily hand themselves in, they would soon be caught.
"They should take this course of action because they don't want us to be seizing their car during the school run or
being locked up on a Saturday and have to wait in custody to plead their case in court on the Monday.
"Operation Surrender is about education and giving people the opportunity to make the right choice and deal with
their problem, before they get caught by another means."
END QUOTE
While Brendan Facey might be acting as a glorified debt collector for the State Government in the
function as Sheriff, he too may just discover this to become his very expensive personal lesson. I
requested in the past to seize and desist but to no avail. From his own writings, he (Brendan Facey) is
well aware that as a CONSTITUTIONALIST I rely upon my constitutional rights and if he simply
assumes whatever to disregard to act appropriately and you are going to assist him with this, then you
both as well as others involved should learn the legal consequences of this.
I pointed out in the past, that in my view the police has no legal authority to obstruct a motorist in
his/her freedom of movement merely for the Sheriff to check if there is an outstanding warrant. if
nevertheless you and any other police officer persist in roadblocks for such unlawful conduct then
suffer the legal consequences.
If you were honest to your oath as a police officer then I view you will immediately take appropriate
action to ensure that you and other police officers are not acting unlawfully by seeking to enforce
warrants that were never validly issued in the first place.
.
My 4-9-2013 correspondence to Brendan Facey, Sheriff, list the webaddresses of most relevant
documents and so as I forwarded you a copy via the Victorian Police at Heidelberg, then you can
always check it out.
The above questions may just show that the courts do hold state employees themselves personally
liable where they act against a persons constitutional rights.
.
On 19 July 2006 I comprehensively defeated the Commonwealth in the County Court of Victoria on
the issue of compulsory voting because again as a CONSTITUTIONALIST I happen to be more aware
what is constitutionally permissible and applicable. As the government lawyers discovered over a 5
year litigation period.
You may elect to disregard the provisions and limitations of the constitution and persist in enforcing
warrants but then suffer the legal consequences of this also!
Way back in 1988, when the Victorian Police executed a warrant upon my 2 year old daughter, I then
challenged the validity in the Supreme Court of Victoria, and the Supreme Court of Victoria then held
the warrant was without legal force, and ordered my daughter to be returned to me. My daughter has
the record of having been arrested at age 2 years old!
I am pursuing a class action against those perpetrators who seek and do enforce purported warrants of
the purported Infringement Courts.
.
Perhaps it might be you worth while to check out my writings, as for sure if you conduct caused people
to now agree to make payments which legally they do not have to where the warrants are without legal
force, then each and every such person may very well participate in a class action to sue so to say the
pants of you. In my view the Police should have absolutely nothing to do with interfering with a
persons legal rights not to concede to make payments in regard of unconstitutional/unlawful warrants.
\
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indeed, I find it objectionable that the Sheriffs office is using its powers to portray acting lawfully
where I view they are not.
.
You got yourself a job because The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK)
facilitate within s106 of the constitution subject to this constitution for the States to exist, and so its
police force! The meaning of a police force is to maintain law and order, and not to become
extortionist or terrorist, by willing to imprison people regardless of the invalidity of the warrants.
It is not my concern if you are or are not aware of certain warrants being invalid (without legal force)
as the Chief Commissioner of Police must be held accountable for if he failed to pass this on to you
and other police officers.
.
Some 25 years ago the Victorian Police declared my motor vehicle unroadworthy, regarding alleged
bold tyres, etc, this after I spoke up against Flemmington Police officers that they had no legal right to
question my passenger merely because he was a coloured person. so, the police retaliated with
declaring my vehicle to be unroadworthy, such as bold tyres, the day after i had new tyres fitted! That
Infringement Notice was then withdrawn by the Sergeant, within the hour, after he inspected my
vehicle and saw the vehicle was fitted with brand new tyres, and found no defect with the vehicle at
all! The then Chief Commissioner of Police made known that the officers concerned were send on a
training course how to do a roadworthy. It should be clear,I was all along parked, and not driving my
vehicle, and was merely retribution by the police officers for challenging their rights to unlawfully
question so to say a foreigner,because he was black,who did no more but was seated in my parked
vehicle on an estate,while I was seated in the drivers seat, without the keys in the ignition, because we
were waiting for my kids.!
If indeed I am right, as I maintain I am, and so far I am as no court of competent jurisdiction has ruled
against my constitutional claims, then all and any Infringement Notices/Infringement Court
orders/warrants are and remain to be invalid, and so every police official and other person nevertheless
persisting in enforcing fine payments/court orders/ warrants then take it upon themselves to be sued
personally.
.
The Attorney-General is well aware of my writings and yet never bothered to address the issues even
so I view he ought to have done so. As such, you may also question why on earth you and other police
officers were left in a lurch to enforce warrants the Attorney-General knew or ought to have known
were without legal force.
Likewise, I reported the matter to the Chief Magistrate, and as the documents are already available on
my blog there is no need for me to repeat it all again, safe to say that those who have a DUTY OF
CARE to act appropriately and fail to do so and by this allow harm to come to myself or any other
person must accept the legal consequences.
.
I suspect no one ever pursued matters in such extensive details as I did but then again I am about
DEMOCRACY and the assurance of citizens that we are government within the framework of the
constitution and not despite of it.
.
Your choice is to join those upstanding citizens and pursue the proper enforcement of the law or go
along with any criminal activity, regardless how unconstitutional and suffer the legal con sequences of
it.
.
As I discovered decades ago, the police would attend to a nursing home where a former Justice of the
Peace, suffering Alzheimers, was cared for and had her signing warrants. the son, himself already a
senior citizen explained to me that the police kept pestering his mother to sign warrants even so she
\
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was no longer a Justice of the Peace and she had no mental ability to understand what she was signing
for. So, before you rely upon any warrant you may just do better to check out its validity.
.
last year, I attended to a Magistrates Court with a friend who was subjected to a warrant. the Clerk
insisted it was valid and that he could do nothing about it. later it was discovered that in fact the
warrant was issued in an administrative way by the clerk in error that he assumed the warrant related to
a tribunal for registration where in fact months later he discovered that it related mainly to a Supreme
Court of Victoria order to which he had no legal powers. Still he did nothing about it and the sheriff
officers enforce the warrant, this regardless of that it was made known to them of its invalidity!
http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/law-order/individuals-wanted-by-police/story-fni0fee21226706923074
QUOTE
."If we can start clearing up some of these fines, I'm sure it's going to have a knock-on effect
with other crime."
END QUOTE
In my view, to use the term other crimes implies that you accuse persons against whom a warrant
was issued already committed a criminal act. If therefore it turns out that the very warrants you rely
upon were in fact without legal validity and to the purported litigation it relies upon, then you have
condemned citizens as criminals nevertheless!
I do not know nor desire to discover what your salary is but I assume most people are struggling to
make ends meet, and so will not have $10,000 or so around in a drawer. hence, to forge them to pay
something that may be without legal force to me itself may be an act of terrorism and extortion, where
this is under the thread of possible imprisonment, impounding a car, etc.
.
I my case the police alleges by way of Infringement Notice that I exceeded the speed limit by 5
kilometres an hour,. That is the only issue on foot. I challenged this from onset. If you then would be
willing to so to say arrest me, if I happen to be pulled over and the warrant were to be relied upon,
despite my numerous objections to the validity of the warrant, then perhaps a mental asylum may be
more fitting for you as hardly can this kind of conduct to say imprison me be warranted.
As the Framers of the constitution embedded in the constitution as a legal principle that there must be a
judicial decision AFTER both parties have been heard.
.
At no time did I receive a summons to attend to court! A Registrar cannot be the head of the Court, and
so the infringement Registrar cannot validly issue orders/warrants without supervision of a judge. I
challenged the Infringement Registrars orders and he refused this, despite that the High Court of
Australia
in
Harris
v
Caladine
made
clear
that
a
Registrars decision must always be reviewable as otherwise it is unconstitutional. also the
Infringement Court cannot be part of the Magistrates Court of Victoria, because the latter just be an
open court as a Chapter III court of the constitution, the Infringement Court is not an open court.
And on and on it goes. As such the infringement Court can not be a valid court and so neither issue
valid court orders/warrants and fool you if you fall for this rot. worse is the denial, as I view it, to the
police officers serving under your command which may rely upon you being aware of the legal
technicalities for them to act. And, even worse for the victims of those warrants, like the parents
driving their kids to school and being terrorised by their motor vehicle being impounded and their
children witnessing this then perceiving the police to be the terrorist rather then who they should have
respect for.
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Police cannot demand respect, they must earn the respect, and many are doing a very good job but
regrettably many also do not. Your job, as I view it is to ensure that officers under your command can
rely upon your judgment and competence to know what is legally appropriate.
Well, you now have an opportunity to check out details!
.
This correspondence is not intended and neither must be perceived to set out all issues and or details and
neither has anything been stated in order of priority.
Awaiting your response, G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Friends call me Gerrit)
MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL

.
Our name is our motto!)
END 130905-COMPLAINT Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Inspector Stephen Mutton-CONSTITUTIONAL issues etc
The meaning of court of law in legal terms is where anyone is equal and where anyone can seek
legal relief when deemed to be aggrieved.
The Infringement Court which purports to be part of the magistrates Court of Victoria clearly is not
such a court, as it only allows an enforcement agency listed in appendix 2
(2013_14_report_infringements_sys) to institute litigation. Further, principle errors that are in the
Infringement Court system are that for example it causes a fine before conviction (violates the Act
Interpretation Act 1980 provisions), it denies the right of a review without time limit as referred
previously to His Honour Kay J Family Court of Australia Abbott v Abbott (1994), it requires an
accused to consent/apply to litigation which implies a consent by the accused to litigate denied the
right of a accused not consent to litigation, as I time and again proved where I OBJECTED TO THE
JURISDICTION of any court (including the Infringement Court) to hear and determine matters. It
must be clear that where a Notice is invalid in law then no legal sanction can be enforced against the
accused.
QUOTE 2013_14_report_infringements_sys
the option to elect to have an infringeable offence heard and determined by the Magistrate
Court 1
END QUOTE 2013_14_report_infringements_sys
Yet, the Infringement Act 2006 nevertheless limits the option of an accused wrongly accused to pay a
fine stated in the notice or to elect to go to court. Why on earth would an innocent person rather than
the accuser have to decide to go to court?
the right for a person to have an infringement notice reviewed by the issuing agency where
there may have been a mistake of law or identity, or where special or exceptional
circumstances may apply (refer to footnote 1 for exceptions).
Not only is there an alleged process for the enforcement agency to review it but also for the
Infringement Registrar to review the order issued yet, both are placing burdens upon the accused and
not upon the enforcement agency As such a shift from Innocent until proven guilty.
QUOTE 20140205-G. H .Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Mr Tony Abbott PM- Re Metrology National Measurement Institute
Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research -etc
THE QUEEN v. DAVISON [1954] HCA 46; (1954) 90 CLR 353
QUOTE
4. It appears from the facts stated in the special case that in spite of its form, the order was made by the deputy registrar and
not by the court or judge or under the actual authority of the court or judge. The circumstance that Mr. Hartstein was a
\
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deputy-registrar and not the registrar of the district is of no importance. Section 12(2) says that in each district there shall be
a district registrar and such deputy registrars, official receivers and other officers as are necessary. Sub-section (6) of s. 12
says that the Attorney-General may by order direct that any specified deputy registrar shall have and exercise any or all of
the powers and functions of a registrar. The Attorney-General made an order which though it did not exactly follow the
words of the sub-section may be taken to have conferred on Mr. Hartstein the powers and functions of a registrar. It must
not be supposed, however, that the registrar or the deputy-registrar are officers of the Federal Court of Bankruptcy or form
part of the staff or organization of the court. In its first form sub-s. (5) of s. 12 did provide that the registrars and deputy
registrars should be officers of the court and should have such duties as the Attorney-General directed or as were
prescribed. The expression "the Court" was defined to mean any court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy or a judge thereof:
s. 4. An attempt was made under s. 18 as it then stood to confer jurisdiction in bankruptcy on a number of courts of the
States. In Le Mesurier v. Connor (1929) 42 CLR 481 , it was held in this Court that s. 77(iii) of the Constitution does not
enable the Parliament to make a commonwealth officer a functionary of a state court and to authorize him to act on its
behalf and administer part of its jurisdiction and that s. 51 (xxxix) does not authorize the reconstitution of a state court
invested with federal jurisdiction under s. 77(iii) or of the organization through which its powers and jurisdiction are
exercised. Accordingly s. 12(5) and ss. 23 and 24 as they then stood, were held ultra vires and void
END QUOTE
Therefore all and any orders/warrants issued by the Registrar of the Infringement Court I maintain are
without legal force and so ULTRA VIRES. It also means that police officers assisting the Sheriff
Office to stop and retain motor vehicle drivers for purpose of those unconstitutional orders/warrants to
be enforced in my view is aiding and abetting and a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice, etc.
END QUOTE 20140205-G. H .Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Mr Tony Abbott PM- Re Metrology National Measurement
Institute Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research -etc
There are various parts commencing with section 18 of the National Measurements Act 1960 (as
amended) which makes it an offence to use measuring instruments in the manner that appears to me
the Victorian Police is using it.
20140205-G. H .Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Mr Tony Abbott PM- Re Metrology National
Measurement Institute Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research -etc
While payment of a fine is not deemed an admission of guilt, the fact remains that for example with
VicRoads it applies a penalty such as demerit points against as persons license and can cause a person
to lose his drivers license, by this being prevented from driving his motor vehicle, and in case of an
owner operator truck driver this could result in losing earning ability and so paying any truck
mortgage and by this lose his ability to live his normal live and provide for his family, regardless that
the notice might have been wrongly issued. Yet, a person who own a vehicle but doesnt drive the
vehicle has no such legal consequences. Akls9o, while the enforcement agencies are permitted to
issue Infringement Notices for whatever idiotic purpose in real the same doesnt apply where it is the
enforcement agency that is at fault. Those who issue the invalid Infringement Notices have no equal
retributions/legal accountability for this as they may inflict upon an innocent accused person. The
Infringment act 2006 is therefore not a legislation that can be considered to be where all
persons/parties before the court are equal because it places the accused in severe disadvantage while
the accuser (prosecutor) generally has no legal accountability. As I indicated in my original request, I
discovered that the police officer had after having issued the Infringement Notice some time
afterwards ALTERED THE DETAILS OF THE COPY OF THE INFRINGMENT NOTICE
FILED WITH THE Perin Court (as it then was known), without notifying the accused.
As such, the Infringement Act 2006 permits the Infringement Registrar to issue a court order not
upon what the accused may be advised about but what may be placed before the Infringement Court by
an enforcement agency. As such, when an accused may seek a review against the issue of an
Infringement Notice, the person to review it may have a different version of an Infringement Notice
before him/her then what the accused refers to and so may dismiss the complainant on this basis, even
so the reviewer might be unaware that the version of the copy of the Infringement Notice he/she relies
upon is not at all the correct version as issued by the enforcement agency against the accused.
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Likewise the Infringement registrar might be misled by this kind of process. Clearly the system doesnt
allow the accused to know what actually was placed before the Infringement Registrar, and by this
undermines the ability of any aggrieved person to have his/her complaint appropriately reviewed.
It also must be noted that the Infringement Court despite using the heading MAGISTRATES COURT
OF VICTORIA is not or appears not to be part of the MAGISTRATES COURT OF VICTORIA.
Moving the Infringements Court counter enquiries to Civic Compliance Victoria
Early in 2013-14, the enquiries counter of the Infringements Court moved to Civic Compliance
Victoria (CCV). Previously customers who attended CCV with an enquiry that required an
Infringements Court registrars determination had to be referred to the Infringements Court at a
separate location in the city. The collocation of the Infringements Court and Civic Compliance
Victoria provide a one-stop-shop for the public to enquire about their fines, leading to improved
efficiency and reduced waiting times for customers.

As a trademark holder I am well aware that owning a trademark is not in itself a license to trade under
the trademark as there are legal provisions that must be complied with. Civic Compliance Victoria is
as I understand it a trademark owned by the State of Victoria and is in itself not a registered business.
To operate as a registered business (including for the collection of fine payments) it therefore must be
registered as a business and have a registered business bank account. My research indicates that Civic
Compliance Vic and Not at all Civic Compliance Victoria is the business account with Westpac. It
may appear to be the same but it is not and most people are aware about Julia Gillard and the purported
trade union account that wasnt a trade union account at all but one allegedly her boyfriend used for
private purposes. Hence it is imperative that any trading bank account is correct in details to the
trading business.
Obviously as I referred to previously, the Governor of the State of Victoria has been limited to appoint
judges to a impartial administration of justice and to associate in anyway at all the Infringement
Court with the Magistrates Court of Victoria undermines the legal status of the Magistrates Court of
Victoria to be impartial and as such the court itself legal validity is in question. This also where
Victoria (CCV) where the enquiry itself now is taken out of the Court facilities. As we saw with the
Family Court of Australia at Melbourne, it was at 570 Bourke Street, Melbourne for many years. The
building was not itself a court building but was having certain levels occupied by the court. While
private corporations also occupied part of the building. There is absolutely nothing wrong with a court
being situated in a privately owned building provided that its court business is not mixed with private
business activities. Civic Compliance Victoria is not a court business but is privately run by Tenix
Solutions IMES Pty Ltd purportedly by a deed of assignment, singed then by the Attorney-General
and the Police Minister, this even so neither one or combined had the legal powers to engage in such
deed, because the State has no powers to interfere with the administration of justice. The deed purports
that Tenix Solutions IMES Pty Ltd (as I understand it to be) to operate the Infringement system
and access court facilities, including using its computers to issue court orders! In fact I understand it
manage also the issue of correspondences under the heading of the Sheriffs Office, the Victorian
Police and VicRoads to mention a few.
Infringement Notices generally refer to payments to be made to Civic Compliance Victoria but the
payments are actually made to Civic Compliance Vic when the Westpac bank account is used. And
also payments are at times to be made to the enforcement agency and this clearly poses a problem.
This, as where it relates to an alleged offence against State legislation then any alleged fines (not
conceding the system is appropriate and/or valid) should be made payable to the Consolidated
Revenue Funds.
\
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What we now have is that while former Premier Dennis Napthine claimed that Infringement Notices
are a form of taxation there are now more than 120 enforcement agencies all applying taxation.
In my view the move of the Infringement Registrars office into Civic Compliance Victoria underlines
the corruption of the system and it is in name purportedly a court but in real it is not.
Alternatively if the Government were to claim that the area hired at this address is part of the
Magistrates Court of Victoria precinct then Civic Compliance Victoria being owned as a tradename
by the State of Victoria has no business to operate within the court precinct. The very meaning of an
impartial administration of justice is that the State Government must not in any way have any special
position but that the court is impartial. This clearly is not shown if the Magistrates Court of Victoria
through the Infringement Court is using the States owned trademark Civic Compliance Victoria
within the Court precinct. Yet, as I understand it despite of the above the Court orders payments to be
made to Civic Compliance Victoria into its Westpac account Civic Compliance Vic and by this
align itself with the State Government to defraud taxpayers of any monies that should be paid into
Consolidated Revenue Funds.
QUOTE 110920-Mr Robert Clark Attorney-General - STATUS QUO- COMPLAINT - DETAILS REQUESTED - etc
there is more to this as while the Sheriffs Office or what purports to be the Sheriffs office state to
provide 43 days the legislation as reproduced below refers to 28 days. What this means is that when
the Infringement Notice Order is issued then automatically after a 28 day period has passed a
WARRANT must be issued even so the accused has set in motion a court process to have the decline
of the revocation order (of 27 July 2011) to be overruled.
It means that a person like myself awaiting a trial to hear and determine matters, and obviously first of
all a jurisdiction hearing to determine if the court has any jurisdiction at all to enforce the purported
Infringement Act 2006 provisions the Civil Compliance Victoria private company (Tenix or whom
else may be involved) disregard the RULE OF LAW and simply pursues the warrant enforcement.
So now we have a private company which determines what, if any JUSTICE a person may be
provided with.
We now have that in the end a court may find that indeed there is no jurisdiction as it may find that
indeed the legislation or part thereof is unconstitutional and yet in the meantime a private company
operating under the Victorian government trademark Civil Compliance Victoria can nevertheless in the
meantime inflict any harm no matter how uncalled for and even have a Sheriff break in and arrest me
and not a single legal provision in the purported Infringement Act 2006 exist to protect any innocent
person against such abuse of power.
It means that the Sheriff Office can have my driver licence suspended, my motor vehicle registration
cancelled or have the vehicle deregistered and this even so I am awaiting for a trial date for the Court
to hear and determine matters.
.
This is utterly terrorism of a kind that only morons could get involved with to pursue and disregard
entirely the right of any person to be deemed innocent until proven guilty by proper legal procedures.
I do not accept that Civil Compliance Victoria a private company who earns moneys from what it is
doing could be deemed to be competent to deal with warrant issues or for that any orders at all.
.
Unless a entity is a public entity it cannot be involved in issuing orders as the courts only can operate
as an IMPARTIAL JUDICIARY and clearly where this purported legislation states that a
Infringement Registrar must issue a warrant then the Court no longer can be deemed to be impartial
as all it does is so to say bow to its political masters and perhaps so as to secure their own future
employment.
.
QUOTE
80.Issue of infringement warrants
p19
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(1) An infringements registrar must issue an infringement warrant against a person to whom an enforcement
order notice is sent (including a director to whom a declaration under section 91 applies) if the person for a
period of more than 28 days
(a) defaults in the payment of the outstanding amount of the fine; or
(b) in the case of a natural person other than a director to whom a declaration under section 91 applies,
defaults in the payment of a payment under a payment order.
(2) An infringements registrar who issues an infringement warrant against a natural person, including a
director to whom a declaration under section 91 applies, may endorse the warrant with a direction that the
person arrested must be released on bail as specified in the endorsement.
(3) An endorsement under sub-section (2) must fix the amounts in which the principal and the sureties, if any,
are to be bound and the amount of any money or the value of any security to be deposited.
END QUOTE
.
As set out below the Imperial Acts Application Act 1980 provides also for;
QUOTE
12.
And several grants and promises made of fines and forfeitures, before any conviction or
judgement against the persons, upon whom the same were to be levied.
END QUOTE
.
Yet, what we now have is that the word fine is clearly used in the purported Infringement Act 2006
QUOTE
(a)
END QUOTE
defaults in the payment of the outstanding amount of the fine;
http://www.magistratescourt.vic.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/Magistrates+Court/Home/Fines+and+Penalties/
QUOTE
Fines and Penalties
What is a fine?
A fine is a monetary penalty that can be imposed by a magistrate. The Sentencing Act 1991
defines fine as:
'the sum of money payable by an offender under an order of a court made on the
offender being convicted or found guilty of an offence and includes costs but does not
include money payable by way of restitution or compensation or any costs of or
incidental to an application for restitution or compensation payable by an offender under
an order of a court.' (Section 3, Sentencing Act 1991).
As a part of an order in relation to a fine, a magistrate may also impose other monetary
penalties, such as ordering an offender to pay compensation or costs.
END QUOTE
.
It therefore must be clear that there appears to be a conflict of provisions that a fine is to be dealt with
by a magistrate but on the other hand Civil Compliance Victoria a private company run entity can now
impose fines a and warrants and have the Sheriff doing whatever, including arresting a person totally
uncontrolled.
END QUOTE 110920-Mr Robert Clark Attorney-General - STATUS QUO- COMPLAINT - DETAILS REQUESTED - etc
In my case I did set out to immediately request details and those have not been forthcoming at all and
so prevented me to even make any informed decision if I can or cannot challenge the allegation made
against me. It may very well, as occurs at times, that the alleged incident may not at all relate to me
and yet no evidence was presented to me that indeed I was involved in the incident as claimed by the
Infringement Notice. Not uncommon numberplates turn out to be incorrectly read or other problems
turn up that mistakes were made as to the identification of the driver. Indeed, the police themselves
have hundreds of cases where they allegedly cannot even identify who were driving police vehicles
that were allegedly speeding and so if they cannot even identify their own drivers, despite that police
\
p20
12-12-2015
vehicles are issued against a certain person who has to sign for it. Then how can they do better with
dealing with a member of the general public I may very well ask?
.
QUOTE
24. Review by enforcement agency
(1) If an enforcement agency receives an application for review under section 22, the enforcement agency
must
(a) review the decision to serve an infringement notice on the person; and
(b)
suspend any procedures that are being used for the enforcement of the infringement penalty in
respect of the infringement offence until
(i) the review is complete; and
(ii) the applicant is sent advice of the outcome.
(2) An enforcement agency must ensure that a review under this section is conducted by a person who was not
involved in making the decision to serve the infringement notice which is the subject of the review.
(3) An enforcement agency must review a decision and advise the applicant of the outcome of the review
(a) within the prescribed time; or
(b) if an enforcement agency requests additional information under section 23, within the period of the
time prescribed for the purposes of paragraph (a) plus 21 days, whether or not the additional
information was received by the agency.
(4) If an enforcement agency fails to comply with sub-section (3), the infringement notice is deemed to be
withdrawn.
(5) Nothing in this section limits the power of an enforcement agency to review a decision to serve an
infringement notice on any other basis.
END QUOTE
.
As I indicated in previous correspondence to the Premier Ted Baillieu and copies of the same were
forwarded to Civil Compliance Victoria, the police and the Magistrates Court of Victoria that while I
had a review on foot the Police simply ignored this and notified me that I had 1 demerit point against
my licence regarding the issue in dispute.
As such besides that I have challenged the validity of the purported Infringement Act 2006 the police
themselves proved they cannot care less and do not give a cahoot as to what may be required or not as
their notification of the 1 Demerit point regarding the alleged speeding was dated 19 July 2011 while
the decline of the review was dated 27 July 2011:
QUOTE
Your application for revocation has been refused, as the Infringements Registrar is not satisfied that there are
sufficient "rounds to revoke/cancel the order. The amount of $243.90 must be paid to this office by 7 Sep 11 or a
warrant may be issued.
If you do not agree with the Infringements Registrar's decision in this matter, you may elect to object and have
your Application for Revocation heard by a Magistrate in open court. You will be required to attend the
hearing.
If you wish to object, you must do so in writing. Your written objection, quoting the Infringements Court Case
Number, must be received by the Infringements Registrar within 42 days of the date of this letter.
The Infringements Registrar does not have the power to reconsider your application as this can only be done by a
Magistrate in open court.
END QUOTE
.
Now let us count 42 days, considering that the 27 July date is not to be counted as a day is counted
from midnight of the day the order was made till the next day midnight and so on. Therefore we will
achieve that day 43 being on 8 September 2011 is the date when the 42 days have expired.
27 July 2011 - day 0
11 August 2001 day 15
p21
12-12-2015
28 July 2001 - day 1

29 July 2001 - day 2
30 July 2001 - day 3
31 July 2001 - day 4
1 August 2001 - day 5
1 September 2001 day 36
7 August 2001 day11
8 August 2001 day12
9 August 2001 day13
10 August 2001 day14
.
In regard of this 27 July 2011 Infringement Notice Order I have records (and also acknowledge of
document by Civil Compliance Victoria and so it cannot be claimed the documents were not received)
of the following document having been forwarded regarding the Infringement matter:
110810-Magistrates Court of Victoria -No 1158210495
.
110828-Magistrates Court of Victoria -No 1158210495

110830-Magistrates Court of Victoria -No 1158210495-etc (21 pages)
(Including ADDRESS TO THE COURT COMPLAINT - ETC)
110906-Ted Baillieu Premier -No 1158210495-etc
Therefore it must be clear that the legal processes should have been for the Magistrates Court of
Victoria first to address the issue if it could invoke jurisdiction or not.
Below a email confirmation from the Magistrates Court of Victoria proving it had received the
document then referred to.
QUOTE
Re: see attachment 110828-Magistrates Court of Victoria -No 1158210495

1 recipients
CC: recipientsYou More
FROM:
help@magistratescourt.vic.gov.au
TO:
Mr Gerrit H. Schorel-Hlavka
Monday, 29 August 2011 10:15 AM
Message Body
Dear Mr Schorel-Hlavka
Thank you for your email.
Your email has been forwarded to the Chief Magistrate.
Many thanks
help@magistratescourt.vic.gov.au
\
p22
12-12-2015
"Mr Gerrit H. Schorel-Hlavka"

<inspector_rikati@yahoo.com.au>
To "help@magistratescourt.vic.gov.au" <help@magistratescourt.vic.gov.au>
cc "Gerrit H." <inspector_rikati@yahoo.com.au>,
"heidelberg.uni@police.vic.gov.au" <heidelberg.uni@police.vic.gov.au>,
"traffic_inquiries@tenixsolutions.com" <traffic_inquiries@tenixsolutions.com>,
"ted.baillieu@parliament.vic.gov.au" <ted.baillieu@parliament.vic.gov.au>
28/08/2011 01:24
Please respond to
"Mr Gerrit H. Schorel-Hlavka"
<inspector_rikati@yahoo.com.au>
Subject see attachment 110828-Magistrates Court of Victoria -No 1158210495
END QUOTE
Just in case there is a question as to if Civil Compliance Victoria was included I will quote a part
of a correspondence:
QUOTE 110828 CORRESPONDENCE
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Mr Grey Chief Magistrate, Magistrates Court of Victoria
Ground Floor, 277 William Street
Melbourne Vic 3000
30-8-2011
C/o help@magistratescourt.vic.gov.au
Cc:
Acting Chief Commissioner of the Victorian Police C/o heidelberg.uni@police.vic.gov.au
C/o Victoria Police Centre, G.P.O Box 913, Melbourne, VIC, 3001, AUSTRALIA
Civic Compliance Victoria GPO Box 1916, Melbourne VIC 3001 Traffic_Inquiries@tenixsolutions.com
Ted Baillieu Premier of Victoria
ted.baillieu@parliament.vic.gov.au
Ref: Infringement Court case Number 1158210495
Infringement Notice Number 0201683566
ADDRESS TO THE COURT COMPLAINT - ETC

Sir,
END QUOTE 110828 CORRESPONDENCE
.
Do notice:
QUOTE
* Civic Compliance Victoria GPO Box 1916, Melbourne VIC 3001 Traffic_Inquiries@tenixsolutions.com
END QUOTE
QUOTE 110530 confirmation received email
From: TS TRAFFIC Inquiries <Traffic_Inquiries@tenixsolutions.com>
[ add to contacts ]
To: mayJUSTICEalwaysPREVAIL@schorel-hlavka.com
Cc:
Date: Monday, May 30, 2011 11:23 pm
Subject: RE: Your Infringement notice request
Attachments: Text version of this message. (1KB)
Dear Sir/Madam,
Thank you for your email regarding an infringement notice.
If you are appealing an infringement notice or seeking an extension of
time, please ensure that you have provided either the infringement
number and/or vehicle registration number and a postal address for
prompt reply.
Please note that your correspondence cannot be assessed without
provision of these details, as the response can only be mailed to your
postal address.
\
p23
12-12-2015
If you have any enquiries, please do not hesitate to contact this office
on 03 9200 8206.
Yours faithfully,
Tenix Solutions Parking Services
Disclaimer: The information transmitted is intended only for the person or
entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged
material. Any review, retransmission, dissemination or other use of, or taking
of any action in reliance upon, this information by persons or entities other
than the intended recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, please
contact the sender and delete the material from your computer. For a copy of our
privacy policy please visit our website or contact us.
END QUOTE 110530 confirmation received email

.
This is just one of the many emails received but even if they had not received my emails with
attachments then as they were also forwarded to the Police then the Police had the onus to pas on the
content to the Infringement Registrar to ensure that any decision that was to be made was upon all
relevant details and not just a deliberate concealment of details that the police didnt want the
Infringement Registrar to know about.
Again the purported Infringement Act 2006 doesnt provide in that regard any protection for an
accused and so police can scheme and conceal relevant details time and time again to ensure to score
conviction, and this is called JUSTICE? Come on only a moron would consider this concealment to
be JUSTICE in progress.
Those who take offence to my strong expressions better get a grip on themselves because those people
who have been terrorised by this kind of conduct and may have lost not just their driver licence but
also their home, etc, as result would more then likely view I am too kind to the mentally impaired
person who cannot understand and comprehend that JUSTICE is not what they deem to fabricate from
it but is what is ordinary accepted by the general community to reflect the workings of a democratic
system ina democratic society.
.

RE: Your Infringement notice request
1 recipientsCC: recipientsYou MoreHide Details FROM:TS TRAFFIC Inquiries TO:Mr Gerrit H. Schorel-Hlavka
Message flagged Wednesday, 10 August 2011 7:01 PMMessage BodyDear Sir/Madam,
prompt reply.
postal address.
on 03 9200 8206.
Yours faithfully,
\
p24
12-12-2015
Message flagged Sunday, 28 August 2011 1:24 AMMessage BodyDear Sir/Madam,
prompt reply.
postal address.
on 03 9200 8206.
Yours faithfully,
The following one was in regard of the ADDRESS TO THE COURT for the expected court
hearing, just that Civil Compliance Victoria decided to just issue the WARRANT themselves
and why waste monies on a court? So, why have a Chief Magistrate if he cannot even control
legal matters governing the magistrates Court of victoria?
Message flagged Tuesday, 30 August 2011 7:08 PMMessage BodyDear Sir/Madam,
prompt reply.
postal address.
on 03 9200 8206.
Yours faithfully,
\
p25
12-12-2015

privacy policy please visit our website or contact us.Delete ReplyReply ForwardSpamMovePrint Actions
NextPrevious
Message flagged Thursday, 8 September 2011 6:53 PMMessage BodyDear Sir/Madam,
prompt reply.
postal address.
on 03 9200 8206.
Yours faithfully,
.
There are others as well but safe to state that clearly emails were forwarded to the Victorian Police,
Premier Ted Baillieu, who after all is as I view it the leader of this government sponsored terrorism,
QUOTE
30. Person may elect to have matter heard and determined in Court
(1) A person who has been served with a penalty reminder notice may elect to have the matter of the
infringement offence heard and determined in Court.
(2) If a person elects to have the matter of the infringement offence heard and determined in Court, the
person must
(a) make a written statement to the effect that the person has elected to have the matter of the
infringement offence heard and determined in Court; and
(b) serve that written statement on the enforcement agency specified in the penalty reminder notice
within 28 days after the penalty reminder notice was served on the person.
\
p26
12-12-2015
QUOTE
.
Actually even if a person do not elect to go to court, opposing the JURISDICTION of the court then
the police cannot proceed with the matter any further because all litigation comes to a halt when there
is a challenge to the validity of the legislation and any court to invoke jurisdiction in that regard.
When a police officer comes to a persons property and demanding access then a resident doesnt have
to go first to go to a court to get an injunction against the police officer but merely can orally deny any
access to enter the property and the Police officer will be trespassing if he disregard the oral
prohibition (or written prohibition of any signage).
As such it is the perpetrator that must seek the courts sanction for a warrant to go against a persons
rights.
Therefore if the police alleges I was committing an offence then it cannot unilaterally enforce it but
must seek an adjudication from a competent court of jurisdiction! This never eventuated because as I
am a CONSTITUTIONALIST and immediately referred to the Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act 1900 (UK) then effectively this became then a federal issues and prohibits any in
chambers decision but must be conducted in an open court!
.
Act Interpretation Act 1901; (Cth)

15A Construction of Acts to be subject to Constitution
QUOTE
Every Act shall be read and construed subject to the Constitution, and so as not to exceed the legislative power of
the Commonwealth, to the intent that where any enactment thereof would, but for this section, have been construed
as being in excess of that power, it shall nevertheless be a valid enactment to the extent to which it is not in excess of
that power.
END QUOTE
.
I did refer to the Federal powers such as to measurements, etc, and so invoked by this also federal
powers. I am not aware which joker was to accept that some private company under the usage of the
civil compliance Victoria trademark can somehow then operate as some KANGAROO COURT and
STAR CHAMBER COURT exercising federal jurisdiction!
The High Court of Australia held that where a party pleads the non-application of a State Act
because of Commonwealth legislation then the State Court is exercising Federal jurisdiction.
(However only if the State Court can invoke jurisdiction, which VCAT cannot and neither is a court!)
Troy v Wrigglesworth (1919) 26 C.L.R. 305; 25 (1926) 38 C.L.R. 441; 33 A.L.R. 66.
.
Held by the High Court of Australia that the expression Court or judge of a State does not include
a Judge sitting in Chambers exercising the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Wilcox v Donohoe,
(1905) 3 C.L.R. 83; 12 A.L.R. 54.
.
Held by the High Court of Australia that the federal jurisdiction which is conferred on a State Court by
the section is subject to any limitations imposed by the laws of the State upon its state jurisdiction,
unless otherwise expressly declared. Federated Saw-mill Timberyard and General Woodworkers
Employees Association v Alexander, (1912) 15 C.L.R. 308; 19 A.L.R. 22.
.
Held by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland that the police magistrate exercising
Federal jurisdiction is not an officer of a Federal Court within the meaning of this paragraph
(Section 39 of the Judicial Act 1903) R. v. Archdall and Others; Ex parte Taylor, 1919 St. R. Qld 207;
13 Q.J.P.R. 22 C.L.R. 437 in which the High Court (Isaacs, Higgins, Gavan Duffy and Ricch JJ ;
Griffith CJ and Barton J dissenting) held that a Judge of an inferior Court of a State invested with and
purporting to exercise Federal jurisdiction is not an officer of the Commonwealth within the meaning
of s. 75 (v) of the Constitution.
.
\
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Held by the High Court of Australia that under this section the Courts of the several States have federal
appellated jurisdiction, as regard the matters enumerated in ss75 and 76 of the Constitution, to the
same extent that, and subject to the same conditions as, under the State laws they have appellated
jurisdiction in matters to which State laws apply. Ah Yick v Lehmert, (1905) 2 C.L.R. 593; 11 A.L.R.
306
.
Held by the High Court of Australia (Williams J.) that under this section 40 of the Judiciary Act 1903
the Attorney-General for the Commonwealth or a State may apply for the removal into the High Court
of a cause or part of a cause whether or not he is a party to the proceedings in which the cause arises,
and if the cause really and substantially arises under the Constitution or involves its interpretation, the
court MUST grant the removal as of right notwithstanding that the matter is apparently concluded
by authority. Any distinct and divisible question may be part of such a cause within the meaning of
this section. In re an Application by the Public Service Association of N.S.W. , (1947) 75 C.L.R. 430
.
Per Evatt J. ; Each question as to the limits inter se is involved where State Legislature is
challenged on the grounds that it contravenes s. 90 of the Constitution. Hopper v Egg and Egg
Pulp Marketing Board (Vic), (1939) 61 C.L.R. 665, at p 681; A.L.R. 249, at p 255
.
Per Evatt J.; Each question of the validity of the Commonwealth legislation in s51 of the
Constitution (and a fortiori in s. 52) necessarily raised a question as to the limits of
Commonwealth and State powers. Ibid at p. 682 C.L.R. and p 255 A.L.R.
.
Held that a State Court exercising federal jurisdiction when it erroneously applies
Commonwealth Act to subject matter before the Court. Commonwealth v Cole, (1923) 32 C.L.R.
602 and Commonwealth v Dalton, (1924) 33 C.L.R.. 452; 30 A.L.R. 85
.
I now intent to file a case into the High Court of Australia and hence a STATUS QUO should be put
in place as I view this madness must be stopped and for this require you to provide me with relevant
details such as the identity of the magistrate who was claimed to have issued (so the Sheriffs Office
claims) a WARRANT against me. The date of the hearing. What, if any, notification was given to me
as to attend to the said hearing, etc.
.
As the Sheriffs office refers to

QUOTE
OUTSTANDING WARRANT $297.70
WARRANT TYPE: Infringement warrant Against a Natural Person
END QUOTE
.
In past correspondence to the premier Mr Ted Baillieu I canvassed extensively numerous matters and
refer to that also.
Basically the Police issued an Infringement Notice upon which I referred to in my 23 February 2011
correspondence and seeking details about the alleged 5 kilometres speeding as well as challenging the
jurisdiction of any court to hear and determine the issue.
It is my view that when the State makes an allegation against a citizen then the appropriate venue to
determine the dispute as who the rights of the parties are the courts.
As the Framers of the Constitution made clear that the States were created within s106 subject to this
constitution and all legal principles embedded in the constitution would apply.
As such, where there is a separation of powers between the Executive (Government), Legislators
(Parliament) and the Judiciary) Courts then any legislation that were enacted in violation of this would
be ULTRA VIRES.
\
p28
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Convention)
QUOTE
Mr. GORDON.-Well, I think not. I am sure that if the honorable member applies his mind to the subject he will
see it is not abstruse. If a statute of either the Federal or the states Parliament be taken into court the court is
bound to give an interpretation according to the strict hyper-refinements of the law. It may be a good law
passed by "the sovereign will of the people," although that latter phrase is a common one which I do not care much
about. The court may say-"It is a good law, but as it technically infringes on the Constitution we will have to
wipe it out." As I have said, the proposal I support retains some remnant of parliamentary sovereignty, leaving it to
the will of Parliament on either side to attack each other's laws.
END QUOTE
.
And as the High Court of Australia made clear in the HCA 27 of 2999 Wakim case that one can ignore
unconstitutional orders and the High Court of Australia previously stated likewise about
unconstitutional legislation.
.
What we now seem to have within the Department of Justice is a culture of blatant ignorance to the
Separation of powers and for example the Courts the Department of Justice (including the DPP) and
entities such as a Prostitution control Commission all sharing the same business registration number.
In my view this violates the separation of powers doctrine and successfully did so on 19 July 2006
before the Supreme Court of Victoria where the court upheld my cases against the Crown (in that case
the Commonwealth) however a s78B NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS was then also
served upon each and every State and Territorial Attorney-General and none challenged me on these
and numerous other constitutional issues I then raised.
For example I then also successfully challenged the validity of the purported Victorian Constitution
Act 1975 and again the then Attorney General Robert Hulls didnt challenge me on this either that as I
claimed was unconstitutional and ULTRA VIRES as it was not approved, and neither had been placed
before the State electors, which is a pre-requisite for any amendment to the state constitution since
federation.
You cannot have the purported Infringement Act 2006 dictating the court (being it the Infringement
Registrar or otherwise) that is consider allegations of an enforcement agency because this would
violate the separation of powers and/or interfere unconstitutionally with the independence of the
judiciary, a a judicial officer must consider details of both parties.
.
Convention),
QUOTE Mr. OCONNER (New South Wales).Because, as has been said before, it is [start page 357] necessary not only that the administration of justice
should be pure and above suspicion, but that it should be beyond the possibility of suspicion;
END QUOTE
.
The problem that we now have is that an enforcement agency can be any private company which has
nothing to do with governing but simply has been allowed to use for example Civil Compliance
Victoria trade mark by the Government.
.
QUOTE
"enforcement agency", in relation to an infringement offence, means
(a) a person or body authorised by or under an Act to take proceedings for the infringement
offence in respect of which the infringement notice or official warning was issued or served;
or
(b)
a person by whom, or body by which, a person or body referred to in paragraph (a) is

employed or engaged to provide services if the taking of the proceedings referred to in that
p29
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paragraph would occur in the course of that employment or in the course of providing those
services; or
(c) a prescribed person or body or person or body which is a member of a prescribed class of
person or body;
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE email 110810

From: Ex Facie <exfacie.com@gmail.com>
To:
Cc:
Date: Wednesday, August 10, 2011 11:07 am
Subject: Response from Dept. of Justice - re CCV and trade marks
Attachments: Text version of this message. (3KB)
Hi all,
I received a second response from the Department of Justice re "Civic Compliance Victoria"/"CCV" and infringement notices. Below
are my questions and responses received (in bold font). The response to my third question is revealing! There may be a bit more
digging of value in this area...
In your previous letter you stated that, Tenix Solutions IMES Pty Ltd, is licensed to use the names CCV and Civic Compliance
Victoria.
1. To confirm, is TENIX SOLUTIONS IMES PTY LTD that you mentioned in your letter the company with the ABN 47 126 390 378?
(Clarification is requested as there is another company registered under the name of TENIX SOLUTIONS PTY LTD, ABN 73 075 154
755, so it is a bit confusing).
Response: Tenix Solutions IMES Pty LTd, with ACN 126 390 378, is the company referred to in my letter of 28 June
2011 and is a separate entity from the company Tenix Solutions Pty Ltd.
2. Does TENIX SOLUTIONS PTY LTD (ABN 73 075 154 755), also have license to use the trade marks CIVIC COMPLIANCE
VICTORIA, CCV, and the CCV logo?
Response: No.
I have become aware of a company registered under the name of CIVIC COMPLIANCE PTY LTD (ABN: 68 122 448 122; ACN 122
448 122).
3. Is CIVIC COMPLIANCE PTY LTD licensed to use the trade marks CIVIC COMPLIANCE VICTORIA, CCV, and the CCV logo?
Response: I am unaware of any company called Civic Compliance Pty Ltd and the State has no relationship with this
company. As stated in my letter of 28 June 2011, Tenix Solutions IMES Pty Ltd is the only entity licensed to use the
names 'CCV' and 'Civic Compliance Victoria'.
4. What relationship, if any, exists between CIVIC COMPLIANCE PTY LTD (ABN 68 122 448 122) and STATE OF VICTORIA
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE?
Response: I refer to the response in paragraph 3 above.
The respondant also informed stated, "... the Department of Justice will place your letter on file and will not respond to any further
correspondence that does not raise any new concerns. Should you require free or low cost legal advice, you may contact the
Federation of Community Legal Centres on (03) 9652 1500 during business hours."
My assumption is that CIVIC COMPLIANCE PTY LTD may be owned by TENIX SOLUTIONS IMES PTY LTD, thus they are entitled to
use CCV trade marks. If this assumption is wrong, then CIVIC COMPLIANCE PTY LTD may be breaching trade mark law...
Question to the group - do you think it is worth writing to CIVIC COMPLIANCE PTY LTD, presenting the letter from the Dept of
Justice, and asking them if they have right to use State-registered trade marks? Would I as a person of the State of Victoria have
standing to demand a response?
I'm thinking I may write to CIVIC COMPLIANCE PTY LTD (with your collective help drafting a letter/notice) and asking them how
they have the right to use the registered trade marks...
I will keep the letter from the Dept of Justice out of the public domain for now, but if you believe it is of value for a court case let
me know. If writing to CIVIC COMPLIANCE PTY LTD ends up in a dead end then I will make all the letters public domain.
Cheers,
Steve
END QUOTE email 110810

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What this means that a person unknown to a private company actually using Civil Compliance
Victoria trademark may be providing confidential details in the misconception of dealing with a
government department and it being bound by confidentiality. I view this is a serious deceptive
conduct and the Government should never allow any private entity to use any trademark or other
facilities that are not government entities. As was reported various private car parking companies were
instructing their employed to ensure to have a certain number of \Infringement Notices issued and
because of this Infringement Notices were issued knowingly to be fabricated claims. It is a total
absurdity for the legislation to permit such kind of conduct to be enforced through the purported
Infringement Act 2006 provisions as it also means that instead of civil litigation between civil parties
the government is allowing civil parties to register as enforcement agencies and by this sidestep or
railroad ordinary civil litigation provisions. A clear example is that where ordinary the onus is upon
the prosecutor/applicant to prove his claim now the private company can make up any allegation and
use the purported Infringement Act 2006 system to circumvent any accountability.
.
In 2008 Banyule City Council issued a Infringement Notice against me for allegedly exceeding a 3hr
parking limit even so I claimed to have been parked for less than the maximum prescribed period. In
the end the time recorded by the person employed by Banyule city council proved that I had been
recorded being parked for a 2hr and 29 minutes period and clearly this was less than 3 hours permitted
parking period.
After any months the Infringement Notice was withdrawn, that is against my person but not against
everyone else wrongly issued a Infringement Notice and this just underlines that innocent persons are
subjected to a tyrannical system that they are forced to pay monies under the threat of every
increasing charges regardless how innocent they may be because the onus to for the prosecutor to
prove any offence actually had eventuated is removed by this. The government has put in place a
system that as a Registrar made clear it was cheaper to end up paying regardless how innocent one is
then to seek to fight for JUSTICE. To me this is a form of government sponsored terrorism that
doesnt fit in a democratic system.
Within the provisions of the constitution I have the inherited right to pursue JUSTICE and so without
fabricated additional cost to try to thwart my rights to do so.
When the Infringement Notice was issues I responded to challenge it all and was entitled to it. The fact
that I did not specifically elect to defend the matter in court has no real meaning because clearly I
disputed the ability of any court to hear and determine the matter.
While government may seek to twist and infringe upon how an accused can or cannot obtain
JUSTICE in the end the fact that the legislation or purported legislation pursue a certain way doesnt
alter the fact that as the Framers of the Constitution made clear we all have our civil rights as they are
embedded in the constitution and one is that if one is accused then the accuser can elect to take the
matter to court or leave it be.
If the accuser elects to take the matter to court then the accuser has the onus to prove his accusations.
.

QUOTE Mr. HIGGINS:
I think it is advisable that private people should not be put to the expense of having important questions of
constitutional law decided out of their own pockets.
END QUOTE
.
It must be clear that the ever escalating cost and charges are because I challenged the allegations in the
Infringement Notice from onset, such as in my 23 February 2011 correspondence (see also the police
response dated 20 March 2011 and my further correspondences) and as such the issue was not as the
\
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subsequent Infringement Notice claimed that I had not communicated but rather that they were not
equipped to deal with this kind of legal challenge.
Still, my right of a legal challenge cannot be denied.
.
QUOTE Main v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).

The law provides that once State and Federal jurisdiction has been challenged, it must be proven.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Hagens v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 533,
Once jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven
END QUOTE
QUOTE Standard v. Olsen, 74 S. Ct. 768,
No sanctions can be imposed absent proof of jurisdiction.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 2nd 906 at 910,
Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time, even on final determination.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet. 157, 7 L.Ed. 381; Griffith v. Frazier, 8 Cr. 9, 3L. Ed. 471.
Where there is absence of jurisdiction, all administrative and judicial proceedings are a nullity and confer no
right, offer no protection, and afford no justification, and may be rejected upon direct collateral attack.
END QUOTE
.
It must therefore be very clear that where I opposed the jurisdiction of any court to hear and determine
matters then from that moment it was a bar of any further conduct regarding the Infringement notice
unless and until a court of competent jurisdiction had made a judicial determination after hearing both
parties that actually a court, being it the Infringement Court or other court, not that I concede it would
have made such a determination, that could exercise judicial powers regarding the matters.
What we have however is that the Sheriffs office as the website indicates an administrative officer
is not terrorising not just myself but also my wife and by this placing her health and wellbeing in
jeopardy and this because the sheriffs Office cant bother to make sure that all matters are conducted
appropriately as is constitutionally and otherwise legally permissible.
As such, where no court had pronounced the re was jurisdiction then technically the
Infringement Notice and any possible enforcement of it came to a halt. To use terrorism upon a
person to nevertheless pay up or suffer the consequences to me is a very serious matter and no
less the kind of terrorism that one can expect of others who disregard our democratic system.
.
http://www.magistratescourt.vic.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/Magistrates+Court/Home/Fines+and+Penalties/
QUOTE
Fines and Penalties
What is a fine?
A fine is a monetary penalty that can be imposed by a magistrate. The Sentencing Act 1991
defines fine as:
'the sum of money payable by an offender under an order of a court made on the
offender being convicted or found guilty of an offence and includes costs but does not
include money payable by way of restitution or compensation or any costs of or
incidental to an application for restitution or compensation payable by an offender under
an order of a court.' (Section 3, Sentencing Act 1991).
As a part of an order in relation to a fine, a magistrate may also impose other monetary
penalties, such as ordering an offender to pay compensation or costs.
END QUOTE
.
We now have a consideration of the definitions of the purported Infringement Act 23006;
\
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QUOTE
"infringement penalty" means the amount stated in an infringement notice as payable in respect of the
infringement offence to which the notice relates;
END QUOTE
QUOTE
"outstanding fines", in relation to an infringement warrant, means the total of
(a) the amount specified in the infringement warrant that is unpaid; and
(b) the costs of execution of the infringement warrant that are unpaid;
END QUOTE
Imperial Acts Application Act 1980

QUOTE
12.
And several grants and promises made of fines and forfeitures, before any conviction or
judgement against the persons, upon whom the same were to be levied.
END QUOTE
QUOTE subsection of 12 above
8. That election of members of parliament ought to be free.

9. That the freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings in parliament, ought not to be
impeached or questioned in any court or place out of parliament.
10. That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.
11. That jurors ought to be duly impannelled and returned.
12. That all grants and promises of fines and forfeitures of particular persons before
conviction, are illegal and void.
END QUOTE subsection of 12 above
.
With elections to the Parliament being free we find no such thing exist because people are forced to
pay deposit, etc.
With freedom of speech in the parliament then somehow this is different because after all politicians
desire only that which suits themselves, not that I have an issue with this provision but hold that either
it is all or none and not so to say cherry picking of what may suit Members of Parliament but blatantly
disregard what served the general community.
And again we have to consider:
QUOTE subsection of 12 above
12.That all grants and promises of fines and forfeitures of particular persons before
conviction, are illegal and void.
END QUOTE subsection of 12 above
.
The entire Infringement Notice system is to apply any fine/penalty irrespective if the person is guilty
of any alleged offence and without any trial before a court.
.
QUOTE
"infringements registrar"
(a) means a registrar within the meaning of the Magistrates' Court Act 1989
who is a registrar on whom functions under this Act or the Magistrates'
\
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Court Act 1989 have been conferred in respect of any proceeding or class of
proceeding or procedure under this Act; and
(b) includes any deputy registrar employed pursuant to section 17 of that Act to
whom duties, powers and functions under this Act are delegated under the
Magistrates' Court Act 1989;
"infringement warrant" means a warrant issued under Part 6;
END QUOTE
.
As I indicated in previous correspondences to Premier Ted Baillieu the Magistrates Court website
provides that Infringement Notice orders are administrative decision and as such not judicial
decisions in an open court, this even so the Infringement Notice order relies upon purported evidence
of the enforcement agency and as such cannot constitute to be an administrative decision at all.
Neither can this be an informed decision either administrative or judicially because if this had been
so then the Infringement Registrar never could have issued Infringement Notice orders where I had
challenged the jurisdiction of the Infringement Court.
It is clearly a legal requirement that unless and until if ever at all the Court declares to have jurisdiction
having heard both parties about the issue and handing down a judicial decision no court can proceed
without having dismissed the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION.
Therefore there is a fatal error within this system how it operates.
.
As I discovered the Police were using the envelope of Vicroads to claim I had 1 demerit point and this
too appears to produce the view that the police (the accuser) simply controls it all and we have
absolutely no proper democratic system in place that holds the accuser accountable as to prove any
accusation. It means the police can target me as much as they like without check and balances to be in
place and so to say revenge themselves for the past defeat they had, such as in the van Rooy criminal
case.
QUOTE
. "VicRoads" means the Roads Corporation established under Part II of the Transport Act 1983.
END QUOTE
.
Now lets consider the following:
QUOTE
9.Enforcement agency guidelines and policies

An enforcement agency, other than a prescribed enforcement agency, may make and
publish enforcement agency guidelines and policies in respect of the use of official
warnings for infringement offences.
END QUOTE
.
How on earth is any citizen going to know which enforcement agency they are dealing with let alone
their guidelines and policies where Civil Compliance Victoria is the front of numerous different
enforcement agencies but pretending to be all a government organization?
.
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It may be noted that besides a scribble no identity is disclosed who the relevant Infringement Registrar
is and so anyone, even the tea lady could have signed it. Surely in litigation a more controlled conduct
could be used as a scribble must be accompanies by the name of the person who purportedly signed it
if at all as it could also have been a mailbox asked just to plant his little curved lines for all I know.
.
While the regime what must be stated in the Infringement notice is set out to some extend nothing in it
remotely refers to an objector. Seems to me not a single lawyer in the parliament and neither the legal
advisors who call themselves lawyers may have realised there is such a creature of OBJECTION TO
JURISDICTION and that such an objection stops everything in its track and not a single person can
pursue any enforcement unless and until if ever at all a court of competence dismisses the
OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION.
QUOTE
13. Forms of infringement notice
(1)
Subject to sub-section (2), an infringement notice must

(a) be in writing and contain the prescribed details;
(b) state
that the person is entitled to elect to have the matter of the infringement offence heard
and determined in Court.
(2) In addition to the requirements of sub-section (1), an infringement notice must contain the relevant
prescribed further details if the infringement notice is in respect of an offence
(a) that requires additional steps to be taken to expiate the offence; or
(b) to which a graduated penalty applies when a subsequent infringement notice is served on a person;
or
(c) that results in any penalty other than an infringement penalty and prescribed costs being incurred in
addition to the infringement penalty payable under an infringement notice.
END QUOTE
.
Because so to say I challenged the lot, such as any court having jurisdiction then clearly the
operation of the purported Infringement Act 2006 also came to a standstill because it relies upon
a certain procedure that now didnt apply.
QUOTE
16. Person may elect to have matter heard in Court
(1) A person served with an infringement notice may elect to have the matter of the infringement offence
heard and determined in Court
(a) in the case of a lodgeable infringement offence, at any time before an enforcement order is made;
(b) in the case of any other infringement offence, at any time before the expiry of the period for
bringing a proceeding in relation to the offence to which the infringement notice relates.
(2) This section does not apply to infringement offences to which the following provisions apply
(a) sections 89 and 89A to 89D of the Road Safety Act 1986;
(b) section 215C of the Transport Act 1983;
(c) sections 61A and 61BA of the Marine Act 1988.
17. Enforcement agency can refer matter to Court
(1) An enforcement agency may refer a matter for which an infringement notice has been served to the
Court
(a) in the case of a lodgeable infringement offence, at any time before an enforcement order is made;
(b) in the case of any other infringement offence, at any time before the expiry of the period for
bringing a proceeding in relation to the offence to which the infringement notice relates.
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(2) This section does not apply to infringement offences to which the following provisions apply
(a) sections 89 and 89A to 89D of the Road Safety Act 1986;
(b) section 215C of the Transport Act 1983;
(c) sections 61A and 61BA of the Marine Act 1988.
END QUOTE
.
It must be clear that even if the Police had held they had a legitimate case against me their option
would have been then having received my 23 February 2011 correspondence to place the matter before
a court and then have the court decide if it could or couldnt invoke jurisdiction. Clearly the police
were not interested to follow that option and somehow may have wrongly perceived that where I
objected to the jurisdiction of any court to hear and determine matters then the onus was upon me to
disprove jurisdiction, where in fact I have to do no such thing as the onus lies with the prosecutor to
prove JURISDICTION. However the fact that after so much writing the Police still continue their
merry way of total terrorism and tyranny then there can be no excuse as they should be well aware
that unless they themselves follow proper legal procedures they cannot demand citizens to do so.
.
QUOTE
22. Application for internal review
(1) A person who has been served with an infringement notice or a person acting on that person's behalf with
the first-mentioned person's consent, may apply to the relevant enforcement agency for review of the
decision to serve the infringement notice if the person believes
(a) the decision
(i) was contrary to law; or
(ii)
involved a mistake of identity; or
(b) that special circumstances apply to the person; or

(c) the conduct for which the infringement notice was served should be excused having regard to any
exceptional circumstances relating to the infringement offence.
END QUOTE
.
The problem is that while the purported legislation provided for an enforcement agency to raise the
matters of principle of law it doesnt canvas such provision for an accused. That is why the Police
werent going to do anything because again they can get me back for their comprehensive defeat in the
van Rooy criminal case and seems to be willing to stand by and allow any harm to eventuate to not just
myself but also my wife. This to me is very serious as I view the Police had an onus and obligation to
ensure that any information it provided to the Infringement Registrar accurately reflected also my
opposition to the Infringement Notice and any j\court jurisdiction!
.
QUOTE
23. Request for additional information

(1) An enforcement agency may request any additional information which it requires to
conduct a review under section 24 from the applicant.
(2) If an enforcement agency makes a request under sub-section (1), it must suspend the
review for a period not exceeding 21 days.
(3) The applicant must provide the additional information within 14 days of service of the
request for additional information by the enforcement agency.
(4) If a person fails to provide the requested information to the enforcement agency within
the time specified in sub-section (3), the enforcement agency must review the decision
under section 24 without the additional information.
END QUOTE
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While the purported Infringement Act 2006 provides for an enforcement agency to request
additional information what about the accused having the same rights and it being provided for. After
all this is what I requested from onset way back in February 2011 and now about 7 months later
nothing was provided so far. It should be recognised that a person accused of an offence may be
required to do san elaborate research as to establish what may or may not be relevant to the issues
litigated and as such the police should be the last to deny any citizen of this opportunity. How can I
research the type of equipment the police may seek to rely upon when they conceal this from me for
the past 7 months? How indeed can I do road side checking, etc, as to prepare a counter offence
against the Police claim where I am denied any knowledge upon which the police seek to trade upon?
The mere fact that the police seek to conceal details may be because it sis aware that it may have
merely created a false claim against me.
After all, what would stop the Police having incorrectly set up any equipment so as to deliberately
record speeds higher then actually was travelled by me or anyone else?
.
I recall an incident where police officers were issuing Infringement Notices (some decades ago) and I
noticed that speeds of up to 120 Kilometres were recorded and yet the police didnt stop the motorist
but commented to me that it was a faulty reading. Yet, when two motor cycles were recorded to
purportedly do 90 kilometres an hour (even so not overtaking any other vehicle) in a 60 kilometre zone
then the officer offered for the motor bike drivers to elect which one of them would accept the fine. At
times I observed the police to simply not do any reading but to use the previous reading of another
motorist to issue an Infringement Notice. As the police officers revealed they were on a quota and so
had to issue Infringement Notices and no driver would really be aware that the reading was of
someone else. And after all this the police officer then asked the Infringement Notice he had
previously issued to me back and destroyed it as he held it was cancelled. I had no doubt that he
became aware that I would challenge their conduct in court if they were to proceed against me.
As such, I am well aware that the police target people if only to get their quota and the infringement
system now operating has corrupted our court system also as people who are innocent of any
wrongdoing are now ending up losing a lot of money to take time of work to defend themselves or
otherwise and the very con artist who for the sake to get their quotas are sowing hatred and
aggravation are ending up never to be punished for their evil deeds.
I understand what you are stating, but the Infringement Act 2006 for example in 9AA Suspension of
motor vehicle or trailer registration refers to
QUOTE
(2) While the registration of a motor vehicle or trailer is suspended under sub-section (1), the vehicle is unregistered
for the purpose of this part.
END QUOTE
.
Then also consider the provisions about suspension of driver licence such as in 19A etc. and 183
(1A)states:
QUOTE
If directed to do so by the sheriff under section 110 of the Infringement Act 2006, the Corporation must suspend a
driver licence or permit of a person of whom the direction applies until the sheriff notifies the Corporation that one
of the matters referred to in section 111 of that Act has occurred.
END QUOTE
.
Section 110 is headed: Sheriff may direct VicRoads to suspend driver licence
What we now have is a crazy system where the Infringement Registrar must issue a warrant
irrespective that a legal process may be going on before the courts and the Sheriff then uses the
warrant to dictate the suspension of a driver licence as the authority must then do so. And by the time
the court finally comes around to try to hear and determine any matter the victim of this government
\
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sponsored terrorism by then may have been nabbed for driving without a valid driver licence, driving
an unregistered motor vehicle even so he did no wrong?
Are we having bloody idiots in this system or not? What kind of morons do we have on the taxpayers
payroll which cannot manage to understand what JUSTICE stands for?
And the police then claiming to pick up so many offenders of driving without a valid driver licence
and driving an unregistered motor vehicle concealing that they and the sheriff office actually caused
this problem in the first place.
.
See also section 110 part 8 Re "infringement registrar", and the meaning of "infringements registrar"
Then also consider what an "infringement offence" might be and you may find that a municipal
council could say take you on for building a shed and then fine you and have your driver licence
suspended for this, etc.
So be aware it may not always have to relate to alleged traffic violations as it can be anything not at all
related to traffic issues and still your driver license could be suspended, etc.
As such in the Colosimo case an infringement notice was issued and they then litigated before VCAT
even so VCAT has no jurisdiction for this. Yet more then 20 lawyer were ganging up against Frank
Colosimo until I took over from his barrister and turned it all around.
So next time you have an issue with your municipal/shire council regarding non traffic issues just be
careful they do not suspend your registration and/or your driver licence!
I consider it terrible and indeed unconstitutional that a driver licence could be suspended for something
nothing to do with driving issues! In particular where a person not having driven a motor vehicle
nevertheless can be deemed legally responsible while the police who have to sign out a motor vehicle
somehow repeatedly do not know who was driving a police motor vehicle that was involved in
offences of speeding, even so the log books of the police officers concerned, the radio dispatch, etc, all
should have records of who was driving besides the partner who was in the same motor vehicle
driving.
Indeed if they attended to any scene then the vehicle would have been recorded and so also the police
officer who attended to the scene (of an accident, etc).
As such, the bull and yes utter bull that the police dont know who was speeding goes to the credibility
or the lack thereof regarding the entire police force, and considering some being involved in murder,
rape, drug dealings, etc, then I view the courts should loath to accept the word of a police officer in
particular where the very police officer concerned may suffer of a mental problem not remembering
when he/she herself was driving a motor vehicle when speeding.
.
The following may also be interesting:

QUOTE
40. Decision to go to Courtlodgeable infringement offences
(1) If a person elects under this Part to have the matter of a lodgeable infringement offence heard and
determined in Court or an enforcement agency refers a matter in respect of a lodgeable infringement
offence to Court under this Part
(a) the enforcement agency must lodge with the Court the prescribed information in respect of
(i) the offender; and
(ii) the infringement offence; and
(iii) the enforcement agency; and
(b) the prescribed information lodged under paragraph (a) is deemed to be a charge in relation to the
offence in respect of which the infringement notice was served; and
(c) the Court must
(i) allocate a time and place of the hearing of the offence; and
\
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(ii) return the hearing details referred to in sub-paragraph (i) to the enforcement agency for
service on the person who was served with the infringement notice; and
(d) at least 14 days prior to the hearing date, the enforcement agency must serve the details
referred to in paragraphs (a) and (c)(i) on the person who was served with the infringement
notice.
(2) Service under sub-section (1)(d) may be by post to the person who was served with the infringement
notice at the address
(a) provided by the person on whom the infringement notice was served; or
(b) on the infringement notice; or
(c) on the penalty reminder notice.
Note: The Magistrates' Court Act 1989 applies to infringement offences that are not lodgeable
infringement offences.
(3) Without limiting any other powers of the Court, the Court may proceed to hear and determine the matter
of a lodgeable infringement offence even though a charge has not been served on the person who was
served with the infringement notice.
Note: See also section 41 of, and clause 7 of Schedule 2 to, the Magistrates' Court Act 1989.
END QUOTE
.
Well so to say just to stuff up big time the provision of (3) as to the Court hearing and determining the
matter in my absenteeism my OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION prevents such a clause to be
effective because the court couldnt exercise any judicial powers unless and until if ever it all it could
dismiss the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION.
.
As the Magistrates Court of Victoria ordinary must hear matters in open court then there can be
neither any issue of some computer dealing with the matter automatically. We might actually see
someone we are paying from Consolidated Revenue Funds doing some work, besides perhaps falling
asleep behind the bench, and actually show some interest in what JUSTICE is about.
.
QUOTE
57. Reliance on lodged material
An infringements registrar is entitled
(a) to rely on the accuracy of the material provided by an enforcement agency when the details of
an infringement penalty and prescribed costs (if any) in respect of a lodgeable infringement offence
are lodged under section 54; and
(b) to assume that the details are true and correct.
END QUOTE
.
This to me is another con-job provision so that the enforcement agency can make up anything and the
Infringement Registrar will so to say be off the hook for any idioticy of issuing orders. Like the
purported warrant issue against me, just that as this is done automatically as I was advised by Carmela
of Civil Compliance Victoria then clearly what really this provision appears to cater for is that the
computer can only act upon the information fed into the computer! For get about providing any
obligation for the enforcement agency to be obligated to provide all relevant details governing
matters because that would complicate the computer program far too much and actually might assist a
person to obtain JUSTICE. Now surely that is not what the Government desire to achieve, does it?
QUOTE
Division 2Enforcement Orders
59. Enforcement orders
(1) If an infringements registrar has not received a request under section 58 from an enforcement agency, the
infringements registrar may make an enforcement order that the person pay to the Court the outstanding
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\
amount of the infringement penalty and the prescribed costs in respect of a lodgeable infringement
offence.
(2) An enforcement order is deemed to be an order of the Court.
END QUOTE
.
Now this last quoted provision appears to me to be more of a STAR CHAMBER COURT and
KANGAROO COURT kind of provision where it is DEEMED to be a court order, which implies it
really isnt but is pretended to be so and the Chief magistrate didnt bother to open his mouth to object
against this as it violate the separation of powers and independence of the judiciary? Come on, how
can we have a government official, even if it is a computer, acting as some court official?
.
QUOTE
61.
Effect of enforcement order

(1) If an enforcement order is made in relation to a lodgeable infringement offence alleged to have been
committed by a person
(a) subject to sections 89 and 89A to 89D of the Road Safety Act 1986, section 215C of the Transport
Act 1983 or sections 61A and 61BA of the Marine Act 1988 (as the case requires), the person is
not to be taken to have been convicted of the offence; and
(b) the person is not liable to any further proceedings for the offence alleged to have been committed;
and
(c) the making of the enforcement order does not in any way affect or prejudice any civil claim, action
or proceeding arising out of the same occurrence; and
(d) payment in accordance with the enforcement order is not an admission of liability for the purpose
of, and does not in any way affect or prejudice, any civil claim, action or proceeding arising out of
the same occurrence.
(2) Any amount recovered as a result of the making of an enforcement order must be paid into the
Consolidated Fund unless the relevant Act or relevant regulation that creates the infringement offence
directs that the amount be paid into another fund.
(3) Despite anything to the contrary in this section, the making of an enforcement order in relation to an
offence which is a traffic infringement within the meaning of the Road Safety Act 1986 does not prevent
the incurring of demerit points under section 25 of that Act in relation to the infringement.
(4) Despite anything to the contrary in this section, the making of an enforcement order
(a) may be recorded for the purposes of a heavy vehicle registration suspension scheme within the
meaning of section 89(7) of the Road Safety Act 1986; and
(b) does not prevent the suspension of the registration of a vehicle under that scheme.
END QUOTE
.
Ok now we get something that obviously may never have been anticipated by the legislators and its
advisors.
QUOTE
the making of the enforcement order does not in any way affect or prejudice any civil claim, action or proceeding
arising out of the same occurrence; and
END QUOTE
.
It also means that I can eventually sue the hell out of those morons who caused such a problem upon
my wife and myself!
.
QUOTE
Division 3Revocation of Enforcement Orders
64. Infringements registrar may revoke enforcement order and refer matter to Court
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(1) Subject to sub-section (4), an infringements registrar, if satisfied that a matter would be more
appropriately dealt with by the Court may, on his or her own motion
(a) revoke an enforcement order; and
(b) refer the matter of the
infringement offence to the Court for hearing and determination.
(2) If an infringements registrar revokes an enforcement order under this section, he or she must notify the
enforcement agency and the person against whom the enforcement order was made
(a) that the enforcement order has been revoked; and
(b) that the matter of the infringement offence has been referred to the Court for hearing and
determination.
(3) A notification under sub-section (2) must include the reasons why the enforcement order was revoked.
(4) An infringements registrar must not make an order under this section if any of the following has
occurred
(a) property has been seized under an infringement warrant other than a seizure of a kind referred to in
section 89;
(b) a declaration under section 91 has been made;
(c) a notice under section 101(2) has been served on a person;
(d) an attachment of earnings order or an attachment of debts order has been made;
(e) an order under section 136 that land is subject to a charge has been made;
(f) a person is arrested in accordance with Part 12.
65. Applications for revocation of enforcement orders
(1) Subject to sub-section (2), the following persons may apply to an infringements registrar at the venue of
the Court at which an enforcement order was made for the revocation of the enforcement order
(a) an enforcement agency; or
(b) a person against whom an enforcement order has been made; or
(c) without limiting paragraph (b), in the case of a person against whom an enforcement order has been
made to whom special circumstances apply, a person acting on his or her behalf.
(2) An application under sub-section (1) cannot be made if
(a) property has been seized under an infringement warrant other than a seizure of a kind referred to in
section 89;
(b) a declaration under section 91 has been made;
(c) a notice under section 101(2) has been served on a person;
(d) an attachment of earnings order or an attachment of debts order has been made;
(e) an order under section 136 that land is subject to a charge has been made;
(f) a person is arrested in accordance with Part 12.
(3) An application under sub-section (1) must
(a) be filed with an infringements registrar; and
(b)
if filed by the person against whom the enforcement order has been made or a person acting on
that person's behalf in accordance with sub-section (1)(c), be accompanied by a written statement
setting out the grounds on which the revocation is sought.
Note: It is an offence to give false or misleading information in a statement required by or under
this Act. See section 167.
66. Powers to revoke enforcement orders

(1) If an enforcement agency applies under section 65 for the revocation of an enforcement order
(a)
an infringements registrar must revoke the enforcement order; and
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12-12-2015
(b) the enforcement order ceases to have effect on its revocation.

(2) If a person against whom an enforcement order has been made or a person acting on that person's behalf
in accordance with section 65(1)(c) applies under section 65 for revocation of the enforcement order and
an infringements registrar is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for revocation
(a) the infringements registrar must revoke the enforcement order; and
(b) an enforcement order ceases to have effect on its revocation.
(3) On an application referred to in sub-section (2), if an infringements registrar is not satisfied that there are
sufficient grounds for revocation of an enforcement order, the infringements registrar must notify the
applicant that the enforcement order has not been revoked because of insufficient grounds to justify its
revocation.
(4) An infringements registrar may
(a) adjourn an application for revocation of an enforcement order; or
(b) if the infringement offence involves a motor vehicle and the infringements registrar is satisfied that
the applicant was not the driver of the vehicle at the time of the offence and the applicant has
nominated another driver
(i) revoke the enforcement order; and
(ii) cancel the infringement notice.
(5) If an infringements registrar revokes an enforcement order under this section, the infringements registrar
must notify the enforcement agency, the person against whom the order was made and if an application
was made under section 65(1)(c), the person who applied on behalf of the person against whom the
enforcement order was made that
(a) the enforcement order has been revoked; and
(b) the matter of the infringement offence has been referred to the Court for hearing and determination.
(6) An infringements registrar must not revoke an enforcement order under this section if a previous
application has been made for the revocation of the enforcement order.
END QUOTE
.
What ought to be clear is that the infringement Registrar had every opportunity, being faced with my
OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION to transfer the matter for a court hearing as to jurisdiction in the
first place. But clearly failed to do so.
.
Unlikely many if any other person would have for so much canvassed so extensively constitutional and
other legal issues regarding an Infringement Notice and yet Carmela of Civil Compliance Victoria
there were no records on file about this. I wonder if she was telling the truth because when I mentioned
the Police 20 March 2011 correspondence she was quick to point out that this was a refusal by the
police regarding my request. As such, she clearly knew I had corresponded and so her claim she had
no records on file may only indicate, at least did to me, that this might have been a deliberate omission
so that Civil Compliance Victoria can pretend it knew of nothing even so she clearly revealed to be
aware of certain matters.
.
There was this I do not care attitude I perceived from this Carmela and there seems to be no so to
say EMERGENCY BUTTON process available where immediately a stop can be made to any
enforcement of any warrant, etc, where suddenly it might be desired to do so. This to me indicates we
have a government that is lost in the wilderness and while going on and on about Law & Order simply
wouldnt know what it really is about.
For the above I intent now to draft a s78B NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS so that it
can represent the facts of this case and for this I urge you to without undue delay provide the relevant
details to me or have them provided to me and ensure that a STATUS QUO is in place to prevent
undue harm to continue or further to eventuate.
.
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This correspondence is not intended and neither must be perceived to refer to all details/issues but may
at least give some understanding that there is a lot wrong with how things are being conducted and I
seek you to immediately stop this rot and ensure no harm comes not only to myself but also to my wife
and the warrant issue is withdrawn and a full and proper independent investigation is held as to the
matters i have referred to above and other related issues canvassed in past correspondences.

.
(
.
Awaiting your response, G. H. Schorel-Hlavka

It also must be stated that Buloke Shire Council in purportedly seeking to enforce (albeit actually in
violation) to state legislation is acting within s114 of the Constitution (Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act 1900 (UK)) it relies in its legal proceedings upon the issue of the Infringement
Notice. And it instituted legal proceedings itself in the Magistrates Court of Victoria, where I refused
to do so as I OBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION of any court. As such the Infringement Notice is
used to substantiate litigation and was not withdrawn as to litigate as to fresh charges by Summons.
While the Summons was issued it relies upon the purported Fire Prevention Notice and its
Infringement Notice. It underlines that the legal processes are grossly misused and abused and yet as I
previously indicated the SRO (State Revenue office) for years has refused to pay out the total amount
of about $218 which was an overcharge originally paid to a water service provider upon settlement of
the sale of a property, and the water service provider, even so my wife remained a customer, wrongly
transferred to the SRO claiming it didnt have my wifes details.
As such, where this is an acknowledged debt and even published on the internet by the Government
why then should my wife not be able to use the Infringement Court to have an order/warrant issued?
Clearly this proves the Infringement Court is not an impartial administration of justice but is no
more but a government dictated entity that purports to be a court. And again, where then the
Infringement Court is purportedly part of the Magistrates Court of Victoria then the Magistrates Court
of Victoria fails to be an impartial administration of justice. Meaning, that in my view all and any
purported court orders are without legal force.
The States are created within section 106 of the Constitution (Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act 1900 (UK)) and there is a separation of powers as required by the Letters Patent
publish on 20-1-1901 in the Victorian Gazette requiring an impartial administration of justice.
The question therefore is where are the legislative powers of the State of Victoria to create some kind
of a purported Court system within the Magistrates Court of Victoria that is not in compliance with
how the Magistrates Court of Victoria as a Chapter III court of the constitution is required to operate?
https://jade.barnet.com.au/Jade.html#!article=61502
QUOTE H. L. DEMDEN v F. PEDDER High Court of Australia
The Commonwealth and the States are, with respect to the matters which under the Constitution are within the ambit
of their respective legislative or executive authority, sovereign States, subject only to the restrictions imposed by the
Imperial connection and the provisions of the Constitution, either expressed or implied. Where, therefore, the
Constitution makes a grant of legislative or executive power to the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth is entitled
to exercise that power in absolute freedom, and without any interference or control whatever except that prescribed
by the Constitution itself.
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END QUOTE
Convention)
QUOTE
Mr. GORDON.-Well, I think not. I am sure that if the honorable member applies his mind to the subject he will
see it is not abstruse. If a statute of either the Federal or the states Parliament be taken into court the court is
bound to give an interpretation according to the strict hyper-refinements of the law. It may be a good law
passed by "the sovereign will of the people," although that latter phrase is a common one which I do not care much
about. The court may say-"It is a good law, but as it technically infringes on the Constitution we will have to
wipe it out." As I have said, the proposal I support retains some remnant of parliamentary sovereignty, leaving it to
the will of Parliament on either side to attack each other's laws.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Mr. THYNNE:
The constitution of this federation will not be charged with the duty of resisting privileged classes, for the
whole power will be vested in the people themselves. They are the complete legislative power of the whole of
these colonies, and they shall be so. From [start page 106] them will rise, first of all, the federal constitution which
we are proposing to establish, and in the next place will come the legislative powers of the several colonies. The
people will be the authority above and beyond the separate legislatures, and the royal prerogative exercised, in
their interest and for their benefit, by the advice of their ministers will be practically vested in them. They will
exercise the sovereignty of the states, they will be charged with the full power and dignity of the state, and it is
from them that we must seek the giving to each of those bodies that will be in existence concurrently the necessary
powers for their proper management and existence. Each assembly, each legislature, whether state or federal
existing under this constitution, will be as Dicey again says-a merely subordinate law-making body whose
laws will be valid, whilst within the authority conferred upon it by the constitution, but invalid and
unconstitutional if they go beyond the limits of such authority.
END QUOTE

QUOTE
Dr. COCKBURN: All our experience hitherto has been under the condition of parliamentary sovereignty.
Parliament has been the supreme body. But when we embark on federation we throw parliamentary
sovereignty overboard. Parliament is no longer supreme. Our parliaments at present are not only legislative,
but constituent bodies. They have not only the power of legislation, but the power of amending their
constitutions. That must disappear at once on the abolition of parliamentary sovereignty. No parliament
under a federation can be a constituent body; it will cease to have the power of changing its constitution at its
own will. Again, instead of parliament being supreme, the parliaments of a federation are coordinate bodiesthe main power is split up, instead of being vested in one body. More than all that, there is this difference:
When parliamentary sovereignty is dispensed with, instead of there being a high court of parliament, you
bring into existence a powerful judiciary which towers above all powers, legislative and executive, and which
is the sole arbiter and interpreter of the constitution.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE
The Hon. A. DEAKIN: I say the great bulk of them are of that character, and am open to refutation if I am wrong,
I should say that the whole of the thirty-seven subjects, but, indisputably, the great bulk of them, are subjects on
which no question of state rights and state interests could arise except by the merest accident. It is, as the right hon.
gentleman admitted, a grave defect in our constitution if we permit these questions to be left for all time to be
determined in a purely states house, or by a state referendum, when those questions are not state questions-when
they ought to be decided, not on state lines, but on national lines, and by a national referendum.
END QUOTE
As I indicated previously the states only had concurrent legislative powers until the Commonwealth
commenced to legislate as to a subject matter as then it becomes exclusive Commonwealth
legislative powers and cannot be reverted back to the States.
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Executive Summary Infringement Activity 2013-14
The State is responsible for managing the infringements system in Victoria.
Infringements are issued by a variety of enforcement agencies including state
agencies such as Victoria Police and local government agencies which include local
councils, universities and hospitals.
Enforcement agencies are required by the Infringements Act 2006 (the Infringements
Act) to provide information to the Attorney-General twice yearly, including statistical
data.
This report provides a brief snapshot of infringements issued during 2013-14. Where
possible, comparative analysis in relation to the numbers and types of infringements
has been made with previous reporting periods.
In 2013-14 there were 4.99 million infringement notices issued in Victoria, down
from 5.82 million in 2012-13 (14 per cent decrease). As was the case in previous
years, the majority of infringements issued across all agencies continues to be for
traffic offences (58.6 per cent) and parking offences (33.9 per cent). Victoria Police
continues to issue the most infringement notices, largely related to traffic offences.
Local councils issued 1.68 million infringements in 2013-14, which was a decrease of
1.6 per cent from the previous year. The majority of infringements issued by
municipal councils were for parking offences (1.61 million).
Government agencies (excluding Victoria Police) issued less than 5 per cent of the
total infringements in 2013-14, a reduction on the percentage issued in 2012-13. This
year-on-year observation is partly a result of electoral infringements issued by the
Victorian Electoral Commission for failure to vote, which were significantly higher in
2012-13 than in 2013-14 due to less local government elections in 2013-14.
A person can contest the initial decision to issue an infringement in court or request
an internal review of the decision to issue an infringement, and this appears to be a
growing trend. By volume, around 1.5 per cent of infringements (mostly for traffic
offences) are heard and determined by the Magistrates Court. Where an internal
review was requested, 55.3 per cent of infringements were confirmed by enforcement
agencies upon review. Infringement notices that remain unpaid may be lodged by
enforcement agencies with the Infringements Court for enforcement.
Following lodgement, an infringement registrar may make an enforcement order to
request payment of the outstanding amount of the infringement penalty and for
additional costs. In 2013-14, around 1.81 million enforcement orders were made, and
85,412 enforcement orders were revoked. Infringement warrants are issued when an
enforcement order remains unpaid.
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To assist those experiencing financial hardship, agencies may offer individuals the
option of paying their infringements by instalment payment plans. During 2013-14,
enforcement agencies approved 604,126 payment plans, with 538,406 plans
commencing and 53,206 plans going into default (representing 9.9 per cent of all
plans commenced).
This Annual Report for 2013-14 and past reports are available from the Department of Justices
website at www.justice.vic.gov.au.
The Infringements System
Infringement offences are prescribed in more than 60 statutes and are administered by a wide
variety of enforcement agencies including state and local government agencies, which include
local councils, universities and hospitals.
Infringement notices or on the spot fines may be issued by enforcement agencies for a range of
offences including parking, traffic and public transport offences. Fixed penalties apply to offences
to provide a person issued with an infringement notice the option of paying a fixed penalty, rather than
proceeding to a court hearing. The value of a penalty unit for a financial year is fixed by the
Treasurer under the Monetary Units Act 2004 and usually increases on an annual basis in line
with the Consumer Price Index. The value of a penalty unit for the 2013-14 year was $144.36.
The infringements system is intended to provide a simple, speedy and efficient means of disposing of
matters in which the nature of the offending and the level of the penalty do not warrant judicial
adjudication.
Key features of Victorias infringements system include:
a common process for issuing and enforcing infringement notices across enforcement agencies
the option to elect to have an infringeable offence heard and determined by the Magistrate
Court 1
the right for a person to have an infringement notice reviewed by the issuing agency where
there may have been a mistake of law or identity, or where special or exceptional
circumstances may apply (refer to footnote 1 for exceptions).
a recognition that people with special circumstances (i.e. people with a mental or intellectual
disability, disorder, disease or illness, a serious addiction, or who are homeless) should not be
dealt with through an automated enforcement process
This option is not available for infringement offences under:

Sections 89A to 89D of the Road Safety Act 1986
Sections 215C of the Transport Act 1983
Sections 61A and 61B of the Marine Act 1988
[Regulation 11K Infringements (Reporting and Prescribed Details and
Forms) Regulations 2006].
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the availability of payment plans for people experiencing financial hardship
strong enforcement measures against people who refuse to pay their fines.
If the infringement notice is paid, the payment will expiate the offence. No further proceedings
may be taken against the offender in respect of the offence the subject of the infringement notice, and
there is no conviction recorded against the person. Payment of an infringement is not an admission
of guilt. Further information on the Infringements System is provided in Error! Reference source not
found.. A list of enforcement agencies is provided in Error! Reference source not found..
Key Initiatives and Highlights: 2013-14

Fines Reform
The Fines Reform Act 2014 (the Fines Reform Act) was passed by Parliament in June 2014. Key
features of the Fines Reform Act include the transition to a single administrative model for
collection and enforcement of infringement and court fines. The new model aims to provide further
simplification, streamlining and consolidation of fines, collection and enforcement processes.
Central to the reforms is a focus on the total amount of fines owed by an individual, rather than the
current transaction-based approach.
Media campaigning by the Sheriff of Victoria
During the month of August 2013, the Sheriff of Victoria featured in over 60 media items, reinforcing
the message that with the assistance of Automatic Number Plate Recognition Technology, Sheriffs
Officers are able to track down people trying to evade paying their infringement fines, who can be
caught anywhere, anytime.
Moving the Infringements Court counter enquiries to Civic Compliance Victoria

Victoria (CCV). Previously customers who attended CCV with an enquiry that required an
Infringements Court registrars determination had to be referred to the Infringements Court at a
separate location in the city. The collocation of the Infringements Court and Civic Compliance
Victoria provide a one-stop-shop for the public to enquire about their fines, leading to improved
efficiency and reduced waiting times for customers.
This report provides detailed information about infringements activity across Victorias over 120 enforcement
agencies and enforcement activity undertaken by the Infringements Court and the Sheriff of Victoria in the
201112 financial year. The report also contains information about new initiatives across the Victorian
infringements system, as well as information about infringements policy.
Infringement notices play a vital role in the administration of justice in Victoria. They are an efficient means of
addressing criminal offences in a way that provides an alternative to traditional court hearings and sentences.
Because the infringements system provides for many offences to be dealt with outside the courtroom, it
enables effective punishment and deterrence of high volume offences.
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In 201112, 4.79 million infringement notices were issued, and as in past years, road safety offences were the
largest category of offences.
Road safety is a key area of focus for government, and enforcing offences such as speeding and running red
lights, including those detected by road safety cameras, plays an important role in minimising the road toll. To
increase transparency and oversight of road safety cameras, the Victorian Government appointed Victorias
first Road Safety Camera Commissioner, Hon. Gordon Lewis, who commenced work in February 2012. You can
find further information about this initiative in the report.
Road safety and traffic offences account for the majority of infringements issued in Victoria, but infringements
are used in a range of other areas including public transport, industry regulation, and environmental
protection, as well as some public order offences. Activity in relation to these infringements, as well as
information about review processes and payment arrangements is included in the report.
While most people who receive infringement notices either pay or take other action to address their fines on
time, the infringements system has a range of measures to address non-compliance for the minority who do
not deal with their fines. The Sheriff of Victoria plays a significant role in enforcing unpaid fines and the report
includes information about the various sanctions used by the Sheriff and a report on enforcement activity.
Infringements Activity
Snapshot of infringements activity
In 2013-14, nearly 4.99 million infringements were issued in Victoria for a wide range of offences,
compared to 5.82 million infringements issued in 2012-13 and 4.79 million infringements issued in
2011-12.
As shown in Chart 1, 2012-13 was an unusually high volume year for infringements issued relative to
a long-term trend. In part, this was due to an increase in the number of infringements issued for failing
to vote in local government elections held by the Victorian Electoral Commission (VEC) during this
period.
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12-12-2015
Millions
Chart 1: Infringements issued over time

7.0
VEC-issued infringements
6.0
All other agencies
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
14
320
1
13
20
1
2-
12
120
1
11
020
1
10
20
0
9-
09
820
0
08
720
0
20
0
6-
07
0.0
Since reporting commenced in 2006-07, the annual number of infringements issued has increased by 19.2 per cent,
averaging 2.54 per cent growth per annum.
Table 2 shows the type of infringement activity - infringement withdrawals, official warnings, election to court and internal
reviews over time.
Table 2: Infringement activities over time
Financial
Year
Infringement
s Issued
Withdrawn
Official
Warnings
Issued
Official
Warnings
Withdraw
n
Election
s to go
to Court
Internal
Reviews
Decided
Infringement
s
2013-14
4,988,254
272,767
159,411
929
72,893
469,093
2012-13
5,820,379
327,838
155,785
1,664
60,676
482,574
2011-12
4,788,385
253,137
133,528
740
44,592
399,178
2010-11
4,974,281
242,866
130,539
658
37,994
401,219
2009-10
4,651,168
226,060
114,105
112
32,806
360,554
2008-09
4,664,712
229,836
102,502
270
28,614
370,760
2007-08
4,144,187
209,452
94,305
177
25,898
354,234
2006-07
4,185,125
141,732
50,730
1,165
19,796
261,247
Infringements issued by offence category

The vast majority of infringements are issued for traffic offences (including tolling) and for parking offences. Table 3
shows the number of infringements issued by reported category for the past three years.
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Table 3: Infringements issued by offence category, 3-year comparison

Offence category
2011-12
2012-13
2013-14
Traffic (including tolling)
2,737,532
3,378,387
2,921,661
Parking
1,684,905
1,737,197
1,689,271
Public Transport
206,913
214,090
203,013
Other categories*
159,035
490,705
174,309
4,788,385
5,820,379
4,988,254
Total Infringements Issued
* Reference to 'Other categories' refers to infringements issued for offences under

various statutes related to categories such as animal, consumer safety and industry
regulation, electoral, environment and pollution, excessive speed, drink and drug
driving, local law and marine.
Infringements issued by agency type
Error! Reference source not found. shows the number and share of infringements issued by type of enforcement agency
in 2013-14.
Victoria Police continues to issue the majority of infringements (3.02 million in 2013-14) as it has wide powers to issue
infringement notices across a broad range of statutes.
Local councils issue the second largest number of infringement notices (1.68 million notices in 2013-14), the majority
being for parking infringements, which is the second most common offence category.
Infringements and Local Councils
There are 79 local councils in Victoria who issue infringements for a range of offences. Local councils authorised to issue
infringement notices are provided at Appendix 2.2
In 2013-14 local councils issued 1.68 million infringements, as shown in Table 4. Metropolitan councils issued the majority
of these infringements (85.3 per cent) which is a similar figure to previous years.
Table 4: Infringements issued by local councils, by type of council, 3-year comparison
Infringements issued
2011-12
2012-13
2013-14
1,424,636
1,453,409
1,434,259
112,978
120,090
109,260
Metro Fringe
99,337
99,289
105,530
Large Rural
32,952
34,147
29,592
Small Rural
3,131
2,398
2,898
1,673,034
1,709,333
1,681,539
Metropolitan
Regional Centre
All local councils
For more details on infringements issued by local councils refer to Error! Reference source not
found..
Councils throughout Victoria are classed according to the size of the population they serve: large
rural, metropolitan, metropolitan fringe, regional centre or small rural.
2
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New Anti-Hoon Laws

Speeding is one of the biggest killers on Victorian roads. To reinforce that excessive speed and other hoon behaviour will
not be tolerated, in July 2011 the Victorian Government introduced tougher penalties, increasing the impoundment
period for a first offence from 48 hours to 30 days. Tough fines apply to these sorts of offences, ranging from around
$700 for an infringement notice, to in excess of $28,000 for court-imposed fines. This is in addition to towing and
impoundment costs of up to $2,000.
Drinking and Driving Do Not Mix

The Government amended legislation in December 2011 to close a loophole in relation to alcohol and driving.
Reinforcing the message that drinking and driving do not mix, it is now an offence to drink alcohol while driving a motor
vehicle, whether or not you are under the limit. Victoria Police enforces these offences by infringement notices that
carry a penalty of around $280 or taking the offender to court where they risk a fine of up to $1,405.
New Sheriffs Officers

Following an extensive recruitment campaign, ten new Sheriffs Officers commenced in the South Eastern Region. During
a comprehensive six-week training program the new recruits studied legislative and operational information relevant to
their new roles, such as how to execute criminal warrants, apply sanctions, communicate effectively and manage
workplace risks and challenges.
All the new recruits also completed field placements, where they worked on-the-job with experienced Sheriffs Officers.
These job placements enabled the recruits to implement their new knowledge in a practical, operational context. Having
completed their training, the new recruits are now working in the field.
Special Operations
Targeted enforcement activity including roadblocks and blitzes by Sheriffs Officers, in conjunction with enforcement
agencies, such as Victoria Police, local councils and VicRoads resulted in $3.6 million collected relating to 103,678
infringement warrants.
Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) Technology

Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) technology was trialled by Sheriffs Officers during 201112. Read more
in the Sanctions Activity section of this report.
Road Safety Camera Commissioner

The Road Safety Camera Commissioner Act 2011 established the office of Road Safety Camera Commissioner and
provided for the appointment, functions and powers of the Road Safety Camera Commissioner. Former County Court
Judge Gordon Lewis AM is Australias first independent Road Safety Camera Commissioner. In addition to being a former
member of the County Court, Mr Lewis has extensive experience working across government and brings a broad range of
experience to his new role.
The focus of the Road Safety Camera Commissioners office is to promote increased transparency and accountability of
the road safety camera system. The office undertakes quality assurance and reporting, investigates systemic issues, and
provides a complaints management service. The Commissioners statutory role requires regular review of the road safety
camera system and investigation of systemic issues concerning the system. The first Road Safety Camera Commissioner
Annual Report was tabled 28 August 2012, covering the period from 06 February 2012 when the office came into
operation, until 30 June 2012. For more information, go to:
www.cameracommissioner.vic.gov.au
Infringements and Options for Review

The decision to issue an infringement notice is discretionary and enforcement agencies have the option
of issuing an official warning, issuing an infringement or electing to prosecute the offence in the
Magistrates Court. For most infringement penalties, a person receiving the infringement has the
following options:
pay the infringement penalty
apply for an internal review
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ask for additional time to pay
ask to pay by instalments
elect to go to court
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A person cannot negotiate with an enforcement agency to lower the infringement penalty amount
as this amount is prescribed in the relevant legislation in relation to the offence.
Legislative timeframes trigger enforcement actions when an infringement remains unpaid. The
options outlined above, such as internal review and electing to contest the infringement offence
in court, allow the initial decision to issue an infringement to be tested.
Electing to go to court
10
Individuals who receive an infringement notice can elect to go to court at any time prior to
lodgement of an infringement penalty with the Infringements Court. In 2013-14, there were
72,893 infringements contested in court, compared to 60,676 in the previous year. Table 5 shows
the number of elections to court over time.
The majority of matters contested in court are for traffic and toll enforcement offences, which
have grown in volume from 47,649 in 2012-13 to 62,664 in 2013-14. This growth correlates with
increases in the number of elections to go to court in the last reporting period.
Table 5: Electing to go to court as proportion of infringements issued over time
Infringement
Activity
Elections to go
to Court
Percentage of
Infringements
Issued
15
2006-07
2007-08
2008-09
2009-10
2010-11
2011-12
2012-13
2013-14
19,796
25,898
28,614
32,806
37,994
44,592
60,676
72,893
0.5%
0.6%
0.6%
0.7%
0.8%
0.9%
1.0%
1.5%
Internal Review
A person who receives an infringement notice has a right under the Infringements Act to have the
issuing enforcement agency review the decision to issue the infringement notice. This process is
known as internal review.
20
A person or someone authorised to act on their behalf is entitled to apply for review of an
infringement notice on any of the following grounds:
(a)
The infringement was issued contrary to law, or there was a mistake of identity in the
infringement notice
(b)
The person had special circumstances, defined in Infringements Act as:

o
a mental or intellectual disability, disorder, disease or illness resulting in the

person being unable to understand or control the conduct that constitutes the
offence
a serious addiction to drugs, alcohol or a volatile substance resulting in the

person being unable to understand or control the conduct that constitutes the
offence
homelessness, where this results in the person being unable to control the
conduct that constitutes the offence
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(c)
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There are other exceptional circumstances that justify withdrawing an infringement

notice (for example where a person has enough awareness and self-control to
normally be liable for his or her conduct, but it is appropriate in the particular
circumstances to withdraw the infringement notice).
The legitimacy of the original decision to issue an infringement notice can be tested
independently and decisions overturned and infringement notices withdrawn, before any
significant enforcement action has commenced.
The infringements system provides a process for internal review of most decisions relating to
offences for which infringement notices can be issued. There are however a number of
exceptions, with the right to an internal review not applying to offences such as those related to
excessive speed, drink and drug driving.
In 2013-14, there were more than 469,093 applications for internal review. Table 6 shows the
number of internal review applications according the grounds of exceptional circumstances,
contrary to law, special circumstances and mistake of identity. The vast majority of internal
review applications were made on the ground of exceptional circumstances (84.7 per cent).
Table 6: Number of internal review by grounds for review, 3-year comparison
Grounds for review
2011-12
2012-13
2013-14
Exceptional Circumstances
327,252
408,423
397,277
56,623
57,332
56,850
Mistake of Identity
6,783
9,952
7,805
Special Circumstances
8,520
6,867
7,161
399,178
482,574
469,093
Contrary to Law
Total: Internal Reviews Determined
It is worth noting that in 2012-13, the VEC determined 10,765 internal review applications but
only 856 in 2013-14. This suggests that without the significant number of local council elections
in 2012-13, the volumes of internal reviews in 2012-13 and 2013-14 are very similar.
20
As shown in Table 7, the majority of internal reviews are sought for the most common type of
infringement categories, including traffic, parking and public transport offence.
QUOTE 130723-R Clark Attorney General & others-Re COMPLAINT
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Mr Robert Clark MP Attorney-General

robert.clark@parliament.vic.gov.au
23-7-2013
Cc: D. Napthine MP Premier of Victoria

denis.napthine@parliament.vic.gov.au
Brendan Facey Director, Infringement Management & Enforcement Services (Sheriff)
Brendan.Facey@justice.vic.gov.au
M Hoyle, Quality and client support Coordinator
Civic Compliance Victoria GPO Box 1916, Melbourne VIC 3001
Traffic_Inquiries@tenixsolutions.com
COMPLAINT
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Re: -COMPLAINT etc Obligation Number 1106575301
Sir,
I received an email (reproduced below) which refers to issues that I raised in my previous
correspondences, but as yet never received any reply upon, and so I urge you to address the
issues as to the validity of speed camera being used without specific approval by the
Commonwealth of Australia and other issues raised in this correspondence.
Below some pictures of workers (on 13 April 2012) at a red light camera, but to me seemingly
not Commonwealth of Australia qualified and authorised technicians.
10
120413-Swanston Street camera (13 April 2012)
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20
As I challenged the validity of the legislation, at least since 30-5-2011, in my correspondence to

the then Premier of Victoria Ted Baillieu, then it remains ULTRA VIRES unless a court
pronounces against it and declares it INTRA VIRUS, not that I concede this should or ought to
eventuate. However, one also has to consider the issue of CONTEMPT OF COURT.
It is widely accepted that those who place a court in disrepute may be found guilty of
CONTEMPT OF COURT. Therefore those who are purporting that the Infringement Court is
part of the Magistrates Court of Victoria but then using the Infringement Court in a manner that
is contrary to the Court's position as a Chapter III court of the constitution and those involved
manipulating the system for this also can be deemed to commit CONTEMPT OF COURT.
Lewis v Ogden [1984] HCA 28; (1984) 153 CLR 682 (15 May 1984)
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QUOTE
8. At common law words or conduct in the face of the court or in the course of proceedings, in order to
constitute contempt, "must be such as would interfere, or tend to interfere, with the course of justice"
(Parashuram Detaram Shamdasani v. King-Emperor (1945) AC 264, at p 268 ). Instead of making
interference, or tendency to interfere, with the course of justice an element in the offences which it created,
subs. (1) introduces the new element of conduct which is wilful in pars. (a) and (c). In these two paragraphs
the word "wilfully" means "intentionally", or "deliberately", in the sense that what is said or done is intended
as an insult, threat, etc. Its presence does more than negative the notion of "inadvertently" or "unconsciously"
(Bell v. Stewart [1920] HCA 68; (1920) 28 CLR 419, at p 427 ). The mere voluntary utterance of words is not
enough. "Wilfully" imports the notion of purpose. (at p688)
9. It is submitted that the section should be read in the light of the common law of contempt and that, when so
read, there should be imported into pars. (a) and (c) the common law requirement that the acts must be such as
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to interfere, or tend to interfere with the course of justice. The short answer to this argument is that all the acts
mentioned in pars. (a) to (d) inclusive are acts which in their very nature interfere or have a tendency to
interfere with the administration of justice and have been so regarded traditionally. To take but one example,
a wilful insult to a judge or jury during a trial necessarily interrupts the course of the trial and tends to divert
attention from the issues to be determined. So in Ex parte Pater (1864) 5 B & S 299 (122 ER 842) where a
barrister was adjudged guilty contempt in that he wilfully insulted a juryman during the course of his address
to the jury, the wilful insult was treated as an obstruction of the administration of justice and, accordingly, as
a contempt. Cockburn C.J. observed (1864) 5 B & S, at p 310 (122 ER, at p 846) :
" . . . they are words which counsel might have uttered in the honest discharge of his duty for the purpose of
vindicating the interests of his client and preventing the other jurors from being prejudiced or unduly
influenced by the opinion of the foreman; and if they had been so uttered, though they were harsh and
offensive to the juryman to whom they were applied, that would be within the right and privilege of counsel.
But if they were uttered with the intention to insult the juryman, then they were an abuse of the privilege of
counsel, and the judge might treat the uttering of them as a contempt . . . ."
Blackburn J., after referring to the power of Quarter Sessions to punish "an unwarrantable obstruction of the
administration of justice in the face of the Court", continued (1864) 5 B & S, at p 312 (122 ER, at p 847) :
" . . . if counsel under colour of addressing the jury, insults a juryman, or the Court, I cannot doubt that it
would be such an obstruction as would be a contempt . . . ."
It follows that a person who wilfully insults a judge in the course of proceedings in court does something
which necessarily interferes, or tends to interfere, with the course of justice. (at p689)
END QUOTE
Lewis v Ogden [1984] HCA 28; (1984) 153 CLR 682 (15 May 1984)
QUOTE
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20. The critical question then is whether in the way in which he made those points the appellant trespassed
beyond the bounds of legitimate advocacy and wilfully insulted the judge. Although the question is by no
means easy to answer, we have come to the conclusion that what was said was neither insulting nor intended
to be so. As we have already indicated, the appellant's remarks are susceptible of the interpretation that the
judge had expressed a consistently adverse view of the accused's case and its presentation, that the judge's
treatment of it was one-sided, and that, accordingly, there was a real risk that his summing up would be of the
same character. The appellant had no means of knowing in advance what the trial judge would say in his
summing up. Having concluded that there was a risk that adverse comments would or might be made, the
appellant was placed in the difficult position of endeavouring to counter such comments in advance by raising
the matter directly in his address. The appellant, in embarking upon this delicate undertaking, by his reference
to the Collingwood umpire and the statement from the dock, and the manner and tone of his delivery - a
matter to which the judge referred - came close to insulting the judge. However, having regard to the
interpretation which we place on what the appellant said, namely that his Honour's attitude to Paul's case was
adverse and unfair in the sense of being "one-sided", we do not consider that the learned judge could have
been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant's comments amounted to an insult. The appellant's
conduct was extremely discourteous, perhaps offensive, and deserving of rebuke by his Honour, but in our
view it could not be said to constitute contempt. (at p693)
21. In conclusion three comments should be made. The first is to recall that the contempt power is exercised
to vindicate the integrity of the court and of its proceedings; it is rarely, if ever, exercised to vindicate the
personal dignity of a judge (Ex parte Fernandez (1861) 30 LJCP 321, at p 332 ; Reg. v. Castro; Skipworth's
Case (1873) LR 9 QB 219, at p 232 ; Bellanto (1962) 63 SR (NSW), at pp 200, 202 ). The second is that the
summary power of punishing for contempt should be used sparingly and only in serious cases
(Shamdasani (1945) AC, at p 270 ; Izuora v. The Queen (1953) AC 327, at p 336 ). The final comment is that
the charge of contempt should specify the nature of the contempt, i.e., that it consists of a wilful insult to the
judge, and identify the alleged insult. (at p693)
22. In the result we would allow the appeal. (at p693)
ORDER
Appeal allowed.
END QUOTE
55
SEE ALSO:
Bell v Stewart [1920] HCA 68; (1920) 28 CLR 419
di Suvero v Bar Association (LSD) [2001] NSWADTAP 9
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Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Elisabeth Sexton [2008] NSWSC 352

McGuirk v University of NSW [2010] NSWSC 448
Principal Registrar, Supreme Court of New South Wales v Katelaris
Prothonotary v Wilson [1999] NSWSC 1148
REGISTRAR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA v MOORE-MCQUILLAN
Rondel v Worsley [1967] UKHL 5 (22 November 1967)

Trajkovski and Department of Transport and Regional Transport [2000] AATA 1073
TRANSPANTHERS- THE GREYING OF TRANSGENDER AND THE LAW
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Whereas ordinary a Parliament may not be held in CONTEMPT OF COURT, as its conduct
ordinary is protected b y privileges. However, a Parliament sitting in clear defiance of a Court
order then those participating in the sitting may be deemed guilty of CONTEMPT OF
COURT,. For example, where a Court has declared an election to be invalid and order a new
election and issue an order that the Parliament cannot sit unless and until a new election has been
held and those elected then are to form the new Parliament, then if nevertheless those held not
elected ignore to hold a new election (through the Electoral Commission) and sit in Parliament to
enact legislation to retrospectively validate their election, then clearly this would be deemed
CONTEMPT OF COURT. Likewise, an Attorney-General acting in blatant violation of a Court
order can be and has been held in CONTEMPT OF COURT.
Even a judge or a prosecutor can be held in CONTEMPT OF COURT.
http://www.visupremecourt.org/wfdata/frame1769-1163/File34.pdf
On Order to Show Cause for Indirect Criminal Contempt
In Re The Honourable Leon A. Kendall
QUOTE
OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM.
This Court, in an August 13, 2009 Order, required Leon A. Kendall, a judge of the
1 This Court, in a September 16, 2009 Order, appointed Attorney Hall.a disinterested private attorney.to serve
as the special prosecutor in this matter because, given the procedural history of this case, allowing a
prosecutor employed by the Department of Justice to prosecute this matter could be perceived as a conflict of
interest by the public. See In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 2004) (affirming appointment
of private counsel as special prosecutor because use of government prosecutor would not necessarily have
banished the public impression of a conflict in this case.). See also Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et
Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 811, 814, (1987) (explaining that prosecutors of contempt action must be guided
solely by their sense of public responsibility for the attainment of justice and that selection of a prosecutor
must not create[] an appearance of impropriety that diminishes faith in the fairness of the criminal justice
system in general.).
In re Kendall
S. Ct. Misc. No. 2009-0025
Opinion of the Court
Page 2 of 29
Superior Court,2 to show cause as to why he should not be held in indirect criminal contempt.3 On December
18, 2009, this Court appointed the Honorable Edgar D. Ross, a retired Superior Court judge, to serve as a
Special Master, with the authority to, among other things, conduct a
2 While this matter was pending, Kendall retired from his position as a Superior Court judge at the conclusion
of his term in October 2009.
3 The August 13, 2009 Order required, in pertinent part,
that Judge Leon A. Kendall . . . SHOW CAUSE . . . why he should not be held in indirect criminal Contempt
of Court for
(1) Obstructing the administration of justice through
a. inflammatory remarks and other characterizations in his July 7, 2009 opinion that appear calculated and
intended to prejudice this Court in public estimation, destroy or call into doubt this Court.s function and
position as the highest local court in the Virgin Islands, and to reduce confidence in the administration of
justice in this jurisdiction; and
b. purporting to review the validity and legality of this Court.s May 13, 2009 opinion and order, including, but
not limited to, stating that the issuance of this Court.s order was clearly improper, that its conclusions
make[] no sense and are erroneous, and that this Court.s mandate should be given no credence,
despite this Court.s status as the highest local court in the Virgin Islands;
(2) Failing to comply with this Court.s May 13, 2009 opinion and order by
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a. refusing to schedule the matter for trial and proceeding to trial in the absence of a valid plea disposition;
b. refusing to consider a change of venue or a continuance to minimize pre-trial publicity in the underlying
matter; and
c. recusing himself from the matter below for the purposes of avoiding future compliance with this Court.s
mandate, leading to additional scheduling delays;
(3) Misbehaving in his official transactions as an officer of the court by
a. failing to comply with this Court.s May 13, 2009 opinion and order in violation of Rule 1.1 of the
American Bar Association.s Model Rules of Judicial Conduct, made applicable to Judge Kendall pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 205 and Virgin Islands Bar Association Bylaw X.8(D);
b. calling into question, through his July 7, 2009 opinion, the integrity of the Virgin Islands judiciary through
inflammatory language directed at this Court and concluding that this Court.s May 13, 2009 opinion and order
was clearly improper, that its conclusions make[] no sense and are erroneous, and that this Court.s
mandate should be given no credence, in violation of Rule 1.2 of the American Bar Association.s Model
Rules of Judicial Conduct, made applicable to Judge Kendall pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 205 and Virgin
Islands Bar Association Bylaw X.8(D);
c. refusing to hear a matter properly assigned to him by recusing himself for reasons not authorized by law, in
violation of Rule 2.11 of the American Bar Association.s Model Rules of Judicial Conduct, made applicable
to Judge Kendall pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 205 and Virgin Islands Bar Association Bylaw X.8(D)[.]
In re Kendall
S. Ct. Misc. No. 2009-0025
Opinion of the Court
Page 3 of 29
show cause hearing and make and submit to this Court proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
After presiding over the show cause hearing and considering the parties. submissions, the Special Master has
recommended that this Court acquit Kendall of all charges. After an exhaustive review of the record,
including a transcript of the show cause hearing, a video of the majority of the proceedings, and numerous
documents entered into evidence by both parties, we accept in part and reject in part the Special Master.s
findings, conclusions, and recommendations.
END QUOTE
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http://www.visupremecourt.org/wfdata/frame1769-1163/File34.pdf
On Order to Show Cause for Indirect Criminal Contempt
In Re The Honourable Leon A. Kendall
QUOTE
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we find that the People proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Kendall is guilty of
indirect criminal contempt by obstructing the administration of justice, failing to comply with the May 13,
2009 Opinion and Order, and misbehaving in his official transactions. Accordingly, we accept in part and
reject in part the Special Master.s December 22, 2010 Recommendation, and shall set this matter for a
sentencing hearing.
Dated this 12th day of October, 2011.
ATTEST:
VERONICA J. HANDY, ESQ.
Clerk of the Court
END QUOTE
The Government must be deemed to be no more but a party before the Courts and not one who can manipulate the
legislative powers of the parliament as to so to say give it an easy ride through some purported court process that
basically guarantees that a Infringement notice is enforced regardless if it was ill conceived.
We must have and maintain a robust judiciary which is to question the legal validity of any plaintiff/applicant
regardless if this is the Government and/or any authority to act for it or an ordinary citizens.
.
QUOTE
Sir JOHN DOWNER.-Now it is coming out. The Constitution is made for the people and the states on
terms that are just to both.
END QUOTE
.
This no longer exists when the State violate the independence of the judiciary by dictating a legal process or better to
state a purported legal process that is designed to rob the citizen of a FAIR and PROPER trial. Indeed, VCAT
(Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal) is precisely such a creature where a citizen is forced to appear before
it rather then being entitled to the protection of a Court of law, as it suits the government better to manipulate its
powers through its own government departments such as VCAT. Judicial officers who support this kind of conduct
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by this in my view are betraying the oath of office they made and so to say are selling their sole to their corporate
masters.
Blair v Magistrates' Court of Victoria & Anor [2002] VSC

242 (19 June 2002)
QUOTE
HIS HONOUR:
1.
In this proceeding the plaintiff, Ian Blair, challenges the jurisdiction of the Magistrates' Court to hear a
proceeding against him in which he is charged with an offence under sub-section 49(1)(e) of the Road
Safety Act 1986. The challenge to the Magistrates' Court jurisdiction was made before Magistrate Cottrill
who decided on 13 October 2000 that the court did have jurisdiction to hear the charge and adjourned the
proceeding to a date yet to be fixed. The basis of the challenge to the Magistrates' Court jurisdiction is the
absence from the court file of the original document fitting the description of the charge and original
summons in sub-section 30(2) of the Magistrates' Court Act 1989.
2.
Section 30 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1989 deals with when a prescribed person may issue a summons.
Sub-section 30(1) provides that a prescribed person may issue a summons to answer a charge for a
prescribed summary offence. Sub-section 30(2) sets out certain requirements when a prescribed person
issues a summons under sub-section 30(1). Sub-section 30(2)(a), provides, in particular, that a prescribed
person issuing a summons under sub-section 30(1), must file the charge and original summons with the
appropriate registrar within seven days after signing the charge-sheet. Sub-section 30(3) provides that "if
it appears" to the court that sub-section 30(2)(a) has not been complied with "the Court must strike out the
charge" and may award costs against the informant. The procedural requirement imposed by sub-section
30(2)(a) is, thus, mandatory and non-compliance with it compels the Magistrates' Court to strike out the
charge.
3.
The plaintiff contended before Mr Cottrill, and also by way of hearing de novo before me, that the charge
had to be struck out because the original document required to be filed under sub-section 30(2)(a) could not
be produced. The Magistrate found as fact that the document which was to be filed under sub-section
30(2)(a) had been filed and was satisfied that sub-section 30(2)(a) had been complied with. His Worship
was able to find the relevant facts by referring to, and relying upon, evidence of the Magistrates' Court's file
and his knowledge of the process and procedures of that court. He was able to conclude, in my view
correctly, that the original of the document which was to be filed under sub-section 30(2)(a) had been filed
and, on the basis of the facts before him, it appeared to him (as it does to me) that the terms of sub-section
30(2)(a) had been complied with.
4.
His Worship has helpfully described the Magistrates' Court process and procedures by which proceedings
are initiated in cases such as this. I was taken to that description, as being factually correct, by both parties.
His Worship explained the commencement of the process and procedures as follows:
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"For the purpose of initiating proceedings for a charge and summons pursuant to s.30 of
the Magistrates' Court Act, the proscribed [sic] person process, the police informant
utilises a set of documents which are joined together by a perforated strip. There are four
relevant documents: first page, white, headed CDEB, Police Brief Copy; second page,
green, headed Charge and Summons To Be Filed At Court After Service; third page,
green, headed Charge and Summons, Original To Be Retained By The Court; fourth
page, blue, headed Charge and Summons, Bring This With You To Court. The balance of
the document consists of two pages being notice and advice proscribed [sic] pursuant to
the Magistrates Court General Regulations and which are not relevant for the purposes of
these proceedings."
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END QUOTE
Munro v Brack & Anor [2000] VSC 229 (5 June 2000)

50
QUOTE
30. It was submitted therefore that as his Honour cannot have considered the matters he was required to
consider by s.5(2) and that his failure in that regard constituted an error of law on the face of the record
sufficient to justify bringing the orders up into this court and quashing them.
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31. There is no absolute duty upon a judge to state his reasons. However it is difficult to conceive of a case in
which a County Court judge, after hearing evidence on an appeal from the Magistrates' Court, would not be
required to give reasons. See R. v. Arnold[4].
32. Expressed another way, a case must be exceptional for a judge not to have a duty to state reasons. See
Soulemezis v. Dudley (Holdings) Pty. Ltd.[5]
33. See also Powter; re Powter[6]; and Farrugia v. The County Court of Victoria & Anor[7].
34. But there is no obligation on a judge dealing with an appeal of the nature of the appeal in this case to give
elaborate reasons for his decision let alone incumbent upon him to state in those reasons that he has given
consideration to the various matters he is required to by s.5(2) of the Sentencing Act 1991.
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END QUOTE
How indeed can any purported legal process be in existence that defies ordinary legal procedures for an accused to
challenge the allegations once place before a court? What we have is that a person alleged to have infringed a traffic
code then is given the alleged option to take it to court or not, which would induce a citizen to incur loss of income,
etc, regardless if the Infringement Notice is ill conceived. This never can be deemed a legitimate legal process as it
must be held that unless and until the allegations has been filed in court (not just lodged) the accused has no
obligation to answer anything. there me fact something is alleged against a person doesn't place any person upon that
person then having to go to court to prove his "innocence"! If my neighbour was to alleged that I had weakened the
fence in some manner, it doesn't mean that I then have to select to go to court or by my refusal to do so can be
deemed to be guilty as alleged. Likewise, where the Government or any of its authorities makes an allegation then it
is open to them to place the matter before the Court and not unless and until; it is filed in a Court of law there is no
obligation to an accused to somehow elect to go to court.
Infringement Act 2006
QUOTE
s. 53
Part 4Lodging Infringement Penalties and Enforcement Orders
Infringements Act 2006 Act No. 12/2006
44
PART 4LODGING INFRINGEMENT PENALTIES AND ENFORCEMENT ORDERS
Division 1Lodgement
54. Lodgement of infringement penalty with infringements registrar
(1) An enforcement agency may lodge details of any outstanding amount of an infringement penalty in
respect of a lodgeable infringement offence together with the prescribed costs (if any) with an infringements
registrar if
END QUOTE
While the Infringement Act 2006 refers to "lodged"/"lodging"/"lodgeable", the truth is, that
anyone can lodge an application or other document in the Court but this in itself doesn't mean it
is "filed'. The Registrar or other officer, including a judge may refuse to accept the lodged
document for filing and then it is and remains a document not subject to litigation between
parties.
QUOTE S3 Definitions
"lodgeable infringement offence" means an infringement offence prescribed under this Act to be an
infringement offence which is enforceable under this Act;
END QUOTE
While it is provided for that and infringement offence can be enforced it does however not
stipulate that the lodgement of an Infringement Notice itself is deemed to be as to filing of a
document ordinary applicable in the Magistrates Court of Victoria.
"enforcement agency", in relation to an infringement offence, means
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(a) a person or body authorised by or under an Act to take proceedings for the infringement offence in respect
of which the infringement notice or official warning was issued or served; or (b) a person by whom, or body
by which, a person or body referred to in paragraph (a) is employed or engaged to provide services if the
taking of the proceedings referred to in that paragraph would occur in the course of that employment or in the
course of providing those services; or (c) a prescribed person or body or person or body which is a member of
a prescribed class of person or body;
END QUOTE
The above doesn't show any indication as to "file" or "filed".

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QUOTE
57. Reliance on lodged material
An infringements registrar is entitled
(a) to rely on the accuracy of the material provided by an enforcement agency when the details of an
infringement penalty and prescribed costs (if any) in respect of a lodgeable infringement offence are lodged
under section 54; and
(b) to assume that the details are true and correct.
58. Agency may request enforcement order not be made
At any time before an enforcement order is made, an enforcement agency may request an infringements
registrar not to make an enforcement order in respect of details of any outstanding amount of an infringement
penalty and prescribed costs (if any) in respect of a lodgeable infringement offence lodged under section 54.
Division 2Enforcement Orders
59. Enforcement orders
(1) If an infringements registrar has not received a request under section 58 from an enforcement agency, the
infringements registrar may make an enforcement order that the person pay to the Court the outstanding
amount of the infringement penalty and the prescribed costs in respect of a lodgeable infringement offence.
(2) An enforcement order is deemed to be an order of the Court.
s. 57
Part 4Lodging Infringement Penalties and Enforcement Orders
Infringements Act 2006 Act No. 12/
END QUOTE
"infringement notice" means a notice in respect of an infringement offence served in accordance with Part 2;
"infringement offence" means an offence under an Act or regulations which, under that Act or those regulations,
may be the subject of an infringement notice;
"infringement offender" means a person who has been arrested under an infringement warrant;
s. 3
Part 1Preliminary Infringements Act 2006 Act No. 12/2006
5
"infringement penalty" means the amount stated in an infringement notice as payable in respect of the
infringement offence to which the notice relates;
(a) means a registrar within the meaning of the Magistrates' Court Act 1989 who is a registrar on whom functions
under this Act or the Magistrates' Court Act 1989 have been conferred in respect of any proceeding or class of
proceeding or procedure under this Act; and
(b) includes any deputy registrar employed pursuant to section 17 of that Act to whom duties, powers and functions
under this Act are delegated under the Magistrates' Court Act 1989;
"infringement warrant" means a warrant issued under Part 6;
"issuing officer" means
(a) a person appointed by an enforcement agency to issue or serve an infringement notice in respect of an
infringement offence; or
(b) a prescribed person or person who is a member of a prescribed class of person;
"lodgeable infringement offence" means an infringement offence prescribed under this Act to be an infringement
offence which is enforceable under this Act;
END QUOTE
It does however claim;

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QUOTE
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(a) means a registrar within the meaning of the Magistrates' Court Act 1989 who is a registrar on whom
functions under this Act or the Magistrates' Court Act 1989 have been conferred in respect of any
proceeding or class of proceeding or procedure under this Act; and
(b) includes any deputy registrar employed pursuant to section 17 of that Act to whom duties, powers and
functions under this Act are delegated under the Magistrates' Court Act 1989;
END QUOTE
If the Infringement Registrar is a Registrar of the Magistrates Court of Victorias then I view the
term "deemed" ("2) An enforcement order is deemed to be an order of the Court.") is not appropriate, as
any order of a Registrar of any Court ordinary can be held to be a Order of the Court unless a
party objects to it, as I did, and then a hearing DE NOVO must be granted. Upon that basis the
Order of the Registrar seizes to exist once a hearing De Novo is undertaken.
In my view the legislation known as Infringement Act 2006 is deliberately designed to turn the
Magistrates Court of Victoria for financial benefits of the Government as well as those operating
the scheme as a closed court without DUE PROCESS. If the infringement Registrar was to be
validly operating as a Registrar of the magistrates Court of Victoria then the Infringement Act
2006 must show the provisions for a alleged infringement offender to be able to file any
documents in opposition of the alleged claims by the enforcement agency.
http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/more-news/nsw-drivers-stung-with-mistaken-citylinkcharges/story-fn7x8me2-1226265158730
QUOTE
NSW drivers stung with mistaken CityLink charges
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Greg Thom
From: Herald Sun
February 08, 2012 12:00AM

Thousands of motorists have been mistakenly charged for using CityLink. Picture: Mark Smith
Source: Herald Sun
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A BILLING bungle has resulted in thousands of motorists being charged for travelling on CityLink
despite being nowhere near the toll road.
New South Wales drivers with the same registration plates as Victorians were stung up to $7 a trip for driving
on the network, despite being thousands of kilometres away.
While the toll operator has vowed to issue a full refund, Victorian drivers who thought they might have had a
free ride won't be so lucky.
35
They will have to cough up the cost of their trips.

CityLink yesterday was checking up to 10,000 interstate licence plates to determine how many people were
eligible for a refund.
The issue affects those who travelled on the toll road between mid-December and Friday, when it was
detected in a review.
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The embarrassing mistake came on the day the tollway's operator, Transurban, revealed a $96.7 million profit.
Related Coverage
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NSW drivers charged with VIC tolls Courier Mail, 1 day ago
Victorian toll for Sydney drivers The Daily Telegraph, 1 day ago
Investors in the clearway Herald Sun, 1 day ago
Glitch delivers toll slug interstate The Australian, 1 day ago

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Lynch has faith in Transurban drivers Herald Sun, 9 days ago
End of sidebar. Return to start of sidebar.

CityLink-generated revenue surged 8 per cent to $235.4 million in the six months to December, compared
with the same period in 2010.
CityLink general manager Elizabeth Mildwater said the problem had been isolated and refunds were on the
way.
"We apologise for the inconvenience caused and would like to assure affected customers that they will not be
out of pocket," she said.
"We are going through the process of reversing the incorrect charges and this may take a few days to come
through." Ms Mildwater said it was believed only a small percentage of customers had been affected.
END QUOTE
What the article shows is that of mid December 2011 about 10,000 NSW drivers may have been
affected. but it was not until 8 February 2012 (outside the ordinary allowable time to make the
payment demanded by the Infringement Notice) before it was reported that it was admitted to be
an error. People may have been overseas or elsewhere, unaware of the Infringement Notice that
may have been delivered in their mailbox, and yet no provision exist for them to object to the
Infringement Notice, by the time they return to their homes and discover the alleged
infringement accusation. Others who may have travelled in that time on the freeway but didn't
commit any offence may wrongly hold to have been in offence. After all the system that should
operate should be as such as to be trustworthy and where then a possible 10,000 motorist may
have been wrongly issued a fine, just on that occasions alone then this place grave doubts about
the system used.
It also places a question as to the privacy of the NSW drivers for their details having been
accessed regardless of not having committed any offences. What we have is a private operator
going about delving into peoples private details causing embarrassment to them in the process
and upsets and those people may assume that because their precise details were known then it
must be applying to them, only to discover that this private operator simply has unlimited access
and basically in my view shows a total disregard to what the "Privacy Act" stands for.
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What this all also indicates is the lack of transparency as to the filing process and the conduct by
the purported Infringement Registrar. Who is the Infringement Registrar or the Deputy
Infringement Registrar really? What is the relevant name of the person and what was the time
and date of the hearing? How many of the NSW drivers, or that any other driver were wrongly
issued with an Infringement order regardless of their innocence of any wrongdoing, where the
Infringement Act 2006 prevents them to file any objection against any Infringement Notice
lodged in the Infringement Court? Who really is the "enforcement agency" when for example I
can receive correspondences from the Police, the Sheriff and Civic Compliance Victoria" all
seemingly dealing with the same matter? Surely, any accused has a right to know with whom he
is dealing and be provided with the precise details of the allegations lodged in the Infringement
court, before he might exercise the right to object to any material/details lodged with the
Infringement Court and well before the Infringement Registrar in an "open court' hears and
determines the matter considering what both parties may have submitted.
What we now have is that the Infringement registrar has basically been set up to issue
Infringement Notices and issuing Infringement orders in total disregard of DUE PROCESS OF
LAW, where an accused can seek to object to the jurisdiction of the court as well as submit any
material/details he may deem relevant for the case.
Indeed, a person may have committed an offence due to excruciating circumstances, such as
being severely injured and driving to a hospital. I recall that during 2012 I found my leg, of a
recent operation, to suddenly open up and because of the large wound on the left leg decided to
immediately drive myself to the hospital. While I was cautious not to exceed speedlimits,
nevertheless in the circumstances such as this it could eventuate that a driver may be faced with
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that every second can mean the difference of life and dead and that ordinary a Court of law
would consider this before passing judgment. Clearly the Infringement Court doesn't provide for
any such opportunity. It leave it at most up to the police officer to determine if the proffered
excuse is acceptable, but a camera used for detecting speed cannot consider this.
I had this incident where I desired to go to the Art Centre in Melbourne but found , too late, to be
heading into the tunnel to Richmond. I immediately drive back from Richmond to the Art Centre
and parked there, obtaining a parking slip. That evening I wrote to the premier about the issue
that I held the signage was insufficient to avoid driving into the tunnel, in the circumstances of
the traffic. I nevertheless received an Infringement Notice that I had not paid the toll for
travelling into the tunnel. However this was withdrawn when I forwarded a copy of my
correspondence to the Premier (then Steve Bracks) and a copy of the parking slip.
what however is to be considered is that if the issuing authority had not withdrawn the
Infringement Notice then I would have had so to say hope in hell to combat the issue before an
Infringement Registrar as there are no legal provisions for this.
Likewise, as I eluded to in past correspondences when Banyule City Council in error issued an
Infringement Notice that I had exceeded a 3 hours parking limit, this even so by their own
records I had parked fro 2 hours and 29 minutes, it took several months before they finally
understood that 2 hours and 29 minutes is less then 3 hours, and then finally withdrew the
Infringement Notice. However, had they not, considering it took Banyule City Council about
6months before finally withdrawing the Infringement Notice, then I would have had no
opportunity to still defend the matter before the Infringement Registrar because the system in
place doesn't allow for this. it would have been sheer and utter notice for me to elect from onset
to go to Court where I knew by the very details Banyule City Council provided that parking for 2
hours and 29 minutes could never have been to exceed the 3 hour parking limit, and then lose a
day to go to court, etc.
Nor can it be deemed appropriate that a Infringement Registrar accept the details, so to say,
punched into a computer as reliable merely because they were provided by an "enforcement
agency" without having regard to the actual records held by Banyule City Council and by this
may have issued Infringement Notices without allowing for any person so affected to oppose it,
even so a competent Infringement Registrar would have so to say thrown out of the window the
case if he had been provided with the details of any driver having been alleged to have exceeded
a 3 hour parking limit when being recorded to have parked there for 2 hours and 29 minutes.
what therefore is clear is that the legislation fails totally to ensure that any so called EX PARTE
hearing (if one can call it to be so) then the "enforcement agency" must produce all relevant
records upon which the Infringement Notice is issued. Including photo's and other records, and
where it relates to camera's their approved testing certificate by the Commonwealth, etc.
Without such provisions in legislation the entire system in my view is a elaborate scam,
involving Members of Parliament (having voted for such draconic legislation they knew or ought
to have known was designed to deny citizens of DUE PROCESS OF LAW, etc.), the
government, and those involved in the practice of acting as an enforcement agency and so to
involving the Sheriff's Office.
.
Again:
45
http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/more-news/nsw-drivers-stung-with-mistaken-citylink-charges/story-fn7x8me21226265158730
QUOTE
New South Wales drivers with the same registration plates as Victorians were stung up to $7 a trip for driving
on the network, despite being thousands of kilometres away.
50
While the toll operator has vowed to issue a full refund, Victorian drivers who thought they might have had a
free ride won't be so lucky.
They will have to cough up the cost of their trips.
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CityLink yesterday was checking up to 10,000 interstate licence plates to determine how many people were
eligible for a refund.
The issue affects those who travelled on the toll road between mid-December and Friday, when it was
detected in a review.
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The embarrassing mistake came on the day the tollway's operator, Transurban, revealed a $96.7 million profit.
END QUOTE
As such, I view that the Infringement Registrar cannot and shouldn't act on any Infringement
Notice that was lodged, but not filed! As the Infringement Act 2006 appears to be silent of any
filing of an Infringement Notice then clearly the ordinary legal procedures ordinary applicable to
the Magistrates Court of Victoria must be considered to be applicable. The Parliament cannot
have any powers to dictate to any Court that a document "lodged" but not filed according to the
rules of the Court nevertheless can be used for litigation, merely because the party happens to
benefit the government, whereas the same is not applicable for an ordinary citizens.
Again:
.
QUOTE
END QUOTE
.
Therefore, any legislation enacted within constitutional powers must likewise be just between
state and its people!
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Also, the Commonwealth Constitution act 1900 (UK) provides for 4 separate powers
1. The executives (Government of the Day) limited to "uniform" application of laws through the
Commonwealth of Australia.
2. The Parliament (legislators)
3. Judiciary
4. (Federal level only) Inter-State Commission (Permitted to make decision in a non-uniform
manner as may be required relevant to the needs of each particular state) under supervision of
the High Court of Australia as to appeals only in regard of "error of law", but not being part of
the Judiciary nor under the control of the government, this, as its powers as to Trade and
Commerce is derived from the Constitution itself, which may be complimented by any Act of
Parliament to provide additional powers in other matters to which the Parliament possesses the
legislative powers, being health funding, education funding, etc.
We now have to consider the following:
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QUOTE
114 States may not raise forces. Taxation of property of Commonwealth or State
A State shall not, without the consent of the Parliament of the Commonwealth, raise or maintain any naval or
military force, or impose any tax on property of any kind belonging to the Commonwealth, nor shall the
Commonwealth impose any tax on property of any kind belonging to a State.
END QUOTE
In my view the Commonwealth has no constitutional powers to dictate the Courts that it must be
operating with a ABN/ACN number as if it is a registered business for GST purposes. This, as it
would undermine the Courts function. so to say it would leave the Government to interfere with
the Courts processes by making clear that if the Court were in a certain litigation rule adverse to
the government then it may increase specific taxation for the Courts, or other such draconic
measures. In my view the Chief Justice is responsible for the conduct of the Court and liable to
answer for monies used from Consolidated Revenue funds. If we cannot trust the Chief Justice
then he shouldn't be in that position in the first place. the Chief Justice task is to ensure that the
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courts remain viable and acts appropriately and not engage in misuse/abuse of public monies as
after all it is designed to enforce the law, not to abuse it.
In my view the GST registration of the Court therefore is unconstitutional and shouldn't be
permitted to be used. the mere usage of an GST identification being it ABN and/or ACN itself is
for the Court to submit to the Executive rather then to remain impartial.
How indeed could the Court make an impartial ruling as to the proper application of the GST
legislation where it is deemed to accept that it is valid by using it for itself, where a party may
seek to challenge the validity of the legislation?
Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2006] HCA 44 (5 September 2006)
QUOTE
12. That is, if the institutional integrity of a court is distorted, it is because the body no longer exhibits in
some relevant respect those defining characteristics which mark a court apart from other decisionmaking bodies.
END QUOTE
And;
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QUOTE
66. As explained in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, effect has been given to the fundamental
importance which is attached to the principle that a court must be independent and impartial by the
development and application of the apprehension of bias principle. Even the appearance of departure from
the principle that the tribunal must be independent and impartial is prohibited lest the integrity of the
judicial system be undermined. As further explained in Ebner, the apprehension of bias principle admits of
the possibility of human frailty and its application is as diverse as human frailty. Thus when reference is made
to the institutional "integrity" of a court, the allusion is to what The Oxford English Dictionary describes as
"[t]he condition of not being marred or violated; unimpaired or uncorrupted condition; original perfect state;
soundness". Its antithesis is found in exposure, or the appearance of exposure, to human frailties of the kinds
to which reference was made in Ebner.
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE
208. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("the ICCPR") provides, relevantly, in Art 14(1),
that:
"[a]ll persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of ... his rights and
obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent,
independent and impartial tribunal established by law."
This provision supplements Art 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. There are analogous
provisions in each of the regional human rights instruments[206].
209. In order to decide whether a court or tribunal may be considered "independent" for these purposes,
regard is usually had (amongst other things) to the manner of the appointment of its members; their
terms of office; the existence of effective guarantees against outside pressure; and the question whether
the body presents an appearance of independence and impartiality
END QUOTE
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As set out below the colonial "sovereign" Parliaments became State "constitutional"
Parliaments. You cannot have that the Federal "constitutional" Parliament cannot overrule the
Chapter III Courts, such as the High Court of Australia, yet a State parliament could be deemed
to be a "sovereign" Parliament and then could overrule the State Courts exercising Federal
jurisdiction. either Chapter III courts are standing alone courts not under the control of the
Federal parliament as this is a "constitutional" Parliament and in line with this the State
Parliaments are also "constitutional" Parliaments or they all have to be considered subject to
Parliaments grills. To claim that there are two versions of Chapter II courts would make a
mockery of the Court system.
Neither could federal jurisdiction be invested in a State Court not being of the status as the High
Court of Australia as to be an independent judiciary (see also Kable). Once it is accepted that the
State Court invested with federal jurisdiction are not under the control of the State Parliaments
because those Parliaments are also "constitutional" Parliaments, in that the States are created by
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the force of section 106 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) then it
flows from that that no state can amend its own constitution as purportedly was done since
federation, but must rely upon the State electors to veto or approve of any amendment of the
respective State constitution.
The sinister conduct by States to allow the purported reference of legislative powers to the
Commonwealth but so with the real hidden agenda to enable the Commonwealth to adjudicate in
matters, is in my view unconstitutional, as the States cannot so to say give away to the
Commonwealth directly or indirectly State judicial powers, as this requires legislation of a
"sovereign" Parliament.
10
This matter is far more extensive then that can be canvassed in this correspondence and again as
Author of books in the INSPECTOR-RIKATI series on certain constitutional and other legal
issues I have canvassed this already extensively in the past.
15
http://www.theage.com.au/national/false-speed-readings-used-to-issue-tickets-20091007-gn8k.html
QUOTE
theage.com.au
National
'False speed readings used to issue tickets'
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STEVE BUTCHER
October 8, 2009
Afrain Asaf
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A VICTORIAN police officer has alleged that some colleagues have corruptly used old readings from laser
and radar devices to issue speeding tickets against unsuspecting motorists.
Senior constable Afrain Asaf claimed yesterday in court she had seen other police officers retain previous
readings and show them to new ''offenders'' who queried their speed. She said she had been working with
colleagues when she saw the practice, described as ''retained readings'', happen a ''few times''.
She told her barrister, Serge Petrovich, some colleagues had issued notices based on an estimation of the
speed and had used a correct reading kept from the previous person intercepted.
She appeared in Ringwood Magistrates Court to plead not guilty to a charge of exceeding the speed limit
after she was detected by a colleague from the traffic management unit (TMU).
Senior Constable Brett Shenton told the court he did not issue an infringement notice after detecting her
speed at 79 km/h in a 60 zone in Burwood at 9.05am on August 16 last year. But he was directed to five
days later by acting Inspector James Cooke after a verbal direction by Senior Sergeant Kim Pluim.
Mr Petrovich said she alleged this decision was partly motivated by a history of complaints about her
alleged treatment she had made against the TMU office.
This included her claims that while on sick leave, a dead rat with a note that read ''If you f---ing come back
we will kill you'' was left at her front door.
The Iranian-born officer said she had been bullied, ostracised and suffered derogatory remarks about her
race, weight and sex life. Mr Petrovich said there had been continuing conflict at the TMU - made up of
Whitehorse, Boroondara and Monash units - that ''manifested'' itself against his client.
Senior Constable Shenton told Mr Petrovich he knew one senior officer felt there was a political agenda to
remove non-Whitehorse members from the TMU. He agreed he had heard ''retained readings'' being
discussed among some colleagues, but said it was ''just banter and joking'' and was not something ''anyone
seriously considered''.
Senior Constable Asaf, who estimated her speed at between 60 and 65 km/h, said she had mentioned
retained readings at work, but was told to ''pretty much mind my own business''.
She said she was also scared of being further bullied or ostracised, but was now prepared to co-operate with
the Office of Police Integrity and the police ethical standards department.
In finding the charge proved and fining her $200, with $42 costs, without conviction, magistrate Lionel
Winston-Smith said serious allegations had been raised, but he accepted the evidence of Senior Constable
Shenton. Senior Constable Asaf is expected to appeal.
END QUOTE
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The following also ought to be considered where the Infringement Registrar doesn't provide a
reason of Judgment and so the affected person has no way of knowing if the Infringement
Registrar considered all relevant matters placed before the Court and if there was NATURAL
JUSTICE provided, as well as a proper consideration of admissible evidence and not of
inadmissible evidence, etc.
.
What we have now is that the implied bias exist because the purported prosecutor doesn't show
up and the defendant is not notified of any hearing and so the Infringement Registrar sits for and
on behalf of the prosecutor, to deal with the alleged claims of offence(s) taking the alleged
details for granted. This is totally contrary to the adversarial system embedded in a Chapter III
court. There is therefore an implied bias by the Infringement Registrar "assuming that one party ,
the "enforcement agency" is in full disclosure of all relevant details, while it actually has a
financial interest not to do so with a denial to the defendant to challenge the manner in which the
claim is presented to the Infringement Registrar as to be correct or not in the circumstances.
The following article must be understood to relate to a traffic court and not to a Chapter
III court, the latter having a higher standard of legal requirements to be followed!
http://www.articlesbase.com/football-articles/traffic-court-no-prosecutor-or-the-cop-is-acting-as-theprosecutor-are-both-legal-grounds-for-dismissal-202252.html
QUOTE
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Traffic Court No Prosecutor or the Cop is Acting as the

Prosecutor are Both Legal Grounds for Dismissal!
Posted: Aug 22, 2007 |Comments: 1 | Views: 3,801 |
The state of New York decriminalized minor traffic offenses in 1934 with the creation of the 'civil traffic
infraction'. New York blazed the legal path that other states quickly followed in decriminalizing minor traffic
offense by also adopting the civil traffic infraction.
The creation of the civil traffic infraction allowed the courts to do away with costly jury trials for traffic
tickets. The courts reasoned that jury trials were not necessary because the infraction was a 'civil offense'
carrying only a 'small' civil fine as a possible penalty and no possibility of jail time.
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The next causality of the civil infraction was the prosecutor. Lawyers are expensive and therefore, many
states decided that the lawyer/prosecutor was not needed for civil traffic infraction cases the cop could be
the prosecutor. Some other states, such as California, correctly legally rationalized that the cop could not bed
the prosecutor (People v Marcroft (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th) However, a California court also (People v. Carlucci
, 23 Cal.3d 249) concocted the irrational decision that no prosecutor was necessary to conduct a civil traffic
trial.
The decision to make the officer the prosecutor presents a great constitutional problem for traffic courts.
Justice and the Constitution demands that courts are to be fair and impartial not favoring one side over the
other. The court, by allowing the state to be represented by a non-attorney (the cop), is favoring the state over
the defendant. If the defendant elects to be represented in traffic court, the court demands that the defendant
go out and hire a Bar attorney at their expense.. Such treatment of the defendant by the court is indisputably
biased and blatantly unfair treatment and is solid grounds for dismissal of the defendant's traffic case.
Civil traffic cases where there is no prosecutor present in the court are treated by traffic courts much like a
small claims court action. In small claims courts both sides simply tell their stories to the judge and are
allowed to cross examine one another under oath and the judge is allowed to ask questions of both sides.
Traffic courts treat the traffic court hearing like a small claims court only to the degree that it serves their
purpose (collection of revenue). Where it does not serve the court's purpose (threat of loss of revenue), they
treat traffic court cases like a different legal animal altogether. For instance, in a civil small claims court the
plaintiff must show up at the time of trial, or the case is dismissed. However, in a traffic trial where there is no
prosecutor, the plaintiff (the state or the People) never shows up and never does ther court dismiss the case.
Who is present in court to legally uphold the claim of the state or the People the defendant when there is no
prosecutor? The judge? The Constitution requires the judge to remain fair and impartial. How about the cop?
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For the reasons explained already, the cop cannot be the prosecutor and in regards to California, an appeals
court in the Marcroft case ruled that the cop is the witness, no more, no less.
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When there is no prosecutor, there is no one present in court who can legally uphold the claim of the state or
the People against the defendant. In this instance, the state or the People (the plaintiff) have legally abandoned
their claim against the defendant in the exact manner as a plaintiff in any other civil court proceeding except
traffic.
Traffic courts are not concerned with justice or protecting people's rights under the Constitution, but
maximizing the collection of revenue is the traffic court's real and true agenda. Lest anyone be inclined to
believe otherwise, try challenging a traffic court judge sometime by moving to dismiss your traffic case
because the state or the People have abandoned their claim against you by not having a prosecutor in court.
Watch as the judge's temperament and demeanor instantly change. The judge will be quick to remind you that
the state grants the court the right to try a civil traffic case absent a prosecutor. If that doesn't immediately
shut you up, then the judge will invoke a judicially intimidating tone of voice accompanied by some strong
facial expressions, as the judge instructs you to move on to something else.
The abandonment of the state's or the People's claim for lack of prosecution is a raw nerve that traffic court
judges do not want exposed in open court. Such a claim exposes to everyone the fraud of the court and the
court's mere pretense at justice.
Slay your traffic ticket with Ticket Slayer!
Ticket Slayer has a National Traffic Dismissal Rate of 85% 92% in California
TicketSlayer.com
25
Author Contact: GregS@TicketSlayer.com
END QUOTE
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The book "Law Made Simple" by Colin F. Padfield, LL.B.,D.P.A.(Lond.) on page 55:
QUOTE
"The Rule against Bias. A true judicial decision can be reached only if the judge himself is impartial. This is
an obvious requirement in a court of law or a tribunal. In R. v Rand (1866) it was held that a judge is
disqualified where (i) he has a direct pecuniary interest, however small, in the subject-matter in dispute; or (ii)
there is real likelihood that the judge would have a bias in favour of one of the parties.
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For example, if a judge is related to, or is a friend of, one of the parties to a dispute there would be real
likelihood of bias. It is immaterial whether a judicial decision was in fact biased, for as was said by Lord
Chief Justice Heward in R. v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy (1924): 'Justice should not only be done, but
should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.'
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As an example of pecuniary bias we may quote:
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Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal (1852). Lord Chancellor Cottenham made decrees in a Chancery suit in
favour of a canal company. Lord Cottenham held several shares in the company. Held: (by the House of
Lords): that the decrees be set aside on the ground of pecurniary interest. No bias was proved in fact, nor
could it be shown that Lord Cottenham was in any way influenced by his shareholding.
As an example of likelihood of bias we may quote:
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R. v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy (1924). A was summoned before magistrates for a motoring
offence. The acting clerk to the justices was a member of a firm of solicitors representing A in civil
proceedings arising out of the same accident. The acting clerk did not advise the magistrates, but he retired
with them to consider their decision. Held: that as the acting clerk was connected with the case in the civil
action he ought not to advise the magistrates in the criminal prosecution. Conviction accordingly quashed,
despite the fact that the acting clerk took no part in the decision to convict and had not been asked by the
justices to give his opinion or advice. "
END QUOTE
.
Director of Public Prosecutions v Serratore Nos. Ca 40642/95 and Crd 72680/95 Criminal Law and Procedure Statutes - Human Rights - Telecommunications - Law Reform [1995] NSWSC 154 (14 November 1995)
QUOTE
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It is well established that the Court should not impute to the legislature an intention to interfere
with fundamental rights, freedoms or immunities; such an intention must be clearly manifested by
clear and unmistakable language: Coco v The Queen [1994] HCA 15; (1994) 179 CLR 427 at 436-437. ...
The close link between the fundamental right to be secure against trespass and the right to privacy is
illustrated by the observations by Lord Scarman in Morris v Beardmore (1981) AC 446 ... Parliament itself
has ... recognised, in the context of telecommunications, the fundamental importance of protecting individual
privacy, although also recognising that the value of privacy can be over-ridden where it conflicts with other
significant community values, provided that detailed safeguards are observed. The recognition and protection
of privacy in the Intercept Act, in my view, justifies a restrictive approach to the construction of the statutory
exceptions to the prohibitions on interception. ... where there is a genuine doubt as to whether the statutory
language authorises the use of intercept information for a particular purpose, that doubt should be resolved in
favour of a narrow, rather than a broad construction of the statutory authorisation.
END QUOTE
.
R v. Lusink and another; Ex Parte Shaw (1980) 6 FLR 235 and 236
QUOTE
However in some cases the words or conduct of a judge may be suck as to lead the parties reasonably to think
that the judge has prejudged an important question in the case, and then prohibition may issue. Of course, the
court which is asked to grant prohibition will not lightly conclude that the judge may reasonably be suspected
of bias in this sense; it must be "firmly established" that such a suspicion may reasonably be engendered in
the minds of the parties or the public, as was made clear by the court in R v Commonwealth Conciliation and
arbitration Commission; Ex parte Angliss Group (1969) 122 CLR 546 at 553-4, in the passage cited in R v
Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (132 CLR at 262).
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The critical question, however, is not whether a judge believes he or she has prejudged a question, but
whether that is what a party or the public might reasonably suspect has occurred (see per Lord Denning
MR in Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC Ltd v Lannon (1969) 1 QB 577 at 599, a judgment cited with
approval by this court in R v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; Ex Parte Angliss
Group (1969) 122 CLR 546 at 553; In some circumstances repeated denials of prejudging might well convey
the impression of "protesting to much"...
END QUOTE
.
Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56 (10 December 2002)
QUOTE
1.
In this regard, the estoppel was seen to be an aspect of "the extended principle expressed by Sir
James Wigram VC in Henderson v Henderson[59]"[60].
2.
It was said in Henderson v Henderson that:

"where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a Court of
competent jurisdiction, the Court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their
whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the
same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of
the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from
negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case."[61]
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END QUOTE
City of Melbourne v Barnett [1999] VSCA 171 (21 October

1999)
QUOTE
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18. The judge's reasons make it a very difficult matter for this Court to determine on what basis his Honour
decided that there was repair carried out to the hole in the bluestone kerbing, or misfeasance by the
Council, or, for that matter, negligence on the part of the Council as a cause of the plaintiff's injuries. In
this context it is well-established that the extent of a judge's duty to give reasons will depend upon the
circumstances of the case, but that reasons given will be inadequate if an appeal court is unable to
ascertain the reasoning upon which the decision is based: Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd. v. Massoud
[1989] V.R. 8 per Gray, J. (with whom Fullagar and Tadgell, JJ. agreed) at 18; Pettit v. Dunkley [1971] 1
N.S.W.L.R. 376 per Moffatt, J.A. at 387-388; Soulemezis v. Dudley (Holdings) Pty. Ltd. (1987) 10
N.S.W.L.R. 247 per McHugh, J.A. at 279-280; Cropp v. Transport Accident Commission [1998] 3 V.R.
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357 at 376. In our view, the reasons given by his Honour, with respect, were wholly inadequate in the areas
already mentioned.
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END QUOTE
.
QUOTE In the Marriage of Tennant (1980) 5 FLR 777 at 780
As no grounds for appeal are required to be specified in the notice of Appeal, which, on filing institutes the
appeal (reg 122), there is no limitations of the scope of the appeal and all findings of fact and law made in the
lower court in relation to the decree appealed are in challenge and cannot be relied on by the appellant or the
respondent. All the issues (unless by consent) must be reheard. This of course brings me to the point of the
absence of reason for the magistrates decision in this case. Perhaps reasons were given orally but not recorded
for the record. Apart from the requirement of such reason for the purpose of the appeal process, there is the
basic ground of criticism that litigants who go to court, put their witnesses up, argue their case and attempt to
controvert the opposing case are entitled to know, if they lose, why they lost. If they are given no reason they
may be entitled to feel the decision against them was conceived in prejudice, bias, or caprice. In such a case
not only the litigant, but justice itself, is the loser.
Magistrates should realise, even more than they seem to do, that this class of business is not mere ordinary
trivial work, and they should deal with these cases with a due sense of responsibility which administrations of
the summary jurisdiction Act and the far reaching consequences of the orders that they make thereafter entail.
[Baker v Baker (1906) 95 LT 549; In Robinson v Robinson (1898) p135; and again in Cobb v Cobb (1900)
p145] it was stated that when making orders of this kind, from which lies an appeal to other courts, it is the duty
of the magistrate not only to cause a note to be made of the evidence, and of his decision, but to give the reasons
for his decision and to cause a note to be made of his reasons... Elaborate judgements are not required, but the
reasons which lead the magistrate to make his order must be explicitly stated.
END QUOTE
.
As I objected to the jurisdiction of the Court and this was made clear in my writings then
the question is and remains to be did the Infringement Registrar consider this and if so did
he make a ruling upon this?
More over, he couldn't have dealt with the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION at the same
time of dealing with the alleged offence as it must be separate proceedings.
It must be clear that there is no known record of how the proceedings actually were dealt with, if
not just being a computer that spits out orders without any proper consideration to the relevant
facts. Such a closed court system is subject to the question of abuse and manipulation of the legal
processes and cannot be accepted as pertaining valid court orders.
50
It is my view that former Attorney General Rob Hulls and former Minister for Police and
Emergency Services Bob Cameron conspired with Tenix Solutions IMES Pty Ltd to
misuse/abuse court facilities by this placing the Court, such as the Magistrates Court of Victoria
in disrepute and by this committed CONTEMPT OF COURT
It is my view that the Chief Magistrate of the Magistrates Court of Victoria by failing to take
appropriate action contributed to this form of what I view to be CONTEMPT OF COURT.
It is my view that the former Premier John Brumby likewise must be deemed to have participated
in this by failing to take appropriate action, as is the same with former Premier Ted Baillieu. It is
also my view that current Premier of Victoria Dennis Napthine and Current Attorney General
likewise by failing to take appropriate action likewise are in CONTEMPT OF COURT.
Likewise I view that Brendan Facey Director, Infringement Management & Enforcement
Services (Sheriff) by his conduct seeking to enforce Infringement Court orders/warrants where
he knew or ought to have known that they are not made in a lawful manner by this also must be
deemed to be in CONTEMPT OF COURT.
55
As I have set out in my 19 July 2013 and 20 July 2013 as well as previous correspondences that
the purported Infringement Court is using operating and under the letterhead of the Magistrates
Court of Victoria, a Chapter III court provided with federal jurisdiction which must be an "open
court".
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QUOTE
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PART 1PRELIMINARY 1
1. Purposes 1
2. Commencement 2
3. Definitions 2
4. Act to be read as one with Magistrates' Court Act 1989 8
END QUOTE
The Magistrates Court of Victoria is bound to conduct matters in accordance with the
Magistrates Court Act 1989 and the Infringements Act 2006, Act No. 12/2006 provides for a
summons and further legal provisions as to filing document such as in Section 30 of the
Magistrates' Court Act 1989, which in my understanding has not been applied in the matter
Obligation Number 1106575301
Tenix Solution IMES Pty Ltd to my understanding has engaged in conduct which I view are to
abuse/misuse the Magistrates Court of Victoria standing and credibility by issuing order
a/warrants as if they are those issued by the Infringement court as part of the Magistrates Court
of Victoria, by accessing its computer network and/or otherwise and to engage in a line of
conduct to deny me and/or others of their rightful legal entitlements to have a matter heard in
"open court", as well as impersonating an officer of the court or other officers, including but not
limited to the Sheriff's Office and by this causing undue harm upon my person, my wife, and/or
others.
It is my understanding that the former Attorney General Rob Hulls and former Minister for
Police and Emergency Services Bob Cameron had no legal standing to engage in a "deed of
charge" (14-8-2007) with Tenix Solution IMES Pty Ltd which was intended for Tenix
Solution IMES Pty Ltd to access Magistrates Court of Victoria computer and/or other files for
purporting civil and/or other enforcement of purported Infringement Notices and related charges
using the Victorian trademark Civic Compliance Victoria and/or other identities into a nonregistered entity also known as Civic Compliance Vic (Westpac Bank Account) instead of into
consolidated Funds of the State of Victoria, for so far any charges were to be deemed lawfully
enforceable which is not conceded, and use such terrorism and other conduct, including but not
limited to extortion to force upon me and/or others to pay monies, including but not limited to the
issue of a warrant and threats of conduct which may and likely will harm my person and/or
others. It is my understanding that while the Infringement Act 2006 allows for the lodgement of
Infringement Notice it doesn't nullify the legal requirements provided for in Section 30 of the
Magistrates' Court Act 1989, not that the Infringement Court operating as part of the magistrates
Court of Victoria then can issue orders/warrants in blatant violation of the legal requirements that
are associated with an "open court" procedure to which the Magistrates Court of Victoria as a
Chapter III court of the Commonwealth Constitution Act 1900 (UK) is required to be where it is
invested with federal jurisdiction.
Brennan v Brennan [1953] HCA 28; (1953) 89 CLR 129 (18 May 1953)
QUOTE
The section gives effect to what has always been a fundamental conception of a trial in English law, quite
apart from statute, that every court of law is open to every subject of the Crown: Scott v. Scott (1913) AC 417
. A trial that is not conducted in open court, apart from some exceptional circumstances, is not a proper trial
at all.
END QUOTE
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/HCA/2009/4.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query="OPEN%20COURT%20PRINCIPLE%
20"
QUOTE
47.
There is also a well established and conservative principle of interpretation that statutes are
construed, where constructional choices are open, so that they do not encroach upon fundamental rights and
freedoms at common law[38]. That is to say, there is a presumption against a parliamentary intention to
infringe upon such rights and freedoms[39]. That presumption has been described in the United Kingdom
as an aspect of a "principle of legality" governing the relationship between parliament, the executive and
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the courts. It was explained by Lord Hoffmann in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex
parte Simms[40]:
10
"[T]he principle of legality means that Parliament must squarely confront what it is doing and accept the
political cost. Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words. This is because there
is too great a risk that the full implications of their unqualified meaning may have passed unnoticed in the
democratic process. In the absence of express language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts
therefore presume that even the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the
individual."
Gleeson CJ described the presumption as "a working hypothesis, the existence of which is known both to
Parliament and the courts, upon which statutory language will be interpreted". He added, "[t]he hypothesis is
an aspect of the rule of law"[41].
48.
It is an aspect of the rule of law that courts sit in public and that they accord procedural fairness.
The importance of these two principles requires a conservative approach to the interpretation of statutes
affecting them.
49.
The open court principle is of long historical standing and well established in all common law
jurisdictions. It was enunciated by the House of Lords in Scott v Scott[42] and affirmed by this Court in
Dickason v Dickason[43]. It was discussed in Russell v Russell[44] which was concerned with the question
whether a provision of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), requiring that State courts exercising jurisdiction
under that Act sit in private, was valid. The provision was held invalid on grounds not material to this
appeal. It was held not to be an exercise of the constitutional power to invest State courts with federal
jurisdiction. Relevantly to this case, however, the open court principle in relation to State courts was
affirmed as "an essential aspect of their character"[45]. Established exceptions to the general rule were
recognised, as was the power of the Parliament to extend the categories of such exceptions[46]. The
exceptional character of departure from the open court principle was emphasised by the observation of
Stephen J[47]:
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"To require that a Supreme Court, possessing all the attributes of an English court of
justice, should sit as of course in closed court is, I think, in the words of Lord Shaw, to turn
that Court into a different kind of tribunal and involves that very intrusion into its
constitution and organization which s 77(iii) does not authorize."
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45
END QUOTE
Wainohu v New South Wales [2011] HCA 24 (23 June 2011)
QUOTE
The provision of reasons for decision is also an expression of the open court principle, which is an essential
incident of the judicial function. A court which does not give reasons for a final decision or for important
interlocutory decisions withholds from public scrutiny that which is at the heart of the judicial function: the
judicial ascertainment of facts, identification of the rules of law, the application of those rules to the facts and
the exercise of any relevant judicial discretion.
END QUOTE
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/HCA/2013/7.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query="OPEN%20COURT%20"
Assistant Commissioner Michael James Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 7 (14 March 2013)
QUOTE
Like most cases about constitutional limits the answer is not black and white. The deeply rooted common law
tradition of the open court, presided over by an independent judge according procedural fairness to both
parties, is adapted to protect the public interest in cases such as those involving national security,
commercially sensitive documents and the protection of police informants.
END QUOTE
50
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/HCA/2003/52.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query="OPEN%20COURT%20"
55
Rogers v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2003] HCA 52; 216

CLR 327; 201 ALR 184; 77 ALJR 1739 (11 September
2003)
QUOTE
16.In Kimber v The Press Association[7], Lord Esher MR said:
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"The rule of law is that, where there are judicial proceedings before a properly constituted judicial tribunal
exercising its jurisdiction in open Court, then the publication, without malice, of a fair and accurate report
of what takes place before that tribunal is privileged. Under certain circumstances that publication may be
very hard upon the person to whom it is made to apply, but public policy requires that some hardship
should be suffered by individuals rather than that judicial proceedings should be held in secret. The
common law, on the ground of public policy, recognizes that there may be greater danger to the public in
allowing judicial proceedings to be held in secret than in suffering persons for a time to rest under an
unfounded charge or suggestion."
10
17. In the same case, Kay LJ[8] explained the basis of the privilege as the "extreme importance that publicity
should be given to all judicial proceedings". It is the public interest in the openness of the administration of
justice that sustains the privilege or protection.
END QUOTE
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SEE ALSO:
Hogan v Hinch [2011] HCA 4 (10 March 2011)
CAN A PUBLIUC OFFICER BE HELD IN CONTEMPT OF COURT?

Let us first consider what the Framers of the Constitution (The Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act 1900 (UK) had to say:
Convention)
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE
Mr. CARRUTHERS:
END QUOTE
.
As such, I might so to say be the kind of person the Framers of the Constitution held had to be
able to understand what the true meaning and application of the constitution was about.
As the States are created from the Colonies in section 106:
QUOTE
Chapter VThe States

106 Saving of Constitutions
40
The Constitution of each State of the Commonwealth shall, subject to this Constitution, continue as
at the establishment of the Commonwealth, or as at the admission or establishment of the State, as
the case may be, until altered in accordance with the Constitution of the State.
END QUOTE
45
And Section 107 is:

QUOTE
107 Saving of Power of State Parliaments

50
Every power of the Parliament of a Colony which has become or becomes a State, shall, unless it is
by this Constitution exclusively vested in the Parliament of the Commonwealth or withdrawn from
the Parliament of the State, continue as at the establishment of the Commonwealth, or as at the
admission or establishment of the State, as the case may be.
END QUOTE
55
What has been misconceived by this is that somehow the State Parliaments therefore remain to
be "sovereign" Parliaments. But as Section 106 clearly states " shall, subject to this Constitution,
continue " then we cannot ignore embedded legal principles.
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The following will also make clear that the Framers of the Constitution intended to have CIVIL
RIGHTS and LIBERTIES principles embedded in the Constitution as well as that Colonial
"sovereign" Parliaments became State "constitutional" Parliaments.
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QUOTE Mr. MUNRO:
We have come here to frame a constitution, and the instructions that were given to us, I am happy to
say, are very clearly laid down by the hon. member, Mr. Baker, in the book which he was good enough
to distribute amongst us. He puts it in this form: That it is desirable there should be a union of the
Australian colonies. That is one of the principles that has already been settled by all our parliaments. Second,
that such union should be an early one-that is, that we should remove all difficulties in the way in order that
the union should take place at as early a date as possible. Third, that it should be under the Crown. Now, I
am quite sure that is one of the most important conditions of all with which we have to deal-that the union
that is to take place shall be a union under the Crown. Fourth, that it should be under one legislative and
executive government. That also is laid down by our various parliaments.
END QUOTE
.
HANSARD 19-4-1897 Constitution Convention
QUOTE Mr. CARRUTHERS:
Mr. Barton first of all recites Dicey to show what occurs under the unwritten Constitution of
England. But here we are framing a written Constitution. When once that Constitution is framed we
cannot get behind it.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE Sir EDWARD BRADDON.-
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60
When we consider how vast the importance is that every word of the Constitution should be correct,
that every clause should fit into every other clause; when we consider the great amount of time, trouble,
and expense it would take to make any alteration, and that, if we have not made our intentions clear,
we shall undoubtedly have laid the foundation of lawsuits of a most extensive nature, which will harass
the people of United Australia and create dissatisfaction with our work, it must be evident that too
much care has not been exercised.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE
Mr. OCONNOR (New South Wales).-The honorable and learned member (Mr. Isaacs) is I think correct
in the history of this clause that he has given, and this is [start page 672] one of those instances which should
make us very careful of following too slavishly the provisions of the United States Constitution, or any other
Constitution. No doubt in putting together the draft of this Bill, those who were responsible for doing so used
the material they found in every Constitution before it, and probably they felt that they would be incurring a
great deal of responsibility in leaving out provisions which might be in the least degree applicable. But it is
for us to consider, looking at the history and reasons for these provisions in the Constitution of the United
States, whether they are in any way applicable; and I quite agree with my honorable and learned friend (Mr.
Carruthers) that we should be very careful of every word that we put in this Constitution, and that we should
have no word in it which we do not see some reason for. Because there can be no question that in time to
come, when this Constitution has to be interpreted, every word will be weighed and an interpretation given to
it; and by the use now of what I may describe as idle words which we have no use for, we may be giving a
direction to the Constitution which none of us now contemplate. Therefore, it is incumbent upon us to see that
there is some reason for every clause and every word that goes into this Constitution.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE Mr. BARTON.
If we are going to give the Federal Parliament power to legislate as it pleases with regard to
Commonwealth citizenship, not having defined it, we may be enabling the Parliament to pass
legislation that would really defeat all the principles inserted elsewhere in the Constitution, and, in fact,
to play ducks and drakes with it. That is not what is meant by the term "Trust the Federal
Parliament."
END QUOTE
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60
.
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.- We have simply said that the guarantee of the liberalism of this Constitution is
responsible government, and that we decline to impair or to infect in any way that guarantee.
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.- Of course it will be argued that this Constitution will have been made by the
Parliament of the United Kingdom. That will be true in one sense, but not true in effect, because the
provisions of this Constitution, the principles which it embodies, and the details of enactment by which
those principles are enforced, will all have been the work of Australians.
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.- Having provided in that way for a free Constitution, we have provided for an
Executive which is charged with the duty of maintaining the provisions of that Constitution; and,
therefore, it can only act as the agents of the people.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE
Mr. DEAKIN.- In this Constitution, although much is written much remains unwritten,
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE Mr. DEAKIN.What a charter of liberty is embraced within this Bill-of political liberty and religious liberty-the
liberty and the means to achieve all to which men in these days can reasonably aspire. A charter of
liberty is enshrined in this Constitution, which is also a charter of peace-of peace, order, and good
government for the whole of the peoples whom it will embrace and unite.
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE
Mr. SYMON (South Australia).- We who are assembled in this Convention are about to commit to the
people of Australia a new charter of union and liberty; we are about to commit this new Magna Charta
for their acceptance and confirmation, and I can conceive of nothing of greater magnitude in the whole
history of the peoples of the world than this question upon which we are about to invite the peoples of
Australia to vote. The Great Charter was wrung by the barons of England from a reluctant king. This new
charter is to be given by the people of Australia to themselves.
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.- We can have every faith in the constitution of that tribunal. It is appointed as the arbiter of
the Constitution. . It is appointed not to be above the Constitution, for no citizen is above it, but under
it; but it is appointed for the purpose of saying that those who are the instruments of the Constitutionthe Government and the Parliament of the day-shall not become the masters of those whom, as to the
Constitution, they are bound to serve. What I mean is this: That if you, after making a Constitution of
this kind, enable any Government or any Parliament to twist or infringe its provisions, then by slow
degrees you may have that Constitution-if not altered in terms-so whittled away in operation that the
guarantees of freedom which it gives your people will not be maintained; and so, in the highest sense, the
court you are creating here, which is to be the final interpreter of that Constitution, will be such a tribunal as
will preserve the popular liberty in all these regards, and will prevent, under any pretext of
constitutional action, the Commonwealth from dominating the states, or the states from usurping the sphere
of the Commonwealth.
END QUOTE
.
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HANSARD 17-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
Australasian Convention)
QUOTE Mr. CLARK.for the protection of certain fundamental rights and liberties which every individual citizen is entitled to
claim that the federal government shall take under its protection and secure to him.
END QUOTE
.
HANSARD18-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
QUOTE Mr. ISAACS.The right of a citizen of this great country, protected by the implied guarantees of its Constitution,
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.-Our civil rights are not in the hands of any Government, but the rights of the Crown
in prosecuting criminals are.
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END QUOTE
.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parliamentary_sovereignty
QUOTE
Parliamentary sovereignty
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
The examples and perspective in this article or section may not represent a worldwide view of
the subject.
Please improve this article or discuss the issue on the talk page.
Parliamentary sovereignty, parliamentary supremacy, or legislative supremacy is a concept in
constitutional law that applies to some parliamentary democracies. Under parliamentary sovereignty, a
legislative body has absolute sovereignty, meaning it is supreme to all other government institutions
(including any executive or judicial bodies as they may exist). Furthermore, it implies that the legislative body
may change or repeal any prior legislative acts. Parliamentary sovereignty contrasts with most notions of
judicial review, where a court may overturn legislation deemed unconstitutional. Specific instances of
parliamentary sovereignty exist in the United Kingdom and New Zealand.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Dr. COCKBURN: All our experience hitherto has been under the condition of parliamentary
sovereignty. Parliament has been the supreme body. But when we embark on federation we throw
parliamentary sovereignty overboard. Parliament is no longer supreme. Our parliaments at present are
not only legislative, but constituent bodies. They have not only the power of legislation, but the power
of amending their constitutions. That must disappear at once on the abolition of parliamentary
sovereignty. No parliament under a federation can be a constituent body; it will cease to have the
power of changing its constitution at its own will. Again, instead of parliament being supreme, the
parliaments of a federation are coordinate bodies-the main power is split up, instead of being vested in
one body. More than all that, there is this difference: When parliamentary sovereignty is dispensed
with, instead of there being a high court of parliament, you bring into existence a powerful judiciary
which towers above all powers, legislative and executive, and which is the sole arbiter and interpreter
of the constitution.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON: I do not think it is a good thing under any circumstances that a judge under a Federal
Constitution, at any rate, should have anything to hope for from Parliament or Government.
Mr. KINGSTON: Hear, hear.
55
Mr. BARTON: Where you have a sovereign Parliament, and the judge is merely the interpreter of
the laws as they arise, and not the guardian of a Constitution in the same sense as a federal judge is, the
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same circumstances remain in part; but where you will have a tribunal constantly charged with the
maintenance of the Constitution against the inroads which may be attempted to be made upon it by
Parliament, then it is essential that no judge shall have any temptation to act upon an unexpected
weakness-for we do not know exactly what they are when appointed-which may result, whether
consciously or not, in biasing his decisions in favor of movements made by the Parliament which might
be dangerous to the Constitution itself.
END QUOTE
It should therefore be very clear that State Parliaments no longer are the "sovereign" Parliaments
of the Colonies but being created within s106 of the (federal) constitution they are subject to the
legal principles embedded in this constitution, and not despite of it and by this are
"constitutional" Parliaments of the States
What we have however is that while in the USA the original 13th Amendment of its constitution
banner Members of the Bar to practice in the Courts, we have that they have basically taken over
the Courts and the Parliament as well as the governments, to such an extend that with their
brainwashed idea's and applications they have undermined the rights of citizens to be judges by a
FAIR MINDED and IMPARTIAL judiciary. We have that instead of respected citizens in the
community being magistrates, now one has to be a member of the legal profession. We have that
to be a judge of a court one now has to be a member of the legal profession. It is argued that the
complications of laws require people trained in law. Really? Let me repeat it again:
Convention)
END QUOTE
.
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QUOTE
Mr. CARRUTHERS:
END QUOTE
As such, every piece of legislation must be in the terms as the power to legislate is from the
constitution. The servant cannot exercise a greater power then its master!
Hence, legislation that requires a lawyer to interpret and explain to an accused is
unconstitutional, because it is then to be deemed beyond the understanding of the
"unlettered people".
In my view, each time the Attorney General therefore provide the Governor with a Bill to be
enacted where the language used in the bill requires a lawyer to explain it then this Bill must be
deemed unconstitutional and the Attorney General certifying to the Governor or GovernorGeneral that the Bill is constitutionally valid in essence is deemed to commit CONTEMPT OF
COURT as well as CONTEMPT AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION (Ordinary referred to as
TREASON).
.
We had the judiciary making out that the constitution doesn't stipulate which Crown (EG British
Crown or Australian crown) is referred to and so it is the Queen of Australia.
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QUOTE Mr. HOLDER:
I pass from these two general principles to a discussion of the only other preliminary I shall have to touch,
and that is the question of the appointment of the representative of the British Crown in the person of the
Governor-General. I do not take it that the words of the Enabling Act requiring us to frame a Constitution for
a Federation "under the Crown" bind us in the matter of whether or not we shall elect our own GovernorGeneral, because I take it that the legal bonds which bind us to the mother-country, to the great British
Empire, are chiefly, first the right of veto which the Imperial authorities have over any Acts our local
Legislature may pass, and which the Federal Legislature may pass, and next the right of the Imperial
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Legislature at any time to pass legislation which may affect us, or which may revoke any legislation affecting
us. These are the great legal bonds which bind us to the British Empire.
END QUOTE
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QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.-I did not say that. I say that our real status is as subjects, and that we are all alike
subjects of the British Crown.
END QUOTE
.
Therefore, the understanding at time of federation was for the unlettered person that this
constitution was created under the British Crown. having therefore members of the legal
profession professing that somehow there is a Queen of Australia is not only insulting to the
crown as well to its people in Australia but ought to be deemed a CONTEMPT OF COURT as
well as a CONTEMPT AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION (TREASON), and underlines that
lawyers say brainwashed in legal studies are now seeking to twist and infringe upon the true
meaning and application of the constitution.
Hansard 31-1-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
QUOTE Mr. SOLOMON.We shall not only look to the Federal Judiciary for the protection of our interests, but also for the just
interpretation of the Constitution:
END QUOTE
.
(Official Record of the Debates of the National
Australasian Convention),
QUOTE Mr. OCONNER (New South Wales).Because, as has been said before, it is [start page 357] necessary not only that the administration of
justice should be pure and above suspicion, but that it should be beyond the possibility of suspicion;
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE
END QUOTE
.
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Therefore, what we have experienced is that instead the Courts filled with lawyers as judicial
officers is the better for it the courts have lost their impartiality and are no more then corporate
courts known in the State of Victoria as "Business Unit 19" and not the legal impartial courts
they ought to be. Judges have lend themselves to be in CONTEMPT OF COURT in regard of
the very courts they are serving by deliberately misstating the true meaning and application of
the constitution.
It cannot be in doubt that the Courts have held that where a Court issue an order against a clerk
as to not present a certain Bill to the Governor-General or Governor (which ever is applicable)
then this is not a CONTEMPT OF THE PARLIAMENT, because the parliament has
completed its part of the passing of the Bill. Indeed, even if a bill is passed the Attorney General
may on instructions of the Government of the Day never present the bill for Royal Assent.
therefore the act to present the bill to the governor/Governor-General is a separate matter.
As such, if the Attorney General presents a Bill for Royal Assent then where such a Bill is
unconstitutional, being it due to the usage of language beyond the understanding of the unlettered
person and/or that it conflicts with the legal principles embedded in the constitution then I view
the Attorney General commits CONTEMPT against the constitution and also may be deemed
to show a CONTEMPT AGAINST THE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR/GOVERNORGENERAL.
THE SAME WHEN REGISTERING THE STATE AS A CORPORATE ENTITY IN THE USA
THIS I VIEW CONSTITUTES A CONTEMPT AGAINST THE COMMONWEALTH OF
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AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION ACT 1900 (UK) AS IT DOESN'T ALLOW FOR A
CORPORATE GOVERNMENT, CORPORATE PARLIAMENT OR A CORPORATE
JUDICIARY
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Likewise, the notion that a person can ordinary only be represented by a legal practitioner in my
view is also a CONTEMPT AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION, because where unlettered
person can only be represented in litigation by a legal practitioner then this defies the legal
principles embedded in the constitution. We therefore have, that lawyers having not just so to say
infiltrates but corrupted the government, the Parliaments and the Courts to make this as much as
possible an exclusion zone for lawyers by this have undermined the very legal principles
embedded in the constitution. And not seemingly satisfied with this kind of destruction to our
democratic system they have now ventured about to deceive the people to create a purported
Infringement Court as if it is a Court of Law within the Magistrates Court of Victoria but by this
thwarting the constitutional rights of citizens in a manner the Framers of the Constitution held
could never be permitted to be exercised by any State.
It would be beyond the scope of this document to list all issues, safe to say I canvassed a
considerable amount in books I published in the INSPECTOR-RIKATI series on certain
constitutional and other legal issues as well as on my blog at www.scribsd.com/inspectorrikati.
.
The following authority (http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/209/123/case.html) Ex Parte Young - 209
U.S. 123 (1908) may underline that State officials can be held in CONTEMPT OF COURT even
being an Attorney General. As even judges can be held in CONTEMPT OF COURT, then I
view nothing can save a Premier, former premier, Sheriff and others who are participating or
remain silent about the misuse and/or abuse of the courts processes.
It is a matter of criminal law that when a person observes someone to commit a crime and fails to
report this or take such action as may be deemed appropriate in the circumstances, then such
person could be dealt with for aiding and abetting in the criminal act, etc.
Here we have even the Chief Magistrate failing to act to stop the misuse and abuse of the
Magistrates Court of Victoria letterhead, its procedures, etc.
It is also clear, albeit it doesn't have to be proven as such, that the State of Victorian is gaining a
financial benefit out of the conduct complained about using the Magistrates Court of Victoria in
such a manner as to enable the Infringement Court to operate as such in a gross denial of a
persons legal rights and in clear violation of what an "open court" is about.
It cannot be argued that the Magistrates Court of Victoria is an "open court" for exercising
federal jurisdiction but otherwise can be anything it likes. Those who are dealt with by the
magistrates Court of Victoria being under the umbrella of the Infringement Court or not, are
entitled to face a court that is consistent in its conduct as an "open court' unless the court itself for
special circumstances hold that the hearing must be a "closed court' because of certain sensitive
details, but then the Court must first declare this to be a "CLOSED COURT" and only do so in
exceptional circumstances. This however cannot be claimed of the Infringement Court which
seems to be no more or less but a computer generated court orders and warrants where the very
purpose is to exclude the accused/alleged offender of any opportunity to present his case.
In my view the Attorney General may have indeed deliberately misled the governor to provide
Royal Assent on the basis the Infringement Act 2006 was valid in constitutional terms where in
fact the very purpose of the legislation was to circumvent the judicial processes and to have the
Infringement Registrar acting as some government dictated system where the right of a FAIR
and PROPER hearing deliberately was intended to be prevented.
In my view the Attorney General had no legal powers to enter in a deed of charge intended to
undermine if not violate the independence of the judiciary by creating some private contract with
Tenix Solutions IMES Pty Ltd, as the State executive nor the Parliament could make inroads in
the judiciary how it conducts judicial matters. Neither could the Chief Magistrate permit or
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consent to such inroads, this, as it goes against the principles of separation of powers. Indeed, it
is a conduct that precisely was what the framers of the Constitution held no State would ever
engage in. In my view Tenix Solutions IMES Pty Ltd may be dealt with for colluding in
deceiving citizens whom are subject to Infringement notices , as to have collaborated with the
abuse of the magistrates Court of Victoria powers. Citizens who are faced with correspondences
that show a heading of the Magistrates Court of Victoria are generally led to believe that the
proceedings they have and/or are subjected to are formal proceedings involving the Magistrates
Court of Victoria. The confidence of citizens in its judicial system such as the Magistrates Court
of Victoria should never be eroded. I found however that even my OBJECTION TO
JURISDICTION was ignored, this as obviously a computer system cannot provide for this
reasoning and those who are so to say pumping out correspondences using the letterhead of the
Magistrates Court of Victoria may not have a clue what is legally required. Also Tenix Solutions
IMES Pty Ltd using the trademark Civic compliance Victoria (not a registered business name)
using the letterhead of the Sheriff's Office, in my view, itself ought to be deemed a violation of
the court processes, this as the Sheriff's Office is deemed to be part of the judicial system to
enforce court orders and not some government utility to have its own government decisions
enforced.
It also should be kept in mind that there appears to be no transparency as to the charges and in
who's pockets the monies eventually are ending up in. As the Victorian Police also directs
payments to be made to the "Civic Compliance Victoria" to be made but now such registered
company exist, , and neither any "Civic Compliance Vic" company either exist (as the name on
the Westpac Bank details) at least to my knowledge then I view it is a system open to fraud.
Indeed, when cost is charged, then what are those cost and are they ending up payable to the
Magistrates Court of Victoria or are they syphoned off by whomever, but pretending to be court
cost? One may question why indeed the Victorian Police directs payments to be made to an
unregistered business enterprise purportedly named Civic Compliance Victoria instead of to the
Consolidated funds? This kind of conduct in my view might have been rather set up as an
elaborate scam, and I for one do not know if the Ministers involved may get some kickback from
the kind of arrangements they have put in place as there appears to my understanding no proper
accountability of how the system operates. How indeed was this matter tendered, if at all, and
what are the precise details. It is that the government allows Tenix Solutions IMES Pty Ltd to
operate on its behalf, as well as the Sheriff's Office and the Magistrates Court of Victoria, a clear
violation of separation of powers?
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The Attorney General of the State of Victoria had no powers to so to say give away or allow
interference with the State (impartial) judiciary, not even if the State of Victorian "constitutional"
Parliament had legislated for this, and certainly not an Attorney-General as right of being an
Attorney General for the Government itself, and likewise so regarding the Minister for Police.
Fancy a Minister (Attorney General or other) not wishing to accept a certain decision of a court,
then simply go forum shopping, to hand it over to whomever to get his way.
in my view neither the State "constitutional" Parliament and/or the Attorney-General or for that
the minister for police had any powers to hand over the function of the Sheriff's Office to a
private entity known as Tenix Solutions IMES Pty Ltd, this as the Sheriff's Office is a part of the
judiciary and not part of the Government. This has to be also as if the Sheriff's Office were
instructed by the Court to arrest (detain) and bring to the court the Attorney-General, such as in
(http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/209/123/case.html) Ex Parte Young - 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
Fancy the Sheriff faced with the dilemma that he has an order of the Court to detain the Attorney
General in regard of alleged CONTEMPT OF COURT but the Attorney General overrides the
court by instructing the Sheriff instead say to arrest the judge for interfering with his function as
a Minister of the Crown. it must be clear that the separation of powers include the Sheriff's
Office and therefore the Sheriff's Office is part of the impartial judiciary or is a Department of
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the Government, but cannot be both. if therefore the sheriff's office is part of the independent
Judiciary, then I for one cannot accept that Tenix Solutions IMES Pty Ltd using the State of
Victoria trademark (not a business registered entity) Civic Compliance Victoria can then
nevertheless issue correspondences for and on behalf of the Sheriff's Office or otherwise direct or
instruct the Sheriff's office what it can or can't do or what it should or shouldn't do or use the
letterhead of the Sheriff's Office to impersonate a Court official as to so to say scare the living
daylights out of citizens that they are dealing with a Sheriff rather then with some imposter
and/or someone acting for the government being it a subcontractor or otherwise, which has no
larger powers then the grantor (the government) has in litigation issues. Indeed, it is a well
known legal principle that for a party in proceedings to conduct itself against a opponent party
that may be deemed harassment, etc, in itself can constitute CONTEMPT OF COURT.
Therefore the conduct of the government, through its contractors and/or others, to employ tactics
to so to say scare the living daylight out of citizens, and we must not ignore the NSW incident
here innocent citizens were subjected to false claims and, this as I view it to be extortion record,
netted the Government contractors about $100 million may underlines how extensive this is in
just one mentioned case.
For completion I am setting out below some quotations of Authorities relevant to the issues
raised by me.
http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/209/123/case.html
Ex Parte Young - 209 U.S. 123 (1908)
QUOTE
A temporary restraining order was made by the Circuit Court, which only restrained the railway company
from publishing the rates as provided for in the act of April 18, 1907, and from reducing its tariffs to the
figures set forth in that act, the court refusing for the present to interfere by injunction with regard to the
orders of the commission and the act of April 4, 1907, as the railroads had already put them in operation; but
it restrained Edward T. Young, Attorney General, from taking any steps against the railroads to enforce the
remedies or penalties specified in the act of April 18, 1907.
Copies of the bill and the restraining order were served, among others, upon the defendant Mr. Edward T.
Young, Attorney General, who appeared specially and only for the purpose of moving to dismiss the bill as to
him, on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over him as Attorney General; and he averred that the
State of Minnesota had not consented, and did not consent, to the commencement of this suit against him as
Attorney General of the State, which suit was, in truth and effect, a suit against the said State of Minnesota
contrary to the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
The Attorney General also filed a demurrer to the bill on the same ground stated in the motion to dismiss. The
motion was denied and the demurrer overruled.
Thereupon, on the 23d of September, 1907, the court, after a hearing of all parties and taking proofs in regard
to the issues involved, ordered a temporary injunction to issue against the railway company restraining it,
pending the final hearing of the cause, from putting into effect the tariffs, rates, or charges set forth in the act
approved April 18, 1907. The court also enjoined the defendant Young, as Attorney General of the State of
Minnesota, pending the final hearing of the cause, from taking or instituting any action or proceeding to
enforce the penalties and remedies specified in the act above mentioned, or to compel obedience to that act, or
compliance therewith, or any part thereof.
Page 209 U. S. 133
END QUOTE
Ex Parte Young - 209 U.S. 123 (1908)
QUOTE
The day after the granting of this preliminary injunction, the Attorney General, in violation of such injunction,
filed a petition for an alternative writ of mandamus in one of the courts of the State, and obtained an order
from that court September 24, 1907, directing the alternative writ to issue as prayed for in the petition. The
writ was thereafter issued and served upon the Northern Pacific Railway Company,
Page 209 U. S. 134
commanding the company, immediately after its receipt,
"to adopt and publish and keep for public inspection, as provided by law, as the rates and charges to be made,
demanded, and maintained by you for the transportation of freight between stations in the State of Minnesota
of the kind, character, and class named and specified in chapter 232 of the Session Laws of the State of
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Minnesota for the year 1907, rates and charges which do not exceed those declared to be just and reasonable
in and by the terms and provisions of said chapter 232. . . ."
Upon an affidavit showing these facts, the United States Circuit Court ordered Mr. Young to show cause why
he should not be punished as for a contempt for his misconduct in violating the temporary injunction issued
by that court in the case therein pending.
Upon the return of this order, the Attorney General filed his answer, in which he set up the same objections
which he had made to the jurisdiction of the court in his motion to dismiss the bill, and in his demurrer; he
disclaimed any intention to treat the court with disrespect in the commencement of the proceedings referred
to, but, believing that the decision of the court in the action, holding that it had jurisdiction to enjoin him, as
Attorney General, from performing his discretionary official duties, was in conflict with the Eleventh
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, as the same has been interpreted and applied by the
United States Supreme Court, he believed it to be his duty, as such Attorney General, to commence the
mandamus proceedings for and in behalf of the State, and it was in this belief that the proceedings were
commenced solely for the purpose of enforcing the law of the State of Minnesota. The order adjudging him in
contempt was then made.
Page 209 U. S. 142
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
We recognize and appreciate to the fullest extent the very great importance of this case not only to the parties
now before the court, but also to the great mass of the citizens of this country, all of whom are interested in
the practical working of the courts of justice throughout the land, both Federal and State, and in the proper
exercise of the jurisdiction of the Federal courts, as limited and controlled by the Federal Constitution and the
laws of Congress.
That there has been room for difference of opinion with regard to such limitations the reported cases in this
court bear conclusive testimony. It cannot be stated that the case before us is entirely free from any possible
doubt, nor that intelligent men may not differ as to the correct answer to the question we are called upon to
decide.
The question of jurisdiction, whether of the Circuit Court or of this court, is frequently a delicate matter to
deal with, and it is especially so in this case, where the material and most important objection to the
jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is the assertion that the suit is, in effect, against one of the States of the
Union. It is a question, however, which we are called upon, and which it is our duty, to decide. Under these
circumstances, the language of Chief Justice Marshall in Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264-404, is most
apposite. In that case, he said:
Page 209 U. S. 143
"It is most true that this court will not take jurisdiction if it should not; but it is equally true that it must take
jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches
the confines of the Constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with
whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it if it be brought before us. We have no more
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the
other would be treason to the Constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid, but we cannot
avoid them. All we can do is to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty."
END QUOTE
Ex Parte Young - 209 U.S. 123 (1908)
QUOTE
In Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (another rate case), it was again held that a suit against individuals for the
purpose of preventing them, as officers of the State, from enforcing, by the commencement of suits or by
indictment, an unconstitutional enactment, to the injury of the rights of the plaintiff was not a suit against a
State within the meaning of the Amendment. At page 169 U. S. 518, in answer to the objection that the suit
was really against the State, it was said:
"It is the settled doctrine of this court that a suit against individuals, for the purpose of preventing them,
as officers of a State, from enforcing an unconstitutional enactment, to the injury of the rights of the
plaintiff, is not a suit against the State within the meaning of that Amendment."
The suit was to enjoin the enforcement of a statute of Nebraska because it was alleged to be unconstitutional
on account of the rates being too low to afford some compensation to the company, and contrary, therefore, to
the Fourteenth Amendment.
There was no special provision in the statute as to rates, making it the duty of the Attorney General to enforce
it, but, under his general powers, he had authority to ask for a mandamus to enforce such or any other law.
State of Nebraska ex rel. &c. v. The Fremont &c. Railroad Co., 22 Neb. 313.
The final decree enjoined the Attorney General from bringing any suit (page 169 U. S. 477) by way of
injunction, mandamus, civil action, or indictment, for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the act. The
5th section of the act provided that an action might be brought by a railroad company in the supreme court of
the State of Nebraska; but this court did not base its decision on that section when it held that a suit of the
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nature of that before it was not a suit against a State, although brought against individual state officers, for the
purpose of enjoining them from enforcing, either by civil proceeding or indictment, an unconstitutional
enactment to the injury of the plaintiff's right. Page 169 U. S. 518.
Page 209 U. S. 155
This decision was reaffirmed in Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S. 537, 188 U. S. 542.
Attention is also directed to the case of Missouri &c. Rwy. Co. v. Missouri R.R. &c. Commissioners, 183 U. S.
53. That was a suit brought in a state court of Missouri by the railroad commissioners of the State, who had
the powers granted them by the statutes set forth in the report. Their suit was against the railway company, to
compel it to discontinue certain charges it was making for crossing the Boonville bridge over the Missouri
river. The defendant sought to remove the case to the Federal court, which the plaintiffs resisted, and the state
court refused to remove, on the ground that the real plaintiff was the State of Missouri, and it was proper to go
behind the face of the record to determine that fact. In regular manner, the case came here, and this court held
that the State was not the real party plaintiff, and the case had therefore been properly removed from the state
court, whose judgment was thereupon reversed.
Applying the same principles of construction to the removal act which had been applied to the Eleventh
Amendment, it was said by this court that the State might be the real party plaintiff when the relief sought
inures to it alone, and in whose favor the judgment or decree, if for the plaintiff, will effectively operate.
Although the case is one arising under the removal act, and does not involve the Eleventh Amendment, it
nevertheless illustrates the question now before us, and reiterates the doctrine that the State is not a party to a
suit simply because the state railroad commission is such party.
The doctrine of Smyth v. Ames is also referred to and reiterated in Gunter, Attorney General v. Atlantic &c.
Railroad Co., 200 U. S. 273, 200 U. S. 283. See also McNeill v. Southern Railway, 202 U. S. 543, 202 U. S.
559; Mississippi Railroad Commission v. Illinois &c. Railroad Co., 203 U. S. 335, 203 U. S. 340.
The various authorities we have referred to furnish ample justification for the assertion that individuals who,
as officers
Page 209 U. S. 156
of the State, are clothed with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the State, and who
threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce against parties
affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution, may be enjoined by a Federal court of
equity from such action.
It is objected, however, that Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 516, has somewhat limited this principle, and that,
upon the authority of that case, it must be held that the State was a party to the suit in the United States Circuit
Court, and the bill should have been dismissed as to the Attorney General on that ground.
We do not think such contention is well founded. The doctrine of Smyth v. Ames was neither overruled nor
doubted in the Fitts case. In that case, the Alabama legislature, by the act of 1895, fixed the tolls to be
charged for crossing the bridge. The penalties for disobeying that act by demanding and receiving higher tolls
were to be collected by the persons paying them. No officer of the State had any official connection with the
recovery of such penalties. The indictments mentioned were found under another State statute, set forth at
page 172 U. S. 520 of the report of the case, which provided a fine against an officer of a company for taking
any greater rate of toll than was authorized by its charter, or, if the charter did not specify the amount, then the
fine was imposed for charging any unreasonable toll, to be determined by a jury. This act was not claimed to
be unconstitutional, and the indictments found under it were not necessarily connected with the alleged
unconstitutional act fixing the tolls. As no state officer who was made a party bore any close official
connection with the act fixing the tolls, the making of such officer a party defendant was a simple effort to
test the constitutionality of such act in that way, and there is no principle upon which it could be done. A state
superintendent of schools might as well have been made a party. In the light of this fact it was said in the
opinion (page 172 U. S. 530):
Page 209 U. S. 157
"In the present case, as we have said, neither of the state officers named held any special relation to the
particular statute alleged to be unconstitutional. They were not expressly directed to see to its enforcement. If,
because they were law officers of the State, a case could be made for the purpose of testing the
constitutionality of the statute by an injunction suit brought against them, then the constitutionality of every
act passed by the legislature could be tested by a suit against the Governor and the Attorney General, based
upon the theory that the former, as the executive of the State, was, in a general sense, charged with the
execution of all its laws, and the latter, as Attorney General, might represent the State in litigation involving
the enforcement of its statutes. That would be a very convenient way for obtaining a speedy judicial
determination of questions of constitutional law which may be raised by individuals, but it is a mode which
cannot be applied to the States of the Union consistently with the fundamental principle that they cannot,
without their assent, be brought into any court at the suit of private persons."
In making an officer of the State a party defendant in a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an act alleged to be
unconstitutional, it is plain that such officer must have some connection with the enforcement of the act, or
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else it is merely making him a party as a representative of the State, and thereby attempting to make the State
a party.
It has not, however, been held that it was necessary that such duty should be declared in the same act which is
to be enforced. In some cases, it is true, the duty of enforcement has been so imposed ( 154 U. S. 154 U.S.
362, 154 U. S. 366, 19 of the act), but that may possibly make the duty more clear; if it otherwise exist, it is
equally efficacious. The fact that the state officer, by virtue of his office, has some connection with the
enforcement of the act, is the important and material fact, and whether it arises out of the general law or is
specially created by the act itself is not material, so long as it exists.
In the course of the opinion in the Fitts case, the Reagan and
Page 209 U. S. 158
Smyth cases were referred to (with others) as instances of state officers specially charged with the execution
of a State enactment alleged to be unconstitutional, and who commit, under its authority, some specific wrong
or trespass to the injury of plaintiff's rights. In those cases, the only wrong or injury or trespass involved was
the threatened commencement of suits to enforce the statute as to rates, and the threat of such commencement
was, in each case, regarded as sufficient to authorize the issuing of an injunction to prevent the same. The
threat to commence those suits under such circumstances was therefore necessarily held to be equivalent to
any other threatened wrong or injury to the property of a plaintiff which had theretofore been held sufficient
to authorize the suit against the officer. The being specially charged with the duty to enforce the statute is
sufficiently apparent when such duty exists under the general authority of some law, even though such
authority is not to be found in the particular act. It might exist by reason of the general duties of the officer to
enforce it as a law of the State.
The officers in the Fitts case occupied the position of having no duty at all with regard to the act, and could
not be properly made parties to the suit for the reason stated.
It is also objected that, as the statute does not specifically make it the duty of the Attorney General (assuming
he has that general right) to enforce it, he has, under such circumstances, a full general discretion whether to
attempt its enforcement or not, and the court cannot interfere to control him as Attorney General in the
exercise of his discretion.
In our view, there is no interference with his discretion under the facts herein. There is no doubt that the court
cannot control the exercise of the discretion of an officer. It can only direct affirmative action where the
officer having some duty to perform not involving discretion, but merely ministerial in its nature, refuses or
neglects to take such action. In that case, the court can direct the defendant to perform this merely ministerial
duty. Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S. 531, 92 U. S. 541.
Page 209 U. S. 159
The general discretion regarding the enforcement of the laws when and as he deems appropriate is not
interfered with by an injunction which restrains the state officer from taking any steps towards the
enforcement of an unconstitutional enactment, to the injury of complainant. In such case, no affirmative
action of any nature is directed, and the officer is simply prohibited from doing an act which he had no legal
right to do. An injunction to prevent him from doing that which he has no legal right to do is not an
interference with the discretion of an officer.
It is also argued that the only proceeding which the Attorney General could take to enforce the statute, so far
as his office is concerned, was one by mandamus, which would be commenced by the State, in its sovereign
and governmental character, and that the right to bring such action is a necessary attribute of a sovereign
government. It is contended that the complainants do not complain and they care nothing about any action
which Mr. Young might take or bring as an ordinary individual, but that he was complained of as an officer,
to whose discretion is confided the use of the name of the State of Minnesota so far as litigation is concerned,
and that when or how he shall use it is a matter resting in his discretion, and cannot be controlled by any
court.
The answer to all this is the same as made in every case where an official claims to be acting under the
authority of the State. The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and, if it be so, the use of the
name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the
authority of, and one which does not affect, the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an
illegal act upon the part of a State official in attempting, by the use of the name of the State, to enforce a
legislative enactment which is void because unconstitutional. If the act which the state Attorney General seeks
to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer, in proceeding under such enactment, comes
into conflict with the
Page 209 U. S. 160
superior authority of that Constitution, and he is, in that case, stripped of his official or representative
character, and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no
power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States. See In
re Ayers, supra, p. 123 U. S. 507. It would be an injury to complainant to harass it with a multiplicity of suits
or litigation generally in an endeavor to enforce penalties under an unconstitutional enactment, and to prevent
it ought to be within the jurisdiction of a court of equity. If the question of unconstitutionality, with reference,
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at least, to the Federal Constitution, be first raised in a Federal court, that court, as we think is shown by the
authorities cited hereafter, has the right to decide it, to the exclusion of all other courts.
The question remains whether the Attorney General had, by the law of the State, so far as concerns these rate
acts, any duty with regard to the enforcement of the same. By his official conduct, it seems that he regarded it
as a duty connected with his office to compel the company to obey the commodity act, for he commenced
proceedings to enforce such obedience immediately after the injunction issued, at the risk of being found
guilty of contempt by so doing.
The duties of the Attorney General, as decided by the supreme court of the State of Minnesota, are created
partly by statute and exist partly as at common law. State ex rel. Young, Attorney General v. Robinson
(decided June 7, 1907),112 N.W.Rep. 269. In the above-cited case, it was held that the Attorney General
might institute, conduct, and maintain all suits and proceedings he might deem necessary for the enforcement
of the laws of the State, the preservation of order, and the protection of public rights, and that there were no
statutory restrictions in that State limiting the duties of the Attorney General in such case.
Section 3 of chapter 227 of the General Laws of Minnesota, 1905 (same law, 58, Revised Laws of
Minnesota, 1905),
Page 209 U. S. 161
imposes the duty upon the Attorney General to cause proceedings to be instituted against any corporation
whenever it shall have offended against the laws of the State. By 1960 of the Revised Laws of 1905, it is
also provided that the Attorney General shall be ex officio attorney for the railroad commission, and it is made
his duty to institute and prosecute all actions which the commission shall order brought, and shall render the
commissioners all counsel and advice necessary for the proper performance of their duties.
It is said that the Attorney General is only bound to act when the commission orders action to be brought, and
that 5 of the commodity act (April 18, 1907) expressly provides that no duty shall rest upon the commission
to enforce the act, and hence no duty other than that which is discretionary rests upon the Attorney General in
that matter. The provision is somewhat unusual, but the reasons for its insertion in that act are not material,
and neither require nor justify comment by this court.
It would seem to be clear that the Attorney General, under his power existing at common law, and by virtue of
these various statutes, had a general duty imposed upon him which includes the right and the power to enforce
the statutes of the State, including, of course, the act in question, if it were constitutional. His power, by virtue
of his office, sufficiently connected him with the duty of enforcement to make him a proper party to a suit of
the nature of the one now before the United States Circuit Court.
END QUOTE
Ex p Howe [1828] NSWSC 55 (11 July 1828)
QUOTE
"There are three different sorts of contempt [p. 256] One kind of contempt is scandalizing the Court
itself. There may be likewise a contempt of Court in abusing parties concerned in causes here. There
may be also a contempt of this Court, in prejudicing mankind against persons before the cause is
heard.
END QUOTE
Ex p Howe [1828] NSWSC 55 (11 July 1828)
QUOTE
45
50
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"It is perfectly clear as to the Courts at Westminster that contempts may not only be in the face of the
Court, that they may be committed out of the Court. In the [p. 258] argument of Wilmot CJ in Rex v
Alman Wilmots Notes 243 he shews clearly that publications libelling the Supreme courts may be punished as
contempt. The cases cited from Mkyns as well as that before Lord Erskine establish that anything done either
for the purpose of obstructing justice or which will have that effect, may be punished as a contempt of the
Court before whom the proceedings are had".
END QUOTE
We therefore have to consider is if the conduct the Attorney General and the Minister of Police,
Tenix Solutions IMES Pty Ltd and others can be deemed to have been nothing less but a
deliberate conduct to pervert the course of justice time and time again
The documents (such as parts reproduced below) of the deed of charge cannot but indicate that
the enforcement was intended.
60
Signed, Sealed and Delivered by The Honourable Rob Justin Hulls, Attorney General of the State of Victoria for
and on behalf of the Crown in the right of the State of Victoria
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Signed, Sealed and Delivered by The Honourable Bob Cameron, Minister for Police and Emergency Services
of the State of Victoria for and on behalf of the Crown in the right of the State of Victoria
10
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QUOTE Sorell v Smith (1925) Lord Dunedin in the House of Lords

In an action against a set person in combination, a conspiracy to injure, followed by actual injury, will give
good cause for action, and motive or instant where the act itself is not illegal is of the essence of the
conspiracy.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Sir JOHN DOWNER.I think we might, on the attempt to found this great Commonwealth, just advance one step, not beyond
the substance of the legislation, but beyond the form of the legislation, of the different colonies, and say
that there shall be embedded in the Constitution the righteous principle that the Ministers of the
Crown and their officials shall be liable for any arbitrary act or wrong they may do, in the same way as
any private person would be.
END QUOTE
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2010/39.html
South Australia v Totani [2010] HCA 39 (11 November 2010)
QUOTE
58.
There is no doubt, and it was not contended otherwise, that the Magistrates Court of South
Australia is a court in which the Parliament of the Commonwealth can invest federal jurisdiction under s 71
of the Constitution. Nor is there any doubt, and it was not contended otherwise, that a member of the
Magistrates Court is a judge for the purposes of s 79 of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he federal
jurisdiction of any court may be exercised by such number of judges as the Parliament prescribes"[138]. In
2008 there were no fewer than 72 Commonwealth statutes which conferred jurisdiction on the Magistrates
Court of South Australia[139]. Established as a court by the State, the Magistrates Court cannot be deprived
by the State "of those minimum characteristics of the institutional independence and impartiality identified
in the decisions of this Court"[140]. For, as appears below, the continuing existence of those characteristics
is an assumption which underlies Ch III of the Constitution.
Constitutional assumptions about courts
59.
The essentials of the British justice system travelled to and settled in the Australian colonies long
before the Federation movement began. The courts of Britain's colonies, including the Australian
colonies[141]:
"in exercising their power to hear and determine, ... did so in the manner of their judicial counterparts
in the place of the law's origin".
As Windeyer J said in Kotsis v Kotsis[142]:
"The nature of a court and the functions of court officers were matters that were well known in
England long before the Australian colonies began. The meaning of the word 'court' has thus come to
us through a long history; and it is by the light of that that it is to be understood in ss 71, 72 and 73 of
the Constitution."
60.
The 19th-century understanding of a "court of justice", extant at the time of the drafting of the
Constitution, was explained in part in the frequently cited judgment of Fry LJ in Royal Aquarium and
Summer and Winter Garden Society Ltd v Parkinson[143]. His Lordship spoke of "the fairness and
impartiality which characterize proceedings in Courts of justice, and are proper to the functions of a
judge"[144]. He described courts as "for the most part, controlled and presided over by some person
selected as specially qualified for the purpose" and said "they have generally a fixed and dignified course of
procedure, which tends to minimise the risks that might flow from [their] absolute immunity"[145]. The
application of that concept to courts contemplated as repositories of the judicial power of the
Commonwealth was accepted by Isaacs and Rich JJ in Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v J W
Alexander Ltd, citing Fry LJ in connection with the proposition that[146]:
"the Federal Constitution is specific that judicial power shall be vested in Courts, that is, Courts of law
in the strict sense".
The understanding of what constitutes "Courts of law" may be expressed in terms of assumptions
underlying ss 71 and 77(iii) in relation to the courts of the States.
60
61.
There are three overlapping assumptions which, as a matter of history and as a matter of inference
from the text and structure of Ch III, underlie the adoption of the mechanism reflected in s 77(iii) of the
Constitution. The first is the universal application throughout the Commonwealth of the rule of law, an
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assumption "upon which the Constitution depends for its efficacy"[147]. The second is that the courts of the
States are fit, in the sense of competent, to be entrusted with the exercise of federal jurisdiction. As
Professor Sawer observed[148]:
"The State Supreme Courts were of a very high and uniform calibre a situation in marked contrast
with that which obtained in the United States shortly after its establishment and there was no
substantial ground for fearing that they would be biased or parochial in their approach to federal
questions."
The generality of the wording of ss 71 and 77(iii) indicates that the assumption of competence extends to
all courts of the States, albeit the supervisory role of the Supreme Courts, as was submitted by the SolicitorGeneral of the Commonwealth, reinforces the independence and impartiality of inferior State courts and
contributes to the fulfilment of the constitutional imperative recognised in Kable[149].
62.
The third assumption is that the courts of the States continue to bear the defining characteristics of
courts and, in particular, the characteristics of independence, impartiality, fairness and adherence to the
open-court principle. This formulation is deliberately non-exhaustive. In considering the attributes of courts
contemplated by Ch III of the Constitution it is necessary to bear in mind the cautionary observation of
Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ in Forge that[150]:
"It is neither possible nor profitable to attempt to make some single all-embracing statement of the
defining characteristics of a court."
Nevertheless, as their Honours added[151]:
"An important element, however, in the institutional characteristics of courts in Australia is
their capacity to administer the common law system of adversarial trial. Essential to that system
is the conduct of trial by an independent and impartial tribunal."
At the heart of judicial independence, although not exhaustive of the concept, is decisional
independence from influences external to proceedings in the court, including, but not limited to, the
influence of the executive government and its authorities[152]. Decisional independence is a necessary
condition of impartiality. Procedural fairness effected by impartiality and the natural justice hearing
rule lies at the heart of the judicial process[153]. The open-court principle, which provides, among
other things, a visible assurance of independence and impartiality, is also an "essential aspect" of the
characteristics of all courts, including the courts of the States[154].
63.
The Convention Debates reveal implicit reflection on the principle of separation of powers in the
context of a provision, later omitted, which would have barred any person holding judicial office from
being appointed to or holding any executive office[155]. The limited record of consideration of judicial
independence by delegates to the Convention otherwise centred around debate about the mechanism for the
removal of federal judges. A leading contributor in this respect was the South Australian Charles Kingston.
He spoke of his desire "to preserve intact the absolute independence of the judges, both in relation to the
Federal Executive and the Federal Parliament; that they may have nothing to hope for, and nothing to fear
either; and that in doing their duty they may feel secure in their office"[156]. The absence of any recorded
debate about the principle of independence enunciated by Kingston indicates that it was
uncontroversial. The historical record does not indicate that the members of the Convention expressly
adverted to the broader concept of the separation of judicial power in their debates[157]. However, that
does not detract from the conclusion that the Constitution was framed on the basis of common assumptions,
at least among lawyers of the day, about the nature of courts and their independence in the discharge of
judicial functions.
The assumption of the continuity of the defining characteristics of the courts of the States as courts of
law is supported by ss 106 and 108 of the Constitution, which, by continuing the constitutions and laws of
the former colonies subject to the Constitution of the Commonwealth, continued, inter alia, the courts of the
colonies and their various jurisdictions. That continuity could accommodate the extension, diminution
or modification of the organisation and jurisdiction of courts existing at Federation, the creation of
new courts and the abolition of existing courts (other than the Supreme Courts). Those powers in
State legislatures are derived from the constitutions of the States
END QUOTE (Bold and colouring added)
When originally I received the Infringement Notice I responded with a 12 page 23-2-2011
correspondence such as:
QUOTE MY 23-2-2011 CORRESPONDENCE TO VICTORIAN POLICE (Page 1)
60
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Victorian Police
23-2-2011
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Victoria Police Centre, G.P.O Box 913
Melbourne, VIC, 3001, AUSTRALIA
5
Cc; Civic Compliance Victoria

GPO Box 1916,
Melbourne VIC 3001
Ethical Standards Department
Victoria Police Unit
Victoria Police Centre, 737 Flinders Street, Melbourne 3005
Phone 1300 363 101, Facsimile 9247 3498
10
Ref: Obligation Number 1106575301
15
Sir/Madam,
It may not been known to you but in recent State elections I was a candidate
promoting very much the (federal) constitution because this is the basis of all Australian
law. After all it is within s.106 of this constitution that the States are created out of the
colonies.
.
20
As a CONSTITUTIONALIST I consider it essential that we do adhere to the constitution

and so its true meaning and application as to do otherwise would invite dictatorship,
tyranny and anarchy and surely the Victorian Police would not want to promote this?
.
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Within the constitution we have the embedded legal principle of CIVIL RIGHTS and as
the Victorian Police is noted on the Infringement Notice to The Operator (0201683566)
then obviously you refer to the Operator of the vehicle concerned and not to the owner. I
admit I never had any formal education in the English language and neither was English my
native language but to me the term Operator is the person that actually controls the
vehicle where as the owner may be a person who may not even drive any motor vehicle at
all but has others doing so. So, the issue is if you forwarded the Notice to the Operator or
not. Obviously the issue then is who is the person (Operator) referred to. Well It refers to
SCHOREL-HLAVKA GERRIT H I am not aware such a person exist by such a name.
I am Gerrit Hendrik Schorel-Hlavka and within my CIVIL RIGHTS I am entitled
to have people using my correct name and as such if you are referring to some fictional
upper case name then have your litigation against a fictional person but if you do mean to
refer to me then kindly refrain from interfering with my CIVIL RIGHTS as to the usage
of my surname. As the Infringement Notice does indicate that under the Crimes Act 1958
(which carries a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years) to provide false or
misleading information then whomever concocted my surname in all upper case letters
clearly gave misleading information!
The legal doctrine of ex turpi causa non oritur action (You cannot come to court with
dirty hands) denies any remedy to a litigant (including a prosecutor or defendant) who does
not come to court with clean hands. As such the Victorian Police cannot go to court to
pursue proper enforcement of law against me when it violates my CIVIL RIGHTS to be
referred to as I have my name and that is Gerrit Hendrik Schorel-Hlavka. After all
unless and until the police does appropriately refer to my name it has no position to go to
court in that regard because it would indicate to the court it TAKE THE LAW INTO ITS
OWN HANDS and so has no position then to seek the court to enforce the rule of law.
.
50
As a CONSTITUTIONALIST I also am well aware that the Framers of the Constitution

specifically devised a democratic system based upon the Magna Carta and other provisions!
END QUOTE MY 23-3-2011 CORRESPONDENCE TO THE VICTORRIAN POLICE
55
QUOTE MY 23-3-2011 CORRESPONDENCE TO THE VICTORRIAN POLICE (Page 3)

QUOTE
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Mr. OCONNOR (New South Wales).-I have mentioned before the reasons, and they appear to me to be
very strong, why these words should be retained. The honorable member will not deny that there should
be a guarantee in the Constitution that no person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. The simple object of this proposal is to insure that no state shall violate what is
one of the first principles of citizenship.
END QUOTE
.

QUOTE
10
Mr. OCONNOR.-With reference to the meaning of the term due process of law, there is in Baker's
Annotated Notes on the Constitution of the United States, page 215, this statementDue process of law does not imply that all trials in the state courts affecting the property of persons must be
by jury. The requirement is met if the trial be in accordance with the settled course of judicial proceedings,
and this is regulated by the law of the state.
15
If the state law provides that there shall be a due hearing given to the rights of the partiesMr. BARTON.-And a judicial determination.
Mr. OCONNOR.-Yes, and a judicial determination-that is all that is necessary.
20
END QUOTE
QUOTE MY 23-2-2011 CORRESPONDENCE TO VICTORIAN POLICE (Pages 5-6)
25
Also, why on earth should I have to pay $7.50 for a print out that besides not reliable is allegedly
evidence against me? Surely if the speed camera is alleging I was speeding (not that I concede I
was in breach of any laws and neither that I was the person referred to in upper case letters) then
it must provide the evidence free of charge. As any accused is entitled to be made aware of what
purported evidence is used against him/her.
.
30
35
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (The Constitution)

QUOTE
Part VPowers of the Parliament
51 Legislative powers of the Parliament [see Notes 10 and 11]
The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good
government of the Commonwealth with respect to:
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE
(xv) weights and measures;
END QUOTE
.
40
Oops, I will have to cross-examine the speed camera and the computer if they both were actually
approved within the legal provisions of the Commonwealth of Australia as to measuring, etc.
.
45

QUOTE
Mr. REID
The object is this, that for some time to come it will not be possible for the Federal Legislature to pass
laws on these subjects, and it is necessary to have some laws on them-the state laws if they exist-until
federal laws are enacted; but the moment a federal law is passed on any one of these subjects, under
the provision under the head of "States" the federal law prevails over the state law.
50
END QUOTE
.
Therefore, unless the equipment used was confirming with and approved under federal laws then
the alleged speed infringement notice is of no value for this also.
.
55
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act

(The Constitution)
QUOTE
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Part VPowers of the Parliament

51 Legislative powers of the Parliament [see Notes 10 and 11]
The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good
government of the Commonwealth with respect to:
END QUOTE
.
10
15
QUOTE
(xii) currency, coinage, and legal tender;
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE
115 States not to coin money
A State shall not coin money, nor make anything but gold and
silver coin a legal tender in payment of debts.
END QUOTE
.
This means that the offer of paying by Infringement Penalty Payment Method obviously is
neither constitutionally valid because it fails to comply with constitutional provisions.
20

QUOTE MY 23-3-2011 CORRESPONDENCE TO THE VICTORRIAN POLICE (Pages11-12)
25
Those who are wheel clamping, etc, may just discover they are in violation of constitutional
rights of the motor vehicle owners/drivers and may just discover that they can be personally
sued for doing so. As the Neurenberg trials made clear that claiming to following orders is
no excuse! We have a constitution and we are bound to act within its provisions!
.
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As for making an application to go to court, now isnt that darn silly? I object to the
jurisdiction of the Court and as such cannot make an application that undermines my
objection. If the Victorian Police pursues this matter then it must be by now aware it and it
alone has to take the matter to court as the legislation cannot be constitutionally valid to
place the onus upon me to apply to a court for the prosecutor to litigate against me. That is
the job of a prosecutor and failing the prosecutor to take the matter to court there is in that
case neither any jurisdiction for any court under whatever name it may purport to operate to
invoke jurisdiction.
.
The above stated must not be perceived and neither is intended to indicate that I in any way
implied or otherwise conceded to have been in breach of law and/or that this is the totality
of what I had to state because it must be obvious that my reference to the 19 July 2006
decision of the County Court of Victoria regarding constitutional and other legal issues then
also is now relied upon by me and the Victorian Attorney-General at the time, despite
having been given an opportunity to dispute my submissions didnt do so and neither
appealed the courts decision and as such the State of Victoria, so any law enforcement
agency, is bound by it!
QUOTE MY 30-5-2011 CORRESPONDENCE TO Premier Ted Baillieu
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
50
Ted Baillieu Premier

30-5-2011
C/o Victorian Police

Victoria Police Centre, G.P.O Box 913, Melbourne, VIC, 3001, AUSTRALIA
heidelberg.uni@police.vic.gov.au
55
Cc; Civic Compliance Victoria

GPO Box 1916,
Melbourne VIC 3001 Traffic_Inquiries@tenixsolutions.com
Victoria Police Unit, Victoria Police Centre, 737 Flinders Street, Melbourne 3005
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Phone 1300 363 101, Facsimile 9247 3498
Ref: Obligation Number 1106575301

5
Re: COMPLAINT
Ted,
Is it too much to ask if Law & Order is to be applied according to law?
END QUOTE MY 23-3-2011 CORRESPONDENCE TO Premier Ted Baillieu
QUOTE MY 30-5-2011 CORRESPONDENCE TO Premier Ted Baillieu
10
15
As the Framers of the Constitution made clear that DUE PROCESS OF LAW is where
there is a judicial determination after both parties have been heard! As such, it is not
relevant what alternative legal processed the Parliament of Victoria may have provided for
because no Parliament can overrule the constitution! Now, if you got some police wanting
to take the matter to court then that is up to the police concerned but unless and until they
do so I have no legal responsibilities as the Imperial Act Interpretation Act 1980 prohibits
a fine before conviction and certainly increasing a fine before conviction.
.
20
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While the Infringements Act 2006 legislation refers to infringements registrar and
warrant issue, etc, lets make it very clear I hold this kind of legislation is unconstitutional
and so is and remains ULTRA VIRES unless and until the prosecutor can obtain a ruling
otherwise.
As such, if the police prosecutor cannot obtain an order to declare the legislation and/or any
part thereof to be INTRA VIRES then the legislation is not enforceable from this moment.
And this means that the Infringement Act from now on neither is enforceable to any other
citizen within the State of Victoria either. I will not make this correspondence of great
length as neither is there any need for this because the same argument was litigated by me
previously extensively in the Magistrates Court at Heidelberg on 4 December 2002 and in
the end on 19 July 2006 the County Court of Victoria upheld both my cases against the
Crown!
END QUOTE MY 23-3-2011 CORRESPONDENCE TO Premier Ted Baillieu
I will now quote the email I received:

QUOTE 22-7-2013 EMAIL 1.22AM
35
1:22 AM
wins against traffic fines in Australia.

40
FROM Donna Aussie TO 1 recipient

From
To
BCC
inspector_rikati@yahoo.com.au
Link to website: http://www.asmd.org.au/

Speed Cameras A controversial Topic
Q. Are speed cameras used by governments in all States and Territories of Australia actually legal?
45
A. No they are not.

Q.So why aren't they legal?
A. i) Because NONE have 'pattern approval' as required under the single and only
legislation in Australia governing measuring instruments for Trade or any other Legal
purpose, and
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ii) None are 'certified legal measuring instruments' in accordance with the National
Measurement Act 1960 and Regulations 1999.
See More here
AND Speed cameras and Red Light cameras etc, appear to not comply with Federal
legislation and also the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act and in particular we list
below the relevant sections of the above Constitution Act and also the NSW Constitution
Act 1902
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION ACT - SECT 51

Legislative powers of the Parliament
10
(xv) weights and measures;

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION ACT - CLAUSE 5
Operation of the Constitution and laws
15
This Act, and all laws made by the Parliament of the Commonwealth
under the Constitution, shall be binding on the courts, judges, and
people of every State and of every part of the Commonwealth,
notwithstanding anything in the laws of any State;
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION ACT - SECT 109
Inconsistency of laws
20
When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth,

the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the
inconsistency, be invalid.
CONSTITUTION ACT 1902
5 General legislative powers
25
The Legislature shall, subject to the provisions of the Commonwealth of

Australia Constitution Act, have power to make laws for the peace,
welfare, and good government of New South Wales in all cases
whatsoever.
ROAD TRANSPORT (SAFETY AND TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT) ACT 1999
NSW
30
44 Approved speed measuring devices

(1) In this Act, an "approved speed measuring device" is a device of a
type approved by the Governor by order published in the Gazette
as being designed to measure the speed at which a vehicle is
travelling.
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(2) The Minister is not to recommend the making of an order by the

Governor for the purposes of subsection (1), except with the
concurrence of the Attorney General
NATIONAL MEASUREMENT ACT 1960 - SECT 19A says
5
Patterns of instruments
(1) The regulations may make provision for or in relation to:
(a) the examination of patterns of measuring instruments;
(b) the approval and verification of patterns of measuring instruments
as patterns of measuring instruments suitable for:
10
(i) use for trade; and

(ii) any other legal purpose;
15
20
25
(7) Before the Governor-General makes a regulation for the purposes

of
subsection
(1),
the
Minister
must
also
either:
(a) be satisfied that the regulation is not inconsistent with a
specification published by the International Organisation of Legal
Metrology regarding the examination and approval of patterns of
measuring instrument;
It can be seen from the above Section 44 of the (NSW) ROAD TRANSPORT
(SAFETY AND TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT) ACT 1999, that it is in conflict
with the COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION ACT Section 51 and the COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION
ACT - SECT 109 as well as the (NSW) CONSTITUTION ACT 1902 SECT 5.
This is a little more complicated than the Section 109 issue, its about pattern
approval not being mandatory.
However, Dr Thurgood, who wrote the Federal National Measurement

Act, said if pattern approval was not mandatory, this applied to every
measuring device in the country, rendering them all invalid and not
subject to standardisation.
30
This article is from USA But c'mon soon here from a good Judge ?
35
Cincinnati Judge orders all speed cameras confiscated,

manufacturer held in contempt (Natural News) Chalk one up for
privacy, at least in one part of the country. Traffic cameras have been a
part of the urban scenery for years now, but in Elmwood Place - a
suburb of Cincinnati - they are history.
END QUOTE 22-7-2013 EMAIL 1.22AM
http://www.fox19.com/story/21541848/judge-ruehlman-rules-on-elmwood-place-speed-cameras
QUOTE
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ELMWOOD PLACE, OH (FOX19) A Hamilton County judge's decision to allow a permanent injunction on controversial speed cameras in
Elmwood Place is garnering national attention.
"We've heard from news outlets all over the country as well as citizens," attorney Mike Allen told FOX19. "I
think what this is going to do start a brush fire of lawsuits just like this from other citizens and other lawyers
that are willing to take it on."
Judge Robert Ruehlman issued a permanent injunction against the cameras on Thursday.
Allen filed the lawsuit on behalf of drivers cited by the Village of Elmwood Place, demanding that the
cameras be taken down. He has called the cameras a violation to drivers' constitutional rights.
"People do not like these speed cameras. They're not fair, they don't give you an adequate chance to contest
them," he said Friday.
The plaintiffs in the case claimed the people and businesses in Elmwood Place had suffered damage as a
result of the speed cameras. They claimed that businesses had lost customers and churches have lost members
because people were afraid to get a ticket while visiting the village.
The judge ruled that the ticket policy fails to give people a chance for due process. In his decision, the judge
goes on to state that the optional $25 hearings are "nothing more than a sham."
In the strongly worded opinion, the judge states that "Elmwood Place is engaged in nothing more than a hightech game of 3 CARD MONTY. It is a scam that the motorists can't win."
Elmwood Place police Chief William Peskin says they don't agree with the ruling and plan to appeal.
The cameras have been at the center of controversy since being installed in September of last year. The
cameras have caused thousands of citations to be issued at a cost of $105 a piece.
Peskin says refunds will not be given to drivers who previously received tickets due to the cameras and says
drivers who have received tickets and have yet to pay will still be required to make payment as the law was in
effect until Thursday afternoon.
Mike Allen says the ruling does not discuss payment but says that is something he is investigating.
"We're conducting legal research to see if that's a viable option," Allen said.
Allen recognizes the case is only at the beginning stages, saying he had anticipated an appeal.
FOX19 reached out to Optotraffic, the company who owns and runs the speed-detecting equipment. A
spokesperson for the company says they will stand behind the village as it appeals the judge's ruling.
Refunds will not be given to drivers who previously received tickets due to the cameras. Drivers who have
received tickets and have yet to pay will still be required to make payment as the law was in effect until
Thursday afternoon.
END QUOTE
http://www.morningjournalnews.com/page/content.detail/id/330037/Ohio-House-approves-proposed-redlight-camera-ban-.html?isap=1&nav=5020
QUOTE
Ohio House approves proposed red-light camera ban

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June 27, 2013

Associated Press
COLUMBUS, Ohio (AP) Law enforcement authorities across Ohio would not be able to use cameras to
determine whether drivers have run red lights or driven over the speed limit under a measure endorsed
Wednesday by members of the state's House.
Lawmakers approved the measure by a 61-32 vote. Supporters touted it as a way to eliminate the abuse of the
cameras that some municipalities have seen.
Local governments have installed cameras with the purpose of swelling their coffers through ticket fines, but
not to increase public safety, said the sponsor of the measure, Lebanon Republican Rep. Ron Maag.
"It is unacceptable to allow these cameras to pry on citizens this way," Maag said.
Critics of the ban said the cameras prevent accidents and save lives.
"What are we trying to do in jeopardizing and eliminating safety because we are so worried about traffic
tickets?" said Rep. Robert Hagan, a Democrat from Youngstown.
A common pleas judge in March invalidated an ordinance in Elmwood Place, a Cincinnati suburb, criticizing
the cameras and the thousands of $105 citations that resulted from their installation.
"Elmwood Place is engaged in nothing more than a high-tech game of three-card monty," Common Pleas
Court Judge Robert Ruehlman wrote in his decision. "It is a scam the motorist cannot win."
He ruled that the tickets violate motorists' constitutional rights to due process and said the village's
enforcement was stacked against drivers. The village began using the cameras in September, resulting in
some 6,600 speeding citations in the first month, triple the number of village residents. Revenues that are
shared with the company that operates the cameras quickly topped $1 million.
The proposed legislation includes an exemption for school zones, where cameras would be allowed to operate
during school recess, opening and closing hours provided that a police officer is present.
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Several leaders of law enforcement organizations testified against the proposal Tuesday before a committee
that analyzed the bill. They acknowledged that cameras do generate revenue for their localities. They said,
however, that the money in some cases is used by the departments to purchase equipment, implement new
programs or hire more officers.
More than a dozen Ohio cities use traffic-enforcement cameras. Some were installed to detect motorists who
run lights, and others to track speed. In some cities, the cameras have both functions.
Local governments and the companies that set up the cameras split the revenue from the tickets. The 40
cameras set in 38 intersections in Columbus yielded the city $2 million last year, according to the city's police
department. Cleveland collected nearly $6 million during the same period.
Backers of the measure also fiercely criticized on Wednesday the inequality created by the way cameragenerated tickets are processed. Unlike tickets written by police officers, camera-issued tickets are not
criminal offenses, do not count against a person's driving record and are not reported to a driver's insurance
company.
The House's approval moved the bill to the state's Senate for further discussion.
Subscribe to Morning Journal News
See more at: http://www.morningjournalnews.com/page/content.detail/id/330037/Ohio-House-approvesproposed-red-light-camera-ban-.html?isap=1&nav=5020#sthash.WGOLtlPY.dpuf
END QUOTE
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http://www.wcpo.com/dpp/news/region_central_cincinnati/elmwood_place/elmwood-place-collected-48000-fromspeed-camera-tickets-after-judge-ordered-them-shut-down
QUOTE
Posted: 06/27/2013
By: Greg Noble, WCPO Digital
ELMWOOD PLACE - Judge Robert Ruehlman has ordered Elmwood Place and its camera vendor to pay
back $48,500 they collected from speed camera tickets after Ruehlman ordered the village to shut down the
cameras on March 7.
Ruehlman found the village and Optotraffic in contempt of his order on Thursday, directed the sheriffs office
to confiscate the camera equipment and ordered Elmwood Place to pay for towing and storage.
The judge also granted attorney Mike Allen's request to certify a class action. Allen, who represents hundreds
of drivers who received $105 speeding tickets from the three cameras, said he intends to get refunds for every
one.
"Judge Ruehlman said the program is shut down. The cameras are off. Stop collecting money. They didn't,"
Allen said. "They got their hands in the taxpayers' pockets again to the tune of $48,000. Judge Ruehlman did
the right thing and ruled for them to give it back, and they're astounded by that. They act like they're offended.
"I don't get it. I don't think the Village of Elmwood Place gets it. But thankfully Judge Ruehlman gets it."
Drivers paid nearly $1.8 million for speed camera tickets in Elmwood Place after the cameras were installed
last September.
Elmwood Place split the pot 60-40 with Optotraffic, the Maryland company that installed and operated the
cameras.
Elmwood Places share was $1,056,515, according to an April 5 email accounting from Optotraffic. The
Maryland company got roughly $704,000.
Drivers who opted for a hearing also paid a $25 fee.
Allen said Elmwood Place and Optotraffic continued to operate the cameras after March 7.
The chief (William Peskin) testified that they were collecting data on speeding, but thats still a direct
violation of the judges order, Allen said. The chief testified that he advised people not to make payments
after March 7, but I take that at face value. The testimony shows he knew that Optotraffic was still collecting
payments (after March 7).
Allen submitted copies of emails between Optotraffic and Peskin as well as other records. Optotraffic sent
weekly emails to Peskin accounting for ticket payments received and money distributed.
Emails dated March 22, March 29 and April 5 recorded ticket payments collected after March 7.
In a March 27 email, Optotraffic notified Peskin it had disabled the ability to make ticket payments online, by
phone or by mail.
In an April 5 email, Optotraffic told Peskin it wouldnt disburse any more funds coming into the Elmwood
Place lockbox.
In a May 10 email, Optotraffic advised Peskin they could use the camera on Vine Street to gather data.
Other emails to Peskin revealed a new idea from Elmwood Place for issuing speeding tickets and attempts by
Optotraffic to lobby against an Ohio House bill that would outlaw speed cameras and red-light cameras in the
state.
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In a March 25 email to Peskin, Elmwood Place Mayor Stephanie Morgan shared a link to a story about
license plate readers and wrote: Hey saw this on the news and wanted to share it since we are getting them
sometime.
In an April 15-17 email string, Optotraffic employees discussed lobbying against Ohio House Bill 69. They
suggested getting Peskin to testify against the bill and emailed Peskin on April 17 asking him to call them.
Optotraffic was subpoenaed but didnt respond and didnt show up in court for Thursdays hearing.
Elmwood Place officials said they will have to go through Optotraffic to make refunds because they dont
know who got ticketed. Drivers paid their tickets through Optotraffic and Optotraffic sent the village its share
of the money.
Ruehlman said he would return the camera equipment and lift the contempt ruling when the $48,500 is
returned.
Allen had filed a contempt motion claiming the village continued using the cameras after Ruehlman's March
7 order. Ruehlman called the ticketing operation "a scam that the motorists cant win" and said the purpose
was to collect revenues, not to control traffic.
The entire case against the motorist is stacked because the speed monitoring device is calibrated and
controlled by Optotraffic, he wrote, noting that Optotraffic got a cut of the ticket money.
Ruehlman's contempt order came one day after the Ohio House passed the legislation that would ban using
cameras for traffic enforcement in the state. The bill moves to the Senate for consideration.
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9 On Your Side reporters Tom McKee and Mario Ramirez contributed to this story.
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Read the e-mails and other testimony presented by Allen at

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/717981-elmwood-place-documents-re-speed-cameras.html
(WCPO Digital removed some pages that displayed personal checks and private information and others not
specifically related to this case.)
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Read more: http://www.wcpo.com/dpp/news/region_central_cincinnati/elmwood_place/elmwood-placecollected-48000-from-speed-camera-tickets-after-judge-ordered-them-shut-down#ixzz2ZhSSwlkp

END QUOTE
http://www.wcpo.com/dpp/news/region_north_cincinnati/hamilton/hamilton-raffic-van-slows-downmotorists
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QUOTE
Hamilton traffic van-cam slows down motorists

Posted: 07/06/2013
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By: Mekialaya White
HAMILTON, Ohio - Police in Hamilton credit a unique traffic enforcement tool for a recent drop in issued
speeding tickets.
Since 2010 citations have decreased as much as 50 percent in some areas. The reason? Officers like Sgt. Ed
Burns believe a special "traffic van" placed in high-traffic areas has deterred motorists from putting the pedal
to the metal.
Hamilton police say the van helps them issue tickets based on video-captured images. It is calibrated before
every use, said Sgt. Burns, traffic supervisor for the Hamilton Police Department.
The system is currently used in 13 different locations around Hamilton. Those locations are varied and
include parks, schools and other high-speed accident areas.
One area that continues to be a problem in Hamilton is near Bypass 4, where motorists have been clocked
traveling up to 40 mph over the speed limit. Sgt. Burns said he hopes continued use of the van will eventually
improve that number.
Some critics, though, don't believe the system should be used long enough to affect those figures. They
contend the van is little more than a speed trap and liken it to the controversial Elmwood Place automated
speed cameras that have been the subject of multiple court battles.
Sgt. Buns said that's not the case. He says the van works as nothing more than a deterrent to motorists.
He also said the city is trying to be transparent about where and how the camera system is used.
We do things every Monday. The location of our speed cameras is put out on the City website, on Facebook,
paper, news media. We want people to know where it's at. We want people to slow down, Sgt. Burns said.
Burns did not indicate how much revenue has been collected as a result of the ticketing system.
END QUOTE
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The mere conduct of the Sheriff to place a sticker on a windscreen itself may be deemed unlawful as it makes the
vehicle unroadworthy and no legal provisions, to my understanding, exist to permit such kind of vandalism to a
registered motor vehicle.
5
Now I will quote some parts of the Deed of Charge:
QUOTE Deed of Charge 14 August 2007 Picture 1
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END QUOTE Deed of Charge

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END QUOTE Deed of Charge
What constitute Infringement Management and Enforcement Service Project one may ask?
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Enforcement being done by the Sheriff's Office (for the Court) then hardly could be
handed over to be controlled by a private company!
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END QUOTE
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END QUOTE
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END QUOTE
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QUOTE Deed of Charge 14 August 2007 Picture6
END QUOTE
5
QUOTE Deed of Charge 14 August 2007 Pictur7
END QUOTE
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And now the Sheriff's Office in action, albeit after the police directed them to drive into a car
park, not for a roadworthy check but just (unlawfully) for the Sheriff's Office to check for any
outstanding warrants, etc. Placing the labels on the screen themselves I view is an act of
vandalism and unlawful as it prevents a driver from operating the vehicle even if the wheelclamp
is removed. what this amount to is not a Court sanctioned conduct but as I view it rather a
Government organised extortion record for a person to pay up no matter the gross denial of any
legal rights.
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In my view this kind of conduct is a form of TERRORISM and EXTORTION not permitted
within the provisions of the (federal) constitution.
This, as the warrants issued by the Infringement Courts fail to satisfy the legal principles
embedded in the (federal) constitution.
In my view the above sets out a case against the government, and those acting for and on behalf
of it, for CONTEMPT OF COURT as to intimidate and extort from parties monies without
them having been given any reasonable opportunity, as ordinary permissible in a Court of Law to
challenge the veracity of the allegations.
.
Marriage of Baines (No. 2) (1981) 7 Fam LR 232 at 237;QUOTE
We recognise that each party is entitled to a Fair and Proper trial and to an adequate opportunity to adduce
relevant evidence and to test the quality and veracity of the evidence adduced by the other party.
END QUOTE
.
Marriage of Baines (1981) 7 Fam LR 226 at 229
QUOTE
The adversary system involves the presentation of facts ascertained by questions put to witnesses, or legal
representations to the court. The role of the judge is that of adjudicator. This does not mean that he can ask no
questions but he is at common law restricted in that he cannot in general call witnesses himself.
END QUOTE
.
Well what we have in my view is a Chapter III court turned into some STAR CHAMBER
COURT and KANGAROO COURT, with a gross denial of your constitutional and other legal
rights. where indeed, as eluded to above, is the prosecutor to pursue the case? It is just that now
the Infringement work, so to say, is doing the dirty work for the Government, ensuring that the
Court cannot be accepted as operating as a Chapter III court. Therefore it would in my view be
inappropriate for the Magistrates Court of Victoria while violating the independence of the
judiciary in such manner shouldn't be permitted to exercise federal jurisdiction in any matter
whatsoever. In my view the High Court of Australia should declare all court order of the
Magistrates Court of Victoria to be null and void, because it fails to act as an impartial judiciary.
Nor can you have that some private company under the guise of Infringement Registrar is
actually issuing Infringement Court orders/warrants as if they are Chapter III Magistrates Court
of Victoria court orders.
This correspondence is not intended and neither must be perceived to set out all issues and or
details and neither has anything been stated in order of priority.
Awaiting your response,
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G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Friends call me Gerrit)

.
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END QUOTE 130723-R Clark Attorney General & others-Re COMPLAINT
QUOTE 20140205-G. H .Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Mr Tony Abbott PM- Re Metrology National Measurement
Institute Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research -etc
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Mr Tony Abbott MP
5-2-2014
Tony.Abbott.MP@aph.gov.au, info@pm.gov.au
10
Cc:
Mr Clive Palmer
Palmer United Party Admin@PalmerUnited.com
Victorian Police
Chief Commissioner of Police
OBL 1106575301
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D. Napthine MP Premier of Victoria

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Dr Richard Brittain LLB, Executive Officer, Legal Metrology, National Measurement Institute, Department of
Innovation, Industry, Science and Research Email: richard.brittain@measurement.gov.au
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M Hoyle, Quality and client support Coordinator , Civic Compliance Victoria

GPO Box 1916, Melbourne VIC 3001 Traffic_Inquiries@tenixsolutions.com
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Ref: 20140205-G. H .Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Mr Tony Abbott PM- Re Metrology National Measurement Institute Department of
Innovation, Industry, Science and Research -etc
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Tony,
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despite what stated in his email to me dated 18 November 2013, I do not agree with certain
claims he makes. For your information I have below reproduced his email to me as I view this is
appropriate to do so.
I will reproduce below my 29-12-2013 correspondence as to indicate that I sought also Dr
Richard Brittain LLB to be aware of my position in matters and he may have opted to rectify his
misconceived statements.
.
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It should be understood that while by convention the Commonwealth may have allowed the
States to continue to legislate, this however cannot overrule constitutional embedded legal
principles, and as such I urge you/request to ensure that the Minister for Metrology National
Measurement Institute Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research address
the issues appropriately.
.
Kikonda Butema Farms Ltd v The Inspector General of Government HCT-00-CV-MA-593-2003

QUOTE
Constitution needles to mention is a supreme law of the land.
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END QUOTE
.
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QUOTE Mr. O'CONNOR:
The very principle of the Federal Constitution is this: that the Constitution is above both Houses of
Parliament. That is the difference between it and our Houses of Parliament now. The Federal Parliament must
be above both Houses of Parliament, and they must conform to it, because it is in the charter under which
union takes place, and the guarantee of rights under which union takes place; and, unless you have some
authority for them to interpret [start page 592] that, what guarantee have you for preserving their rights at all.
It is very necessary to insert this provision in the Constitution, because if you do not do that then these
questions are questions of procedure between the two Houses in which undue pressure may be brought to
bear at any time on one House or other for the purpose of vetoing a law and doing injustice to the States
represented in that House in the different ways in which the States are represented. As to the inconvenience,
there are thirty-two different subjects of legislation here which may be dealt with by the federal authority, and
in regard to any one of these if an error is made which takes the law outside the authority which is given to
the federal power it is invalid-absolutely void-no matter what inconvenience may follow.
Mr. ISAACS: That is not a rule of procedure; that is jurisdiction.
END QUOTE
.

QUOTE
Mr. ISAACS.-The court would not consider whether it was an oversight or not. They would take the
law and ask whether it complied with the Constitution. If it did not, they would say that it was invalid.
They would not go into the question of what was in the minds of the Members of Parliament when the law
was passed. That would be a political question which it would be impossible for the court to determine.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Mr. GLYNN.-I think they would, because it is fixed in the Constitution. There is no special court, but
the general courts would undoubtedly protect the states. What Mr. Isaacs seeks to do is to prevent the
question of ultra vires arising after a law has been passed.
[start page 2004]
Mr. ISAACS.-No. If it is ultra vires of the Constitution it would, of course, be invalid.
END QUOTE
.
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QUOTE Mr. THYNNE:
The constitution of this federation will not be charged with the duty of resisting privileged classes, for
the whole power will be vested in the people themselves. They are the complete legislative power of the
whole of these colonies, and they shall be so. From [start page 106] them will rise, first of all, the federal
constitution which we are proposing to establish, and in the next place will come the legislative powers of the
several colonies. The people will be the authority above and beyond the separate legislatures, and the
royal prerogative exercised, in their interest and for their benefit, by the advice of their ministers will be
practically vested in them. They will exercise the sovereignty of the states, they will be charged with the
full power and dignity of the state, and it is from them that we must seek the giving to each of those bodies
that will be in existence concurrently the necessary powers for their proper management and existence. Each
assembly, each legislature, whether state or federal existing under this constitution, will be as Dicey
again says-a merely subordinate law-making body whose laws will be valid, whilst within the authority
conferred upon it by the constitution, but invalid and unconstitutional if they go beyond the limits of
such authority.
END QUOTE
.
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I am not seeking a change of law I am rather seeking the proper enforcement of relevant (and so
constitutionally valid) legal provisions, commencing with the embedded legal principles in the
constitution the source of all our subordinate laws.
.
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Despite that from onset, even before the purported Infringement Court order/warrant were issued
I challenged the validity of any court to hear and determine matters to my knowledge and
understanding neither the police, the Sheriffs office or others bothered to have this constitutional
issue determined appropriately.
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109
On 19 July 2006 I comprehensively defeated the Commonwealth of Australia, after a 5 year epic
legal battle in the County Court of Victoria. One fatal error then the Commonwealth had made
was failing, being the prosecutor, to place the matters before the High Court of Australia. The
prosecutor wrongly assumed that it was for me to do so. It appears that now with the Victorian
Police/Sheriffs Office it to makes this fatal error.
Article 11 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
"Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law in a public trial at which she/he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence."
.
The legal doctrine of ex turpi causa non oritur action denies any remedy to a litigant
(including a prosecutor) who does not come to court with clean hands.
Despite that the High Court of Australia in Harris v Calidine made clear a Registrars decision
must always be reviewable as otherwise it is unconstitutional, nevertheless the Registrar of the
Infringement Court refused to allow a review before a judge, as I requested. Hence his
subsequent issue of a warrant is of no legal value.
Dimes v. Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal (1852) 3 II,L.C. 759
QUOTE
The fundamental rule of English (Australian) law is that "No man can be a judge in his own case". It has
long been held that if there is bias or the appearance of bias such as to deny justice or create the impression
that justice has not been done, then that bias, or apparent bias, is sufficient to invalidate the decision of
those who made the decision.
END QUOTE
Reg v. The London County Council (1894) XI .L.R. 24
Sharp v. Carey (1897) 23 V.L.R. 248 Austin Digest 17.
Reg. v. Moleswort (1893) 23 V.L.R. 582 Austin Digest 17.
Black v. Black (1951) N.Z.L.R. 723
Ex Parte Blume (1958) W.N. (N.S.W.) 411Austin Digest 93,339,457,458
In Re O (infants) (1971) Ch 748,754 and 755
QUOTE
In my considered opinion the law now is that if an appellate court is satisfied that the decision of the lower
court is wrong, it is it's duty to say so and act accordingly.
END QUOTE
Marriage of McJarrow Fam LR6, 746 (1980)
QUOTE
In my judgment the signing by the registrar of an order is irrelevant to the question as to whether or not an order
was made. The signing and sealing of an order is no more that an administrative act passing and entering the
order into the records of the court. Once an order has been pronounced by the court then there is in existence an
order which can be appealed pursuant to S94 of the Act.
END QUOTE
In Preston Ice and Cool Stores Pty Ltd. v. Hawkings (1955) V.L.R. 89; (1955) Austin Digest 337.
QUOTE
It was held that where there is a review/appeal the party having sought such review/appeal is not bound by
the grounds used in the original hearing but may refer to other grounds even so, such grounds had not been
upon which the original order was based.
END QUOTE
As I was denied to attend to any hearing or purported hearing then my request for a review
couldnt be limited merely by the fact I was denied any submissions from onset, as the review
must be DE NOVO and before a judge.
As the court (Magistrates Court of Victoria never pronounced any orders and the Registrar upon
his own violation, without disclosing to me what evidence, if any, he relied upon, signed the
orders and despite my opposition continued to issue a warrant, then I view this is a very serious
constitutional issue where the State of Victoria is violating the usage of the Magistrates Court of
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Victoria as a court exercising federal jurisdiction (see also set out below by way of quotations)
and this cannot be tolerated by the Commonwealth.
5
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http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/HCA/1991/9.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query="otherwise%20fell%20outside%20its%2
0jurisdiction%20"
Harris v Caladine [1991] HCA 9; (1991) 172 CLR 84 (17 April 1991)
QUOTE
The Full Court on appeal from Maxwell J. held that the review of the Deputy Registrar's decision was
confined to an inquiry whether the parties did in fact consent to the terms of the order and whether the terms
agreed upon were in a form appropriate to the type of order sought and were enforceable. But the order made
by the Deputy Registrar must have been made pursuant to s.79 - the section which confers power upon the
Court to order a settlement of or an alteration in the property interests of the parties. The Court could not
make an order which otherwise fell outside its jurisdiction merely because the parties consented to it
and it follows, a fortiori, that a Registrar, exercising a delegated power, could not do so. Thus, for instance,
under s.80(1)(j) of the Act the Court may make an order by consent, but only in exercising its powers under
Pt VIII. Section 37A(1)(g) allows the delegation to the Registrar of the power to make an order by consent,
but only where it is a power of the Court. And O.36A, r.2(1)(n) delegates to the Registrar the power referred
to in s.37A(1)(g).
END QUOTE
In this case I didnt even consent to jurisdiction but this was disregarded. Moreover the normal
procedure of the Magistrates Court of Victoria as to issue a hearing date for an OPEN COURT
HEARING never eventuated, and as such it being a computer operated by a private company that
issue the orders/warrants this then offend the constitutional legal principle of separation of
powers between the executives (Government) and the judiciary.
The following applies as much to Federal laws of the Commonwealth of Australia as it does to
federal laws in the USA; http://familyguardian.tax-
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tactics.com/Subjects/LawAndGovt/ChallJurisdiction/AuthoritiesArticle/AuthOnJurisdiction.htm
QUOTE
37 Am Jur 2d at section 8 states, in part: "Fraud vitiates every transaction and all contracts. Indeed, the
principle is often stated, in broad and sweeping language, that fraud destroys the validity of everything into
which it enters, and that it vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments."
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE
The general misconception is that any statute passed by legislators bearing the appearance of law constitutes
the law of the land. The U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and any statute, to be valid, must be
in agreement. It is impossible for both the Constitution and a law violating it to be valid; one must prevail.
This is succinctly stated as follows:
The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute, though having the form and name of law, is in
reality no law, but is wholly void, and ineffective for any purpose; since unconstitutionality dates from
the time of its enactment, and not merely from the date of the decision so branding it. An
unconstitutional law, in legal contemplation, is as inoperative as if it had never been passed. Such a
statute leaves the question that it purports to settle just as it would be had the statute not been enacted.
Since an unconstitutional law is void, the general principles follow that it imposes no duties, confers no
rights, creates no office, bestows no power or authority on anyone, affords no protection, and justifies
no acts performed under it. . .
A void act cannot be legally consistent with a valid one. An unconstitutional law cannot operate to supersede
any existing valid law. Indeed, insofar as a statute runs counter to the fundamental law of the land, it is
superseded thereby.
No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts are bound to enforce it.
END QUOTE
Sixteenth American Jurisprudence
Second Edition, 1998 version, Section 203 (formerly Section 256)
QUOTE Scuderi v Morris [2001] VSCA 190 (29 October 2001
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In order to resolve this appeal and to determine the relevant principles, we have had to look at a
considerable number of additional reported decisions as well as a variety of text books, many of which
we have had to find for ourselves with the invaluable assistance of the researchers engaged by the Court.
END QUOTE
.

QUOTE Mr. HIGGINS:
I think it is advisable that private people should not be put to the expense of having important
questions of constitutional law decided out of their own pockets.
END QUOTE
.
15
END QUOTE
END QUOTE
20

END QUOTE
25

END QUOTE
.
30
Where there is absence of jurisdiction, all administrative and judicial proceedings are a nullity and
confer no right, offer no protection, and afford no justification, and may be rejected upon direct
collateral attack.
END QUOTE
.
35
QUOTE Yunghanns & Ors & Yunghanns & Ors & Yunghanns [1999] FamCA 64
(2) The Court always has jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for the purpose of and up to the point
of deciding whether it has jurisdiction to make the orders sought in the proceedings.
40
45
50
55
(3) In carrying out that limited exercise of jurisdiction, the Court is required to determine any essential facts
upon which the existence of its jurisdiction to make the orders sought ultimately depends (the jurisdictional
facts). That determination is a function which is incidental to the exercise of the jurisdiction referred to in
(2) above.
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE Yunghanns & Ors & Yunghanns & Ors & Yunghanns [1999] FamCA 64
(6) Once a respondent challenges the Courts jurisdiction to make the orders sought, the Court, before
considering the adjudicational facts, must find the existence of the jurisdictional facts, on the balance of
probabilities.
END QUOTE
QUOTE.
FAMILY LAW RULES 20042003 No. 375 - RULE 3.05
Objection to jurisdiction
(1)
If, in a Form 3A, a respondent objects to the jurisdiction of the court, the respondent will not be taken to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by also seeking an order that the application be dismissed on another
ground.
(2)
The objection to the jurisdiction must be determined before any other orders sought in the Form 3A.
END QUOTE
60
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112
Director General, Department of Commerce v Cianfrano and Anor [2008] NSWADTAP 56 (24 July 2008) NEW
SOUTH WALES ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS TRIBUNAL
QUOTE
3 The Tribunal decided, contrary to the Departments submission, that it did have jurisdiction to determine the
adequacy of search question: Director-General, Department of Commerce and anor (No 2) [2006] NSW
ADT 195. The matter was listed for further directions. The Tribunals orders were as follows:
1. First Respondents objection to jurisdiction dismissed.
2. Tribunal to reconvene to make further directions as appropriate.
10
15
END QUOTE
.
Trapman v Sydney Water Corporation & Ors [2009] FMCA 942 (16 September 2009)
QUOTE
1. Accordingly, I find that the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the matters contained in Particulars (a)(ii),
(v), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi) and (xii) of Exhibit 1.
1. It follows that I find that the Court does not have jurisdiction to deal with the matters contained in
Particulars (a) (i),(iii), (iv) and (vi) of Exhibit 1.
1. I make orders accordingly.
END QUOTE
.
20
25
Watson v Director-General, Department of Services, Technology and Administration [2010] NSWADT 44 (12
February 2010)
QUOTE
He also stated that, if the Tribunal agreed this view, he would seek an order that the Respondent pay the
Applicants costs occasioned by the objection to jurisdiction on an indemnity basis.
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE
The orders to be made
30
64 For the foregoing reasons, each of the applications constituting these proceedings is dismissed for want of
jurisdiction.
65 In consequence, the Tribunals orders made on 6 January 2010 are discharged.
35
40
45
66 In addition, the directions hearing set down for 15 February 2010 is vacated.
END QUOTE
15A Construction of Acts to be subject to Constitution
QUOTE
Every Act shall be read and construed subject to the Constitution, and so as not to exceed the legislative
power of the Commonwealth, to the intent that where any enactment thereof would, but for this section, have
been construed as being in excess of that power, it shall nevertheless be a valid enactment to the extent to
which it is not in excess of that power.
END QUOTE
.
50
The High Court of Australia held that where a party pleads the non-application of a State Act because of
Commonwealth legislation then the State Court is exercising Federal jurisdiction. (However only if the State Court
can invoke jurisdiction, which VCAT cannot and neither is a court!) Troy v Wrigglesworth (1919) 26 C.L.R. 305;
25 (1926) 38 C.L.R. 441; 33 A.L.R. 66.
.
Held by the High Court of Australia that the expression Court or judge of a State does not include a Judge sitting
in Chambers exercising the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Wilcox v Donohoe, (1905) 3 C.L.R. 83; 12 A.L.R. 54.
.
55
Held by the High Court of Australia that the federal jurisdiction which is conferred on a State Court by the section is
subject to any limitations imposed by the laws of the State upon its state jurisdiction, unless otherwise expressly
declared. Federated Saw-mill Timberyard and General Woodworkers Employees Association v Alexander, (1912)
15 C.L.R. 308; 19 A.L.R. 22.
.
60
Held by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland that the police magistrate exercising Federal jurisdiction
is not an officer of a Federal Court within the meaning of this paragraph (Section 39 of the Judicial Act 1903) R.
v. Archdall and Others; Ex parte Taylor, 1919 St. R. Qld 207; 13 Q.J.P.R. 22 C.L.R. 437 in which the High Court
p112
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113
(Isaacs, Higgins, Gavan Duffy and Ricch JJ ; Griffith CJ and Barton J dissenting) held that a Judge of an inferior
Court of a State invested with and purporting to exercise Federal jurisdiction is not an officer of the Commonwealth
within the meaning of s. 75 (v) of the Constitution.
.
Held by the High Court of Australia that a State Court, the appellated jurisdiction of which is limited by a State Act,
has no federal appellated jurisdiction beyond those limits. R. v. Whitfield and Others Ex parte Quon Tat,
(1013) 15 C. L.R. 689; 19 A.L.R. 97
.
10
Held by the High Court of Australia that under this section the Courts of the several States have federal appellated
jurisdiction, as regard the matters enumerated in ss75 and 76 of the Constitution, to the same extent that, and subject
to the same conditions as, under the State laws they have appellated jurisdiction in matters to which State laws
apply. Ah Yick v Lehmert, (1905) 2 C.L.R. 593; 11 A.L.R. 306
.
15
20
Held by the High Court of Australia (Williams J.) that under this section 40 of the Judiciary Act 1903 the AttorneyGeneral for the Commonwealth or a State may apply for the removal into the High Court of a cause or part of a
cause whether or not he is a party to the proceedings in which the cause arises, and if the cause really and
substantially arises under the Constitution or involves its interpretation, the court MUST grant the removal as of
right notwithstanding that the matter is apparently concluded by authority. Any distinct and divisible question may
be part of such a cause within the meaning of this section. In re an Application by the Public Service Association
of N.S.W. , (1947) 75 C.L.R. 430
.
25
Per Evatt J. ; Each question as to the limits inter se is involved where State Legislature is challenged on the
grounds that it contravenes s. 90 of the Constitution. Hopper v Egg and Egg Pulp Marketing Board (Vic),
(1939) 61 C.L.R. 665, at p 681; A.L.R. 249, at p 255
.
Per Evatt J.; Each question of the validity of the Commonwealth legislation in s51 of the Constitution (and a
fortiori in s. 52) necessarily raised a question as to the limits of Commonwealth and State powers. Ibid at p. 682
C.L.R. and p 255 A.L.R.
.
30
Held that a State Court exercising federal jurisdiction when it erroneously applies Commonwealth Act to
subject matter before the Court. Commonwealth v Cole, (1923) 32 C.L.R. 602 and Commonwealth v Dalton,
(1924) 33 C.L.R.. 452; 30 A.L.R. 85
.
35
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)

39 Federal jurisdiction of State Courts in other matters
QUOTE
(1) The jurisdiction of the High Court, so far as it is not exclusive of the jurisdiction of any Court of a
State by virtue of section 38, shall be exclusive of the jurisdiction of the several Courts of the States,
except as provided in this section.
40
(2) The several Courts of the States shall within the limits of their several jurisdictions, whether such
limits are as to locality, subject-matter, or otherwise, be invested with federal jurisdiction, in all
matters in which the High Court has original jurisdiction or in which original jurisdiction can be
conferred upon it, except as provided in section 38, and subject to the following conditions and
restrictions:
45
(a) A decision of a Court of a State, whether in original or in appellate jurisdiction, shall not be
subject to appeal to Her Majesty in Council, whether by special leave or otherwise.
Special leave to appeal from decisions of State Courts though State law prohibits appeal
(c) The High Court may grant special leave to appeal to the High Court from any decision of any
Court or Judge of a State notwithstanding that the law of the State may prohibit any appeal from
such Court or Judge.
50
Exercise of federal jurisdiction by State Courts of summary jurisdiction

(d)
55
The federal jurisdiction of a Court of summary jurisdiction of a State shall not be judicially
exercised except by a Stipendiary or Police or Special Magistrate, or some Magistrate of the State who is
specially authorized by the Governor-General to exercise such jurisdiction, or an arbitrator on whom the
jurisdiction, or part of the jurisdiction, of that Court is conferred by a prescribed law of the State, within the
limits of the jurisdiction so conferred.
END QUOTE
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114
39A Federal jurisdiction invested in State Courts by other provisions
QUOTE
(1) The federal jurisdiction with which a Court of a State is invested by or under any Act, whether the
investing occurred or occurs before or after the commencement of this section, including federal
jurisdiction invested by a provision of this Act other than the last preceding section:
(a) shall be taken to be invested subject to the provisions of paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of the
last preceding section; and
(b) shall be taken to be invested subject to the provisions of paragraphs (c) and (d) of that
subsection (whether or not it is expressed to be invested subject to both or either of those
provisions), so far as they are capable of application and are not inconsistent with a provision
made by or under the Act by or under which the jurisdiction is invested;
10
in addition to any other conditions or restrictions subject to which the jurisdiction is expressed to be
invested.
15
(2) Nothing in this section or the last preceding section, or in any Act passed before the commencement of
this section, shall be taken to prejudice the application of any of sections 72 to 77 (inclusive) in
relation to jurisdiction in respect of indictable offences.
END QUOTE
.
20
From the above it already ought to be clear that a State Court, subject to certain provisions, can exercise Federal
jurisdiction.
While the authorities below are USA Authorities, the legal concepts nevertheless are of a general nature that can be
applied within the Commonwealth of Australia.
.
QUOTE
25
30
JURISDICTION the power to hear and determine a case. 147 P.2d 759, 761. This power may be
established and described with reference to particular subjects or to parties who fall into a particular category.
In addition to the power to adjudicate, a valid exercise of jurisdiction requires fair notice and an opportunity
for the affected parties to be heard. Without jurisdiction, a court's judgment is void. A court must have
both SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION and PERSONAL JURISDICTION (see below). See also
territorial jurisdiction; title jurisdiction."
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE
35
40
45
50
55
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION refers to the competency of the court to hear and determine a
particular category of cases. Federal district courts have "limited" jurisdiction in that they have only
such jurisdiction as is explicitly conferred by federal statutes. 28 U.S.C. 1330 [EDITOR'S NOTE: see
also 40 U.S.C.S. 255] et seq. See LIMITED [SPECIAL] JURISDICTION. Many state trial courts have
"general" jurisdiction to hear almost all matters. The parties to a lawsuit may not waive a requirement
of subject matter jurisdiction.
END QUOTE
I have below quoted the 10-8-2011 ADDRESS TO THE COURT but have never received any
reply in regard of it, nevertheless it was emailed to the Court and the subsequent orders /warrant
clearly defied DUE PROCESS OF LAW as unless and until the OBJECTION TO
JURISDICTION was overruled by the High Court of Australia, which never eventuated, the
OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION cannot be disposed of otherwise. Hence, no legal powers
existed for the Infringement Court/Magistrates Court of Victoria to issue orders/warrants.
As the constitution applies to all persons equally, it means that the moment I objected to the
validity of the Infringement Act 2006 then this was INTRA VIRES from conception and so for
all people against which this purported legislation was applied. Hence, I view the conduct of the
Victorian Police and the sheriffs office to stop motorist and to threatened them with
imprisonment and by this force them to concede to payments is a form of terrorism we cannot
permit to be left without proper enforcement of legal consequences in those who participate in
this form of extortion/terrorism.
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10
15
20
115
As the Victorian Police/Sheriffs Office rely upon the Infringement Court as part of the
Magistrates Court of Victoria a Chapter III of the constitution court, that must be an open court
then clearly a breach of being an open court offend the Commonwealth legislative provision that
a Magistrates Court of Victoria can exercise federal jurisdiction.
As I raise numerous constitutional issues Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900
(UK) then an Infringement Court headed by a Registrar (not being an officer of the court) cannot
hear and determine constitutional issues. While a Magistrates Court of Victoria may assess if
there is a constitutional issues, as the magistrates Court of Victoria did so on 4 December 2002
and then adjourned matters pending a High Court of Australia decision, but again the prosecutor
for the Commonwealth then omitted to place the matter before the High Court of Australia, then
it must be clear that I proved in the past the proper legal process that needs to be followed.
.
The fact that both the Victorian Police as well as the Sheriffs Office has a scant regard for DUE
PROCESS OF LAW cannot justify their conduct for one of iota.
In my view Dr Richard Brittain LLB Executive Officer, Legal Metrology National Measurement
Institute Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research had a DUTY OF CARE not
to make a statement that was without proper legal research and without sufficient reliable details
and in blatant conflict with the intentions of the Framers of the Constitution.
While Dr Richard Brittain LLB may have stated not to provide a legal opinion, nevertheless he
should be well aware that any court may give weight to his statement, in particular if presiding
judges themselves lack a proper knowledge/understanding as to what the true meaning and
application of the constitution is.
.
25
30
35
40
45
I received yet again from the Sheriffs Office a 10 January 2014 demand with threats and to me
this constitute STALKING as it is a persistent unlawful conduct. ( see also s21 of the Crimes
Act (Vic).
Ordinary a Sheriff may be justified to enforce a court order/warrant however where he is made
aware of a legal dispute, in particular one involving constitutional issues then he has no legal
powers to ignore this and nevertheless enforce the warrant.
In 1988 the Supreme Court of Victoria then also set aside a warrant (despite purportedly already
executed against my then 2 year old daughter) where the police persisted to arrest my daughter in
defiance of Supreme Court of Victoria court orders. I discovered subsequently that the person
who had signed the warrant actually was in a nursing home and no longer a JP suffering, as I
understood from her son, Alzheimers but the Victorian Police nevertheless kept pestering in the
nursing home to sign warrants this even so she was legally not entitled to do so and neither
understood this. I do not know how often the Victorian Police obtained a warrant in such manner
and may still do so but obviously such a warrant would have no legal validity in law and could
have officers involved being guilty of perverting the course of justice, etc. Also, any evidence
they may obtain by such unlawful warrant would not be admissible in court. Many a person who
may have been convicted at the time and now become aware they may have been convicted as
result of unlawfully obtained warrants may very well have their convictions overturned. And
damages awarded against the police.
.
We can do well without such perversion of the course of justice and it is therefore essential that
those seeking to enforce the law actually do so in a lawful manner.
50
In my view the Commonwealth cannot allow/tolerate a court exercising federal jurisdiction to go

about in a manner to violate constitutional legal principles embedded in the constitution.
.
55

QUOTE
Mr. GORDON.- The court may say-"It is a good law, but as it technically infringes on the Constitution
we will have to wipe it out."
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116
END QUOTE

QUOTE
Mr. HIGGINS.-I did not say that it took place under this clause, and the honorable member is quite right in
saying that it took place under the next clause; but I am trying to point out that laws would be valid if
they had one motive, while they would be invalid if they had another motive.
END QUOTE
.
10
15
As I did set out, and so also contrary to the Kable doctrine, the State of Victoria dictates the
Registrar of the Infringement Court (using the Magistrates Court of Victoria letterhead) dictates
the Registrar to issue orders/warrants and by this I view interfere with the judiciary powers. This,
as effectively the Infringement Court is dictated that it must issue a orders/warrant upon the
presentment of details by the prosecutor, without allowing any opportunity to the accused to
challenge this purported evidence, etc.
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/mistrial.html
Definition Save to FavoritesSee Examples

20
Erroneous, invalid, nugatory trial, so declared and brought to an end by the trial judge without a
determination on the merits of the case. Mistrials are caused by fundamental and incurable error
in following the due process, serious misconduct during trial, or where a jury cannot
unanimously agree on the verdict. The trial must start anew, with the selection of a new jury.
Read more: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/mistrial.html#ixzz2mtTA3U6W
25
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/presumption-of-innocence.html
Definition Save to Favorites
30
35
Fundamental principle under which every defendant who enters a criminal trial is presumed to be
innocent under common-law system (prevalent in the UK, USA, British Commonwealth, and
some other countries). This presumption remains valid until he or she is proven guilty in the due
process of law. It is the prosecutor's (government's) burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, the defendant is under no obligation to prove his or her innocence except in the rebuttal of
the evidence presented.
QUOTE
Mr. OCONNOR.-No, it would not; and, as an honorable member reminds me, there is a decision on the
point. All that is intended is that there shall be some process of law by which the parties accused must be
heard.
Mr. HIGGINS.-Both sides heard.
40
Mr. OCONNOR.-Yes; and the process of law within that principle may be [start page 689] anything
the state thinks fit. This provision simply assures that there shall be some form by which a person
accused will have an opportunity of stating his case before being deprived of his liberty. Is not that a
first principle in criminal law now? I cannot understand any one objecting to this proposal.
END QUOTE
45
Again, despite my objection to jurisdiction before any hearing or purported hearing was held by
the Registrar of the Infringement Court part of the magistrates Court of Victoria I was denied
DUE PROCESS OF LAW and denied any knowledge what the Victorian Police actually filed
before the Infringement Court, nor was advised of any date of an open court hearing as well as
denied my legal right for a review before a judge.
The fact that the Sheriffs Office nevertheless fully made aware of this and numerous other
matters continue to be like a terrorist to abuse powers to try to extort from me monies I view is
very serious and never should be tolerated.
50
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117
This is not merely a Victorian legal matter as from onset I raised constitutional issues, including
the question as to the measurement being within Commonwealth exclusive legislative powers
and as such it is and remains a federal issue.
5
QUOTE 29-1202013 CORRESPONDENCE
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Victorian Police
10
15
Chief Commissioner of Police

29-12-2013
OBL 1106575301
Cc: D. Napthine MP Premier of Victoria

Dr Richard Brittain LLB, Executive Officer, Legal Metrology, National Measurement Institute, Department of
Innovation, Industry, Science and Research Email: richard.brittain@measurement.gov.au
20
M Hoyle, Quality and client support Coordinator , Civic Compliance Victoria

GPO Box 1916, Melbourne VIC 3001 Traffic_Inquiries@tenixsolutions.com
25
30
35

COMPLAINT
Ref: Measurements-etc
Sir,
As you may recall from my 23-2-2011 correspondence I objected to the alleged speeding
claim by the Victorian Police. It should be stated that so far after nearly 3 years the Victorian
Police still has not provided me with details as to the instrument it claimed was used to measure
the alleged speed. No details if the camera, if that was used, was fitted onto a motor vehicle or
other vehicle or was mounted on a pole, etc. No information was provided to me, as to if the
instrument was certified to be in accordance with the legal requirements of the National
Measurement Act 1960 and so which person purportedly provided such certification/verification
and to which applicable legislative provision.
50
In Agar v Dolheguy & Anor [2010] VSC 506 (11 November 2010) decision the Supreme Court
of Victoria held that the State parliament of Victoria validly could legislate as to speed detection
equipment where the Commonwealth had not done so. Despite what Dr Richard Brittain LLB
Executive Officer, Legal Metrology National Measurement Institute Department of Innovation,
Industry, Science and Research stated in his email to me dated 18 November 2013, I do not agree
with certain claims he makes. For your information I have below reproduced his email to me as I
view this is appropriate to do so. Indeed, I have certain serious concerns as to some of the content
of the National Measurement Act 1960 (as amended) but will not at this time go into those
details as I intend to follow through with the Federal Government about certain issues. Save to
say that as a CONSTITUTIONALIST I hold the view that no matter what the Commonwealth
may or may not permit a State to do it cannot do so in violation of the constitution. Despite Agar
v Dolheguy & Anor [2010] VSC 506 (11 November 2010) I maintain that the Framers of the
Constitution were very clear about matters and as an example they stated:
55

QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.-I was going to explain when I was interrupted that the moment the Commonwealth
legislates on this subject the power will become exclusive.
END QUOTE
40
45
p117
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118
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON (New South Wales).-If this is left as an exclusive power the laws of the states will
nevertheless remain in force under clause 100.
10
Mr. TRENWITH.-Would the states still proceed to make laws?

Mr. BARTON.-Not after this power of legislation comes into force. Their existing laws will, however,
remain. If this is exclusive they can make no new laws, but the necessity of making these new laws will be
all the more forced on the Commonwealth.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Mr. GLYNN (South Australia).-I desire to call the attention of the leader of the Convention to an
apparent vagueness in the word "exclusive," to which reference has not yet been made. The word
"exclusive," no matter at what time the power arises, whether on the coming into being of the
Commonwealth, or the exercise of the power by the Federal Parliament, may mean, and I believe does
mean, that the power of the state to legislate ceases. On the question of whether the exclusive power
under this provision comes into being with the establishment of the Commonwealth, I would call the
attention of the leader of the Convention to clause 84. That clause seems to indicate that this exclusive
power arises the moment an Act is passed. It speaks of the exclusive power of enforcing customs duties
being vested in the Federal Parliament, but the second paragraph says-
15
20
But this exclusive power shall not come into force until uniform duties of customs have been imposed
by the Parliament.
It would appear that without that limitation the exclusive power would come into force at once, and the
position would be as stated by the Victorian representatives. If you pass this clause as it [start page 255]
stands the state could no longer legislate with regard to Chinese.
25
30
Mr. BARTON.-If the exclusive power is given without any restriction, I think it would arise immediately
on the establishment of the Commonwealth.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Mr. GLYNN.-There seems to be some doubt as to whether the exclusive power arises upon the
establishment of the Commonwealth or on the exercise of the power of legislation. The doubt seems to
be removed by clause 84. It is said that if we put this provision in clause 52 the exclusive power may be
postponed until legislation takes place. But may you not then have a concurrent power, and may not the
competence of the local Legislature to legislate in the matter be continued as long as the legislation is not in
contradiction of federal legislation?
35
Mr. DEAKIN.-That is the point.
40
Mr. GLYNN.-Yes, and there is still a vagueness in the word "exclusive." If it is doubtful whether the
exclusive power commences with the foundation of the Commonwealth, and if it is possible that it may only
come into being on the passing of legislation, may it not still be said that on the passing of exclusive
legislation the power of the local Parliaments to legislate is extinguished, but that on the passing of
concurrent legislation that power does not cease?
45
Mr. REID (New South Wales).-I think that enough has now been said on this subject by honorable
members both sides of the chamber, and I have only a very few remarks to offer. It appears that if the
sub-section remains where it is state laws will be valid until federal legislation, but the states will not be
able to alter or improve those laws during the possibly long interval between federation and federal
legislation. Under these circumstances, as we leave to the states for an indefinite time the power of
maintaining the laws they have, we should grant to them the power of improving those laws. It would
recommend the Constitution more to a large number of persons if we put the sub-section in clause 52,
thus enabling each state to legislate on this matter until the Federal Parliament comes in and legislates
for all.
50
55
END QUOTE
.
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119

QUOTE
The Hon. R.E. O'CONNOR (New South Wales)[3.18]: The moment the commonwealth exercises the
power, the states must retire from that field of legislation.
END QUOTE
.
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55

QUOTE Mr. REID:
We must make it clear that the moment the Federal Parliament legislates on one of those points
enumerated in clause 52, that instant the whole State law on the subject is dead. There cannot be two
laws, one Federal and one State, on the same subject. But that I merely mention as almost a verbal
criticism, because there is no doubt, whatever that the intention of the framers was not to propose any
complication of the kind.
END QUOTE
.

QUOTE
The Hon. R.E. O'CONNOR (New South Wales)[3.18]: We ought to be careful not to load the
commonwealth with any more duties than are absolutely necessary. Although it is quite true that this
power is permissive, you will always find that if once power is given to the commonwealth to legislate
on a particular question, there will be continual pressure brought to bear on the commonwealth to
exercise that power. The moment the commonwealth exercises the power, the states must retire from
that field of legislation.
END QUOTE
.

QUOTE
Mr. OCONNOR.-Directly it is exercised it becomes an exclusive power, and there is no doubt that it will
be exercised.
END QUOTE
Section 109 provides for existing State legislation that was enacted prior to the Commonwealth
having commenced to legislate on a subject matter and this includes any Colonial Act that was
amended after federation, whereas s108 of the constitution applies to any Colonial Act in force at
the time of federation but not having been amended since then but provides for the right of a
State to amend such Colonial law.
I am well aware that the general misconception is that s51 is concurrent powers in that both the
State and the Commonwealth can legislate on the same subject matter and in any conflict then
s109 applies, however this is misunderstood because as the Framers of the Constitution made
clear no new laws and as such the concurrent legislative powers only exist until the
Commonwealth commences to exercise its legislative powers. When it does then it becomes an
exclusive legislative power and the States must retire from this field/subject.
No new laws must include no amendments to existing legislation that was on foot prior to the
Commonwealth commencing to legislate. In Agar v Dolheguy & Anor [2010] VSC 506 (11
November 2010) decision the Supreme Court of Victoria THE Court completely failed to
consider the above issues and as the High Court of Australia itself stated:
.
QUOTE Duncan v Queensland (1916) 22 CLR 556, 582 (per Griffith C.J.)
That case (a previous decision of the High Court, Foggit, Jones & Co v NSW (1915) 21 CLR 357) was
very briefly, and I regret to say, insufficiently argued and considered on the last day of the Sydney
sitting..... The arguments which now commend themselves to me as conclusive did not find entrance to
my mind. In my judgment that case was wrongly decided, and should be overruled.
END QUOTE
Therefore the court may upon proper presentation of relevant details reconsider its position and
accept that indeed Victorian legislation is unconstitutional, regardless even if the Commonwealth
were to permit for State legislation, as the Commonwealth cannot overrule the constitution!
QUOTE
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120
10
Mr. WISE.-If the Federal Parliament chose to legislate upon, say, the education question-and the
Constitution gives it no power to legislate in regard to that question-the Ministers for the time being in each
state might say-"We are favorable to this law, because we shall get 100,000 a year, or so much a year, from
the Federal Government as a subsidy for our schools," and thus they might wink at a violation of the
Constitution, while no one could complain. If this is to be allowed, why should we have these elaborate
provisions for the amendment of the Constitution? Why should we not say that the Constitution may be
amended in any way that the Ministries of the several colonies may unanimously agree? Why have this
provision for a referendum? Why consult the people at all? Why not leave this matter to the Ministers
of the day? But the proposal has a more serious aspect, and for that reason only I will ask permission to
occupy a few minutes in discussing it.
END QUOTE
I find it regrettable that Dr Richard.Brittain LLB seems to me to lack the proper understanding of
the true meaning and application of the constitution, and in error goes along with this kind of
charade of inappropriate usage of measurement instruments not appropriately certified/verified.
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As the National Measurements Act 1960 makes it an offence for usage of measurements
instruments, including the supply of it, not approved appropriately I hold it important that police
officers are not unwillingly left to use measurement instruments where their superiors fails to
protect them against this.
As you may be aware the Infringement Court is part of the Magistrates Court of Victoria and the
High court of Australia has already held that a Chapter III of the Constitution Court (as the
Magistrates Court of Victoria is) must be an open court. The Infringement Act doesnt
provide for specific details as to an accused to be notified of an hearing and so the ordinary
Magistrates Court Act provision must be deemed to apply. No compliance eventuated and
despite the High Court of Australia ruling that a Registrars decision must be always reviewable
before a judge (Harris v Caladine) as otherwise it is unconstitutional as a Registrar is not an
officer of the court,
THE QUEEN v. DAVISON [1954] HCA 46; (1954) 90 CLR 353
QUOTE
4. It appears from the facts stated in the special case that in spite of its form, the order was made by the deputy
registrar and not by the court or judge or under the actual authority of the court or judge. The circumstance that Mr.
Hartstein was a deputy-registrar and not the registrar of the district is of no importance. Section 12(2) says that in
each district there shall be a district registrar and such deputy registrars, official receivers and other officers as are
necessary. Sub-section (6) of s. 12 says that the Attorney-General may by order direct that any specified deputy
registrar shall have and exercise any or all of the powers and functions of a registrar. The Attorney-General made an
order which though it did not exactly follow the words of the sub-section may be taken to have conferred on Mr.
Hartstein the powers and functions of a registrar. It must not be supposed, however, that the registrar or the deputyregistrar are officers of the Federal Court of Bankruptcy or form part of the staff or organization of the court. In its
first form sub-s. (5) of s. 12 did provide that the registrars and deputy registrars should be officers of the court and
should have such duties as the Attorney-General directed or as were prescribed. The expression "the Court" was
defined to mean any court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy or a judge thereof: s. 4. An attempt was made under s.
18 as it then stood to confer jurisdiction in bankruptcy on a number of courts of the States. In Le Mesurier v. Connor
(1929) 42 CLR 481 , it was held in this Court that s. 77(iii) of the Constitution does not enable the Parliament to
make a commonwealth officer a functionary of a state court and to authorize him to act on its behalf and administer
part of its jurisdiction and that s. 51 (xxxix) does not authorize the reconstitution of a state court invested with
federal jurisdiction under s. 77(iii) or of the organization through which its powers and jurisdiction are exercised.
Accordingly s. 12(5) and ss. 23 and 24 as they then stood, were held ultra vires and void
END QUOTE
Therefore all and any orders/warrants issued by the Registrar of the Infringement Court I
maintain are without legal force and so ULTRA VIRES. It also means that police officers
assisting the Sheriff Office to stop and retain motor vehicle drivers for purpose of those
unconstitutional orders/warrants to be enforced in my view is aiding and abetting and a
conspiracy to pervert the course of justice, etc.
There are various parts commencing with section 18 of the National Measurements Act 1960 (as
amended) which makes it an offence to use measuring instruments in the manner that appears to
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me the Victorian Police is using it.
While it appears to me that the Victorian Police, the Sheriffs Office, and others may not
care less as to breaches of law in the end where this matter ultimately be adjudicated upon
by a true court of law then no excuses can exist for the Victorian Police a, the Sheriffs
Office and/or others as to that they didnt know. Indeed I have spent nearly 3 years so far to
try to get some sense into everyone but it seems to me that even Dr Richard Brittain LLB is
not able or willing to be open minded and consider the details I provided.
5
.
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35
QUOTE Australian Agricultural Co Ltd. v F.E.D.F.A of Australasia (1913) 17 CLR 261 and 278
The oath of a justice of this court is ' to do right to all manner of people according to law' Our sworn duty is
to the law itself and to the organic nature of the constitution first of all. If, then, we find the law to be
plainly in conflict with what we or any of our predecessors errornously thought it to be, we have, as I
conceive no right to choose between giving effect to the law, and maintaining an incorrect interpretation, It
is not, in my opinion, better that the court should be persistently wrong than that it should be ultimately
right..
Whatever else may be said with respect to previous decisions - and it is necessary here to consider the
principals upon which a court should act in particular cases - so much at least emerges as is undoubtedly
beyond challenge, that where a former decision is clearly wrong, and there are no circumstances
countervailing the primary duty of giving effect to the law as the court finds it, the real opinion of the court
should be expressed.
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE Australian Agricultural Co Ltd. v F.E.D.F.A of Australasia (1913) 17 CLR 261 and 278
In my opinion, where the prior decision is manifestly wrong, then, irrespective of the consequences, it is the
paramount and sworn duty of this court to declare the law truly....
END QUOTE
As I proved in the past a police officer had tampered with the infringement notice and altered
details that was placed before the court that had not been shown on the infringement notice
provided to the driver and as such, only a fool could accept that an court could determine the
innocence or guilt of an accused without the accused having been given an opportunity to be
made aware what details actually was placed before the court and given an opportunity to
challenge this alleged evidence. It is what we refer to as being NATURAL JUSTICE what it is
about.
I will now quote the email content received from Dr Brittain, Richard LLB albeit again stress
that I do not and must not be seen to agree with the content thereof.
QUOTE 18-11-20913 EMAIL Dr Richard Brittain LLB
40
On Monday, 18 November 2013 3:05 PM, "Brittain, Richard" <Richard.Brittain@measurement.gov.au>

wrote:
Dear Mr. Schorel-Hlavka,
I refer to your e-mail of 10 November 2013 (below) and I would make the following responses to the issues
you have raised:
45
1.
Your submission is very extensive and I am unable to provide a detailed response to it. It also contains a
substantive amount of material from overseas which is likely to be inapplicable and ultimately you may have
misapprehended the law as it applies to this field. I would also make the following comments which I hope may
help to clarify the correct legal position for you:
50
General Comments
2.
The Constitution reserves certain responsibilities to the Commonwealth whilst the residual remain the
responsibility of the States.
55
3.
Under this distribution the regulation of traffic speed is a responsibility of the States (and Territories) whilst
the Commonwealth gives effect to Australias international measurement treaty obligations and facilitates the
national measurement system and its infrastructure.
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4.
Where State and Territory traffic regulators use measurement as a means of regulating traffic speed the field is
overlaid by Commonwealth measurement law provided by the national measurement legislation.
10
5.
Section 10 of the National Measurement Act 1960 (Cth) provides that when it is necessary to show that
measurements are correct this can be done by showing that they have been made in terms of the relevant Australian
legal units of measurement by one of the eleven (11) means (options) detailed in paragraphs (a) to (k) of that
section. This is described as showing that the measurements are legally traceable.
6.
The legal traceability provisions of section 10 only apply when they are enlivened i.e. a necessity has been
established. This of course is a matter for the courts to determine in each individual situation.
The National Measurement Legislation
15
7.
The National Measurement Act 1960 (Cth) (the Act) and its subordinate legislation have the following roles:
i.
Giving effect to Australias treaty obligations wrt measurement i.e. the Treaty of the
Metre and the OIML Convention including with respect to SI units.
20
ii.
Prescribing Australian legal units of measurement for use in Australia.
iii.
Providing means by which measurement can be made and shown at law to be made in
terms of Australian legal units of measurement when it is necessary to do so i.e. that they are legally traceable.
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30
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iv.
Facilitating the national trade measurement system in Australia by requiring inter alia
that all measuring instruments in use for trade are verified i.e. shown to be correct by being checked against legally
traceable standards in compliance with section 10 of the Act. A precondition of verification of measuring
instruments in use for trade is that they are of a pattern that is approved for use for trade. The net effect of this is
to make all measuring instruments in use for trade subject to a mandatory metrological control system under the
Act consisting of pattern approval and verification.
v.
The Act also provides infrastructure for the metrological control of legal measuring
instruments i.e. measuring instruments used to determine physical quantities for law enforcement purposes,
demonstrating compliance (or non-compliance) with a threshold or limit set by law (Commonwealth or State or
Territory) or that are or maybe a relevant issue in legal proceedings. This consists of pattern approval and
certification that can make these instruments certified measuring instruments under the Act and its regulations.
This metrological control system is not mandated by the Act as legal measuring instruments are not regulated by
the Act or the NMI. It is made available to regulators other than the NMI as part of the fulfilment of Australias
treaty obligations wrt measurement.
40
State Traffic Legislation
45
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8.
Whilst the national measurement legislation provides facilities for the pattern approval of legal measuring
instruments operated under State law. It is not mandatory and its absence neither vitiates the measurement made by
such instruments nor does it render them inadmissible.
9.
The situation described in paragraph 8 i.e. the absence of pattern approval under the Act does not constitute an
inconsistency between the requirements of the Act and State law contrary to section 109 of the Constitution it
merely means that the full suite metrological control provisions in the Act are not available to legal measuring
instruments in this situation. This and my previous point has been confirmed in several recent Supreme Court
judgements including in Victoria.
This e-mail is entirely without prejudice and nothing in it is intended to constitute legal advice express or implied.
Notwithstanding this I trust that these comments are of some assistance to you.
55
Yours sincerely
60
Richard
Dr Richard Brittain LLB
Manager, Legal Metrology Authority Appointments
Legal Metrology Branch
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National Measurement Institute
Department of Industry
________________________________________
National Measurement Institute

Bradfield Rd, West Lindfield NSW 2070, Australia
PO Box 264, Lindfield NSW 2070, Australia
Ph: 61-2-8467 3645 Fax: 61-2-8467 3899
Mobile: 0408 617 438
10
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Email: richard.brittain@measurement.gov.au
Internet: http://www.measurement.gov.au
ABN 74 599 608 295
END QUOTE 18-1-2013 EMAIL Dr Richard Brittain LLB
While in Agar v Dolheguy & Anor [2010] VSC 506 (11 November 2010) decision the Supreme
Court of Victoria had its conclusion you may check the reason of judgment, which is supposed to
explain upon what consideration the court arrived at its decision, and nothing really indicates any
consideration to the legal principles embedded in the constitution, as quoted some above. Hence,
I view the decision cannot be relied upon.
HANSARD18-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
END QUOTE
.
30
35
40

QUOTE
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.- Having provided in that way for a free Constitution, we have provided for an
therefore, it can only act as the agents of the people.
END QUOTE
.
45
50
QUOTE Mr. SOLOMON.We shall not only look to the Federal Judiciary for the protection of our interests, but also for the just
interpretation of the Constitution:
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Mr. HIGGINS.-No, because the Constitution is not passed by the Parliament.
END QUOTE
.
55
60

QUOTE
END QUOTE
QUOTE Mr. DEAKIN (Victoria).p123
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124
The record of these debates may fairly be expected to be widely read, and the observations to which I
allude might otherwise lead to a certain amount of misconception.
END QUOTE
Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally; Re Wakim; Ex parte Darvall;

Re Brown; Ex parte Amann; Spi [1999] HCA 27 (17 June
1999)
QUOTE
Constitutional interpretation
10
1.
15
The starting point for a principled interpretation of the Constitution is the search for the intention of its
makers[51]. That does not mean a search for their subjective beliefs, hopes or expectations. Constitutional
interpretation is not a search for the mental states of those who made, or for that matter approved or
enacted, the Constitution. The intention of its makers can only be deduced from the words that they used in
the historical context in which they used them[52]. In a paper on constitutional interpretation, presented at
Fordham University in 1996, Professor Ronald Dworkin argued, correctly in my opinion[53]:
"We must begin, in my view, by asking what - on the best evidence available - the
authors of the text in question intended to say. That is an exercise in what I have called
constructive interpretation[54]. It does not mean peeking inside the skulls of people dead
for centuries. It means trying to make the best sense we can of an historical event someone, or a social group with particular responsibilities, speaking or writing in a
particular way on a particular occasion."
20
END QUOTE
25
Do keep in mind that after a 5 year epic legal battle I comprehensively defeated the
Commonwealth in FAILING TO VOTE that it was unconstitutional to compel anyone to vote,
in the County Court of Victoria on 19 July 2006. As such, despite that about everyone still has
the notion that voting is compulsory, the truth is that I defeated the Commonwealth upon this.
.
30

QUOTE
END QUOTE
35
Australasian Convention) (Re Section 96 of the Constitution)
QUOTE Mr. OCONNOR.In this case the Constitution will be above Parliament, and Parliament will have to conform to it.
END QUOTE
40
As I disputed the validity of the Infringement Act 2006 then the legislation is ULTRA VIRES
Ab Initio unless a court pronounces against it. Hence the current enforcement in disregard of this
cannot and shouldnt be maintained.
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QUOTE
END QUOTE
It appears to me that the Victorian Police, so to say, should come clean and provide the
relevant details I requested long ago. Also, when did it serve me with a summons to attend
to court (the Infringment Court), etc.
QUOTE
Mr. OCONNOR.-No, it would not; and, as an honorable member reminds me, there is a decision on the point. All
that is intended is that there shall be some process of law by which the parties accused must be heard.
Mr. HIGGINS.-Both sides heard.
Mr. OCONNOR.-Yes; and the process of law within that principle may be [start page 689] anything the state
thinks fit. This provision simply assures that there shall be some form by which a person accused will have an
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opportunity of stating his case before being deprived of his liberty. Is not that a first principle in criminal law
now? I cannot understand any one objecting to this proposal.
END QUOTE
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Below an indication that all Commonwealth law must be uniform and cannot allow for
State legislation that is non-uniform as part of Commonwealth law!
QUOTE
Sir JOHN DOWNER
It has been thought well that there should be a uniform law throughout Australia in respect to the citizens of
Australia, and it was considered that this provision should be put into a separate clause giving exclusive
powers, in order to emphasize the fact that the Federal Parliament should legislate upon this matter.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON (New South Wales).-I have prepared an amendment with regard to this sub-section, which puts the
matter into a form which would express the intention of the Convention, whilst avoiding a difficulty. Honorable
members will recollect the difficulty that arose over the construction of words equivalent to "uniform throughout
the Commonwealth" in the United States of America. Although no actual decision has been given, a doubt has been
raised as to the meaning of the word "uniform." The celebrated income tax case went off as to the direct
apportionment of taxation amongst the people according to numbers, and this point was not decided, but a great deal
of doubt has been thrown on the meaning of the word in the judgment of Mr. Justice Field. I think that although the
word "uniform" has the meaning it was intended to have-"one in form" throughout the Commonwealth-still there
might be a difficulty, and litigation might arise about it, and prolonged trouble might be occasioned with regard to
the provision in case, for instance, an income tax or a land tax was imposed. What is really wanted is to prevent a
discrimination between citizens of the Commonwealth in the same circumstances.
END QUOTE
35
G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Friends call me Gerrit)

.
(
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55
END QUOTE 29-12-2013 CORRESPONDENCE

In my view the Commonwealth cannot stand idle and let this matter being ignored as it relates to
constitutional issues and also Federal legislative powers which are violated by the State of
Victoria.
.
In my view the State of Victoria had ample of time since my objection of February 2011 to place
the matter before the High Court of Australia as to seek to obtain a ruling as to jurisdiction but
failed to do so. It is so to say the bully that seeks to use inappropriately its powers to pervert the
course of JUSTICE and this I view the Commonwealth cannot tolerate, in particular where it
undermines Commonwealth legislative powers.
It should be understood that numerous persons are subjected to the terrorism demands of the
Sheriffs Office and so aided and abetted by the Victorian Police which often stop motorist for no
more but to check if they have a warrant outstanding, an abuse of police powers. The courts have
been clear that the police can only intercept a motorist for lawful purposes, such as checking the
validity of a person to drive a vehicle under his/her charge. What we now have however is that
the Sherriffs office is directing for the refusal to continue the registration of a motor vehicle for
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renewal not because the vehicle concerned is unroadworthy but as a terrorist conduct to force
people to pay up to unconstitutional court orders/warrants.
As I challenged the validity of the Infringement Act 2006 from onset, then the act remains
ULTRA VIRES unless the High Court of Australia were to determine otherwise, and this the
Victorian Police/Sheriffs Office failed to pursue.
QUOTE 10-8-2011 ADDRESS TO THE COURT
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
10
Magistrates Court of Victoria

Ground Floor, 277 William Street
Melbourne Vic 3000
C/o:
Cc:
15
10-8-2011
Chief Magistrate of the Magistrates Court of Victoria C/o help@magistratescourt.vic.gov.au

Acting Chief Commissioner of the Victorian Police C/o heidelberg.uni@police.vic.gov.au
C/o Victoria Police Centre, G.P.O Box 913, Melbourne, VIC, 3001, AUSTRALIA
Civic Compliance Victoria
GPO Box 1916,
Melbourne VIC 3001 Traffic_Inquiries@tenixsolutions.com
20

Victoria Police Unit, Victoria Police Centre, 737 Flinders Street, Melbourne 3005
Phone 1300 363 101, Facsimile 9247 3498
Ted Baillieu Premier
of Victoria
25
Ref: Infringement Court case Number 1158210495

Infringement Notice Number 0201683566
30
35
ADDRESS TO THE COURT

Sir/Madam,
a limited set out is provide d below as to why the purported Infringement Notice
Order is null and void and should be revokes/set aside as being ULTRA VIRES, etc.
QUOTE
Mr. GLYNN.-I think they would, because it is fixed in the Constitution. There is no special court, but the
general courts would undoubtedly protect the states. What Mr. Isaacs seeks to do is to prevent the question of
ultra vires arising after a law has been passed.
40
[start page 2004]

END QUOTE
.
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When I first received an infringement notice (which commences the legal processes to
subsequently lead to litigation if persisted with by the Prosecutor) I responded with to challenge
the jurisdiction of any court that would be dealing with the matter. This is a tactic that obviously
was never contemplated by the legislators but nevertheless because it is legally appropriate to
object to the jurisdiction of a court then the entire legal process ordinary contemplated to be
applied by this got stuck by this unless and until a court was to dismiss the objection to
jurisdiction giving a formal ruling and reason of judgment as to why it dismissed the objection
to jurisdiction. Obviously, a computer that purportedly acts as a decision maker cannot deal with
this and so the very computer program designed to simply enforce any Infringement Notice
allegation as a matter of fact now was legally nowhere.
.
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The Infringement Act 2006 does provide that the Infringements Registrar must consider the
evidence as provided and so the question is what is required by the Prosecutor (the so called
enforcement agency) to be submitted?
.
10
15
Foster (1950) S.R. (N.S.W.) 149, at p151 (Lord Denning, speaking on the role of an advocate)
QUOTE
As an advocate he is a minister of Justice equally with a judge, A Barrister cannot pick or choose his
clients...He must accept the brief and do all he honourably can on behalf of his client. I say 'All he
honourably can' because his duty is not only to his client. He has a duty to the court which is
paramount. It is a mistake to suppose that he is a mouthpiece of his client to say what he wants: or
his tool to do what he directs. He is none of those things. He owes his allegiance to a higher cause. It is
the cause of truth and Justice. He must not consciously misstate the facts. He must not knowingly
conceal the truth. He must not unjustly make a charge of fraud, that is, without evidence to support it. He
must produce all relevant authorities, even those that are against him. He must see that his client
discloses, if ordered, all relevant documents, even those that are fatal to his case. He must disregard the
specific instructions of his client, if they conflict with his duty to the court.
END QUOTE
.
20
Now, what the role of the Prosecutor (the enforcement agency) was is to present to the
Infringements Registrar all relevant details as after all my objection to the jurisdiction of the
Court precedes any ability of the court to hear and determine the allegations by the Prosecutor.
.
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40
As I did request in past correspondence to be made aware of the reasons of the Infringements
Registrar as to the issue of the Infringement Notice Order considering that to my knowledge no
formal order and reason of judgment was issued to dismiss the objection to jurisdiction then the
said Infringements Registrar clearly acted without having invoked jurisdiction and therefore any
and all orders issued are null and void and ULTRA VIRES.
As a CONSTITUTIONALIST I am obviously very much aware that the States were created
within s106 of the federal constitution and by this bound to adhere to the legal principles
embedded in the constitution. One is that legislation once challenged to its validity then it is and
remains ULTRA VIRES unless and until a competent court of jurisdiction was to dismiss the
objection.
During the 19 July 2006 litigation (a 5 year epic legal battle with the Commonwealth) I
submitted that the Victorian Constitution Act 1975 was unconstitutional This was not challenged
by the Victorian Attorney General despite that I did provide a s78B NOTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS. And also unchallenged was that courts cannot be
corporations and neither can share the same ABN number as the Victorian Courts do with the
Prostitution Control Commission and the DPP. The County Court of Victoria on 19 July 2006
upheld my cases and the Commonwealth were comprehensively defeated by me in the process.
.
It should be made very clear that the County Court of Victoria didnt hand down any
reservation as to any issues (submissions) I made as the Commonwealth didnt attempt to
challenge any of what my more than 50 constitutional based submissions was about!
.
45
See my book published on 6-7-2006 which contained the relevant details of the case:
.
INSPECTOR-RIKATI & What is the -Australian way of life- really?

A book on CD on Australians political, religious & other rights
ISBN 0-9751760-2-1 (prior to 1-1-2007) ISBN 978-0-9751760-2-3
50
.
55
What also should be understood is that the High Court of Australia is on record with its
judgments that the moment a party raises a federal issue then the matter that ordinary may be a
state litigation issue be3comes a federal matter. (Sea quotations below also.)
Now, obviously the Infringement Court is not suited to deal with a federal issue and while the
Magistrates Court of Victoria is a court that can invoke federal jurisdiction as for juridical
matters it cannot invoke federal jurisdiction for administrative decisions determining the guilt of
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128
the alleged offender upon the evidence of the Prosecutor.
The Framers of the Constitution made clear that a judicial can only be made after hearing both
parties, and as such the Infringement Act 2006 in kin conflict of this also.
Further, the Magistrates Court of Victoria regards Infringement Notice Orders to be
Administrative orders and not JUDICIAL orders and for this also the orders are ULTRA
VIRES and without legal force.
When it comes to a registrars decision then Kay J of the Full Court of Australia on 24 and 25
October 1994 in the matter of Abbot v Abbott made clear that there is no time restrains to seek a
review against a registrars decision (And applied this for example in 19995 in the matter of
Mitterer v Mitterer!). For this, the correspondence of the Infringements Registrar dated 27 July
2011 that he refused my request for revocation is beyond his legal powers as regardless what the
Infringement Act 21006 may state otherwise as I disputed the courts jurisdiction from onset,
regardless if the prosecutor did not reveal this to the say computer pretending to be the
Infringements Registrar it nevertheless cannot undermine my constitutional rights.
In my view the Infringements Registrar should have immediately ensured that the purported
Infringement Notice Order was vacated if anything because no jurisdiction was ever invoked.
.
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35
The issue that escalate this matter further in what seems to me to be corrupt conduct by the
Infringements Registrar and others is that the Infringements Registrars response was dated 27
July 2011 but I received correspondence from what purports by the envelop to be vicroads
while the letter head is under the VICTORIAN POLICE dated 19 July 2011 and as such before
the Infringements Registrar made his decision known the VVICTORIAN POLICE had already
applied a 1 Point demerit to my driver license and as such I was in effect punished despite that
from onset I challenged the validity of the allegation of the VICTORIAN POLICE.
What we therefore have is that not the Infringements Registrar but the VICTORIAN POLICE
effectively decided the outcome of my request to revoke the Infringement Notice Order and as
such it appears to me that there may be a case where the Infringements Registrar is
FRATERNISING with the Prosecutor (the VICTORIAN POLICE) and that in itself invalidate
the orders of the court!
.

(Official Record of the Debates of the National
Australasian Convention),
QUOTE Mr. OCONNER (New South Wales).Because, as has been said before, it is [start page 357] necessary not only that the administration of
justice should be pure and above suspicion, but that it should be beyond the possibility of suspicion;
END QUOTE
.
40
45
As was shown on Channel 7 television on 9-8-2011 taxi drivers for example are nominating
other drivers as having committed alleged offenses even so the nominated person may not at all
have been involved. Yet, the nominated person could by the current Infringement Notice system
end up having demerit points issued against him/her and the Infringement Court can issue orders
such as wheel clamping and even break in and entry and imprisonment where the nominated
person may know of noting. What we have is to have vandalized the legal processes of being
impartial; to courts operating as STAR CHAMBER COURTS this despite that this contravenes
the Imperial Act Interpretation Act 1980 (Vic) and those judicial or other officers of the court
participating in this scandalous government endorsed terrorism upon innocent people are to be
regarded the scum of the earth as they are employed as to ensure that JUSTICE is provided and
they therefore are treasonous to their own position as well as to the general community at are.
.
50
Judicial decisions by a registrar can be based upon the evidence presented by the parties but an
administrative decision by a court cannot deal with the evidence that may be in dispute between
the parties but should be curtailed to precisely as the wording stated administrative decisions.
Hence, I responded from onset to object to the jurisdiction of any court and as such the only
administrative decision that possibly could have been made was for the Infringements
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Registrar to direct a JURISDICTION HEARING at which the onus was for the Prosecutor
(the VICTORIAN POLICE) to prove that the court had and could invoke jurisdiction1
This was an issue I also successfully submitted on 19 July 2006 where I held the failure of the
prosecutor (the Commonwealth) to prove jurisdiction was fatal to its case.
.
It appears the Prosecutor in error relied upon that the Defendant had to disprove jurisdiction but
no such obligation exist upon an accused. What however the accused can do is raise specific
objections and then each and every of those objections must be disproven by the Prosecutor as
even if it fails on 1 objection then the court cannot invoke jurisdiction.
.
It must be understood that the allegation of speeding was never itself addressed by me as it is not
relevant unless and until the court has determine, if ever at all, that it can invoke jurisdiction.
Because of the manner the courts are now conducting matters it has undermined its own
credentials and I view it now no longer can be deemed a fit and proper court to determine
matters. After all the suspicion would remain that the court more than likely might just do
anything to try to enforce its own decisions even so it was obtained unconstitutionally and
unlawfully.
.
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35
As I did challenge the validity of the purported Victorian Constitution Act 1975 as well as the
validity of appointment of lawyers, etc, then no court could possible deal with this issue now
where its own validity is now beyond q1uestion as the fact that the Victorian Attorney General
didnt bother to oppose my submission means they were upheld unchallenged.
What we have therefore is that the Prosecutor must first seek to obtain a court ruling, not being
one where its own jurisdiction now is in question, and no court within the Commonwealth of
Australia can deal with this because one of the issues I raised was that the Commonwealth of
Australia has no constitutional legislative powers to define/declare citizenship.
Again, this too was not challenged by the Victorian Attorney-General. What this means is that
unless the Prosecutor can somehow prove that the constitution allows the Commonwealth to
declare/define citizenship there can be no validity even to the appointment of members of the
parliament as each require an Australian citizenship as a nationality which again cannot be
granted by the Commonwealth as it is a political right involving franchise rights to vote, etc, and
has nothing to do with nationality. As such even judges of the High Court of Australia would fall
foul on the citizenship issue. I am well aware that the 1988 Royal Commission assumed that
the Commonwealth could legislate as to citizenship but the constitution doesnt provide for any
Royal Commission to amend the constitution!
.
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QUOTE Mr. BARTON.Providing, as this Constitution does, for a free people to elect a free Parliament-giving that people
through their Parliament the power of the purse-laying at their mercy from day to day the existence of
any Ministry which dares by corruption, or drifts through ignorance into, the commission of any act
which is unfavorable to the people having this security, it must in its very essence be a free
Constitution. Whatever any one may say to the contrary that is secured in the very way in which the
freedom of the British Constitution is secured. It is secured by vesting in the people, through their
representatives, the power of the purse, and I venture [start page 2477] to say there is no other way of
securing absolute freedom to a people than that, unless you make a different kind of Executive than
that which we contemplate, and then overload your Constitution with legislative provisions to protect
the citizen from interference. Under this Constitution he is saved from every kind of interference.
Under this Constitution he has his voice not only in the, daily government of the country, but in the
daily determination of the question of whom is the Government to consist. There is the guarantee of
freedom in this Constitution. There is the guarantee which none of us have sought to remove, but every
one has sought to strengthen. How we or our work can be accused of not providing for the popular
liberty is something which I hope the critics will now venture to explain, and I think I have made their
work difficult for them. Having provided in that way for a free Constitution, we have provided for an
therefore, it can only act as the agents of the people. We have provided for a Judiciary, which will
determine questions arising under this Constitution, and with all other questions which should be dealt
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with by a Federal Judiciary and it will also be a High Court of Appeal for all courts in the states that
choose to resort to it. In doing these things, have we not provided, first, that our Constitution shall be free:
next, that its government shall be by the will of the people, which is the just result of their freedom: thirdly,
that the Constitution shall not, nor shall any of its provisions, be twisted or perverted, inasmuch as a
court appointed by their own Executive, but acting independently, is to decide what is a perversion of its
provisions? We can have every faith in the constitution of that tribunal. It is appointed as the arbiter of the
Constitution. It is appointed not to be above the Constitution, for no citizen is above it, but under it; but
it is appointed for the purpose of saying that those who are the instruments of the Constitution-the
Government and the Parliament of the day-shall not become the masters of those whom, as to the
Constitution, they are bound to serve. What I mean is this: That if you, after making a Constitution of
this kind, enable any Government or any Parliament to twist or infringe its provisions, then by slow
degrees you may have that Constitution-if not altered in terms-so whittled away in operation that the
guarantees of freedom which it gives your people will not be maintained; and so, in the highest sense,
the court you are creating here, which is to be the final interpreter of that Constitution, will be such a
tribunal as will preserve the popular liberty in all these regards, and will prevent, under any pretext of
constitutional action, the Commonwealth from dominating the states, or the states from usurping the
sphere of the Commonwealth. Having provided for all these things, I think this Convention has done
well.
END QUOTE
.

QUOTE
Mr. SYMON.-Very likely not. What I want to know is, if there is anybody who will come under the
operation of the law, so as to be a citizen of the Commonwealth, who would not also be entitled to be a
citizen of the state? There ought to be no opportunity for such discrimination as would allow a section of a
state to remain outside the pale of the Commonwealth, except with regard to legislation as to aliens. Dual
citizenship exists, but it is not dual citizenship of persons, it is dual citizenship in each person. There may
be two men-Jones and Smith-in one state, both of whom are citizens of the state, but one only is a
citizen of the Commonwealth. That would not be the dual citizenship meant. What is meant is a dual
citizenship in Mr. Trenwith and myself. That is to say, I am a citizen of the state and I am also a citizen
of the Commonwealth; that is the dual citizenship. That does not affect the operation of this clause at all.
But if we introduce this clause, it is open to the whole of the powerful criticism of Mr. O'Connor and those
who say that it is putting on the face of the Constitution an unnecessary provision, and one which we do not
expect will be exercised adversely or improperly, and, therefore, it is much better to be left out. Let us, in
dealing with this question, be as careful as we possibly, can that we do not qualify the citizenship of this
Commonwealth in any way or exclude anybody [start page 1764] from it, and let us do that with precision and
clearness. As a citizen of a state I claim the right to be a citizen of the Commonwealth. I do not want to
place in the hands of the Commonwealth Parliament, however much I may be prepared to trust it, the
right of depriving me of citizenship. I put this only as an argument, because no one would anticipate such a
thing, but the Commonwealth Parliament might say that nobody possessed of less than 1,000 a year should
be a citizen of the Federation. You are putting that power in the hands of Parliament.
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Mr. HIGGINS.-Why not?
45
Mr. SYMON.-I would not put such a power in the hands of any Parliament. We must rest this
Constitution on a foundation that we understand, and we mean that every citizen of a state shall be a
citizen of the Commonwealth, and that the Commonwealth shall have no right to withdraw, qualify, or
restrict those rights of citizenship, except with regard to one particular set of people who are subject to
disabilities, as aliens, and so on.
END QUOTE
.
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60

QUOTE
Mr. SYMON.-The honorable and learned member is now dealing with another matter. Would not the
provision which is now before us confer upon the Federal Parliament the power to take away a portion of this
dual citizenship, with which the honorable and learned member (Dr. Quick) has so eloquently dealt? If that is
the case, what this Convention is asked to do is to hand over to the Federal Parliament the power, whether
exercised or not, of taking away from us that citizenship in the Commonwealth which we acquire by joining
the Union. I am not going to put that in the power of any one, and if it is put in the power of the Federal
Parliament, then I should feel that it was a very serious blot on the Constitution, and a very strong reason why
it should not be accepted. It is not a lawyers' question; it is a question of whether any one of British blood
who is entitled to become a citizen of the Commonwealth is to run the risk-it may be a small risk-of
having that taken away or diminished by the Federal Parliament! When we declare-"Trust the
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Parliament," I am willing to do it in everything which concerns the working out of this Constitution, but I am
not prepared to trust the Federal Parliament or anybody to take away that which is a leading inducement for
joining the Union.
END QUOTE
.
As was made clear;

QUOTE
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As a citizen of a state I claim the right to be a citizen of the

Commonwealth. I do not want to place in the hands of the Commonwealth
Parliament, however much I may be prepared to trust it, the right of
depriving me of citizenship.
END QUOTE
.

QUOTE
Dr. COCKBURN: All our experience hitherto has been under the condition of parliamentary
sovereignty. Parliament has been the supreme body. But when we embark on federation we throw
parliamentary sovereignty overboard. Parliament is no longer supreme. Our parliaments at present are
not only legislative, but constituent bodies. They have not only the power of legislation, but the power
of amending their constitutions. That must disappear at once on the abolition of parliamentary
sovereignty. No parliament under a federation can be a constituent body; it will cease to have the
power of changing its constitution at its own will. Again, instead of parliament being supreme, the
parliaments of a federation are coordinate bodies-the main power is split up, instead of being vested in
one body. More than all that, there is this difference: When parliamentary sovereignty is dispensed
with, instead of there being a high court of parliament, you bring into existence a powerful judiciary
which towers above all powers, legislative and executive, and which is the sole arbiter and interpreter
of the constitution.
END QUOTE
.
35
The latter makes it very clear that the purported Victorian Constitution Act 1975 has no legal
validity if it was not approved by State referendum. The Colonial sovereign Parliaments were
free to amend their own constitutions but upon federation they became State constitution
Parliaments and from then on any State constitution was as s106 of the constitution stated
subject to this constitution and so all legal principles embedded in the constitution applies also
to the States.
.
40

QUOTE Mr. THYNNE:
I shall quote from Mr. Dicey's recent work, which is very clear in its language. He says:
One of the characteristics of a federation is that the law of the constitution must be either legally
immutable or else capable of being changed only by some authority above and beyond the ordinary
legislative bodies, whether federal or state legislatures, existing under the constitution.
45
END QUOTE
.
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QUOTE Mr. OCONNOR.In this case the Constitution will be above Parliament, and Parliament will have to conform to it.
END QUOTE
.
55
While the Queensland Government pretended in 2001 to refer back to the original colonial
constitution and then replace it with the 2001 Queensland constitution act the truth is that the
original Queensland constitution act was a sovereign constitution whereas since federation it
became a constitution constitution and as such the 2001 Queensland Constitution Act was an
invalid exercise then and remains to be so.
It must be obvious that governments and so Parliaments have tried to hoodwink citizens with
deceptive State constitution amendments, etc, but that must stop.
.
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QUOTE
Sir JOHN FORREST.-What is a citizen? A British subject?
Mr. WISE.-I presume so.
Sir JOHN FORREST.-They could not take away the rights of British subjects.
Mr. WISE.-I do not think so. I beg to move- That the words "each state" be omitted, with the view of
inserting the words "the Commonwealth."
I apprehend the Commonwealth must have complete power to grant or refuse citizenship to any citizen
within its borders. I think my answer to Sir John Forrest was given a little too hastily when I said that every
citizen of the British Empire must be a citizen of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth will have power
to determine who is a citizen. I do not think Dr. Quick's amendment is necessary. If we do not put in a
definition of citizenship every state will have inherent power to decide who is a citizen. That was the
decision of the Privy Council in Ah Toy's case.
Sir JOHN FORREST.-He was an alien.
Mr. WISE.-The Privy Council decided that the Executive of any colony had an inherent right to
determine who should have the rights of citizenship within its borders.
Mr. KINGSTON.-That it had the right of keeping him out.
END QUOTE
.
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QUOTE
END QUOTE
.
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QUOTE Mr. MUNRO:
I do not see the necessity for considering the hon. member's proposal at the present time. I am proud of
being a citizen of the great British empire, and shall never fail to be proud of that position. I have no
desire to weaken a single link binding us to that empire, whether as regards the appointment of a
governor-general or anything else.
END QUOTE
.
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It must therefore be clear that no matter what politicians may desire they are limited to only
propose amendments to a State constitution and it can only be put in force if the State electors
approve of it by referendum. If the State electors veto the proposed amendment then it has no
legal force.
The judges of the High Court of Australia themselves have compromise the independence of this
court because the judges were appointed under the British Crown and then went about to hand
down a decision as to the purported Queen of Australia. This, even so the Framers of the
Constitution made it very clear that the constitution didnt provide for this to be do.
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.-I did not say that. I say that our real status is as subjects, and that we are all alike
subjects of the British Crown.
END QUOTE
Hansard 6-4-1897 Constitution convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
QUOTE Mr. DEAKIN:
In the first instance, the power of the Crown itself is nowhere defined, and cannot be defined under this
constitution.
END QUOTE
.
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QUOTE
Mr. SYMON ( South Australia ).p132
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10
In the preamble honorable members will find that what we desire to do is to unite in one indissoluble Federal
Commonwealth -that is the political Union-"under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Ireland , and under the Constitution hereby established." Honorable members will therefore see that the
application of the word Commonwealth is to the political Union which is sought to be established. It is not
intended there to have any relation whatever to the name of the country or nation which we are going to create
under that Union. The second part of the preamble goes on to say that it is expedient to make provision for the
admission of other colonies into the Commonwealth. That is, for admission into this political Union, which
is not a republic, which is not to be called a dominion, kingdom, or empire, but is to be a Union by the
name of "Commonwealth," and I do not propose to interfere with that in the slightest degree.
END QUOTE
.
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If then the Constitution doesnt allow the definition of the Crown then how on earth can the High
Court of Australia overrule the constitution, as it is created by the constitution and therefore is
not above the constitution?
.

QUOTE Sir JOHN DOWNER.No one is more in favour of that than I am. But, at the same time, it is said-"Let the Houses of Parliament act
capriciously and variously from day to day-allow this 'tacking' to go on if the Houses choose to agree to it-let
the Houses do one thing one day and another the next, and do not bother about altering the Constitution, but
trust the Parliament." Of course; but Parliament must only be trusted when it is within the Constitution.
The Senate of to-day and the House of Representatives must not be put in a position superior to the
Constitution.
END QUOTE
.
HANSARD 19-4-1897 Constitution Convention

QUOTE Mr. CARRUTHERS:
Mr. Barton first of all recites Dicey to show what occurs under the unwritten Constitution of
England. But here we are framing a written Constitution. When once that Constitution is framed we
cannot get behind it.
END QUOTE
.
Obviously neither can any constitutional Parliament override the constitution!

.
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QUOTE Mr. GORDON.The court may say-"It is a good law, but as it technically infringes on
the Constitution we will have to wipe it out."
END QUOTE
QUOTE Mr. CLARK.for the protection of certain fundamental rights and liberties which every individual citizen is entitled to
claim that the federal government shall take under its protection and secure to him.
END QUOTE
.
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HANSARD18-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

END QUOTE
.
It must be clear that the Framers of the Constitution specifically expressed themselves that the
Government, the Parliament and also the Courts would be bound by the limits of the constitution.
.
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QUOTE Mr. DEAKIN (Victoria).The record of these debates may fairly be expected to be widely read, and the observations to which I
allude might otherwise lead to a certain amount of misconception.
END QUOTE
.
Convention)
QUOTE Mr. ISAACS.p133
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We want a people's Constitution, not a lawyers' Constitution.
END QUOTE

QUOTE
Mr. CARRUTHERS:
END QUOTE
.
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It appears to me however that the very lawyers expected to understand legal language somehow
are the worst offenders against the constitution and its embedded legal principles.
.
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QUOTE
Mr. WISE.-If the Federal Parliament chose to legislate upon, say, the education question-and the
Constitution gives it no power to legislate in regard to that question-the Ministers for the time being in each
state might say-"We are favorable to this law, because we shall get 100,000 a year, or so much a year, from
the Federal Government as a subsidy for our schools," and thus they might wink at a violation of the
Constitution, while no one could complain. If this is to be allowed, why should we have these elaborate
provisions for the amendment of the Constitution? Why should we not say that the Constitution may be
amended in any way that the Ministries of the several colonies may unanimously agree? Why have this
provision for a referendum? Why consult the people at all? Why not leave this matter to the Ministers
of the day? But the proposal has a more serious aspect, and for that reason only I will ask permission to
occupy a few minutes in discussing it.
END QUOTE
.
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QUOTE Thomas Jefferson:

"The germ of destruction of our nation is in the power of the judiciary, an irresponsible body - working
like gravity by night and by day, gaining a little today and a little tomorrow, and advancing its noiseless
step like a thief over the field of jurisdiction, until all shall render powerless the checks of one branch over
the other and will become as venal and oppressive as the government from which we separated.".
END QUOTE
.
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QUOTE Sir JOHN DOWNER.I think we might, on the attempt to found this great Commonwealth, just advance one step, not beyond
the substance of the legislation, but beyond the form of the legislation, of the different colonies, and say
that there shall be embedded in the Constitution the righteous principle that the Ministers of the
Crown and their officials shall be liable for any arbitrary act or wrong they may do, in the same way as
any private person would be.
END QUOTE
.
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What appears to me is that there is a collusion between the prosecutor and the court because my
writings were not just forwarded to the Prosecutor (VICTORIAN POLICE) but also to others and
as such it cannot be held that there was no intention to harm or indeed no conspiracy to pervert
the course of JUSTICE existed because the appalling way the court as well as the Prosecutor
conducted matters in blatant disregard of proper legal procedures being followed places in
question what really is the purpose of it all also. After all it got nothing to do with LAW
ENFORCEMENT because no law is enforced, rather it turns out to be was well organized
TERRORISM upon the general population where the courts that are to be impartial so to say
has sold itself out to the government and has allowed itself to become a tool of INJUSTICE..
.
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I may refer to the London riots and as a person who has conducted for more than 30 years a
special lifeline service under the motto MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL I expressed
previously in correspondence to the then Prime Minister John Howard that soon there be riots.
Within weeks the Sydney riots eventuated.
Currently what is eventuating in England may soon be realized within the Commonwealth of
Australia because citizens are sick and tired of the kind of TERRORISM perpetrated upon them
not just by the government or enforcement authorities but even involved the courts.
.
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People innocent of any wrongdoing are subjected to an Infringement court system that denies
them any constitutional valid legal process and by this an innocent person from onset is denied
JUSTICE. People by this can loose their driver license, their income, perhaps their family life
and then end up on the streets even so they may have done no wrong at all.
This is government sponsored TERRORISM on a grand scale and must be stopped as if this is
not curtailed then people may not just go along with a VELVET REVOLUTION but resort to
riots and other destructive conduct and then those who are responsible for it have possibly blood
on their hands.
.
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How on earth can any Court allow itself to be manipulated to such an extent that JUSTICE is
denied?
Law Encyclopedia: Coram
[Latin, Before; in the presence of.]
The term coram is used in phrases that refer to the appearance of a person before another individual or
a group. Coram non judice, "in the presence of a person not a judge," is a phrase that describes a
proceeding brought before a court that lacks the jurisdiction to hear such a matter. Any judgment
rendered by the court in such a case is void.
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Bowers v Smith (1953) 1 ALL ER 320 (Re Clarke Hall) and (Morrison on Children, 7 Ed, P3)
QUOTE
"... the first business of the court is to try to issue whether or not the case is bought within the terms of the
statute, and only if this be proven by proper evidence can the court proceed to decide upon treatment"
END QUOTE
Schorel v Elms (1994) Unreported M2944X of 1989 SA27 of 1993
Page 16 and 17: "Justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done"
Article 11 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
"Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law in a public trial at which she/he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence."
END QUOTE
.
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The legal doctrine of ex turpi causa non oritur action denies any remedy to a litigant
(including a prosecutor) who does not come to court with clean hands.
If your own action is very unlawful and very unethical, if you come to court with Dirty Hands
best not to question others legality, morality, and ethics!
QUOTE
Modern principle of litigation demands that substantive justice should be dispensed readily without
undue regard to technicalities. What matters is that the pleading must be clear enough on the remedy the
court should award. In the instant case I do not consider citing the wrong law as compelling enough to
dismiss the application. It was an innocent oversight which did not occasion any mischief on the respondent.
It was not fatal to the application as it was subject to amendment without prejudice to the respondent.
END QUOTE
.
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QUOTE
Constitution needles to mention is a supreme law of the land.
END QUOTE
.
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QUOTE
The purpose of a review is to correct a glaring absurdity in light of discovery of new facts and
circumstances. It is in light of the above that even courts of law also review their judgments and orders.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE In the Marriage of Tennant (1980) 5 FLR 777 at 780

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As no grounds for appeal are required to be specified in the notice of Appeal, which, on filing institutes the
appeal (reg 122), there is no limitations of the scope of the appeal and all findings of fact and law made in the
lower court in relation to the decree appealed are in challenge and cannot be relied on by the appellant or the
respondent. All the issues (unless by consent) must be reheard. This of course brings me to the point of the
absence of reason for the magistrates decision in this case. Perhaps reasons were given orally but not recorded
for the record. Apart from the requirement of such reason for the purpose of the appeal process, there is the
basic ground of criticism that litigants who go to court, put their witnesses up, argue their case and attempt to
controvert the opposing case are entitled to know, if they lose, why they lost. If they are given no reason they
may be entitled to feel the decision against them was conceived in prejudice, bias, or caprice. In such a case
not only the litigant, but justice itself, is the loser.
10
Magistrates should realise, even more than they seem to do, that this class of business is not mere ordinary
trivial work, and they should deal with these cases with a due sense of responsibility which administrations of
the summary jurisdiction Act and the far reaching consequences of the orders that they make thereafter entail.
[Baker v Baker (1906) 95 LT 549; In Robinson v Robinson (1898) p135; and again in Cobb v Cobb (1900)
p145] it was stated that when making orders of this kind, from which lies an appeal to other courts, it is the duty
of the magistrate not only to cause a note to be made of the evidence, and of his decision, but to give the reasons
for his decision and to cause a note to be made of his reasons... Elaborate judgements are not required, but the
reasons which lead the magistrate to make his order must be explicitly stated.
END QUOTE
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Well, considering I requested documentation why orders were issued against me and the refusal
for this, and that at no time, at least to my knowledge, the court deal with the issue of the matter
was within its jurisdiction then if for this kind of nonsense one need to have a law degree to
accomplish this then I can do well without this.
.
Where is the legal principle of no fine before conviction?

.
30
The courts always have been so to say the backbone of a democratic system but it appears to me
that those employed in the seat of JUSTICE simply are indirectly promoting for people to take
the law into their own hands because of themselves being incompetent to appropriately conduct
their duties and obligations to ensure that the courts remain and are being seen as being impartial
in its conduct.
.
35
QUOTE Re: Sidebotham (1880) 14 Ch D 458 James LJ

A person aggrieved must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been
pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or
wrongfully affected his title to something.
END QUOTE.
.
40
There can be no doubt that having applied a demerit point despite that the VICTORIAN
POLICE was well aware of my writings that I challenged from Set their allegation and the
jurisdiction of any courts then their deliberate persistence to nevertheless as inflict harm
upon me rather than to await legal processes to be followed
.
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Because Infringement Notices have regretfully become a way of life that the
parliament sought to circumvent the courts as to the traditional manner of
hearing a dispute as to force onto the courts a system that will be in favour of
the government then the courts had the opportunity to refuse to be swindled
in such kind of TERRORISM upon the general community or simply
participate in it and by this also participate in the destructing of the
democratic system as we knew it.
What we have now ended up with is the destructing of confidence by people in the legal system
as well as in the government and law enforcement agencies and so in the democratic processes
ordinary applicable to a democracy. That is why what transpires in English with the riots is so
much of an expression of utter and sheer frustration with being able to defy the Governments and
also combined with opportunist criminals who have no regard for the rights and wellbeing of
others. The reported spontaneous joining of onlookers in the riots may underline that when you
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undermine the publics confidence in the legal processes and in law enforcement agencies then
this can be the end result. That is why the courts must never tolerate law enforcement agencies to
manipulate the courts as for example now eventuated in this case and must hold the relevant
Infringements Registrar and the others involved, including the VICTORIAN POLICE
accountable as to me this was nothing lets then seeking and accomplishing to pervert the courts
of JUSTICE and to scandalise by this the courts integrity.
As was announced on channel 7 Melbourne news that experts warn about riots eventuating
in victoria (Remember the Bob Jane riot in 2010) because of the social and other disorder
and 59% of people responded to a newspol that the expect such riots (as London) could
eventuate in Victoria!
Riots generally have an origin of slowly build up resentment amongst the general public feeling
to be powerless to do anything about what is being done wrong, such as the conduct of the courts
to turn itself in a cash collecting agency got the government and disregarding the democratic
rights of citizens in the process. When the Perin Court was still as such operating the
Registrar made clear that 95% of people pay up because it would be more expensive for them to
fight the allegation and even if they do they still can lose their case and end up far worse.
As such this is a calculated kind of EXTROTION and TERRORISM rather than any law
enforcement and this in particular considering that from onset the system is against the accused
no matter how innocent because even if proven not to be the person having committed any
offenses nevertheless the accused will be severely out of pocket because of the litigation and
attendances to the court.
A clear example was where I attended on various occasions to a court allegedly of a speeding
infringement in 2000 during cross examination I had the police officer drawing where all the
alleged speed sings were and he drew quite a few. I then submitted to the court a statement from
vicroads that it had only one sign at the location and then the judge turned around that as I had
not that statement at the time of the alleged offense then I couldnt use it. As such the judge was
covering the ass of the lying police officer! Also, I questioned him about how he was operating
the speed detecting unit and not once but twice I asked him to demonstrate it and then made
known to the trail judge that the witness failed to show he switched on the unit, which is
obviously required to be able to use it. Likewise did I point out that the Infringement notice had
originally recorded a 100 speed limit but the original filed with the court had it altered to 80
kilometres I couldnt have been speeding. What really had occurred was that the police officer
mistakenly had assumed that the place he held I was speeding was subject to an 80 kilometre
sign but was in fact 100kilometres and so I was wrongly issued an infringement notice and he
was not only willing to commit perjury in the witness box but the trial-judge was willing to cover
his ass for this. Perhaps also because even the signature was incorrect and obviously the judge
didnt like it that I was using all the legal skills to expose the gross deception of the police
officer. After all the police officer claimed to have read the speed while I was in a bend of the
road and that itself also is a question of correct reading! And the fact that the Infringement notice
referred to an location that was neither applicable seemed not to deter the judge to still uphold
the allegation against me as proven. Well when you have this kind of judicial interference with
what is supposed to be an impartial court then no wonder people, given the opportunity or when
an opportunity arises will resort to violence as somehow finally being able to express the long
held resentment against law enforcement and government, etc, albeit regretfully generally other
innocent members of the general public are then suffering as result.
.
50
At one hearing the Police Prosecutor complained to me afterwards as to why I gave her such a
hard time about legal technicalities, after I had defeated her allegations upon which I explained
she was doing this every time to defendants and should be able to take some of her own
medicine.
Because of the fact that I was assisting people in many cases the police basically used to target
me and time and time again I was able to defeat most of their allegations because while the
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courts accept police officers to be honest the truth is many fabricate their allegations and
regretfully get away with it.
The courts should never accept that because a witness is a police officer that because of that their
evidence is of a greater value to be relied upon because doing so is to be bias and deny the
accused a fair and proper trial. After all many police officers are involved in rape, robberies, drug
dealings and even murders and so going on the number as such involved in such crimes and
many still serving in the police force then the courts cannot accept that because they wear a
uniform they will be honest, as I proved with the vicroads statement (even so refused to be
accepted) as after all it showed the police officer fabricated his evidence. What the courts do not
seem to comprehend is that every time they excuse the criminal conduct of a police officer to
perjure himself/herself then it undermines also the standing and credibility of the court itself and
invites by this for the police to continue this kind of elaborate deception.
.
15
20
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30
With all the publications about faulty speed cameras I view the courts must place the onus upon
the enforcement agency to prove that the alleged speeding was as result of correct measuring and
not merely take the word of the informant. After all there are ample of police officers who
themselves successfully challenge speeding fines proving that the cameras were faulty or
wrongly set and what we have therefore is a court system that is willing to enforce the faulty
speed cameras against innocent people position against police officers when they are caught
themselves.
No court could accept that cameras so often found to be incorrectly reading speeds, some
swaying in the wind or timing wrongly set or affected by weather or traffic conditions can be
relied upon. Indeed when did the Infringements Registrar attend to the issue of any equipment
used for readings was actually calibrated and tested according to federal legislation as the
Commonwealth alone had legislative powers for the measurement by instruments?
What evidence was there before the Infringements Registrar that the camera used was not
affected by the wind or other pressures caused by moving traffic while it purportedly was
measuring a vehicles speed? Did any court ever considered that the very accused being a police
officer challenging an Infringement Notice may actually have been enforcing Infringement
Notices of the same camera against other motorist? So, the camera is faulty for the police
themselves but not in regard of other motorist, is that it?
.
35
40
My writings challenged the reading of a camera and as it was a camera and not a police officer
himself then where is the evidence because again ample of times cameras are set incorrectly and
that also is one of the litany of cases where people were wrongly fined?
Now, kind of nonsense nevertheless can cost innocent professional drivers their driver license ,
their lively hood and perhaps in the process the bust up of their family if they lose their home in
the process and all this because the courts have lost their place as to be an impartial court acting
on behalf of the general public to deal with evidence upon basis what is placed before it in a
defended trail and have now resorted to what I would hold corrupt and terrorism conduct to
enforce court decisions regardless of the innocence of the accused.
.
45
While the Infringement Notice does show that a person can elect to g9o to court this kind of
terrorism never should be accepted as valid in a democrac7yy as unless and until the prosecutor
institute litigation in the court there is nothing for the accused to answer.
Neither is it for me to pay the enforcement agency monies to obtain some alleged photo because
I am not making the allegation and the accuser (the police) must themselves then provide the
relevant details.
.
50
I recall an incident where I was issued with an Infringement Notice in 2008 by Banyule City
Council alleging that I had exceeded a three hour parking limit. Well to cut it short it turned out
that I had been recorded to be parked there for 2 hours and 29 minutes but neither the parking
warder or the lawyer for Banyule City Council understood that 2 hours 29 minutes was less than
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3 hours until months of writing they finally learned they were wrong. Now, the Infringement Act
2006 provides that the Infringements Registrar must accept the evidence of the enforcement
agency and in that way had it f=gone through the Infringements Registrar would have enforced
an Infringement notice on the basis that I had exceeded parking of 3 hour limit by being parked
for 2 hours and 29 minutes. Now surely this kind of nonsense never should eventuate and while I
finally achieved to have the Infringement notice withdrawn others who were also booked for
parking longer than 3 hours were ending up force to pay up or loose a day in court and if
unaware of the inability of the council worker to appropriately read the clock then they have
basically hope ion hell to obtain JUSTICE.
.
This case is a clear example how pervert the system operates as while for the alleged speeding I
could only be issued with a 1 demerit point if upheld that is somehow non-payment of the fine
but to legally challenge the allegation can result in a warrant issue and the deregistration of my
motor vehicle registration, the suspension of my driver licence and even being imprisoned and
this all on the say so of the police and/or the sheriff regardless that from onset I made clear I
challenged the allegation and the courts jurisdiction. It means we have a legal system gone mad,
because what eventuated was that while I wrote in immediately and the police responded to make
clear the Infringement Notice would stand nevertheless I then had another Infringement Notice
with a higher cost claiming I had not responded. Now who are the idiots or morons doing this as
where the police themselves responded to my writings then obviously I had responded but just
not the way they wanted me to respond. Still, they increased the fine to $170.00 and again I
reiterated my opposition to it all and to the Infringement Court increased it now to $245.00
obviously for me daring to pursue the proper application of my constitutional rights. Now this
kind of insanity is how the Magistrates Court of Victoria is dealing with its
ADMINISTRATIVE decision and you wonder why people may end up when they are given
suddenly the opportunity to it and cause considerable destruction? Well, that is because people
are sick and tired of what is going on but are just waiting to vent their anger when an opportunity
arises. This appalling madhouse of a court system must be stopped and we need to return to a
proper judiciary where the public can have confidence that they can be heard and obtain
JUSTICE as if the courts themselves do not smarten up to provide a democratic process then
soon or later the people will no longer tolerate this and then will for themselves take the action
they deem appropriate to return to their democratic rights to have a proper legal system.
.
35
40
45
50
The purported Infringement Act 2006 purports the Infringements Registrars decision to be of a
Court order even so it basically seems to me to be where an informant feeds details selectively
into a computer and then this automatically issue court orders and then are pretended to be that of
an Infringements Registrar. As such the system cannot deal with a person like myself who pursue
what is constitutionally appropriate because those who terrorism is designed to deny the accused
his/her constitutional rights. In my view any magistrate or judge who were to enforce this kind of
nonsense doesnt belong to be adjudicating because if only the pride to be able to serve the
people let alone the oath entered into to serve the seat of JUSTICE in themselves should be
sufficient for any judicial officer to reject any inappropriate conduct to participate in this
government sponsored kind of TERRORISM.
The issue is not if the legislation exists as again on 19 July 2006 I proved that despite that
legislation existed of compulsory voting it nevertheless was unconstitutional and the County
Court of Victoria upheld this. Therefore it is for the court to attend to the first issue of the day
and that is if it can invoke jurisdiction and the fact that it failed to attend to this in itself
underlines it fails to be conducting litigation appropriately.
If by now the courts still cannot manage to conduct their affairs in a democratic manner
then this hardly is to its credibility.
Normally a persons driver licence can be suspended for gaining 12 demerit points and yet with
the 1 demerit point I can nevertheless have my driver licence suspended not because I was
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lawfully convicted of any wrongdoing but because the courts have lend themselves to participate
in an elaborate government sponsored TERRORISM upon citizens,.
.
What wasnt apparently understood was that because I challenged the validity of the Victorian
Constitution Act 1975 then the act became by tis ULTRA VIRES unless and until if ever at all a
competent court declared it INTRA VIRES. It means that for this also that any legislation
enacted since 1975 also is in question because if the parliamentarians all were not lawfully
appointed then so any legislation is also ULTRA VIRES.
.
10
15
20
I CAN STATE THAT FOR MANY YEARS NUMEROUS PERSONS CONTACTED ME

ABOUT THE GROSS INJUSTICE THEY HELD SUFFERED IN THE COURTS BUT I HELD
THAT I CANNOT FIGHT EVERY PERSONS BATTLE AND INDEED HAVE NO
CONTROL OVER HOW THEY CONDUCT THEIR CASES AND SO IT WAS MERELY
WAITING TILL THE POLICE WERE TO TRY THE ELABORATE SWINDLE AND
TERRORISM UPON ME.
Obviously where I very successfully assisted Josepha van Rooy successfully in defeating 3
criminal charges where there were 4 police officers witnesses and a clerk of court and a deputy
clerk of court (magistrates court) with filing a NO CASE TO ANSWER and the trail judge
instructed the jury to return a verdict of NOT GUILTY after the prosecutor completed his case
after 5 days then obviously I can expect the police to target me again. As such what is now
eventuating is no surprise to me because similarly the police in the past targeted me. The issue is
of course if the Court should go along with their kind of conduct of should reject this abuser of
the legal processes.
.
25
30
35
In the end it is faced with the fact that when the police made me aware of their allegation that I
was speeding I then did provide them with my 23 February 2011 response and so the question is
and remains did the relevant police officer inform whomever was dealing with the case about this
or simply concealed this to pervert the course of JUSTICE and so to cause a subsequent
Infringement Notice to be issued for $170.00 and again later so to say perverted the course of
JUSTICE by concealing from the Infringements Registrar that I had opposed jurisdiction as to
have an Infringement Notice Order issued for $245.00? If indeed this can be established then the
court may take this to be a CONTEMPT IN FACE OF THE COURT by the relevant
enforcement agency and should not hesitate to charge the relevant person(s) of contempt in face
of the court and of conspiracy charges as to make clear to the public that no one is above the
RULE OF LAW and the court will vigorously pursue the police if they are involved with
perverting the course of JUSTICE.
.
40
45
QUOTE Sorell v Smith (1925) Lord Dunedin in the House of Lords

In an action against a set person in combination, a conspiracy to injure, followed by actual injury, will give
good cause for action, and motive or instant where the act itself is not illegal is of the essence of the
conspiracy.
END QUOTE.
As such even so the police and the Infringements Registrar may claim they were simply doing
what they otherwise permitted to do nevertheless where they knew or ought to have known (See
my email and attached correspondence also to the Infringements Registrar) then their conduct
may amount to a conspiracy.
.
50
I understand that in the case of MORIATY v LONDON, CHATMAM & DOVER RY Queens
Bench 1870 L.R. 5 Q.B. 314;39 L.T.Q.B. 109;22 L.T. 163;34 J.P. 692;18 W.R. 625 in which the
plaintiff sued a railway company for personal injuries sustained and this plaintiff has gone about
suborning false evidence and it was held by the Court that even so the plaintiff would have had a
genuine and justify to case to sue normally, by the plaintiff conduct to suborn false evidence
this was seen by the Court that this conduct amounted to an admission that he had no case.
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Therefore where the police went about to elaborately deceive the court to conceal my objection
to the court, etc, than it must by this be deemed to have no case.
.
10
QUOTE In the Marriage of P.N. and J.S. Axtell 7 FLR 931

The test of judicial bias as laid down by the high court is whether it has been established that it might
reasonably be suspected by a fair minded person that the judge might not resolve the question before him
with a fair and unprejudiced mind
END QUOTE.
Clearly there can be no question but there was bias by the Infringements Registrar because the
very legislation (Infringement Act 2006) requires the Infringements Registrar to accept the
evidence of the enforcement agency and as such there was no impartial decision being it
administrative or otherwise in a judicial nature.
.
15
Lets be clear about it I am not scandalising the court as all I do is to expose the rot, the court
itself is scandalising its own status, as I view it that has eventuated and as Author of books in the
INSPECTOR-RIKATI series on certain constitutional and other legal issues I publish
material as to seek to achieve that we have courts operating to what our democratic system
requires them to do.
.
20
25
30
35
Ambard v Att Gen for Trinidad and Tabaco (1939) AC 322 at 335
QUOTE
The basic of the right to fair comment is the Right of Freedom of speech and the inalienable right of
everyone to comment fairly upon matters of public importance.
END QUOTE
No wrong committed in criticism of administration of justice:
LORD ATKIN in AMBARD v ATTORNEY-GENERAL for TRINIDAD and TABAGO (1936) A.C. 332, at 335
QUOTE
But whether the authority and position or an individual judge, or the due administration of justice, is concerned,
no wrong is committed by any member of the public who exercises the ordinary right of criticising, in good
faith, in private or public, the public act done in the seat of justice. The path of criticism is a public way, the
wrong headed are permitted to err therein: provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper
motives to those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism,
and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice, they are immune. Justice is not a
cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of
ordinary man
END QUOTE
.
40
45
The right for the public to be informed about the judicial process being properly applied or acts:
THE COMMENTS OF SIR JAMES MARTIN C.J., IN THE MATTER THE EVENING NEWS (1880) N.S.W.
LR 211 AT 239.:
QUOTE
The right of the public to canvass fairly and honestly what takes place here cannot be disputed. Our practice of
sitting here with open doors and transacting our judicial functions as we do, always in the broad light of day,
would be shown of some of its value if the public opinion respecting our proceedings were at all times to be
rigidly suppressed. We claim no immunity from fair, even though it be mistaken criticism.
END QUOTE
.
50
55
As to value of criticism, keeping judge subject to rules and principles of honour and justice;
(a) R v FOSTER (1937) St. E Qd 368
(b) Re WASEMAN (1969) N.Z.L.R. 55, 58-59
(c) Re BOROVSKI (1971) 19 D.L.R. (34) 537
(d) SOLICITOR-GENERAL v RADIO AVON LTD (1978) 1 N.Z.L.R. 225, at 230-31
.
It is safe to say the Infringements Registrar never did formally invoke federal jurisdiction and as
such in that regard he neither could have provided any administrative and/or judicial decision!
.
60
Marchesi v. Barnes at p.439

QUOTE
If the particulars are not supplied the court has an inherent power to dismiss the information.
END QUOTE
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See also Whitehead v. Koulouklidis Supreme Court which held that the informant must supply
sufficient particulars so as to identify not only the transaction or occurrence, but every
ambiguous or non-specific element of the offence.
.
10
Johnson v. Miller (1938 A.L.R 104 at 112 per Dixon J.

QUOTE
The defendant is not only entitled to be appraised of the legal nature of the offence. But also with the
particular act, matter or thing alleged as the foundation of the charge.
END QUOTE
.
PLEADING AND PROCEDURE STATE AND FEDERAL, Cases and materials-FIFTH EDITION, University
Casebook Series.
QUOTE At page 32;
15
20
25
30
35
Maybe the adversary system would be satisfactory if there were no jury. But abolishing the jury system
would require constitutional change that is practically impossible. Further more, in the participants view
many of the judges are not much better; at least with the jury there is always a chance of getting someone
who is reasonably concerned, intelligent, and disinterested.
There are good versions of the adversary system. A trial before a capable federal judge presented by
competent counsel is a fair trial. But this doesnt happen very often.
Just results can often be achieved when the judges are simply terrible. Litigants confronted by the ordeal of
trial before a judge who is an idiot or bigot will quickly compose their differences-the Quasimodo
techniques of justice.
END QUOTE
QUOTE In the marriage of Smith v Saywell (1980) Fam LR 6 245 at 258
Where a case pending in a federal court other than the HIGH COURT or in a court of a state or territory
involves a matter arising under the Constitution involving its interpretation, it is the duty of the court not to
proceed in the cause unless and until the court is satisfied that notice of the cause, specifying the nature of the
matter has been given to the Attorney General of the commonwealth and (a) if the cause is pending in a court of
a state - to the Attorney General of that state; or (b) if the cause is pending in a Federal court and was initiated in
a state - to the Attorney General of that state, and for a reasonable time elapsed since the giving of the notice for
consideration by that Attorney General or by those Attorney General, of the question of intervention in the
proceedings or the removal of the cause to the HIGH COURT.
END QUOTE
..
40
QUOTE Bringinshaw v Bringinshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361,362

Not inexact proof, indefinite testimony or indirect inference (By prosecution)
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE Re: Ratten (Vic Full Supreme Court) (1974) VR201 at 214
Fair Trial Present Evidence
END QUOTE
..
45
50
55
60
The following applies as much to Federal laws of the Commonwealth of Australia as it does to
federal laws in the USA; http://familyguardian.taxtactics.com/Subjects/LawAndGovt/ChallJurisdiction/AuthoritiesArticle/AuthOnJurisdiction.htm
QUOTE
37 Am Jur 2d at section 8 states, in part: "Fraud vitiates every transaction and all contracts. Indeed, the
principle is often stated, in broad and sweeping language, that fraud destroys the validity of everything into
which it enters, and that it vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments."
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE
The general misconception is that any statute passed by legislators bearing the appearance of law constitutes
the law of the land. The U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and any statute, to be valid, must be
in agreement. It is impossible for both the Constitution and a law violating it to be valid; one must prevail.
This is succinctly stated as follows:
The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute, though having the form and name of law, is in
reality no law, but is wholly void, and ineffective for any purpose; since unconstitutionality dates from
the time of its enactment, and not merely from the date of the decision so branding it. An
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10
unconstitutional law, in legal contemplation, is as inoperative as if it had never been passed. Such a
statute leaves the question that it purports to settle just as it would be had the statute not been enacted.
Since an unconstitutional law is void, the general principles follow that it imposes no duties, confers no
rights, creates no office, bestows no power or authority on anyone, affords no protection, and justifies
no acts performed under it. . .
A void act cannot be legally consistent with a valid one. An unconstitutional law cannot operate to supersede
any existing valid law. Indeed, insofar as a statute runs counter to the fundamental law of the land, it is
superseded thereby.
No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts are bound to enforce it.
END QUOTE
Sixteenth American Jurisprudence
Second Edition, 1998 version, Section 203 (formerly Section 256)
.
15
QUOTE CCH 92-217 page 78485 (1991)

The Court could not make an order which otherwise fell outside its jurisdiction merely because the parties
consent to it..
END QUOTE
.
20

QUOTE Mr. HIGGINS:
I think it is advisable that private people should not be put to the expense of having important
questions of constitutional law decided out of their own pockets.
END QUOTE
.
25

END QUOTE
30

END QUOTE
35

END QUOTE
40
45

END QUOTE
.
Where there is absence of jurisdiction, all administrative and judicial proceedings are a nullity and
confer no right, offer no protection, and afford no justification, and may be rejected upon direct
collateral attack.
END QUOTE
.
50
55
60

15AConstruction of Acts to be Subject to Constitution
QUOTE
Every Act shall be read and construed subject to the Constitution, and so as not to exceed the legislative
power of the Commonwealth, to the intent that where any enactment thereof would, but for this section, have
been construed as being in excess of that power, it shall nevertheless be a valid enactment to the extent to
which it is not in excess of that power.
END QUOTE
.
The High Court of Australia held that where a party pleads the non-application of a State Act because of
Commonwealth legislation then the State Court is exercising Federal jurisdiction. (However only if the State Court
can invoke jurisdiction, which VCAT cannot and neither is a court!) Troy v Wrigglesworth (1919) 26 C.L.R. 305;
25 (1926) 38 C.L.R. 441; 33 A.L.R. 66.
.
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10
Held by the High Court of Australia that the federal jurisdiction which is conferred on a State Court by the section is
subject to any limitations imposed by the laws of the State upon its state jurisdiction, unless otherwise expressly
declared. Federated Saw-mill Timberyard and General Woodworkers Employees Association v Alexander, (1912)
15 C.L.R. 308; 19 A.L.R. 22.
.
Held by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland that the police magistrate exercising Federal jurisdiction
is not an officer of a Federal Court within the meaning of this paragraph (Section 39 of the Judicial Act 1903) R.
v. Archdall and Others; Ex parte Taylor, 1919 St. R. Qld 207; 13 Q.J.P.R. 22 C.L.R. 437 in which the High Court
(Isaacs, Higgins, Gavan Duffy and Ricch JJ ; Griffith CJ and Barton J dissenting) held that a Judge of an inferior
Court of a State invested with and purporting to exercise Federal jurisdiction is not an officer of the Commonwealth
within the meaning of s. 75 (v) of the Constitution.
.
15
Held by the High Court of Australia that a State Court, the appellated jurisdiction of which is limited by a State Act,
has no federal appellated jurisdiction beyond those limits. R. v. Whitfield and Others Ex parte Quon Tat,
(1013) 15 C. L.R. 689; 19 A.L.R. 97
.
20
Held by the High Court of Australia that under this section the Courts of the several States have federal appellated
jurisdiction, as regard the matters enumerated in ss75 and 76 of the Constitution, to the same extent that, and subject
to the same conditions as, under the State laws they have appellated jurisdiction in matters to which State laws
apply. Ah Yick v Lehmert, (1905) 2 C.L.R. 593; 11 A.L.R. 306
.
25
Held by the High Court of Australia (Williams J.) that under this section 40 of the Judiciary Act 1903 the AttorneyGeneral for the Commonwealth or a State may apply for the removal into the High Court of a cause or part of a
cause whether or not he is a party to the proceedings in which the cause arises, and if the cause really and
substantially arises under the Constitution or involves its interpretation, the court MUST grant the removal as of
right notwithstanding that the matter is apparently concluded by authority. Any distinct and divisible question may
be part of such a cause within the meaning of this section. In re an Application by the Public Service Association
of N.S.W. , (1947) 75 C.L.R. 430
.
30
Held that a State Court exercising federal jurisdiction when it erroneously applies Commonwealth Act to
subject matter before the Court. Commonwealth v Cole, (1923) 32 C.L.R. 602 and Commonwealth v Dalton,
(1924) 33 C.L.R.. 452; 30 A.L.R. 85
.
35
From the above it already ought to be clear that a State Court, subject to certain provisions, can
exercise Federal jurisdiction.
While the authorities below are USA Authorities, the legal concepts nevertheless are of a general
nature that can be applied within the Commonwealth of Australia.
.
QUOTE
40
45
JURISDICTION the power to hear and determine a case. 147 P.2d 759, 761. This power may be
established and described with reference to particular subjects or to parties who fall into a particular category.
In addition to the power to adjudicate, a valid exercise of jurisdiction requires fair notice and an opportunity
for the affected parties to be heard. Without jurisdiction, a court's judgment is void. A court must have
both SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION and PERSONAL JURISDICTION (see below). See also
territorial jurisdiction; title jurisdiction."
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE
50
55
END QUOTE
.
60
And not to overlook:

Held by the High Court of Australia that the expression Court or judge of a State does not
include a Judge sitting in Chambers exercising the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Wilcox v
Donohoe, (1905) 3 C.L.R. 83; 12 A.L.R. 54.
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therefore it must be clear that a Infringements Registrar as now eventuated never could have be
deemed to validly issue orders not even of an administrative nature where the legislation in fact
requires him to consider the evidence of the enforcement agency as this requires a judicial
decision and nevertheless the failure also to conduct matters in an open court is a fatal error.
.
In the end I was entitled to a proper hearing and robbed of this.

.
10
Even if the Court were to now revoke the order issued nevertheless it is faced that I have an
objection to the jurisdiction and I challenged the validity of certain legal provisions and they
cannot be disposed of merely by revoking the orders which in any event are not and cannot be
legally enforceable.
.
Again:
QUOTE
15
20
END QUOTE
.
25
30
Therefore neither by consent of the parties, not that I were to do so) can the Court avoid the legal
consequences of the various legal challenges and in fact is all along prohibited of enforcing any
legislation that I all along disputed since 2002 in regard of the later 2006 case. It cannot be held
against me that the Victorian Attorney General as first law officer of the State may not have
acted appropriately at the time when needed in past litigation then before the County Court of
Victoria on 19 July 2006 as all I am concerned about is that I endured a 5-year epic legal battle in
which I comprehensively and unchallenged defeated the Crown on all constitutional and other
legal issues I raised and entitled to the benefits of that judicial determination and therefore for
this also no alleged administrative decision of an Infringements Registrar can circumvent this
as to undermine my rights to the benefits of those cases then determined, which now the
Infringements Registrar purports to do with the Infringement Notice order.
.
35
40
This document is not intended and neither must be perceived to set out all relevant matters but
may indicate, considering also past correspondence in this dispute, that the Infringements
Registrar had no place to deny the revocation of the unconstitutional issued orders and no court
can enforce these unconstitutional issued orders and those orders must be revoked or otherwise
disposed of and appropriate action must be taken against those who misused and abused the legal
processes of the court.
.
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I pursue a VELVET REVOLUTION to hold politicians and judges legally accountable so we

can reclaim our constitutional and other legal rights but those who defy this may have to consider
that the alternative may be that others are not going to go along any longer and the courts failing
to act in a democratic manner may face that riots may eventuate instead. As I deplore any form
of violence I view the court should welcome my attempt to clean up the rot by way of VELVET
REVOLUTION and cooperate to ensure that never again an member of the general community
will be terrorised by this kind of legal process as I had so far to endure but that the courts from
now on will be acting as all along required to be impartially and to provide JUSTICE.
.
Obviously as I am aware what is so wrong with the entire purported democratic process that
purports to be in place but isnt and those involved wouldnt have a clue this being so I will seek
to attempt to educate this court why and how it all went so wrong, this, so that it may be able to
deal appropriately with matters, not just in regard of myself but in regard of all accused.
.
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The first issue is that any legislation is not enacted merely because of me or specifically designed
to suit me but for the general community and therefore if it is by legal challenge ULTRA
VIRES then it means it is so for all persons and not just merely because I happened to challenge
it. Therefore the moment I placed a legal challenge against the constitutional validity of the
purported Victorian Constitution Act 1975 then it should have automatically been passed on to
all courts that the act was now to be held ULTRA VIRES unless and until, if ever at all, a
competent court of jurisdiction were to declare the act intra vires.
.
10
15
Such procedure doesnt exist and because of this we have that the courts continued to rely upon
the purported Victorian Constitution Act 19765 as if it was valid. While we have judges
(including magistrates and other judicial officers) travelling the world purportedly to educate
themselves in judicial matters I would rather say they better first learn the unique legal process
that is applicable within the Commonwealth of Australia as failing to do so you are totally
incompetent to adjudicate in a democratic manner. As such forget about rorting the system to
travel overseas on junkies but learn what the job is about to adjudicate in a fair and proper
manner.
.
20
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30
35
40
45
50
Prior to federation most Members of Parliament entered the parliament on the basis of it being an
Honour to be a Member of the Parliament and to serve the People, these days however the entire
election system has been so to say high jacked and indeed involves serious criminal conduct as I
personally reported to the Parliament regarding three recent elections, where it no longer is that a
person can be elected to serve the people but many candidates are having their opportunities
railroaded even by how the Victorian Electoral Commission operates as well as the conduct of
the political parties. What we therefore have is that the criminal element serves to ensure certain
people are going to be successful to be elected and dominate the Parliament. This is because
parliamentarians are given a cosy deal and long retirement packages, etc, where the very
incentive to serve the people no longer exist as it all becomes to enter so to say the gold mine and
many Members of Parliament are then gold diggers.
Just consider how so many State MPs are traveling overseas on junkies where because of
federation external affairs actually became a federal legislative power! As the Framers of the
Constitution made clear the States would retain legislative matters within its own borders and the
Commonwealth would deal with anything that was external of a State. As such why all the
junkies of Members of Parliament travelling overseas, if not because they can so to say rort the
system to travel with their family at cost of taxpayers and by this deplete also the States
Consolidated Revenue Funds also. The same with judicial officers travelling all over the world
when none, I repeat one, would be competent in constitutional matters and so cannot even
understand let alone comprehend how to deal with constitutional issues placed before the court.
Over the decades I even had to design for courts forms (needed for litigation) because they didnt
have them now how scandalous is this?
.
In 1985 I designed the ADDRESS TO THE COURT/TRIBUNAL which is a document where

an unrepresented person can prior to a hearing place his/her legal arguments as to be able to get a
fairer hearing. Well even in a recent case a person seeking to file it the registrar refused to accept
this even so it is even used in the high court of au7stralia! The Legal Aid solicitor also refused to
use it and in the process this person was duped in obtaining JUSTICE as the magistrate also
refused to accept it, this even so on appeal a Court of appeal ruled that the court even if not
reading the ADDRESS TO THE COURT nevertheless must consider the content of it.
What we therefore have is that the courts have no internal system that operates that whenever a
judicial decision is made then automatically it is made known to other judicial officers so that the
unlettered persons appearing as Defendants is not robbed of their rights.
We also have where lawyers are entering the court files and tampering with the files to alter the
version of Affidavit material after the other party has already responded upon it so as to fabricate
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a different version of response by the other party. It is what commenced to expose more than 25
years ago but to my knowledge is still perpetrated by lawyers.
We have also that lawyers are fabricating or falsifying cost and as such the courts are ordering
cost that have no reality with the real cost that may have been incurred or that reasonably could
have been incurred. It all has become a gigantic rip of system.
There are numerous other ills within the legal system I have exposed in my books in the
INSPECTOR-RIKATI series on certain constitutional and other legal issues where litigation
is more the playground of lawyers to pervert the course of JUSTICE and regretfully at times
aided by the judicial officer involved.
I may deplore violence but I for one can UNDERSTAND why people are driven to it because I
have been the one for decades dealing with them.
As if the at times corruptive conduct by courts/tribunals, etc, isnt enough the politicians in the
parliament desire for their own political survival to pursue as many convictions as they can and
by this corrupt the entire legal processes. No longer are Members of parliament there to serve the
people but rather their own self political survival and then anything goes.
We have some lawyer then appointed who may know next to nothing about what is legally
appropriate let alone constitutionally permissible to become Attorney General and who then
recommends to the Governor or Governor-General that certain legislation is constitutionally
valid even so having not a clue if in fact this is so. It means that the courts then are enforcing
legislation against the general community even so not a single judicial officer either has the
competence to understand let alone comprehend if the legislation is constitutionally valid.
Everyone is assuming it is and the poor unlettered Defendant is left in a lurge.
When then a unlettered person objects to this then the judicial officers concerns lacking any skill
to deal with constitutionally based objections will simply ignore the objection as no system
seems to be in place to ensure that such an objection is appropriately dealt with. Indeed, in the
Colosimo case, which I took over from a barrister, it was shown that Mr Colosimo ended up
being declared mentally unfit to deal with certain matters and so placed under administration and
had been by then already subjected to 5 CONTEMPT hearing whereas after I took over the case I
proved that Mr Colosimo had done no legal wrong and got rid of the administration orders also
which had been the product of deceptive conduct by the Office of the Public Advocate.
In the end I also discovered that the trial judge even by the 6 CONTEMPT hearing actually never
even had bothered to formally charge Mr Colosimo even so having threatened him with
imprisonment. Now how on earth can such a system flourish in a democratic system one has to
ask? How many others are like Mr Colosimo robbed of any competent judicial determination
where incompetent governs the judicial processes?
Yet despite that more than 20 lawyers were involved in the Colosimo case none of them ever
understood that it was all so wrong and when I exposed it then none of them were held legally
accountable for the TERRORTISM they had perpetrated upon Mr Colosimo!
Regretfully not a single judicial officer from onset was willing to just consider appropriately
what Mr Colosimo stated from onset, to object to the jurisdiction and that is an indictment
against the entire court system that is currently operating because lawyers generally are so to say
brainwashed during legal studies to accept some kind of legal process to be applicable regardless
this is wrong. As such when a person appears before the judicial officer the judicial officer is
more inclined to listen to the crap dished up by the lawyer then to listen to the genuine
submissions of the unlettered person. Judicial officers are so to say training to listen to the crap
of fellow lawyers and look down on the very people they are actually to serve.
.
50
I have exposed ion my books how lawyers are fabricating matters and judicial officers are
accepting this nonsense at the detriment of innocent people! What kind of a legal system is this
where so to say the judicial officer is in bed with the prosecutor or the lawyers involved and are
fraternizing as to how they will conduct the case to defeat the unlettered person. Again my books
fill pages of this rot and expose it all.
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Most Members of Parliament are chosen by political parties for being more than likely a
candidate that will succeed to be elected, being it because of sporting achievements or otherwise
and not upon their competence. What we therefore have is a corrupt system where the People are
robbed of any proper representation in the Parliament by people who seek to enter the parliament
for the right reasons.
Parliamentarians have made themselves cosy deals to be handsomely financially rewarded and
have delegated much of their responsibilities as to have more photo opportunities then to attend
to issues concerned. Obviously the public purse needs to fund their over indulgences and so they
have to design different ways to milk the general public and one of them is to use speed detection
cameras regardless how faulty they might be. The courts have been perverted to accept this rot
rather than to make clear that the Framers of the constitution embedded the Magna Carta in the
constitution and as such unless and until the law enfcorcme3nt agency proves beyond doubt that
its allegation is without any question as to credibility it will have no part in enforcing it.
Indeed, law enforcement agencies now are merely private operators who even on national
television have indicated to knowingly issue falsely infringement notices for the sake of keeping
their jobs because they are required to issue a minimum number of infringement notices. So we
have now an infringement court system of the Magistrates Court of Victoria designed to operate
to enforce this kind of utter and sheer nonsense and deplete any credibility of the courts.
Politicians are not likely to be competent to be aware what are constitutional issues let alone if
proposed legislation is constitutionally permissible and often the Members of parliament who are
holding law degrees lack also any competence in this but are generally so to say rule the roost in
dictating to other members of parliament that because they have a law degree they know it all.
Further, when it comes to political parties then one can say the leader of the political party
generally dictates how the members are voting on a Bill and well the members will assume that
their leader will be competent in constitutional issues relating to the bill, even so the leader has
no clue at all.
This is some of the background how we have Bills before the Parliament totally mismanaged and
lack any proper system to deal with this even so for many years I have canvassed in my books
that a constitutional permissible. As such, the moment the OFFICE-OF THE-GUARDIAN a
constitutional commission is in place then it doesnt matter how ill-informed Members of
Parliament ever may have been because they can obtain from the OFFICE-OF THEGUARDIAN all relevant details as can any member of Public, the Courts and the Government.
In my view we have currently a gross incompetence that continues ongoing as to how the
parliament operates and this then is perpetrated upon the courts also.
.
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How on earth could the Parliament enact legislation that Infringement Notices can be deemed to
be Magistrates Court orders, well aware it generally is merely a computer dealing with it, if
enforced when it prevents any public hearing in the first place? If offend the very principles of an
open court hearing and a judicial decision upon both parties being heard. It offend the notice of
credible evidence because now any employee of a parking business can become the
enforcement agency and a litany of false allegations and so issue of Infringement Notices are
being issued that has so to say corrupted the entire court systems to enforce this kind of blatant
government sponsored TERRORISM upon the general public.
.
Is there no pride within the judiciary that they will not lend themselves to participate in this kind
of government sponsored TERRORISM?
In a recent case, albeit it never came to the courts, I had to deal with a stubborn council for more
than 6 months in regard of an Infringement Notice against an invalid person even so in law the
person was parked lawfully, but due to administrative errors within the council itself it was not
understood to be so. Now this resulted to months and months of terrorising the disable person,
placing even the life of the child in the process ain jeopardy and was it not for my persistence to
pursue JUSTICE the Infringement Notice may not have been withdrawn. Now when peoples
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lives are even placed at risk because of what I consider to be the utter stupidity of a council and
its staff then we must have grave concerns. Obviously because councils are aware that the courts
are operating with bias in favour their allegations regardless how wrong the council might be in
their allegations this causes an accumulation of injustices perpetrated upon many.
What we need is a better educated judiciary who understand first of all the basics of what means
to provide JUSTICE! Also what it means to be truly independent and impartial.
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R v. Lusink and another; Ex Parte Shaw (1980) 6 FLR 235 and 236
QUOTE
However in some cases the words or conduct of a judge may be suck as to lead the parties reasonably to think
that the judge has prejudged an important question in the case, and then prohibition may issue. Of course, the
court which is asked to grant prohibition will not lightly conclude that the judge may reasonably be suspected
of bias in this sense; it must be "firmly established" that such a suspicion may reasonably be engendered in
the minds of the parties or the public, as was made clear by the court in R v Commonwealth Conciliation and
arbitration Commission; Ex parte Angliss Group (1969) 122 CLR 546 at 553-4, in the passage cited in R v
Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (132 CLR at 262).
The critical question, however, is not whether a judge believes he or she has prejudged a question, but
whether that is what a party or the public might reasonably suspect has occurred (see per Lord Denning MR
in Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC Ltd v Lannon (1969) 1 QB 577 at 599, a judgment cited with approval
by this court in R v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; Ex Parte Angliss Group
(1969) 122 CLR 546 at 553; In some circumstances repeated denials of prejudging might well convey the
impression of "protesting to much"...
END QUOTE
.
Dimes v. Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal (1852) 3 II,L.C. 759

QUOTE
The fundamental rule of English (Australian) law is that "No man can be a judge in his own case". It has
long been held that if there is bias or the appearance of bias such as to deny justice or create the impression
that justice has not been done, then that bias, or apparent bias, is sufficient to invalidate the decision of
those who made the decision.
END QUOTE
Reg v. The London County Council (1894) XI .L.R. 24
Sharp v. Carey (1897) 23 V.L.R. 248 Austin Digest 17.
Reg. v. Moleswort (1893) 23 V.L.R. 582 Austin Digest 17.
Black v. Black (1951) N.Z.L.R. 723
Ex Parte Blume (1958) W.N. (N.S.W.) 411Austin Digest 93,339,457,458
.
40
Here I requested a revocation of the Infringement court order and the very Infringements
Registrar who issued the Infringement Notice order then refused revocation where obviously this
is implied bias and makes the Infringement Re3gistrars decision also for this without legal force!
Clearly the court hasnt even a system in place that the Infringements Registrar at the very least
is required to appropriately deal with such a matter!
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This caser obviously is not some average case because it is now faced with a
CONSTITUTIONALIST who unlike others successfully challenged the validity of the
purported Victorian Constitution Act 1975 and so no Magistrates Court by administrative or
judicial decision can overturn or otherwise interfere with the County Court of Victoria judicial
decision. The fact that the Parliament legislated that a court means the Magistrates Court in
itself means that from onset this case was doomed to fail because no authority existed for any
higher court to hear and determine the alleged infringement!
I do not need to legally challenge the Infringement Notice order as constitutionally it is a
non-existing order and any attempt by any court to seek to enforce it would not give it any
judicial validity because a subsequent order can never validate an order that was issued
without jurisdiction.
.
What has been established also is that the VICTORIAN POLICE using vicroads envelope to
enforce 1 Demerit point then basically the VICTORIAN POLICE controls vicroads and the
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Court and by this has also compromised any separation of powers.
This has not just been one gigantic blunder but perverting the course of justice initiated by the
VICTORIAN POLICE and one then wonders why people in riots have such a disregard for law
enforcement agencies when clearly their conduct is appalling at the very least and criminal also.
.
This court may not particular like my criticism but it would do better to accept there are major
issues canvassed by me which indicates there is a total lack of proper law and order enforcement
and that the courts are no more but a tool for the government to TERRORISE the general
community in handing over their hard earned monies regardless of how innocent they might be
of any wrongdoing.
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IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE MOMENT I MADE MY OBJECTIONS

KNOWN THE VICTORIAN POLICE WAS COMPELLED TO ENSURE THIS WAS
APPROPRIATELY CATERED FOR. However, and likely because of my extensive assistance
over decades to assist others wrongly accused by the VICTORIAN POLICE it may just have
held that it would so to say teach me a lesson that they are all mighty and power full and can use
and misuse taxpayers monies to perpetrate a gross injustice upon me and they the officers
involved will be without legal redress no matter their conniving conduct. Well, let the court
prove it will not only refuse to participate in such elaborate conspiracy but it will not tolerate this
kind of fraudulent conduct and that those who are involved will be held legally accountable.
It is when the courts show they will finally start holding lying police accountable that perhaps the
general community may gain again trust in the courts.
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Again, merely setting aside or revoking the purported Infringement Notice order will not get rid
of the legal challenges I made against the purported Victorian Constitution Act 1975, the
Infringement Act 2006y and other purported legislation and it may have to be considered that all
and any convictions by any court within the Victorian jurisdiction may be invalid! Now that is
really a comprehensive problem is even murderers could find to be released from prisons because
the validity of the purported Victorian Constitution Act 1975 was not determined and so remains
ULTRA VIRUS and also because those charge with offenses which were not instituted in the
name of the British Monarch also were invalid in law. If there is any lesson to be learned out of
this all then surely it is that in future all legislation and any Bill and any amendment pursued to
amend the constitution is being considered first by a constitutional council that has the
competence of understanding and comprehending the appropriate application of the relevant
constitution. Then no matter how uneducated any Member of the Parliament, the judiciary or
others may be at least they can always fall back upon the constitutional council to provide them
with relevant information pertaining what is pursued to be constitutionally permissible or not.
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This document is not intended and neither must be perceived to set out matters in any order of
priority or refer to all issues and details and it also relies upon past correspondences provided to
the VICTORIAN POLICE, the premier and others, including the Infringements Registrar.
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The VICTORTIAN POLICE obviously has compromise itself by its own conduct that any
persistence to pursue the allegations against me may be perceived to pursue matters to seek to
justify its own co9nduct regardless of how wrongly it acted. Which court? then is going to hear
and determine matters where the above set out clearly indicates that I successfully challenged the
validity of any court to heart and determine matters because no court that is listed as a
corporation can be deemed to be a court to act for the general community. If a court having
attained an ABN number was to be able to adjudicate then any business could do so! Also the
constitution provides for an elected Parliament and the Parliament to act as agents for the People,
this clearly cannot be deemed to exist where the Victorian Government is registered on the stock
market or otherwise as a business entity, as I exposed during the 5-year epic legal challenge
before the County Court of Victoria and again comprehensively defeated the Crown in it.
.
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Lets make it absolutely clear had instead of myself the Crown succeeded in the case it would
have ensured that I would have been faced to accept that the court made its decision and I was
bound by it, well now that instead of the crown I succeeded then likewise I am entitled to all the
benefits of the cases and so regardless if this may not be appreciated by others nothing can
undermine my legal rights of those benefits. Hence, the VICTORIAN POLICE somehow has to
face it that unless and until, if at all, it can somehow have a judgment of a competent court of
jurisdiction to overturn the 19 July 2006 County Court of Victoria decision, which I view is
unlikely as the Victorian Attorney-General had the opportunity at the time to challenge my
submissions but elected not to do so, then it has no business in the first placed to institute
proceedings in the Infringement Court because this is not a court that somehow by an
administrative decision can rob me of the legal rights associated with my 19 July 2006 orders.
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As such any attempt by any magistrate to seek to enforce the unconstitutional and invalid
Infringement Notice order can further place the magistrate in being liable to have acted
maliciously and without jurisdiction because again where orders were issued without first having
invoked jurisdiction then no subsequent court can invoke jurisdiction to enforce such an order,
neither can the magistrate order a hearing as if it starts DE NOVO because so to say too much
water has gone under the bridge to enable any impartial hearing to eventuate and again where I
challenged the validity of the purported Victorian Constitution Act 21975 then everything arising
from this, including the appointment of lawyers to the bar of the supreme Court of victoria is in
question and so also then the validity of appointment of any judicial officer.
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Now this is what is a comprehensive case to pursue JUSTICE and I anticipate that the court will
realise it does better ensure the proper legal procedures are followed as to seek to regain the
confidence of the general community also.
.
The 27 July 20211 correspondence of the Infringements Registrar states;
QUOTE
30
Your application for revocation has been refused, as the Infringements Registrar was not satisfied that there
are sufficient grounds to revoke/cancel the order.
END QUOTE
.
And
QUOTE
35
The Infringements Registrar does not have the power to reconsider your application as this can only be
done by a magistrate in open court.
END QUOTE
.
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No relevant references are stated to which part of the legislation this is claimed upon and more
over no magistrate can hear the matter in open court where in the first place no jurisdiction was
invoked.
As such, it is very obvious that the Infringements Registrar purportedly having considered
what I wrote nevertheless couldnt grasp what is legally applicable and that is that before he
made any kind of decision at all he had to involve a process to invoke jurisdiction by way of a
jurisdiction hearing and unless and until such a hearing had eventuated and my objection to the
jurisdiction was dismissed (not that I seek to imply it would) there was not even any jurisdiction
for the Infringements Registrar to determine if he could or couldnt revoke the Infringement
Notice Order.
Considering that the Infringements Registrar apparently has been dealing with hundreds of
thousands of cases and yet still doesnt appear to me to have a clue how to deal in a proper legal
manner with an objection to jurisdiction then one has to ask what is the competence of this
Infringements Registrar? How often has the court in the past enforced such kind of ridiculous
rulings? How many lives were destroyed in the process because of this and then you wonder why
people participate in riots?
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I am well aware that the government ever increasing desire for money, and so to waste more and
more, has resulted to it seeking to devise a system that the courts will be acting like a STAR
CHAMGBER COURT that instead of proven until GUILTY now the system is designed that
anyone is GUILTY until proven innocent. What we have however accomplished in the process
that the Courts conducting themselves as KANGAROO COURTS because of a kind of
litigation that is not permissible and neither can be acceptable for a Court of Law.
Let for argument sake have where a widow sells the motor vehicle of her late husband but the
new owner doesnt register the motor vehicle on his name and rakes up numerous infringements
and then the dead man can be not just have his diver license cancelled but also have the Sheriff
breaking in to arrest him to hold him accountable before the Courts and answer the charges that
may have arisen. Well, it would be comical besides being utterly stupid indeed if the Sheriff or
other enforcement agency were to break into a grave and either take the ashes or the skeleton
before a court to answer charges! Well one would have to be a complete idiot to contemplate
holding a dead man legally accountable before the courts but it seems by the provisions of the
Infringement Act 2006 this is possible.
While this kind of system may serve the government of the Day to terrorise its citizens the courts
never should participate in this kind of terrorism and should have from onset made clear that it
will only deal with cases that are placed before it in a democratic permissible manner and not
some computer parading as some Infringements Registrar making decisions that pretend to be
administrative decisions but are in real terms judicial decisions and then magistrates are bound to
accept them as being of the judicial kind of decisions because the purported evidence was relied
upon.
It might be interesting indeed how many magistrates ended up issuing orders to have a
persons residence broken into by warrant issue and even to arrest the man for nonpayments of fines when the man was already dead for many years and so the likely hood of
such a man to be brought before the courts to answer any charges in my view would be
zero.
Every court has the right to refuse to turn itself into some KANGAROO COURT and/or STAR
CHAMBER CLOURT but perhaps registrars/magistrates in particular are more concerned as to
y-=their own personal job prospects then to serve the general community as an impartial
adjudicator.
.

QUOTE
35
Mr. WISE (New South Wales).-The only class of cases contemplated by this section are offences
committed against the criminal law of the Federal Parliament, [start page 354] and the only cases to
which Mr. Higgins' amendment would apply are those in which the criminal law of the state was in
conflict with the criminal law of the Commonwealth; in any other cases there would be no necessity to
change the venue, and select a jury of citizens of another state. Now, I do not know any power, whether in
modern or in ancient times, which has given more just offence to the community than the power possessed by
an Executive, always under Act of Parliament, to change the venue for the trial of criminal offences, and I do
not at all view with the same apprehension that possesses the mind of the honorable member a state of affairs
in which a jury of one state would refuse to convict a person indicted at the instance-of the Federal Executive.
It might be that a law passed by the Federal Parliament was so counter to the popular feeling of a particular
state, and so calculated to injure the interests of that state, that it would become the duty of every citizen to
exercise his practical power of nullification of that law by refusing to convict persons of offences
against it. That is a means by which the public obtains a very striking opportunity of manifesting its
condemnation of a law, and a method which has never been known to fail, if the law itself was
originally unjust. I think it is a measure of protection to the states and to the citizens of the states which
should be preserved, and that the Federal Government should not have the power to interfere and prevent the
citizens of a state adjudicating on the guilt or innocence of one of their fellow citizens conferred upon it by
this Constitution.
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END QUOTE
.
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Yet, despite this we have judges telling the jury time and time again that they (the jury) must
consider matters upon the evidence only and not as to the issue of law, this even so the legal
principle has been embedded in the constitution that a jury can decide both on evidence and on
law and can NULLIFY any law it deems to be inappropriate to enforce.
What we have however is that even prosecutors are deceiving the courts such as was reported
causing a man to be convicted and serving time in imprisonment by the Prosecutor concealing
relevant evidence that proved or could have proven the man to be innocent. Now, why was the
Prosecutor not then subsequently imprisoned for 18 months to serve the same time as the
innocent man had been caused to do? What we have is a total misconception what the function of
the Prosecutor and the courts really are.
Sure the Government of the Day desires to have a record of convictions and really isnt interested
in the innocence or the guilt of the accused but in reality the role of a Prosecutor is not to pursue
the conviction of anyone but to place before the Court all relevant evidence so the court can
adjudicate and by way of an informed decision hand down its judgment. The Courts function is
neither to pursue the conviction of any accused but to hand down a reason of judgment that
demonstrated a proper informed consideration of all relevant matters as to what was the most
acceptable situation and if this informed decision includes a conviction then so be it but to rate
any court on his conviction it scores then the courts no longer are serving as impartial courts but
have an self-interest to serve its own so to say survival for the sake of the Government of the Day
Foster (1950) S.R. (N.S.W.) 149, at p151 (Lord Denning, speaking on the role of an advocate)
QUOTE
As an advocate he is a minister of Justice equally with a judge, A Barrister cannot pick or choose his
clients...He must accept the brief and do all he honourably can on behalf of his client. I say 'All he
honourably can' because his duty is not only to his client. He has a duty to the court which is
paramount. It is a mistake to suppose that he is a mouthpiece of his client to say what he wants: or
his tool to do what he directs. He is none of those things. He owes his allegiance to a higher cause. It is
the cause of truth and Justice. He must not consciously misstate the facts. He must not knowingly
conceal the truth. He must not unjustly make a charge of fraud, that is, without evidence to support it. He
must produce all relevant authorities, even those that are against him. He must see that his client
discloses, if ordered, all relevant documents, even those that are fatal to his case. He must disregard
the specific instructions of his client, if they conflict with his duty to the court.
END QUOTE
.
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There can be absolutely no doubt that the Prosecutor concealed the truth from the Infringements
Registrar as had the prosecutor made known that from onset I challenged the jurisdiction of any
court then clearly the Infringements Registrar could never have gone about to issue any
purported Infringement Notice order. The Infringements Registrar would have to have ordered a
JURISDICTION hearing. But then again when the computer is really dealing with it all and
the Infringements Registrar may not have a clue what the computer is being fed with but
nevertheless allows his position to be used as to seek to validate whatever this computer is
turning out as being purported administrative decisions by Infringement Notice orders then I
view not just the Infringements Registrar is derelict in his duties as a registrar of a court but also
the chief magistrate permitting such kind of a system to operate must be held accountable and so
every other Registrar/magistrate/judge who participate in such utter nonsense and sheer robbery
and TERRORISE to be perpetrated upon the general community and have turned the court in a
KANGAROO COURT and/or STAR CHAMBER COURT!
.
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The Chief Magistrate and indeed any judicial or administrative officer of any court should have
absolutely no concern as to the interest of the government unless it is specifically related to the
interpretation of the legislation in question and then only for so far it was expressed during the
debates in the Parliament and recorded in the Hansard, as to do otherwise would undermine the
separation of power between the executives, the legislators and the courts (See also the Kable
decision for this regarding appointment of judges, etc!)
.
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It must be clear that as the Infringements Registrar never did bother to invoke jurisdiction then
obviously the purported Infringement Notice order of 12 July 2011 is without legal force and
ULTRA VIRES and so null and void. It cannot be set aside or revoked as it really doesnt exist at
all in law. It simply should be removed from the re3cords as not being any6 legally valid
decision but again we see the courts really have still no proper system in place how to deal with
such non-existing order and that the danger is that some conniving person may still seek to use
such an invalid decision as being legally enforceable. So, we may perhaps still see at times
skeletons being difgge3d up and placed in handcuffs (after all to avoid any attempted escape
from the law) and then placed before a magistrate to answer charges and as JUSTICE is blind to
appearance of the accused then the magistrate may very well order this skeleton to be serving a
stretch in imprisonment to teach it a lesson not to pay any defaulting Infringement Notices. Well
if it is the Infringements Registrar then one can be assured it will eventuate and for a magistrate
who due to non-appearance will proceed EX PARTE then too the skeleton risk to be suffering
imprisonment not in a coffin but in a cell.
.
It is this mindless kind of circumstances that can eventuate from all this nonsense of legislation
of the purported Infringement act 2006 that exposes how absurd the courts have allowed itself to
be manipulated but the legislators as well as the Government of the Day and to abandon the
separation of power even so this is a legal principle embedded in the constitution and the States
by way of s106 are bound to observe subject to this constitution.
.
25
This is also an indictment upon the legal profession who have not earlier stopped this kind of rot
being perpetrated against the general community as well as to the clients they represented. Surely
oat least one of the lawyers should have had enough brains to realise that the purported
Infringement Act 2006 was legally so to say a moron and could not be applied?
.
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40
The very function of the court to nullify any legislation that may not be appropriate to enforce
against the general community has clearly been abandoned by the court. For sure we all aware
that when it comes to the rich and the famous then the courts will generally find some way to get
the accused of any charges but when it comes to ordinary people then they must suffer the so to
say legal consequences even so their circumstances are not as serious as to speeding, etc.
What therefore the courts have gotten involved in is what often is perceived by the general public
as selectively using nullification for their fellow lawyers and the suspicion of any financial
kickbacks also is being suspected.
.
How on earth can an Infringements Registrar possible enforce any Infringement Notice that may
be issued by a so called enforcement agency that makes its monies about the conviction rate of
accused? Surely any court official dealing with such matters should be aware that the financial
incentive to score more money in a conviction rate itself might be an inducement for the
enforcement agency to manipulate the electronic system being used as to ensure innocent
drivers are convicted.
.
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I recall an incident where the police way back in 1976 alleged I was traveling at a speed of 90
kilometres an hours in a 60 kilometres zone. My passenger disputed I was travelling at that speed
and in fact made clear to the police officer that I had pointed out to better watch my speed as I
was doing close to 60 kilometres an hour. The police officer took no notice of this and
nevertheless issued the Infringement notice. Even so I never paid it the matter never went to
court for the simple reason that after dropping of my passenger I went so to say back to the scene
of the crime and went to observe the police checking speed limits, as after all for me to accelerate
within a about one hundred meters to gain a speed of 90 kilometres an hour after having turned a
corner having waited for red light itself underlines that the speed reading was defective. While
standing there I would make the police alert how motorist were recorded to be doing speeds up to
120 kilometres an hour , while traveling amongst other vehicles and the police officer often
commented that it was a faulty reading. Then I observed how the police stopped two motorists
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and offered one of the drivers to accept the Infringement Notice for speeding doing, yes 90
kilometres an hour in a 60 kilometres zone, one of the drivers then accepted to take the
Infringement Notice on his name. Because the other driver already had previous charges against
him. It was really nice to see how the police were operating and now Alan Fells (dealing with the
taxi industry) and even lawyers are claiming it is unlawful to divert Infringement notices to
another person when the VICTORIAN POLICE if anything introduced this system way back.
I stayed around for a bit longer as it was really educational how the police would demonstrate to
a motor vehicle driver having been speeding and show the reading that actually had been left on
it and was previously claimed to have been an incorrect reading. When I was saying goodbye to
the police officers one of them then suddenly commented that the Infringement Notice that had
been issued against me was cancelled. I never heard of it again and so the police officers must
have become aware that their little dirty scheme practiced by the police to score convictions and
destroying in the process many livelihoods and perhaps lives they couldnt take the risk to take
me to court as then I could expose their dirty system to cause Infringement Notices against
innocent people to be issued.
.
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In one case a man was issued with an Infringement Notice for failing to give way to the right on
an incident allegedly a week after the car was a write off and so the incident never could have
taken place as such. This is what we are having that police officers are fabricating incidents and
issuing Infringement Notices disregarding how this impact upon innocent people and how this
can destroy their livelihood, the ability to pay their mortgage, etc.
.
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It is for this that we need a robust court that will not tolerate any nonsense of allegations but will
demand that the accuser prove their case and not as the purported Infringement Act 2006
demands that the Infringements Registrar must accept the allegation and issue an Infringement
Notice Order without even bothering to check the validity of the allegations and so neither
checking what the accused has to say. This case is not where I am so to say on trial but where
rather the entire system is on trial, in particularly so the courts themselves.
There can be absolutely no excuse for any judicial/administrative officer to disregard the essence
of democracy and to ensure that we have a democratic system in place and operating with courts
that will not be bullied into scoring convictions against innocent people.
.
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There is a hell of a lot more to it all, such as judicial officer using signature rubber stamps so that
staff can issue orders as if the judge did so and in the process up to 5 different versions end up
being issued of the same orders because every\one uses the signature stamp. Lawyers
deliberately making false/misleading claims to achieve an adjournment, as for decades I have
been investigating the conduct of lawyer and publish it in my books in the INSPECTORRIKATI series on certain constitutional and other legal issues. The overall rot perpetrated
against the general community is horrendous and Michael Alderton is but one of the many
victims who hanged himself (1995) after he was railroaded in his case. That is the reality behind
it all that nothing is done to ensure courts are operating in a democratic manner and the filth that
uses their conniving ways to destroy peoples lives are getting away so to say with murder and
the courts are seemingly endorsing all this.
As a CONSTITUTIONALIST, Professional Advocate, etc, I have experienced what the rot
really is in the courts, and the Supreme Court of Victoria is not excluded of this either, neither so
for that the High Court of Australia and there is an urgent need to clean up or we may just face
that riots will become every days events in Australia also. I oppose any violence and so urge the
court to ensure that this nonsense is stopped fro so far it is within its powers and it can start with
declaring the Infringement Notice Order to be null and void and to then deal with the relevant
persons who perverted the course of JUSTICE as to hold them legally accountable and in future
will ensure that any accused is provided with the appropriate democratic right ordinary
applicable, regardless if legislation purports otherwise.
.
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In 2002 I filed a complaint with the Commonwealth Ombudsman but he refused to
investigate, years later when the government ordered him to investigate this matter it was
discovered that all those years while he refused originally to investigate my complaint
hundreds of people had been wrongly detailed. The Ombudsman obviously wasnt
revealing this in his report! And this is why any person engaged to pursue a clean-up of the
legal system must be a person who is not a lawyer but who has a considerable knowledge
and understanding about legal matters and who has a proper grip as to what is actually
constitutionally permissible and cannot be suspected of any loyalty with the legal profession
as to enable a truly independent person to clean sweep the system and to provide
recommendations for this to the relevant courts.
.
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It should be obvious that those employed in the court system have no likelihood of understanding
that their practices may be unconstitutional or just unlawful. They are so to say trained into a job
and will perform as such irrespective they may all along do it wrong.
.
The refusal of the Registrar, and later the Magistrate, to accept the ADDRESS TO THE
COURT of the Defendant in WOOKEY, RENAE (Applicant) And GILBERT, LUKE
(Defendant) Case Nr. B11443389 may underline how disastrous matters are dealt with where a
man seeking to provide the end result was that the Court issued orders which effectively prevent
the Defendant now to go on circuit playing darts in a dart completion because it could be held at
once a year near the location of the applicant. Now surely this kind of nonsense of ruling can be
deemed a total absurdity? For sure the magistrate didnt specifically refer to the dart competition
but should have had he read the ADDRESS TO THE COURT as then the magistrate would
have been aware that his orders would be grossly intrusive and so uncalled for in the mans
ordinary life. As an author of books in the INSPECTOR-RIKATI series I can and will
certainly expose the details to show how absurd the magistrates Court deals with certain cases
but surely the court itself should accept that it doesnt serve the general community to unduly
infringe into the life of a man where there is absolutely no need to do so!
.
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Truthfully, my 78 year old wife is fearful that the neighbour from across the road having a habit
to have his waste-bin on our side the day after it is collected at his side, may one day result in an
Infringement notice as council officers may assume we left it out for too long and then she might
be ending up being imprisoned because the Infringements Registrar, being essentially a
computer, will not consider the true realistic evidence and issue orders no matter what the real
circumstances are. This is the fear that is being created amongst law abiding citizens because the
Magistrates Court no longer is perceived by many as an impartial court, but is perceived by many
as some corrupt court that cannot be trusted. My wife escaped long ago from a communist
regime but now holds the view that Australia is now worse than the communist regime then ever
was because now the courts are so to say hand in hand with the Government of the Day to
TERRORISE innocent people.
When people lose faith in the judicial system then society becomes unruling and soon or later
one ends up with the kind of riots that is spreading around the world and so in particular in
England where people are seeking to vent their anger but regretfully do so causing the innocent
people to suffer rather than to hold legally accountable the real culprits.
The problem is however that who do you turn to when the courts themselves are perceived
to act corruptly?
.
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Time and time again this question is posed to me and I view this court can demonstrate now how
it answer it by making clear it will not sanction the Infringement Notice Orders and hold the
people involved in it legally accountable! This so in future no STAR CHAMBER COURT
and/or KANGAROO COURT proceedings will eventuate within the Magistrates Court of
Victoria as the court will refuse to have any interference into the proper democratic conduct of
the court.
.
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Also, any officer acting judicially and/or administratively must be instructed to provide any
unrepresented person with an equal opportunity to have his/her case placed before the court and
accept any ADDRESS TO THE COURT which relates to the matters in dispute.
.
The moment we curtail the rights of an unrepresented litigant for the sake of allegedly smoothing
the proceedings while in fact causing by this more than likely protracted litigation and harming
unduly a party so denied of his/her legal rights we have abandoned what the legal processes are
about.
.
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In my books I have shown the transcript of how a Barrister at the Bar table stated a version about
a certain judgment and then produced the real judgment and how the lawyer had substituted the
real judgment with words that actually resulted to the contrary intention then the judgment was
about. Now surely it underlines that magistrates may prefer to hear lawyers talking but really
what is the sense if they are swindled in the process and the course of JUSTICE is perverted
because the lawyer fabricate authorities to suit his client?
Is this the kind of JUSTICE a judicial officer really cares about, that really amounts to a gross
INJUSTIC?
.
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I have for decades exposed how lawyers serve upon another party a version of Affidavit material
not at all being a true copy of what is filed in court. Meaning that the other party may agree to the
content of an paragraph unaware that the version of the court is different and so could agree with
a very serious allegation no know to him/her. And this is some of the litany of issues that are
going on in the courts and then one wonder why people lose respect for the courts?
.
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As I discovered transcript of proceedings also are a t time manufactured to present a kind of

evidence not at all as such existing. For example where the witness under oath read out a
document that stated Scott is the husbands the transcript then had the version that Scottish
bastard. The transcript didnt show any comment by the trial judge as to denounce the term
Scottish bastard and neither did the prosecutor do so and it was obvious that the witness never
stated this. Yet, when comparing the transcript with what was actually read out by the witness
there were up to 16 alterations on each page. While it might be very well for a person like myself
to expose this kind of rot it should be kept in mind that most people would lack the ability to do
so and so in particular because recording of a hearing is generally not permitted to be done by the
general public.
.
I have been the subject of serious allegations by judicial officers but always challenged them to
prove with both the audio recording as well as the transcript that I had made a certain statement
and then obviously they fail because they just concocted it. And this is a very serious issue
because when I am representing a party then that party is clearly robbed of proper representation
because the judicial officer likes to have a go at me and fabricate matters for this merely because
of not being able to handle that I had the judicial officer making a fool of himself/herself. As the
courts have made clear it is JUSTICE that is the loser when courts fail toe to proper legal
procedures. If my writings (that is being published around the world) can avoid even a single
person to avoid to commit suicide or even murder but to return to the fold of the courts and the
courts prove to be impartial and not going to be acting as a STAR CHAMBER COURT and/or
KANGAROO COURT then I have accomplished what I set out to do.
.
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Again the above stated is not intended and neither must be perceived to deal with all relevant
matters but safe to say that it is the court that now must prove its credibility and get rid of the
unconstitutional/unlawful purported Infringement Notice Order and act appropriately in the
future while seeking to appropriately address past errors to whomever!
.
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This document is not intended and neither must be perceived to indicate that I accept the
jurisdiction of the court as clearly I provide this set out to continue my opposition to the
jurisdiction of any Australian court to deal with this matter!
.

QUOTE
Mr. HIGGINS.-Suppose the sentry is asleep, or is in the swim with the other power?
Mr. GORDON.-There will be more than one sentry. In the case of a federal law, every member
of a state Parliament will be a sentry, and, every constituent of a state Parliament will be a
sentry. As regards a law passed by a state, every man in the Federal Parliament will be a
sentry, and the whole constituency behind the Federal Parliament will be a sentry.
10
END QUOTE
.
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The existence of the courts as independent entities within the separation of powers is because of
the constitution and therefore the courts must honour their obligations and duties within the
constitutional separation of powers, and as such cannot accept this unconstitutional provisions of
the Infringement Act 2006 such as to interfere with its court processes and demanding it must
accept evidence from one party without hearing the version of the accused and turning it in to
some in some STAR CHAMBER COURT or KANGEROO COURT.
.
Either we have a constitution or we dont!

.

.
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(
.
G. H. Schorel-Hlavka
END QUOTE 10-8-2011 ADDRESS TO THE COURT
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No one can accuse me of not having given effort to try to get some common sense in the
Victorian Police and/or the Sheriffs Office and indeed the Registrar of the Infringement Court
and the Magistrates Court of Victoria as well as many others but as usual they seem to be hell
bend on abuse of powers rather than to display an example of DUE LEGAL PROCESS to be
observed and followed. Again, most citizens would not have the ability to understand and present
constitutional matters, indeed most lawyers may not even do so either.
Lets all make sure JUSTICE DOES PREVAIL!
40
Awaiting your response, G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Friends call me Gerrit)

(
45
END QUOTE 20140205-G. H .Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Mr Tony Abbott PM- Re Metrology National
Measurement Institute Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research -etc
50
QUOTE ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2 (MY UNCONTEST APPEALS- BY ALL ATTONOR GENERALS!) County Court of Victoria,
Case numbers T01567737 & Q10897630 ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2
To be able to consider if the Court can or cannot invoke jurisdiction, it requires to ascertain if the
subject matter of alleged failure to comply with Commonwealth law (Section 245 of the
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Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918) in fact is applicable. After all, if the relevant provision is
not applicable then the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions is pursuing a vexatious
charges and the Court cannot entertain the charges or either one of them. .
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Mr. THYNNE:
The union of these colonies must take place in either one or two ways, namely, either by a
unification under one all-powerful parliament, or by a federation which gives to the central
federal parliament certain limited powers and reserves to the other parliaments all other
powers. As I think we may be in danger of overlooking some of the first principles
connected with federation, I may be pardoned if I briefly define some of the characteristics
of a federation. I shall quote from Mr. Dicey's recent work, which is very clear in its
language. He says:
One of the characteristics of a federation is that the law of the constitution must be
either legally immutable or else capable of being changed only by some authority
above and beyond the ordinary legislative bodies, whether federal or state
legislatures, existing under the constitution.
30
Australian Agricultural Co Ltd. v F.E.D.F.A of Australasia (1913) 17 CLR 261 and 278
The oath of a justice of this court is ' to do right to all manner of people according to law'
Our sworn duty is to the law itself and to the organic nature of the constitution first of all.
If, then, we find the law to be plainly in conflict with what we or any of our
predecessors errornously thought it to be, we have, as I conceive no right to choose
between giving effect to the law, and maintaining an incorrect interpretation, It is not,
in my opinion, better that the court should be persistently wrong than that it should
be ultimately right..
Whatever else may be said with respect to previous decisions - and it is necessary here to
consider the principals upon which a court should act in particular cases - so much at least
emerges as is undoubtedly beyond challenge, that where a former decision is clearly wrong,
and there are no circumstances countervailing the primary duty of giving effect to the law
as the court finds it, the real opinion of the court should be expressed.
35
It is a matter of fact that I was issued with a Certificate of Australian Citizenship No.
ME9401317C on the 28th day of March 1994. I do not believe that the Commonwealth Director
of Public Prosecutions contest the issue of this certificate.
The certificate states;
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QUOTE
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Australian citizenship Act 1948
40
Certificate of Australian Citizenship

GERRIT HENDRIK SCHOREL
Born on 7 th June 1947
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50
having applied for a Certificate of Australian Citizenship, having satisfied the conditions
prescribed by the Australian Citizenship Act 19448 for the grant of such Certificate
and having undertaken to fulfil the responsibilities of a citizen.
I the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs,
Grant this Certificate of Australian citizenship to the abovenamed applicant who is
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an Australian citizen on and after 28 th March 1994.
Issued by the authority

Of the Minister
For Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs.
END QUOTE
By marriage, on 28 March 2001, I became Gerrit Hendrik Schorel-Hlavka

10
Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. 133 (1795)
Yet, it is to be remembered, and that whether in its real origin, or in its artificial state,
allegiance, as well as fealty, rests upon lands, and it is due to persons. Not so, with
respect to Citizenship, which has arisen from the dissolution of the feudal system and is
a substitute for allegiance, corresponding with the new order of things. Allegiance and
citizenship, differ, indeed, in almost every characteristic. Citizenship is the effect of
compact; allegiance is the offspring of power and necessity. Citizenship is a political tie;
allegiance is a territorial tenure. Citizenship is the charter of equality; allegiance is a
badge of inferiority. Citizenship is constitutional; allegiance is personal. Citizenship is
freedom; allegiance is servitude. Citizenship is communicable; allegiance is repulsive.
Citizenship may be relinquished; allegiance is perpetual. With such essential
differences, the doctrine of allegiance is inapplicable to a system of citizenship; which it
can neither serve to controul, nor to elucidate. And yet, even among the nations, in
which the law of allegiance is the most firmly established, the law most pertinaciously
enforced, there are striking deviations that demonstrate the invincible power of truth,
and the homage, which, under every modification of government, must be paid to the
inherent rights of man.
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And
These are tacit acknowledgments of the right of expatriation, vested in the individuals; for,
though they are instances of adopting, not of discharging, subjects; yet, if Great Britain
would (ex gratia) protect a Russian naturalized by service, in her fleet, it is obvious that
she cannot do so without recognizing his right of expatriation to be superior to the
Empress's right of allegiance. But it is not only in a negative way, that these deviations in
support of the general right appear. The doctrine is, that allegiance cannot be due to two
sovereigns; and taking an oath of allegiance to a new, is the strongest evidence of
withdrawing allegiance from a previous, sovereign.
35
And
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The power of naturalizing has been vested in several of the state governments, and it
now exists in the general government; but the power to restrain or regulate the right
of emigration, is no where surrendered by the people; and it must be repeated, that,
what has not been given, ought not to be assumed. It may be said, however, that such
a power is necessary to the government, and that it is implied in the authority to
regulate the business of naturalization. In considering these positions, it must be
admitted, that although an individual has a right to expatriate himself, he has not a
right to seduce others from their country. Hence, those who forcibly, or seductively,
take away a citizen, commit an act, which [p*143] forms a fair object of municipal
police; and a conspiracy or combination, to leave a country, might, likewise be
properly guarded against. Such laws would not be an infraction of the natural right of
individuals; for, the natural rights of man are personal; he has no right to will for
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others, and he does so, in effect, whenever he moves the mind of another to his
purpose, by fear, by fraud, or by persuasion.
And
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But naturalization and expatriation are matters of internal police; and must depend
upon the municipal law, though they may be illustrated and explained by the
principles of general jurisprudence. It is true, that the judicial power extends to a
variety of objects; but the Supreme Court is only a branch of that power; and
depends on Congress for what portion it shall have, except in the cases of
ambassadors, &c. particularly designated in the constitution. The power of declaring
whether a citizen shall be entitled in any form to expatriate himself, or, if entitled, to
prescribe the form, is not given to the Supreme Court; and, yet, that power will be
exercised by the court, if they shall decide against the expatriation of Captain Talbot.
Let it not, after all, be understood, that the natural, loco-motive, right of a free citizen,
is independent of every social obligation. In time of war, it would be treason to
migrate to any enemy's country and join his forces, under the pretext of expatriation.
1 Dall. Rep. 53, and, even in time of peace, it would be, reprehensible (say the writers
on the law of nature and nations) to desert a country labouring under great
calamities. So, if a man acting under the obligations of an oath of office, withdraws to
elude his responsibility, he changes his habitation, but not his citizenship. It is not,
however, private relations, but public relations; private responsibility, but public
responsibility; that can affect the right: for, where the reason of the law ceases, the
law itself must, also, cease. There is not a private relation, for which a man is not as
liable by local, as by natural, allegiance;--after, as well as before, his expatriation: He
must take care of his family, he must pay his debts, wherever he resides; and there is
no security in restraining emigration, as to those objects, since, with respect to them,
withdrawing is as effectual, as expatriating. Nor is it enough to impair the right of
expatriation, that other nations are at war; it must be the country of the emigrant. No nation
has a right to interfere in the interior police of another: the rights and duties of citizenship,
to be conferred, or released, are matter of interior police; and yet, if a foreign war could
affect [p*145] the question, every time that a fresh power entered into a war, a new
restraint would be imposed upon the natural rights of the citizens of a neutral country;
which, considering the constant warfare that afflicts the world, would amount to a
perpetual controul. But the true distinction appears to be this:--The citizens of the neutral
country may still exercise the right of expatriation, but the belligerent power is entitled to
say, "the act of joining our enemies, flagrante bello, shall not be a valid act of
expatriation." By this construction, the duty a nation owes to itself, the sacred rights of the
citizen, the law of nations, and the faith of treaties, will harmonize, though moving in
distinct and separate courses. To pursue the subject one step further: A man cannot owe
allegiance to two sovereigns. 1Bl. Com. He cannot be citizen of two republics. If a man
has a right to expatriate, and another nation has a right and disposition to adopt him,
it is a compact between the two parties, consummated by the oath of allegiance. A
man's last will, as to his citizenship, may be likened to his last will, as to his estate; it
supersedes every former disposition; and when either takes effect, the party, in one
case, is naturally dead, in the other, he is civilly dead;--but in both cases, as good
Christians and good republicans, it must be presumed that he rises to another, if not
to a better, life and country. An act of expatriation, likewise, is susceptible of various
kinds of proof. The Virginia law has selected one, when the state permits her citizens
to depart; but it is not, perhaps, either the most authentic, or the most conclusive that
the case admits. It may be done obscurely in a distant county court; and even after
the emigrant is released from Virginia, to what nation does he belong? He may have
entered no other country, nor incurred any obligation to any other sovereign. Not
being a citizen of Virginia, he cannot be deemed a citizen of the United States. Shall he
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be called a citizen of the world; a human balloon, detached and buoyant in the
political atmosphere, gazed at wherever he passes, and settled wherever he touches?
But, on the other hand, the act of swearing allegiance to another sovereign, is
unequivocal and conclusive; extinguishing, at once, the claims of the deserted, and
creating the right of the adopted, country. Sir William Blackstone, therefore, considers it
as the strongest, though an ineffectual, effort to emancipate a British subject from his
natural allegiance; and the existing constitution of France declares it expressly to be a
criterion of expatriation. The same principle operates, when the naturalization law of the
United States provides, that the whole ceremony of initiation shall be performed in the
American courts; and if it is here considered as the proof of adoption, shall it not be
considered, also, as the test of expatriation? If America [p*146] makes citizens in that way,
shall we not allow to other nations, the privilege of the same process? In short, to admit
that Frenchmen may be made citizens by an oath of allegiance to America, is, virtually, to
admit, that Americans may be expatriated by an oath of allegiance to France. After this
discussion of principles, forming a necessary basis for the facts in this case, it is insisted,
1st, That Talbot was a naturalized citizen of the French Republic at the time of receiving a
commission to command the privateer, and of capturing the Magdalena. He left this
country with the design to emigrate; and the act of expatriation must be presumed to be
regular, according to the laws of France, since it is certified by the municipality of Point a
Pitre, by the French Consul, and by the Governor of Guadaloupe. 2d, That Redick was
also, a naturalized citizen of the French Republic, when he purchased the vessel, and
received a commission to employ her as a privateer.
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And
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Ballard was a citizen of Virginia, and also of the United States.

Within the united States of America a person granted naturalization is also granted citizenship,
where as the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) does not provide for this.
Section 51(xix) provides for naturalization.
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35
As already extensively placed before the magistrates in previous proceedings (upon which I rely
before this Court also) some of the Colonies (now States) naturalized aliens and others didnt
however each and every Colony did have legislation in regard of citizenship and the rights to
franchise.
The Hansard records of the 2 March and 3 March 1898 Constitutional Convention Debates
made clear that naturalization powers would be transferred from the Colonies to the newly to
be formed Commonwealth of Australia, as it would be approved by the British Parliament but
CITIZENSHIP legislative powers would be retained by the States in the newly formed
Commonwealth of Australia.
Mr Quick proposed to give the Commonwealth of Australia constitutional powers to
define/declare CITIZENSHIP but this was defeated/refused by the Delegates!
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45
I took occasion to indicate that in creating a federal citizenship, and in defining the
qualifications of that federal citizenship, we were not in any way interfering with our
position as subjects of the British Empire. It would be beyond the scope of the
Constitution to do that.
Therefore, even if the amendment of Mr Quick had succeeded it still was not intended to give
any legislative powers to the commonwealth of australia to interfere with the rights of any person
as a British subject.
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Hansard 2-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates;
Mr. BARTON.-I did not say that. I say that our real status is as subjects, and that we
are all alike subjects of the British Crown.
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Dr. QUICK.-If we are to have a citizenship of the Commonwealth higher, more

comprehensive, and nobler than that of the states, I would ask why is it not implanted in the
Constitution? Mr. Barton was not present when I made my remarks in proposing the
clause. I then-anticipated the point he has raised as to the position we occupy as subjects of
the British Empire. I took occasion to indicate that in creating a federal citizenship,
and in defining the qualifications of that federal citizenship, we were not in any way
interfering with our position as subjects of the British Empire. It would be beyond the
scope of the Constitution to do that. We might be citizens of a city, citizens of a
colony, or citizens of a Commonwealth, but we would still be, subjects of the Queen. I
see therefore nothing unconstitutional, nothing contrary to our instincts as British
subjects, in proposing to place power in this Constitution to enable the Federal Parliament
to deal with the question of federal citizenship. An objection has been raised in various
quarters-as by the honorable and learned members (Mr. O'Connor and Mr. Wise)-to the
effect that we ought to define federal citizenship in the Constitution itself. I have
considered this matter very carefully, and it has seemed to me that it would be most
difficult and invidious, if not almost impossible, to frame a satisfactory definition. There is
in the Constitution of the United States of America a cast-iron definition of
citizenship, which has been found to be absolutely unworkable, because, among other
things, it says that a citizen of the United States shall be a natural-born or naturalized
citizen within the jurisdiction of the United States, and it has been found that that
excludes the children of citizens born outside the limits of this jurisdiction. That
shows the danger of attempting definitions, and although I have placed a proposed
clause defining federal citizenship upon the notice-paper, the subject, seems to me
surrounded with the greatest difficulty, and no doubt the honorable and learned
members (Mr. Wise, Mr. O'Connor, and Mr. Symon) would be the first to attack any
definition, and would be able to perforate it. In my opinion, it would be undesirable to
implant a cast-iron definition of citizenship in the Constitution, because it would be
better to leave the question more elastic, more open to consideration, and more
yielding to the advancing changes and requirements of the times.
Mr. SYMON.-I agree with the honorable member, and I also think it is unlikely that the
Commonwealth will seek to derogate from it, but I will not place a power in the hands of
the Commonwealth which will enable them to derogate from it, and if that is not done it
will be merely a dead letter. Is there any citizen of the Commonwealth who is not already a
citizen of the state? State citizenship is his birthright, and by virtue of it he is entitled to the
citizenship of the Commonwealth. When you have immigration, and allow different
people to come in who belong to nations not of the same blood as we are, they become
naturalized, and thereby are entitled to the rights of citizenship.
Sir EDWARD BRADDON.-They are citizens if they are British subjects before they
come here.
45
Mr. SYMON.-That is a point I do not wish to deal with. But they become citizens of
the states, and it is by virtue of their citizenship of the states that they become citizens
of the Commonwealth. Are you going to have citizens of the state who are not citizens
of the Commonwealth?
Mr. KINGSTON.-In some states they naturalize; but they do not in others.
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Mr. WALKER.-Is not a citizen of the state, ipso facto, a citizen of the
Commonwealth?
And
Mr. SYMON.-The honorable and learned member is now dealing with another matter.
Would not the provision which is now before us confer upon the Federal Parliament the
power to take away a portion of this dual citizenship, with which the honorable and
learned member (Dr. Quick) has so eloquently dealt? If that is the case, what this
Convention is asked to do is to hand over to the Federal Parliament the power, whether
exercised or not, of taking away from us that citizenship in the Commonwealth which we
acquire by joining the Union. I am not going to put that in the power of any one, and if it is
put in the power of the Federal Parliament, then I should feel that it was a very serious blot
on the Constitution, and a very strong reason why it should not be accepted. It is not a
lawyers' question; it is a question of whether any one of British blood who is entitled to
become a citizen of the Commonwealth is to run the risk-it may be a small risk-of
having that taken away or diminished by the Federal Parliament! When we declare"Trust the Parliament," I am willing to do it in everything which concerns the working out
of this Constitution, but I am not prepared to trust the Federal Parliament or anybody to
take away that which is a leading inducement for joining the Union.
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And
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Mr. OCONNOR.-I have said that I do not see that such a trust in the Federal Parliament
would be effective. I sympathize with the honorable member's view, but I think it will be
carried out by some kind of definition of citizenship, and I was pointing out the only
aspect in which it appears to me it might be desirable to have some such definition, and
that is, you are creating new rights to citizens of the Commonwealth as citizens of the
Commonwealth in regard to your courts. You establish courts for the Commonwealth, and
every citizen of the Commonwealth is entitled to the use of those courts.
25
Mr. HIGGINS.-Who is he?

And
30
Mr. GLYNN (South Australia).-I shall have to oppose Dr. Quick's amendment, although
I would really go further than he intends. His object is to have a common citizenship, and
he proposes to define that in a proposed new clause, 120A, which reads as follows:All persons resident within the Commonwealth, being natural-born or naturalized subjects
of the Queen, and not under any disability imposed by the Parliament, shall be citizens of
the Commonwealth;
35
and he now wants to give power to Parliament to vary that subsequently.

Mr. ISAACS.-It is not clause 120A that he is proposing now.
Mr. HIGGINS.-It is his amendment in clause 52-to insert "Commonwealth citizenship"
as a new sub-section.
40
Mr. GLYNN.-I am quite aware of that, but what I want to understand is whether Dr.
Quick will propose the insertion of clause 120A, and also put it in the power of the
Parliament to vary the Commonwealth citizenship under clause 52? That is the point about
which I am doubtful. But I desire to point out that Dr. Quick is not going as far as they
have gone in America or Germany. There is a common citizenship both of the
Commonwealth and of the states in America. Citizenship of the Commonwealth carries
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with it citizenship of the states, and the Constitution provides that immunities and
privileges enjoyed by the citizens of a particular state shall be equally shared, when in that
state, by the citizens of all the other states. Now, the German Constitution makes a
declaration that there must be a common citizenship. It does not state that the Parliament
of Germany will have the power of providing for a citizenship of the empire, but that there
must be a common citizenship of the whole empire, and that the privileges which are given
in one part of the empire would apply right through the whole empire. That is to say, there
is a Commonwealth citizenship and a state citizenship running the one with the other-a
perfect equality of rights. All that is done in Germany is that Article 3 of the Imperial
Constitution declares that there shall be a common citizenship for all Germany, and that
the rights of the individual citizens of any state must be extended to the individual citizens
of any other state as long as they come within the jurisdiction of the former state; but the
German Constitution also provides that Parliament-and here is the distinction-may define
what the conditions of that common citizenship are to be. The Constitution declares that
there must be a common citizenship, but it leaves the determination of the particular terms
of that citizenship to the Parliament. That is different from the proposal of Dr. Quick.
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And
[start page 1761]

Mr. KINGSTON.-It was in the Bill.
20
Mr. OCONNOR.-There is no portion of the Bill which gives any right of citizenship, or
points out what citizenship is.
Mr. HIGGINS.-The word "citizen " occurred in clause 110, although it is now struck
out.
And
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Mr. OCONNOR.-The words in clause 110 do not define any right of citizenship; they
prevent certain restrictions upon it. I would point out to Dr. Quick that he is proposing to
give a power to regulate or describe rights of citizenship, when we really do not know at
present what is meant by a citizen. I confess I do not know what the honorable and learned
member means by that term. Does he mean only the political rights which you give to
every inhabitant of a state who is qualified to vote, or does he go beyond that, as the
American decisions have gone, and describe every person who is under the protection of
your laws as a citizen? The citizens, the persons under the protection of your laws, are not
the only persons who are entitled to take part in your elections or in your government, but
every person who resides in your community has a right to the protection of your laws and
to the protection of the laws of all the states, and has the right of access to your courts. If
you are going to define citizenship for the purpose of giving these rights, you must say
clearly what you mean by citizenship. You leave it to the Federal Parliament to say what
citizenship is; and I think there is a great deal in what Mr. Glynn says, that we must not
hand over to the Federal Parliament the power to cut down the rights the inhabitants of
these states have at the present time. If we do not know what you mean by citizenshipMr. ISAACS.-Commonwealth citizenship.
45
Mr. OCONNOR.-Exactly. But if we do not know what you mean by citizenshipwhether you mean to restrict it to political rights or to the right of protection under your
laws, which every person, whether a naturalized subject or a person for the time being
resident in one of these communities, possesses-we may drive the Federal Parliament into
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some difficulty, in which it is not at all unlikely that some cutting down of what we believe
to be the rights of citizenship may take place. I would point out that under the Bill the
power of dealing with aliens and immigration gives an abundant right to the
Commonwealth to protect itself, and, of course, the right of defining citizenship will
have to be exercised with due regard to any laws which might be made regarding the
position of aliens. I would ask my honorable friend (Dr. Quick) to say if he has considered
how far he means the Federal Parliament to go in the definition of citizenship, and what he
means by citizenship? Because, unless we have a clear idea of that, it seems to me that we
are handing over to the Federal Parliament something which is vague in the extreme, and
which might be misused.
10
And
Mr. SYMON.-Very likely not. What I want to know is, if there is anybody who will
come under the operation of the law, so as to be a citizen of the Commonwealth, who
would not also be entitled to be a citizen of the state? There ought to be no opportunity for
such discrimination as would allow a section of a state to remain outside the pale of the
Commonwealth, except with regard to legislation as to aliens. Dual citizenship exists,
but it is not dual citizenship of persons, it is dual citizenship in each person. There may
be two men-Jones and Smith-in one state, both of whom are citizens of the state, but
one only is a citizen of the Commonwealth. That would not be the dual citizenship
meant. What is meant is a dual citizenship in Mr. Trenwith and myself. That is to say,
I am a citizen of the state and I am also a citizen of the Commonwealth; that is the
dual citizenship. That does not affect the operation of this clause at all. But if we introduce
this clause, it is open to the whole of the powerful criticism of Mr. O'Connor and those
who say that it is putting on the face of the Constitution an unnecessary provision, and one
which we do not expect will be exercised adversely or improperly, and, therefore, it is
much better to be left out. Let us, in dealing with this question, be as careful as we
possibly, can that we do not qualify the citizenship of this Commonwealth in any way or
exclude anybody [start page 1764] from it, and let us do that with precision and clearness.
As a citizen of a state I claim the right to be a citizen of the Commonwealth. I do not
want to place in the hands of the Commonwealth Parliament, however much I may be
prepared to trust it, the right of depriving me of citizenship. I put this only as an
argument, because no one would anticipate such a thing, but the Commonwealth
Parliament might say that nobody possessed of less than 1,000 a year should be a citizen
of the Federation. You are putting that power in the hands of Parliament.
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Mr. HIGGINS.-Why not?

Mr. SYMON.-I would not put such a power in the hands of any Parliament. We must
rest this Constitution on a foundation that we understand, and we mean that every
citizen of a state shall be a citizen of the Commonwealth, and that the Commonwealth
shall have no right to withdraw, qualify, or restrict those rights of citizenship, except
with regard to one particular set of people who are subject to disabilities, as aliens,
and so on. Subject to that limitation, we ought not, under this Constitution, to hand over
our birth right as citizens to anybody, Federal Parliament or any one else, and I hope the
amendment will not be accepted.
40
And
45
Mr. BARTON.-If the honorable member's exclamation means more than I have
explained, then the best thing to do is to confide to the Commonwealth the right of dealing
with the lives, liberty, and property of all the persons residing in the Commonwealth,
independently of any law of any state. That is not intended, but that is what the expression
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"Trust the Federal Parliament" would mean unless it was limited by the consideration I
have laid down. I am sure Dr. Quick will see that he is using a word that has not a
definition in English constitutional law, and which is not otherwise defined in this
Constitution. He will be giving to the Commonwealth Parliament a power, not only of
dealing with the rights of citizenship, but of defining those rights even within the very
narrowest limits, so that the citizenship of a state might be worth nothing; or of
extending them in one direction, and narrowing them in another, so that a subject
living in one of the states would scarcely know whether he was on his head or his
heels. Under the Constitution we give subjects political rights to enable the Parliament to
legislate with regard to the suffrage, and pending that legislation we give the qualification
of electors. It is that qualification of electors which is really the sum and substance of
political liberty, and we have defined that. If we are going to give the Federal Parliament
power to legislate as it pleases with regard to Commonwealth citizenship, not having
defined it, we may be enabling the Parliament to pass legislation that would really
defeat all the principles inserted elsewhere in the Constitution, and, in fact, to play
ducks and drakes with it. That is not what is meant by the term "Trust the Federal
Parliament."
Mr. HIGGINS.-You give the Federal Parliament power to naturalize.
20
Mr. BARTON.-Yes; and in doing that we give them power to make persons subjects of
the British Empire. Have we not done enough? We allow them to naturalize aliens. That
is a power which, with the consent of the Imperial authority, has been carried into
legislation by the various colonies, and, of course, we cannot do less for the
Commonwealth than we have done for the colonies.
Mr. KINGSTON.-Such legislation is only good within the limits of each state.
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30
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Mr. BARTON.-Yes; and here we have a totally different position, because the actual
right which a person has as a British subject-the right of personal liberty and
protection under the laws-is secured by being a citizen of the states. It must be
recollected that the ordinary rights of liberty and protection by the laws are not
among the subjects confided to the Commonwealth. The administration of [start page
1766] the laws regarding property and personal liberty is still left with the states. We
do not propose to interfere with them in this Constitution. We leave that amongst the
reserved powers of the states, and, therefore, having done nothing to make insecure the
rights of property and the rights of liberty which at present exist in the states, and having
also said that the political rights exercisable in the states are to be exercisable also in the
Commonwealth in the election of representatives, we have done all that is necessary. It is
better to rest there than to plunge ourselves into what may be a sea of difficulties. We do
not know to what extent a power like this may be exercised, and we should pause before we
take any such leap in the dark.
Again;
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Mr. SYMON.-I would not put such a power in the hands of any Parliament. We must
rest this Constitution on a foundation that we understand, and we mean that every
citizen of a state shall be a citizen of the Commonwealth, and that the Commonwealth
shall have no right to withdraw, qualify, or restrict those rights of citizenship, except
with regard to one particular set of people who are subject to disabilities, as aliens,
and so on. Subject to that limitation, we ought not, under this Constitution, to hand over
our birth right as citizens to anybody, Federal Parliament or any one else, and I hope the
amendment will not be accepted.
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Also
The administration of [start page 1766] the laws regarding property and personal
liberty is still left with the states.
As was made clear by Mr quick;
5
I took occasion to indicate that in creating a federal citizenship, and in defining the
qualifications of that federal citizenship, we were not in any way interfering with our
position as subjects of the British Empire. It would be beyond the scope of the
Constitution to do that. We might be citizens of a city, citizens of a colony, or citizens
of a Commonwealth, but we would still be, subjects of the Queen.
10
Therefore, the Constitution never provided any constitutional powers for the Commonwealth of
Australia to legislate as to CITIZENSHIP.
15
As the Commonwealth of Australia was provided with powers within Subsection 51(xix) of the
constitution to naturalize aliens to become British nationals and the Nationalization Act
was enacted after Federation then clearly the powers to naturalize an alien to become a British
national is not diminish. In 1948, the Federal parliament then replaced the Naturalization Act
with the Australian citizenship Act 1948 by this STEALING the legislative powers of the
States states in regard of citizenship by purporting that there was an Australian citizenship as
an Australian nationality.
Barton J,
20
the parliament cannot give the word a meaning

not warranted by s73 of the Constitution.
Commonwealth v Brisbane Milling Co. Ltd. (1916) 21 C.L.R. 559; A.L.R. 272.
If the Commonwealth of Australia never had any constitutional powers to declare/define
citizenship then what is the meaning of the Certificate of Australian Citizenship realty?
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If Australian citizenship is purported to be Australian nationality then this must fail as Subsection
51(xix) provided constitutional powers for the Commonwealth of Australia to naturalize aliens
to become British nationals! Without any Section 128 referendum this cannot be changed to
some purported Australian nationality.
We either have a Constitution or not! We use it as was intended by the framers of the
Constitution, modified as have been provided for by the successful referendums or we have no
constitution at all and no federation exist!
In view that the British parliament declared Australians to be foreigners can this then alter the
application of the constitution, one may ask?
Constitutional law cannot be amended by mere implication but must be amended by appropriate
legislation. In the case of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) Section
128 exclude the British Parliament to amend the constitution as it can only be amended by the
consent of the people, as expressed by a Section 128 referendum. Hence, regardless if the British
parliament did or didnt pass legislation to declare Australians foreigners the only way to
resolve the matter was and remains to have the Constitution amended to allow the
Commonwealth of Australia to naturalize aliens to become Australian nationals.
The following part of transcript indicates how the High Court of Australia itself is confusing
citizenship with nationality.
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Dang, Ex parte - Re MIMA M118/2001 (18 April 2002)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M25 of 2001
5
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 18 APRIL 2002, AT 10.17 AM
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KIRBY J: Your clients were not British subjects.

MR MAXWELL: That is so. If I might move immediately to the question of what
Patterson decided. In our respectful submission, what Patterson decided was this, that
allegiance, not citizenship, is the touchstone for determining alien status.
KIRBY J: There is only one reference to citizenship in the Constitution, is there not, and
that is the disqualification that was considered in Sue v Hill?
MR MAXWELL: Yes, your Honour.
KIRBY J: There is no other reference to the concept and, indeed, we did not have a
Citizenship Act until quite late in the history of the Commonwealth.
MR MAXWELL: One of the critical aspects which comes through clearly in the
judgments, both the dissenting and the majority judgments in Patterson, is the point your
Honour has just adverted to: alien is a concept of our Constitution, citizenship is a concept
of our statute law. Your Honours Justices Gummow and Hayne in the joint judgment put in
these terms the proposition advanced by the prosecutor in Patterson, namely, at paragraph
[223]:
alienage and citizenship . . . do not occupy the relevant universe of discourse That, we would respectfully adopt, though your Honours disagreed in the result, as being
the proposition which the majority did endorse. That is to say, it does not follow that
because a person is a non-citizen he or she is, by definition, an alien because you must be
one or the other.
What Patterson held and why Nolan had to be overruled was that there is a category of
non-citizen non-alien. That is what your Honours held by majority Taylor was. He was not
a citizen and he was not an alien.
GUMMOW J: I should make clear to you I do not regard that matter as closed.
MR MAXWELL: I am indebted to your Honour.
GUMMOW J: It seems to me absolutely fundamental.
MR MAXWELL: It is absolutely fundamental and, in our respectful submission, there can
be no conclusion, with respect, other than that is what this Court found because Mr - - GUMMOW J: I am not so sure about that. The Solicitor-General goes into all of this.
MR MAXWELL: Your Honour, we note with some surprise that less than a year after that
decision was handed down, the Commonwealth is inviting this Court to reopen it and
overrule it if it says what we say it says.
GUMMOW J: The question really is whether it should have overruled Nolan. Now, I will
not hold you up.
MR MAXWELL: Your Honour, in our respectful submission, this Court did overrule
Nolan. Four Justices of the Court addressed the question whether it should be overruled
and each of them decided for reasons given that it should and it is no longer the law in this
country, in our respectful submission, and we will go further and say that necessarily Pochi
was at best left under a considerable cloud, if not necessarily overruled by that overruling.
GUMMOW J: It seems to me what I was putting to you really can be put to one side
because you have to go further in this case, and that is the real point.
MR MAXWELL: Indeed, your Honour. Plainly enough - - KIRBY J: As I understand your argument, it is that until Taylor there was clear authority
that there was a simple clear criterion for alienage, non-citizen.
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MR MAXWELL: Exactly so.
KIRBY J: After Taylor, whatever is the criterion, the base has shifted.
KIRBY J: It did not have to shift further than British subjects to resolve the issue of
Patterson.
MR MAXWELL: That is so.
KIRBY J: But you say, having shifted the basis, a new, stable basis must be found and
therefore this case presents the obligation to find that new, stable basis.
GUMMOW J: And what is the stable basis?
MR MAXWELL: The starting point is that the obligation of allegiance can come into
existence between a person and the Queen of Australia otherwise than by the taking out of
citizenship. The next question is, by what criteria is the establishment of that obligation to
be determined - I am sorry, your Honour?
GAUDRON J: You say "can". Did Patterson go further than say at a certain time it could
come into operation by that method in respect of a certain category of people?
MR MAXWELL: That is so, but - - GAUDRON J: Yes. Well, you have to go beyond that to say that since, when? At all
relevant times it has been possible and it continues to be possible?
MR MAXWELL: Your Honour, all I need to establish is that at the date of the relevant
decisions the obligation of allegiance had been assumed by these individuals. It is quite
separate, of course, from the discussion which was necessarily engaged in for Patterson
about the evolution of the Crown in right of Australia and its separation from Britain.
These are, plainly, individuals who have never been British subjects. This is a different
case. But as his Honour Justice Kirby has put, we will be inviting the Court to explore this
category of non - - GUMMOW J: We do not set off on exploration tasks. We respond to submissions and we
are trying to find what your submission is.
MR MAXWELL: Of course, your Honour.
GUMMOW J: You can tantalise us with this notion of a stable basis. The question is:
what is it?
MR MAXWELL: In these cases - - GUMMOW J: Bearing in mind that Patterson was, on one view of it, all about the
changing nature of the British Commonwealth, to use that expression.
MR MAXWELL: Your Honour, we put the stable basis on three bases in these cases as
set out in our submission. First, we say that each of these individuals renounced his
allegiance to his country of birth by fleeing from a regime which could not guarantee him
protection.
GUMMOW J: How do notions of allegiance work with republican systems of
government? As I understand it, the whole notion of citizenship dates back to the American
and French Revolutions, where they had to replace notions of allegiance which were
monarchical with something else and they devised the notion of citizenship. These
gentlemen never owed allegiance to any sovereign, did they?
MR MAXWELL: No, though your Honour will - - KIRBY J: Although they would have been born during the reign of Prince Sihanouk.
Cambodia was not a separate colony of France; it was a protectorate. So I think that is
something we would not know without some detail.
GUMMOW J: That is right.
MR MAXWELL: But, your Honour, in our respectful submission, as a matter of principle
this will not turn on whether a person came from a country which was a monarchy or a
republic. The concept of allegiance - - p170
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GUMMOW J: The point I am trying to make to you is that notions of allegiance come out
of English medieval feudalism. That is where it comes from - monarchical feudalism.
MR MAXWELL: With respect, we fully appreciate that. As your Honours in the lengthy
joint judgment explained, the concept has developed very significantly since the original
notion of personal loyalty to a lord. It became, and it was declared in the Court of Queen's
Bench in the 1880s, as your Honours pointed out, that it changed from a personal
obligation or an obligation to the sovereign in his or her personal capacity to an obligation
to the sovereign in his or her political capacity. That is just one respect in which the
discussion about allegiance in the 21st century is a different discussion from that which it
would have been under more confined notions.
HAYNE J: And it is pointed up by your proposition that each renounced allegiance to the
country of his birth because the regime of the day would not protect him.
HAYNE J: But is allegiance concerned with allegiance to the government? Is it more
abstracted a notion than allegiance to whatever regime is in power?
GAUDRON J: There is a further question of course too and that is, by whose law is this
renunciation to be determined? That was addressed in Sykes and the general principle of
international law is that that is determined by the laws of the country of which the person
was a citizen or to which he or she owed allegiance.
GAUDRON J: So it is not a simple question, I should have thought.
MR MAXWELL: No, and it is not necessary for our argument, with respect, that there
have been no renunciation.
GAUDRON J: Well - - MR MAXWELL: It is not. It happens to be the fact and it makes our cases a fortiori, but
what is the critical question is whether it can be said of the person that he has assumed the
obligation of allegiance and our submission puts it that it - - GAUDRON J: And you put that as a one-way traffic as well.
MR MAXWELL: Well, with respect, no we do not. We gratefully accept the analysis of
their Honours in the joint dissenting judgment, which points out that changes in the
relationship of allegiance can occur either by the joint act of the parties to it, the subject
and the sovereign, or by the unilateral act of either, which, apart from anything else,
enables us to put to one side the old notion that allegiance was perpetual and the naturalborn subject could never give it up. The concept of naturalisation scotched that notion 100
years ago. It can be given up by a formal act. We submit that one would expect to find a
parallel notion of renunciation by conduct, but we accept - and our learned friends say just
because you have renounced your citizenship of another country does not mean you have
become a citizen of Australia. Well, we accept that. We do not assert that the renunciation
somewhere else makes you a subject of the Queen of Australia. There needs to be an act or
a course of conduct of which it can be said that this person enjoys the protection of the
Queen of Australia and owes her obligations of allegiance.
GLEESON CJ: At which stage did your clients cease to owe allegiance to Cambodia or
Vietnam respectively?
MR MAXWELL: At the time they sought refuge in refugee camps or, alternatively, upon
the grant of permanent residence visas to each of them, enabling them to come from the
refugee camp to Australia. At that point, we have argued in our submission that the selfdescription as a refugee is the explanation or the manifestation of the renunciation.
GLEESON CJ: They are interesting alternatives, in practice, because if the former is
correct, they would have been in the same situation even if they had been refused visas.
MR MAXWELL: That is so. Again, they were granted visas and that means that - and we
will take your Honours in due course to the findings of fact in the Tribunal in each case each of these persons was a refugee at the time and, as I understand it, there is no dispute
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about that. We do not say that an application for refugee status was made and determined
in Australia. There is no evidence that that occurred. Nor is there any doubt but that they
were refugees in the sense in which that term is understood - defined in the Convention.
Your Honours will see in the material a question arises before the Tribunal "whether the
protection obligations which Australia owed under the Convention still obtained as at the
date of the Tribunal review?" Held: "No they don't. Conditions have changed in Cambodia
or Vietnam. The protection obligation does not subsist."
To come back to your Honour's question. The assertion of refugee status is the act of
renunciation because it is a statement that, "I cannot rely on the sovereign government of
my country to protect me." Indeed, that language is used in the Convention itself.
GLEESON CJ: Why did they need visas? I wondered if it was because they were aliens.
MR MAXWELL: Well, they otherwise had no right to enter Australia.
GUMMOW J: You seem to be asserting they did. Of course HYPERLINK
"http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/c167/" the Constitution - - MR MAXWELL: As a matter of international law - - GUMMOW J: Forget about international law, because HYPERLINK
"http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/c167/" the Constitution operated in
some magical way.
MR MAXWELL: No, your Honour. We conceded before Justice Hayne that these people
had not - I think we conceded they were aliens at the point of arrival. We will seek to
qualify that concession by the protection allegiance argument we have made in our reply.
We start with the proposition that Australia owed obligations of protection to these
refugees under the 1951 Convention. At that point there was an acceptance of what is
described in the Refugee Convention in these terms, and it is in the material, a person is,
"unable or . . . unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country".
What is helpful in this analysis, in our respectful submission, is what Sir John Salmond, in
the Law Quarterly Review article that we will take your Honours to, and the House of
Lords in Joyce refer to as "the reciprocal obligations of protection by the sovereign to the
subject and allegiance by the subject to the sovereign."
KIRBY J: Could I just ask a factual matter, that is partly a legal matter. Was there any
impediment to your clients becoming naturalised Australian citizens?
MR MAXWELL: Not that I am aware of, your Honour, no. No application was made. At
a certain point they may have, by their criminal convictions, become unable to satisfy the
"good character" requirement.
KIRBY J: Does one draw any inference at all from the fact that in the interval between
their arrival as children and their evictions, that they could have signified their allegiance to
the Queen of Australia and the people of Australia by becoming citizens but omitted,
failed, refused to do so?
MR MAXWELL: In our respectful submission, no. One draws no inference because - and
this comes back to the fundamental point - the assumption of citizenship - we have put this
in terms in the outline - is a sufficient condition of allegiance but it is not a necessary
condition, and that is what Patterson held. If that is correct, then the non-taking out of
citizenship does not disqualify a person from being a subject of the Queen of Australia.
GAUDRON J: But are we not a little bit off the track here? From a constitutional point of
view we are concerned with aliens and non-aliens. At least in the case of persons who are
not and never have been British subjects is it not the case that it is well within the
legislative power of the Parliament to decide and define who are and who are not aliens?
CALLINAN J: That is what Mr Justice Barton said in Ferrando v Pearce.
GAUDRON J: But is that not the case, that it has legislative power to define who are and
who are not aliens?
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MR MAXWELL: Yes, but, with respect, to exclude from a statutory definition of aliens let me put that differently - to include within a statutory definition of aliens someone who
is not is beyond power.
GLEESON CJ: But if granting a visa to someone produces the result that they are not an
alien, then the entire scheme of the Migration Act 1997 has miscarried, has it not? Its long
title is it is "An Act relating to the entry into, and presence in, Australia of aliens, and the
departure or deportation from Australia of aliens". Visas can be cancelled, can they not?
10
By the reasoning of the Framers of the Constitution (the Delegates to the Constitution
Conventions) a subject to the Crown was anyone who was subjected to the laws of the Crown
regardless if they were aliens or not.
Shaw v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

15
HYPERLINK "http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high_ct/2003/72.html"
[2003] HCA
72
9 December 2003
B99/2002
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10. However, contrary to the submissions for the applicant, the result of such a consideration
of his position is his classification as an alien for the purposes of HYPERLINK
"http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/c167/s51.html" s 51 (xix) of the
Constitution. Much of the applicant's argument proceeded from the premise that, because
the expression "British subject" could be applied to him, he was not an alien. That
premise is flawed. First, "British subject" is not a constitutional expression; it is a
statutory expression. Secondly, and more fundamentally, if "British subject" was being
used as a synonym for "subject of the Queen", an expression which is found in the
Constitution, that usage would assume that there was at the time of federation, and there
remains today, a constitutional and political unity between the UK and Australia which
100 years of history denies.
Hansard 2-3-1898 Constitutional Convention Debates
Mr. BARTON.- I did not say that. I say that our real status is as subjects, and that we are
alike subjects of the British Crown.
Mr. MUNRO:
. I am proud of being a citizen of the great British empire, and shall never fail to be
proud of that position.
Mr. HOLDER:
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because I take it that the legal bonds which bind us to the mother-country, to the
great British Empire,
Mr. BARTON:
The association of the Queen with the action of the commonwealth is distinct, and is
firmly embedded in the whole bill. If that is done, there can be no association of the
idea of republicanism with this bill.
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Mr. BARTON.-Yes; and here we have a totally different position, because the actual
right which a person has as a British subject-the right of personal liberty and
protection under the laws-is secured by being a citizen of the States. It must be
recollected that the ordinary rights of liberty and protection by the laws are not among the
subjects confided to the Commonwealth.
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Dr. QUICK.we were not in any way interfering with our position as subjects of the British Empire.
It would be beyond the scope of the Constitution to do that. We might be citizens of a
city, citizens of a colony, or citizens of a Commonwealth, but we would still be,
subjects of the Queen.
Mr. BARTON.We are subjects in our constitutional relation to the empire, not citizens. "Citizens" is an
undefined term, and is not known to the Constitution. The word "subjects" expresses the
relation between citizens of the empire and the Crown.
Sir GEORGE TURNER.-Is a naturalized alien a subject?
20
Mr. BARTON.-He would be a citizen under the meaning of this clause.

Sir GEORGE TURNER.-Suppose you say "subject" without definition, would that
include naturalized aliens?
Mr. BARTON.-Yes. Dr. Quick's definition is: Persons resident in the Commonwealth,
either natural-born or naturalized subjects of the Queen, and if they are subject to no
disabilities imposed by the Parliament they shall be citizens of the Commonwealth. Why
not use the word "subject," and avoid the necessity of this definition?
25
And
Mr. OCONNOR.-Exactly. It has two meanings, but we are only dealing now with
the one meaning-the general meaning. Mr. Isaacs' reference shows the danger that
might be incurred by using the word "citizen," because it might have the restrictive
meaning the last decision imposes. All we mean now is a member of the community or
of the nation, and the accurate description of a member of the community under our
circumstances is a subject of the Queen resident within the Commonwealth."
30
Mr. SYMON.-A person for the time being under the law of the Commonwealth.
35
Mr. OCONNOR.-A person for the time being entitled to the benefits of the law of
the Commonwealth.
And
Mr. BARTON (New South Wales).-If it is a fact that citizens, as they are called, of each
state are also citizens of the Commonwealth, there may be some little doubt as to whether
this is not providing for practically the same thing.
40
Mr. WISE.-No, there may be territories that is what I want to provide for.
Mr. BARTON.-In other portions of the Bill we use the words "parts of the
Commonwealth" as including territories, so that the object of Mr. Wise would be met
by using the words "citizens of every part of the Commonwealth" or "each part of
the Commonwealth."
45
And
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Mr. BARTON.We are subjects in our constitutional relation to the empire, not citizens. "Citizens" is
an undefined term, and is not known to the Constitution. The word "subjects"
expresses the relation between citizens of the empire and the Crown.
5
Sir GEORGE TURNER.-Is a naturalized alien a subject?

Mr. BARTON.-He would be a citizen under the meaning of this clause.
Sir GEORGE TURNER.-Suppose you say "subject" without definition, would that
include naturalized aliens?
Mr. BARTON.-Yes. Dr. Quick's definition is: Persons resident in the Commonwealth,
either natural-born or naturalized subjects of the Queen, and if they are subject to no
disabilities imposed by the Parliament they shall be citizens of the Commonwealth. Why
not use the word "subject," and avoid the necessity of this definition?
10
Dr. QUICK.-This definition does not interfere with the term "subject" in its wider relation
as a member of the empire or subject of the Queen.
15
Mr. BARTON.-No, but the definition of "citizen" as a natural-born or naturalized

subject of the Queen is co-extensive with the ordinary definition of a subject or citizen in
America. The moment be is under any disability imposed by the Parliament be loses his
rights.
And
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Dr. QUICK.-The regulation would have to specify the ground of disability.

Mr. BARTON.-Yes; but my honorable friend says not under any disability imposed by
the Parliament. Would not the difficulty be that if he were under any slight disability for
regulative purposes, all his rights of citizenship under the Commonwealth would be lost?
Mr. KINGSTON.-There might be a special disability on minors.
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Mr. BARTON.-That might be one of the disabilities. Of course here the disabilities
as to minors would not matter much, but I would like to put this consideration to Dr.
Quick, that if we use the term "subject," or a person subject to the laws, which is a wider
term, we shall avoid the necessity for a definition of "citizen." You might say a subject or
resident being the subject of the Queen.
And
Mr. SYMON.-There is no man in Australia who is more profoundly versed in
constitutional law than Mr. Isaacs, and he knows that every point and every question has
been the subject of more or less debate and discussion, and will be until the end of time.
The words "subject," "person," and "citizen" can be made subjects of controversy
at all times if occasion requires it. At the same time, it does not affect the principle
that there should be a definition of "citizen," either in the form suggested by Dr.
Quick or by Mr. Barton.
35
And
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Mr. ISAACS (Victoria).-I am afraid that the amendment is far too wide, unless we say
that the disabilities imposed by Parliament may extend to birth and race. This would,
notwithstanding the rights conferred under clause 52, deprive Parliament of the
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power of excluding Chinese, Lascars, or Hindoos who happened to be British
subjects.
And
Mr. GLYNN.I would like to mention, in connexion with what Mr. Isaacs said as to aliens, that this
provision would not interfere in the slightest degree in the way of preventing aliens
from coming in, because it is only when the aliens get inside the Commonwealth that
this provision is to apply to them. The decision of the Privy Council in the case of Ah Toy
v. Musgrove was that an alien had no right to land here, but that decision does not affect
his citizenship after he has landed.
10
And
Mr. WISE (New South Wales).-My mind has wavered very much during this debate. I
have come to the conclusion that my original suggestion was wrong, that the best form
of all in which the original amendment could be moved is [start page 1793] that in which it
was proposed by Mr. Symon, and that then no definition such as is suggested by Dr. Quick
will be really required, because, if we allow each state to make its own standard of
citizenship, we shall reserve all the rights of the states, and obviate all the difficulties
contemplated by Mr. Trenwith, by retaining to each state the right to determine the
qualification of its own citizens. And then we will make a provision that is necessary as
part of the Federal Constitution, that when a man has acquired citizenship in one state he
shall be entitled to the right of citizenship in the other states.
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And
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Dr. COCKBURN (South Australia).-If the word "citizen" simply means resident or
inhabitant, why should we go to all this trouble about it? If it means inhabitant, what
is the use of saying the inhabitant of one state going to another state shall be an
inhabitant of that other state? It seems to me that if you are going to use the word
"citizen" in the sense of being equal to resident or inhabitant, and it is to have no
other meaning such as has always been attached to it, we had better leave out the
clause.
30
And
Mr. OCONNOR (New South Wales).-I would suggest that Mr. Symon should accept the
amendment suggested by Mr. Barton, so that his clause shall read35
Every subject of the Queen resident in any state or part of the Commonwealth shall be
entitled to all privileges and immunities of subjects resident in other states or parts of the
Commonwealth.
I am altogether in favour of the principle of Mr. Symon's amendment; but the word
"citizen" creates a difficulty. If, instead of the word "citizen," we use the words "Every
subject of the Queen resident in a state," it really means the same thing. The meaning to
be given to the word "citizen" in Mr. Symon's amendment is not the narrow limited
meaning of the citizen who can exercise the franchise, but it is the broad general
meaning which the word has been held to have under the United States Constitution.
It has been decided there that the word "citizen" has, [start page 1796] in a general
and wide sense, this meaning:-
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In its broad sense the word is synonymous with subject and inhabitant, and is
understood as conveying the idea of membership of the nation, and nothing more.
And
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Dr. COCKBURN.-But the present proposal if carried would raise an initial difficulty in
framing special laws. It might be urged that it was necessary to discriminate between
residents who are subjects of the Queen and those who are not, and the amendment
would introduce an element which would give rise to a great deal of trouble in the
future.
Mr. HIGGINS.-You want to keep both classes out.
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Dr. COCKBURN.-We desire always to deal with Asiatics on broad lines, whether
they are subjects of the Queen or not; and in South Australia, and, I believe, other
colonies, those lines of distinction are obliterated. In South Australia we make no
difference between Chinese from Hong Kong and those from other parts of China.
That, I think, is the most effective way of dealing with this matter.
Again;
We are subjects in our constitutional relation to the empire, not citizens. "Citizens" is
an undefined term, and is not known to the Constitution. The word "subjects"
expresses the relation between citizens of the empire and the Crown.
Clearly, the Framers made clear it is not the relationship between a subject and some Queen, but
more significantly the relationship between the subjects as citizens of the empire and the
Crown. One must therefore be a citizen of the empire to have a relationship with the Crown.
If one is not a subject of the Crown residing as a citizen in the empire then no relationship exist.
This, the High Court of Australia never addressed as such. It simply sought to bypass this kind of
definition, being it unaware of it all together or not. But, the Queen of Australia is no Queen
recognised by the British Crown, or can be Queen of the Empire. It is a fictitious name and title
that can hold no water, so to say, to issue proclamation in that title, as to do so would create a
fictitious appointment not worth the paper it is written upon.
To get a bit of an understanding about internal affairs and external affairs the following may
be considered;
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Dr. COCKBURN: I should like to justify the vote that I shall have to give on this matter,
because it will be rather dissonant with the votes I have been giving throughout the sittings
of the Convention. I shall vote for the clause as it stands, and also for the amendment
intended to be proposed by the hon. member, Mr. Gordon, because I take it to be essential
to federation. It is the very definition of a federation that, as regards external affairs, the
federation shall be one state, and only have one means of communication, and in regard to
internal affairs the federation should be many statesMr. GORDON: These are not internal affairs!
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Dr. COCKBURN: These are internal affairs, and it is one of the principles of federation
that, in internal affairs, there should be complete autonomy. In local affairs, why do you
want to go outside the state at all? For the alteration of the constitution of a state, why
should you go outside the boundary of that state?
Effectively, external affairs referred to in the constitution deals with nations/territories not
within the Commonwealth of Australia and/or under the British parliament. The Delegates did
refer to the Home Office when referring to contact with the British government, as it is the
home of the Commonwealth of Australia, which exist only because of the States (formally
colonies) being granted Letters Patents to have their own limited self government under British
law.
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Mr. BARTON: The hon. member who is in the chair will be able to inform you. He said:
10
I do not think there is in this Convention a stronger advocate of State rights and State
interests than I am; but still I strongly support the clause as it stands, for it seems to me that
one of the very fundamental ideas of a Federation is that, so far an all outside nations are
concerned, the Federation shall be one nation, that we shall be Australia to the outside
world, in which expression. I include Great Britain; that we shall speak, if not with one
voice, at all events, through one channel of communication to the Imperial Government;
that is, as it has been put, we shall not have seven voices expressing seven different
opinions, but that Her Majesty's Government in Great Britain shall communicate to
Her Majestys Government in Australia through one channel of communication only.
Again;
15
Her Majesty's Government in Great Britain shall communicate to Her Majestys

Government in Australia
It is clear that the Framers of the Constitution referred to the one and only person and any
purported title of a legal fiction of Queen of Australia cannot amend or purport to amend the
Constitution, or the application of the Constitution.
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Mr. BARTON (New South Wales).-The Drafting Committee could not interpret the
intentions of the Convention, excepting in so far as they found them expressed in the
Bill, in the amendments, or in the debates. We have endeavoured to give effect simply
to what the Convention have said and done.
And
Sir RICHARD BAKER (South Australia).When we consider how vast the importance is that every word of the Constitution
should be correct, that every clause should fit into every other clause; when we
consider the great amount of time, trouble, and expense it would take to make any
alteration, and that, if we have not made our intentions clear, we shall undoubtedly
have laid the foundation of lawsuits of a most extensive nature, which will harass the
people of United Australia and create dissatisfaction with our work, it must be evident
that too much care has not been exercised.
END QUOTE ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2 (MY UNCONTEST APPEALS- BY ALL ATTONOR GENERALS!) County Court of
Victoria, Case numbers T01567737 & Q10897630 ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2
QUOTE ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2 (MY UNCONTEST APPEALS- BY ALL ATTONOR GENERALS!) County Court of Victoria,
Case numbers T01567737 & Q10897630 ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2
40
Whatever the argument might be of those seeking to advocate that the Commonwealth of
Australia is an independent nation, the truth is that constitutionally it never is and never can be.
Mr. SYMON (South Australia).-I beg to move-
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I wish to clear away the misconception in the first place that I have any objection whatever
to the word "Commonwealth," or to the use of the word "Commonwealth," in this Bill. I
have no objection to that where it is confined to the expression of the political Union. In
the preamble honorable members will find that what we desire to do is to unite in one
indissoluble Federal Commonwealth-that is the political Union-"under the Crown of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and under the Constitution hereby
established." Honorable members will therefore see that the application of the word
Commonwealth is to the political Union which is sought to be established. It is not
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179
intended there to have any relation whatever to the name of the country or nation which we
are going to create under that Union. The second part of the preamble goes on to say that it
is expedient to make provision for the admission of other colonies into the Commonwealth.
That is, for admission into this political Union, which is not a republic, which is not to
be called a dominion, kingdom, or empire, but is to be a Union by the name of
"Commonwealth," and I do not propose to interfere with that in the slightest degree.
The first clause says-This Act maybe cited as the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution
Act." I assent to all that. Then comes clause 3, which says it shall be lawful for the Queen,
by and with the advice of Her Majesty's Most Honorable Privy Council, to declare by
proclamation that, on and after a day therein appointed, not being later than one year after
the passing of this Act, the people of the colonies enumerated shall be united in a Federal
Constitution under the name of-I say it ought to be "of Australia." Why do we want to put
in "the Commonwealth of Australia"? We are there by our Constitution giving the name to
our country, and, to the united people who are to be established as a nation under the
Constitution. By what name, I would like to ask honorable members, will they call this
Federal Union? It will be called by the name Australia, whether we like it or not.
Again;
That is, for admission into this political Union, which is not a republic, which is not to
be called a dominion, kingdom, or empire, but is to be a Union by the name of
"Commonwealth," and I do not propose to interfere with that in the slightest degree.
The Commonwealth of Australia is a LIMITED POLITICAL UNION by the Colonies (now
States) As like the EUROPEAN UNION is in Europe.
No one would seek to argue that the European Union is a country. Yet, it doesnt matter if one is
a British national, a Dutch national, Frenchman, German or else they are all citizens of the
European Union
Citizenship is not limited to the nationality of the person but by the territory in which the person
resides that forms part of the European Union.
No one could dream of the European Union to become some Monarchy, Republic or Dominion.
Likewise, the Commonwealth of Australia likewise cannot be a Monarchy, Republic or
Dominion. It is a federation out of the States.
The States themselves can perhaps become independent in time and then assume to become a
Republic or Monarchy but not while they remain dominions. If the states cannot become
Monarchies or Republics in the current climate then their Agent, so to say, the Commonwealth of
Australia hardly can take on some different constitutional position.
The term citizenship was not at all associated with nationality but rather covered any
subject of the Queen residing within the Commonwealth of Australia or for that the continent
Australia.
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The terms Australian citizen, Australian citizens , Australian citizenship,

Commonwealth citizens, federal citizen, citizen of the Commonwealth were used ongoing
by the Framers of the Constitution, as shown below, and as such were terms not as to
nationality but in regard of citizenship as being a resident in the colonies (now States) and the
Commonwealth of Australia. Therefore any constitutionalist, as I am, is or should be aware that
the term Australian citizenship cannot be held to relate to nationality. Neither that there can be
an Australian nationality merely because some judges happen to desire to make such a
declaration as the proper powers to legislate for this is to follow the procedures within Section
128 of the Constitution.
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13-02-1890 Re; Australian citizen
13-03-1891 Re; Australian citizens
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Re; dual citizenship
26-03-1897 Re; citizen of the Commonwealth
29-03-1897 Re; Dual citizenship
30-03-1897 Re; federal citizen
Re; citizen of the Commonwealth
15-04-1897 Re; Dual citizenship
Re; Commonwealth citizenship
28-01-1898 Re; Australian citizenship
Re; Commonwealth citizens
Re; federal citizenship
40
Such as Hansard 8-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates
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Mr. SYMON.-Yes. Mr. Wise asked why should New South Wales or Victoria-to take a case
which is extremely unlikely to occur-prohibit a citizen of the neighbouring colony from
acquiring property in the legislating colony, or only allow him to acquire it under adverse
conditions? But why not? The whole control of the lands of the state is left in that state. The
state can impose what conditions it pleases-conditions of residence, or anything else-and I
am not aware that a state has surrendered the control of the particular administration of
its own lands, or of anything that is left to it for the exercise of its power and the
administration of its affairs. I would much prefer, if there is to be a clause introduced, to have
the amendment suggested by Tasmania, subject to one modification, omitting the words-"and all
other persons owing allegiance to the Queen." That would re-open the whole question as to
whether an alien, not admitted to the citizenship here-a person who, under the provisions
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with regard to immigration, is prohibited from entering our territory, or is only allowed to
enter it under certain conditions-would be given the same privileges and immunities as a
citizen of the Commonwealth. Those words, it seems to me, should come out, and we should
confine the operation of this amendment so as to secure the rights of citizenship to the citizens
of the Commonwealth. I think, therefore, that with some modification the amendment suggested
by Tasmania would be a proper one to adopt.
And
Mr. KINGSTON.-I say we are creating a Commonwealth in which I hope there will be a
federal citizenship, and I shall be glad indeed to see the powers of the Federal Parliament
enlarged to enable that body to legislate, not only with reference to naturalization and
aliens, but also with reference to the rights and privileges of federal citizenship.
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An HONORABLE: MEMBER.-What is the meaning of citizenship?

Mr. KINGSTON.-It is not defined here, but it ought to be defined in the Constitution, or
else we ought to give power to the Federal Parliament to define it. And, after having
defined what shall constitute Australian citizenship for the purposes of the
Commonwealth, we ought to carefully prevent any state legislating in such a way as to
deprive any citizen of the Commonwealth of any privileges which citizenship of the
Commonwealth confers within its borders. I have the honour to come from a state which
has already adopted a system of absentee taxation, but I do not hesitate to say, speaking on
my own individual account, that I think the continuance of that system, applied to citizens
of the Commonwealth resident in other states of the Commonwealth, would be a great
mistake and an unfederal act.
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Mr. HIGGINS.-If a rich South Australian went to live in Tasmania, on account of the
cool climate, would you allow the imposition of the absentee tax on him?
25
Mr. KINGSTON.-I do not think it ought to be imposed on him.

And
An HONORABLE MEMBER.-How would that affect a tax on absentees?
40
Mr. WISE.-It would give full power to impose a tax on absentees outside the
Commonwealth, but not within it. There [start page 675] should be no absentees within the
Commonwealth after federation. I do not see, how, after federation, a man can be regarded
as an absentee at Sydney when he lives in Melbourne. If we are to have federation, the idea
that when a man moves from one part of the Commonwealth into another he becomes an
absentee, or ceases to be an Australian, is one that must vanish, and we ought, as far as our
Constitution will permit us, to do everything to make it vanish quickly. It is a survival of
the old idea that there is a distinctive citizenship in a Victorian, and a distinctive
citizenship in a New South Wales man. That is the idea which I am endeavouring to
destroy by supporting the amendment of Tasmania, that Australian citizenship, and that
alone, shall be recognised in every part of the Federation. The way to secure that is to
provide in the clearest terms, as Tasmania suggests, that no local Parliament can have any
authority to, in any way, abridge the citizenship of an Australian.
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Mr. REID (New South Wales).-I really think that the constant attempts which are being
made to interfere with the rights of the states, in matters which are left to them expressly, is
becoming quite alarming. There are a number of general words already in this Constitution
which, I fear, may be used so as to almost destroy the independent powers of legislation of
the states, with reference to every conceivable subject that they have left to them.
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182
For the above, and what already has been placed before on file in previous proceedings the issue
therefore is that if the Commonwealth of Australia holds that Australian citizenship purports
some kind of Australian nationality then this is ULTRA VIRES, as no such constitutional
powers were granted by the Imperial parliament and neither by any Section 128 referendum.
Section 51(xix) only provides for naturalization of aliens to be made British nationals.
The problem with this is that if the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 purports to be Australian
nationality then this likewise is unconstitutional and so ULTRA VIRES.
If therefore the Constitution of the State of Victoria relies upon the Australian Citizenship Act
1948 as to provide State franchise then this is also ULTRA VIRES, as an the State cannot rely
upon an unconstitutional enactment.
If the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 is purporting to grant citizenship as to refer to political
rights then that too would be unconstitutional, and so ULTRA VIRES.
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If the AUSTRALIAN CITIZENSHIP referred to in the Australian Citizenship Act 1948

in fact is and remains to mean that a person is naturalized to be a British national, then in any
case it is ULTRA VIRES where it purports to define/declare the nationality of any person born
within the States, as any subject born within the realm of the King (Queen) is automatically a
national and so a subject of the British Crown. Any reliance by the State Constitution to allow for
franchise based upon a unconstitutional provision in that regard also remains ULTRA VIRES.
25
It ought to be kept in mind that in 1948 most likely no one really has a slightest understanding
and perception as to what was constitutionally appropriate. Whatever was enacted at the time by
ill conceived perceptions cannot make it lawful. It remains ULTRA VIRES for so far it is
beyond constitutional powers or exceeding constitutional powers.
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35
As the Framers of the Constitution made clear that the Commonwealth of Australia could put a
disability to any alien upon naturalization to obtain citizenship, this by legislation any race is
subjected to provided within subsection 51(xxvi) of the Constitution or otherwise being limited,
such as that a person naturalized cannot obtain citizenship within, say, 2 years of naturalization,
then a Certificate of Australian Citizenship cannot be granted to anyone. For example, since
the 1967 referendum that provides for Aboriginals to be dealt with under the race provisions of
Section 51(xxvi) constitutionally not a single Aboriginal can have citizenship involving franchise
as they are constitutionally barred once the Commonwealth of Australia enacted legislation
within its race constitutional powers.
Likewise, while the race powers did not give the Commonwealth of Australia any powers to
legislate against the general community the fact that the Commonwealth of Australia
nevertheless did so and so with the Racial Discrimination Act, by this in effect it also robbed
each and every citizen of their right to have franchise and indeed be a Member of Parliament!
40
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50
Because Australian citizenship, albeit wrongly, has been the core requirement of numerous
positions, such as to be a judicial officer, to be a police officer, to be a Member of Parliament,
etc, it is having horrific consequences that follows from what currently is so wrongly applied.
Still, the rule of law, so constitutional law, must be applied in a proper manner, and not some
Banana Republic kind of system.
The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 also relies upon the unconstitutional declaration/
definition of Australian citizenship as to provide for franchise where in fact franchise in the
Commonwealth of Australia is obtained only by having obtained State franchise through State
citizenship.
What is missing is the States legislation to provide for State citizenship and by this for
franchise!
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Moller v The Board of Examiners [1999] VSC 55 (10 March 1999)
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16. The concept of allegiance was considered by Ormiston, J. (as he then was) in Nicholls v.
Board of Examiners for Barristers and Solicitors [1986] V.R. 719. At p.728 his Honour
said:
"Allegiance is a concept which is at the same time both obvious and subtle. Its precise
nature has varied over the centuries in ways which it is unnecessary to discuss here.
For those reasons it is undesirable to say more about the duty of allegiance than is
necessary for the decision in this case. It should be observed, however, that it is not
now an obligation peculiar to monarchical systems of government, whatever may have
been its basis in Stuart times: cf. the Case of the Postnati:: Calvin's Case (1608) 7 Co.
Rep. 1a; 2 State Trials 559; 73 E.R. 761 and Re the Stepney Election Petition (1886)
17 Q.B.D. 54. Secondly, the present case does not concern the oath of allegiance to be
given by a subject, national or citizen. Even when an alien had virtually no rights, the
correlative right of protection by the sovereign was sufficient to justify a duty of
allegiance on the part of aliens, at least aliens from friendly countries, who lived
within the realm. Since the disabilities of aliens have been largely abolished, except as
to the right of entry into the country, their duty of allegiance, when they live within
this country, cannot be disputed. On the other hand, I have found no authority, at least
since the Middle Ages, which suggests that the taking of an oath of allegiance creates
any new or different obligation on a resident foreign national. In making this latter
observation, I am in no way referring to those oaths which are taken as part of a
naturalization ceremony or which otherwise contain a renouncing of all other
allegiance, as appears in the oaths in Schedules 2 and 3 to the HYPERLINK
"http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/aca1948254/" Australian
Citizenship Act 1948. I add that what I have said as to the status of aliens appears
applicable to all those who do not owe a general duty of allegiance and I say nothing
as to the effects of the repeal of the HYPERLINK
"http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/aa194775/" Aliens Act 1947 and
the prospective repeal of the definition of 'alien' in the HYPERLINK
"http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/aca1948254/" Australian
Citizenship Act 1948 (Act No. 129 of 1984, HYPERLINK
"http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/c167/s4.html" s.4 (2)(a)).
Consequently there would appear to be significant differences between the local duty
of allegiance owed by aliens or non-citizens, and that owed by citizens or those who
otherwise owe a general duty of allegiance. When Parliament amended s.5(2) of the
Legal Profession Practice Act 1958, it chose to retain the obligation to take an oath of
allegiance for those who wished to become admitted to practise, but gave a right to
those applicants to seek exemption from that obligation. As was pointed out by the
Chief Justice in Re Miller [1979] V.R. 381, at p.383, this appears to be a recognition
by Parliament of the importance attaching to that obligation. It is therefore neither
necessary nor desirable that any opinion should be expressed as to the right of persons
other than aliens or non-citizens to seek exemption under the amended sub-section.
The present applicant is a citizen of a foreign country and the considerations applicable
to him are not necessarily considerations applicable to citizens of this country, nor to
persons who may hold dual citizenship."
Dual citizenship is not a dual nationality this as the Framers of the Constitution made clear;
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Mr. SYMON.Dual citizenship exists, but it is not dual citizenship of persons, it is dual citizenship in
each person. There may be two men-Jones and Smith-in one state, both of whom are
citizens of the state, but one only is a citizen of the Commonwealth. That would not be
the dual citizenship meant. What is meant is a dual citizenship in Mr. Trenwith and
myself. That is to say, I am a citizen of the state and I am also a citizen of the
Commonwealth; that is the dual citizenship.
Supreme Court of Victoria - Court of Appeal

10
Moller v Board of Examiners for Legal Practitioners [1999] VSCA 116 (30 July 1999)
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24. Mr Bevan-John's next submissions related to the appellant's personal position. He put it
that the appellant has already publicly and deliberately declared his allegiance to
Australia and that the purpose of his taking the oath has been fulfilled by his pledge upon
taking citizenship. He submitted that it was unfair to use the exemptive power under
HYPERLINK "http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/lpa1996120/" the
Act to excuse those who do not want to make any commitment of allegiance to
Australia at all and to deny it in respect of one who has already made the solemn pledge
of that allegiance when he formally undertook Australian citizenship.
And
32. The requirement which the Court imposes on those seeking admission to practise as
barristers and solicitors in this State to take an oath or make an affirmation of allegiance
retains a significance which goes beyond the mere academic and the pompous. Young,
C.J. explained its importance in Re Miller [1979] V.R. 381 at 383 in terms of the statutory
recognition given by the Parliament to the oath of allegiance and its administration to
persons carrying out significant functions in this State.
33. To my mind his Honour's comments remain valid, notwithstanding the differences to be
found between the terms of HYPERLINK
"http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/lpa1996120/s6.html" s.6 of the
HYPERLINK "http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/lpa1996120/" Legal
Practice Act 1996 and those which existed in s.5 of the Legal Profession Practice Act
1958. As Street, C.J. said in Re Howard [1976] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 641 at 643, the significance
of the oath being administered to those wishing to practise as barristers and solicitors is
its reminder to them that their role will be to serve law and justice in the State, of which
the Sovereign is the fountainhead.
34. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Court, in exercising its role as the ultimate
controller of the profession, imposes as one of the prerequisites for admission to practise
a promise of allegiance and does not lightly entertain applications to exempt persons from
that obligation. Where, as here, exemption was sought on the grounds of a strongly held
commitment to a republican model of government and a fear of compromising conscience
and principles if required to take an oath of allegiance, it is equally, in my view, not
surprising that His Honour exercised his discretion against exemption.
Again;
He submitted that it was unfair to use the exemptive power under HYPERLINK
"http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/lpa1996120/" the Act to excuse
those who do not want to make any commitment of allegiance to Australia at all and to
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deny it in respect of one who has already made the solemn pledge of that allegiance when
he formally undertook Australian citizenship.
10
What was misconceived was that the oath of alliance is not as to citizenship but to
naturalization in regard of Subsection 51(xix) op the Constitution The oath of alliance to be
admitted to the Bar to practice in the State of Victoria is a different kind of alliance as it related
to uphold the specific laws of the State of Victoria. The oath of alliance in the State of NSW, for
example, is to uphold the laws of that State when seeking admission to the Bar there.
There can be no oath of alliance in regard of Australian citizenship as referred to by the
Framers of the Constitution as it is obtained AUTOMATICALLY when obtaining state
citizenship.
15
As I perceived it at the time of what I considered to be naturalization I made an oath of alliance

to become a subject of the British Monarch and indeed the Dutch Government advised me that
by taking up this naturalization I no longer have the Dutch nationality. This being so then clearly
the oath of alliance was in regard of the naturalization powers provided for within Subsection
51(xix) to naturalize aliens to become British nationals, and as such nothing to do with
citizenship as to being to include franchise.
20
It is not relevant if the intentions of the Commonwealth of Australia is to include franchise as

it simply is unconstitutional and so ULTRA VIRES.
25
Many aliens who arrived as children in the Commonwealth of Australia with their parents,
who subsequently naturalized, found that years later they never were actually naturalized even so
they were voting in elections. Indeed, the Australian Electoral Commission is on record that
people were found not to be naturalized and so not entitled to vote even so they had filled out a
card to be an Australian citizen and so entitled to vote.
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50
What has occurred that often children understood, as their parents did, that they were
naturalized at the time their parents were but this was somehow omitted from the documentation
to show so. My own 45 year old stepdaughter discovered this only a few years ago! By this,
while she considers herself to be an State citizen, and so an Australian citizen and also having
been naturalized, the Commonwealth of Australia however never accept any of this. The Pochi
case is another clear example, where Mr. Pochi was deported where the High Court of Australia
in 1982 held he was not an Australian citizens despite that he had lived for most of this life and
had children here. The High Court of Australia confusing Australian citizenship with
nationality.
To many Australian citizenship remains to be relating to having political rights and nothing to
do with nationality, and yet the Commonwealth of Australia keep advertising about Australian
citizenship but in real terms may and does in fact refer to some concocted Australian
nationality even so no constitutional powers exist in that regard.
Therefore, the fact that I had filled in enrolments cards to vote in Federal elections is of no
meaning where this was done upon misconceptions created by the Commonwealth of Australia
itself to refer to Australian citizenship but which in fact was not at all referring to franchise
of citizenship as such but to some purported Australian nationality.
As a self educated constitutionalist, I view that the Racial Discrimination Act in effect (even
so unconstitutional in its conception) in fact robs every person of their citizenship and so their
franchise as the Framers made clear that any legislation within the race provisions disqualified
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every such person of their citizenship and so their franchise. Hence, there can be no one who
is eligible to vote or to be a Member of Parliament.
In any event, where I claim that constitutionally I am a British national if the naturalization was
effected within the constitutional provisions of subsection 51(xix) of the Constitution, and the
High Court of Australia already made clear in Sue v Hill that British nationals are foreigners
(aliens) and so kicked out Heather Hill, then clearly I cannot be deemed to be entitled to vote
in any event. Australians are Australians by the fact that they are residing within the
Commonwealth of Australia, not because they are naturalised or born in the Commonwealth of
Australia.
10
Those born in the United Kingdom, but residing then in the colonies (now States) and
participating in the Constitution Conventions to create a federation nevertheless
considered themselves to be Australians, besides being British nationals.
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Lord Denning M.R. in Reg. v.

Governor of Brixton Prison; Ex parte Soblen (1963) 2 QB 243, at p 299, stated
4. The law of this country is very jealous of any infringement of personal
liberty (Cox v. Hakes (1890) 15 App Cas 506, at p 527) and a statute or
statutory instrument which purports to impair a right to personal liberty is
interpreted, if possible, so as to respect that right: R. v. Cannon Row Police
Station (Inspector) (1922) 91 LJKB 98, at p 106.
CHU KHENG LIM AND OTHERS v. THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT AND ETHNIC AFFAIRS AND ANOTHER (1992) 176 CLR 1 F.C. 92/051
14. Aliens, not being members of the community that constitutes the body
politic of Australia, have no right to enter or remain in Australia unless
such right is expressly granted. Laws regulating their entry to and providing
for their departure from Australia (including deportation, if necessary) are
directly connected with their alien status. And laws specifying the
conditions on and subject to which they may enter and remain in Australia are
also connected with their status as aliens to the extent that they are capable
of being seen as appropriate or adapted to regulating entry or facilitating
departure if and when departure is required((107)
35
This indicates that permission to be and remain in Australia is not depending on being a natural
or born national, but rather if one has become a member of the body politic of Australia. This
body politic is in fact being an Australian citizen.
The right of exercising any rights as an Australian citizen is enshrined in the Constitution
40
Mr. DEAKIN.45
In this Constitution, although much is written much remains unwritten,

It falls under personal liberties to exercise ones right to vote or not to vote.
50
LEGAL FICTION
Sue v Hill Authority;
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GRADUAL INDEPENDENCE, that is what the High Court of Australia argued in the Sue v Hill
case to oust her, despite being a subject of the British Crown from the Senate. Quit frankly, at
that time, I had myself argued that in 1919 by the signing of the Treaty of Versailles the
Commonwealth of Australia had become in effect an INDEPENDENT nation and by this the
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) was no more valid then any other
colonial legislation.
The Family Court of Australia even published this in its judgment!
But, while I had this great kind of argument as to why the Commonwealth of Australia was an
INDEPENDENT nation, I later discovered that constitutionally this could not be so. If, the
Commonwealth of Australia somehow became an INDEPENDENT nation then at some point of
time legislation enacted in the commonwealth of Australia and in any of the states would be
defective as they would no longer be what the respective Constitutions required.
The commonwealth of Australia exist as a part POLITICAL UNION between the States, and it
would be sheer impossible for the Commonwealth of Australia to somehow then dictate the
States if it remained to be colonial entities or become independent. No such constitutional
powers were ever provided for in the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK)
and the Framers of the Constitution clearly opposed such possibility without a Section 128
referendum! Indeed, they made clear that the Commonwealth of Australia could not , so to say,
throw off the Imperial connection under this Constitution.
The signing of the Treaty of Versailles could not have somehow invoked the Commonwealth
of Australia to become INDEPENDENT and neither can there be something like a gradual
becoming of INDEPENDENT as to even contemplate this on constitutional grounds would mean
that having a Constitution is of no avail as no one will know when things are purportedly
changed over time as it be the judges who may declare what they view by hindsight.
The POLITICAL UNION between the Colonies (now States) to form a political alliance, albeit
partly, was a contract that was binding among them. However, can we accept that somehow a
contracts between them on partial political issues somehow then can change everything?
Would this mean that if tenants of a building are making an alliance then somehow they can
become the owners of the building merely because they claim that over time they became the
owners by what they did?
As the Framers of the constitution made clear, external affairs gave the Commonwealth of
Australia powers to make treaties but only for so far it already was within its constitutional
powers. It could not use it to acquire somehow powers it didnt possess in the first place. As
such, while the Commonwealth of Australia, for example, may make a treaty with any other
foreign nation that their citizens drivers licences will be accepted as valid without needing a
international driving licence, the truth of the matter is that there is no constitutional powers for
the Commonwealth of Australia to do so in the first place, as only the States have the legislative
powers in that regard.
If it were to be allowed for the Commonwealth of Australia to make any kind of treaty in regard
of matters the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) specifically withheld
any legislative powers for, then the whole notion of having a Constitution that can only be
amended by way of Section 128 referendum no longer is applicable as the Commonwealth of
Australia can simply circumvent any constitutional limitation by making treaties in regard of
matters it didnt have constitutional powers for.
The Constitution is constant and can only be amended by Section 128 referendum. CoAG
(Council of Australian Governments) is an unconstitutional entity and cannot therefore somehow
circumvent Section 128 provisions either.
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When I contested the legal validity of the application of the Cross Vesting Act, in 1994, I was, so
to say, thrown out by the Courts, yet in 1999 the High Court of Australia in the Wakim case then
formally declared the purported Cross vesting act to be unconstitutional.
5
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In my 28 October 2002 to Mr Justice Michael Kirby I contested the validity of the Australian
Act, and on 17 June 2003 His Honour in the MIMA case then made clear the Australian Act had
no legal enforcement against the Constitution.
It doesnt matter if the States therefore somehow agreed to the enacting of the Australian Act
as it was beyond the powers of Subsection 51(xxxvii) to allow for this in that this subsection only
allows for matters to be referred that is in dispute between two or more States but not all States.
The Australian Act could not be held to have been a matter of dispute between two or more
States such as the Murray River can be!
There never was any constitutional powers given to the High Court of Australia to declare the
Commonwealth of Australia to be some alleged INDEPENDENT nation as its constitutional
powers are bounded by the limits of the Constitution.
Are we next going to have that essentially we have become part of the Republic of Indonesia
because we now are enacting legislation dealing with refugees to please the Indonesian
Government?
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As Author of various books about certain constitutional issues under the INSPECTORRIKATI label I have extensively canvassed those constitutional issues, and rely upon my past
published books also in support of this argument that Australians are Australians because they
are living in the Continent of Australia and that they are British nationals and this is
EMBEDDED in the Constitution to remain so. No one can point out that there is a country
named Australia where it makes laws regarding, say, driving licences, council rates, etc for the
whole of the nation. The Commonwealth of Australia doesnt even have legislative powers over
local governments in the States.
It is simply a LEGAL FICTION that the Commonwealth of Australia is a INDEPENDENT
nation, and so also that somehow the Commonwealth of Australia has a Queen of Australia.
Would it not encompass that judicial officers who made an oath of alliance to the British
Monarch and since remained judges of the Courts but never did make a new alliance to the
pretended Queen of Australia then are disqualified from sitting as judicial officers at the
bench of the Queens Courts?
Surely, no one could accept that lawyers who swore an oath of alliance to the British Monarch
somehow could continue to be members of the Bar and be judicial officers when we somehow
now hold that the British Monarch and its subjects are all foreigners and ousted from not only
voting but also from being Members of Parliament, as Heather Hill was?
When I applied to naturalize it was in the perception that the I would become a British national
with the British Crown as head of the Empire. It is not, in my view, for the High Court of
Australia then to somehow imply later with the Sue v Hill case that somehow I never gained any
alliance to the British Crown, neither became a subject of the British crown but somehow
became a subject to a non existing Queen of Australia of a fictional country.
In my 30 September 2003 published book titled;
50
INSPECTOR-RIKATI on CITIZENSHIP
A book on CD about Australians unduly harmed.
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ISBN 0-9580569-6-X
END QUOTE ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2 (MY UNCONTEST APPEALS- BY ALL ATTONOR GENERALS!) County Court of
Victoria, Case numbers T01567737 & Q10897630 ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2
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Special Operations
Targeted enforcement activity including roadblocks and blitzes by Sheriffs Officers, in conjunction with
enforcement agencies, such as Victoria Police, local councils and VicRoads resulted in $3.6 million collected
relating to 103,678 infringement warrants.
As I have set out in past writings it is my view that the Police has legitimate powers to stop a
motor vehicle as to ascertain a persons right to be in charge of a motor vehicle, however I do not
accept that the Police can do so for purpose of the Sheriffs Office to check a motorist if there is
any warrant outstanding. Any such conduct has already been held by various court (USA
Authorities) to be unlawful as the purpose is not to check the right and entitlement of the
motorist but to check for ulterior purposes.
One cannot have that those purporting to enforce the rule of law themselves violate the rule of
law.
In a recent judgement by the Supreme Court of Victoria it was held that a man who did run away
when the Police asked him questions was entitled to do so and the Police arrest subsequently was
unlawful. Why then if a pedestrian doesnt have to answer question to the police unless placed
under arrest should a motorist have to answer questions of s Sheriff Officer when not under
arrest?
I had the incident that I was directed by the Policed to drive into Camp Road, Broadmeadows of
road car park and then directed to go to the Sheriff, who then asked me for details. As such, the
police unlawfully directed me to drive into the car park, not for any inspection of my motor
vehicle but merely for the Sheriffs Officer to check details if a warrant was outstanding.
What kind of procedure fairness is there when one contest the validity of an Infringement
Notice and the Infringement Registrar disregard any proper legal procedures to be followed and
issue in the end a warrant when it is without legal basis and worse a Sheriff could act upon it?
Over the years my writings have come to nothing when it comes to addressing the issues of
concern and while most people would give up (and that is likely the intentions of those refusing
to appropriately deal with matters) as an Author of books in the INSPECTOR-RIKATI series
on certain constitutional and other legal issues it serves me to expose the rot that is going on!
If for example the Sheriff were to act in violation of my constitutional and other legal rights and
my 83 year old wife due to that becomes ill or even dies then the Sheriff could be held personally
legally responsible, as would be anyone else like, a police officer, because they are acting
unlawful to enforce a warrant that is unconstitutional and without legal force. And rest assure
that is what I contemplate as to also expose how this rot has been going on for far too long.
People being pulled over and terrorise and extorted monies from them by unconstitutional/invalid
Infringement Court orders/warrants.
Law enforcement must be itself operate within the law. Legal provisions are not valid if
they are in violation to a persons constitutional rights.
My elaborate set outs cannot/shouldnt be ignored, and the question remains; When will the
Attorney-General finally take appropriate action to address these and other issues mentioned in
my requests and other writings?
This document is not intended and neither must be perceived to refer to all details/issues.
50
G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O. W. B. (Friends call me Gerrit)

(Our name is our motto!)
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Daniel Andrews Premier Victoria

Mr Martin Pakula, martin.pakula@parliament.vic.gov.au & attorney-general@justice.vic.gov.au

As I stated in my previous corresponssdence:;

Efficiency the system effectively manages high volume offences.

QUOTE 130723-R Clark Attorney General & others-Re COMPLAINT

We hear a lot about Australian citizenship which as a CONSTITUTIONALIST I published;

Misuse of Public Funds

Public Funds may not be Used for Personal Purposes

Examples of Misuse of Public Funds

State Agency Participation in Ballot Measure Elections

Using Public Funds and Ballot Measure Campaigns

ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2

In criminal matters, at least as I understand it, the Prosecutor

END QUOTE 20150709-2013_14_report_infringements_sys

Uniform Tax \case, 1942 (65CLR 373 at 408) 23-7-1942

Inspector Stephen Mutton, from Melton police

Mr Jon Kaila jon.kaila@news.com.au

Mr Brendan Facey Department of Justice

Infringement management & Enforcement Services Brendan.Facey@justice.vic.gov.au

Awaiting your response, G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Friends call me Gerrit)

MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL

Our name is our motto!)

END 130905-COMPLAINT Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Inspector Stephen Mutton-CONSTITUTIONAL issues etc

END QUOTE 2013_14_report_infringements_sys

END QUOTE 2013_14_report_infringements_sys

END QUOTE 2013_14_report_infringements_sys

defaults in the payment of the outstanding amount of the fine;

11 August 2001 day 15

26 August 2001 day 30

28 July 2001 - day 1

110828-Magistrates Court of Victoria -No 1158210495

Re: see attachment 110828-Magistrates Court of Victoria -No 1158210495

"Mr Gerrit H. Schorel-Hlavka"

Subject see attachment 110828-Magistrates Court of Victoria -No 1158210495

Ref: Infringement Court case Number 1158210495

Infringement Notice Number 0201683566

ADDRESS TO THE COURT COMPLAINT - ETC

END QUOTE 110530 confirmation received email

QUOTE 110810 confirmation received email

Tenix Solutions Parking Services

Act Interpretation Act 1901; (Cth)

As the Sheriffs office refers to

a person by whom, or body by which, a person or body referred to in paragraph (a) is

QUOTE email 110810

END QUOTE email 110810

Hansard 20-4-1897 Constitution Convention Debates

QUOTE Main v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).

Imperial Acts Application Act 1980

8. That election of members of parliament ought to be free.

9.Enforcement agency guidelines and policies

Subject to sub-section (2), an infringement notice must

involved a mistake of identity; or

(b) that special circumstances apply to the person; or

23. Request for additional information

The following may also be interesting:

Effect of enforcement order

infringement offence to the Court for hearing and determination.

66. Powers to revoke enforcement orders

an infringements registrar must revoke the enforcement order; and

(b) the enforcement order ceases to have effect on its revocation.

MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL

Our name is our motto!)

Awaiting your response, G. H. Schorel-Hlavka