Action Research--A Scientific Approach?

Author(s): Fred H. Blum

Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Jan., 1955), pp. 1-7
Published by: University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association
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of ~Science
iphi1osophp
VOL.

-'L

January,I 95 5

NO.

ACTION RESEARCH-A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH?

FRED H. BLUM

The concept of action-research has been developed during the last decade,
mainly at the Research Center for Group Dynamics, University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor and at the Commission for Community Interrelations of the American
Jewish Congress-centers founded by the late Kurt Lewin whose original and
creative mind has made many contributions to social-psychological and sociological research. I owe my acquaintance with this new approach to the Research
Center, particularly to Ronald Lippitt and Alvin Zander. Yet most of the following observations are based on my research experience during the last four years.'
The responsibility for what I am saying is, therefore, completely my own.
1. What is Action Research? Simply defined, action research means diagnosis of
a social problem with a view of helping improve the situation. All action-research
has, therefore, two stages:
(1) A diagnostic stage in which the problem is being analysed and hypotheses
are being developed.
(2) a therapeutic stage in which the hypotheses are tested by a consciously
directed change experiment, preferably in a social "life" situation.
Since all science diagnoses certain problems, it may seem at first that the only
difference between action-research and more traditional types of research lies
in the addition of a therapeutic phase. This, however, is not correct since the
difference in orientation affects the overall research design, the methods and the
techniques used.
Let us assume that we want to examine the impact of industrial organisatioril
on workers' life and that we are particularly interested to explore possibilities of
a greater degree of selfexpression through work. In an ordinary research project
it would be adequate to examine workers' attitudes towards their work in relation
to the organization of the work process. In a project oriented towards therapy
such a limitation is not legitimate since the possibility of change is certainly
affected by other factors such as management and union officials' attitudes, the
existing structure of power, etc. These factors must, therefore, be included into
the research design.
Even more central is the difference in approach to the "object" of research.
I See

(3) for a systematic treatment of problems similar to those discussed in this paper.
1

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FRED

H. BLUM

If the situation investigated is eventually to be changed, people must become involved in the research rather than being passive subjects. It would, for example,
not be sufficient to go to a factory, determine a sample on the basis of payroll
data and then make arrangements for interviews on company time and during
working hours. The kind of relationship which can be established on such a basis
is not strong enough to involve people nor does it allow the researcher to be involved with people. And this is what an action-researcher has to bring about: a
mutual relationship, a sharing of an experience out of which a new experience-a
change-can grow. Such a human involvement must be combined with a certain
"inner distance" which is not a result of coldness but of consciousness. Through
awareness of our own self and respect for the other person we can develop an
attitude which combines ability for clear scientific thought with a human feeling
for the people who are part of our research.
This kind of attitude is only real if it manifests itself in the methods of research
used and the manner in which certain techniques are applied. To give a few simple
illustrations: there has to be a willingness not only to ask questions but also to
answer other people's queries, and to familiarize them with the purpose of the
research. The research must, furthermore, be designed in such a way as to be
meaningful for those from whom information is to be obtained, and who are
eventually to become participants. Only then can people possibly get involved.
The ethical implications of such an approach-which will be examined shortly
-come to the foreground as we move on to the therapeutic stage. In this stage
people take part in an experiment which is consciously directed towards the
implementation of certain values. For example, a department in a factory may
be reorganized in order to allow workers to realize certain values which the diagnosis of the existing situationi has shown to be thwarted. Such a reorganization
is based on hypotheses as to a way of overcoming present shortcomings. While
one group-or department-takes part in such a change another matched-control group will be left under the old circumstances in order to approximate as
much as possible a truly experimental situation. This meanis that the scientist,
if he does not become a change agent himself, becomes at least closely associated
with such a change experiment. Ideally such an experiment should be carried
through on the initiative of the groups conicernedbut in any case it must be done
with their cooperation.
2. Implications of Action Research. The most significant implications of the approach just outlined and the main problems which it raises, stem from the peculiar relatedness of the researcher to his "object" of investigation: the mutual
involvement of people into a concrete life process.
The understanding of such a process requires:
(1) A conceptual framework which transcenids the traditional limitations of
"disciplines" and develops an integrated framework of social thought. True
action research is, therefore, by its very nature of an interdisciplinary character.
(2) A conceptioin of reality according to which all aspects of life have-prima
facie-equal reality. Emotions, feelings, ideologies, are as "real" as those facts
which can be expressed in statistical series. The concept of "reality" of the action

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ACTION RESEARCH

researcher is, therefore, much wider than that of most traditional social scientists.2
(3) A theoretical framework which includes macroscopic (for example socialcultural) elements as well as microscopic ones (peculiar to the specific situation
examined). All life situations encompass different "levels" of causal and teleological relationships. A knowledge of overall sociological and economic interrelationships, besides a knowledge of psychology, is therefore necessary.
(4) The greatest possible development of scientific tools. Since the causal and
teological factors determining any concrete life situation are extremely complicated.
(5) The greatest possible degree of consciousness of the researcher in regard
to (a) his individual, (b) his social and (c) his general cultural values-and peculiarities-since the scientific tools are applied in direct human relationships.
(6) An awareness of the ethical problems of action (or inaction) and of the role
of means and ends in human life.
The main practical implications of this list of requirements is this: ideally
action-research should be undertaken by a team which is small enough to function
as a group but which is sufficiently large to represent different (a) personality
types (b) social values and (c) talents.
This need applies to the diagnostic and to the therapeutic stage.
To the diagnostic phase it applies in a dual manner: (1) since data are collected
in close personal relationships it is desirable to have different inter-personal
situations, each bringing out specific aspects of the problem to be investigated, (2)
since the interpretation of data is closely related to perception, and perception
in turn is dependent upon individual, social and cultural values, a team-interpretation may bring out aspects otherwise neglected.
While desirable during the diagnostic phase, a team becomes a necessity in
the therapeutic phase. The skills required to change group attitudes can hardly
be found in a person who has also the technical-scientific insights necessary for
other phases of the research. And even if such an unusual combination could be
found, there are still distinct advantages of separating the change-agenlt itself
from the analyser and interpreter. A person who is preoccupied with many problems at a time can never see himself as clearly as a third person can. All people
involved in action-research should, therefore, be matched by "observers" who
function as part of the team. Consciousness and scientific validity of data is
thereby greatly increased.
Though these requirements pose problems which can only be solved through
a great deal of training and further exploration, they are not the most serious
obstacles the action-researcher finds. The most serious handicaps are the limitations imposed on him by the very society he wants to modify.
Experimentation is limited by those who control our social organization. In
the industrial scene, for example, experimentation is pretty much limited by the
desire and by the interests of management-and by the ability of social scientists
to evoke such a desire.
2 See (2 Ch. 1) for further discussion
thought.

of the concept of reality under-lying scientific

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FRED H. BLUM

An equally important impediment to experimentation is the idea that in a

free society people do on their own what they really want to do and hence any
experimentation would force values oInother people. There are two answers to
such a position (1) it is simply not true that we have achieved that degree of
consciousness-and of democratic procedures-to enable people to express freely
their deepest needs, (2) there is a world's difference of doing things "to people
or even for people and doing things with people" (9, p. 13).
If change is carried through with other people, the development of new attitudes finds its proper corrective by people's willingness to follow a new path.
The action researcher must be constantly aware of the fine line which separates
genuine development of people's peculiar individualities from manipulative
practices. But to assume that such a genuine self-development comes by itself
is to deny the necessity of education, of opening up new vistas before people and
making them aware of potentialities of which they are now unconscious. It also
neglects the decisive influence of society in determining people's attitudes.
I have worked during about a year with a small group of workers and during
this time we were able to develop a consciousness of democratic values which was
not articulate before. When a worker says, for example, after about nine months
of weekly meetings-that "he now sees how life could be if we didn't have to live
up to the Jones' ", he rejects certain values with which he was identified-and
seemingly "satisfied"-all his life.
It is true that any improvement in social life implies a concept of mental
health. The traditional separation of the social scientist from social life allows
him to pass problems of mental health to the applied social scientist such as
social workers, public administrators etc. Social workers, for example, are busily
engaged in adjusting people to a society which breeds depressions, conflicts, and
personal maladjustments of various kinds. Without disparaging the real value
of such an adjustment-as compared with the inability to function humanly
at all-the present situation remains highly unsatisfactory. It limits the potentialities of social work and separates the social scientist from ethical human
problems. Action research would change this situation: it would connect the
social scientist and the social worker as a team both experimenting with the best
ways and means of bringing a democratic society to its highest potential. The
social scientist would be more concerned with the general problems and the diagnostic aspects of the experiment and the social worker would be more concerned
with therapy and the direct contact with people-but both would be interrelated.
We may remark in passing that such a combination would give to what is truly
feminine a role in society which it does not now have-in itself a contribution
to mental health which should not be underestimated.
3. Possible Objections to Action Research. The main objection which the action
researcher has to meet squarely is that he confuses his role as a scientist with
his role as a human, social, political and ultimately a religious being, that he
ceases to do objective research as he becomes entangled with the world of values.
Traditionially accustomed to separate truly "scientific" research from action
with its "dangerous" value implications, few social scientists would relate

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ACTION

RESEARCH

'action' to 'research' if either of these words came up in an association-test, to

give a concrete example of a spontaneous linkage of words.3
Yet there is a deep connection between scientific thought, social change and
human values, since all social science is contingent upon value judgments. Karl
Mannheim has shown clearly that all systems of thought have their roots in a
"social collective" and, more specifically that they implement a desire and will
to maintain or to change the society in which they originate (4).
Values penetrate the whole conceptual framework since they affect such fundamental choices as between "data" and "variables." They also determine the
orientation of the whole structure of thought toward certain problemsand hence
the meaning of all theory. If it was possible to theorize without a problem, social
scientists could achieve a high degree of objectivity in the sense of absence of
value judgments. Since, however, no meaningful social theory can be developed
without a problem, values-or, to be more explicit-attitudes toward society
are implicit in (a) the manner in which we become conscious of social problems
(b) the kind of problems we become conscious of and (c) our approach to these
problems.
Fundamentally the action-researcher becomes conscious of the crisis of democracy which is ultimately a spiritual crisis. The rise of totalitarianism, authoritarianism, the "escape from freedom," and the struggles of a culture which
has lost awareness of the meaning of life are the background of his work.
The kind of problems he becomes conscious of are essentially human problems
since it is the neglect of human-spiritual values which is typical for the upheavals
of our time. Man rather than the machine, productiveness rather than productivity are, therefore, in the center of his consciousness.
Since the existential roots of action-research are deeply embedded in the crisis
of our time, the approach is oriented towards change, towards healing. The social
scientist thus becomes the physician of his society.
Such a consciousness of the problems to be investigated is very different from
the existential basis of traditional scientific thought-but it is not necessarily
less "scientific" nor less "objective" than alternative approaches.
In order to understand the real differences and the real determinants of the
scientific character of social research, let us contrast the action-research approach
to its extreme opposite: the attitude of the scientist who is "free from value
judgments" and who never mixes up "what ought to be" with "what is."
Typically such a scientist becomes conscious of the problems of "freedom"
in the sense of overcoming obstacles to the realization of a laissez-faire society,
or, once realized, to the maintenance of a laissez-faire society which is regulated
by "the unseen hand," and which functions automatically through an impersonal
market mechanism.
The kind of problems representatives of this school of thought become conscious of are, therefore, problems of staving off "interference" with the free
"natural" play of social forces. By the very nature of this approach, conscious
social action is excluded.
3 See (1) for discussion of the problem of values and the role of the social scientist.

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FRED

H. BLUM

Since the traditional roots of a separation of "what is" from "what ought to
be" lie in an ethical acceptance of the basic values underlying a laissez-faire
society, this school of thought accepts "what is" without examining it on the
basis of consciously chosen human values.
These differences in approaches can be best understood if we examine them in
terms of different conceptions of (1) the nature of man (the subject or the observer in a scientific investigation), (2) the nature of the object and (3) the relationship of the subject (the observer) to his object of investigation.
The traditional "laissez-faire" system of thought conceives of man as an isolated being without relatedness to others-Leibnitz's "monad without windows"
-a being that is divided into different spheres making up an "economic man,"
a political a psychological, a sociological and maybe even a religious man. The
object of investigation is conceived as a mechanical field of automatic dehumanized relationships and the proper relationship of the scientist to such a
world is that of an "uninvolved" observer.
These conceptions are closely interrelated: to take the role of the pure observer necessitates a separation of human values from one's field of observation
since "the observation of behaviour in interpersonal fields is an aspect of participating in them" (8, p. 14). Before being able to play this role, the scientist
must, therefore, reduce his field of observation to a mechanical field of automatic
relationships. And he must divide himself in as many spheres-the scientist, the
citizen, the religious being etc.-as he divided the "people" who enter his mechanistically differentiated object of investigation. He becomes cut off from life as
a unified whole but is deeply involved and participates strongly in a "schizophrenic" culture which divided various spheres of life.
The action researchers' basic conception of the world in which he lives is
diametrically opposed to these ideas: He considers man to be a unified whole who
is "immersed"-through feeling, thought, intuition and sensation-into the
world in which he lives. He conceives society as a "field" or a "configuration"
which has a teleological as well as a causal component. And he feels related to his
society as an integral part-both as an "aesthetic" and a "theoretic" being-to
use Northrop's language (5).
An action researcher is, therefore, related to a life process, to people-to a
field of interpersonal relations. He is concretely related and hence involved with
his whole being. He is not separated in segments of being nor does he separate
other people. Fully aware that "the differences between perception and interpretation are dependent upon individual factors, not on general ones" (6, p. 18),
he tries to give the greatest possible scientific validity to his data by becoming
conscious of himself and of the world in which he is living.
The problem of objectivity in social sciences is therefore a problem of consciousness of and respect for the values underlying our-and other people's
thought. Divergent schools of social research differ only-assuming they are
equally capable of handling scientific tools-in regard (a) to their degree of consciousness of values (b) the specific values chosen-explicitly or implicitly and
(c) their exclusiveness or willingness to accept alternative approaches and values.

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ACTION

RESEARCH

To look at human fate from the ivory tower of aloofness is not more objective
than to look at it with the compassion of human involvement. Yet it is an objectivity based on different philosophical, human and ultimately religious premises. In order to understand fully the meaning of action research, we must therefore consider it as a peculiar manifestation in a broad stream of events which
challenges the validity of traditional scientific methodology as well as its philosophical and human implications. Action research is the revolt against the separation of "facts" and "values," which gives its particular flavor to the notion of
"objectivity" in social sciences. It is a protest against the separation of "thought"
and "action" which is the heritage of nineteenth century laissez-faire. It is a
desperate attempt to transcend the sterile specialization of the social sciences
with its implicit repudiation of a human responsibility for social events. Philosophically it constitutes a challenge to the whole fabric of thought based on
Newton's physics and Locke's social philosophy. Its ultimate human implication is a search for unity and wholeness-and attempt to combine "wisdom
(juana), service (karma) and devotion (baakti)" (7, p. 82).
Howard University
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