CHAPTER 1:INTRODUCTION

1.1 WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION

There are a number of ways of looking at the World Trade Organization. It is an organization
for trade opening. It is a forum for governments to negotiate trade agreements. It is a place
for them to settle trade disputes. It operates a system of trade rules. Essentially, the WTO is a
place where member governments try to sort out the trade problems they face with each other.
The WTO was born out of negotiations, and everything the WTO does is the result of
negotiations. The bulk of the WTOs current work comes from the 198694 negotiations
called the Uruguay Round and earlier negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT). The WTO is currently the host to new negotiations, under the Doha
Development Agenda launched in 2001.
Where countries have faced trade barriers and wanted them lowered, the negotiations have
helped to open markets for trade. But the WTO is not just about opening markets, and in
some circumstances its rules support maintaining trade barriers for example, to protect
consumers or prevent the spread of disease.
At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the worlds trading
nations. These documents provide the legal ground rules for international commerce. They
are essentially contracts, binding governments to keep their trade policies within agreed
limits. Although negotiated and signed by governments, the goal is to help producers of
goods and services, exporters, and importers conduct their business, while allowing
governments to meet social and environmental objectives.
The systems overriding purpose is to help trade flow as freely as possible so long as there are
no undesirable side effects because this is important for economic development and wellbeing. That partly means removing obstacles. It also means ensuring that individuals,
companies and governments know what the trade rules are around the world, and giving them
the confidence that there will be no sudden changes of policy. In other words, the rules have
to be transparent and predictable.
Trade relations often involve conflicting interests. Agreements, including those painstakingly
negotiated in the WTO system, often need interpreting. The most harmonious way to settle
1

these differences is through some neutral procedure based on an agreed legal foundation.
That is the purpose behind the dispute settlement process written into the WTO agreements.
1.2 WORK OF WTO
While the WTO is driven by its member states, it could not function without its Secretariat to
coordinate the activities. The Secretariat employs over 600 staff, and its experts lawyers,
economists, statisticians and communications experts assist WTO members on a daily
basis to ensure, among other things, that negotiations progress smoothly, and that the rules of
international trade are correctly applied and enforced.
Trade negotiations
The WTO agreements cover goods, services and intellectual property. They spell out the
principles of liberalization, and the permitted exceptions. They include individual countries
commitments to lower customs tariffs and other trade barriers, and to open and keep open
services markets. They set procedures for settling disputes. These agreements are not static;
they are renegotiated from time to time and new agreements can be added to the package.
Many are now being negotiated under the Doha Development Agenda, launched by WTO
trade ministers in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001.
Implementation and monitoring
WTO agreements require governments to make their trade policies transparent by notifying
the WTO about laws in force and measures adopted. Various WTO councils and committees
seek to ensure that these requirements are being followed and that WTO agreements are
being properly implemented. All WTO members must undergo periodic scrutiny of their trade
policies and practices, each review containing reports by the country concerned and the WTO
Secretariat.
Dispute settlement
The WTOs procedure for resolving trade quarrels under the Dispute Settlement
Understanding is vital for enforcing the rules and therefore for ensuring that trade flows
smoothly. Countries bring disputes to the WTO if they think their rights under the agreements

are being infringed. Judgements by specially appointed independent experts are based on
interpretations of the agreements and individual countries commitments.
Building trade capacity
WTO agreements contain special provision for developing countries, including longer time
periods to implement agreements and commitments, measures to increase their trading
opportunities, and support to help them build their trade capacity, to handle disputes and to
implement technical standards. The WTO organizes hundreds of technical cooperation
missions to developing countries annually. It also holds numerous courses each year in
Geneva for government officials. Aid for Trade aims to help developing countries develop the
skills and infrastructure needed to expand their trade.

Outreach
The WTO maintains regular dialogue with non-governmental organizations, parliamentarians,
other international organizations, the media and the general public on various aspects of the
WTO and the ongoing Doha negotiations, with the aim of enhancing cooperation and
increasing awareness of WTO activities
1.3 WTO STAND FOR
The WTO agreements are lengthy and complex because they are legal texts covering a wide
range of activities. But a number of simple, fundamental principles run throughout all of
these documents. These principles are the foundation of the multilateral trading system
Non-discrimination
A country should not discriminate between its trading partners and it should not discriminate
between its own and foreign products, services or nationals.

More open

Lowering trade barriers is one of the most obvious ways of encouraging trade; these barriers
include customs duties (or tariffs) and measures such as import bans or quotas that restrict
quantities selectively.

Predictable and transparent

Foreign companies, investors and governments should be confident that trade barriers should
not be raised arbitrarily. With stability and predictability, investment is encouraged, jobs are
created and consumers can fully enjoy the benefits of competition choice and lower prices.

More competitive
Discouraging unfair practices, such as export subsidies and dumping products at below cost
to gain market share; the issues are complex, and the rules try to establish what is fair or
unfair, and how governments can respond, in particular by charging additional import duties
calculated to compensate for damage caused by unfair trade.

More beneficial for less developed countries

Giving them more time to adjust, greater flexibility and special privileges; over three-quarters
of WTO members are developing countries and countries in transition to market economies.
The WTO agreements give them transition periods to adjust to the more unfamiliar and,
perhaps, difficult WTO provisions.

Protect the environment

The WTOs agreements permit members to take measures to protect not only the environment
but also public health, animal health and plant health. However, these measures must be
applied in the same way to both national and foreign businesses. In other words, members

must not use environmental protection measures as a means of disguising protectionist

policies.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

M. Sankara Reddi, M. Ramesh and M. Chandrayya(2009)
In his opinion WTO is receiving the deepest indulgence of everyone, as it is affecting the
major sectors of Indian economy and agriculture in particular now and more intensively in
the coming years. A major concern growing with the increasing impact of WTO is, as to how
the small and marginal farmers who dominate the Indian agriculture, depend heavily on
agriculture for their livelihood, have small marketable surplus and operate under heavy
constraints to be competitive in a subsidized agriculture production and trade regime, could
benefit from WTO. The concern more often swings to the other side that the spreading
tentacle of WTO with reduced tariff regime and increased access to Indian market for the
products from subsidized agriculture could severally damage the agriculture based livelihood
of majority of Indian farmers. The challenge to policy makers is how to protect Indian
agriculture from the impending WTO threat, enhance the competitiveness of Indian farming
and make farming a viable and self sustaining enterprise to improve and ensure livelihood
security of the farmers. A strategy to address this challenge shall necessarily involve reorientation and injection of market linked dynamism in Indian agricultural R&D,
strengthening of supportive institutions to serve the resource poor farmers, and steering fast
the change with appropriate policies and trained human ware.

P. Arunachalam(2009)
He starts his articles by calling readers, if you gone through last 17 years of economic dailies
and economic magazines, business dailies and business magazines, even vernacular dailies
and books written and also edited by different authors in Indian and abroad, you could see
that around forty percent of the research articles and papers, editorials, reviews related World
Trade Organization (WTO) and WTO related issues only particularly about agriculture. Why
this particular area attracted this much attention from politicians, bureaucrats, academicians,
business persons, critics in India and abroad? The simple reason is, this is the only
organization at the world level where you could see a clear cut differences exist between
developing countries and developed countries. He argues that the root cause of distortion of
international trade in agriculture has been the massive domestic subsidies given by the
industrialized countries to their agricultural sector over many years. This in turn led to
excessive production and its dumping in international markets as well as import restrictions
to keep out developing countries agricultural products from their domestic markets. Hence,
the starting point for the establishment of a fair agricultural trade regime has to be the
reduction of domestic production subsidies given by industrialized countries, reduction in the
volume of subsidized exports and minimum market access opportunities for agricultural
produces worldwide. . He suggests that India has a uniquely important contribution to make
at this point to restart the Round. This is to show some further flexibility on agriculture. Not
to the extent of opening Indias huge agricultural subsistence economy to global competition.
But by moving where you can to allow other limited but real market access, including in
some difficult commodity areas.

V.Balasubramanian
Discusses the negative and positive benefits of India as WTO member through his paper
WTO and Indian Agriculture Insight, Implication and imperatives. He notices some
problems of Indian farmers. Firstly the governments of developed countries spend huge
amounts on agricultural subsidies. This has resulted in the decline of prices of agricultural
commodities in the world market. The policies of the Indian Government have compelled the
farmers of the country to compete with cheaper foreign agricultural commodities when they
have to spend more and more for ever increasing cost of agricultural inputs such as seeds,
6

fertilizers, pesticides, electricity, etc. Increasing cost of inputs, decline in growth rates and
lower prices of outputs have adversely affected the farmers and it has accelerated the
indebtedness, desperation, destitution and starvation to a vast majority of rural people
particularly the small and marginal farmers and tenant cultivators in India. He says two major
factors are responsible for the present downfall of Indian agriculture. First, the government
has substantially reduced the development expenditure in agriculture sector owing to its
eagerness to reduce the fiscal deficit. Secondly, import liberalization has contributed in a big
way for the reduction in prices of agricultural products. Having failed to get remunerative
prices for their products, many farmers have curtailed their farm operations which in turn
have increased unemployment among the agricultural workers. Thus import liberalization is a
major cause for the existing plight of poor farmers. He analyzing that the crop uncertainties
due to vagaries of nature and perishability of most of the agricultural
commodities make the supply erratic. Hence the alternating shortage and surplus resulting
from bad and good harvests destabilise the prices and earnings for the producers. This has
made our export earnings uncertain and instable. Export earning instability will have an
impact on domestic instability and reduce the efficiency. Hence Indias opening up of
agriculture to the world trade and increased emphasis on production for exports is therefore
likely to bring economic instability within the country and consequently, instability in the
earnings of producers and their patterns of investment.
Kaliappa Kalirjan and Kanhaiya Singh (2006)
Discussing about issues related to the WTOs Agreement on Agriculture from Indias point of
view through their paper India and the WTO's Agreement on Agriculture (A-oA) . Why
India should work towards the success of the Doha Round is also discussed. They opine that,
India does not have to worry about its subsidy, as it is already below the required line and it
also does not have any domestic support to reckon with. Moreover, the ongoing negotiations
are likely to yield enough flexibility in product choice and tariff selection. Therefore, India
should work towards the success of the Doha round and in the mean time make use of the
opportunity to reform its domestic market to bring in more efficiency. With favorable bound
rates for agriculture onboard, the negotiating framework of India must be different from that
of other developing countries. The situation is highly tenacious for India, particularly in view
of the fact that the developed countries have managed to link agriculture subsidy with the
market access in services and industry.
7

Anwarul Hoda and Ashok Gulati (2007)

Described about Indian agriculture in Doha Round of WTO point of view, through their book
entitled by WTO Negotiations on Agriculture and Developing Countries Book Description.
The World Trade Organization's Doha Round of trade talks has been plagued by a lack of
concrete progress toward establishing a fair and harmonious agricultural trading system.
Because the results of the Doha Round could have far-reaching implications for the trade and
economic prospects of developing countries in the twenty-first century, it is critical for these
countries to fully understand the issues involved in the negotiations agriculture. However,
there has been no authoritative analysis of the rules and modalities on which governments of
developing countries can rely. This book, coauthored by an insider to the trade talks that led
to the establishment of the WTO, fills this gap. It examines the implementation experience
of key members of the WTO, and then traces the developments in the negotiations up to the
recent impasse. In light of these considerations, and on the basis of a case study of India, the
authors propose various elements of a negotiating position and strategy for developing
countries. The authors offer tough but realistic recommendations regarding tariffs, market
access, treatment of sensitive or special products, and other aspects of international trade.
Joseph A Mc Mahon (2007)
The book entitled The WTO Agreement on Agriculture provides an indepth examination of
the substantive provisions and the disputes that have arisen in each of these three areas. The
WTO Agreement on Agriculture subjected agriculture to a set of international rules for the
first time in the history of international trade. Ever since its negotiation, the Agreement has
been at the forefront of the controversy surrounding the purpose and impact of the WTO
itself. The commentary is structured around the three areas of reform initiated by the
Agreement - market access, domestic support and export competition.
In addition, the book situates these provisions against their background in pre-WTO
regulation. It analyzes the operation of the 'Peace clause' and assesses the impact of the
clause's expiration. The commentary concludes by assessing the Agreement's accommodation
of and impact on developing economies, and examining the process of reforming domestic
farm subsidies, one of the dominant issues currently confronting thw WTO.
8

Munisamy Gopinath (2008),

Wrote a paper about Domestic support in Indias point of view entitled India: Shadow WTO
Agricultural Domestic Support Notifications.

In this study, he broadly outlined Indias

domestic support (DS) policies and our understanding of their classification and measurement
for the purposes of official notifications. First of all he is describing about Indian agriculture
at the beginning of WTO in 1995. Indias official notifications began in 1995 with green box
support of nearly US$2 billion and limited use of special and differential treatment. The
productspecific aggregate measure of support (AMS) was negative because external reference
prices were larger than minimum support prices. Non-productspecific AMS, by way of
fertilizer, electricity, irrigation, credit, and seed subsidies, accounted for about 7 percent of
the value of agricultural production in 1995. In subsequent notifications, for 1996 and 1997,
several key changes were observed. The first was the transfer of 80 percent of fertilizer,
irrigation, and electricity subsidies from non-product-specific Aggregate Measurement of
Support to special and differential treatment of low-income and resource-poor farmers.
Shadow notifications, based on our understanding of the underlying methods, showed that
green box support had grown to nearly US$8.0 billion in 2005. Non product-specific AMS
accounted for about 1 percent of the annual value of agricultural production for 1998-2005.
With Indias general elections expected in early 2009, the immediate future includes popular
policies such as credit subsidies and significant growth in minimum support prices.
Nevertheless, non product- specific AMS would not likely exceed the limits proposed in the
Doha Round (that is, 10 percent of value of production) even with popular policies. However,
product-specific AMS would turn positive, especially in cereals, with high growth in support
prices and the appreciation of Rupee as seen in recent years. There is a declining importance
of agriculture as a source of Indias exports since 1995. Except for meat products, none of the
major agricultural exports shows a clear upward or downward trend.

CHAPTER 3 : AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE: MARKET ACCESS

Market access is one of the three main pillars of the AoA the other two being domestic
support measures and export competition. It deals with rules and commitments related to
import of goods. Its purpose is to expand trade by preventing various non-tariff barriers and
by binding and reducing tariffs. Besides tariffs, other trade policy instruments covered by the
market access pillar include Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) and Special Safeguard (SSG) as a
trade remedy measure. In the WTO context, market access is about both obligations and
rights14. Nepals obligation as a WTO member is to provide market access to other Members
in return for her right of access to others markets for Nepalese goods on multilaterally
agreed terms. Thus, a balanced analysis of market access provisions would cover both
obligations and rights. The focus of this chapter is on the obligation side of this equation,
i.e. on the likely implications of the market access provisions of the AoA on Nepal's
agricultural trade policies and on the Nepalese agriculture. As Nepal does not have any TRQ
commitments, and does not have access to the SSG, the most important instrument for
managing imports is applied tariffs, within the limit set by Nepal's WTO bound rates. Given
that these bound rates are already agreed upon, the key question to be asked is: what would
10

be the most appropriate structure of the applied tariffs in order to safeguard the interest of the
Nepalese agriculture?
The chapter, organized in four sections, introduces the AoA provisions on market access;
discusses some theoretical and conceptual issues on border protection and tariffs to
understand why and how the WTO membership matters in this area; analyses Nepals applied
tariffs on selected major commodity groups drawing upon the experience for recent years and
in relation to the corresponding bound rates; and draws some conclusions.
3.1 AGRICULTURE: MARKET ACCESS
Under the reform programme, members have converted their non-tariff measures to
equivalent bound tariffs. Some additional market access is provided through tariff rate quotas,
and the tariffs are being reduced. Contingency protection is provided through special
safeguards, and transparency works through notifications.

The conceptual framework

On the market access side, the Uruguay Round resulted in a key systemic change: the switch
from a situation where a myriad of non-tariff measures impeded agricultural trade flows to a
regime of bound tariff-only protection plus reduction commitments. The key aspects of this
fundamental change have been to stimulate investment, production and trade in agriculture by
(i) Making agricultural market access conditions more transparent, predictable and
competitive,
(ii) Establishing or strengthening the link between national and international agricultural
markets, and thus
(iii) Relying more prominently on the market for guiding scarce resources into their most
productive uses both within the agricultural sector and economy-wide.
In many cases, tariffs were the only form of protection for agricultural products before the
Uruguay Round the Round led to the binding in the WTO of a maximum level for these
tariffs. For many other products, however, market access restrictions involved non-tariff
barriers. This was frequently, though not only, the case for major temperate zone agricultural
products. The Uruguay Round negotiations aimed to remove such barriers. For this purpose, a
11

tariffication package was agreed which, amongst other things, provided for the replacement
of agriculture-specific non-tariff measures with a tariff which afforded an equivalent level of
protection. The tariffs resulting from the tariffication process account, on average of the
developed country Members, for around one fifth of the total number of agricultural tariff
lines. For the developing country Members, this share is considerably smaller. Following the
entry into force of the Agreement on Agriculture, there is now a prohibition on agriculturespecific non-tariff measures, and the tariffs on virtually all agricultural products traded
internationally are bound in the WTO.
Schedule of tariff concessions
Each WTO Member has a schedule of tariff concessions covering all agricultural products.
These concessions are an integral part of the results of the Uruguay Round, are formally
annexed to the Marrakesh Protocol [cross-reference] and have become an integral part of the
GATT 1994 [cross-reference]. The schedule sets out for each individual agricultural product,
or, in some cases agricultural products defined more generally, the maximum tariff that can
be applied on imports into the territory of the Member concerned. The tariffs in the schedules
include those that resulted from the tariffication process, which, in many cases, are
considerably higher than industrial tariffs, reflecting the incidence of agriculture-specific nontariff measures prior to the WTO. Many developing countries have bound their previously
unbound tariffs at ceiling levels, i.e. at levels higher than the applied rates prior to the
WTO.
Developed country Members have agreed to reduce, over a six-year period beginning in
1995, their tariffs by 36 per cent on average of all agricultural products, with a minimum cut
of 15 per cent for any product. For developing countries, the cuts are 24 and 10 per cent,
respectively, to be implemented over ten years. Those developing country Members which
bound tariffs at ceiling levels did not, in many cases, undertake reduction commitments.
Least-developed country Members were required to bind all agricultural tariffs, but not to
undertake tariff reductions
Tariff quota commitments
As part of the tariffication package, WTO Members were required to maintain, for tariffied
products, current import access opportunities at levels corresponding to those existing during
12

the 1986-88 base period. Where such current access had been less than 5 per cent of
domestic consumption of the product in question in the base period, an (additional) minimum
access opportunity had to be opened on a most-favoured-nation basis. This was to ensure that
in 1995, current and minimum access opportunities combined represented at least 3 per cent
of base-period consumption and are progressively expanded to reach 5 per cent of that
consumption in the year 2000 (developed country Members) or 2004 (developing country
Members), respectively.
The current and minimum access opportunities are generally implemented in the form of
tariff quotas. In case of minimum access, the applicable duty was required to be low or
minimal, low that is either in absolute terms or, at least, in relation to the normal ordinary
customs duty that applies to any imports outside the tariff quota. These tariff quotas,
including the applicable tariff rates and any other conditions related to the tariff quotas, are
specified in the schedules of the WTO Members concerned.
While the vast majority of tariff quotas in agriculture have their origin in the Uruguay Round
negotiations, a number of such commitments were the result of accessions to the WTO.
Currently (July 1999), 37 Members have tariff quotas specified in their schedules. In total,
there are 1374 individual tariff quotas. These tariff quotas constitute binding commitments as
opposed to autonomous tariff quotas which Members may establish at any time, for example,
in order to stabilize the domestic price after a poor harvest.

The prohibition of non-tariff border measures

Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture prohibits the use of agriculture-specific non-tariff
measures. Such measures include quantitative import restrictions, variable import levies,
minimum import prices, discretionary import licensing procedures, voluntary export restraint
agreements and non-tariff measures maintained through state-trading enterprises. All similar
border measures other than normal customs duties are also no longer permitted. Although
Article XI:2(c) of the GATT [cross-reference] continues to permit non-tariff import
restrictions on fisheries products, it is now inoperative as regards agricultural products
because it is superseded by the Agreement on Agriculture.

13

However, Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture does not prevent the use of non-tariff
import restrictions consistent with the provisions of the GATT or other WTO agreements
which are applicable to traded goods generally (industrial or agricultural). Such measures
include those maintained under balance-of-payments provisions (Articles XII and XVIII of
GATT), general safeguard provisions (Article XIX of GATT and the related WTO
agreement), general exceptions (Article XX of GATT), the Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade or other
general, non-agriculture-specific WTO provisions.

Special treatment
The Agreement on Agriculture contains a special treatment clause (Annex 5), under which
four countries were permitted, subject to strictly circumscribed conditions, to maintain nontariff border measures on certain products during the period of tariff reductions (with the
possibility of extending the special treatment, subject to further negotiations). As one of the
conditions, market access in the form of progressively increasing import quotas has to be
provided for the products concerned. The products and countries concerned are: rice in the
case of Japan, Korea and the Philippines; and cheese and sheepmeat in the case of Israel. As
of 1 April 1999, Japan has ceased to apply special treatment.

The special safeguard provisions

As a third element of the tariffication package, Members have the right to invoke for tariffied
products the special safeguard provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture (Article 5),
provided that a reservation to this effect (SSG) appears beside the products concerned in
the relevant Members schedule. The right to make use of the special safeguard provisions
has been reserved by 38 Members, and for a limited number of products in each case.
The special safeguard provisions allow the imposition of an additional tariff where certain
criteria are met. The criteria involve either a specified surge in imports (volume trigger), or,
on a shipment by shipment basis, a fall of the import price below a specified reference price
(price trigger). In case of the volume trigger, the higher duties only apply until the end of the

14

year in question. In case of the price trigger, any additional duty can only be imposed on the
shipment concerned. The additional duties cannot be applied to imports taking place within
tariff quotas.
Notification obligations
The bound agricultural tariffs and the tariff quota commitments are contained in Members
schedules. There is no requirement for Members to notify their tariffs to the Committee on
Agriculture. Applied tariffs are, however, to be submitted to other bodies of the WTO,
including the Committee on Market Access and in the context of the Trade Policy Review
mechanism.
Members with tariff quotas and the right to use the special safeguard provisions are required
to make both ad hoc and annual notifications to the Committee on Agriculture. At the
beginning of the implementation period, an up-front notification was due, setting out how
each tariff quota is to be administered. Such notifications disclose, for example, if imports are
permitted on a first-come-first-served basis or if import licences are used and in the
latter case, an indication of who is able to obtain a licence and how they are allocated. An ad
hoc notification is required if the method of allocation under any tariff quota changes. At the
end of each year, a notification of the quantity of imports entering under each tariff quota is
required (tariff quota fill).
Members with the right to use the special safeguard provisions must notify its first use in
order to allow its trading partners to establish the parameters of the special safeguard action,
such as the volume or price used to trigger the special safeguard action. In the case of the
price trigger, an upfront notification of the relevant reference prices has also been possible. In
addition, an annual summary notification of the use of the special safeguard is required.

3.2 THE AOA PROVISIONS ON MARKET ACCESS

Prohibition of quantitative restrictions on imports One significant achievement of the AoA
was prohibition of border measures other than ordinary customs duty. A WTO Member is
no longer allowed to limit trade through import bans or quantitative restrictions, or other
15

similar measures, except under such specified situations as safeguards, food safety and
adverse balance of payment situation. The only border instrument permitted is ordinary
customs tariff, which includes ad valorem and specific duties. Article 4.2 of the AoA spells in
detail the measures that are prohibited, e.g. quantitative trade restrictions, variable import
levies, minimum import prices, discretionary import licensing, nontariff measures maintained
by state trading enterprises, voluntary export restraints and similar border measures other
than ordinary customs duty. Table 1 shows the main market access provisions of the AoA.
Table 1: Main provisions of the AoA on market access
Instrument
AoA Article 4.1 & Schedules

General provisions
First bindings, and then reductions of the bound tariffs,
plus other market access commitments as in the

AoA Article 4.2

Schedules
Prohibition of quantitative restriction on imports; only

AoA Article 5

ordinary tariffs to apply on imports

Special safeguard (SSG) provision against import surges
(quantity and depressed prices) relative to established

Schedules

triggers
Implementation of current and minimum access

Schedules

commitments with tariff rate quotas (TRQs)

Tariff reduction schedule reduction of the bound rates
over the implementation period Reduction rates for
bound tariffs Developed countries: 36% on average
(minimum 15% for all tariff lines) over 6 years
Developing countries: 24% average (minimum 10% for
all tariff lines) over 10 years Least developed countries:
No reduction required

Tariff binding and reduction

During the UR negotiations, modalities were developed to convert existing non-tariff barriers
to equivalent tariffs, which would be the new bound rates (see Sharma 2000a for these
modalities). Countries that had non-tariff barriers were required to compute tariff equivalents
based on the gap between domestic and world prices. The developing countries could also
16

choose this tariffication process. They also had the option to offer what is called as ceiling
binding of tariffs. That is, they could offer ceiling rates as they chose. If not objected by
other WTO Members that would be the WTO bound rates. Most developing countries chose
this method to establish the bound rates. They included all South Asian WTO members. In
the case of Nepal this choice was not available. Like other newly acceding countries Nepal
bound its tariffs through negotiations.
Bound versus applied tariffs
In the WTO terminology, bound tariffs are the rates that a country commits not to exceed at
any point in time (except in some specified situations). By contrast, applied rates refer to
tariffs that are actually applied at any given point in time. The basic rule is: applied rates may
be lower but must not exceed the bound rates. Hence bound rates have special significance as
they limit the ability of a country to vary tariffs. In the GATT, and now the WTO, tariff
negotiations amounted to reducing the bound rates. The experience of the past 10 years shows
that applied tariffs of most developing countries are far below the bound rates, while they are
closer in the case of the developed countries.
Tariff Rate Quota
Quotas in the ordinary sense of the term were common trade policy instrument for a long
time prior to the UR. In the UR, as countries tariffied non-tariff barriers, there was a concern
that the resulting ordinary tariffs could turn out to be too high for any trade to take place.
Moreover, there were many products that were little traded for various reasons, e.g.
prohibitively high tariffs, binding quotas or import restrictions. As a result, it was agreed that
there should be minimum market access commitment, e.g. 5% of total domestic
consumption. This gave rise to the concept of the TRQ to facilitate minimum trade. A TRQ is
a two-tired tariff instrument under which imports up to the quota level face low or no tariff
while all imports above the quota level face the usual MFN tariff. In the UR, 36 countries
made TRQ commitments on agricultural products for a total of 1,370 tariff lines. Although 19
of these are developing countries, the developed countries account for 67% of the TRQs. In
the post-1995 period, the (unsatisfactory) administration of TRQs, and the issue of less than
100% quota fill rate, has attracted a great deal of discussion in the WTO.

17

Special Safeguard Measures

This is another innovation of the AoA (Article 5). It is specific to agricultural products only.
The general WTO trade remedy measures like anti-dumping apply to all products, including
agricultural products (for details, see the chapter on import surges by Gautam et al in this
volume). The SSG is a temporary measure that permits an importing country to charge duties
higher than the WTO bound rate when faced with import surges. The SSGs are available only
to those products that were tariffied and for which the right to resort to the SSG was
reserved by placing the label SSG in country Schedules. There are two types of surges that
trigger the SSG:
(i)
(ii)

when import volumes surge beyond some defined threshold and

When import prices fall below a previously defined threshold. The extra duty
applicable depends on the extent of the surge, relative to the defined thresholds. In
the UR, 38 WTO Members reserved right to the SSG measure for selected
products. As the majority of the developing countries did not tariffy, and offered
ceiling bindings, very few of them have access to the SSG.

In the case, as shown in the last column of Table 1, the provision prohibiting all non-tariff
measures applies. As a LDC, however, Nepal would not be required to reduce bound tariffs
once the transition phase of the WTO accession process is complete. But applied rates cannot
exceed the bound duties. Nepal does not have access to the SSG while there was no need for
opening TRQs, which Nepal did not. There is a provision in the WTO rules called initial
negotiating rights (INR). In Nepals tariff Schedule, some countries have been designated as
INR holders for some products. This means that in future if Nepal wants to revise bound
tariffs upwards, this must be first negotiated with the INR holder.

18

CHAPTER 4: INDIA & WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO)

INTRODUCTION
After over 7 years of negotiations the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations were
concluded on December 15, 1993 and were formally ratified in April 1994 at Marrakesh,
Morrocco. The WTO Agreement on Agriculture was one of the many agreements which were
negotiated during the Uruguay Round.
The implementation of the Agreement on Agriculture started with effect from 1.1.1995. As
per the provisions of the Agreement, the developed countries would complete their reduction
commitments within 6 years, i.e., by the year 2000, whereas the commitments of the
developing countries would be completed within 10 years, i.e., by the year 2004. The least
developed countries are not required to make any reductions.
The products which are included within the purview of this agreement are what are normally
considered as part of agriculture except that it excludes fishery and forestry products as well
19

as rubber, jute, sisal, abaca and coir. The exact product coverage can be accessed in the legal
text of the agreement from the web site www.wto.org.
4.1 SALIENT FEATURES
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture contains provisions in 3 broad areas of agriculture and
trade policy: market access, domestic support and export subsidies.
Market Access
This includes tariffication, tariff reduction and access opportunities. Tariffication means that
all non-tariff barriers such as quotas, variable levies, minimum import prices, discretionary
licensing, state trading measures, voluntary restraint agreements etc. need to be abolished and
converted into an equivalent tariff. Ordinary tariffs including those resulting from their
tariffication are to be reduced by an average of 36% with minimum rate of reduction of 15%
for each tariff item over a 6 year period. Developing countries are required to reduce tariffs
by 24% in 10 years. Developing countries as were maintaining Quantitative Restrictions due
to balance of payment problems were allowed to offer ceiling bindings instead of tariffication
Special safeguard provision allows the imposition of additional duties when there are either
import surges above a particular level or particularly low import prices as compared to 198688 levels.
It has also been stipulated that minimum access equal to 3% of domestic consumption in
1986-88 will have to be established for the year 1995 rising to 5% at the end of the
implementation period.

Domestic Support
For domestic support policies, subject to reduction commitments, the total support given in
1986-88, measured by the Total Aggregate Measure of Support (total AMS), should be
reduced by 20% in developed countries (13.3% in developing countries). Reduction
commitments refer to total levels of support and not to individual commodities. Policies
which amount to domestic support both under the product specific and non product specific

20

categories at less than 5% of the value of production for developed countries and less than
10% for developing countries are also excluded from any reduction commitments. Policies
which have no or at most minimal, trade distorting effects on production are excluded from
any reduction commitments (Green Box-Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture
www.wto.org. The list of exempted green box policies includes such policies which provide
services or benefits to agriculture or the rural community, public stock-holding for food
security purposes, domestic food aid and certain de-coupled payments to producers including
direct payments to production limiting programmes, provided certain conditions are met.

Special and Differential Treatment

provisions are also available for developing country members. These include purchases for
and sales from food security stocks at administered prices provided that the subsidy to
producers is included in calculation of AMS. Developing countries are permitted untargeted
subsidised food distribution to meet requirements of the urban and rural poor. Also excluded
for developing countries are investment subsidies that are generally available to agriculture
and agricultural input subsidies generally available to low income and resource poor farmers
in these countries.

Export Subsidies
The Agreement contains provisions regarding members commitment to reduce Export
Subsidies. Developed countries are required to reduce their export subsidy expenditure by
36% and volume by 21% in 6 years, in equal installment (from 1986 1990 levels). For
developing countries the percentage cuts are 24% and 14% respectively in equal annual
installment over 10 years. The Agreement also specifies that for products not subject to
export subsidy reduction commitments, no such subsidies can be granted in the future.
4.2 INDIA'S COMMITMENTS

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Market Access
As India was maintaining Quantitative Restrictions due to balance of payments
reasons(which is a GATT consistent measure), it did not have to undertake any commitments
in regard to market access. The only commitment India has undertaken is to bind its primary
agricultural products at 100%; processed foods at 150% and edible oils at 300%. Of course,
for some agricultural products like skimmed milk powder, maize, rice, spelt wheat, millets
etc. which had been bound at zero or at low bound rates, negotiations under Article XXVIII
of GATT were successfully completed in December, 1999, and the bound rates have been
raised substantially.

Domestic Support
India does not provide any product specific support other than market price support. During
the reference period (1986-88 ), India had market price support programmes for 22 products,
out of which 19 are included in our list of commitments filed under GATT. The products are rice, wheat, bajra, jawar, maize, barley, gram, groundnut, rapeseed, toria, cotton, Soyabean
(yellow), Soyabean (black), urad, moong, tur, tobacco, jute, and sugarcane. The total product
specific AMS was (-) Rs.24,442 crores during the base period. The negative figure arises
from the fact that during the base period, except for tobacco and sugarcane, international
prices of all products was higher than domestic prices, and the product specific AMS is to be
calculated by subtracting the domestic price from the international price and then multiplying
the resultant figure by the quantity of production.
Non-product specific subsidy is calculated by taking into account subsidies given for
fertilizers, water, seeds, credit and electricity. During the reference period, the total nonproduct specific AMS was Rs.4581 crores. Taking both product specific and non-product
specific AMS into account, the total AMS was (-) Rs.19,869 crores i.e. about (-) 18% of the
value of total agricultural output.
Since our total AMS is negative and that too by a huge magnitude, the question of our
undertaking reduction commitments did not arise. As such, we have not undertaken any
commitment in our schedule filed under GATT. The calculations for the marketing year

22

1995-96 show the product specific AMS figure as (-) 38.47% and non-product specific AMS
as 7.52% of the total value of production. We can further deduct from these calculations the
domestic support extended to low income and resource poor farmers provided under Article 6
of the Agreement on Agriculture. This still keeps our aggregate AMS below the de minimis
level of 10%.
Export Subsidies
In India, exporters of agricultural commodities do not get any direct subsidy. The only
subsidies available to them are in the form of
(a) Exemption of export profit from income tax under section 80-HHC of the Income Tax Act
and this is also not one of the listed subsidies as the entire income from Agriculture is exempt
from Income Tax per se.
(b) Subsidies on cost of freight on export shipments of certain products like fruits, vegetables
and floricultural products. We have in fact indicated in our schedule of commitments that
India reserves the right to take recourse to subsidies (such as, cash compensatory support)
during the implementation period.
4.3 MANDATED NEGOTIATIONS
Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA)

(www.wto.org) mandates that

negotiations for continuing the reform process in agriculture will be initiated one year before
the end of the implementation period. As the implementation period for developed countries
culminated at the end of the year 2000, the negotiations on the Agreement on Agriculture
have begun in January 2000.
These negotiations are being conducted in special sessions of the WTO Committee on
Agriculture (COA) at Geneva. The following are the broad parameters for carrying out
negotiations:
Experience of member countries in implementation of reduction commitments till date;
The effects of reduction commitments on World Trade in Agriculture;

23

Non trade concerns, special and differential treatment to developing country members and the
objective of establishing a fair and market oriented agricultural trading system; and
Identifying further commitments necessary to achieve the long-term objectives of the
Agreement.
During extensive deliberations in the WTO Committee on Agriculture and in the General
Council, member countries had agreed to broadly adhere to the mandate of Article 20 of the
Agreement. In pursuance of the same, in the first phase of the negotiations, members have
submitted 47 negotiating proposals, which were discussed in Seven Special Sessions of the
CoA. With the approval of the Cabinet Committee on WTO Matters, India also submitted its
negotiating proposals to the WTO on 15th January 2001, in the areas of market access,
domestic support, export competition and food security. These proposals were drawn up and
drafted based on inputs received from wide ranging consultations with various stakeholders
and keeping in view Indias objectives in the negotiations, which are to protect its food and
livelihood security concerns and to protect all domestic policy measures taken for poverty
alleviation, rural development and rural employment as also to create opportunities for
expansion of agricultural exports by securing meaningful market access in developed
countries. India also co-sponsored two papers, one on "Market Access" along with 11 other
developing countries and another on "Export Credits for Agricultural Products" along with 9
other countries/group of countries.
Agricultural trade
While the volume of world agricultural exports has substantially increased over recent
decades, its rate of growth has lagged behind that of manufactures, resulting in a steady
decline in agricultures share in world merchandise trade. In 1998, agricultural trade
accounted for 10.5 per cent of total merchandise trade when trade in services is taken into
account, agricultures share in global exports drops to 8.5 per cent. However, with respect to
world trade agriculture is still ahead of sectors such as mining products, automotive products,
chemicals, textiles and clothing or iron and steel. Among the agricultural goods traded
internationally, food products make up almost 80 per cent of the total. The other main
category of agricultural products is raw materials. Since the mid-1980s, trade in processed
and other high value agricultural products has been expanding much faster than trade in the
basic primary products such as cereals.

24

Agricultural trade remains in many countries an important part of overall economic activity
and continues to play a major role in domestic agricultural production and employment. The
trading system plays also a fundamentally important role in global food security, for example
by ensuring that temporary or protracted food deficits arising from adverse climatic and other
conditions can be met from world markets.
Trade policies prior to the WTO
Although agriculture has always been covered by the GATT, prior to the WTO there were
several important differences with respect to the rules that applied to agricultural primary
products as opposed to industrial products. The GATT 1947 allowed countries to use export
subsidies on agricultural primary products whereas export subsidies on industrial products
were prohibited. The only conditions were that agricultural export subsidies should not be
used to capture more than an equitable share of world exports of the product concerned
(Article XVI:3 of GATT). The GATT rules also allowed countries to resort to import
restrictions (e.g. import quotas) under certain conditions, notably when these restrictions were
necessary to enforce measures to effectively limit domestic production (Article XI:2(c) of
GATT). This exception was also conditional on the maintenance of a minimum proportion of
imports relative to domestic production.
However, in practice many non-tariff border restrictions were applied to imports without any
effective counterpart limitations on domestic production and without maintaining minimum
import access. In some cases this was achieved through the use of measures not specifically
provided for under Article XI. In other cases it reflected exceptions and country-specific
derogations such as grandfather clauses, waivers and protocols of accession. In still other
cases non-tariff import restrictions were maintained without any apparent justification.
The result of all this was a proliferation of impediments to agricultural trade, including by
means of import bans, quotas setting the maximum level of imports, variable import levies,
minimum import prices and non-tariff measures maintained by state trading enterprises.
Major agricultural products such as cereals, meat, dairy products, sugar and a range of fruits
and vegetables have faced barriers to trade on a scale uncommon in other merchandise
sectors.
In part, this insulation of domestic markets was the result of measures originally introduced
following the collapse of commodity prices in the 1930s Depression. Furthermore, in the
25

aftermath of the Second World War many governments were concerned primarily with
increasing domestic agricultural production so as to feed their growing populations. With this
objective in mind and in order to maintain a certain balance between the development of rural
and urban incomes, many countries, particularly in the developed world, resorted to market
price support farm prices were administratively raised. Import access barriers ensured that
domestic production could continue to be sold. In response to these measures and as a result
of productivity gains, self-sufficiency rates rapidly increased. In a number of cases,
expanding domestic production of certain agricultural products not only replaced imports
completely but resulted in structural surpluses. Export subsidies were increasingly used to
dump surpluses onto the world market, thus depressing world market prices. On the other
hand, this factor, plus the effects of overvalued exchange rates, low food price policies in
favour of urban consumers and certain other domestic measures, reduced in a number of
developing countries the incentive for farmers to increase or even maintain their agricultural
production levels.
4.4 RUGUAY ROUND AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS
In the lead-up to the Uruguay Round negotiations, it became increasingly evident that the
causes of disarray in world agriculture went beyond import access problems which had been
the traditional focus of GATT negotiations. To get to the roots of the problems, disciplines
with regard to all measures affecting trade in agriculture, including domestic agricultural
policies and the subsidization of agricultural exports, were considered to be essential. Clearer
rules for sanitary and phytosanitary measures were also considered to be required, both in
their own right and to prevent circumvention of stricter rules on import access through
unjustified, protectionist use of food safety as well as animal and plant health measures.
The agricultural negotiations in the Uruguay Round were by no means easy the broad
scope of the negotiations and their political sensitivity necessarily required much time in
order to reach an agreement on the new rules, and much technical work was required in order
to establish sound means to formalise commitments in policy areas beyond the scope of prior
GATT practice. The Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures were negotiated in parallel, and a Decision on Measures
Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-developed and
Net Food-importing Developing Countries also formed part of the overall outcome.

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Introduction to the Agreement on Agriculture

The Agreement on Agriculture, (the Agreement), came into force on 1 January 1995. The
preamble to the Agreement recognizes that the agreed long-term objective of the reform
process initiated by the Uruguay Round reform programme is to establish a fair and marketoriented agricultural trading system. The reform programme comprises specific commitments
to reduce support and protection in the areas of domestic support, export subsidies and
market access, and through the establishment of strengthened and more operationally
effective GATT rules and disciplines. The Agreement also takes into account non-trade
concerns, including food security and the need to protect the environment, and provides
special and differential treatment for developing countries, including an improvement in the
opportunities and terms of access for agricultural products of particular export interest to
these Members.
Relationship with other WTO Agreements
In principle, all WTO agreements and understandings on trade in goods apply to agriculture,
including the GATT 1994 and WTO agreements on such matters as customs valuation, import
licensing procedures, pre-shipment inspection, emergency safeguard measures, subsidies and
technical barriers to trade. However, where there is any conflict between these agreements
and the Agreement on Agriculture, the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture prevail.
The WTO Agreements on Trade in Services and on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property rights are also applicable to agriculture.
Product coverage
The Agreement defines in its Annex 1 agricultural products by reference to the harmonised
system of product classification the definition covers not only basic agricultural products
such as wheat, milk and live animals, but the products derived from them such as bread,
butter and meat, as well as all processed agricultural products such as chocolate and sausages.
The coverage also includes wines, spirits and tobacco products, fibres such as cotton, wool
and silk, and raw animal skins destined for leather production. Fish and fish products are not
included, nor are forestry products.
Rules and commitments
The Agreement on Agriculture establishes a number of generally applicable rules with regard
to trade-related agricultural measures, primarily in the areas of market access, domestic
27

support and export competition. These rules relate to country-specific commitments to

improve market access and reduce trade-distorting subsidies which are contained in the
individual country schedules of the WTO Members and constitute an integral part of the
GATT.
Implementation period
The implementation period for the country-specific commitments is the six-year period
commencing in 1995. However, developing countries have the flexibility to implement their
reduction and other specific commitments over a period of up to 10 years. Members had the
choice of implementing their concessions and commitments on the basis of calendar,
marketing (crop) or fiscal years. A WTO Members implementation year for tariff reductions
may thus differ from the one applied to export subsidy reductions. For the purpose of the
peace clause, the implementation period is the nine-year period commencing in 1995.
Committee on Agriculture
The Agreement established a Committee on Agriculture. The Committee oversees the
implementation of the Agreement on Agriculture and affords Members the opportunity of
consulting on any matter relating to the implementation of commitments, including rulebased commitments. For this purpose, the Committee usually meets four times per year.
Special meetings can be convened if necessary.

CHAPTER 5: SUGGESTIONS FOR PROMOTING EXPORTS

Infrastructure Development:

28

A major impediment to promoting exports is the lack of adequate infrastructure, particularly

cold storage facilities and transportation. There is a need to encourage public-private
partnership in building such facilities and ensuring their proper maintenance. There is no
dearth of financial assistance as there are several incentives being provided by Government
of India under its capital investment subsidy scheme as well as those available under the
schemes envisaged by APEDA. Concerted efforts need to be made in this direction in
collaboration with commercial banks.
Marketing Strategy:
In the new scenario where all the quantitative restrictions have now been removed and there
is increased opportunity for the developing countries to have access to global markets, it is
imperative that a marketing strategy is worked out, focusing on major items of import by
countries and to concentrate on such products using the comparative advantage. The countries
in the European Union, African countries and the CIS countries need to be given greater
attention.
Contract Farming:
Contract farming needs to be encouraged not only to provide a broad base for raw materials
for processing but also for the supply of the right type of inputs and other linkages necessary
for the acceptability of the quality standards for competitive exports
Market Access and Information:
There is a need to provide continuous updating of data on market information, market access,
procedures and processes etc
Biotechnology:
India has been recognized as one of the five top biotechnology leaders in the Asia-Pacific
region. In terms of number of patents filing, India ranks third in Asia. Biotechnology leads to
reduction in cost and improvement in productivity. Given the low-cost but high-calibre work
force, there is a need for optimal utilization of intellectual and biological resources with a
view to bringing cost effectiveness in production.
Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights:

29

India should launch genetic and legal literacy movements immediately to sensitize
panchayats and rural families on the implications of the protection of plant varieties and
Farmers Rights Act 2001 and Biodiversity Act 2002, since they contain provisions for
recognizing and rewarding the contributions of the primary conservers of biodiversity and
holders of traditional knowledge.
Credit Facilities:
The EXIM Bank, in consultation with APEDA and the Ministry of Agriculture, may set up
Farm Export Promotion Cells in each AEZ and provide necessary technical support and
guidance to the exporters. It can also open offices in each state in order to promote Agriexport and also establish overseas branches in countries where Indian exports are favourite
destinations.
Economies of scale:
Economies of scale and brand-banding can only happen when large and big companies enter
the sector. In this respect, contract farming and corporate farming should be extended credit
facilities with liberal terms and making storage, movement, processing, marketing and trade
of farm commodities free from regulations and controls. It is necessary to consider
streamlining the procedure for export financing of agricultural products which are perishable
in nature and making it entrepreneur-friendly. Likewise, the procedure for obtaining export
credit guarantee cover should be streamlined and made exporter-friendly and in this respect a
comprehensive insurance cover, right from the stage of production to export, can also be
considered.
Policy Challenges
The following policy options should receive our attention at the earliest with a view to
preparing ourselves meeting the full impact of WTO
Increased flow of institutional credit to facilitate agricultural exports
Diversification from cereals to high-value crops such as fruits and vegetables,
floriculture, spices, animal husbandry, fisheries, medicinal & herbal crops etc.
Promoting and encouraging public-private partnership to facilitate investment in
infrastructure such as in irrigation, agriculture research, electricity, roads, rural markets,
cold storage and transportation etc., in an endeavour to reduce transportations costs .

30

 Organizing farmers into associations that would jointly produce and process commodities
for international markets at both the regional and global levels including formation of
SHGs and motivating them for cultivation, processing, marketing, nurseries, seeds
production etc., and linking such initiatives through contract farming and corporate
farming.
Increased investment on developing viable and cost effective seeds industry.
Increased investment in agriculture.
Developing institutions and providing support to them for the vertical integration of
production, processing, packaging and marketing of agricultural produce with publicprivate partnership.
Policy framework for the contract and corporate farming should be streamlined.
Improving sanitary and phyto sanitary measures as wells as adoption of codex
alimentarius standards of food safety and simultaneously evolving SPS standards for our
domestic products as well as imports, including strengthening the capacity of the state
government institutions for educating the farmers with regard to SPS requirements

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, let us remember the quote from our eminent agricultural scientist, Dr M .S
Swaminathan, India should ensure that all boxes in the WTO must be abolished, and trade
distortion, and unfair practices must be spelt out clearly and factors governing sustainable

31

livelihood should be recognised so that resource-poor, developing countries should be able to

place restrictions on imports.
The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) was to bring about discipline in one of most distorted
sectors of trade by inter alia disciplining the unrestricted use of production and export
subsidies, as well as by reducing import barriers, including non-tariff barriers.Thus, the AoA
sought to limit the extent of support granted by individual countries and attempted to ensure
that countries adopt a more liberal policy as for as agricultural trade was concerned.At the
same time, as indicated in the preamble, the AoA recognized non-trade concerns (NTCs) of
countries.These NTCs amongst others, included food security and the need to protect the
environment
However, this fine balance between trade and non-trade concerns, as mandated in the
preamble does not appear to have been fully reflected in the provisions of the Agreement and
consequently in its implementation. The major thrust of the Agreement appears to be based
on the hypothesis that liberalisation is the panacea of all ills in the agricultural sector. While
this may be tenable from a conventional economic view point, such reasoning doesnot take
into account the problems faced by a number of developing countries, which because of
certain underlying constraints, have to necessarily take into account non-trade concerns such
as food security, while formulating their domestic policies. This is particularly true of
developing countries where a significant percentage of the population is not only dependent
on the agricultural sector for its livelihood, but is also surviving just around the poverty
line. In such countries a purely market oriented approach may not be appropriate. Instead,
for some countries, it may be necessary to adopt, what we would like to term a market plus
approach, in which non-trade concerns such as maintenance of the livelihood of the agrarian
peasantry and the production of sufficient food to meet domestic needs are taken into
consideration.
We, therefore, feel that at this juncture it is important to closely examine this aspect of the
AoA, so as to ensure that the reform process in the agriculture sector takes into consideration
the food security and other non-trade concerns of countries like India

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Websites
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_intro02_access_e.htm
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www.scribd.com
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_intro07_summary_e.htm#domestic_support
Reports
1) WTO Agreement on Agriculture and its Implications A monthly newsletter of the
ministry of commerce
2) Agreement on Agriculture: Market Access
Krishna P. Pant, Yogendra K. Karki, Pradyumna R. Pandey
Others:
Sharma, Ramesh (2000), Safeguard Measures, Module 6, Agreement on Agriculture, FAO
Resource Manual on Multilateral Trade Negotiations on Agriculture, FAO Rome. Available
at: www.fao.org/trade.
Sharma, Ramesh (2002), Developing Country Experience with the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture and Negotiating Issues, Paper presented at International Agricultural Trade
Research Consortium (IATRC) summer symposium on The Developing Countries,
Agricultural Trade and the WTO, Vancouver, Canada, June 2002

33