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WuWv
NICIAS
VAGrr
NICIAS
AND
THE
SICILIAN EXPEDITION
BY THE
Rev.
/$J.if%HURCH, M.A.
in
LONDON
SEELEY AND
CO.
LIMITED
PREFACE
The
ultimate,
it
might be
said,
These
Thucydides.
facts
whom
to
knowledge specially
accompany the
book
my
sixth
I
have to
volume of
his history.
found
it
in
In writing
me Mr
relief),
Haver-
and have
very helpful.
A. C.
February 1899.
ac-
field's
yd
in-
this little
everyone
CONTENTS
CHAP.
I.
Statesman
and Citizen,
PLAN
OF THE SIEGE
OF
SYRACUSE
by the Athenians.
wall (i) built by the Syracusans.
the
by
Syracusans.
Forts protecting intercepting wall (2).
Naval Station of the Athenians.
Boom closing the mouth of the Great Harbour.
FFF Intercepting
HHH
K-
NICIAS
AND THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION
CHAPTER
'
Thucydides, TheraTheramenes
below the other
put
two.'
That the philosopher should have mentioned Theramenes at all is incomprehensible.
We know him only as an unscrupulous oligarch,
who became on occasion an equally unscrupu-
among
menes
lous
patriots
but
Nicias,
democrat.
from
distinguished
temporary the historian, was a respectable ?nd
consistent, but not very able, leader of the
aristocratic party in Athens,
in point of cleverness and
whose limitations
eloquence were
made
NIC/AS
more conspicuous by
the
as
shall
his
having to stand forth
of
Pericles.
opponent
Nicias, as we
had many
see,
qualities
that
made him
he would have
worthy of Aristotle's praise
added to them the distinction of a uniform
;
success
occasion
his
We
it
know
was such
It was indeed so
particulars are given.
great
as
to make him one of the most famous
millionaires of Greece.
Romans.
from the
silver
came
mines of Laurium, which the
long periods,
and,
doubtless,
on terms more
He
had so
profitable to them than to itself.
vast an army of slaves that after
providing for
his
master miner
Thrace
with a thousand
men
at a
charge of
At Athens it was a great thing for a statesman to be rich. Ways were open to him of
using his wealth in such a manner as to make
impression on his fellowcitizens, and that without laying himself open
to the charge of ostentation.
Among ourselves
a
very favourable
dramatic
were
sent,
island
There
of Delos, or to the oracle of Delphi.
would seldom be a year in which one or other
of these duties would not be imposed upon him.
In the course of time he would be called upon
1
Possibly at Amphipolis, which was near a rich
mining country, and belonged to Athens between the
years 437"4 2 42 An
obol was equivalent to five farthings, but five
NICIAS
would be
Some,
necessary sum.
be anxious to
would
on
the
other
hand,
do
everything in as
splendid a style as possible, and for such the reward of popular favour was immediate. It was
an expenditure which everyone
enjoyed, and for
which everyone was grateful. A still more imposing form of patriotic generosity could be displayed in times of war, for then the wealthier
were called upon to furnish a ship for
citizens
being
the
bare
wages
ship,
the
necessary
equipment,
and
Plutarch
has
and Artemis.
Twin
It is mentioned as a
specially creditable act on the
part of a certain Cleinias, in the Persian war, that he paid
the whole cost of a ship.
at
make
multitude, and to
crush, singing
Nicias,
when
their
way through
the
all
it
He
better.
embassy, changed all this for the
at
the
the
on
landed the chorus,
previous day,
During the
neighbouring island of Rheneia.
night, a bridge,
at
commemorated
and
feasts,
About 400.
NICIAS
and beauty.
When
by
blance to the
in slavery,
common
very
as truly as
just
honest.'
a
of
'
'
than poor.
Yet
combination
it
Greek statesman
money
of
circumstances
'
poor but
Athens yielded to these temptations with lamentable frequency, from Themistocles onwards
against Nicias no one ever breathed any reproach
;
of the kind.
He
an instance of recklessness he
looks for
it,
not
among
his
of Northern Europe.
whether
or not he puts into
Thucydides, who,
the mouths of his characters what they actually-did
barbarians
the
among
'
men
for
which
is
my own
There is no quality
more generally and ungrudgingly ad-
mired than
safety.'
this.
His
The two
instances
This
is
rich citizen,
to
religion,
not in
itself a
positive proof.
who was
personally indifferent
have gladly seized either
might
mind of
his
Nicias.
He
dominant influence
sacrificed daily,
the
for
in the
he kept in
NICIAS
it was to ascertain
the pleasure of the gods.
These religious feelings, associated as they were
respect.
pure morality,
Nor must we
command our
harshly condemn
if
they
its
hovers, so
'
I
meaning.
perceive ye are,' he said to his
audience on the Areopagus, in all things,' according to the Authorised Version, somewhat
'
'
'
too
according to the Revised,
in the margin.
superstitious,' with
religious
superstitious,'
'
Nor
since
have passed
of
'
the two.
between
CHAPTER
II
SOLDIER
The command
of
the
fleets
and armies of
Athens was
held
this
in
office
lifetime of Pericles.
Its duties
administration as well as
included
command
the
home
in the field,
to the
possible that the former fell
share of Nicias on the earlier occasions of his
and
it
is
Anyhow, we do
being elected to the office.
not hear of him as conducting any operation
of either army or fleet before the year 427 b.c.
He
must have been highly gratifying to his countrymen. There was no state in the Lacedaemonian
alliance that was more hated by the Athenians
than Megara.
It
rebelled,
9
slaughtering at
NICIAS
to
more than
fifteen miles
series
of mutual
long
from the
injuries
Peiraeus.
had
em-
War.
Compelled to
see her
An Athenian squadron
points of the coast.
was sent to blockade the harbour, but could
not do this effectually because it had no
Nicias saw an
anchorage nearer than Salamis.
a
of
opportunity
heavy blow at this
striking
In
the
which
was occupied by
SOLDIER
1 1
on one side by
towers and walls extending from Nisasa, the
port of Megara, and on the other by a
Nicias
lagoon bridged over by a causeway.
embarked some battering-rams on his ships of
fort,
and
further
protected
on the side of the lagoon, into a convenient base for the blockading fleet.
This was the earliest operation of the year.
fortified
iEgean,
from
ally
city
its
settled
walls,
and on
its
Re-embarking
his
army,
he sailed northwards, wasting the country as
he went, where there this could be done without
territory.
when
NICIAS
i2
to have
mand
the
great success was gained, possibly because
tended
They had
adversaries
lost
forty-seven
men,
their
as
many.
own
it
increasing forces of the enemy had made
prudent to retreat, that he had left two of his
own dead on
the
field.
In the eighth year of the war, Nicias conducted with success an operation of more importance, and likely to have a more permanent
This was the occupation of the island
effect.
SOLDIER
13
Chilon, one
territory.
of the
Seven
tion for
this
in
island,
about 4000.
unprepared.
sailed
thither
with a force
of
resistance
struggle.
treated,
becoming
a tribute
Athenian
allies
of four
garrison
in
days
ravaging
the mainland.
On
talents.
in
the
Cythera,
spent
neighbouring
some
coast
of
way home he
his
feeble
state,
she
hostile
NICIAS
neighbours against
to hold up.
able
have
already
spoken
After various
other.
fluctuations
the
'
'
Pericles,
is
which indeed
distant.
to expel the
exiles
home
at
Thyrea, a
district
the tastes of
a race
its
new
inhabitants,
who came of
They were
at
this
upon
the
coast.
Thyrea consisted
retreating inland to Thyrea.
of an upper and a lower town.
The iEginThey were held to have distinguished themselves beyond
other Greeks at the battle of Salamis, to which they had
sent a squadron of twenty-five ships.
1
all
SOLDIER
etans resolved to hold
not
persuade
their
the former,
allies
declared
to
that
but could
The
remain.
the
Lacedaemonians
untenable, and retreated to the
was
Their
place
hills.
alive.
now
ticular.
mand
ablest
of Demosthenes,
soldier
in
the
who was
Athenian
probably the
service,
had
own
country.
NICIAS
16
force
pure-blood Spartans
families of the city.
was so affected by
envoys to Athens to
to
belonging
The
first
Spartan Government
disaster
this
the
that
sent
it
This mission
The terms demanded
solicit peace.
accomplished nothing.
were such as it was impossible to grant, and
Then affairs took
the envoys went home.
The
another turn.
an
supply the
to
armament.
fared
pretty
As
well.
for
needs
the
of so large
besieged,
not to
They seem
they
have
handsome
The
SOLDIER
from friendly
cities
17
in
sent
going,
'
and he pointed
'
Nicias,
this
proper
force.
their
place.'
as he
they
This
is
so easy.'
idea.
It
dilemma.
and
my
seemed
c
Nicias
'
not go, if
caught eagerly at the
Why
to put
NICIAS
'
the campaign.'
Instantly there arose a great
shout from the assembly, which doubtless
They
enjoyed the humour of the situation.
it.
accept
to yield.
command
'
'
400
archers,
roll
and
will
bring
the
is
which
but
Athens.
braggart,
lives
Nicias
it
If
why
and
the
at
in
of
expense
incompetent
should he be trusted with the
the
man was
of Athenian soldiers?
for Nicias
must end
believed
was made
an
It
was impossible
to wish that he
SOLDIER
19
and mischievous.
believed
to
And
this
CHAPTER
111
PEACE-MAKER
success at Sphacteria put an
Cleon's
time to
all
eighth year
failing to capture
of the harbour.
the city
itself,
got possession
invasion of Bceotia.
to effect
it.
It
is
not within
20
my
province to
It will suffice
the story of the campaign.
to say that the attempt failed, and failed distell
The
astrously.
great battle at
many
valuable
Amphipolis.
be easily imagined that a year which
had opened with such high hopes found the
It
will
Athenians
at its close in a
still
Brasidas
Thrace
in
if it
should be suc-
it
might work for peace. Its dominant
motive was the desire to recover the Spartan
Many of these belonged
prisoners at Athens.
cessful
historian Thucydides,
year, was banished for
NICIAS
22
to the
first
ful friends,
who were
had power-
Brasidas, on the
other hand, full as he was of ambitious schemes,
Grote thinks,
that
thinking,
in
at
possible
to urge
them
at
result
was a compromise.
It
is
March.
14th of Elaphebolion
Sparta.
Two
at
Athens, 12 th of Gerastius at
PEACE- MAKER
23
of
unwelcome
fused
the
truce.
to him.
to surrender,
Scione
difficulty in satisfy-
fierce and,
justifiable-
it
must be allowed,
outburst
There was no
of anger
a perfectly
was the
result.
working of
the
NICIAS
24
his
fifty ships of
war, iooo heavy-armed troops, about as many
light-armed, and iooo Thracian mercenaries.
colleague.
Mende was
Nicias, who
An
recovered.
assault
failed,
In
The
March 421
the
year's
truce
impossible,
but
there
expired.
made peace
was no immediate
re-
In August, however,
sumption of hostilities.
Cleon prevailed upon the Athenians to make
a vigorous effort to recover
in Thrace.
Nicias,
we may be
lost
Grote supposes, he
was one of the generals of the year, and refused to serve when the
Assembly resolved on
opposition.
Whether,
as
It
sending an expedition, is more doubtful.
can hardly be supposed that the
generals had
it in their
power to go or not to go as they
pleased.
The
case of Sphacteria
was evidently
PEACE-MAKER
25
Cleon was
of
my
The
result
crushing
On
defeat,
losing
600 heavy-armed
in
killed
killed,
and missing.
The
men removed
the
peace.
Sparta was still
as anxious as ever for it, and Athens, after
this second disaster, which was scarcely less
principal obstacles
to
at
Delium, had
necessity.
allies
so small
or,
at
that
one time
least,
the
The
at
acquired
agreed
during
that each
the
war.
in the
spring.
NICIAS
26
On the term
by force.
narrow interpretation was put.
Plataea, which had surrendered, was not given
back to Athens
Athens, on the other hand,
the
kept
Megarian and Corinthian towns
had
it
'
acquired
'
force
A peace for
which had capitulated to her.
was concluded in March 421.
fifty
years
Nicias was one of the Athenian commissioners
who swore
as the
'
to
and
it,
it
Peace of Nicias.'
Some of
the
allies
the
it
arrangement
Difficulties started
was
up
at
decide
to
had been
which of the two
once.
It
by lot
contracting parties should be the first to fulfil
Athens gained the
its part of the conditions.
agreed
commander
their
Am-
in
Greek
historian,
380-295
b.c.
PEACE-MAKER
Clearidas declared that
it
was not
27
in his
power
and
went
back
with
stipulation,
He was
the envoys to explain the situation.
to
this
fulfil
home
to
protest
Sparta was
tion.
now
in
fulfil
her
part
of the
now proposed
new arrangement
to Nicias and
in Sparta,
had
remained
colleagues (they
for
the
fulfilment of the
waiting, it would seem,
Let
Athens
and
conditions).
Sparta come closer
in
allies.
And this was
become,
fact,
together
a
his
done.
each
NICIAS
23
coming under
Athenians should
in
that
treaty,
advantageous
to
must be confessed
He
and
his
that
country.
the criticism
And
is
it
just.
his
might
Athenian allegiance
but if, as Grote
urges,
and
Athens
had
combined in an energetic
Sparta
;
effort to
compel submission, the towns could
not have long resisted.
From this point of
the
withdrawal
of
the garrisons was a
view,
mistake.
With a besieging force outside, and
a garrison within, under
peremptory orders to
assist not the defence but the
attack, surrender
PEA CE-MAKER
would
have
been
inevitable.
that Nicias
and
29
We
can
only
suppose
their heads when they saw a chance of what
an actual
they had never ventured to hope for
with Sparta.
After this, they may well
have thought, perpetual peace was almost assured.
As a matter of fact, the peace and the treaty
which followed it were doomed from the beginalliance
to
unprincipled
when
if possible,
though one
at least of their
unreasonable. 1
But
they
shamefully
tricked by Alcibiades, with the result of mak1 This was that the site of the Fort Panactum should
be considered a fair equivalent for the position which the
Athenians had occupied near Sphacteria.
Panactum ought
to have
been given up
razed
to the ground,
it
as it
They
NICIAS
3o
that they
came with
powers to
a very
settle,
favourable impression by their moderation and
full
reasonableness.
to ally
You
'
ship.
far less
known
will find,'
reasonable than
that
you have
'
he
said,
the
the Assembly
If it is
Senate.
make.
full
will
It
The
be
shall
able
can,
to
obtain
the
The envoys
saying
naturally
word
about
fell
into
of
the
matter
the
of
consent
the
Pylos.'
trap,
to
not
Nicias,
Do
own
host.
The Assembly
'
to treat
met.
asked
PEACE-MAKER
31
They answered
as
and
statement, and
which had
in fact
own
lips
an exactly con-
the
Assembly generally,
met under the impression that
Alcibiades himself
astonished and indignant.
made a furious speech denouncing Spartan
duplicity, and seized the opportunity of proposing that the envoys from Argos should be
called in.
On
quake.
dismissed.
this the
Of
Assembly was,
as
usual,
needless to speak.
more sinned
The
it
is
against
another
He
espoused.
With
a feeble successor
NICIAS
32
rid
'
of by the
have so formidable an
in
politics.
CHAPTER
IV
We
a plague
their
find
is
Bceotia.
followed in
little
more than
21),
year
ulterior
Southern
Italy,
less
interfered,
itself.
during the
NICIAS
34
aim,
real
or
nominal,
being
to
protect
the
The first
against 'the Dorian cities.
was to be politely told that Sicily, having
arrived, at a general pacification, did not need
Ionian
result
in
by
particular,
But
this
pacification
The
had
Ionian city of
been actually de-
its
and
its
was made
Various circum-
in
Sicily to give
additional force
to their representations.
Selinus, a Greek city
in the west of the island, had quarrelled with its
which was inhabited by a
neighbour Egesta,
people of Italian race.
which had be
help of Selinus, and Egesta,
active on the side of Athens on the occasion
of her
first
to her old
applied for assistance
ally.
to
35
'is destroying,
'Syracuse,' they said,
are
that
cities
the
one by one,
friendly to you ;
will follow. When she
Leontini is
; Egesta
people.
gone
her
with
Peloponnesus
been a potent
have
must
This
you
it
was adargument, even if those to whom
'
to crush
Tacitus
dressed only half believed in its truth.
at
throne
the
to
a
of
imperial
pretender
says
that
himself
Rome that he sought to persuade
his
life
was
'
in
To
men enough
for their
own
defence,
they had
'
hould
be sent to Kgcsta
who should
see
for
layer
Temple
oi
at
the top.
before
them
NICIAS
36
as
if
city.
They were
in
uncoined
silver.
Mean-
entertainers.
its
We
should
command
and Lamachus.
The
of Alcibiades, Nicias,
business of the Generals was to relieve Egesta,
refound Leontini, and further Athenian interests generally.
A few days
seized
the
'
said,
you
37
You
are
make
you
that
whose
alliance, indeed,
they have
Thrace you
will be able to
it
last,
so distant
And
what does
establish its
is
it
it
risk its
to assail yours?
of war
own empire
NICIAS
38
'
suggesting to you
And
if
there
is
he
is
far too
a man who is
command for
young
undertaking, a
on the score of
and
man who
delighted to be
which, indeed,
so urges you to this
looks for admiration
of his
his
where they
sit
riper years,
by
who
their leader.
are near
Do
them,
you,
refuse
men of
to
be
scheme.
of
Sicily,
re-
An act
President, to put this question again.
which so many share is no real breach of the
law.
What you will really do will be to give
the Assembly a chance of
correcting a perilous
mistake.'
in
39
He
AJcibiades
began by
disposed
proofs of the national resources.
Who,
for in-
start
person had ever done before at Olympia
seven chariots in the lists, win the first prize,
and also secure the second and fourth places ?
He
tion.
then proceeded to argue the general quesThe Sicilian cities were not really for-
midable
And
tile.
Our
bound
to help
'
allies
there,'
he went on,
'
we
in return
are
by
Generally it is
keeping our enemies employed.
adventure
to
decline
for
an
imperial city
folly
;
only safeguard
still
against
it is
this
danger
is
enter-
prise abroad.'
Leontini made
from
its
NICIAS
40
insisting
would be necessary
'
said,
the
to employ.
Ionian
it
Supposing,' he
Naxos
cities
still
'
and
Catana
be seven powerful
treasure in abundance.
cities
ships,
a great
force,
more than
their match,
away.
He
was practicable
quate means.
from
conceded
that
the
enterprise
One
this position.
Nicias
Nicias could
appeal
colleagues,' he said,
'
but generally,
'
my
should say,
41
hundred ships of war and transports, either of our own or from the allies, as
of heavy-armed troops we
may be wanted
must have 5000 at least, more if we can. Then
we must have archers from here and from Crete,
and slingers, and other troops as may be wanted.'
a
CHAPTER
AN ILL-OMENED START
Preparations
outrage.
Among
images and symbols which so struck the attention of St Paul when he traversed the streets
These
of Athens, the Herm<e were conspicuous.
were four-sided pillars of stone surmounted by a
human head, neck and bust, and stood in the
doorways of many private homes and of the
All these, with a few exceptions,
temples.
to
one account, with but one accordaccording
ing to another, were mutilated in a single night.
The
city
terror.
We
AN ILL-OMENED START
all
can also
realise,
less vividly,
though
43
the fear
His notorious
specially aimed at illcibiades.
recklessness of demeanour at once suggested his
name as one of the guilty parties, and he lost no
time in endeavouring to free himself from the
He demanded that he should be put on
charge.
trial at once, not only for this but for a
kindred accusation that he had, in company with
some of his friends, celebrated a profane travesty
his
real
NICIAS
44
The
reason
fail
to delay the
its
It
The
this course
see,
as
we
been fixed
at
AN ILL-OMENED START
it
was
45
equipment that
They
supplementing to
means the
the
utmost
out
of
their
state allowances, in
providing
the ships, and attractgorgeous figure-heads for
rowers for what may be
ing by extra pay strong
1
As it was the greatest
called the labour-oars.
private
were parting
were attracted by
Many
;
all
words
after him.
The
to the
Nos.
NICLIS
46
Then
Once
out of harbour.
moved
in
line
/Egina.
At Corcyra
the
organised
carefully
force
in
Three
vision.
swift
was
it
ships
more
and
reviewed
three divisions,
easy
with
to
pro-
in
Greek
cities
in
Italy
120
700 slingers from Rhodes
from
armed
troops (exiles
Megara).
light
There were also 30 store ships carrying
them bakers,
cargoes of provisions, and with
masons and carpenters, and 100 smaller vessels
attending on them, besides a larger number
owned by traders, who followed the expedition
Crete)
in
hopes of
profit.
The armament
of
AN ILL-OMENED START
47
with water.
council of war
wealth of Lgesta was a fraud.
followed. The opinions given were as follows
Nicias.
our
main
'
Let us
sail
If
business.
to
Selinus.
This
can
Lgesta
is
furnish
whole
the
however,
ALCIBIADES.
we have
'
It
collected
oil
our
side.
If
we
can
secure
would be
Messene,
specially convenient both
tor our army and our fleet.
Let us see also
what we can do with the native tribes.
If they
it
are
friendly,
provisions.
we
shall
This done,
be well
supplied
we should
at
with
once attack
NICIAS
48
Syracuse.
Of
if
course,
Lamachus.
Syracuse
and
at
'
My
once,
voice
while
panic-stricken.
is
it
The
for
is
first
attacking
unprepared
impression
close to Syracuse,
As
the
will
be a convenient
head-
quarters with
its
no
little
a great opportunity
It is highly
was lost.
probable that if the
Athenians had attacked Syracuse at once they
would have captured it, just as the allied armies
in the Crimea would have been spared the long
and tedious siege, costly both in lives and
money, if they had marched on Sebastopol
AN ILL-OMENED START
49
etc.,
outside the
Naxos accepted
walls.
and entered the town. The leaders of the antiAthenian party were glad to escape, and Catana
became an ally. Camarina preferred to remain
neutral.
Meanwhile a squadron of ten ships
had been sent into the great harbour of Syracuse.
From the deck of one of them a herald pro'
claimed,
may come
On
to Catana they
summons
them with
to Alcibiades
The
accused appeared
When
they
He
himself to Sparta.
in his absence.
'
will
show them
that
am
NICIAS
5o
alive,'
he
sentence
a fatal success to
of the
all
his
make good
his threat.
town,
its
in-
By
origin.
'native'
it is
sup-
CHAPTER
VI
AT SYRACUSE
It will be as well, before I proceed any further,
to give a brief description of Syracuse, and of
the surrounding localities.
Syracuse itself consisted of an Inner and an
Outer City. The Inner City occupied an island,
or rather what had been an island, for, as
Thucy-
it
from the
down with
a gradual slope
point
called
Euryalus, where
5i
narrow ridge
NICIAS
52
connected
it
The Outer
from the
Here, we
by houses.
may suppose, would have been found the inhabitants and the property on which Lamachus
certain extent, occupied
Sicily.
To
this
The
day
it
is
Inner Harbour
included
the
probably excavations.
protected by
hostile attack.
its
It
situation
The
river
to be safe
Anapus flowed
from
into
AT SYRACUSE
side
of the
53
On some
high ground
about
half-a-mile
overhanging
right bank,
from its mouth, was a temple of Olympian
plateau.
its
inaction
or in
enterprises,
trifling
and, as
was closed.
ing
command
practically in
colleague
Lamachus being
The
Horsemen would
Catana, and
to
put
know why
ride
up
to
their
insulting questions,
had come.
they
lines
at
wanting
Was
it
to
settle
Greek
ingenious
community
in
NICIAS
54
that
than
effect
the
invaders
But to do
seemed.
they
this
he
wanted to transport the army to the neighbourhood of the city unopposed. If he went
by sea, he would have to disembark on a
shore occupied by the
enemy if he went by
numerous cavalry of the enemy, to
which he had none of his own to oppose,
would certainly do much damage. The problem was, to get the Syracusans out of the
;
land, the
way, and
A
who
with
it
what purported to be
in
that
pathisers
of the Athenian
ran thus,
Many
soldiers are in the habit of
city.
'
It
daybreak with
prise
them
into
the
we
strong
will
force
you
you will sur-
do our
generals
trap.
They made
city,
levy
of
the
in
AT SYRACUSE
the
55
direction
night at
town.
his
his
ridge
wing
right
walls,
rough
from the
troops.
city,
Late
Syracusans,
practised
followed.
operations was
made
who had
cavalry of the
discovered the
fraud
day the
they had marched, going and returning, between forty and fifty miles, they offered battle.
As Nicias did not accept the challenge, they
city.
NICIAS
56
The
in
the
eight
of a
formation
deep.
ranged in sixteen
in
The
hollow square,
Both were
middle.
the
files.
They were superior in
and
had
some
1200
number,
cavalry, an arm
in which their adversaries were
wholly wantBut
were
ing.
they
Many had
ill-disciplined.
battle
back, found
it
that
the
where they
could.
Nicias, according to Greek custom, made an
The best
encouraging speech to his men.
'
'
And how
down upon
as
rash.
ignorant as
it is
But
us because
if
it is
AT SYRACUSE
other thought,
far
remember
that
57
'
life
the very
first
time that
it
implied
overwhelming
disaster
in
the
future.
enemies
was a
and
as Nicias,
skilful soldier,
enemy unprepared.
The
it
taught them
the season
that
it
was
thunderstorm that
helped to decide
it
Their experience
common
incident of
NICIAS
58
garded
it
as a sign
of divine displeasure.
The
left
them
checked
far,
as
Nor were
herald
On
to
on
hundred and
had
fallen
their side.
He must have
thing was clear to him.
some cavalry if he was to hold the field at
One
Accordingly he
sent home a requisition for this, and for a
fresh supply of money, while he set himself to
all
against
much
When we
get as
the
Syracusans.
as he could of
little
AT SYRACUSE
59
stood
Five
months
of
all
probably an inevitable
loss
now
followed,
was
that
force.
ment
(It
that
inaction
will
hereafter have
to be
considered
how
it
requisition
aristocrats
on
their
and the
guard,
attempt
was crushed.
if
we
translate
it
by
was
pleadappropriate,
curiously
fair-spoken,'
The point debated was
ing for Athens.
Is Syracuse or Athens more
this
'
practically
likely to interfere
with
the
independence
of
NICIAS
6o
Camarina
Their
epitomised
Hermocrates.
may
arguments
The
'
be
thus
professions of the
is it that
they
How
Leontini, a colony
of Chalcis in Euboea, while they keep Chalcis
can they pretend to
itself in slavery ?
How
are
theirs
does
ambition
its
which
has
already
enslaved
their
kinsmen
to
This scheme of
obviously false.
but come from that insatiable
at
you
You
are
say that
you
the alliance is
But
by
So much I have
not aggression.
alliance.
why you
to stand neutral
if
we
we
fall,
inaction
defence,
Do
shall
not
rewarded
slaves.'
show
not think
are victorious,
that policy
you will be
by being made
for
said to
we
will
answer
for
your
AT SYRACUSE
Euphemus.
'Between
61
We
found it to
there has always been enmity.
be so, and we seized the opportunity of the
victory over the Persians to rid ourselves of
At the
the unjust predominance of Sparta.
latter reason
it
our own
safety
brings
Only
we had
You we
desire
to
make
us here.
There
to us.
independent.
It
You
not reject this alliance now.
years.
Athenian
no
are
will surely miss it when there
Do
auxiliaries at
ful
of
Syracuse was dangerous to the smaller states
NICIAS
62
Sicily.
He
there was
was
less successful in
showing that
The
Athens.
sham.
and
Camarina
interests,
the
centre
of the
it
thought
best
to
independent natives in
was
Nicias
island,
more
but
It
without
success.
Some
The
in
their
petition
Syracusans
were
application
was
naturally
for
to
far
auxiliaries
of Etruria.
cities
more
help.
their
were
successful
Their
first
own mother
Heraclid of
AT SYRACUSE
63
own
accompany them
to
their
plea
with
to
found
of
support
At
energy.
assistance.
unexpected
Sparta
they
Alcibiades was there.
invitation
Sparta
utmost
the
and
He
the
in
before
hesitated
naturally
the
but
that
taking
this
dominated
him
feeling
passionate desire to revenge himself
own
countrymen
prevailed.
The
step,
upon
the
his
Syracusan
an abbreviated form,
in
'
Let
with
my
I
me
prisoners
Then and
you
then
requited
only did
me
me
I
as
hostility.
against you.
being a partisan
NICIAS
64
That
of democracy.
am no
to
'
do.
I
our
change
we were
system
Now
No
knows
helped to plan
we were
most
great
it,
host
after
We
should
of Sicilian
of barbarian
disputed
masters
scheme,
and
generals
that
it
out.
carry
If Syracuse
and
Italy,
is
and,
what
may
falls,
is
would
be
sure
will
do
alone
can
left
You
Greeks,
fleet
to
Greece.
nothing
or, indeed,
this
fore,
you
us
of
are
Italian
Our
Then we were
cities.
with
bring
and
tribes.
your
for
Peloponnesus.
and
I,
were to begin by
this
we were to
from Italy
Greeks in Italy
on
to
This, or
go
Carthage.
done, we were to attack the
to
of
We
than
better
this
it.
Sicily
the
attack
I
attempt
of government when
at
conquering
friend.
their
best
to
hinder
them.
save
Sicily
can
My
the
that
advice, there-
you.
send an army to help Syracuse,
still
more important than an
army,
her
from
sending
reinforcements
to
Sicily.
AT SYRACUSE
Occupy and
fortify
Deceleia.
65
This
will
in-
commanded by
be
proved
himself,
as
certain
we
shall
Gylippus,
see,
who
eminently
CHAPTER
VII
The
most
breeding of horses.
We
may
be certain, there-
could
it
to suppose that a
man
It
so experienced
as
pedition.
Probably it had always been intended
to find horses in the island, which, indeed, was
famous for
1
its
breed,
of
iii.
704) mentions the horses of AgrigenIn the CEdipus Coloneus of Sophocles, Ismene rides
Virgil {^En.
tum.
results
a Sicilian horse.
66
67
This
now,
however,
on
this operation
more
wall,
built about a
Harbour.
I
might say greater length,
had
to
cover
more ground. So far
seeing
the attacking side was at a great disadvantage
equal
length
it
as
have occupied
We
shall find,
This
little
NICIAS
68
of seizing
the
point
He
On
it.
was
approached from
the
sea,
had
The Syracusans
occupied the position in force.
were not disposed to acquiesce without a struggle
in the loss
The
it
hill,
and
The
and half
it
men.
The
69
seemed, the central point from which the investing lines were to start, being drawn northward to the Bay of Thapsus, southward to the
it
Great Harbour.
to
siege
operations.
terrified
own
to give
battle.
These brought
troopers to harass the besiegers.
out their own cavalry, and in the skirmish which
followed the latter had the advantage.
This is
the first and last appearance of the Athenian
cavalry in the story of the siege.
1
Some
taking the
writers
word
doubt whether
kuklos to
tion generally.
2
So at Platasa the
camp of Mardonius
mean
till
fortified
NICIAS
7o
The
Circle Fort
fort
if
it
was
was
next
Though
quired.
put them
at
a disadvantage
vigilant enemy,
to risk a battle.
such
discouragement
of the city, and he
more prudent
to a
as
to
felt
policy.
to
this,
or
at
which
palisade,
purpose for a time, he
least
hoped
to
finish
hinder him.
temple
finishing this
it,
and the
71
Nicias, however,
its
vigilance.
It seemed as if it
ans had put it off its guard.
would be allowed to keep the position, just as
had been allowed to occupy it, without interBy degrees the customary watches
ruption.
it
The
ceased.
Some even
sun.
stole
The
Sicilians
NICIAS
72
soldiers,
accoutred
being
detached
which
the
party
followed
in
pursuit,
and overtook
them.
to press
through the postern gates along with the fugitives ; some soldiers from the main division,
covered
walls.
stroyed.
But the plan of the intercepting wall was not
be
73
up.
across Epipolae
It
as
far
west
Anapus.
their
command,
Nicias,
as
we
shall
see
hereafter,
to divert the
attention of the
NICIAS
74
was on
fleet
carried.
city
While the
its
way,
the
wall
The
Once more
a well-disciplined force,
strongly leavened with
the veterans of many campaigns, asserted itself.
The
the bridge by which, as has been already mentioned, the road to Helorus was carried across
on the
the stream. 1
dinate officer in
command, hurried
to intercept
them.
75
on the spur of the moment. His arrival restored the Athenian superiority, but the help
he
cost
countrymen dear.
characteristic imPressing
petuosity, he found himself with but a few
1
followers on the further side of a dyke.
There
he was slain by a Syracusan horseman. A few
moments afterwards the Athenians came up, but
that
brought
to
his
the
enemy had by
this
The
Fighting was not yet over for the day.
Syracusans, encouraged by the check administered
to the Athenian right, made a sally against the
The movement was unexpected,
Circle Fort.
and the garrison was probably weaker than
the
field.
some
By
preventing him
battering-rams
which
lay
from taking
of timber and
in
front
of
1
It is a curious coincidence that in Aristophanes's play
of The Acharnians, Lamachus, whose martial ardour is
ridiculed in a fairly good-humoured way, is represented as
meeting with an accident in leaping a ditch. Doubtless
NICIAS
76
the
were
walls
on
set
The
fire.
flames
engaged
Great Harbour.
the
effective.
The
mediately
Syracusan generals,
anticipating an attack on their quarters, recalled
all
their troops, and retreated within their
lines.
It
is
difficult
to
Athens suffered by
estimate
the
the
loss
which
death of Lamachus.
The
in
some three
his
months was
end a
largely
period
due to
of
his
We
affair
no
that
was
had
he
a
great
That
it
may
victory
first
seemed
possible
that
the
mistake
might
the
retrieved,
lost
army
77
most
its
moment
Circle
that
Fort
experience
useful.
illness
when
just
were found
But the cause
from the
field
his
We
particularly
most
know from
the
There
some trouble
may
be
of
this
found the
kind,
him
detained
that
and
sagacity
be
to
trous consequences.
happen to
the
at
is
the
sufferer
was an
no ailment
It
In
brain.
is
it
mysterious
disas-
believed,
cause
which
disastrously as he
command of
did
his mental
if
he had had
full
unequal,
unequal
indeed,
to
their
that for
antagonists
time
their
so
com-
NICIAS
78
Circle
to
the
Bay
completed but not
of
much
It
to
reached, or was soon about
from
the
Circle
to
the
down
Great
reach,
Harbour.
Four-fifths, we may say, of the
land circuit of Syracuse was blockaded
the
fifth
in
a
But
was,
remaining
way, open.
the egress and ingress thus left was not by
any means easy or convenient.
Everything
had to pass by the narrow neck of ground
which connected Epipolas with the high lands
of the interior.
It only remained for Nicias
to occupy this by a fort
and it is impossible
to imagine why he did not
and Syracuse
would have been practically cut off from
communication with the outer world.
done.
CHAPTER
VIII
years.
cities,
want of
discipline that
we have observed
in
them
to
submission without
regard the
abhorrence.
possibility
The
of
peacethe demowhile
but
was
indeed
small,
party
1
Dacetius, 455
79
b.c.
NICIAS
So
cracy,
Nevertheless,
resistance
nished
supplies in
maritime
three
they
the
But
cities
abundance.
sent, in
actually
The
Etrurian
the
shape
of
fifty-oared
had
native
Nicias,
Lamachus
tribes
no
at
gave
side,
adherence.
their
having
longer
his
in
the
neither
energetic
considered
countrymen, was
1
The government
still
struggling
of his
indifference
of Syracuse,
after
485
B.C.,
was
those of an oligarchy.
81
He
had,
how-
ever,
to start.
was too
saved.
It
the Athenian
This
city
was a Spartan
the enterprise.
But Nicias, by
his
fatal to
negligence
whom
he
NICIAS
82
An
him seemed
little
better than a
It was not worth while to take precautions against any mischief that he might do.
The more acute Alcibiades had seen what
pirate.
powerful
Gylippus now
in
the
mere
general.
learnt that the danger threaten-
The
city
connected
interior.
Of
it
it
hazardous.
Even
but he was
here he found no
small squadron
Rhegium
shortly
pursuit.
Shortly afterwards he sailed along
the north coast of the island, his destination
83
summons was
sent
to Selinus to
send her
thousand
Epipolas,
effected
unopposed
junction
The
been
left
rest
of the squadron
escaping
Syracuse
The
the
in
Athenian
advance.
Syracusans
It
blockade,
to
reach
were deliberating
in
public
NICIAS
84
of
it.
surrender,
and
The news
that
long
before
approaching.
city
Gylippus was
seen
to
force
of the
be
It is useless to
led
Nicias
to
as probable,
He knew
he must
of the mission of Gylippus
have heard from the commander of the small
;
He
No
made upon
Himera was
attack was
him during
not
less
We
85
could
be
approached.
stranger
instance of negligence in an experienced soldier
command
the supreme
lost
no time
strength.
in
He
in
up
then
him,
and
he
accordingly
retired
to
him.
This was
really to
acknowledge
defeat.
NICIAS
86
The
walls,
inaction of the besiegers seems to have so improved the morale of the Syracusan troops that
The
besieging
While
in
return.
sword.
incident
CHAPTER
IX
have
made by
I
line
had
failed.
how both
Gylippus.
the Great Harbour the Athenian wall was complete ; of the northern portion,
to the Bay of Thapsus, much
done.
It
He
to work.
began
at
that
a
Gylippus
set
men work
with
general
constant
also
Within
demonstrations
month
lost.
NICIAS
88
tory of Plemmyrium,
the Great Harbour.
Athenian
had
ships
the
southern
Up
to
been
arm
of
time the
this
stationed
the
at
and
accommodation,
but
occupied,
investment
no longer
it
more
was
practically
of the city on
And
possible.
disadvantage
conveniently
that the
meant
it
there was
and there was no wood at hand.
For both
of these necessaries the crews had to range
for considerable distances inland, and were,
same
the
The
time
ships
These
had
escaping,
and
safely,
desertion
were
never
except
this
became more
largely
manned
had
any reason
the
difficulty
difficulty
was
the
their
crews.
service as
These would
by
easy.
slaves.
for
not
of
doing it
now removed.
many
be
foreigners
to
faithful
89
evidently becoming to
more doubtful.
how
these
causes
effectiveness of the
gleam
of
observers
all
We
shall
operated
Athenian
now
success
more and
see
before
to
destroy
the
brightened
the
long
fleet.
of the Athenians.
Gylippus, after
several times to no
prospects
challenging an engagement
purpose, ventured to attack the Athenian lines.
He
met with
was
ill
a severe repulse.
chosen, for it did not
utilised.
He
Assembly
next
for
ing
its
battlefield
for the
The
his
confessed
his
day, and
defeat
did
mistake
thus
by
away with
in
the
account-
much
of
'
It is monstrous,' he said
injurious effect.
to suppose that we, men of the
in conclusion,
'
we are, should
not be able to drive out of the country this
rabble of Ionians and islanders.'
Peloponnesus and
Dorians
as
few days afterwards he did something towards making his boast good. This time it
was Nicias who attacked, encouraged, doubt-
NICIAS
90
The
On
wall
latter
Practically the
investment was
at
an end
the
The remainder
now arrived the
Communication with
extremity of Epipolas.
the interior was thus secured, while, at the
same time, the Athenians were cut off from
their
own
the
the sea.
See
p. 81.
91
face
siderable
resist
would be able to
fleet, it was true, still
reinforcements,
an attack.
commanded
the
The
sea,
but,
it
as
been before
has
suffering
He
he
made
himself.
If he was to
This he
The
sperses
his
narrative
NICIAS
92
report.
Greek
cities
ment.
It
runs thus
as to
told
We
tion.
the
forces
defeated in
of
frequent
Syracuse,
we were
and
it
engagements
was against
and we constructed
we now occupy. Then
Gylippus, the Spartan, came with an army raised
partly in the Peloponnesus, partly in some of the
Sicilian cities.
Him, too, we conquered in our
Syracuse that
sent,
take
more than
gives
it.
eight
minutes to deliver,
39,
as
would not
Thucydides
engagement;
in the
93
a multitude of cavalry and javelinthrowers that we had to retreat within our lines.
whelmed by
We
forces of the
wall
tercepting
our
line
In
line.
field.
single in-
of investment.
the
this wall,
we
have
fact,
things
we profess to be besieging
to this pass
we are in fact besieged ourselves. By
others
land we are certainly so, for the cavalry do
come
More
enemy has
sent
to ask
more
for
than
this,
the
He is
going on a tour of the Sicilian cities.
the
to
over
and
obtain
to
neutral,
bring
trying
is
our ships.
'
You must
not think
even by
sea.
it
When we
in excellent condition.
came, our
Our
fleet
was
NICIAS
94
Now
We
our ships.
First, as to
them ashore to
refit
for the
enemy's
fleet,
if
blockade
always
we
are
bound
to have
our
all
fleet
afloat.
It
is
numbers
on guard and another under
If
repair.
we
no
little
'
difficulty.
still are,
our
They have
citizen
seamen,
many
The
been, and
causes.
slaves desert
Of
off
the foreigners
to
fight,
change
our service
for
that
or
stray
95
away somewhere
in
You know
substitutes.
as
well
as
that
who
good
men
Of all
that
is,
I,
as
your general, can find no remedy for the misAthenians are not easy to manage ; nor
chief.
can I find, as the enemy can easily do, recruits
to
fill
the vacant
places.
We
force
only
allies,
enemy
in Italy,
supplies,
turn against us, in the conviction that our condition is hopeless, and no reinforcement comes
from you, we
will gain a
shall
be starved out
the
enemy
useful.
It
is
absolutely necessary,
if
you
are
NICIAS
96
to
deliberate
should have
our
affairs.
And
it is, I feel,
tell
if,
in
Do
the end,
not doubt
first
But now
and men.
all
is
Sicily
united against
and fresh forces are coming from the Peloponnesus this is the prospect before us, and
remember that we are no match even for those
whom we now have against us. Either tell us
us,
to
come home
or send us a reinforcement of
men,
as
well
And
it
without delay, as
help which the
The
soon as that
yet,
unless
you
are
it
forestall
your action,
97
as
it
seems to
us,
who
without
circumstances
than
madness.
passion,
was passion that distorted the popular
The pride and the anger of the
judgment.
But
better
little
it
as
we
did
when
American
independence, and
the
long
after
it
command,
who were
demanded were
sible
were named
Eurymedon
and Demosthenes
N1CIAS
98
soldier
that
medon was
mid-winter
talents of
the
to
city
go
with
money.
then
out
at
possessed.
once
it
Eury-
was then
CHAPTER
promised
of sixty
war, of
The
help.
Athenian
reinforcement
and
five
Chian
consisted
ships-of-
be
levied
Acarnania,
engaged
among
and
for
the
1500
same
the
friendly
service.
tribes
were
Thracians
These
of
also
latter
effort,
all
the
more
wonderful
because
the
NICIAS
ioo
(p. 6$).
tended for
disaster,
much
which
it
is
not
too
He counselled a
Syracuse early in the spring.
It is by boldness,' he told the
bold policy.
'
'
Syracusans,
successes
;
it
the best
this
make
land
simultaneous
and
attack on the
besiegers
sea.
by
two divisions.
from the other
taken
enemy's eighty.
For
day
to
with
go
the
ans
practice, and
The Atheni-
recovered
prepared, and
the
have
inflicted
enemy, who
lost
destroyed.
counterbalanced
first
defeat
upon
the
by
loss
This
Cape Plemmyrium,
a
way that makes us think
badly served by
sons crowded
had
the
also
left
of
crews, three
their
the
said,
serious
but
Syracusans,
roi
his
down
Athenian
of the
that Nicias
oi
was but
edge when
manned, and
the water's
to
were
Gylippus
observed
discipline before,
advantage
in
The garri-
subordinates.
ships
being
the forts insufficiently guarded.
probably
on
torts
came about
loss
it.
le
attacked
the
forts
at
vast
not
sails
amount
the
of
least
of
with them,
the
being
ships-ot-war, and
important
forty
three ships which had been
masts
the
and
hulls
drawn up on
of
land,
who had
served
in
the
expedition,
that
no
NICIAS
102
more
disastrous to the
What was
with Ortygia on
yet worse was this
the
entrance
to
the
side
of
Great Harbour,
one
:
got
was
as likely to
their
Here
all
the
ships-of-war
were drawn
up.
it is
its
to
One
hold
its
own
considerable
practically
meant
advantage,
however,
defeat.
the
HELP FR OM A THENS
Athenians gained,
or,
rather,
escaped
they
enfeebled
About
03
a
condition,
immediate
ruin.
month
in
Catana and Naxos,
except
which they probably did not visit, and in
Agrigentum, which adhered to a policy of
everywhere,
body of more than 2000 heavycollected, and began its march to SyraBut Nicias was on the alert
he precuse.
vailed upon the native tribes, through whose
territory the force had to pass, to lay an ambush
neutrality.
armed
The
for them.
result
two-fifths of the
reinforcements
arrived.
the loss
first
mentioned induced him to postpone the execution of his plan for a short time
but
when he
must be no
days' sail distant, he felt that there
The time, however, had not
further delay.
been
lost.
Corinthian
Ariston
practical skill,
seaman,
of
great
NICIAS
104
The
allies.
in
the
former case
latter
it
trial
was
of
trial
of strength, in the
The Athenian
skill.
ships
They
make
impact,
adversary.
captain
to
avoid
an
in
Thucydidcs
ii.
83-4
Grote
v.
120, seq.
105
so as to strike the
light beak, elevated
enemy
for one
high above water-mark, was exchanged
much shorter, heavier, and stronger, and placed
much
The opposing
lower.
must,
ships
he
to the
At
lines.
right
While
flank.
their
attention was
thus
come
ready
for
action.
They manned
their
own
fighting.
Prudence
would
have
to
suggested
the
conflict
Athenians that they should decline
to which, enfeebled as they were, they were
But national pride was
unequal.
terribly
against
such
cautious
counsels.
Nicias,
who
NICIAS
106
is
said
The
in
the
way
of preparation.
One precaution which he took
turned out to be very useful.
He protected
the approach to the mooring ground of his
ships by stationing some merchant vessels at
intervals of 200 feet.
These were provided
with
monstration.
like
when
But
on board.
decisive
losing
conflict,
all
till
patience,
HELP FR OM A THENS
What
weaker.
another
the advantage.
way
They had
the
a
o7
The
the
Syracusans had
number of
dart-
decks.
number of
little
boats,
too,
took
They
lost
more
merchant
And
ships,
afforded
lost
by the
vessels.
at
their
CHAPTER
XI
could
of Demosthenes
with
his
fleet
into
with
all
the
an
inspiriting
tune.
And,
in-
light
troops,
archers,
slingers
and
javelin-
engines of war.
That Athens beset with foes, with an invading
army actually within sight of her walls, should
send such a force on so distant an expedition
throwers, with
the
requisite
to the
besieging
THE
NEW ARMAMENT
109
term of what W as
was
practically besieged,
proportionately
- comers were
But
the
new
dismayed
great.
at the condition of
things which they saw.
army,
we may
if
use
the
itself
terrible
had made
first
the
still
generals
when they
possessed their
he must not
That mistake
strike at once, before his
must
repeat.
resources had begun to waste, and while the
full
strength.
He
enemy were
still
of
magnitude
therefore, at
his
armament.
He
resolved,
if
he failed
go home.
One
the
thing was distinctly encouraging
Athenians had, for the time at least, recovered
their superiority.
The
or
besieged had
attacking
of a siege
it
built
Demosthenes
began by
methods
no
NICIAS
the storming
other alternative
enemy
The
were repulsed.
was to turn the position by attacking the fortiwestern extremity where it
fication
at
its
parties
ficult
by
all,
on
He
surprise.
night
consented.
attack
He
resolved
therefore
to
this
took the
his
colleagues
command
himself,
Besides a
the
position,
to
permanently.
occupy
sunset on a moonlight night, and making a long
circuit that his movements might be neither
seen nor heard, he reached Euryalus, the fort
The surprise was complete.
on the ridge.
The
in
rear
of the
wall.
THE NE W ARMAMENT
it
duty
1 1 1
the Athenians.
The
wall was
now
have
could
maintained
in possession
whom
his
it
he had
down.
position
If
till
the enemy, he pressed forward with an eagerness that threw his troops into confusion.
For
hurried
up
from the
went
city
well.
with
Gylippus
some
fresh
checked
the
Athenian advance.
sugfirst
forward
movement
their confusion
confusion followed.
success if
it
ruinous.
is
1
The
p. 21).
battles of
Coronea
(b.c.
scale
NICIAS
ii2
which
far
in the war,
exceeded
But moonlight
is
those
it
might
be,
close
to
as
them,
if the
were
as
enemy
THE
NEW ARMAMENT
113
Not unfrequentJy
blows with their own
rout.
to
estimates
short of
two thousand.
The
it
help,
its
neutrality.
Meanwhile,
in the
thenes was urging with all his powers the adoption of the second of the two alternatives which
An
assault
all
his
NICIAS
ii4
sea,
August was
far
in
extreme to remain.
At home, where
unhealthy season of the year.
had
established
a fortified fort
the invaders
in Attica itself,
Nicias
He
off.
They were
want
He
this
it
was the
fact
would be bad
to
go
it
'
THE NE W ARMAMENT
1 1
will
We
do
men who
the
are
in
danger
their
alter
now
my
and
cry
betrayed their
not.
declare
country
countrymen
for
would
that
a
far
the
bribe.
general
I
know
owed
it
who had
NICIAS
n6
'
are
We
now.
We
which we
have the enemy's country
our pleasure, and we shall have the
up,' he said,
'
to ravage at
open sea in
shall
He
saw,
doubtless,
that
And
so
was, doing
the
nothing,
it
but
anticipations of a
financial crisis in Syracuse were well founded.
To us such hopes seem ridiculous history
his
teaches us
that
command money
with
of his
at
for
But the
conduct was
it.
home.
Brave
victorious state
can
always
necessities, or dispense
its
the
field,
he
was timid
made himself
accustomed to judge.
There was,
it
is
pro-
THE NE V A RATA ME NT
1 1
had a
plan,'
been
in
said
is
it
Trochu
of General
the case
have
to
of
Then Gylippus
considerable
returned
to
reinforcement,
Syracuse
with
partly
consisting
'
plan,'
but he
of them and
in support
No council was
he could not but give way.
held, but it was unanimously agreed to go.
Preparations
secrecy
and
ready when
moon.
It
the
for
departure
were
made with
be
superstitious
mistake
fears
to
(b.c.
412).
suppose
of Nicias
availed
that
on
n8
NICIAS
the
to overrule a general
occasion
this
to depart.
army
anxiety in
had come
Possibly, if it
so direct
prohibition.
in his feeling.
On
the con-
Whatever Demosthenes
difference of opinion.
expiatory sacrifices.
The irony of the
situation
lies
in
the
opinion on
according
the subject, Nicias and the army were wrong.
An eminent soothsayer, Philochorus by name,
fact
who
to
that,
flourished
at
the
Athens
best
about
century
later,
to
whom
years
to
as
his
go
for
advice
had
been
many
1
still
alive,
1
Nicias's 'domestic soothsayer,' if we may so describe
He
him, died a short time before the Sicilian expedition.
seems to have fallen into less skilful hands.
THE NE W ARMAMENT
this
interpretation,
so
convenient,
If
it
had,
so
might
Nicias,
rational,
or
have been
we may be
1 1
at
least
suggested.
sure,
would
men
to accept
it.
CHAPTER
XII
Syracusans,
that the
we may be
invading
were
sure,
force
go
but
the
encouraged
naturally
push
Athenians
to
success
their
must
not
be
of
their
and
to
it
side
furthest.
allowed
to
clear con-
victorious
the
well
intended
take
to
The
up
another
free
must
be
attacked
destroyed.
where
thev
were,
and
the
till
Gylippus
accordingly
had
exercised
for
few
days
ships-of-war
the crews were, he
their
in
Athenian
aiming
day
lines,
at,
after,
duties.
any
a
important
great
and
120
result.
practically
On
the
decisive
was
cusan
lines
marched
army
took up
whole of the
stockade
the
of
out
of the
the
threatening
position
the
outside
The whole
fought.
121
Syra-
city
and
Athenian
the
ranged itself
which was the
fleet
within
In numbers there
ships of- war.
considerable
the Syradifference,
very
the
triremes,
seventy-six
having
Athenian
was no
cusans
Athenians
largely on
The crews were
vantage
former.
plement,
by
In
eighty-six.
was
fresh,
mand
of
to
at
their
and
of
full
made
the
adthe
com-
efficient
practice.
oured
vigorous,
the
efficiency
the side
in
com-
outflank
him.
Harbour
afForded.
time broken
this
him
and
his
The
through
movement
left,
and
squadron
nearly
overtook
whole,
of
the
the
whole,
Athenian
to get
fleet.
or
nearly
Few
of
the
the
NICIAS
122
by
or
the
far
greater
grounded by
in
points
were
own
Great
the
to attack
liable
were
part
their
Harbour,
by
ashore
driven
crews
where
they
forces of
land
the
various
at
the enemy.
the
time
out
sallied
against
the
foremost
as
they
As others arrived
passed and routed them.
the men
from within the line came out
A general battle
numbers.
in
greater
and
the
followed,
victory remained with the
Athenians,
lost,
either
whole
the
slain
the
or
of
the
An
captured.
Athenian
station
crews
being
attempt
to
fireship
by
was made the same day, but failed.
The Athenians were now almost in despair,
for they had been conclusively beaten on their
destroy
own
element.
They now
1
recognised
how
in-
23
was
political
On
the fact
also
constitution
this fact
that these
cities
resembling their
Thucydides
insists,
and
it
is,
had
own.
as I
democratic
state
attacking
one
that
count
an
was
with
oligarchy might
governed by
certainty on finding allies in the party that
was out of power. The experience was too
common
comment. But in Syracuse the democracy was all powerful, and the
democracy was fiercely hostile to Athens. The
Syracusans, on the other hand, were full of exultation and pride.
They began actually to take
to call for
pretended to
solved on
and
the
disable
credit,
them,'
'
had
been
his
come
and, by
over
here,
the
'
of Alcibiades and
friends,
or
siding
argument
they will
with our
never
entertained
any
such
purpose,
though
NICIAS
i2 4
the thought
may have
statesman
crossed the
such
as
mind of
was
Brasidas.
far-seeing
But the unprovoked attack that had been
made
upon them
felt
Syracuse
inevitably suggested it.
had earned the gratitude of the
she
that
Greek
cities,
liberate
certainly
that Athens should
still
own
hold her
and
impossible
after
armament seemed
We
scheme of
tained,
himself,
or
And
not
less
remark-
narrative.
terrupt the sequence of the
i
it
is
here
too
in-
now
Svracusans
that
felt
1 2
whole
the
in their
power,
it
by blocking
to
the
the
entrance
Great
a space
Harbour,
up
of about 1600 yards, with a small islet about
half way.
line
of ships-of-war, merchant
of various kind, anchored
and craft
and chained together, was constructed obliquely
The work took three days to
across it.
vessels
complete,
made by
was
and
no
apparently
was
attempt
When
it.
immediate
became imperative. Only a small quanof provisions was in
stock.
Further
tity
supplies had been countermanded in view of
their intended departure.
Countermanded or
it
action
not,
with
Two
alternatives
their
were
before
them
introduced
blockaded.
to
burn
by land, or to make
be
tried
contract
compass.
necessary
The
once
their
Only
to
The
more.
hold
object was,
much
the
to
as
troops
make
was
within
lines
so
The
as
the
was
was
narrowest
absolutely
retained.
many men
as
NICIAS
i26
possible
numbers
and men of
utilised,
compelled to
all
man them.
Each
had a
vessel
bowmen
armed
and
javelin-throwers ;
stationed on the
being
the
heavywith
prow
them
place,
and
so preventing a second
reviewed his forces when they
fast,
Nicias
be
or
starved
was
but
it
theirs
the
courage them.
You,' he said,
'
'
homes
again.
good.
We
have
tage
You are to
fought.
shipboard rather than sailors.
on
be
is
27
stronger ships,
the battle will
soldiers
a sad
be
It
must
men,
and
hold
them
enemy's ships
grapple
fast till they have been boarded and captured.
You, seamen and oarsmen, do your best.
You are more numerous and you are better
defended on deck than you were in the last
the
battle.
Allies,
fight
made you
has
share
for
all
the
the
country
which
benefits
of
its
empire.
last
Win
this
battle,
for
the
occasion
can
never
Thucydides
how he became
the
full
easily will
tide
of confidence
much more
when he
is
NICTAS
128
The fleet he
garrison the lines.
handed over to his colleagues Demosthenes,
Menander, Euthydemus. But before it started
retained
to
knew
that
all
that
depended
and
struggle,
on
the
he
felt
He
result
of
that
no
day's
preparation could be sufficient, no exhortation to energy too urgent, when the issue
station
knew
the
known
personally
the
the
parentage,
personal record of
recalled their
him.
circumstances,
each.
own achievements
of the
to
achievements
To
;
All
and
He
and
some
he
to others he
of
their fathers
spoke
To all he appealed by the
and ancestors.
memory of family, home and country, by all
sacred associations,
The
battle
both
that
human and
followed
was
divine.
fiercely
the
last
the
conflict.
Some of
off to
guard
the
the
Syracusan
line
of
129
were stationed
others
blockading vessels
about the harbour to act where they might
Volunteers from the city manned
be wanted.
;
number of
and
craft
smaller
took
their
useful
the
in
share
in
city
who
steered
straight
for
the
bour.
There
was
an
barrier,
left,
doubtless,
mouth of
open
for
this
they
Against
So energetic was it
ships.
attack.
the
har-
the
space
the passage of
their
directed
in
the
that
line
time
it.
the
struggle
was
something
like
that
naval
battle.
all
their
might,
But it
seldom happened that when one ship met
another in conflict that they became separWhile they were approaching
ated again.
the
steersmen
used
all
their
skill.
NICIAS
3o
each
the
other
and
slingers
archers
were
the
once locked
grappltogether by
that took
was
the
heavy-armed
ing
up the struggle. Sometimes one ship would
be engaged with a single adversary, some-
busy
it
irons,
Sometimes the
two or more.
was of her own choosing, sometimes it
It was a sailor's
came about by accident.
There was no
or rather a soldier's battle.
with
times
conflict
manoeuvring,
officer
captain
over the harbour there were
in
miles
narrow
space
ships engaged
of
number of
200
which
numerous,
small
were
so
distance,
momentous,
on the shore
terest.
With
of
and
spectacle,
interest ;
pended
certainly
us
how
of
was
spectators
life
and
with
Had
from
so
the Athenians
death.
seen
be
could
it
it
breathless
in-
was a matter
been
mere
it
would have had an entrancing
what it was to men whose all de-
upon
not
they
it,
can
described.
shouted
hardly
The
be
imagined,
historian
tells
encouragement when
they
own
their
side
131
how
victorious,
they cried aloud and wailed when they witnessed the defeat of countrymen and friends
;
how, while
to
get
them
reached
The
of
were
others
it
loss
56
were
able
which
captured
protected
before they
ships
of
out
Syracusans had
was
whelming
the
Athenian
the
some
stockade
the
to
All
strife.
whom
50
left
the
total
of
out of 76.
blow
that
the
116;
the
So overdefeated
Demosthenes,
however,
had
not
lost
his
He
flatly
refused to
embark
again.
CHAPTER
XIII
THE END
Escape might
still
if
all
beaten,
speak,
energy had
out of the defeated army.
Once again the
want of discipline which was so conspicuous
been
not
so
to
might have
Hermocrates, who
of remarkable ability,
was
evidently
saw
how
army
man
which
much damage
again, so
to Syracuse, to escape
native
presented
this
tribes.
view
command, urging
on
have
that
the
to
route
take
he was
them
which
in
right,
to
to
the
He
strongly
re-
the
generals
in
occupy positions
Athenians would
escaping.
but
were
They
sure
thought
that
the
They might
THE END
133
from
hanging
that
terrible
over
it.
It hapjoyous celebration.
pened also to coincide with the great festival
of Heracles, and the combined attraction to
called
revelry
for
was such
contend against.
started
that
time
least,
at
Hermocrates
as
it
If the
night,
would be useless to
Athenian army had
they
might,
for
the
But
have made their escape.
had recourse to a stratagem
Athenian generals,
their
correspondents
purporting to come from
This was to the effect that
within the city.
with
message
the Syracusan
points on the
to
the
and
if
indeed
manded.
had been
Such delays,
it
given,
once
was
counter-
permitted,
are
NJ CIAS
134
be
to
apt
The
extended.
next
day
was
much
lost.
done.
It
necessities
of
the
Such
resolutions,
think
about
moment.
if
them,
If
tended
situation
to be left unburied
cruelty,
is
not
to
of the
once
the
enemy.
taken
to
out
in
carried
delay.
the sick
abandoned
time
are
to
battle
in
Great
everything
else
THE END
some of them
friends,
135
among them,
it
might
than the
to
doom
remain.
of those
But
these
made
more vigorous com-
any
possessed
followed their
feeble
Such
remnant
departing
of
friends
as
still
strength
as
far
as
spectacle,
that
forty
thousand
of the
struggled
army
as
it
mixed multitude
along,
loaded,
charged with
this
NICIAS
136
the
armament had
sailed
He
he said
men have
'
stances
I,
with
And
one of
failed
I
meanest
the
in
my
my
soldier,
reasons
yet
this
is
still
fear the
hope.
have never
less
than
too
Remember,
how many
cellent
is
your quality
as
soldiers.
There
is
this
that
THE END
which
but
he
small
stands
store
is
his
137
We
fortress.
of food,
therefore
have
we must
on
press
restore
shelter
is
not
river.
and
skirmishers,
slowly,
in the
on,
the
they
by the cavalry
moved
whole distance
slowly,
very
accomplished
NICIAS
138
or
they were
with water.
streams,
themselves
to
obliged
While
provide
they
were
here
on
either
made no
hill,
That
side.
day
with
precipices
the
Athenians
On
further advance.
the morning
nothing
the
did
return
but
to
night before.
succeed in, at
fortified
found
that
in
up
heavy-armed
cessantly
upon
in
of
do
encampment
of
day they
approaching the
above.
But they
of
it.
many
It
files
was
to
force
the
enemy formed
their
harassed
them
could
the fourth
force,
front
tried
from
after
least,
Syracusan
they
obstacle
On
mentioned
pass
a
drawn
their
that
their
in
deep,
vain
The
way.
a
solid
the
javelin-throwers,
who
the
phenomenon
with
indifference.
Now,
such
THE END
i39
a
they regarded it as
heaven.
They defeated,
sign of the anger of
their retreat,
block
to
an
indeed,
attempt
was
their
depression,
level
The
to
day, the fifth, they again attempted
inthe
from
much
suffered
so
march, but
next
cessant attacks
not
to their
encampment.
That night Nicias and Demosthenes resolved
They now
leaving their
same night.
camp
The
fires
start
divisions of the
making
Arrived
army
in
At
progress.
at the river Cacyparis they found the
another
Nicias's
NICIAS
4o
now
division had
The Athenians
When
they did
hurried
turned
to defend
themselves.
so, a
forward
Demosthenes
by
a wall.
for
the
Gylippus
strongly guarded.
and
his
colleagues
Late
the day
proclaimed that
in
offer.
place,
free.
Some
Afterwards a general
terms being that
the
THE END
141
He
still
to
believe
but
terms were refused, and an attack was commenced and continued till evening. The
fugitives endeavoured to renew their retreat
during the night, but, finding that the enemy
had discovered their purpose, they, abandoned
it.
the
order to
way through
The
and escaped.
river Assinarus.
The
thirst
it had to be satisfied at
any cost. The
once
became
a
scene
of frightriver,
reached,
ful confusion.
The men rushed pell-mell into
such that
NICIAS
142
the enemy,
river
who
some were
own comrades,
pushed
Even when
stream.
and
blood
sought
dirt,
to relieve
the
their
his
The Spartan
helpless soldiers might be spared.
issued
an
order
the
that
massacre
should
general
cease,
but
many were
slain before it
reached the
own
profit.
is
much
where we
are
The
state
many of
those
who had
straggled
THE END
143
The
fate
the extreme.
the
lives
Gylippus made an
effort to save
He
liked,
of Athenian soldiers
we
generals.
may well imagine,
one
notorious as Sparta's
and
all
The
lives.
in
of the Epipolas.
bread and half-a-pint of water was all the proThere they were
vision furnished to them.
won the
Some of them, we
favour of their masters by reciting the verses of
Euripides, a favourite poet among cultured
Athens.
are told,
NICIAS
i44
This
Sicilians.
is
the one
bright
spot in a
Plutarch,
Men
in
who
pairs,
the
Crassus,
gives
third
First Triumvirate.
are
parallel
member of
Some points
to
the
Nicias
in
so-called
of resemblance
sufficiently
armies
skill;
countrymen
in their fall.
largely
for
is
But the
differ-
Crassus was
war which he had
great.
As
it.
Nicias
to private
is
men and
the
soldiers.
NOTE ON PAGE
(THUCYDIDES,
124.
III., 57-58).
After remarking
that the struggle at Syracuse involved a variety and number of combatants, surpassed
only by the great catalogue of tribes and states that
took part in the Peloponnesian war itself, Thucydides
goes on to say
*
These many races that came to share in the conquest or in the defence of Syracuse ranged themselves
on one side or the other, not from the sense of right
or obligation of kinship, but from the accident of
private interest or the constraint of superior force.
That the Athenians, being of Ionic race, should
attack Syracuse, a Dorian state, was natural enough,
and with the Athenians, as using the same speech and
institutions, came the men of Lemnos, of Imbros, of
j^Egina (as it then was), and of Histiasa in Euboea, all
of them Athenian colonists.
Of the other combatants on this side, some were subjects, others selfgoverning allies, and others, again, mercenaries.
Among the subjects and tributaries murt be
reckoned the men of the Euboean cities, Eretria,
:
and
Chalcis,
Styria
NOTE ON PAGE
46
origin.
Subjects
they
were,
it
is
124
true,
and acting
the
ot
One
the
but
colonists,
though Argive by
the Dorian
fight against
their
own
state of Syracuse,
and against
Syracusan
near the Peloponnese, Cephalonia
gents from the islands
and Zacynthus, both independent states, but practias
compelled so to act by their position
of the
command
Athenian
of
the
in
view
islanders,
cally
sea.
They made
Athens,
was
a small
company of
exiles
NOTE ON PAGE
124
147
founding of Gela.
were some Etrurians, always on bad terms with Syracuse, and some Iapygian mercenaries.
These, then,
were the people that fought for Athens.
On the side of Syracuse was Camarina, its next
neighbour, Gela, the nearest state beyond Camarina,
Agrigentum, the next in order, being neutral
Selinus.
These cities are on that coast of the island
that faces Africa.
From the coast facing the Etrurian
Sea came the men of Himera, the only Greek city and
All these cities
only ally of Syracuse in that region.
and
NOTE ON PAGE
148
124
Of the Greeks
with the Athenian invader.
from outside Sicily there were the Lacedaemonians,
who supplied a Spartan general and troops, both slave
and freedmen.
Corinth was the only state that furWith these came
nished both a fleet and an army.
Corinth also paid some
Leucadians and Ambraciots
Arcadian mercenaries, and compelled some natives of
From Greece outside the PeloponSicyon to serve.
selves
nese
came the
Boeotians.'
It will
much
INDEX
in the
Acarnanians, serving
expedi-
tion, 99.
Achradina, 51.
29-31
36-41
of the
the expedition,
of the mutilation
promotes
accused
Herma; 43-44
campaign, 47-48
his trial, 49
at Messene,
is
his plan
of
recalled to stand
Spartans, 63-65.
Amphipolis,
lost to
Athens, 21
not
Nicias
at, 4-5.
Demosthenes
17 ; in comreinforcement, 108 ;
at Pylos,
mand
of the
leads
night
111-13; pro-
attack,
137
surrenders, 140
his energy,
the retreat,
condemned
to death, 143.
Egesta
Bceotia ravaged by Nicias,
vaded by Athenians, 20
1 1
5
in-
troops
invites
neutral,
49
discussion at,
of,
help,
Euphemus, Athenian
Camarina, 59-61.
Eurymedon
spokesman
no.
command
in joint
33,62.
Catana gained by an accident, 49
Athenians at, 53-58, 68, 115.
Chalcis, 60.
26-27.
Cleon, his mission to Pylos, 17-19 ;
advocates war, 22, 23 5 his command in Thrace, 24 ; death, 25.
at
of rein-
59-62, 139.
Carthage, ultimate aim of expedition,
34
36-39.
Camarina,
Athenian
fraudulent conduct
Helots,
16, 28.
INDEX
Hermae, 42-49.
paign, 47
53
59-60 ; commands
deceives
70 5
Syracusan
forces,
Nicias, 132-33.
Himera, 50, 82, 83, 84.
Hybla, 50.
Hyccara taken by Athenians, 50.
Hyperbolus, 31-32.
at
Camarina,
Labdalum,
86.
commander
Lamachus, joint
36
pedition,
his
plan
has
little
paign, 48, 67
of ex-
cam-
of
influence,
his death disastrous to Athens,
;
53 ;
73-76.
Locri, 46.
44, 56.
to
hostility
from
exiles
in
virtually
command,
tribes,
Olympia,
1 1
39.
attacked by Nicias,
20
Pericles, 2, 9.
Mantinea,
Megara,
the
in
Athens,
1.0-1
1
;
Plataea, 26.
attacked,
Athenian army,
Plemmyrium,
Plutarch,
1, 4, 6,
106, 144.
46.
Megara
Rheneia, 5.
Rhodes, 1 16.
(Sicilian), 48.
Salamis, 10.
Scione, revolt of, 23.
Selinus, 34, 47, 48.
Niceratus, 2.
Tarentum,
1-4
envoy
acter, 6-8
to
4-6
elected general, 9
Delos,
charattack
on Megara, 10 ; on Melos, 11 ; on
Corinth, 12-13 5 on ^ginetans at
Thyrea, 13-15 ; conduct of the
affair of Pylos, 17-19 ; command
in Thrace, 23, 24 5 concludes peace,
26 ; opposes the expedition, 36-38 ;
consents by giving estimate of forces
required, 39-41 ; his plan of cam-
46, 81.
Theramenes,
1.
Thyrea,
14.
Trogilus, 70.
Tyke, 68.
AND THE
NICIAS
Rev. A.
J.
Church,
versity College,
SICILIAN EXPEDITION.
M.A., formerly Professor of Latin
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