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CIVIL PROCEDURE

Panay Railways Inc., Vs. Heva Management And


Development Corporation, Pamplona Agro-Industrial
Corporation, And Spouses Candelaria Dayot And
Edmundo Dayot, G. R. No. 154061, January 25, 2012)
Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are
considered applicable to actions pending and unresolved at
the time of their passage. Procedural laws and rules are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The effect of
procedural statutes and rules on the rights of a litigant may
not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. This retroactive application does not violate any
right of a person adversely affected. Neither is it
constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to or arise from
procedural laws and rules. It has been held that a person
has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant
cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case,
whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing
rules of procedure. More so when, as in this case, petitioner
admits that it was not able to pay the docket fees on time.
Clearly, there were no substantive rights to speak of when
the RTC dismissed the Notice of Appeal.
SM Land, Inc. (Formerly Shoemart, Inc.) and Watsons
Personal Care Store, Phils., Inc. Vs. City of Manila,
Liberty Toledo, in her official capacity as the City
Treasurer of Manila, et al. G.R. No. 197151. October 22,
2012
In fact, this Court has held that even if there was complete
non-compliance with the rule on certification against forum
shopping, the Court may still proceed to decide the case on
the merits, pursuant to its inherent power to suspend its
own rules on grounds, as stated above, of substantial justice
and apparent merit of the case.
Audi AG v. Mejia, G.R. No. 167533, July 27, 2007; De los
Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 138297, January 27, 2006
Hierarchy of courts meant that while the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue original writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus,
such concurrence does not accord litigants unrestrained
freedom of choice of court to which filing thereof may be
directed. Petitions should be filed with the court of lower
level unless the importance of the issue involved deserves
the action of a higher court.
Omictin vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148004, January
22, 2007
The court cannot or will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal prior to resolving the same, where
the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring special knowledge, experience and
services in determining technical or intricate matters of
fact.

Abad, et. al. v. RTC of Manila, et. al. G.R. No. L-65505,
October 12, 1987
Jurisdiction, once it attaches, cannot be ousted by the
happening of subsequent events even of such character
which should have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in
the first instance. The rule of adherence of jurisdiction
(exists) until a cause is finally resolved or adjudicated.
Fe V. Rapsing, Tita C. Villanueva and Annie F. Aparejado,
represented by Edgar Aparejado Vs. Hon. Judge
Maximino R. Ables, of RTC-Branch 47, Masbate City;
SSGT. Edison Rural, et al. G.R. No. 171855. October 15,
2012
It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case is conferred by law and
is determined by the allegations of the complaint
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. As a
necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot
be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer
or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question
of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the
defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is
the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint. The averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the
matters to be consulted.
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968
A party may be barred from raising the defense of lack of
jurisdiction or jurisdiction may be waived on the ground of
estoppel by laches. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of
a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and,
after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction.
Concha v. Lumocso, G.R. No. 158121, December 12,
2007
In a number of cases, we have held that actions for
reconveyance of, or for cancellation of title, to or to quiet
title over real property are actions that fall under the
classification of cases that involve title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein.
Heirs of Telesforo Julao v. Spouses De Jesus, G.R. No.
176020, September 29, 2014
The assessed value must be alleged in the complaint to
determine which court has jurisdiction over the action.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint, which contains the concise
statement of the ultimate facts of a plaintiffs cause of action.
Flores v. Mallare-Philips, L-66620, September 24, 1986
Where there are several claims or causes of action between
the same or different parties embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of
the claims in all causes of action, irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions.
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The causes of action in favor of two or more plaintiffs or


against two or more defendants should arise out of the same
transaction or series of transactions and there should be a
common question of law or fact as provided in Sec. 6, Rule
3
SPOUSES TEODORO and ROSATIO SARAZA and
FERNANDO SARAZA v. WILLIAM FRANCISCO. G.R. No.
198718, November 27, 2013
Although the end result of the respondents claim was the
transfer of the subject property to his name, the suit was
still essentially for specific performance, a personal action,
because it sought Fernandos execution of a deed of
absolute sale based on a contract which he had previously
made. Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then governs
the venue for the respondents action. It provides that
personal actions may be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where
the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or
in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff. Considering the
respondents statement in his complaint that he resides in
Imus, Cavite, the filing of his case with the RTC of Imus was
proper.
SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA v.
FRANCISCO LINDO AND WELHILMINIA LINDO, et al. G.R.
NO. 208232. MARCH 10, 2014
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter
of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court
has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of
the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for
the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is
in the municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend on the
amount of the claim. But where the basic issue is something
other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the
money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not
be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable
of pecuniary estimation. These cases are cognizable
exclusively by RTCs.
LZK HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v.
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK. G.R. NO. 187973,
January 20, 2014
By its very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ
of possession is a non-litigious proceeding. It is a judicial
proceeding for the enforcement of ones right of possession
as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit
filed in court, by which one party sues another for the
enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.
Paglaum Management & Development Corp. And Health
Marketing Technologies, Inc., Vs. Union Bank Of The
Philippines, Notary Public John Doe, And Register Of

Deeds Of Cebu City And Cebu Province, $J. King & Sons
Co., Inc. Intervenor, G.R. No. 179018, June 18, 2012
Civil Case No. 01-1567, being an action for Annulment of
Sale and Titles resulting from the extrajudicial foreclosure
by Union Bank of the mortgaged real properties, is classified
as a real action. In Fortune Motors v. Court of Appeals, this
Court held that a case seeking to annul a foreclosure of a real
estate mortgage is a real action, viz: An action to annul a real
estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from an
action to annul a private sale of real property. (Muoz v.
Llamas, 87 Phil. 737, 1950). While it is true that petitioner
does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of
the property in question, his action for annulment of sale
and his claim for damages are closely intertwined with the
issue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is
considered immovable property, the recovery of which is
petitioners primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is
that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of
real property does not operate to efface the fundamental
and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to
recover said real property. It is a real action.
Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc., et al. vs.
Fil-Estate Land, Inc., G.R. No. 152272, March 5, 2012
The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as
constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting
the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in
accordance with the prayer of said complaint. Stated
differently, if the allegations in the complaint furnish
sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained,
the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defense
that may be asserted by the defendant.
SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING v. ALEXANDER
CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY. G.R. No.
179736, June 26, 2013.
The allegation of petitioners that they are not the owners of
the subject property, thus making them unable to remove
the installed surveillance cameras on the corporations
building, cannot be upheld especially when the corporation
who is managed by the family of petitioners. They are thus
considered parties-in-interest in the present case.
HEIRS OF FAUSTINO MESINA and GENOVEVA S. MESINA,
rep. by NORMAN MESINA v. HEIRS OF DOMINGO FIAN,
SR., rep. by THERESA FIAN YRAY, et al. G.R. No. 201816,
April 8, 2013
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for
the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial
proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be
added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the
tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court, that
court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiffs failure to
comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the nonparty claimed to be indispensable.
Living @ Sense, Inc. vs. Malayan Insurance Company,
Inc. G.R. No. 193753. September 26, 2012
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The nature of the solidary obligation under the surety does


not make one an indispensable party. An indispensable
party is a party-in-interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action, and who shall be
joined mandatorily either as plaintiffs or defendants. The
presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the
court with jurisdiction, thus, without their presence to a suit
or proceeding, the judgment of a court cannot attain real
finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even
as to those present.
Theodore And Nancy Ang, Represented By Eldrige
Marvin B. Ceron, Vs. Spouses Alan And Em Ang,
Respondents. G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that Atty. Aceron is
not a real party in interest in the case below as he does not
stand to be benefited or injured by any judgment therein.
He was merely appointed by the petitioners as their
attorney-in-fact for the limited purpose of filing and
prosecuting the complaint against the respondents. Such
appointment, however, does not mean that he is subrogated
into the rights of petitioners and ought to be considered as
a real party in interest.
El Hogar Filipino v. Seva, No. 36627, November 19, 1932
Where said parcels are the objects of one and the same
transaction, the venue is in the court where ANY of the
provinces (places) where a parcel of land is situated.
Mijares, et al. v. Piccio, et al., L-10458 April 22,1957
If parcels of land are subject of separate and distinct
transactions where there is no common venue, separate
actions should be laid in the court of the province where
each parcel of land is situated
Polytrade Corp. v. Blanco, G.R. No. L-27033, 1969
In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words (e.g. only,
solely, exclusively in this court, in no other court save,
particularly, nowhere else but/except) venue stipulation is
merely permissive and not exclusive which means that the
stipulated venue is in addition to the venue provided for in
the rules
Calo v. Ajax, L-20865, March 13, 1968
A counterclaim, even if otherwise compulsory, but the
amount exceeds the jurisdiction of the inferior court, will
only be considered permissive. Hence, the fact that it is not
set-up in the inferior court will not bar plaintiff from
instituting a separate action to prosecute it.
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BIGNAY EX-IM
PHILIPPINES, INC. G.R. NO. 171590, February 12, 2014
Non-payment of docket fees on ones counterclaim is a
jurisdictional defect. Anent the counterclaims interposed by
defendant for the collection of certain sum of money
adverted earlier hereof, this Court could not exercise
jurisdiction over the same as defendant did not pay the

docket fees therefor. Although the counterclaims were


denominated as compulsory in the answer, the matters
therein alleged were not connected with the plaintiffs
complaint. The counterclaims could stand independently
from the plaintiffs complaint hence they are a sic
permissive counterclaims.
Georgia T. Estel, vs. Recaredo P. Diego, Sr. and Recaredo R.
Diego, Jr., G.R. No. 174082, January 16, 2012
Verification is deemed substantially complied with when, as
in the instant case, one who has ample knowledge to swear
to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition
signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the
petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct.
Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic, G.R. No. 89114, December 2,
1991
Ultimate Facts are those important and substantial facts
which form the basis of the primary right of the plaintiff and
which make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the
defendant. They are the principal, determinate, constitutive
facts, upon the existence of which, the entire cause of action
rests.
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., v. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 7993738, February 13, 1989
Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by
the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified,
the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment
Sps. Go v. Tong, G.R. 151942, Nov. 27, 2003
Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a
jurisdictional requirement, nonpayment of which at the
time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of
the case for as long as the fee is paid within the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period; more so when the
party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the
rules prescribing such payment.
Re: In The Matter of Clarification of Exemption From
Payment of All Court And Sheriffs Fees of Cooperatives
Duly Registered in Accordance with Republic Act No.
9520 Otherwise Known as the Philippine Cooperative
Code Of 2008, Perpetual Help Community Cooperative
(Phcci), A.M. No. 12-2-03-0 , March 13, 2012
With the foregoing categorical pronouncements of the
Supreme Court (Supreme Court En Banc Resolution in A.M.
No. 08-2-01-0, which denied the petition of the GSIS for
recognition of its exemption from payment of legal fees
imposed under Section 22 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,
11 February 2010; Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose
Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes, 26
February 2010), it is evident that the exemption of
cooperatives from payment of court and sheriffs fees no
longer stands. Cooperatives can no longer invoke Republic
REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 3

Act No. 6938, as amended by Republic Act No. 9520, as basis


for exemption from the payment of legal fees.
Rosario v. Carangdang, G.R. No. L-7076, April 28, 1955
If the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction
upon the court then the court cannot admit the amended
complaint. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the case by
the filing of the original complaint, the lower court has
neither the power nor the jurisdiction to act on the motion
for the admission of the amended complaint, much less to
allow such amendment, since it is elementary that the court
must first acquire jurisdiction over the case in order to act
validly therein.
Surigao Mine Exploration Co. v. Harris, G.R. No. L45543, May 17, 1939
The cause of action must exist at the time the action was
begun, and the plaintiff will not be allowed by an
amendment to introduce a cause of action which had no
existence when the action was commenced.
OAMINAL v. CASTILLO, G.R. No. 152776, October 8, 2003
The filing of Motions seeking affirmative relief to admit
answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of
default with motion for reconsideration are considered
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
Having invoked the trial courts jurisdiction to secure
affirmative relief, respondents cannot after failing to
obtain the relief prayed for repudiate the very same
authority they have invoked
REINIER PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING, INC. and
NEPTUNE SHIP MANAGEMENT SVCS, PTE., LTD. v.
CAPTAIN FRANCISCO B.GUEVARRA. G.R. No. 157020,
June 19, 2013.
The clarification provided in A.M. 00-2-14-SC actually
covers a situation where the due date falls on a Saturday,
Sunday, or holiday. Precisely, what such clarification
wanted to address is the erroneous claim that the period of
extension in such a case is to be reckoned from the next
working day and not from the original expiration of the
period. The correct rule, according to the clarification, is
that any extension of time to file the required pleading
should x x x be counted from the expiration of the period
regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday,
Sunday or legal holiday.
SPOUSES BENEDICT and SANDRA MANUE vs. RAMON
ONG G.R. No. 205249, October 15, 2014
Personal service of summons has nothing to do with the
location where summons is served. A defendants address
is inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is clear in what it requires: personally
handing the summons to the defendant. What is
determinative of the validity of personal service is,
therefore, the person of the defendant, not the locus of
service.

Planters Development Bank, Vs. Julie Chandumal, G.R.


No. 19561905 September 2012
In this case, the sheriff resorted to substituted service of
summons due to his failure to serve it personally. In
Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, the Court detailed the
requisites for a valid substituted service of summons,
summed up as follows: (1) impossibility of prompt personal
service the party relying on substituted service or the
sheriff must show that the defendant cannot be served
promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service; (2)
specific details in the return the sheriff must describe in
the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances
surrounding the attempted personal service; (3) a person of
suitable age and discretion the sheriff must determine if
the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of
defendant is of legal age, what the recipients relationship
with the defendant is, and whether said person
comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons
and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at
least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons, which
matters must be clearly and specifically described in the
Return of Summons; and (4) a competent person in charge,
who must have sufficient knowledge to understand the
obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance,
and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the
summons.
GEORGE PIDLIP P. PALILEO and JOSE DE LA CRUZ vs.
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK G.R. No. 193650,
October 8, 2014
The service and filing of pleadings by courier service, as
made by the respondent to the petitioners, is a mode not
provided in the Rules. Realizing its mistake, PDB re-filed
and re-sent the omnibus motion by registered mail, which
is the proper mode of service under the circumstances. By
then, however, the 15-day period had expired. PDBs Notice
of Appeal, which was filed only on September 7, 2006, was
tardy; it had only up to August 1, 2006 within which to file
the same. The trial court therefore acted regularly in
denying PDBs notice of appeal.
Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr., represented by their coheirs and attorneys-in-fact, Mercedes A. Favis and Nelly
Favis-Villafuente v. Juana Gonzales, her son Mariano
Favis, all minors represented herein by their parents,
Sps. Mariano Favis and Larcelita D. Favis,G.R. No.
185922, January 15, 2014
Significantly, the Rule requires that such a motion should be
filed within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim. The time frame
indicates that thereafter, the motion to dismiss based on the
absence of the condition precedent is barred. It is so
inferable from the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9
stating that defense and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
There are, as just noted, only four exceptions to this Rule,
namely, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; litis
pendentia; res judicata; and prescription of action. Failure
to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts at a
REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 4

compromise has been made but had failed is not one of the
exceptions.
Go v. Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 58986, April 17, 1983
What causes the loss by a plaintiff of the right to effect
dismissal of the action by mere notice is not the filing of the
defendants answer with the court but the service on the
plaintiff of said answer or of a motion for summary
judgment. Where the plaintiff filed the notice of dismissal of
his action in the court after the filing of defendants answer
but before service thereof, the plaintiffs notice to that effect
ipso facto brought about the dismissal of the pending action
without need of any order from the trial court
VIRGINIA S. DIO and H.S. EQUITIES, LTD vs. SUBIC BAY
MARINE EXPLORATORIUM, INC., represented by its
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, TIMOTHY
DESMOND G.R. No. 189532, June 11, 2014
Petitioners filed counterclaim against respondents.
However, the latter alleged that the dismissal of the main
action results to the dismissal of the counterclaims. The
Court ruled that as the rule now stands, the nature of the
counterclaim notwithstanding, the dismissal of the
complaint does not ipso jure result in the dismissal of the
counterclaim, and the latter may remain for independent
adjudication of the court, provided that such counterclaim,
states a sufficient cause of action and does not labor under
any infirmity that may warrant its outright dismissal. Stated
differently, the jurisdiction of the court over the
counterclaim that appears to be valid on its face, including
the grant of any relief thereunder, is not abated by the
dismissal of the main action. The courts authority to
proceed with the disposition of the counterclaim
independent of the main action is premised on the fact that
the counterclaim, on its own, raises a novel question which
may be aptly adjudicated by the court based on its own
merits and evidentiary support.
Natividad Lim vs. National Power Corporation, Sps.
Roberto Ll. Arcinue and Arabela Arcinue, G.R. No.
178789. November 14, 2012
Lim points out that an answer-in-intervention cannot give
rise to default since the filing of such an answer is only
permissive. But Section 4, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure requires the original parties to file an answer to
the complaint-in-intervention within 15 days from notice of
the order admitting the same, unless a different period is
fixed by the court. This changes the procedure under the
former rule where such an answer was regarded as
optional. Thus, Lims failure to file the required answer can
give rise to default.
STA. RITA & CO., INC. AND ARLENE STA. RITA KANAPI v.
ANGELINE M. GUECO. G.R. No.193078, August 28, 2013
Persons who are not parties to a case, either as petitioners,
defendants or intervenors, they cannot participate in the
proceedings of the same. Consequently, they also cannot be
adversely affected by the outcome of such proceeding. A
complaint-in-intervention cannot be treated as an

independent action as it is merely an ancillary to and a


supplement of the principal action. The complaint-inintervention essentially latches on the complaint for its
legal efficacy so much so that the dismissal of the complaint
leads to its concomitant dismissal.
Eloisa Merchandising, Inc. And Trebel International,
Inc., Vs. Banco De Oro Universal Bank And Engracio M.
Escasinas, Jr., In His Capacity As Ex-Officio Sheriff Of The
Rtc Of Makati City, G.R. No. 192716, June 13, 2012
While under the present Rules, it is now the duty of the clerk
of court to set the case for pre-trial if the plaintiff fails to do
so within the prescribed period, this does not relieve the
plaintiff of his own duty to prosecute the case diligently.
This case had been at the pre-trial stage for more than two
years and petitioners have not shown special circumstances
or compelling reasons to convince us that the dismissal of
their complaint for failure to prosecute was unjustified.
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112710, May 30,
2001
Deposition is a written testimony of a witness given in the
course of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trial or
hearing upon oral examination or in response to written
interrogatories and where an opportunity is given for crossexamination.
EAGLE
RIDGE
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
MARCELO N. NAVAL and CRISPIN I. OBEN vs. CAMERON
GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC. G.R. No.
204700, November 24, 2014
Cameron Granville filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Courts April 10, 2013 decision. Cameron Granville posited
that the motion for production was filed out of time and that
the rule on parole evidence is applicable. However, the
Court ruled that the availment of a motion for production,
as one of the modes of discovery, is not limited to the pretrial stage. Rule 27 does not provide for any time frame
within which the discovery mode of production or
inspection of documents can be utilized. The rule only
requires leave of court upon due application and a showing
of due cause.
Nenita Gonzales, Et. Al. Vs. Mariano Bugaay And Lucy
Bugaay, G.R. No. 173008, February 22, 2012
In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a
demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether
there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the
judgment. Being considered a motion to dismiss, thus, a
demurrer to evidence must clearly be filed before the court
renders its judgment. Accordingly, the CA committed
reversible error in granting the demurrer and dismissing
the Amended Complaint a quo for insufficiency of evidence.
The demurrer to evidence was clearly no longer an
available remedy to respondents and should not have been
granted, as the RTC had correctly done.
TEOFILO B. ADOLFO vs. FE T. ADOLFO G.R. No. 201427,
March 18, 2015
REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 5

Judgment on the pleadings is proper where an answer fails


to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse partys pleading. An answer
would fail to tender an issue if it does not deny the
material allegations in the complaint or admits said
material allegations of the adverse partys pleadings by
confessing the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal
with them at all. Now, if an answer does in fact specifically
deny the material averments of the complaint and/or
asserts affirmative defenses (allegations of new matter
which, while admitting the material allegations of the
complaint expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless
prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff), a judgment on the
pleadings would naturally be improper.
Spouses Ramon Villuga And Mercedita Villuga, Vs. Kelly
Hardware And Construction Supply Inc., Represented
By Ernesto V. Yu, Executive Vice-President And General
Manager, G.R. No. 176570, July 18, 2012
A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary
judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face
appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and
admissions presented by the moving party show that such
issues are not genuine.
Philippine Business Bank vs. Chua, 15 November 2010
A partial summary judgment as a rule is not appealable
sepearately from the judgment in the entire case, unless
allowed by the court under Sec.1(f) Rule 41. Hence, the
failure to appeal separately from a partial summary
judgment or to challenge it by a special civil action for
certiorari does not make the same final and executory.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANDY ZULIETA a.k.a.
Bogarts, G.R. No. 192183, November 11, 2013.
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA v. HONORABLE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. G.R. No.
208566, November 19, 2013
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle
states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a
subsequent case if, between the first and second actions,
there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
causes of action. On the other hand, the focal point of stare
decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched
under Article 8 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule
that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one
case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the
facts are substantially the same, even though the parties
may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of
justice that, absent any powerful countervailing
considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike.
CECILIA PAGADUAN vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION et
al G.R. No. 206379, November 19, 2014

The principle of res judicata is applicable either by way of


bar by prior judgment or by conclusiveness of judgment.
Here, Salvadors defense was res judicata by conclusiveness
of judgment. Contrary to Salvadors contention , however,
there appears to be no identity of issues and facts in the two
administrative cases. The first case involved facts necessary
to resolve the issue of whether or not Salvador falsified her
PDS. The second one involved facts necessary to resolve the
issue of whether or not Salvador was convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude. Falsification was the main issue
in the first case, while it was no longer an issue in the second
case. The only fact to consider in the second administrative
complaint is the fact of conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. It must be borne in mind that both administrative
complaints were based on different grounds. The grounds
were separate and distinct from each other and entailed
different sets of facts.
LZK Holdings and Development Corporation v. Planters
Development Bank, G.R. No. 187973, January 20, 2014
All the elements of the doctrine are present in this case. The
final judgment in G.R. No. 167998 was rendered by the
Court pursuant to its jurisdiction over the review of
decisions and rulings of the CA. It was a judgment on the
merits of Planters Banks right to apply for and be issued a
writ of possession. Lastly, the parties in G.R. No. 167998 are
the same parties involved in the present case.
Neypes v. CA, GR 141524, September 14, 2005
The aggrieved party has a fresh period of 15 days from the
denial of motion for reconsideration or new trial within
which to file his appeal. This applies to Rules 40, 41, 42, 43
and 45.
Yu v. Samson Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, February 9, 2011
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases,
the Courts pronouncement of a fresh period to appeal
should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal
cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. First, BP 129, as amended, the
substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes
no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case
and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically
states that [t]he period for appeal from final orders,
resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in
all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice
of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision
appealed from. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this
Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction.
SAN LORENZO RUIZ BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS
GROUP, INC. AND OSCAR VIOLAGO, PETITIONERS, vs.
MA. CRISTINA F. BAYANG G.R. No. 194702, April 20,
2015
It is settled that the fresh period rule in Neypes applies
only to judicial appeals and not to administrative appeals.
The fresh period rule shall apply to Rule 40 (appeals from
the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts);
REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 6

Rule 41 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court


of Appeals or Supreme Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals); Rule 43
(appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of
Appeals); and Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to the Supreme
Court). Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings
under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Fortune Life Insurance Co., Inc. v. COA, G.R. No. 213525,
January 27, 2015
The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are
different. In the former, the aggrieved party is allowed 15
days to file the petition for review from receipt of the
assailed decision or final order, or from receipt of the denial
of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. In the latter,
the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed.
The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if
allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission
concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion
be denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within
the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days
in any event, reckoned from the notice of denial. We ruled
in Pates v. Commission on Elections that the belated filing
of the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief that
the fresh period rule should apply was fatal to the recourse.
As such, the petitioner herein should suffer the same fate for
having wrongly assumed that the fresh period rule under
Neypes applied.
GREGORIO DE LEON, DOING BUSINESS AS G.D.L.
MARKETING vs. HERCULES AGRO INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION AND/OR JESUS CHUA AND RUMI RUNGIS
MILK G.R. No. 183239, June 02, 2014
The CA correctly ordered that De Leons appellants brief be
stricken off the records. De Leons motion for time praying
for an additional 10 days to file his motion for partial
reconsideration is validly denied by the RTC, since such
motion is a transgression of the mandatory prohibition on
the filing of a motion for extension to file a motion for
reconsideration. Doctrinally-entrenched is that the right to
appeal is a statutory right and the one who seeks to avail
that right must comply with the statute or rules. The
perfection of appeal in the manner and within the period set
by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well,
hence, failure to perfect the same renders the judgment
final and executory.
Priscilla Alma Jose, Vs. Ramon C. Javellana, Et Al., G.R.
No. 158239
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of
an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule
65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be
resorted to.
Casupanan vs. Laroya, G.R. No. 145391, 26 August 2002

A dismissal for forum-shopping under Sec. 5 Rule 7 is


without prejudice unless otherwise stated in the dismissal
order. Under Sec. 1 Rule 41, no appeal lies from an order
dismissing a case without prejudice and hence a party may
file an appropriate civil action under Rule 65.
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, represented by its
Administrator MELQUIADES A. ROBLES vs. AURORA A.
SALVAA G.R. No. 192074, June 10, 2014
The present rule is that a government party is a party
adversely affected for purposes of appeal provided that the
government party that has a right to appeal must be the
office or agency prosecuting the case. The grant of the right
to appeal in administrative cases is not new. In Republic Act
No. 2260 or the Civil Service Law of 1959, appeals by the
respondent were allowed on the decision of the
Commissioner of Civil Service rendered in an
administrative case involving discipline of subordinate
officers and employees. Thus, LRTA had standing to appeal
the modification by the Civil Service Commission of its
decision.
Perez v. Ombudsman, GR. No. 131445, May 27, 2004
Appeals from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary cases are no longer
appealable to the SC but to the CA via a petition for review
(Rule 43) (Fabian v. Desierto, GR. No. 129742, Sept. 16,
1998). However, the remedy of an aggrieved party from a
decision or order of the Office of the Ombudsman in a
criminal case is to file a petition for certiorari before the SC.
JULIET VITUG MADARANG and ROMEO BARTOLOME,
represented by his attorneys-in-fact and acting in their
personal capacities, RODOLFO and RUBY BARTOLOME
vs. SPOUSES JESUS D. MORALES and CAROLINA N.
MORALES G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014
A petition for relief from judgment must be filed within 60
days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or
proceeding and within six (6) months from entry of
judgment or final order. The double period required under
Section 3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and should be strictly
complied with. A petition for relief of judgment filed beyond
the reglementary period is dismissed outright. Under
Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a
petition for relief from judgment may be filed on the ground
of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. A
motion for reconsideration is required before a petition for
certiorari is filed to grant the court which rendered the
assailed judgment or order an opportunity to correct any
actual or perceived error attributed to it by the reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the
case. In this case, petitioners had until July 9, 2010 to file a
notice of appeal, considering that their former counsel
received a copy of the order denying their motion for
reconsideration of the trial courts decision on June 24,
2010. Since petitioners filed their notice of appeal only on
August 11, 2010, the trial court correctly denied the notice
of appeal for having been filed out of time. Even if we
assume that petitioners filed their petition for relief from
REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 7

judgment within the reglementary period, petitioners failed


to prove that their former counsels failure to file a timely
notice of appeal was due to a mistake or excusable
negligence.
Dare Adventure Farm Corporation Vs. Spouses Felix
and Nenita Ng, Spouses Martin and Azucena Ng and
Agripina R. Goc-ong, et al. G.R. No. 161122. September
24, 2012
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity
so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when
other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final
order or final resolution sought to be annulled was
rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic
fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not
allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties
aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or resolutions.
Leticia Diona, rep. by her attorney-in-fact, Marcelina
Diona Vs. Romeo A. Balangue, Sonny A. Balangue,
Reynaldo A. Balangue, and Esteban A. Balangue, Jr. G.R.
No. 173559. January 7, 2013
While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on
the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction,
jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional
ground to annul a judgment. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals,
this Court declared that a final and executory judgment may
still be set aside if, upon mere inspection thereof, its patent
nullity can be shown for having been issued without
jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law.
HEIRS OF RETERTA VS MORES & LOPEZ, G.R. No.
159941, August 17, 2011
The concept of final judgment, as distinguished from one
which has become final (or executory as of right [final and
executory]), is definite and settled. A final judgment or
order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing
more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an
adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the
evidence presented at the trial declares categorically what
the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party
is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an
action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or
prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended,
as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights
and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more
remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties
next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of
a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of
an appeal), this is what is referred to as the final judgment
for purposes of appeal.
Ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment
once it becomes final or, to use the established and more
distinctive term, final and executory.
MAGDALENA T. VILLASI v. FILOMENO GARCIA G.R. NO.
190106, January 15, 2014

Indeed, the power of the court in executing judgments


extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the
judgment debtor alone. An execution can be issued only
against a party and not against one who did not have his day
in court. The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria
is founded on his title or right of possession. Corollary
thereto, before the court can exercise its supervisory power
to direct the release of the property mistakenly levied and
the restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant
must first unmistakably establish his ownership or right of
possession thereon. However, the Spouses Garcia failed to
prove that they have a bona fide title to the building as they
were unable to present credible evidence to prove their
ownership. All that the Spouses raised were their
postulation as title holders of the land and the presumption
of ownership over improvements built thereon; whereas
Villasi, on the other hand, was able to show documentary
proof of ownership.
Department of Environment and Natural Resources v.
United Planners Consultants, Inc., G.R. No. 212081,
February 23, 2015
Execution is fittingly called the fruit and end of suit and the
life of the law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be
nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. While
it appears that the Special ADR Rules remain silent on the
procedure for the execution of a confirmed arbitral award,
it is the Courts considered view that the Rules procedural
mechanisms cover not only aspects of confirmation but
necessarily extend to a confirmed awards execution in light
of the doctrine of necessary implication which states that
every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed
to include all incidental power, right or privilege.
CORONA INTERNATIONAL VS CA, G.R. No. 127851.
October 18, 2000
In upholding the disallowance of the execution pending
appeal ordered by the trial court, albeit on different
grounds, we are guided by the rule that execution pending
appeal must be strictly construed being an exception to the
general rule. So, too, execution pending appeal is not to be
availed of and applied routinely, but only in extraordinary
circumstances. Here, with the alleged collapse of
petitioners business operations rendered doubtful, we find
no good reason to order execution pending appeal.
INFANTE VS. ARAN BUILDERS, INC., G.R. NO.156596, 24
AUGUST 2007
If the action affects title to or possession of real property or
any interest therein, the action for revival must be filed with
the court having jurisdiction over the place where the real
property or any portion thereof is situated. Otherwise, the
action for revival of judgment is a personal action wherein
the venue lies with the residence of either the plaintiff or
defendant, at the option of the plaintiff.
VILLARIN VS MUNASQUE, G.R. No. 169444, September
17, 2008
REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 8

Based on the foregoing, the sheriff is required to first


demand of the judgment obligor the immediate payment of
the full amount stated in the writ of execution before a levy
can be made. The sheriff shall demand such payment either
in cash, certified bank check or any other mode of payment
acceptable to the judgment obligee. If the judgment obligor
cannot pay by these methods immediately or at once, he can
exercise his option to choose which of his properties can be
levied upon. If he does not exercise this option immediately
or when he is absent or cannot be located, he waives such
right, and the sheriff can now first levy his personal
properties, if any, and then the real properties if the
personal properties are insufficient to answer for the
judgment.
CALUAG VS PECSON, October 29, 1948, G.R. No. L-1403
Judgment for Specific acts pertains to a judgment directs a
party to execute a conveyance of land or to deliver deeds or
other documents or to perform any specific act which may
be performed by some other person, or in some other way
provided by law with the same effect, as in the present case,
section 10, and not said section 9 of Rule 39 applies; and
under the provision of said section 10, the court may direct
the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party, by
some other person appointed or designated by the court,
and the act when so done shall have like effect as if done by
the party himself.
SPOUSES VERSOLA VS. CA, G.R. NO. 164740,31 JULY
2006
It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption
merely alleges that such property is a family home. This
claim for exemption must be set and proved to the sheriff.
Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming
the exemption.
CHING vs. CA, G.R. NO. 124642, FEBRUARY 23, 2004)
Upon application of the third person through a motion to set
aside the levy on attachment, the court shall order a
summary hearing for the purpose of determining whether
the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance
of his duties in the execution of the writ of attachment. The
court may order the sheriff to release the property from the
erroneous levy and to return the same to the third person.
In resolving the application, the court cannot pass upon the
question of title to the property with any character of
finality but only insofar as may be necessary to decide if the
sheriff has acted correctly or not.
HELEN CABLING assisted by her husband ARIEL
CABLING vs. JOSELIN TAN LUMAPAS as represented by
NORY ABELLANES, G.R. No. 196950, June 18, 2014
Under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which is
made applicable to extrajudicial foreclosures of real estate
mortgages, the possession of the property shall be given to
the purchaser or last redemptioner unless a third party is
actually holding the property in a capacity adverse to the
judgment obligor. It contemplates a situation in which a
third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such

as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary, who


possesses the property in his own right, and is not merely
the successor or transferee of the right of possession of
another co-owner or the owner of the property.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS SECURITIES
CORPORATION vs. EDGARDO V. GUEVARA G.R. No.
167052, March 11, 2015
In an action for enforcement of foreign judgment, the Court
has limited review over the decision rendered by the
foreign tribunal. The Philippine courts cannot pass upon the
merits of the case pursuant to the incorporation clause of
the Constitution, unless there is proof of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
Calo v. Roldan, G.R. No. L-252, March 30, 1946
The provisional remedies denominated attachment,
preliminary injunction, receivership, and delivery of
personal property, provided in Rules 59, 60, 61, and 62 of
the Rules of Court, respectively, are remedies to which
parties litigant may resort for the preservation or
protection of their rights or interest, and for no other
purpose, during the pendency of the principal action. If an
action, by its nature, does not require such protection or
preservation, said remedies can not be applied for and
granted.
Davao Light v. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 343
A preliminary attachment may be defined, paraphrasing the
Rules of Court, as the provisional remedy in virtue of which
a plaintiff or other party may, at the commencement of the
action or at any time thereafter, have the property of the
adverse party taken into the custody of the court as security
for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered.
Equitable v. Special Steel, G.R. No. 175350, June 13,
2012
A writ of preliminary attachment is too harsh a provisional
remedy to be issued based on mere abstractions of fraud.
Rather, the rules require that for the writ to issue, there
must be a recitation of clear and concrete factual
circumstances manifesting that the debtor practiced fraud
upon the creditor at the time of the execution of their
agreement in that said debtor had a preconceived plan or
intention not to pay the creditor.
Executive Secretary, et al. Vs. Forerunner Multi
Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 199324. January 7, 2013
It is a deeply ingrained doctrine in Philippine remedial law
that a preliminary injunctive writ under Rule 58 issues only
upon a showing of the applicants clear legal right being
violated or under threat of violation by the defendant.
Clear legal right, within the meaning of Rule 58,
contemplates a right clearly founded in or granted by law.
Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal right
precludes the grant of preliminary injunctive relief. For
suits attacking the validity of laws or issuances with the
REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 9

force and effect of law, as here, the applicant for preliminary


injunctive relief bears the added burden of overcoming the
presumption of validity inhering in such laws or issuances.
These procedural barriers to the issuance of a preliminary
injunctive writ are rooted on the equitable nature of such
relief, preserving the status quo while, at the same time,
restricting the course of action of the defendants even
before adverse judgment is rendered against them.

Replevin is so usually described as a mixed action, being


partly in rem and partly in personam-in rem insofar as the
recovery of specific property is concerned, and in personam
as regards to damages involved. As an action in rem, the
gist of the replevin action is the right of the plaintiff to
obtain possession of specific personal property by reason of
his being the owner or of his having a special interest
therein.

FLORD NICSON CALAWAG v. UNIVERSITY OF THE


PHILIPPINES VISAYAS, ET AL./ MICAH P. ESPIA, ET AL.
v. DR. CARLOS BAYLON, ET AL. G.R. No. 207412/207542,
August 07, 2013
Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction presents a fourth requirement: it is
justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute.
When the complainants right is thus doubtful or disputed,
he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the
issuance of injunctive relief is improper.

Hao v. Andres, A.M. No. P-07-2384, June 18, 2008


The rules provide that property seized under a writ of
replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff.
Under Section 6, Rule 60, the Sheriff should have waited no
less than 5 days in order to give the complainant an
opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the bond.

SPOUSES SILVESTRE O. PLAZA AND ELENA Y. PLAZA v.


GUILLERMO LUSTIVA, ELEODORA VDA. DE MARTINEZ
AND VICKY SAYSON GOLOSENO. G.R. NO. 172909,
MARCH 5, 2014
A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy; it
is auxiliary, an adjunct of, and subject to the determination
of the main action. It is deemed lifted upon the dismissal of
the main case, any appeal therefrom notwithstanding. Upon
the dismissal of the main case by the RTC, the question of
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction has become
moot and academic. Upon the dismissal of the main action,
the question of the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction automatically died with it.
Bacolod City Water District v. Labayen, G.R. No. 157494,
December 10, 2004
A restraining order, on the other hand, is issued to preserve
the status quo until the hearing of the application for
preliminary injunction which cannot be issued ex parte.
Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a judge may issue a
temporary restraining order with a limited life of twenty
(20) days from date of issue. If before the expiration of the
twenty (20)-day period the application for preliminary
injunction is denied, the temporary restraining order would
be deemed automatically vacated.
SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON AGNER vs. BPI
FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC. G.R. No. 182963, June 3,
2013.
Prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a
writ of replevin, since there is nothing in Section 2, Rule 60
of the Rules of Court that requires the applicant to make a
demand on the possessor of the property before an action
for a writ of replevin could be filed.
BA Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA
102
The action is primarily possessory in nature and generally
determines nothing more than the right of possession.

Ocampo v. Tirona, G.R. No. 147382, April 6, 2005


Interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has
property whether personal or real, in his possession, or an
obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming
any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in
part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to
court and asks that the persons who claim the said property
or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance
with the obligation, be required to litigate among
themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to
one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect
a person against a double liability but to protect him against
a double vexation in respect of one liability.
Wack-Wack Golf v. Won 70 SCRA 165
It must be noted that a stockholder should use reasonable
diligence, that is, by filing the interpleader suit within a
reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting
to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise,
he may be barred by laches or undue delay.
Almeda v. Bathala Marketing Industries, 542 SCRA 470
Respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for
purposes of determining the correct interpretation of
condition Nos. 6 and 7 of the lease contract to prevent
damage and prejudice. The court took cognizance on the
case, despite the fact that a separate action was pending in
another court because in the instant case no breach was
committed.
Jumamil v. Caf, G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005
The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are:1) the
subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, statute, executive
order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said
documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require
judicial construction; 3) there must have been no breach of
the documents in question; 4) there must be an actual
justiciable controversy or the ripening seeds of one
between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue
must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate
relief is not available through other means or other forms of
action or proceeding.
REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 10

Lokin v. COMELEC, 621 SCA 385


Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for
certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review of the
resolution of the COMELEC in approving the withdrawal of
his nomination. The constitutional mandate is now
implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments,
final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the
Commission on Audit.
Vergara v. Rugue, G.R. No. L-32984, August 25, 1977
The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and
oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a
fair and orderly administration of justice. It is directed
against proceedings that are done without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being
no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
Angchangco v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 122728, February
13, 1997
Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation,
board, or person to do the act required to be done when it
or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Special People, Inc. Foundation, represented by its
Chairman, Roberti P. Cericos v. Nestor M. Canda, et al.,
G.R. No. 160932. January 14, 2013
A key principle to be observed in dealing with petitions for
mandamus is that such extraordinary remedy lies to compel
the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in
nature, not those that are discretionary. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done. The duty is
ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the
exercise of official discretion or judgment.
Galang v. Geronimo, G.R. No. 192793, February 22, 2011
A petition for certiorari was filed questioning an
interlocutory order of a trial court in an electoral protest
was within the appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC. Since
it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance
of an appeal from the decision of the regional trial court in
election contests involving elective municipal officials, then
it is also the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
RET. LT. GEN. JACINTO C. LIGOT, et al. v. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING COUNCIL G.R. No. 176944, March 6, 2013.

Lt. Gen. Ligot, et al. filed a petition for certiorari when the
CA extended the freeze order against their properties. Ligot,
et al. should have filed a petition for review on certiorari,
and not a petition for certiorari, to assail the CA resolution
which extended the effectivity period of the freeze order
over their properties.
THE CITY OF MANILA vs. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIACUERDO. G.R. NO. 175723 , February 4, 2014
The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs
of certiorari involves the exercise of original jurisdiction
which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or
by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of
appellate jurisdiction. On the strength of the constitutional
provisions under Article VIII, it can be fairly interpreted
that the power of the CTA includes that of determining
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within
the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus,
follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested
with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 456
Phil. 755
The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision
of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, if the error
subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act
complained of was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or
agency with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the
aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the said Rules.
Fermin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179695, December 18,
2008
The Court has already likened a proceeding under Section
78 to a quo warranto proceeding since they both deal with
the eligibility or qualification of a candidate. The distinction
mainly in the fact that a Section 78 under Section 253 of
the OEC, petition is filed before proclamation, while a
petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the
winning candidate
Spouses Rosales v. Spouses Alfonso, G.R. No. 137792,
August 12, 2003
This is the mortgagors equity (not right) of redemption
which, as above stated, may be exercised by him even
beyond the 90-day period from the date of service of the
order, and even after the foreclosure sale itself, provided it
be before the order of confirmation of the sale. After such
order of confirmation, no redemption can be effected any
longer.
Sepulveda v. Pelaez, G.R. No. 152195, January 31, 2005
Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the
property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for
partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.
The mere fact that Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. has repudiated the
REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 11

co-ownership between him and the respondent does not


deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the action for partition, for, in a complaint for partition, the
plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co- owner of
the subject property; and, second, the conveyance of his
lawful shares.
Sarmiento v. Manalite Home Owners Association, G.R.
No. 182953, October 11, 2010
In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint,
and prove, that he was in prior physical possession of the
property in dispute until he was deprived thereof by the
defendant by any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule
70 of the Rules either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy
or stealth. In unlawful detainer, there must be an allegation
in the complaint of how the possession of defendant started
or continued, that is, by virtue of lease or any contract, and
that defendant holds possession of the land or building
after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.
Reyes v. Sta. Maria, G.R. No. L- 33213 June 29, 1979
There are three kinds of actions for the recovery of
possession of real pro. property, namely, (1) the summary
action for forcible entry or detainer (denominatedaccion
interdictal under the former law of procedure, Ley de
Enjuiciamiento Civil) which seeks the recovery of physical
possession only and is brought within one year in the justice
of the peace court; (2) the accion publiciana which is for the
recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an
ordinary civil proceeding in a Court of First Instance; and
(3) accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of
ownership (which of course includes the jus utendi and the
jus fruendi) also brought in the Court of First Instance.
Arquelada v. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No.
139137, March 31, 2000
The action for unlawful detainer was based on the
expiration of the contract of lease, a demand to vacate was
not necessary for judicial action after the expiration of the
terms of the lease. There being no need for any demand or
notice, there was likewise no necessity to wait for five (5)
days upon notice or demand before an action for unlawful
detainer may be filed.
CHARLIE LIM vs. SPOUSES DANILO LIGON and
GENEROSA VITUG-LIGON G.R. No. 183589, June 25,
2014
As a result of the finality of the judgment in the ejectment
case, Spouses Ligon were evicted from the subject property.
They filed a complaint against defendant Lim for Quieting of
Title and Recovery of Possession to restore them to their
possession of the subject property. The legal limitation,
despite the finality of the ruling in the ejectment case, is that
the concept of possession or prior possession which was
established in favor of defendants predecessors-in-interest
in the ejectment case pertained merely to possession de
facto, and not possession de jure. The favorable judgment in
favor of defendants predecessors-in-interest cannot

therefore bar an action between the same parties with


respect to who has title to the land in question.
Juanita Ermitano, represented by her Attorney-in-fact,
Isabelo Ermitano v. Lailanie M. Paglas; G.R. No. 174436.
January 23, 2013
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that the
only question that the courts resolve in ejectment
proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of
the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to
the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a partys
title to the property is questionable. In an unlawful detainer
case, the sole issue for resolution is the physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any
claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Where the
issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts
may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the
right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however,
merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action
between the same parties involving title to the property.
Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Anthony
Parungao, Narciso B. Nieto, in their capacity as
Undersecretaries of Legal Affairs and Field Operations
of the Department of Agrarian Reform, et al., G.R. No.
197507. January 14, 2013
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court
by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity,
and signifies not only a willful disregard of the courts order,
but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the
court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in
some manner, to impede the due administration of justice.
To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly
contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court. Thus, a
person cannot be punished for contempt for disobedience
of an order of the Court, unless the act which is forbidden or
required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that
there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what
specific act or thing is forbidden or required.
Inoturan v. Limsiaco, Jr. 458 SCRA 48
It is only the judge, who orders the confinement of a person
for contempt of court, who can issue the order of release.
CASTILLEJOS CONSUMNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
(CASCONA) vs. JOSE S. DOMINGUEZ, ET AL. G.R. No.
189949, March 25, 2015
A criminal contempt involves a conduct that is directed
against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge
acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration
of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or
disrespect. Civil contempt on the other hand, consists in
failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a
civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein and
is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf
the violated order is made.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 12

Montaer vc CA, G.R. No. 174975, January 20, 2009


A special proceeding, by which a party seeks to establish a
status, right, or a particular fact, has one definite party,
who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right,
or particular fact, but no definite adverse party.
THELMA M. ARANAS v. TERESITA V. MERCADO. G.R. NO.
156407, JANUARY 15, 2014
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as
an intestate court is special and limited. The trial court
cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of
the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title
adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue
of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the
trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine
whether or not they should be included in the inventory of
properties to be administered by the administrator.
Uriarte vs CFI Of Negros, G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29,
1970
The matter of venue, or the particular Court of First
Instance where the special proceeding should be
commenced, is regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules
of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first
instance in the province in which he resided at the time of
his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
court of first instance of any province in which he had
estate.
Leo C. Romero and David Amando C. Romero vs. Hon.
Court of Appeals, Aurora C. Romero and Vittorio C.
Romero, G.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012
In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the
question of ownership of certain of the properties involved
whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the
husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the
jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to
liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the
estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his
heirs who are all parties to the proceedings.
Romero vs CA, G.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012
In testament to this, it has been held that it is within the
jurisdiction of the probate court to (1) approve the sale of
properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs
before final adjudication; (2) to determine who are the heirs
of the decedent; (3) the recognition of a natural child; (4)
the status of a woman claiming to be the legal wife of the
decedent; the legality of disinheritance of an heir by the
testator; and (5)to pass upon the validity of a waiver of
hereditary rights.
Pereira vs CA, G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989
When a person dies leaving property, the same should be
JUDICIALLY ADMINISTERED and the competent court
should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order

established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left


no will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to name an
executor therein.
Neri, at al. vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha
Ibrahim Uy., G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of
the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy,
all the heirs of Anunciacion should have participated.
Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly
excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not
properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid
and binding upon them and consequently, a total nullity.
Nufable vs Nufable, G.R. No. 126950 July 2, 1999
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited
only to passing upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought
to be probated, the due execution thereof, the testators
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribes by law. The question of
the intrinsic validity of a will normally comes only after the
court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.
Ajerovs.CA, G.R.No.106720 September 15, 1994
Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate,
the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the
instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedents last will and
testament; (2) whether said will was executed in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3)
whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary
capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether
the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary
acts of the decedent.
Emilio A.M. Suntay III vs. Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay., G.R.
No. 183053, October 10, 2012
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an
administrator over the estate of a decedent is the
prospective administrators interest in the estate. This is the
same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into
account in establishing the order of preference in the
appointment of administrator for the estate. The rationale
behind the rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a
wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate,
or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste,
improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest
and most influential motive to administer the estate
correctly. In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of
preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a
decedents estate must demonstrate not only an interest in
the estate, but an interest therein greater than any other
candidate.
Ocampo vs. Ocampo, G.R. No. 187879, July 5, 2010
The principal object of the appointment of a temporary
administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass to
the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for
the benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of
Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 13

Estate of Olave vs. Reyes, G.R. No. L-29407 July 29, 1983
The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of
the estate in the probate court is to protect the estate of
deceased persons to enable the executor or administrator
will be able to examine each claim and determine whether
it is a proper one which should be allowed. Further, the
primary object of the provisions requiring presentation is
to apprise the administrator and the probate court of the
existence of the claim so that a proper and timely
arrangement may be made for its payment in full or by prorata portion in the due course of the administration.
Gutierrez vs. Baretto-Datu, G.R. No. L-17175, July 31,
1962
The word claims as used in statutes requiring the
presentation of claims against a decedents estate is
generally construed to mean debts or demands of a
pecuniary nature which could have been enforced against
the deceased in his lifetime and could have been reduced to
simple money judgments; and among these are those
founded upon contract.
Stronghold Insurance vs. Republic-Asahi, G.R. No. 147561,
June 22, 2006
Generally, death of either the creditor or the debtor does
not extinguish the obligation and only obligations that are
personal or are identified with the persons themselves are
extinguished by death. Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims
arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased
debtor as these claims are not actually extinguished.
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Absolute
Management Corporation, G.R. No. 170498. January 9,
2013
A distinctive character of Metrobanks fourth-party
complaint is its contingent nature the claim depends on
the possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged liable to
AMC, a future event that may or may not happen. This
characteristic unmistakably marks the complaint as a
contingent one that must be included in the claims falling
under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
De Bautista v. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-28298, November
25, 1983
The only instance wherein a creditor can file an action
against a distributee of the debtors asset is under Sec. 5,
Rule 88 of the Rules of Court. The contingent claims must
first have been established and allowed in the probate court
before the creditors can file an action directly, against the
distributes, such is not the situation in the case at bar.
Natcher vs. CA, G.R. No. 133000, October 2, 2001
Before any conclusion about the legal share due to a
compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that the net
estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all
payable obligations and charges from the value of the
property owned by the deceased at the time of his death;
then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it,
form there, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can

be established; and it is only then can it be ascertained


whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.
Solivio vs. CA, G.R. No. 83484, February 12, 1990
As a general rule, the better practice, however, for the heir
who has not received his share, is to demand his share
through a proper motion in the same probate or
administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate
or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed,
and not through an independent action.
Torbela vs. Rosario, G.R. No. 140528 G.R. No. 140553,
December 7, 2011
It is true that in express trusts and resulting trusts, a trustee
cannot acquire by prescription a property entrusted to him
unless he repudiates the trust. Acquisitive prescription may
bar the action of the beneficiary against the trustee in an
express trust for the recovery of the property held in trust
where (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust;
(b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known
to the cestui que trust, and (c) the evidence thereon is clear
and conclusive.
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Hi-Tri
Development Corporation and Luz R. Bakunawa., G.R.
No. 192413, June 13, 2012
Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error when it
ruled that the issuance of individual notices upon
respondents was a jurisdictional requirement, and that
failure to effect personal service on them rendered the
Decision and the Order of the RTC void for want of
jurisdiction. Escheat proceedings are actions in rem,
whereby an action is brought against the thing itself instead
of the person. Thus, an action may be instituted and carried
to judgment without personal service upon the depositors
or other claimants . Jurisdiction is secured by the power of
the court over the res.]Consequently, a judgment of escheat
is conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement, as
publication is considered a general and constructive notice
to all persons interested.
Republic vs. CA & Solano, G.R. No. 143483, January 31,
2002
The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured by
the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it is
decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to
be punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwise they may
lose them forever in a final judgment.
Oropesa vs. Oropesa, G.R. No. 184528, April 25, 2012
A guardianship is designed to further the wards well-being,
not that of the guardian. It is intended to preserve the
wards property, as well as to render any assistance that the
ward may personally require. It has been stated that while
custody involves immediate care and control, guardianship
indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one in
loco parentis as well.
REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 14

Napoleon D. Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D.


Neri-Chambers, Rosa D. Neri-Millan, Douglas D. Neri,
Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos and Victoria D. Illut- Piala vs.
Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy., G.R. No.
194366, October 10, 2012
Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the
minor under parental authority, does not have the power to
dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such power
is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the wards
property and even then only with courts prior approval
secured in accordance with the proceedings set forth by the
Rules of Court.
IN RE: Stephanie Garcia, GR 148311, March 31, 2005
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child,
whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general,
the rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical act,
a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate
paternity and filiation.
Suarez vs.. Republic, L-20914 December 24, 1965
The adoptee may use the surname of the adopter. The minor
cannot bear adopters surname as a married woman, for her
husband has not joined in the petition for adoption and
cannot join it, because he has children by a previous
marriage and to allow the minor to adopt the surname of
the husband of the adopter (where the husband had not),
would mislead the public into believing that she (adoptee)
has also been adopted by the husband, which is not the case.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS OF MINOR SHANG KO VINGSON YU SHIRLY
VINGSON SHIRLY VINGSON DEMAISIP v. JOVY
CABCABAN. UDK no. 14817, January 13, 2014
Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of
habeas corpus is available, not only in cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived
of his liberty, but also in cases involving the rightful custody
over a minor. The general rule is that parents should have
custody over their minor children. But the State has the
right to intervene where the parents, rather than care for
such children, treat them cruelly and abusively, impairing
their growth and well-being and leaving them emotional
scars that they carry throughout their lives unless they are
liberated from such parents and properly counselled.
Feria vs. CA, G.R. No. 122954, February 15, 2000
Consequently, the writ of habeas corpus may also be availed
of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a)
there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right
resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no
jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive
penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to
such excess.
Lee Yick Hon vs. Insular Collector Of Customs, G.R. No.
L-16799, March 30, 1991

Peremptory writ of habeas corpus, is one which


unconditionally commands the respondent to have the
body of the detained person before the court at a time and
place therein specified. The order served in the case before
us was merely a preliminary citation or one which merely
requires the respondent to appear and show cause why
the peremptory writ should not be granted.
Velasco vs.CA G.R.No.118644 July 7,1995
It must be kept in mind that in both habeas corpus and
certiorari proceedings is whether an inferior court has
exceeded its jurisdiction, the former involves a collateral
attack on the judgment and reaches the body but not the
record, while the latter assails directly the judgment and
reaches the record but not the body.
RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA, JR., VIOLETA LOZADA and
ARTURO LOZADA, vs. PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL
ARROYO, EDUARDO ERMITA, AVELINO RAZON, ANGEL
ATUTUBO and SPO4 ROGER VALEROSO,* G.R. Nos.
184379-80, April 24, 2012
The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically
to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and
security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate
the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ
conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to
the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced
disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be
resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by
the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the
indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less
than the desire to secure Amparo reliefs and protection
and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.
Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas
and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v.
Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19,
2013
It is clear from this rule that this type of summary
procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mindboggling how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings
in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application
of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A
writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by
which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or
particular fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence,
the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
is seriously misplaced.
Secretary of Defense vs. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906,
October 7, 2008
The writ applies to extralegal/extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof while a search
warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the
People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to
a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
property described therein and bring it before the court.

REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 15

Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas


and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v.
Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19,
2013
If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the
court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as
may be proper and appropriate. The judgment should
contain measures which the judge views as essential for the
continued protection of the petitioner in the Amparo case.
These measures must be detailed enough o that the judge
may be able to verify and monitor the actions taken by the
respondents. It is this judgment that could be subject to
appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule 45. After the measures
have served their purpose, the judgment will be satisfied. In
Amparo cases, this is when the threats to the petitioners
life, liberty and security cease to exist as evaluated by the
court that renders the judgment. Parenthetically, the case
may also be terminated through consolidation should a
subsequent case be filed either criminal or civil. Until the
full satisfaction of the judgment, the extraordinary remedy
of Amparo allows vigilant judicial monitoring to ensure the
protection of constitutional rights.
Canlas vs. Napico, G.R. No. 182795, June 5, 2008
The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final
judgment of the court, which in this case was affirmed with
finality, is not included among the enumeration of rights as
stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the remedy
of a writ of amparo is made available.
Egardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising vs.
Virginia Pardico, for and in behalf in representation of
Benhur Pardico., G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012
For the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and
proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not
enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial
evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with
the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge
the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of
said missing persons, with the intention of removing them
from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of
time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the
burden of proving by substantial evidence the
indispensable element of government participation. x x x
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF
AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL
RODRIGUEZ,
petitioner
vs.
GLORIA
MACAPAGALARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG
JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ.
GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G.
TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO
M. DE VERA, an officer named MATUTINA, LT. COL.
MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name
HARRY, ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN BONG PASICOLAN
and VINCENT CALLAGAN, G.R. No. 191805
The writ of amparo partakes of a summary proceeding that
requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate

interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. As


explained in the Decision, it is not an action to determine
criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence,
or even administrative responsibility requiring substantial
evidence. The totality of evidence as a standard for the grant
of the writ was correctly applied by this Court. x x x
In the matter of the petition for the writ of Amparo and
the writ of Habeas Data in favor of Francis Saez,
petitioner vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO RAZON,
22Nn MICO, CAPT. LAWRENCE BANAAG, SGT. CASTILLO,
CAPT. ROMMEL GUTIERREZ, CAPT. JAKE OBLIGADO,
CPL. ROMAN ITO QUINT ANA, PVT. JERICO DUQUIL, CPL.
ARIEL FONTANILLA, A CERTAIN CAPT. ALCA YDO, A
CERTAIN FIRST SERGEANT, PVT. ZALDY OSlO, A
CERTAIN PFC. SONNY, A CERTAIN CPL. JAMES, A
CERTAIN JOEL, RODERICK CLANZA and JEFFREY
GOMEZ, respondents, G.R. No. 183533, September 25,
2012
Given that the totality of the evidence presented by the
petitioner failed to support his claims, the reliefs prayed for,
therefore, cannot be granted. The liberality accorded to
amparo and habeas data cases does not mean that a
claimant is dispensed with the onus of proving his case.
Indeed, even the liberal standard of substantial evidence
demands some adequate evidence.
JOY MARGATE LEE vs. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGA G.R. No.
203254, October 08, 2014
A Habeas Data Petition is dismissible if it fails to adequately
show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy
on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on
the other. Moreover, it is equally dismissible if it is not
supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security of the victim.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERLINDA L.
OLAYBAR. G.R. NO. 189538, February 10, 2014
While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to
determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the
proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had
been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of
respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the
evidence of the parties had already been admitted and
examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification
of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the
correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth
as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing
the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by
cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in
any way, declare the marriage void as there was no
marriage to speak of.
Silverio vs. Republic G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007
However, a change of name does not alter ones legal
capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change
REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 16

of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather


than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name
for his declared purpose may only create grave
complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Republic vs. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676, September
12, 2008
Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be
what the individual, like respondent, having reached the
age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and
has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with
what he was born with.
Lee v. CA, G.R. No. 118387, October 11, 2001
Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil
register are now to be corrected and changed without need
of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil registrar
or consul general. What is left for the scope of operation of
Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries
of the civil register.
SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA and ERNESTO S. DE
MESA, vs. SPOUSES CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR. and MA.
RUFINA D. ACERO,SHERIFF FELIXBERTO L. SAMONTE
and REGISTRAR ALFREDO SANTOS., G.R. No. 185064,
January 16, 2012
Here, the subject property became a family residence
sometime in January 1987. There was no showing, however,
that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as
a family home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988, the subject property became a family home by
operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt from
execution. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting
that the subject property was a family home.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
RAMONCITA O. SENADOR v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 201620, March 6, 2013
If the subject matter of the offense is generic and not
identifiable, an error in the designation of the offended
party is fatal and would result in the acquittal of the
accused. However, if the subject matter of the offense is
specific and identifiable, an error in the designation of the
offended party is immaterial.
Mary Rose A. Boto vs. Senior Assistant City Prosecutor
Villena, A.C. No. 9684, September 18, 2013
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations shall be filed simultaneous or separately with
the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the
libellous article is printed and first published or where any
of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense.

Bureau of Customs v. Peter Sherman, et al, G.R. No.


190487, April 13, 2011.
It is well-settled that prosecution of crimes pertains to the
executive department of the government whose principal
power and responsibility is to insure that laws are faithfully
executed. Corollary to this power is the right to prosecute
violators. Thus, all criminal actions commenced by
complaint or information are prosecuted under the
direction and control of public prosecutors. In the
prosecution of special laws, however, the exigencies of
public service sometimes require the designation of special
prosecutors from different government agencies to assist
the public prosecutor; but this designation does not detract
from the public prosecutor having control and supervision
over the case.
LETICIA I. KUMMER v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal
amendment of a complaint even after the plea but only if it
is made with leave of court and provided that it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. It is
clear that consistent with the rule on amendments and the
jurisprudence, the change in the date of the commission of
the crime of homicide is a formal amendment it does not
change the nature of the crime, does not affect the essence
of the offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to
meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the
accused.
JOEL C. MENDEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
COURT OF TAX APPEALS G.R. No. 179962, June 11, 2014
Dr. Joel Mendez was charged with tax evasion. However, the
prosecutor filed amended complaint which changed the
date of the commission of the offense. The court ruled that
amendments that do not charge another offense different
from that charged in the original one; or do not alter the
prosecutions theory of the case so as to cause surprise to
the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will
assume are considered merely as formal amendments.
People of the Philippines vs. Danilo Feliciano Jr., et. al,
G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014
It should be remembered that every aggravating
circumstance being alleged must be stated in the
information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance,
even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such.
It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the
aggravating circumstance of wearing masks and/or other
forms of disguise in the information in order for all the
evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the
trial court.
People v. Oso, 62 Phil 271
In case of variance between the complaint filed by the
offended party and the information in crimes against
chastity, the complaint controls

REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 17

PEOPLE vs. GULLERMO LOMAQUE, GR 189297, June 5,


2013
A variance in the mode of commission of the offense is
binding upon the accused if he fails to object to evidence
showing that the crime was committed in a different
manner than what was alleged. While the information
clearly states that the crime was committed by appellants
insertion of his penis inside AAAs vagina, the latter
solemnly testified on the witness stand that appellant
merely put his penis in her mouth. Nevertheless, appellant
failed to register any objection that the Information alleged
a different mode of the commission of the crime of rape.
Thus, appellants conviction for rape by sexual assault must
be sustained, the variance notwithstanding.
Honesto General vs. Hon. Graduacion Reyes Claravall,
et al., 195 SCRA 623
In any event, the Court now makes that intent plainer, and
in the interest of clarity and certainty, categorically declares
for the guidance of all concerned that when the civil action
is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal in
accordance with Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
because the offended party has not waived the civil action,
or reserved the right to institute it separately, or instituted
the civil action prior to the criminal action the rule is as
follows: (1) when the amount of the damages, other than
actual, is alleged in the complaint or information filed in
court, then the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the
offended party upon filing thereof in court for trial; and (2)
in any other case, however i.e., when the amount of
damages is not so alleged in the complaint or information
filed in court the corresponding filing fees need not be paid
and shall simply constitute a first lien on the judgment,
except in an award for actual damages.
RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 161075. JULY 15, 2013
An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the
defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial question to
stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of
the defendant for estafa through falsification. This is
because the result of the independent civil action is
irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.
SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC. v. SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, ET AL. G.R. No. 166836, September 4, 2013
The pendency of an administrative case for specific
performance brought by the buyer of residential
subdivision lots in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) to compel the seller to deliver the transfer
certificates of title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots is properly
considered a ground to suspend a criminal prosecution for
violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the
ground of a prejudicial question. The administrative
determination is a logical antecedent of the resolution of the
criminal charges based on non-delivery of the TCTs.
Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. vs. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013

It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation,


fraud and physical injuries may be independently instituted
pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not
operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the
suspension of a criminal case. This was precisely the Courts
thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus: Moreover, neither is there a
prejudicial question of the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of each other.
Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, iun the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only
a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action. xxx In the instant
case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment
on account of alleged fraud committed by respondent and
his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.
As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will
justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.
GODOFREDO ENRILE AND DR. FREDERICK ENRILE, vs.
HON. DANILO A. MANALASTAS G.R. No. 166414, October
22, 2014
The preliminary investigation is not yet a trial on the merits,
for its only purpose is to determine whether a crime has
been committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof. The scope of the
investigation does not approximate that of a trial before the
court; hence, what is required is only that the evidence be
sufficient to establish probable cause that the accused
committed the crime charged, not that all reasonable doubt
of the guilt of the accused be removed. As the MTC and RTC
rightly held, the presentation of the medical certificates to
prove the duration of the victims need for medical
attendance or of their incapacity should take place only at
the trial, not before or during the preliminary investigation.
P/Insp. Ariel S. Artillero v. Orlando C. Casimiro, etc., et
al, G.R. No. 190569, April 25, 2012
There is no provision in Rule 112 of the Rules of Court that
gives the Complainant or requires the prosecutor to
observe the right to file a Reply to the accuseds counteraffidavit. To illustrate the non-mandatory nature of filing a
Reply in preliminary investigations, Section 3 (d) of Rule
112 gives the prosecutor, in certain instances, the right to
resolve the Complaint even without a counter-affidavit, viz:
(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, of if
subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the
ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall resolve
the complaint based on the evidence presented by the
complainant. On the other hand, petitioner was entitled to
receive a copy of the Counter- affidavit filed by Aguillon.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ENGR. RODOLFO
YECYEC ET AL. G.R. No. 183551, November 12, 2014
REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 18

It must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the


public prosecutor exercises a wide latitude of discretion in
determining whether a criminal case should be filed in
court, and the courts must respect the exercise of such
discretion when the information filed against the person
charged is valid on its face, and that no manifest error or
grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public
prosecutor. In this case, there is no question that the
Information filed against the respondents was sufficient to
hold them liable for the crime of Theft because it was
compliant with Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, a review of the resolutions of the MCTC, the
Provincial Prosecutor, the RTC, and the CA shows that there
is substantial basis to support finding of probable cause
against the respondents. Hence, as the Information was
valid on its face and there was no manifest error or
arbitrariness on the part of the MCTC and the Provincial
Prosecutor, the RTC and the CA erred when they overturned
the finding of probable cause against the respondents.

of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the


Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give the
Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses
committed by public officers and employees. The authority
of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public
officers or employees is concurrent with other government
investigating agencies such as provincial, city and state
prosecutors, however, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of
its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan may take over, at any stage, from any
investigating agency of the government, the investigation of
such cases.
People vs. Mabuyo, 63 SCRA 532; People vs. Lazo; 198
SCRA 274
The accused who is denied the mandatory preliminary
investigation may refuse to enter a plea upon arraignment
and to object to the continuation of further proceedings
based on lack of preliminary investigation. If he pleads
without objection, he cannot raise the issue on appeal.

Iris Kristine Balois Alberto vs. CA, GR No. 182130, June


19, 2013
Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal
information, exists when the facts are sufficient to engender
a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. It does not
mean actual and positive cause nor does it import
absolute certainty. Rather, it is based merely on opinion and
reasonable belief. Accordingly, probable cause does not
require an inquiry whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction; it is enough that it is believed that the
act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged.

Imelda S. Enriquez vs. Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., A.M.


No. RTJ-06-2011, August 7, 2006
A preliminary investigation is a proceeding distinct from an
inquest. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or
proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof,
and should be held for trial. An inquest is a summary
inquiry conducted by a prosecutor for the purpose of
determining whether the warrantless arrest of a person
was based on probable cause.

Manila Electric Company, represented by Manolo C.


Fernando v. Vicente Atilano, et al., G.R. No. 166758, June
27, 2012
The determination of probable cause for the filing of an
information in court is an executive function which pertains
at the first instance to the public prosecutor and then to the
Secretary of Justice. As a rule, in the absence of any grave
abuse of discretion, courts are not empowered to substitute
their own judgment for that of the executive branch; the
public prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of
evidence that will establish probable cause in filing a
criminal information and courts will not interfere with his
findings unless grave abuse of discretion can be shown. In
this case, the Supreme Court found no error in the public
prosecutors determination that no probable cause existed
to justify the filing of a criminal complaint.

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Hon, Rosabella M.


Tormis, AM No. MTJ-12-1817, March 12, 2013
Whenever a criminal case falls under the Summary
Procedure, the general rule is that the court shall not order
the arrest of the accused unless he fails to appear whenever
required. In this case, Judge Tormis claimed that the
issuance of the warrant of arrest against the accused in the
Librando case was justified because of the accuseds failure
to appear during her arraignment despite notice. However,
as clearly found by the OCA, Judge Tormis order requiring
the accused to appear and submit her counter-affidavit and
those of her witnesses within ten days from receipt of the
order was not yet served upon the accused when she issued
the warrant. In doing so, Judge Tormis issued the warrant
of arrest in violation of the Rule on Summary Procedure that
the accused should first be notified of the charges against
him and given the opportunity to file his counter-affidavits
and other countervailing evidence.

Alfredo Romulo A. Busuego vs. Office of the


Ombudsman, GR No. 196842, October 9, 2013
The Ombudsmans primary jurisdiction, albeit concurrent
with the DOJ, to conduct preliminary investigation of crimes
involving public officers, without regard to its commission
in relation to office, had long been settled in Sen. Honasan II
vs. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ, and
affirmed in subsequent cases: The Constitution, Section 15

People of the Philippines vs. Ng Yik bun, et al, G.R. No.


180452. January 10, 2010.
An arrest made during the commission of a crime does not
require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered
reasonable and valid under Rule 113, section 5(a) of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. In the instant case,
contrary to accused-appellants contention, there was
REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 19

indeed a valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto.


Consider the circumstances immediately prior to and
surrounding the arrest of accused-appellants: (1) the police
officers received information from an operative about an
ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police officers,
with the operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in
Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the
goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters;
and (4) they spotted the six accused-appellants loading
transparent bags containing a white substance into a white
L-300 van. Evidently, the arresting police officers had
probable cause to suspect that accused-appellants were
loading and transporting contraband, more so when Hwan,
upon being accosted, readily mentioned that they were
loading shabu and pointed to Tan as their leader. Thus, the
arrest of accused- appellants who were caught in flagrante
delicto of possessing, and in the act of loading into a white
L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425, as
amended is valid.
People of the Philippines vs. Roberto Velasco, G.R. No.
190318, November 27, 2013
Jurisprudence tells us that an accused is estopped from
assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this
issue or to move for the quashal of the information against
him on this ground before arraignment, thus, any objection
involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the
court acquired jurisdiction of the person of the accused
must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the
objection is deemed waived. Nevertheless, even if
appellants warrantless arrest were proven to be indeed
invalid, such a scenario would still not provide salvation to
appellants cause because jurisprudence also instructs us
that the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for
setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint after a trial free from error.
LEVISTE v. CA
A finding that none of the bail negating circumstances is
present will not automatically result in the grant of bail.
Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less
stringent sound discretion approach. However, if the
appellate court determines the existence of any of the bail
negating circumstances, it has no other option except to
deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the
appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of
discretion will thereby be committed
TRINIDAD LACHICA v. JUDGE ROSABELLATORMIS
It is undisputed that respondent judge personally received
the cash bail bond for the accused. For this act alone,
respondent is already administratively liable. Section 14,
Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
specifies the persons with whom a cash bail bond may be
deposited, namely: the collector of internal revenue or the
provincial, city or municipal treasurer. A judge is not
authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail nor should
such cash be kept in his office.

Yap v. CA and the People, G.R. No. 141529 (2001)


Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is
on appeal may be meritorious, the SC found that the setting
of the amount at P5.5M is unreasonable, excessive, and
constitutes an effective denial of As right to bail.
People v. Ortega, 276 SCRA 166 (2003)
An accused may not be convicted of an offense unless it is
clearly charged in the complaint or information. To convict
him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint
or information would be a violation of this constitutional
right.
WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE vs. NEW PROSPERITY
PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by ELIZABETH UY
G.R. No. 183994, June 30, 2014
Speedy trial is a relative term and necessarily a flexible
concept. In determining whether the accuseds right to
speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered in
view of the entirety of the proceedings. The factors to
balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b)
reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert
it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. Surely, mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not
suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in
judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a
vacuum, and that particular regard must be given to the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. While the
Court recognizes the accuseds right to speedy trial and
adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, we
cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to
fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements
which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time
are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial.
Anna Lerima Patula vs. People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 164457, April 11, 2012
Sec. 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not
the only rule that explains why testimony that is hearsay
should be excluded from consideration. Excluding hearsay
also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to
cross-examine the original declarant claiming to have a
direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence. If
hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because the
declarant is not in court. It is then to be stressed that the
right to cross-examine the adverse partys witness, being
the only means of testing the credibility of the witnesses
and their testimonies, is essential to the administration of
justice.
People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014
There are instances when searches are reasonable even
when warrantless. In the Rules of Court, searches incidental
to lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate
warrant. This court has taken into account the uniqueness
of circumstances involved including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable
cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was
REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 20

made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the


articles procured.
RETIRED SP04 BIENVENIDO LAUD vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES et al, G.R. No. 199032, November 19, 2014
Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC allows the
Manila and Quezon City RTCs to issue warrants to be served
in places outside their territorial jurisdiction for as long as
the parameters under the said section have been complied
with, as in this case. As in ordinary search warrant
applications, they shall particularly describe therein the
places to be searched and/or the property or things to be
seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court. The Executive
Judges of these RTCs and, whenever they are on official
leave of absence or are not physically present in the station,
the Vice-Executive Judges are authorized to act on such
applications and shall issue the warrants, if justified, which
may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the said courts. The Court observes that all the abovestated requirements were complied with in this case. As the
records would show, the search warrant application was
filed before the Manila-RTC by the PNP and was endorsed
by its head, PNP Chief Jesus Ame Versosa, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized in connection with the heinous crime of Murder.
Finding probable cause therefor, Judge Peralta, in his
capacity as 2nd Vice-Executive Judge, issued Search
Warrant which, as the rules state, may be served in places
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said RTC.
FELILIBETH AGUINALDO and BENJAMIN PEREZ vs.
REYNALDO P. VENTUS and JOJO B. JOSON, G.R. No.
176033, March 11, 2015
Arraignment was suspended pending the resolution of the
Motion for Reconsideration before the DOJ. However, the
lapse of almost 1 year and 7 months warranted the
application of the limitation of the period for suspending
arraignment. While the pendency of a petition for review is
a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited
provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a
period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition
with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the
expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign
the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HALIL GAMBAO y
ESMAIL, EDDIEKARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y
SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI,
THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL
y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL, NORA EVAD y
MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON a.k.a LARINA
PERPENIAN and JOHNDOES, G.R. No. 172707, October 1,
2013
The manner by which the plea of guilty is made, whether
improvidently or not, loses legal significance where the
conviction can be based on independent evidence proving
the commission of the crime by the accused.

People v. Lacson, G.R. No. 149453. April 1, 2003


In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court,
it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the
revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the
express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to
the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first
impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the
time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those
of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of
criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the
accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both
the State and of the accused to due process. The Court
believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the
State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the
consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties.
The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it
is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient
that the rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners
failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the
time-bar.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLO L. ESTACIO, JR.
and MARITESS ANG
The conditions for the discharge of an accused as a state
witness are as follows:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the
accused whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the
proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the
testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially
corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any
offense involving moral turpitude.
ESTHER P. MAGLEO vs. PRESIDING JUDGE ROWENA DE
JUAN-QUINAGORAN and BRANCH CLERK OF COURT
ATTY. ADONIS LAURE, BOTH OF BRANCH 166,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, A.M. No. RTJ-122336, November 12, 2014
Accuseds Demurrer to Evidence, the ruling is an
adjudication on the merits of the case which is tantamount
to an acquittal and may no longer be appealed. The current
scenario, however, is an exception to the general rule. The
demurrer to evidence was premature because it was filed
before the prosecution rested its case. The RTC had not yet
ruled on the admissibility of the formal offer of evidence of
the prosecution when Magleo filed her demurrer to
evidence. Hence, Judge Quinagoran had legal basis to
overturn the order granting the demurrer to evidence as
there was no proper acquittal.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUDGE RAFAEL R.
LAGOS, et al. G.R. No. 184658, March 6, 2013.
A motion to file a demurrer was granted after the
prosecutions presentation of the testimonies of the
apprehending officers because the prosecution failed to
REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 21

present the testimony of the confidential informant. It has


long been settled that the grant of a demurrer is tantamount
to an acquittal. An acquitted defendant is entitled to the
right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his
acquittal. This rule, however, is not without exception. The
rule on double jeopardy is subject to the exercise of judicial
review by way of the extraordinary writ of certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court finds and
so holds that the grant of the demurrer for this reason alone
was not supported by prevailing jurisprudence and
constituted grave abuse of discretion.
MERENCILLO V. PEOPLE (2007)
Minor discrepancies or inconsistencies do not impair the
essential integrity of the prosecutions evidence as a whole
or reflect on the witnesses honesty. The test is whether the
testimonies agree on essential facts and whether the
respective versions corroborate and substantially coincide
with each other so as to make a consistent and coherent
whole. Thus, inconsistencies and discrepancies in details
which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be
successfully invoked as grounds for acquittal.
Marino B. Icdang v. Sandiganbayan, et al, G.R. No.
185960, January 25, 2012
Petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated
when his counsel failed to assist him during the
promulgation of the judgment. He faults the Sandiganbayan
for proceeding with the promulgation despite the petitioner
not then being assisted by his counsel, and being a layman
he is not familiar with court processes and procedure.
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, provides: The judgment is
promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused
and any judge of the court in which it was
rendered.However, if the conviction is for a light offense,
the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his
counsel or representative. There is nothing in the rules that
requires the presence of counsel for the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction to be valid. While notice must be
served on accused and his counsel, the latters absence
during the promulgation of judgment would not affect the
validity of the promulgation. Indeed, no substantial right of
the accused on the merits was prejudiced by such absence
of his counsel when the sentence was pronounced.
People of the Philippines vs. Val Delos Reyes, G.R. No.
130714 & 139634, October 16, 2012
At the outset, the Court notes that these cases were elevated
to Us on automatic review in view of the RTCs imposition
of the death penalty upon appellant in its June 25, 1997
Decision. However, with the Courts pronouncement in the
2004 case of People vs. Mateo, providing for and making
mandatory the intermediate review by the CA of cases
involving the death penalty, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the proper course of action would be to
remand these cases to the appellate court for the conduct of
an intermediate review.

DENNIS T. VILLAREAL v. CONSUELO C. ALIGA. G.R. NO


166995, JANUARY 13, 2014
A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However,
in such case, the People is burdened to establish that the
court a quo, acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. No
grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court
simply because of its alleged misapplication of facts and
evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on said
evidence. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of
jurisdiction, and not errors or mistakes in the findings and
conclusions of the trial court.
CHAN v. HONDA MOTORS
The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon
the following factors: (1) it must issued upon probable
cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the
judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must
examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and
such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the
warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be seized.
Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 686
The probable cause must be determined personally by the
judge himself in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, on facts personally known
to them.
Luz vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197788,
February 29, 2012
It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and
positive testimony, that the necessary consent was
obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given. In this case,
all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the
police station at three in the morning, accompanied by
several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily
against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.
Elenita C. Fajardo vs. People of the Philippines., G.R. No.
190889, January 10, 2011
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain
view of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to
have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented
as evidence. It applies when the following requisites concur:
(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has
a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer
must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a
position from which he can particularly view the area. In the
course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently
REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 22

across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The


object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery
inadvertent.
EVIDENCE
El Greco Ship Maning and Management Corporation vs.
Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 177188, December
4, 2008
It does not apply to administrative or quasi-judicial
proceedings as administrative bodies are not bound by the
technical niceties of the rules obtaining in the court of law.
People vs. Marti (193 SCRA 57)
The forwarder, who discovered leaves from a box sent to
it by Marti, sent a request to the NBI to subject the leaves to
a laboratory testing which later turned out to be marijuana
leaves. The Court held that there was no violation of
constitutional rights because the rights granted by the
Constitution are protection from arbitrary exercise of
power by the government, and not by third parties, in this
case, the forwarder.
Salcedo-Ortanez vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 111
Ortanez presented three (3) cassette tapes of alleged
telephone conversations between his wife and unidentified
persons. The Court held that the cassette tapes are not
admissible since absent a clear showing that both parties to
the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the
same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory
under Rep. Act No. 4200.
Ogawa v. Menigishi, 676 SCRA 14, 21, July 9, 2012
The burden of proof lies with the party who asserts his/her
right. In a counterclaim, the burden of proving the existence
of the claim lies with the defendant.
Morales v. Harbour Centre Port Terminal, Inc., 664
SCRA 110
In administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings like those
conducted before the NLRC, the standard of proof is
substantial evidence which is understood to be more than
just a scintilla or such amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.
Calamba Steel Center, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. 151857, April 28, 2005
Court of Appeals ignored the existence of the tax return
extant on the record. As a general rule, courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of records
in other cases tried or pending in the same court, even when
those cases were heard or are actually pending before the
same judge. However, an exception is when reference to
such records is sufficiently made without objection from the
opposing parties.
People vs. Tundag, G.R. Nos. 135695-96. October 12,
2000

In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is


improper, despite the defense counsels admission. As
required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters
such as age, a hearing is required before courts can take
judicial notice of such fact.
Latip v. Chua, G.R. No. 177809, October 16, 2009
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three
material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common
and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining
what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of
notoriety.
Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation v. Central
Colleges of the Philippines, 666 SCRA 540
It is an established principle that judicial admissions cannot
be contradicted by the admitter who is the party himself
and binds the person who makes the same, absent any
showing that this was made through palpable mistake, no
amount of rationalization can offset it.
CIR vs. Petron Corporation, G.R. No. 185568, 21 March
2012
CIR and Petron jointly stipulated before the CTA that Petron
did not participate in the procurement and issuance of the
Tax Credit Certificates. This stipulation of fact by the CIR
amounts to an admission and, having been made by the
parties in a stipulation of facts at pretrial, is treated as a
judicial admission.
NEDLLOYD LIJNEN B.V. ROTTERDAM AND THE EAST
ASIATIC CO., LTD. vs. GLOW LAKS ENTERPRISES, LTD.
G.R. No. 156330, November 19, 2014
It is well settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves
in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. To prove a foreign law, the party
invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Under the rules of private international law, a foreign law
must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the
absence of pleading and proof, the laws of the foreign
country or state will be presumed to be the same as our
local or domestic law. This is known as processual
presumption. While the foreign law was properly pleaded
in the case at bar, it was, however, proven not in the manner
provided by Section 24, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court. While a photocopy of the foreign statute relied upon
by the court a quo to relieve the common carrier from
liability, was presented as evidence during the trial, the
same however was not accompanied by the required
attestation and certification.
ALBERTO ALMOJUELA y VILLANUEVA vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 183202, June 2, 2014
Although based on the evidence adduced by both parties, no
direct evidence points to Almojuela as the one who stabbed
REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 23

Quejong. A finding of guilt is still possible despite the


absence of direct evidence. Conviction based on
circumstantial evidence may result if sufficient
circumstances, proven and taken together, create an
unbroken chain leading to the reasonable conclusion that
the accused, to the exclusion of all others, was the author of
the crime.
People v. Yau, G.R. No. 208170, August 20, 2014
It has been an established rule in appellate review that the
trial courts factual findings, such as its assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight of their
testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the factual
findings, are accorded great respect and have even
conclusive effect. Such factual findings and conclusions
assume even greater weight when they are affirmed by the
CA. In the case at bench, the RTC gave more weight and
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
compared to those of the accused appellants. After a
judicious review of the evidence on record, the Court finds
no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings of the
RTC and the CA, and their respective assessment and
calibration of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
People v. Larrahaga, G.R. Nos. 138874-75, July 21, 2005
An object evidence, when offered in accordance with the
requisites for its admissibility, becomes evidence of the
highest order and speaks more eloquently than witnesses
put together. The presence of the victims ravished body in
a deep ravine with handcuffs on her wrist is a physical
evidence that bolsters the testimony of the witness.
People v. Vallejo, 382 SCRA 192
A rape-slay case of a 9-year old girl, admitted in evidence
the DNA samples of the victim which were found in the
bloodstained garments of the accused. Vaginal swabs taken
from the victim were also admitted and were found to show
the DNA profile of the accused who was subsequently
convicted.
People vs. Cardenas, G.R. No. 190342. March 21, 2012
Non-compliance with the procedural requirements under
RA 9165 and its IRR relative to the custody, photographing,
and drug-testing of the apprehended persons, is not a
serious flaw that can render void the seizures and custody
of drugs in a buy-bust operation. What is essential is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
People vs. Tan, 105 Phil. 1242 (1959)
When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more
sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a contract
upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the party
to be charged thereby, produces facsimile upon the sheets
beneath, such signature being thus reproduced by the same
stroke of the pen which made the surface or exposed
impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as
duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in

evidence as such without accounting for the nonproduction


of the others.
Pacasum vs. People, G.R. No. 180314, April 16, 2009
Only a photocopy of the Employee Clearance was presented
in evidence. The Court held that the photocopy is admissible
as evidence since an exception to the best evidence rule is
when the document sought to be presented is in the
possession of the person against whom it is to be offered
and such party fails to present it even after reasonable
notice.
National Power Corporation vs. Codilla, G.R. No.
170491. April 3, 2007
The evidence offered by NAPOCOR were photocopies. The
Court held that the photocopies were not equivalent to the
original documents based on the Rules on Electronic
Evidence. The information contained in the photocopies
submitted by NAPOCOR will reveal that not all of the
contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who
purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or
produced electronically.
MCC Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Ssangyong
Corporation, G.R. No. 170633. October 17, 2007
The Court held that the print-out and/or photocopies of
facsimile transmissions are not electronic evidence. Thus, it
is consequential that the same may not be considered as the
functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.
Cruz vs. CA, 192 SCRA 209
The parol evidence rule is predicated on the existence of a
document embodying the terms of an agreement. A receipt
is not such a document as it merely attests to the receipt of
money and it is not and could have not been intended by the
parties to be the sole memorial of their agreement.
Maulini vs. Serrano, 28 Phil 640
Serrano introduced parol evidence to prove that he was
merely acting as an agent without any consideration. The
Court held that Serrano can introduce such parole evidence
because the case at bar is not one where the evidence
offered varies, alters, modifies, or contradicts the terms of
indorsement admittedly existing.
Heirs of Lacsa vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 234
(1991)
The ancient document rule applies to the two Spanish
documents and should thus be admitted without the need
for evidence on its authenticity and execution. They meet
the 3 requisites of the ancient document rule, namely: (1)
be at least thirty (30) years old (2) found in the proper
custody and is unblemished by alterations and is otherwise
free from suspicion and (3) that it is produced from a
custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine.
Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp. vs. NLRC, 161 SCRA
122 (1988)
REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 24

Respondent Rances failed to submit any attestation issued


by the proper Dubai official having legal custody of the
original of the decision of the Dubai Court that the copy
presented by said respondent is a faithful copy of the
original decision, which attestation must furthermore be
authenticated by a Philippine Consular Officer having
jurisdiction in Dubai. The transmittal letter, signed by Mohd
Bin Saleh, Honorary Consul for Philippines does not comply
with the requirements of either the attestation under
Section 26 nor the authentication envisaged by Section 25.

Under the Dead Mans Statute Rule, if one party to the


alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death,
insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not
entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own
uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction.
Thus, the alleged admission of the deceased Pedro Caparas
that he entered into a sharing of leasehold rights with
Modesta Garcia and Cristina Salamat cannot be used as
evidence against Dominga Caparas as the latter would be
unable to contradict or disprove the same.

People vs. Burgos, 200 SCRA 67 (1991)


The Order disallowing the printing of the material encoded
in the diskettes is void. There was neither testimonial
evidence nor any physical evidence on the diskettes that
might indicate they had actually been tampered or their
contents altered in order to secure the conviction of the
accused. The mere fact that the diskettes had been in the
possession of the prosecution does not necessarily imply
that it had tampered with the evidence to suit its
prosecutorial objectives.

Lichauco vs. Atlantic Gulf, 84 Phil. 330


The Dead Mans Statute disqualifies only parties or
assignors of parties; officers and/or stockholders of a
corporation, therefore, are not disqualified from testifying
for or against the corporation which is a party to an action
upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased
person, as to any matter of fact occurring before the death
of such person.

People vs. Solomon, 229 SCRA 402


The acceptance of a witness depends on the quality of his
perceptions and the manner he can make them known to
the court. The testimony of Soria was positive, clear, plain,
coherent and credible despite her slurred speech and the
use of leading questions.
People vs. Mendoza, 254 SCRA 18
Paul, a five-year-old boy, testified that Rolando boxed his
wife then burned her. The testimony of Paul shows that he
is of above average intelligence, that he is capable of giving
responsive answers, of recalling events, and of relating his
recollections. For a child witness to be competent, it must
be shown that he has the capacity of (1) observation, (2) of
recollection, and (3) of communication.
Ordono vs. Saquigan, 62 SCRA 270
When an offense directly attacks or directly and vitally
impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception
to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the
other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime
committed (by) one against the other. Using the criterion, it
can be concluded that in the law of evidence the rape
perpetrated by the father against his daughter is a crime
committed by him against his wife (the victims mother).
People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694
By his testimony imputing the commission of the crime
against his wife, the husband is considered to have waived
all his objections to the testimony of his wife. It is to be
expected that after giving such a testimony, it is but normal
for his wife to rebut the allegation.
APOLONIO GARCIA, in substitution of his deceased
mother, Modesta Garcia, and CRISTINA SALAMAT v.
DOMINGA ROBLES vda de CAPARAS. G.R. No. 180843,
April 17, 2013.

People vs. Carlos 47 Phil. 626 (1925)


Where a privileged communication from one spouse to
another comes into the hands of a third party, whether
legally or not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on
the part of either of the spouses, the privilege is thereby
extinguished and the communication, if otherwise
competent, becomes admissible.
Uy Chico vs. Union Life, 29 Phil. 163 (1915)
It will be noted that the evidence in question concerned the
dealings of the plaintiffs attorney with a third person. A
communication made by a client to his attorney for the
express purpose of its being communicated to a third
person is essentially inconsistent with the confidential
relation. Such communication is between the third person
and the client, the attorney being merely an agent.
People vs. Sandiganbayan, 275 SCRA 505 (1997)
The period to be considered is the date when the privileged
communication was made by the client to the attorney in
relation to either a crime committed in the past or with
respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future.
in other words, If the client seeks his lawyers advice with
respect to a crime that the former has theretofore
committed, he is given the protection of a virtual
confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege
declares cannot be broken by the attorney without the
clients consent.
Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 273 (1992)
In order that the disqualification by reason of physicianpatient privilege be successfully claimed, the following
requisites should concur: (1) the privilege is claimed in a
civil case; (2) the person against whom the privilege is
claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine,
surgery or obstetrics; (3) such person acquired the
information while he was attending to the patient in his
professional capacity; (4) the information was necessary to
enable him to act in that capacity; (5) the information was
REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 25

confidential and if disclosed, would blacken the reputation


of the patient.
Krohn vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 146 (1994)
Where the person against whom the privilege is claimed is
the patients husband who testifies on a document executed
by medical practitioners, his testimony does not have the
force and effect of the testimony of the physician who
examined the patient and executed the report. Plainly, this
does not fall within the prohibition.
Banco Filipino vs. Monetary Board, 142 SCRA 523
(1986)
The privilege under Section 21, Rule 130 is intended not for
the protection of public officers but for the protection of
public interest. Where there is no public interest that would
be prejudiced, this rule will not be applicable. The rule that
a public officer cannot be examined as to communications
made to him in official confidence does not apply when
there is nothing to show that the public interest would
suffer by the disclosure question.
Dela Paz vs. IAC, 154 SCRA 65 (1987)
The mere fact that the witness died after giving his direct
testimony is no ground in itself for excluding his testimony
from the record so long as the adverse party was afforded
an adequate opportunity for cross- examination but
through fault of his own failed to cross-examine the witness.
The right to cross-examine Loreto was waived by
Petitioners through their repeated absence and motions to
postpone the cross- examination.
People vs. Del Castillo, 25 SCRA
Section 14, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides
that the court may grant or withhold leave to recall a
witness, in its discretion, as the interests of justice may
require; and We believe that it was the better part of
discretion and caution on the part of the trial court to have
denied as it did, the request of the defense to recall Ceribo.
The record is loaded with circumstances tending to show
insidious attempts, too obvious to be overlooked, to tamper
with the witnesses for the prosecution. Under the
circumstances, to allow such a procedure would only
encourage the perversion of truth and make a mockery of
court proceedings.
Viacrusis vs. Court of Appeals, 44 SCRA 176(1972)
The testimony and the public document are declarations
adverse to the interest of the Costelos which is admissible
in evidence. The previous recognition by a party in physical
possession of the property in dispute of the ownership in
another constitutes a declaration against the interest of the
former and ay be received in evidence not only against such
party who made the declaration or his successors in interest
but also against 3rd persons.
People vs. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 (1979)
The silence of an accused (or in this case, the three
appellants) under custody, or his failure to deny statements

by another implicating him in a crime, especially when such


accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such
implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit
confession of his participation in the commission of the
crime.
People vs. Alegre, 94 Phil. 109 (1979)
As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an
accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and
does not have probative value against his co- accused. It is
merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are
concerned.
People vs. Yatco, 97 Phil. 941 (1955)
The rule regarding statements made by a co-conspirator
refers to statements made by one conspirator during the
pendency of the unlawful enterprises and in furtherance of
its object and not to a confession made long after the
conspiracy had been brought to an end. Under the rule on
multiple admissibility of evidence, the confession of a coaccused may be inadmissible against his co-accused for
being hearsay but may nevertheless be admissible against
the declarants own guilt.
People vs. Wong Chuen Ming, 256 SCRA 182 (1996)
The fact that all accused are foreign nationals does not
preclude application of the exclusionary rule because the
constitutional guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights are
given and extend to all persons, both aliens and citizens. The
accused cannot be made to affix their signatures on
evidence without complying with the Bill of Rights. By
affixing their signatures on the evidence, the accused are in
effect made to tacitly admit the crime charged for, in this
case, mere possession of prohibited drugs is a crime. These
signatures amount to uncounseled extra-judicial confession
prohibited by the Bill of Rights and therefore inadmissible
as evidence.
People vs. Irang, 64 Phil. 285 (1937)
While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible
in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is
otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant
as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show
his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at
the time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance
connected with the crime.
People vs. Soliman, 53 O.G. 8083 (1957)
While good or bad character may be availed of as an aid to
determine the probability or improbability of the
commission of an offense, such is not necessary in the crime
of murder through TREACHERY or EVIDENT
PREMEDITATION (remember that the character of the
wounds show that the deceased was killed in a lying
position). The proof of such character may only be allowed
in homicide cases to show that it has produced a reasonable
belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a
REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 26

justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was


necessary.
U.S. Vs. Mercado, 26 Phil. 127 (1913)
Generally, a witness cannot be impeached by the party
against whom he has been called, except by showing: 1. that
he has made contradictory statements; or2. by showing
that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is
bad. The question to which the defendant objected neither
attempted to show that the witness had made contradictory
statements nor that his general reputation for truth,
honesty, or integrity was bad.
U.S. Vs. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464 (1980)
A statement is not prohibited by the hearsay rule if it is
merely offered for proving the fact that the statement was
made, and not as a means of proving the truth of the fact
asserted therein. Implied assertions, which are inferences
that can be drawn from the conduct of persons, are not
covered by the hearsay rule unless they are intended to be
an assertion concerning the matter in inquiry. (Ex.
Testimony that a person pointed to a person in a police line
up)
Estrada vs. Desierto, 356 SCRA (2001)
The ban on hearsay does not cover independently relevant
statements, which consist of statements that are
independently relevant of the truth asserted therein. They
belong to two classes: 1. Those statements which are the
very facts in issue, 2. Those statements which are
circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue. The second
class includes the following: Statement of a person showing
his state of mind; Statement of a person showing his
physical condition; Statement of a person to infer a state of
mind of another person; Statements which may identify the
date, place and person in question; Statements to show a
lack of credibility of a witness.
People vs. Laquinon, 135 SCRA 91 (1985)
The declaration of the deceased is not admissible as an antemortem declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to
whether he would die or not. The declaration fails to show
that the deceased believed himself in extremist, at the
point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct, which
is the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an
exception to the hearsay rule. It may be admitted, however,
as part of the res gestae since the statement was made
immediately after the incident and the deceased had no
sufficient time to concoct a charge against the accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANECITO ESTIBAL Y
CALUNGSAG G.R. No. 208749, November 26, 2014
Res gestae means the things done. It refers to those
exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately
before, during, or immediately after the commission of the
crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements
were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired
by the excitement of the occasion and there was no

opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate


a false statement. There are then three essential requisites
to admit evidence as part of the res gestae, namely: (1) that
the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence;
(2) the statements were made before the declarant had the
time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the
statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediate attending circumstances.
Tison vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 582 (1997)
Where a party claims a right to the part of the estate of the
declarant, the declaration of the latter that the former is her
niece is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such
relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no
other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason that such
declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity
of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice.
Fuentes vs. CA, 253 SCRA 430 (1996)
To admit declarations against interest as exceptions to the
hearsay rule: (a) the declarant must not be able to testify
due to death, mental incapacity or physical incompetence
rather than mere absence from the courts;; (b) the
declaration must concern a matter of fact cognizable by the
declarant;; (c) the circumstances render it improbable that
a motive to falsify exists.
People vs. Cabuang, 217 SCRA 675 (1993)
Entries in a police blotter, though regularly done in the
course of performance of official duty, are not conclusive
proof of the truth of such entries. They are only prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated since they would be
incomplete or inaccurate.
THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO,
and GLORIA, ALL SURNAMED DIMAGUILA v. JOSE AND
SONIA A. MONTEIRO. G.R. NO. 201011, January 27, 2014
As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court similarly provides that entries in official records are
an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in
official records made in the performance of the duty of a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The documents
trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty. Cadastral maps are the output
of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to
execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral
surveys. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule
and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
People v. Lee, 382 SCRA 596
The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is
regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a controversy,
so that evidence relating thereto is not admissible.
Ordinarily, if the issues in the case were allowed to be
influenced by evidence of the character or reputation of the
parties, the trial would be apt to have the aspects of a
REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 27

popularity contest rather than a factual inquiry into the


merits of the case.
Interpacific Transit vs. Aviles, 186 SCRA 385 (1990)
Objection to documentary evidence must be made at the
time it was formally offered, and not when the particular
document is marked is identified and marked as an exhibit.
Vda. de Onate vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 283
(1995)
Evidence not formally offered may be admitted and
considered by the trial court provided the following
requirements are present, first, the same must have been
duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the
same must have been incorporated in the records of the
case.

exception. The Court, in the appropriate cases, has relaxed


the formal-offer rule and allowed evidence not formally
offered to be admitted. Jurisprudence enumerated the
requirements so that evidence, not previously offered, can
be admitted, namely: first, the evidence must have been
duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the
evidence must have been incorporated in the records of the
case. In the present case, we find that the requisites for the
relaxation of the formal-offer rule are present. As it is
correctly observed, Godofredo identified the Certification to
File an Action during his cross-examination. Although the
Certification was not formally offered in evidence, it was
marked as Exhibit 1 and attached to the records of the
case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDWIN IBANEZ Y


ALBANTE, ET AL. G.R. No. 197813, September 25, 2013
The Rule on Examination of a Child Witness specifies that
every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut
this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party
challenging the childs competence. Petitioners flimsy
objections on Rachels lack of education and inability to
read and tell time carry no weight and cannot overcome the
clear and convincing testimony of Rachel as to who killed
her father.
On the other hand, Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court explicitly provided that a witness can testify only to
those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that
is, which are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in these rules. Anicetas testimony is
mainly hearsay, especially on the purported fight between
Wilfredo and Jesus that ended in Wilfredos death. Anicetas
testimony as such carries no probative weight. At best,
Anicetas testimony is an independent relevant statement:
offered only as to the fact of its declaration and the
substance of what had been relayed to Aniceta by Marilou,
not as to the truth thereof.
EAGLERIDGE
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
MARCELO N. NAVAL and CRISPIN I. OBEN v. CAMERON
GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC. G.R. No.
204700, April 10, 2013.
Under Section 17, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court, when
part of a writing or record is given in evidence by one party,
the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the
other, and when a detached writing or record is given in
evidence, any other writing or record necessary to its
understanding may also be given in evidence.
FEDERICO SABAY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R.
No. 192150, October 01, 2014
Section 34 of Rule 132 of our Rules on Evidence provides
that the court cannot consider any evidence that has not
been formally offered. This rule, however, admits of an
REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 28

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