Sie sind auf Seite 1von 284

Part I

Local Governments: Creation, Merger, Abolition and Powers

CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS

1987 Constitution
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their
powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and
removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to
the organization and operation of local units.
Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments.
Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to
component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their
prescribed powers and functions.
Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to
levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to
the local governments.

Chapter 2, RA 7160 (Sec 6 10)


Sec. 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. A local government unit may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the case of a
province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the sangguniang
panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial
jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code.
Comment: Congress has the power to create or abolish a province, city, municipality, or any other political
subdivision. The sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod has the power to create and abolish
barangays located within its territorial jurisdiction
Sec. 7. Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its
conversion from one level to another level shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected
capacity to provide services, to wit:

(a) Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government
facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the
local government unit concerned;
(b) Population. It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction
of the local government unit concerned; and
(c) Land Area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a local
government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its
populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF), the
National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
Mariano v. Comelec (242 SCRA 211)
Facts: Petitioners assail the Constitutionality of RA 7859 on the ground that it did not properly identify the
land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bound.
Held: The petitioners in the case have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed
area of Makati (without metes and bounds) will cause confusion as to its boundaries. Congress has refrained
from using metes and bounds description of land areas of other local government units.
Municipality of Jimnez v. Baz Jr. (265 SCRA 182)
Facts: EO 258 creating the Mun. of Sinacaban contained a technical description of its land area. Based on
said EO 258, Sinacaban claimed portions of several barrios previously thought to be part of the Mun. of
Jimenez. The latter Municipality asserted jurisdiction in the claimed portion on the basis of an agreement
entered into in 1950 with Sinacaban, approved by the Provincial Board.
Held: The technical description, containing the metes and bounds of a municipalitys territory staed in EO
258 creating the Municipality of Sinacaban, Misamis Oriental is binding.
Sec. 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of existing local government units shall comply with
the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided, however, That such division shall not
reduce the income, population, or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of the
original local government unit or units shall not fall below its current classification prior to such division.
The income classification of local government units shall be updated within six (6) months from the
effectivity of this Code to reflect the changes in their financial position resulting from the increased
revenues as provided herein.
Sec. 9. Abolition of Local Government Units. A local government unit may be abolished when its income,
population, or land area has been irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum standards prescribed for its
creation under Book III of this Code, as certified by the national agencies mentioned in Section 7 hereof to
Congress or to the sangguniang concerned, as the case may be.
The law or ordinance abolishing a local government unit shall specify the province, city, municipality, or
barangay with which the local government unit sought to be abolished will be incorporated or merged.
Comment: The Code now lays down three important indicators of viability in the creation of local
government units namely: income, population and land area.
Sec. 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be
conducted by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date
of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.

Abbas v. COMELEC (179 SCRA 278)


Held: There is no conflict between the power of the President to merge administrative region with the
Constitutional provision, requiring plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the
requirement of the plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or
barangays, not administrative regions.
City of Pasig v. COMELEC 314 SCRA 179
Facts: Karangalan Village petitioned that they be segregated from Brgy. Manggahan and Dela Paz, Pasig.
Plebiscite was scheduled but the Mun. of Cainta moved to suspend due to a pending case in RTC-Antipolo,
Rizal for settlement of boundary dispute.
Held: A case involving a boundary dispute between local government units presents a prejudicial question
which must first be decided before plebiscites for creation of proposed barangay maybe held.

ARTICLES AND REFERENCES


Public Corporations, Chapters 1-6 (Martin)
CHAPTER ONE: General Principles
A corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law, having the right of succession and the
powers, attributes, and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence. It exists only in
contemplation of law.
A corporation is a legal institution devised to confer upon the individuals of which it is composed powers,
privileges, and immunities which they would not otherwise possess, the most important of which are
continuous legal identity or unity, and perpetual or indefinite succession under the corporate name,
notwithstanding successive changes by death or otherwise, in the corporators or members.
Classes of corporations
1.
2.

Public formed or organized for the government of a portion of a State for the accomplishment
of parts of its own public works. These are created by State either by special or general act.
2. Privateformed for some private purpose, benefit, aim or end; organized wholly for the profit
and advantage of their own members and cannot constitutionally be granted governmental
powers. These are created by the will of the incorporators with the recognizance of the State.

Public vs Private Consider as criterion the relation of the corporation to the State. If it is created by the
State as its own agency or instrumentality to help it carry out its governmental functions, then it is public.
Otherwise, it is private.
3.

Quasi-publicprivate corporations that render public service or supply public wants; while
purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its members, the law requires them to discharge
functions for the public benefit (i.e. utility companies).

Private vs Quasi public Consider as criterion the service the corporation renders to the public. If a
corporation performs a public sovereign power, even though its incorporators intend to obtain profits from
its undertaking, it is quasi-public.
Classes of public corporations

1.

2.

Quasi-Corporationspublic corporations created as agencies of the State for a narrow and limited
purpose. They differ from other public corporations in that they do not possess the powers and
liabilities of self-governing corporations. Instead, their powers generally relate to matters of State,
and not municipal concerns. Thus, although they are public in nature, they cannot be strictly
considered municipal corporations because of their limited number of corporate powers and low
grade of corporate existence. The main purpose of their creation is to aid the State in, or to take
charge of, some public or state work other than community government for the general welfare.
2. Municipal corporations

CHAPTER TWO: Nature, elements, kinds and history of municipal Corporations


A municipal corporation is a body politic constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitants of a city or
town for the purpose of its local government. It is established by law partly as an agency of the State to
assist in the civil government of a country, but chiefly to regulate and administer the local or internal affairs
of the city/town/district which is incorporated.
Courts regard these as subordinate branches of government of the State exercising delegated powers
(municipal administration as an instrumentality of state administration). Municipal corporations are granted
charters for the better government of particular areas or districts.
Municipal corporation vs public corporationAll municipal corporations are public corporations, but not
all public corporations are municipal corporations. Municipal corporations refer to incorporated villages,
towns, and cities with powers of local administration.
Elements:
1.
2.
3.
4.

A legal creation or incorporation;


A corporate name by which the legal entity is known and in which all corporate acts are done;
Inhabitants constituting the population invested with the political and corporate powers which are
exercised through duly constituted officers and agents;
Place or territory within which the local civil government and corporate functions are exercised.

Kinds:
1.

2.

Municipal Corporation Properincorporated cities/towns/villages invested with the power of


local legislation. These exist and are governed by their respective charters. Its distinctive purpose
and distinguishing feature is the power of local government.
Quasi-municipal corporationsame as a quasi-corporation, i.e. it operates directly as an agency
of the State to help in the administration of public functions.

Municipal corporation proper vs quasi municipal corporation When invested with the power of local
government, the municipal corporation as an agency of the state becomes a municipal corporation proper.
Consider as criterion the voluntary or involuntary nature of the corporation; the existence or non-existence
of a charter; and whether the purpose of the corporation is solely a governmental agency or one for selfgovernment.
Municipal corporation proper vs quasi corporation Both are agents of the state for limited and narrow
purposes but have different powers and liabilities. Municipal corporations proper are created either by the
direct solicitation or by the free consent of the persons composing them while quasi corporations (also
called involuntary corporations) are only local organizations which, for purposes of civil administration, are
invested with some characteristics of corporate existence. They are local subdivisions of the state, created
by the sovereign legislative power of its own sovereign will and without any particular solicitation, consent
or concurrent action from the inhabitants (West Chicago Park Commissioners vs Chicago).
Purposes:

1.

2.

To serve as an agency or instrumentality of the state in carrying out the functions of government
which the state cannot conveniently exercise (i.e. tax collection, assessment of property,
enforcement of police regulations)
To act as an agency of the inhabitants in the regulation and operation of municipal franchises and
public utilities, and the promotion and management of their local affairs (i.e. maintenance of
water system, ferries, wharves). In this character, they act as separate entities for their own
purposes and not as subdivisions of the State (Lidasan vs COMELEC).

Dual nature : Two-fold character:


1.

2.

PublicMunicipal corporation acts as an agent of the State for the government of the territory
and inhabitants within the municipal limits. It exercises by delegation a part of the sovereignty of
the State.
PrivateMunicipal corporation acts as a business corporation with functions not strictly
governmental or political. It sees to the administration of local affairs which are beyond the
sphere of the public purposes for which its governmental powers are conferred (Villa vs City of
Manila, Surigao Electric Co. Inc. vs Municipality of Surigao).

Origin and history


England Municipal corporations can be traced back to the farmer commonwealths of the Teutons, and
each wick, ham, stead, or tun took its name form the winsmen who lived there.
United States Early American municipal corporations were similar to English municipalities of the 18th
century. Prior to the revolution, local governments in the nature of municipalities existed in the American
colonies by prescription, sovereign recognition or by virtue of special charters from the sovereign.
Philippines under the Spanish Regime The basic unit of local administration was the pueblo, composed
of numerous barrios, and governed by the cabeza de barangay, an honorific title continued by the Spaniards.
Towns were organized, under the government of a gobernadorcillo, also called capitan, who represented the
provincial governor as the arbiter of local questions, collected taxes, assisted the parish priest and
entertained visiting officials. He was assisted by tenientes (deputies), alguaciles (subordinate employees)
and chiefs of police. Elections for these municipal offices were held annually.
Barangays were administered by cabezas de barangay whose principal duties were to act as agents for the
collection of taxes. They paid no tribute on their own account and were members of the principalia, the
voting and privileged class. The position was originally hereditary and breaks were filled by appointments,
but eventually, the position became elective and service compulsory.
The Maura Law constituted a municipal council of 1 captain and 4 lieutenants, in charge of the active work
of governing the municipality, such as administration of public works and the details of taxation. These
positions were honorary, and each of the members was required to have special qualifications. The
Governor General, provincial council and provincial governor retained disciplinary jurisdiction over the
council and its individual members.
Philippines under the American Regime General Order No. 43, series of 1899 first provided for the
government of municipalities. This was superseded by General Order No. 40, series of 1900, promulgated
by the Military Governor, supposedly to give the Filipino people the right to elect their municipal officers,
only slightly restricted by certain conditions. President McKinleys instructions to the 2nd Philippine
Commission also directed the body to devote their attention to the establishment of municipal governments,
giving the natives of the islands the opportunity to manage their own local affairs to the fullest extent of
which they are capable, and subject to the least degree of supervision and control which a careful study of
their capacities and observation of the workings of native controls show to be consistent with the
maintenance of law, order and loyalty.

The Philippine Commission passed Act No. 82 on January 31, 1901, providing for the organization and
government of municipalities and Act No. 83 on February 5, 1901, for the organization of provinces. These
were later modified in the Administrative Code.
CHAPTER THREE: Creation of Municipal Corporations
The power to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative, exclusive and practically unlimited.
Aside from the legislature, the President under his martial law powers can exercise legislative powers and
create municipal corporations.
In the absence of a Constitutional provision permitting it, this power cannot be delegated by the legislature
to any inferior or subordinate tribunal or board. However, it can pass a general law for the incorporation of
municipal corporations, giving the conditions on which they may be created, and determining whether such
conditions exist.
Certain conditions are needed in order to obtain a municipal corporations incorporation as a city or a town.
Such conditions may refer to extent of area, nature of the territory, the character of the land and the uses to
which it may be devoted, the number of inhabitants, and the density and location of the area to be
incorporated.
Creation of municipal corporations
In the Philippines, there is a general municipal law (Chapter 57 of the Administrative Code) under which
the municipalities in regularly organized provinces were organized and a special municipal law (Chapter 64
of the Administrative Code) under which municipalities in the specially organized provinces were
organized.
The legislature may, by special act organize chartered cities in the Philippines.
Under the Local Government Code, a barangay may be created, named, and its boundaries defined by an
ordinance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panlungsod, subject to the approval of the
majority in a plebiscite called for the purpose by the COMELEC to be held in the units affected within such
a period of time as may be determined by the ordinance creating the said barangay.
Under Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, the President may by executive order define the
boundaries of any province, sub province, municipality or any political subdivision, and increase or
decrease the territory comprised therein, separate any political division other than a province into such
portion as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new
subdivision so created and change the seat of government within any subdivision, to such place as the
public welfare may require, provided that the authorization of Congress shall first be obtained whenever the
boundary of any province or sub-province is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more
sub provinces (**Note that this provision was later declared unconstitutional and repealed by RA No.
5185).
Municipality of Cardona vs Binangonan (36 Phil. 547) HELD: Sec 1 of Act No. 1748 which conferred upon
the Governor General the power to enlarge, constrict or otherwise change the boundary of a province, subprovince, municipality or township does not constitute an abdication of legislative functions with regard to
this particular subject matter. It is simply transference of certain details with respect to provinces,
municipalities and townships, many of them newly created, and all of them subject to rapid change both in
development and population. The proper regulation of this may require prompt action of such detailed
character as not to permit the legislative body to undertake efficiently.
Pelaez vs Gimenez (December 24, 1965)
HELD: Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet the requirements for a valid delegation
of power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or

implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise. Although the last clause
of the first sentence of Sec. 68 gives the President the power to change the seat of the government within
any subdivision to such place as the public welfare may require, the phrase as the public welfare may
require qualifies not the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which the seat of
government may be transferred.
Calalang vs Williams (70 Phil 726) and People vs Rosenthal (68 Phil 328) upheld public interest and
welfare as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of authority to execute a law. However, this doctrine
must be construed in the relation to the specific facts and issues involved in these cases, outside of which
they do not constitute precedents and have no bonding effect.
If the validity of the delegation of power in Sec 68 were upheld, there would no longer be any legal
impediment to statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything, which, in his opinion, may be
required by public welfare or interest. Such grant of authority would virtually be an abdication of power of
Congress in favor of the Executive.
The power of control under Sec 10(a) Art X of the Constitution (at the time) implies the right of the
President to interfere in the exercise of the discretion vested by law in the officers of the executive
departments, bureaus or offices, as well as to act in lieu of such offices. With respect to local governments,
the fundamental law permits the President to wield no more authority than of checking whether said local
governments or their officers perform their duties as provided by statute.
Essential requisites for the incorporation of Municipal Corporations
1.

Territory

In the United States, it is within the power of the legislature, subject only to constitutional restrictions to
determine the nature and extent of the territory to be incorporated and to prescribe the minimum or
maximum area which may be incorporated. Aside from whatever restriction the constitution may impose,
the area incorporated must be contiguous.
2.

Population

The Barrio Charter (RA 2370) specifies 500 as the minimum number of inhabitants required for the creation
of a barrio, and inasmuch as municipalities are composed of barrios, there should be at least 500 inhabitants
to comply with the requirement as to population.
3.

Charter

The charter usually invests the people of the place with the power of local government, determines the form
of government of the municipal entity and defines its rights, powers and obligations. It is conferred for
political purposes.
The rule requiring assent of the inhabitants for incorporation of a municipal corporation to be effective is
not applicable in the Philippines. However, under the new Constitution, the creation of a political division
should be subject to the approval of majority of the votes cast in the units affected.
Municipal corporations may also exist through prescription. Its existence will be presumed in where it is
shown that the community has claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and
acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or objection for a period long enough to afford title
by prescription.
A corporation may exist in fact although not in point of law because of certain defects in some essential
features of its organization. It may be considered a de facto municipal corporation, if the following

requisites are complied with: 1) a valid law authorizing incorporation; 2) an attempt in good faith to
organize under it; 3) a colorable compliance with the law, and; 4) an assumption of corporate powers.
Municipality of Malabang vs Benito (March 28, 1968)
HELD: In cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that the
statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that
there was some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization. In the present case, the mere
fact that the municipality of Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated
cannot make it a de facto corporation, because independently of Sec 68 of the Administrative Code, there is
no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation. An unconstitutional act is not a law; it is, in
legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.
Attack against the validity of incorporation
The validity of incorporation and the corporate existence of a municipal corporation may not be attacked
collaterally. It may be challenged only by the State in a direct proceeding such as quo warranto.
But this rule applies only where the municipal corporation is at least a public corporation. Where it is
neither a corporation de facto or de jure but a nullity, its existence may be questioned collaterally or directly
in any action or proceeding by anyone whose rights or interests are affected thereby, including the citizens
of territory incorporated unless they are estopped from doing so (Municipality of Malabang vs Benito).
The principle of estoppel applies to an individual who wants to attack the validity of incorporation of a
municipal corporation. Where an individual dealt with it and acquiesced in the exercise of its corporate
functions, or where he has entered into a contract with the said corporation, he may be estopped to deny its
corporate existence.
A person or private corporation may likewise be precluded by laches from attacking the validity of the
incorporation of a municipality.
Beginning of corporate existence
The legal existence of a municipal corporation is to be determined by the law creating it. However, where
the law is silent as to the beginning of its corporate existence, the rule is that this shall commence from the
moment the law or charter creating it becomes effective.
Under the Local Government Code, when a new local government unit is created, its corporate existence
shall commence upon the qualification of its executive and a majority of the member s of its legislative
body unless some other time is fixed therefor by law (Sec 6).
A distinction should be made between the creation of the corporation as a legal entity and the organization
of its government. The first should precede the second. The organization of the government of a municipal
corporation presupposes necessarily the previous existence of the said corporation at the time its
government is organized (Mejia vs Balolong, GR No L-1925, 1948).
Carreon vs Carreon (April 30, 1965)
HELD: The existence of the City of Dagupan as a corporate body is incompatible with the continued
existence of the municipal government of Dapitan. Sec 86 of RA 3811 creating the City of Dagupan out of
the municipality of Dapitan can only mean that the municipal officials become city officials upon approval
of the city charter. So when petitioners filed their certificates of candidacy for the positions in the city
government, they filed their certificates to the same positions that they were holding, and could not be
considered resigned therefrom under the old Election Code.
The existence of a municipal corporation may be proved by its record of incorporation or charter. In the
absence of a charter, its incorporation may be shown by parol evidence, at least to prove a de facto

existence. Its existence may also be shown by reputation or by long use of its corporate powers, or by
legislative grants necessarily implying a town corporation.
CHAPTER 4: Alteration and dissolution of Municipal Corporations
A municipal corporation cannot, without legal authorization, exercise its powers beyond its own corporate
limits. It is therefore necessary that it must have its boundaries fixed, definite and certain, in order that they
may be identified and that all may know the exact scope or section of territory and geographical division
embraced in the corporate limits and over which the local corporation has jurisdiction. An incorporation is
void where the boundaries of the municipal corporation are not described with certainty.
With respect to disputes as to jurisdiction of municipal governments over areas or barangays, these shall be
heard and decided by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province where the municipalities concerned are
situated. Where the areas or barangays in dispute are claimed by municipalities situated in different
provinces, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan involved shall jointly hear and decide the dispute. In case no
settlement is reached within 60 days from the date was referred to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
concerned, said dispute shall be elevated to the Regional Trial Court by the province which first took
cognizance of the dispute. The case shall be decided by the said court within 1 year from the start of the
proceedings and appeal may be taken from the decision within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules
of Court (Sec 79, Local Government Code).
Boundary disputes within barangays within the same city or municipality shall be heard and decided by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned for the purpose of affording the parties an
opportunity to reach an amicable settlement. In case no amicable settlement is reached within 60 days from
the date the dispute was referred to the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan, the case shall be
heard and decided by the Regional Trial Court by the of the province or city where the barangays concerned
are located within 1 year from the start of court proceedings. Appeal may be taken decision within the time
and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court (Sec 80, Local Government Code).
In the absence of any Constitutional prohibition, the Congress may alter or dissolve municipal corporations
by:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

fixing, altering, or changing the boundaries of municipal corporations for the purpose of enlarging
or decreasing its territory;
dividing a municipal corporation into 2 or more separate municipalities;
merging or consolidating 2 or more separate municipalities into 1;
annexing one municipality to another;
repealing its charter.

Effects of annexation or consolidation


1.
2.

3.

4.

On the legal existence of the territory annexed- Unless otherwise provided, the annexation of one
municipal corporation to another will dissolve the annexed territory.
On the laws and ordinances of the annexed corporations- In the absence of a provision to the
contrary, the annexed territory shall be become subject to the laws and ordinances by which the
annexing corporation is governed.
On the right of officers or employees of the annexed corporation to continue to hold their officesSubject to what the legislature provides upon annexation, the officers and employees of the
annexed territory shall terminate their official relation with their offices.
On the title to the property of the annexed territory- The annexing territory shall acquire title to
the property of the annexed territory at the time of the annexation unless the annexing statute
provides otherwise. When the annexed territory forms part of a municipality from which it is
taken, the legislature may provide for the payment of compensation for the indebtedness incurred
on account of the property taken. Public buildings and improvements in the annexed territory are
not required to be paid for by the annexing territory, as they have already been paid for by the

5.

annexed territory. However, if any indebtedness on these exists, the annexing territory must be
required to share in the payment of said indebtedness.
On the debts and obligations of the annexed territory- Those contracted prior to the annexation
shall be assumed by the annexing territory in the absence of any provision to the contrary.

Effects of division
1.
2.

On the legal existence of the original corporation- The corporate existence of the original
municipality is extinguished.
On the property, powers and rights of the original corporation- Unless the law provides otherwise,
when a municipal corporation is divided into 2 or more municipalities, each municipality acquires
title to all the property, powers, rights and obligations falling within its territorial limits.

Limitations on the power to dissolve municipal corporations


1.
2.

by an express provision in the Constitution prohibiting the legislature to dissolve municipal


corporations;
those provisions in the Constitution affording protection to the rights, property and contracts of
the inhabitants.

Unless the Constitution has conferred such power, the courts have no power to dissolve municipal
corporations. However, they can declare the act of the legislature creating a municipal corporation illegal.
Municipal corporations cannot bring about their own dissolution by a mere surrender of their charter. A
municipal corporation is not ipso facto dissolved or destroyed by non-user of its powers in whole or in part,
or for its failure for a number of years to exercise the functions if a municipality. In such cases, the
municipal corporation would be suspended but not civilly dead, since its dormant functions could be
revived without action on the part of the sovereignty from which in theory of law, corporate life originally
came.
In the absence of a statute, a municipal corporation is not dissolved by the mere failure to elect or appoint
its officers and agents to conduct its government. The officers do not constitute a corporation. Rather, the
inhabitants of the designated locality are the corporators.
Vilas vs City of Manila (42 Phil 953)
HELD: The juristic identity of the corporation has in no wise been affected by the change of sovereignty,
and in law, the present city is in every legal sense the successor of the old. As such, it is entitled to the
property and property rights of the predecessor corporation and is subject to all of its liabilities. The mere
change of the sovereign authority governing a country does not necessarily dissolve the municipal
corporation organized under the former sovereign. Only such governmental functions as are incompatible
with the present sovereignty may be considered suspended.
Dissolution of a municipal corporation through the repeal of its charter or otherwise, without any provision
for reincorporation, destroys and puts an end to the existence of the corporation. Its territory and inhabitants
are then subject to such governmental functions as the State may impose subject to Constitutional
limitations.
CHAPTER FIVE: Legislative control and Executive supervision over Municipal Corporations
Limitations on legislative control
1.

Constitutional Limitations
a.
Those relating to the protection of private property
b. Those preventing the impairment of contractual obligations
c. Those prescribing a uniformity of law and prohibiting special or local legislation

2.

Limitations depending on the nature of the rights and powers exercised by the municipality
a. a) In matters that relate to private powers or rights, the corporation is the agent of the
inhabitants, and is assumes the character and relations of private individuals, and it is
not subject to the absolute control of the legislature.

In matters that relate to public or governmental powers or rights, the corporation is the agent of the State
and is subject to its control.
Legislative control over the municipal charter
Unless prohibited by the Constitution, the charter, being a creation of the State may be modified, amended
or repealed by the legislature when it is deemed necessary or advisable (US vs Joson, 26 Phil 1)
Provisions of the charter relating to public or governmental matters do not constitute a contract within the
impairment clause of the Constitution, so the legislature has absolute power to amend or alter them at will.
Provisions of the charter granting rights, powers or privileges to the municipality for its own private interest
may be considered as a contract, falling within the protection of the impairment clause.
Legislative control over the form of government
The legislature can change the form of government of a municipal corporation since it is a mere incident of
their creation or existence, which the legislature has absolute and unlimited control over.
The right of local self government is not inherent in municipalities and the legislature has the absolute
power to deprive them of their rights to govern themselves in local affairs.
In order to deprive the people of the right of local self government or any power vested by law in the
municipality, it must be upon express terms of the legislature (City of Manila vs Manila Electric Railroad
and Light Co, 26 Phil 89).
Legislative control over municipal officers
Subject to the Constitution, the legislature has absolute discretion in providing for the manner of selection
and appointment of the officers to administer the public and governmental affairs of the municipal
corporation (i.e. justices of the peace, policemen), but the municipality may not be deprived of the right to
select the officers who will administer the private affairs of the municipality (i.e. caretakers of municipal
parks or streets). The distinction lies in the nature of their functions.
Legislative control over municipal property
Property which the municipality has acquired in its public or governmental capacity is under the complete
control of the legislature. The State, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw the power of the municipality
to hold and manage its property. It may take such property without compensation, conditionally or
unconditionally, despite protest from the citizens. It may require the municipality to spend its funds for the
acquisition and maintenance of such property and provide for any regulation for the use and management
thereof which it may deem to be for the public interest.
Property which the municipality acquired in its private or proprietary capacity is held by it in the same
character as a private individual. The legislature is subject to the constitutional restrictions when dealing
with such property and cannot control it, except through a valid exercise of police power or by taking of
private property upon payment of just compensation.
Clinton vs Rapids, et al (24 Iowa 465)
HELD: Public streets are not the private property of the city; it cannot alienate or use them for other than
legitimate purposes. And over the use of such property acquired, dedicated under the statutes to the public

use, the legislature, so far as regards the rights of public corporations, possesses an unlimited control and
therefore can divert the use of the same for some other public purposes. In this case, the legislature can
authorize the railroad company to lay its tracks on the streets of the city.
Proprietors of Mt. Hope Cemetery vs City of Boston (153 Mass 509)
HELD: The legislature has no power to require the city to transfer the cemetery to the corporation without
compensation, because a cemetery is within the class of property which the city owns in its private or
proprietary character. Ownership of such class of property is protected under the Constitution in that it
cannot be taken without the payment of just compensation to the city.
Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs City of Zamboanga (March 28, 1968)
HELD: RA No 3039 which provides that all buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former
Province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanaga are transferred to the city free of
charge, is valid insofar as it affects lots used as the capitol site, school site and its grounds, hospital and
leprosarium sites because they are truly private in nature. With respect to the 26 lots, the province of
Zamboanga del Norte cannot be deprived of its share in their value inasmuch as said lots are patrimonial
properties since they are not being utilized for distinctly governmental purposes.
Legislative control over public utilities
Unless the Constitution provides otherwise, municipal regulations over the operation of a water, light or gas
company prevail against national or state regulations, because these involve the exercise of the proprietary
or business functions of the municipality. However, the service and rates of the public utility may be subject
to state regulation.
Legislative control over municipal contracts
Municipal contracts are regulated or controlled by the general legislation applicable to either all municipal
corporations created thereafter or existing ones. The legislature may prescribe the methods of making
municipal contracts or impose restrictions thereon by requiring bonds from the persons contracting with the
municipality. It may regulate municipal employment, such as by determining the number of working hours
of laborers.
Execution of municipal contracts is subject to the requirements and restrictions in Secs 606-608 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
Legislative control over municipal funds and revenues
The legislature has absolute control over the public revenues of a municipality such as those derived from
taxation. It may require the expenditure of these funds for public purposes, but it has no control over public
revenues over which the municipality or its creditors have already acquired a vested right. However, no
such right arises until after an actual appropriation is made.
The legislature may not control the private revenues of a municipal corporation because these posses the
character of trust funds equitably belonging to the inhabitants.
CHAPTER SIX: Executive and Ministerial supervision over Local Governments
The President shall exercise general supervision over local governments to ensure that local affairs are
administered according to the law. General supervision includes the power to order an investigation of the
conduct of local government officials when necessary. This general supervision shall be exercised primarily
through the Ministry of Local Government (now the DILG).
There is a difference between control and supervision. Supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that his subordinate officers perform their duties, and to take such action as

prescribed by law if they should fail to perform those duties. Control means the power of an officer to alter,
modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for the latter (Mondano vs Silvosa, 51 OG 3427).
This power of general supervision does not authorize the President to remove or suspend a local official
without any ground or on grounds not authorized by law (Planas vs Gil, 67 Phil 62).
Lacson vs Roque (49 OG 93)
HELD: Suspension of the Mayor of the City of Manila on the ground of a pending charge against him for
libel was illegal because it was not based on grounds provided for in law. To be a misconduct in office, the
act must be committed in relation to the performance of his duties.
Jover vs Borra (49 OG 2765)
HELD: The act of the President when, for not valid reasons, he relieved the Mayor of Iloilo City of his
office and designated an Acting Mayor in his stead, is illegal. Although the office of the mayor is
appointive, Congress fixed the term of office of the Mayor to 6 years, and this implies that the said officer
can continue in office until the expiration of his term unless removed for cause as provided by law. The
Presidents action in this case amounted to an assertion of absolute control and not merely supervision.
Mondano vs Silvosa (supra)
HELD: Suspension of the Mayor of Mainit, Surigao by the Provincial Governor under an alleged authority
of the President pending the hearing of charges of rape and concubinage is illegal because the charges
preferred against him were not based on grounds provided for by law. The alleged act of the Mayor did not
involve misconduct in office. Neither was he convicted yet of a crime involving moral turpitude.

Compendium on Local Autonomy and Local Government, Chapters 1-3 (Agra)


CHAPTER ONE: Nature of Local Governments
Local Government Unit is a political subdivision constituted by law, possessing substantial control over its
own affairs.
In a unitary system of government, it is an intra-sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, and is not
intended to be imperium in imperio (empire within an empire). The 1987 Philippine Constitution does not
prescribe federalism. Autonomy does not contemplate the creation of mini-states.
A Chartered City is a political body corporate, endowed with faculties of municipal corporations exercised
through its city government in conformity with law and its proper corporate name; may sue and be sued,
enter into contracts and be contracted with.
No plebiscite is necessary when creating a national government agency such as the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA). Plebiscite is only required for the creation of local government units.
Dual nature/Two-Fold powers of Local Governments
1.

Public, Governmental or Political springs from sovereignty; exercised in administering the


powers of the State and promoting public welfare; include legislative, judicial, public and political
aspects

Public character as regards the State: agent of the government


2.

Corporate, Private or Proprietary arising from existence as legal persons, not as public agencies;
exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community; include ministerial, private and
corporate aspects

Private character as regards the State: promote local necessities and convenience for its own community
LGUs as agents and delegates of the National government
Municipal Corporations (MC) derive their powers and rights from the legislature they can only exercise
delegated legislative powers conferred by Congress as the national lawmaking body, therefore they cannot
defy Congress will, nor modify or violate it. As agents, they are vested with the power of subordinate
legislation, wherein the delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise higher powers.
MCs have no power to impose tax on natl govt instrumentalities, or otherwise retard, impede, burden or
in any manner control the operations of constitutional law enacted by Congress to execute powers vested in
the natl govt. Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat national policies.
Exercise of governmental functions
As agencies of the State, MCs enjoy sovereign immunity from suit when engaged in governmental
functions. However, they are subject to suit even in the performance of these functions if their charter so
provides.
Under the Real Property Tax Code, LGUs have no choice but to collect real property tax this means it is
the national government expressing itself through the legislative branch that is levying the tax. The LGUs
are merely constituted as agents to fix the rates.
As agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government, MCs are endowed
with police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation.
The National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) exercises administrative control and supervision over
PNP officers and members while local chief executives exercise operational supervision and direction.
Since the latter are only acting as representatives of NAPOLCOM, they are answerable to the former for
their actions. However, unless the acts of the local executives are countermanded by NAPOLCOM, their
acts are considered valid and binding. Although mandatory, deputization of local executives is not
automatic and self-executory it requires a formal act of the NAPOLCOM.
Delegated powers of local governments (not inherent)
1.
2.
3.

Police Power inherent in the State, but not MCs; valid delegation by Natl Legislature
necessary, since the latter is the repository of the inherent powers of the State
Power to Tax must always yield to a legislative act; however, may be exercised pursuant to the
direct authority conferred by the 1987 Philippine Constitution
Power of Eminent Domain conferring statues cannot be broadened or constricted by implication

As agents of the community


Municipal authorities are in a better position to determine the evils sought to be prevented by the inclusion
or incorporation of particular provisions in enacting a particular statute and therefore to pass the appropriate
ordinance to attain the object of the law.
Although the general law requires a majority vote in enacting ordinances, sanggunian may provide for
higher requisite vote in amending specific ordinances.
Corporate existence of LGUs
Municipality [created under E.O. 265 (1949), later declared unconstitutional] which has performed
governmental acts and been given State recognition and acknowledgment is a regular de jure municipality.
[LGC of 1991 cured defect by stating that municipal districts organized pursuant to E.O.s and presidential

issuances, which have their respective seats of office at the the of the Codes effectivity are to be considered
regular de jure municipalities.]
Attack on legal existence of a body politic:
Quo Warranto must be timely filed; quo warranto suit against corporation for forfeiture of charter must be
commenced within 5 years from time that act complained of was done or committed.
Any other direct proceeding which must be brought in the name of the Republic.
To change the name of a local government unit, a plebiscite is required to be conducted in the unit or units
directly effected. Cannot be effected by mere resolution of sanggunian.
Since the LGC is silent, sanggunian panlalawigan has no authority to change the name of its province
authority lies with Congress.
Territorial jurisdiction of political subdivisions
Definition of territorial boundaries of LGU is a standard provision of the law creating them. Such
provision, however, is not a grant of ownership of National Govt properties within the boundaries to the
LGU. Jurisdiction refers to the sphere of political authority, not the area of ownership. An express grant is
necessary to effect transfer of ownership.
Council sessions must be conducted within territorial jurisdiction, except for instances such as lahar having
wiped out the barangay.
Punong barangay cannot alter boundaries on his/her own.
Power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges in the municipal waters was granted for revenue purposes.
Commercial fishing operation within the 15-km. area of municipal waters is not prohibited provided: (a)
activity is not undertaken in water areas within7 km. from shoreline; (b) allowed only in waters 7 or more
fathoms deep.
CHAPTER TWO: Local Autonomy and Centralization
Local autonomy is not the same as decentralization. Local autonomy can only mean a measure of
decentralization of functions of government.
Decentralization devolution of national administration to the local levels in which local officials remain
accountable to the central govt in the manner law may provide.
LGU is autonomous in the sense that is is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resource.
Power which used to be highly centralized is thereby deconcentrated.
Two levels of decentralization:
1.

Decentralization of Administration/Administrative Autonomy central government delegates


administrative powers to political subdivisions to achieve the ff. purposes:
broaden local power base
make units more responsive and accountable
ensure full development of local governments as self-reliant communities
break the monopoly of National Government over managing local affairs
relieve National Government from the burden of managing local affairs

Role of the President: general supervision, only to ensure that local affairs are administered according to
law. He/She has no control over their acts in the sense that he/she can substitute their judgments with
his/her own.
Administrative Autonomy primarily pertains to: power and responsibility to deliver basic services
2.

Decentralization of Power/Political Autonomy involves abdication of political power in favour


of LGUs; autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with
minimum intervention from central authorities; amounts to self-immolation.

Autonomous government becomes accountable to constituency, not central authorities.


President of the Republic
Omission of phrase as may be provided for by law in relation to power of general supervision over
LGUs in 1987 Constitution merely serves to underscore LGUs autonomy from Congress and to break the
latters control over local government affairs. Basic law did not intend to deprive legislature of all authority
over municipal corporations, particularly concerning discipline.
Department Secretaries
Secretary of Justice review and revoke tax ordinances with regard to constitutionality or legality; cannot
substitute own judgment nor replace the same with another version nor declare it unjust, excessive,
oppressive or confiscatory since they involve exercise of judgment or discretion as to wisdom and
reasonableness; power is of supervision, not control
Secretary of DILG administrative supervision over local govt units; need not confirm the decision of a
local chief executive imposing penalty of removal against appointive officials
Congress
Retains control of the LGU, although in significantly reduced degree under present Constitution. Basic
relp between national legislature and local governments has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in
1987 constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy.
Local autonomy not self-executing
It is subject to the passage of a local government code, local tax law, income distribution legislation and
national representation law.
Interpretations in favor of decentralization
Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favour of centralized power in Malacanang and the
other beneficial to local autonomy, scales must be weighed in favour of the latter. (Should be resolved in
favour of the greater economy of the local government.)
The power to review must be guided by a liberal construction in favour of the supervised/lower LGU and in
consonance with the principles of local autonomy.
The value of local governments as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy that
they enjoy.
Fiscal autonomy

Pursuant to fiscal autonomy granted to LGUs, and although the LGC is silent as to the placement of idle or
excess funds, the sanggunian may authorize the investment, placement in time deposit or any judicious
utilization of such funds as far as general funds are concerned.
Incidents of decentralization
Under the principle of local autonomy, even though the power to abolish an office is not expressly
conferred on provincial governments, it is necessarily implied from the power to create offices.
R.A. 5185, which gives mayors the power to appoint all officials entirely paid out of city funds, and B.P.
337, empowering local executives with the authority to appoint all officers and employees of the city were
not meant to vest the city mayors per se with comprehensive powers rather, they underscore the transfer
of the power of appointment over local officials and employees from the President to the local governments
and to highlight local autonomy.
LGUs enjoy full autonomy in the operation and management of economic enterprises, such as public
markets. A sanggunian may provide for a different scheme of allocating market stalls.
LGUs may not provide for allowances to judges assigned within a given locality since this would counter
the spirit of R.A. 6758, which standardizes the salaries of government personnel.
LGU cannot create its own government owned or controlled corporation to provide basic services, since
only Congress may create such corporation by special law. Also, it is the function of the LGu to provide
such services.
Department of Agriculture may opt to devolve the function of regulating the operation of commercial
fishing vessels within municipal waters, in consonance with the spirit of local autonomy, to LGUs.
Centralization and national integration

Office of the President

When Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections are not conducted in certain areas, the President may appoint
SK officials in exercise of his/her residual powers and the power to appoint other officers of the government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided.
Ordinances enacted by local legislative bodies must not be repugnant to or in conflict with existing
Administrative Orders or local budget circulars issued by the Dept. of Budget and Management (DBM) for
govt employees and officials.
Classification or reclassification of public forest land is a prerogative of the President upon
recommendation of the pertinent department head.
Additional compensation outside the purview of R.A. 6758 (ex. medical benefits) only allowable if
approved by President via administrative order.
Sangguniang panlalawigan cannot authorize grant of representation and transportation allowance to all
division chiefs (divisions only components of departments/offices) of the provincial gov;t, since it violates
Admin. Order 42 (clarifying role of DBM; only allows grant of benefit to department heads or asst.
department heads).

Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

No local elective may be suspended during election period except upon prior written approval of the
COMELEC.

Omnibus Election Code states that LGUs must share in expenses for the election of barangay officials,
therefore COMELEC may direct compliance therewith.

Commission on Audit (COA)

Approval by COA of disbursements of local funds relates to administrative aspect of the matter of the
officials accountability, but does not foreclose Ombudsmans authority to investigate and determine WON
there is a crime to be prosecuted for which he/she is accountable. Compliance with COA rules and
regulations does not necessarily mean that misappropriation of public funds was not committed.
COA has power to compromise or release any unsettled claim or liability whenever government interest
requires.
Disposal of unserviceable property through public auction does not need approval by COA, but those
disposed of through negotiated sale does.
In consonance with its constitutional mandate as guardian of public funds, disposal of real property owned
by LGU shall be subject to approval of COA regardless of value or cost involved and mode of divestment,
even if Committee on Awards determines floor price that is disadvantageous to the LGU.
In exercise of its contract review functions, COA may direct the adoption of the BIR zonal valuation if it is
a more reasonable selling price as compared to the highest available bid during the public auction.
COA may employ the services of private appraisers to determine the value of real property sought to be
sold if the amount involved is substantial and the transaction is the subject of investigation by the Office of
the Ombudsman.

Civil Service Commission (CSC)

Has the power to approve or disapprove appointments set before it by inquiring into the eligibility of the
person, but does not have the power to make appointments itself or to direct the appointing authority to
change employment status of an employee, otherwise this will amount to an arrogation of power belonging
to appointing authority.
May accredit an LGU, subject to certain requirements where appointments of local officials are no longer
subject to CSC approval.
Cannot nullify a board resolution calling for a reorganization in the local government offices CSC has
jurisdiction only insofar as the implementation of the reorganization is concerned. Proper forum to assail
resolution are the regular courts (RTCs).

Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)

General supervision is exercised by the President through the Secretary of Local Government.
Application for authority to travel abroad by all local officials and employees (other than governors, city
mayors or highly urbanized and independent component cities) shall be approved by the Secretary. Failure
to obtain authority ma constitute gross negligence and dereliction of duty.
It is the governor that has authority to impose preventive suspension against a respondent municipal elective
official. DILG has to authority to impose such suspension.
DILG shall be the lead national government agency to oversee/administer national government assistance to
local government units in the implementation of devolved infrastructure programs.

[NOTE: a basic element that determines centralization is that the effects of the concerns of a particular
department are not confined to a particular region rather, they can be felt on a nationwide scale]

Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), Telecommunications Office


(TELOF)

Cannot devolve its regional office functions to the LGUs, considering the interdependence of various
telecom systems on a nationwide scale.

Land Transportation Office (LTO)


Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
Department of Environment and National Resources (DENR)

Concerned with enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations, and the protection, development and
management of forest lands.
DENR retains power of control over activities concerning community-based forestry projects
(notwithstanding fact of devolution), being the national agency authorized by the Administrative Code of
1987 to protect and preserve the environment, which is a constitutional mandate. Therefore, its power
cannot be encroached upon by LGU.

Department of Justice (DOJ) (role of Secretary of Justice discussed above)


Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
Department of Finance (DOF)

Secretary of Finance is the proper appointing authority for treasurers, and the proper disciplining authority
to issue preventive suspension.
Local legislative councils are bereft of authority to initiate administrative action against the treasurer.

Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)

General supervision over the implementation of the National Building Code, including appellate jurisdiction
over the decisions and order of the local building officials remains with the Secretary of Public Works and
Highways.
Local chief executive possesses the authority to appoint an engineer who shall also act as local building
official.

Department of Energy (DOE)


Department of Agriculture (DA)
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO)
Public Estates Authority (PEA)
Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS)
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC)

Local autonomy and the judicial system

The exercise of an authority or a power by a local government unit may be judicially inquired into and
corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due
process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee.
Internal acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII, which enjoyed administrative autonomy are
subject to the jurisdictionof the courts.
Courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the power of eminent domain and to
determine whether there is genuine necessity therefor.
Courts, not the CSC, are the proper forum to assail and seek nullification of a resolution for reorganization
in the local government offices. CSC has jurisdiction only insofar as the implementation of the
reorganization is concerned.
Provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
These LGUs enjoy administrative autonomy. The 1987 constitution ensures the autonomy of local
governments and political subdivisions, and limits the Presidents power to general supervision over local
governments.
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
Peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, and contemplates the grant of political autonomy (according to Cordillera
Broad Coalition vs. COA).
Registration of motor vehicles whose effects are not confined to a region should not be devolved to the
ARMM and should remain with the LTO.
CAB has no authority to devolve or share any of its general and specific functions with the ARMM in the
regulation of all entities engaged in air transportation or air commerce. However, ARMM may assist CAB
in the performance of its functions.
Regional government of ARMM may not enact a Regional Public Works Act which will absolutely
dispense with public bidding since this would be contrary to public policy in the prosecution of public
undertakings.
May not also enact a Regional Police Force Law.
Employee of Sothern Philippines Development Authority may refuse to be transferred to the ARMM and
may claim and be entitled to separation pay. Cannot be obligated to transfer because of constitutional
prohibition against involuntary servitude.
Permanent vacancies in the Sangguniang Bayan within a province situated in ARMM are filled by the
provincial governor, not regional governor.
Cordillera Autonomous Region
Peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, and contemplates the grant of political autonomy. (according to
Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. COA)
CHAPTER THREE: Devolution
Devolution a mandatory process premised on the constitutional mandate that all local government units
possess and enjoy local autonomy

E.O. 503 effectively extends the period of devolution from 6 months as provided for in the LGC to 1 year in
order to accommodate the smooth transition and address difficulties in the devolution process.
Powers devolved to LGUs
Specific grant necessary the enumeration of powers and services under sec. 17 of the LGC is not
exclusive
Power to discipline locally assigned national employees cannot be subject to the jurisdiction of the
municipal council (ex. fire personnel are under Bureau of Fire Protection of DILG, fire protection not being
a devolved function)
Devolution has a corresponding effect on local budgeting processes.
Although regulation of cockfighting has been devolved to local governments, a municipal government
cannot issue a permit to a promoter to hold cockfights in places other than a licensed cockpit, since this
would violate the law.
Ports which are vital to the national interest and security which are linked to each other are expressly
excluded from the coverage of devolution.
Implementation of locally-funded communal irrigation projects (CIP) shall be devolved to LGUs. The
allocation for locally funded CIPs will no longer be released to the National Irrigation Administration
(NIA) as a consequence of devolution. However, foreign-assisted CIPs fall outside the coverage of
devolution.
Licensing and regulation of activities undertaken by travel agencies, tour operators and professional
congress organizers should be transferred to LGUs.
There is partial devolution in terms of the functions of the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA).
The functions devolved are the promotion, organization and development of cooperatives. CDA retains the
powers relating to registration of cooperatives and the issuance of rules and regulations, policies and
guidelines.
General supervision over the implementation of the National Building Code, including appellate jurisdiction
over the decisions and order of the local building officials remains with the Secretary of Public Works and
Highways.
With regard to the compensation and position classification system, the Joint Commission on Local
Government Personnel Administration was abolished and transferred to the appropriate office in the CSC.
Absorption of personnel
Devolution does not only involve the delegation of the powers to regulate but also the transfer of the
necessary assets and personnel.
Objectives

To ensure the administrative and technical capabilities of the LGUs to provide the devolved
basic services and facilities at the local level
To ensure that the delivery of basic services is not duly prejudiced or disrupted.

Incidents of absorption

Re-appointment of an employee to the same position held prior to the reorganization constitutes a
reconsideration of any previous objection to his/her earlier appointment.
CSC has no power to disapprove appointments made to those already employed but subsequently devolved.
Devolved personnel do not lose their security of tenure. Even without appointment, they shall continue to
hold the position to which they were last appointed.
Exceptions
Not administratively viable there is a duplication of functions when the duties and responsibilities of
national government agency personnel are similar to those of incumbent local government employees, and
their offices perform the same functions.
However, this does not apply to a national employee who is responsible for or attached to a devolved asset
(ex. drivers of devolved agencies). The LGU and National Govt may invoke this provision if both agree as
to the duplication, but LGU may still opt to absorb the employee.
Involuntary servitude employee may refuse to be transferred and may claim separation pay.
Appointment not renewed an appointment not renewed by the DBM prior to the completion of the 6month process cannot be re-appointed on the basis alone of the city government affected
Devolved personnel are considered local government personnel and should be covered by the existing
Position Classification and Pay Plan. There shall be no diminution in pay or benefits, therefore they may
continue to enjoy higher rates than their counterparts. Gradual equalization of salaries of all local
government personnel must then be achieved to eliminate (or at least minimize) the aforesaid disparity. To
achieve this, LGUs lower than special cities and first class provinces may adopt the salary schedule for
higher LGUs subject to the following conditions:

LGU is financially capable


Salary schedule shall be uniformly applied
Schedule of the highly urbanized cities and first class provinces shall not be higher than that
adopted by the national government
In implementing a new and higher salary schedule, the salary grade allocation of positions and
salary steps of personnel shall be retained
Adoption shall be subject to budgetary and general limitations on Personal Service Expenditures
(Secs. 324-325, LGC)
In case of component cities and municipalities, schedule shall not be higher than that of the
province or city where they belong
Adoption of higher salary schedule shall not alter existing classification of LGU concerned

LGUs may grant allowances/additional compensation to national government employees assigned in their
localities at rates authorized by law, rules and regulations, subject to the following conditions:

Annual income or finances of LGU as certified by the local treasurer concerned will allow such
grant without exceeding the general limitations for personal services
Budgetary requirements (Sec. 324 of LGC and R.A. 6758) have been satisfied and provided fully
in the budget as certified by the Budget Officer and COA representative
LGU has fully implemented the devolution of personnel/functions in accordance with the LGC

The mandatory absorption does not preclude affected LGUs from creating equivalent positions nor
conferring functions different from the position previously held by the devolved employeee provided there
is no diminution of pay and benefits, reduction in rank and impairment of tenure. Assignment of devolved
personnel is an administrative decision of the LGU.

A local chief executive may appoint one person or a committee to investigate, hear, make findings and
submit recommendations incidental to administrative complaints against erring appointive local officials,
including devolved personnel.
Transfer of assets
Assets transferred to LGUs pursuant to devolution cannot be recovered since the transfer is mandatory.
However, a provincial government may continue funding a general hospital until the same is officially
transferred to the DBM. Since devolved hospitals have become components of LGUs like other devolved
national government agencies, they shall be covered by COA Circular No. 92-382.
Memoranda of Agreement to effect devolution
To effect devolution, a MOA must be effected between a National Government Agency and local
governments concerned. The local chief executive, in order to enter into an agreement, must have the
authority of the local legislative council. The DILG cannot revoke such agreement, rule on the alleged
diminution of powers, nor pass upon the merits of the contents and provisions of the agreement.
Oversight Committee
The OC is the body empowered to formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for
the efficient and effective implementation of all provisions of the LGC. Opinions rendered by it shall
prevail over those of the DOJ.
The DOJ is bereft of authority to review or pass upon the rulings of the OC, unless the latter itself requests.
The OC, however, cannot expand nor constrict the law. It must always remain congruent to it. A resolution
adopted by the OC is devoid of legal force and effect unless approved by the President and subsequently
incorporated or embodied in an executive or administrative order.

Alfiler
See attachments

Tapales
See attachments

CREATION OF L OCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS


Tan v. Comelec
BP 885 (an Act creating a new province of Negros del Norte) was enacted. It provides for the new
provinces component cities, boundaries, and the conduct of a plebiscite for its creation. A plebiscite was
held, pursuant to the requirement of said BP (shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are

the areas affected), but the plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of the new
province, to the exclusion of the voters from the rest of the province. (Negros Occidental some cities and
municipalities of Negross Occidental = Negros del Norte)
WON the petition questioning the constitutionality and validity of the plebiscite renders the case moot and
academic because the result was in favor of the creation of the new province and such creation was now fait
accompli.
HELD: No.
It is the legality of the plebiscite itself which is challenged.
WON the province complied with the plebiscite requirement.
HELD: No.
Sec 3, Art XI provides that No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or
units affected. This means that the rest of Negros Occidental must be included in the conduct of plebiscite
as the boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily substantially altered by
the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province.
WON the new province complied with the requirements of land area.
HELD: No.
Sec 197 of the LGC provides that a province may be created if it has a territory of at least three thousand
five hundred square kilometers, xxx. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more
islands. The use of the word territory clearly, reflects that it has reference only to the mass of land area and
excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control. It can be safely concluded that the word
territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be synonymous with "land area" only.

Torralba v. Municipality of Sibagat


BP 56, enacted February 1980, created the Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur. Petitioners
assail its validity for being violative of Section 3, Article XI, 1973 Constitution: No province, city,
municipality, or barrio may be created except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code; that the LGC must first be enacted to determine the criteria for the creation of any
province, city, municipality, or barrio and since no LGC [came into being only on 10 February 1983] had
yet been enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, the latter could not have possibly complied with any
criteria when the Municipality was created.
HELD: Section 3, Article XI, 1973 Constitution does not prohibit the modification of territorial and
political subdivisions before the enactment of the LGC. It does not say that the LGC is a condition sine qua
non for the creation of a municipality. The constitutional provision simply means that once said Code is
enacted, the creation, modification or dissolution of LGUs should conform with the criteria thus laid down.
The power to create a municipal corporation is legislative in nature. In the absence of any constitutional
limitation, a legislative body may create any corporation it deems essential for the more efficient
administration of government. The creation of the new Municipality was a valid exercise of legislative
power vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Interim Batasang Pambansa. Pursuant to BP 56, a valid
plebiscite has been conducted among the unit/s affected. The officials of the new Municipality have taken
their oaths and are performing their functions. A de jure entity has been created.

Bai Sema v. Comelec


WON RA 9054 delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays, is constitutional.

WON a province (created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201) is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district
for such province
HELD: No.
For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate at the
same time the power to create a legislative district. Congress cannot delegate to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of Representatives.
Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to
reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. However,
under the Local Government Code, "only x x x an Act of Congress" can create provinces, cities or
municipalities.
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power
to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation
under its plenary legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not one of the
express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies. In the present case, the
question arises whether the delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision of the Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of
the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is
followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution provides, "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative" in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, "Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city
whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member x x x."
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the
same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative
district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also
the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000
involves the power to create a legislative district because once the city's population reaches 250,000, the
city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city
inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.

Province of North Cotabato v. GRP


On 8/5/08, the government and the MILF were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 in Malaysia.
The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same
contained, among others, the commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect
human rights, negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain
from the use of threat or force to attain undue advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive
agenda are on-going.
WON the creation of the MOA-AD violates the Petitioners right to information on matters of public
concern

HELD:
(a) The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the people at large
(b) The right to information contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of
the transaction
(c) The right includes (1) the right of the people to demand information and (2) the duty of the
officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.
(d) E.O No 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate continuing
consultations, and such establishes petitioners right to be consulted on the peace agenda,
corollary to the Constitutional right.
(e) Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion
when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation.
At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the peoples
right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda.
1.

2.

3.

E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local
levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information,
comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.
The Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations before
any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may
call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented
therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically
result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total
environment.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut
procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other
things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department
or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by
mere agreement or compromise.

The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to information or the
specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive
secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the
official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.

Lopez v. Comelec
WON PD 824 (enacted November 1975) creating Metropolitan Manila is valid.
HELD: Yes.
In Paredes v. Executive Secretary the constitutional provision on the need for a majority of the votes cast in
the plebiscite in the unit or units affected would be satisfied even if "those voters who are not from the
barangay to be separated were excluded in the plebiscite." It cannot be argued therefore that the plebiscite
held in the areas affected to constitute Metropolitan Manila in the referendum on February 27, 1975 was not
a sufficient compliance with the constitutional provision. With the voters in such four cities and thirteen
municipalities, now composing Metropolitan Manila, having manifested their will, the constitutional
provision relied upon by petitioners has been satisfied. It is to be noted likewise that at the time of such
plebiscite in February, 1975, there was no Local Government Code.

Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly recognized the juridical entity known as Metropolitan
Manila. Such express constitutional affirmation of its existence in the fundamental law calls for the
dismissal of these petitions, there being no legal justification for the declaration of unconstitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 824. Nor was it the first time that there has been acknowledgment in law of the
creation of Metropolitan Manila.
Under PD 824: "The Commission, the General Manager and any official of the Commission shall be under
the direct supervision and control of the President. Notwithstanding any provision in this Decree, the
President shall have the power to revoke, amend or modify any ordinance, resolution or act of the
Commission, the General and the Commissioners." It may give rise to doubts as to its validity insofar as it
confers the power of control on the President. That control he certainly exercises under the present
Constitution over the ministries. His power over local governments does not go that far. It extends no
further than general supervision. These doubts, however, do not suffice to nullify such a provision.
Succinctly put, that construction that would save is to be preferred as against one that will destroy. To show
fidelity to this basic principle of construction is to lend substance to the equally basic doctrine that the
constitution enters into and forms part of every statute. Accordingly, the presidential power of control over
acts of the Metro Manila Commission is limited to those that may be considered national in character.
Where, however, the acts of the Metro Manila Commission may be considered as properly appertaining to
local government functions, the power of the President is confined to general supervision.

PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
Alvarez v. Guingona
RA 7720 converted the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an independent component city. Petitioners
claim that the said municipality has not met the minimum average annual income required under the LGC.
They assert that Internal Revenue Allotments are not actually income but merely transfers and/or budgetary
aid from the national government and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like
population, land and equal sharing.
Another contention of the petitioner is that RA 7330 originated not from Congress but from the Senate.
Apparently, RA 7330 originated from HB 8817 which was filed on April 18, 1993. After the third reading,
the bill was transmitted to the Senate on January 18, 1994. Meanwhile, a counterpart bill SB 1243 was filed
on May 19, 1993. On February 23, 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the senate. The committee
recommended that HB 8817 be approved without amendment, taking into consideration that the house bill
was identical to the senate bill.
HELD:RA 7720 is valid.
Internal Revenue Allotments are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of funds of
the LGU. They are included in computing the average annual income required to become a city. The IRAs
regularly and automatically accrues to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of
the LGU. Thus they constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of
much needed funds.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not
contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of
Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill. Nor does
the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill
from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

Every law, including RA No. 7720,has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality It is a wellentrenched jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the presumption of constitutionality.
Consequently, for RA No. 7720 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one; in other words, the grounds for nullity
must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.

POWERS AND FUNCTIONS


A.

Governmental powers and functions

Municipality of San Fernando v. Firme


A collision occurred involving (1) a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate
of Macario Nieveras, (2) a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino
Velasquez and (3) a dump truck of the petitioner Municipality of San Fernando and driven by Alfredo
Bislig. Several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr. died as a result of the injuries they
sustained and 4 others suffered physical injuries.
HELD: the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was
then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions.
The test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the
municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions. The municipal corporations exist in a
dual capacity, and their functions are twofold. In one they exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and
while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental. Their
officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by them, are nevertheless public
functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In
the other capacity the municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from their
existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of such
functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state or
sovereign power."
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in
the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were
acting in a proprietary capacity.
The driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get
a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets. In the absence of any evidence
to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed. Hence, the municipality
cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the
discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger tragic and deplorable though it may
be imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation
B.

Proprietary powers and functions

City of Manila v. IAC


Vicencio Sto. Domingo, deceased husband of plaintiff Irene Domingo was buried in a lot of the North
Cemetery which lot was leased by the City of Manila to Irene from 1971 to 2021. Irene paid the full rental
thereof. In January of 1978, the cemetery authorities exhumed and removed the remains of Vivencio from
the lot which were then placed in a bag and kept in the bodega of the cementery. When Irene went to the

cemetery for All Souls Day, she was shocked to learn that the remains of her husband were not anymore in
the lot as the same had been rented out to another lessee.
HELD: The City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such endowed with the faculties of
municipal corporations to be exercised by and through its city government in conformity with law, and its
proper corporate name. It may sue and be sued and contract and be contracted with. Its powers are two fold
in character, public, governmental or political on one hand, and corporate private and proprietary on the
other hand.
The North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila which was created by resolution of the
Municipal Board. The City of Manila prescribes the procedure and guidelines for the disposition of burial
lots and plots within the cemetery through Admin. Order No. 5, s.1975. With said acts of dominion, the
cemetery is no doubt within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private
character.
There is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private respondents. Hence, obligation
arising from contracting parties. Thus, a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law
between them. Therefore a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to damages even if no
penalty of such breach is prescribed in the contract.
Hence, the breach of a contractual obligation between the City of Manila and plaintiff, involving property
which is patrimonial in character entitles the latter to damages.

Part II
Decentralization; Local Autonomy; Powers of Municipal
Corporations
ARTICLES/REFERENCES
Public Corporations, Chapters IV VII (Martin)

Chapters IV VI, see above

CHAPTER SEVEN: Powers of municipal corprorations


Sources of Powers of Municipal Corporations:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Constitution
Statutes of the State
Charter
In some states which adhere to it, the doctrine of the inherent right of self-government, with
respect to certain municipal matters

Classification of municipal powers


1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

Express Powers are those granted in express word by the special charter or the general law
under which the corporation is organized
Implied Powers are those powers which arise by natural implication from the grant of express
powers or by necessary inference from the purposes or functions of the corporation
Inherent Powers are those which are necessary and inseparable from every corporation, and
which come into existence as a matter of course as soon as a municipality is created. They are the
common-law powers of a corporation
Legislative Power is the authority to make laws. This power is generally vested in the common
council.
Executive Power is the authority to enforce laws, or appoint the agents charged with the duty of
such enforcement; generally vested in the mayor and the heads of the designated departments and
other officers created by law.

Chapter II Book I , LGC (Sec 6 24)

Sec 6 10, see above

Sec. 11. Selection and Transfer of Local Government Site, Offices and Facilities
The law or ordinance creating or merging local government units shall specify the seat of government from
where governmental and corporate services shall be delivered.
Factors relevant in selection of seat of government: geographical centrality, accessibility, availability of
transportation and communication facilities, drainage and sanitation, development and economic progress,
and other relevant considerations.

Transfer of seat of government:

When conditions and developments in the LGU concerned have significantly changed
Public hearing and two-thirds vote of all the members of the Sanggunian
No transfer shall be made outside the territorial boundaries of the LGU.
The old site and improvements thereon may be disposed of by sale or lease or converted
to such other use as the Sanggunian concerned may deem beneficial to the LGU
concerned and its inhabitants.

Transfer, relocation, and conversion to other uses of local government offices and facilities:

Public hearings conducted for the purpose


i. Concurrence of the majority of all the members of the Sanggunian

Sec. 12. Government Centers.


Government center - where offices, agencies, or branches of the National Government, LGUs, or
government-owned or controlled corporations may be located.
LGUs, in designating such a center, shall take into account the existing facilities of national and local
agencies and offices which may serve as the government center.
The National Government, LGU, or government-owned or controlled corporation concerned shall bear the
expenses for the construction of its buildings and facilities in the government center.
Sec. 13. Naming of Local Government Units and Public Places, Streets and Structures.

By the Sanggunian
Of LGUs, public places, streets, and structures within their territorial jurisdiction (see below for
detailed list)
In consultation with PHC
o In changes of name of public schools, upon recommendation of the local school board
o In changes of names of publc hospitals, health centers, and other health facilities, upon
recommendation of the local health board
With notice to the Office of the President, the representative of the legislative district concerned,
and the Bureau of Posts
Ratified in a plebiscite conducted for the purpose in the political unit directly affected

Limitations:

Cannot be named after a living person


Justifiable reason
Not oftener than once in ten years
The name of a LGU or a public place, street or structure with historical, cultural, or ethnic
significance shall not be changed, unless by a unanimous vote of the Sanggunian concerned and
in consultation with the PHC.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan may change the names of the following:

Component cities and municipalities, upon the recommendation of the Sanggunian concerned
(i.e., Sanggunian of the component city and municipality
Provincial roads, avenues, boulevards, thoroughfares, and bridges
Public vocational or technical schools and other post-secondary and tertiary schools
Provincial hospitals, health centers, and other health facilities

Any other public place or building owned by the provincial government.

The Sanggunians of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities (i.e., component cities whose
charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials) may change the names of the
following:

City barangays, upon the recommendation of the sangguniang barangay concerned


City roads, avenues, boulevards, thoroughfares, and bridges
Public elementary, secondary and vocational or technical schools, community colleges and nonchartered colleges
City hospitals, health centers and other health facilities
Any other public place or building owned by the city government.

The Sanggunians of component cities and municipalities may change the names of the following:

City and municipal barangays, upon recommendation of the sangguniang barangay concerned
City, municipal and barangay roads, avenues, boulevards, thoroughfares, and bridges
City and municipal public elementary, secondary and vocational or technical schools, postsecondary and other tertiary schools
City and municipal hospitals, health centers and other health facilities
Any other public place or building owned by the municipal government.

Sec. 14. Beginning of Corporate Existence.


An LGUs corporate existence commences upon the election and qualification of its chief executive and a
majority of the members of its Sanggunian, UNLESS some other time is fixed therefor by the law or
ordinance creating it.
Sec. 15. Political and Corporate Nature of Local Government Units.
Every LGU is a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with
law.
As such, LGUs exercise powers

as a political subdivision of the National Government


as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory

Sec. 16. General Welfare.


Every LGU shall exercise powers

expressly granted
necessarily implied therefrom
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance
essential to the promotion of the general welfare.

LGUs shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote
health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals,
enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain
peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Sec. 17. Basic Services and Facilities.

LGUs shall

endeavor to be self-reliant and continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and
functions currently vested upon them
discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them
pursuant to the LGC
exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are
necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and
facilities

Basic services and facilities (not an exclusive list)


For Barangays

Agricultural support services which include planting materials distribution system and operation
of farm produce collection and buying stations
Health and social welfare services which include maintenance of barangay health center and daycare center
Services and facilities related to general hygiene and sanitation, beautification, and solid waste
collection
Maintenance of katarungang pambarangay
Maintenance of barangay roads and bridges and water supply systems
Infrastructure facilities such as multi-purpose hall, multipurpose pavement, plaza, sports center,
and other similar facilities
Information and reading center
Satellite or public market, where viable

For Municipalities

Extension and on-site research services and facilities related to agriculture and fishery activities
which include dispersal of livestock and poultry, fingerlings, and other seedling materials for
aquaculture; palay, corn, and vegetable seed farms; medicinal plant gardens; fruit tree, coconut,
and other kinds of seedling nurseries; demonstration farms; quality control of copra and
improvement and development of local distribution channels, preferably through cooperatives
inter-barangay irrigation systems; water and soil resources utilization and conservation projects;
and enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves
Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR,
implementation of community-based forestry projects which include integrated social forestry
programs and similar projects; management and control of communal forest with an area not
exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers; establishment of tree parks, greenbelts, and similar forest
development projects
Subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book I of the LGC, health services which include the
implementation of programs and projects on primary health care, maternal and child care, and
communicable and non-communicable disease control services; access to secondary and tertiary
health services; purchase of medicines, medical supplies, and equipment needed to carry out the
services herein enumerated
Social welfare services which include programs and projects on child and youth welfare, family
and community welfare, women's welfare, welfare of the elderly and disabled persons;
community-based rehabilitation programs for vagrants, beggars, street children, scavengers,
juvenile delinquents, and victims of drug abuse; livelihood and other pro-poor projects; nutrition
services; and family planning services
Information services which include investments and job placement information systems, tax and
marketing information systems, and maintenance of a public library

Solid waste disposal system or environmental management system and services or facilities
related to general hygiene and sanitation
Municipal buildings, cultural centers, public parks including freedom parks, playgrounds, and
other sports facilities and equipment, and other similar facilities
Infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of the residents of the municipality
and which are funded out of municipal funds including, but not limited to, municipal roads and
bridges; school buildings and other facilities for public elementary and secondary schools; clinics,
health centers and other health facilities necessary to carry out health services; communal
irrigation, small water impounding projects and other similar projects; fish ports; artesian wells,
spring development, rainwater collectors and water supply systems; seawalls, dikes, drainage and
sewerage, and flood control; traffic signals and road signs and similar facilities
Public markets, slaughterhouses and other municipal enterprises
Public cemetery
Tourism facilities and other tourist attractions, including the acquisition of equipment, regulation
and supervision of business concessions, and security services for such facilities
Sites for police and fire stations and substations and the municipal jail

For Provinces

Agricultural extension and on-site research services and facilities which include the prevention
and control of plant and animal pests and disease; dairy farms, livestock markets, animal breeding
stations, and artificial insemination centers; and assistance in the organization of farmers' and
fishermen's cooperatives, and other collective organizations, as well as the transfer of appropriate
technology
Industrial research and development services, as well as the transfer of appropriate technology
Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR,
enforcement of forestry laws limited to community-based forestry projects, pollution control law,
small-scale mining law, and other laws on the protection of the environment; and mini-hydro
electric projects for local purposes
Subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book I of this Code, health services which include
hospitals and other tertiary health services
Social welfare services which include programs and projects on rebel returnees and evacuees;
relief operations and, population development services
Provincial buildings, provincial jails, freedom parks and other public assembly areas, and other
similar facilities
Infrastructure facilities intended to service the needs of the residents of the province and which
are funded out of provincial funds including, but not limited to, provincial roads and bridges;
inter-municipal waterworks, drainage and sewerage, flood control, and irrigation systems;
reclamation projects; and similar facilities
Programs and projects for low-cost housing and other mass dwellings, except those funded by the
Social Security System (SSS), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and the Home
Development Mutual Fund (HDMF): Provided, That national funds for these programs and
projects shall be equitably allocated among the regions in proportion to the ratio of the homeless
to the population
Investment support services, including access to credit financing
Upgrading and modernization of tax information and collection services through the use of
computer hardware and software and other means
Inter-municipal telecommunications services, subject to national policy guidelines
Tourism development and promotion programs

For Cities

All the services and facilities of the municipality and province

Adequate communication and transportation facilities


Support for education, police and fire services and facilities
Public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the
National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent
executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered
under this section, except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly
designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs, and services.

The designs, plans, specifications, testing of materials, and the procurement of equipment and materials
from both foreign and local sources necessary for the provision of the foregoing services and facilities shall
be undertaken by the LGU concerned, based on national policies, standards and guidelines.
Devolution

Act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various local
government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities
National agencies or offices shall devolve to local government units the responsibility for the
provision of basic services and facilities within six (6) months after the effectivity of the LGC.
o Includes the transfer to LGUs of the records, equipment, and other assets and personnel
of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions, and
responsibilities.
o Personnel of said national agencies or offices shall be absorbed by the LGUs to which
they belong or in whose areas they are assigned to the extent that it is administratively
viable as determined by the Oversight Committee
o The rights accorded to personnel pursuant to civil service law, rules and regulations
shall not be impaired
Regional directors who are career executive service officers and other officers of similar rank in
the said regional offices who cannot be absorbed by the LGU shall be retained by the National
Government, without any diminution of rank, salary or tenure
Regional offices of national agencies or offices whose functions are devolved to LGUs shall be
phased out within one year from the approval of the LGC.
National agencies and offices may establish such field units as may be necessary for monitoring
purposes and providing technical assistance to LGUs.
The properties, equipment, and other assets of these regional offices shall be distributed to the
LGUs in the region in accordance with the rules and regulations issued by the Oversight
Committee.

The National Government or the next higher level of local government unit may provide or augment the
basic services and facilities assigned to a lower level of local government unit when:

Services or facilities are not made available


If made available, they are inadequate to meet the requirements of its inhabitants

Funding of basic services and facilities

From the share of local government units in the proceeds of national taxes and other local
revenues and funding support from the National Government, its instrumentalities and
government-owned or controlled corporations which are tasked by law to establish and maintain
such services or facilities
To ensure the active participation of the private sector in local governance, LGUs may, by
ordinance, sell, lease, encumber, or otherwise dispose of public economic enterprises owned by
them in their proprietary capacity

Costs may also be charged for the delivery of basic services or facilities enumerated in this
Section.
Any fund or resource available for the use of local government units shall be first allocated for the
provision of basic services or facilities before applying the same for other purposes, unless
otherwise provided in the LGC

Sec. 18. Power to Generate and Apply Resources.


LGUs proprietary powers:

to establish an organization that shall be responsible for the efficient and effective implementation
of their development plans, program objectives and priorities
to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges which shall accrue
exclusively for their use and disposition and which shall be retained by them
to have a just share in national taxes which shall be automatically and directly released to them
without need of any further action
to have an equitable share in the proceeds from the utilization and development of the national
wealth and resources within their respective territorial jurisdictions including sharing the same
with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits
to acquire, develop, lease, encumber, alienate, or otherwise dispose of real or personal property
held by them in their proprietary capacity and to apply their resources and assets for productive,
developmental, or welfare purposes, in the exercise or furtherance of their governmental or
proprietary powers and functions and thereby ensure their development into self-reliant
communities and active participants in the attainment of national goals.

Sec. 19. Eminent Domain.


LGUs exercise of power of eminent domain, requisites:

Through the chief executive


Pursuant to an ordinance
For public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefits of the poor and the landless
Upon payment of just compensation
Pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws
Valid and definite offer made to the owner that was not accepted

LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon

Filing of the expropriation proceedings


Deposit with the proper court of at least 15% of the FMV of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated

The amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the
fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.
Sec. 20. Reclassification of Lands.

City or municipality
Through an ordinance passed by the Sanggunian
After public hearing for the purpose
In the following cases:
o when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as
determined by DA

where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for residential,
commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the Sanggunian concerned:
Limited to the following percentages of the total agricultural land area at the time of the passage
of the ordinance
o Highly urbanized and independent component cities - 15%
o Component cities and first to the third class municipalities - 10%
o Fourth to sixth class municipalities - 5%
BUT President upon recommendation of NEDA may authorize a city or municipality to reclassify
lands in excess of the abovementioned limits when public interest so requires
Agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries under R.A. No. 6657 (CARL) shall
not be affected. Conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of
CARL.

Sec. 65, CARL


Conversion of Lands
After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound
for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic
value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the
landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the
reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully
paid his obligation.
LGUs shall continue to prepare their respective comprehensive land use plans enacted through zoning
ordinances which shall be the primary and dominant bases for the future use of land resources.
Requirements for food production, human settlements, and industrial expansion shall be taken into
consideration in the preparation of such plans.
When approval by a national agency (e.g., DA) is required for reclassification, such approval shall not be
unreasonably withheld. Failure to act on a proper and complete application for reclassification within three
(3) months from receipt of the same shall be deemed as approval thereof.
Sec. 21. Closure and Opening of Roads.
Requisites

Pursuant to an ordinance
With provisions for the maintenance of public safety

In cases of permanent closure:

Ordinance must be approved by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Sanggunian
An adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure must be provided when
necessary
BUT no freedom park shall be closed permanently without provision for its transfer or relocation
to a new site (adequate substitute always necessary)
o A property permanently withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any
purpose for which other real property belonging to the LGU concerned may be lawfully
used or conveyed

Temporary closures

During an actual emergency, or fiesta celebrations, public rallies, agricultural or industrial fairs,
or an undertaking of public works and highways, telecommunications, and waterworks projects
Any national or local road, alley, park, or square
Duration shall be specified by the local chief executive concerned in a written order
No national or local road, alley, park, or square shall be temporarily closed for athletic, cultural,
or civic activities not officially sponsored, recognized, or approved by the LGU
For the establishment of shopping malls, Sunday, flea or night markets, or shopping areas where
goods, merchandise, foodstuffs, commodities, or articles of commerce may be sold and dispensed
to the general public
Any local street, road, thoroughfare, or any other public place
By a duly enacted ordinance

Sec. 22. Corporate Powers.


LGUs corporate powers:

To have continuous succession in its corporate name


To sue and be sued
To have and use a corporate seal
To acquire and convey real or personal property
To enter into contracts
To exercise such other powers as are granted to corporations, subject to the limitations provided
in this Code and other laws

Corporate seals

LGUs may continue using, modify, or change their existing corporate seals
Newly established LGUs or those without corporate seals may create their own corporate seals
which shall be registered with the DILG
Any change of corporate seal shall also be registered with DILG.

Contracts

Unless otherwise provided in the LGC, no contract may be entered into by the local chief
executive in behalf of the LGU without prior authorization by the Sanggunian concerned.
A legible copy of the contract shall be posted at a conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or
the city, municipal or barangay hall.

Fiscal autonomy

LGUs shall enjoy full autonomy in the exercise of their proprietary functions and in the
management of their economic enterprises, subject to the limitations provided in the LGC and
other applicable laws.

Sec. 23. Authority to Negotiate and Secure Grants.


Local chief executives may negotiate and secure financial grants or donations in kind from local and foreign
assistance agencies

upon authority of the Sanggunian,


in support of the basic services or facilities enumerated under Sec. 17
without necessity of securing clearance or approval therefor from any department, agency, or
office of the National Government of from any higher LGU

BUT projects with national security implications shall be approved by the national
agency concerned
o When the national agency fails to act on the request for approval within thirty (30) days
from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed approved
report of nature, amount, and terms to both Houses of Congress and the President within thirty
(30) days upon signing of such grant agreement or deed of donation

Sec. 24. Liability for Damages.


LGUs and their officials are not exempt from liability for death or injury to persons or damage to property.

Compendium on Local Government, Chapters 5 6 (Agra)


CHAPTER FIVE: Police Power, Power of Eminent Domain, General Powers and Authority
A.

Police power, general welfare clause

Police power is inherent in the State, but not in municipal corporations. There must be a valid delegation of
such power by the National Legislature (which is the repository of inherent powers of the State) in order for
the MC to exercise such power. MCs exercise such power under the general welfare clause. The power is
broad and is said to be commensurate with but not exceeding the duty to provide for the real needs of the
people in their health, safety, comfort and convenience, and consistently as may be with private rights.
Police power is said to be the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, and in a sense, the greatest
and most powerful attribute of government. To secure the general welfare of the State and the fundamental
aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated.
Two Branches of the General Welfare Clause
First: attached to the main trunk of municipal authority; relates to ordinances and regulations necessary to
carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law.
Second: much more independent of the specific functions of the council which are enumerated by law;
authorizes ordinances that seem to be necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and the
inhabitants, and for the protection of property.
General Rule: Ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power of the general welfare clause must be:

Reasonable
Consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation
Not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State

The powers of the municipal corporations are to be construed strictissimi juris, and any doubt or ambiguity
must be construed against the municipality.
Exercise of police power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical,
unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial or due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee.
Zoning
A zoning ordinance or regulation is a valid exercise of police power and has the effect of nullifying or
superseding contractual obligations. The rule of non-impairment of contracts is not absolute it must be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power. Laws and reservation of essential attributes of

sovereign power are read into contracts agreed upon by parties and they form part of, and are read into,
every contract, unless clearly excluded in cases where exclusion is allowed.
Police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a (lease) contract earlier
executed. Police power may be activated anytime.
Financial assistance
LGU may use unappropriated available public funds for extending financial assistance to qualified
(indigent) bereaved families. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits
a limited number of persons. (However, may not be applied to heirs of deceased local government officials
as financial assistance.)
Improper exercise of police power
The prohibition of establishment of legitimate enterprises (such as night clubs and cabarets) is not valid.
Under B.P. 337, local governments are only empowered to regulate their operations.
Confiscation of products
A city mayor has no authority to cause the seizure/confiscation of meat products in contravention of a city
ordinance, as it is a violation of due process requirements.
B.

Power of eminent domain

As exercised by LGUs, it is only a delegated power. The statutes conferring such power cannot be
broadened or constricted by implication. As a right, it is founded on genuine necessity, and the necessity
must be of public character and for the public good. Therefore, LGUs may not capriciously choose what
private property should be taken.
Courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the rights and to determine whether
there is genuine necessity therefore.
Requisites for the Valid Exercise of Eminent Domain:

Ordinance must be passed authorizing the local chief executive to subject a certain property to
expropriation
Public use, purpose or welfare of poor and landless
Payment of just compensation
Valid and definite offer to pay property, which was not accepted

A municipal ordinance authorizing the mayor to file expropriation proceedings must be approved by the
provincial board.
Role of higher/supervising local government
Sangguniang panlalawigan has the power to declare a municipal ordinance providing for the exercise of
eminent domain invalid on the SOLE GROUND that it is beyond the power of the sangguniang bayan or
the mayor to issue. Therefore, the SP cannot declare the ordinance invalid for being unnecessary
considering there are other available lots.
Role of national government agencies
The approval of the national government is not required for local governments to exercise its power of
eminent domain.

Stages in actions for expropriation


First: Determination of authority of plaintiff to exercise such power, and the propriety of its exercise in the
context of the facts involved. Ends with an order (if not dismissal) of condemnation declaring the lawful
right of plaintiff to take the property. Such order is a final order.
Second: Determination by the court of the just compensation as of the date of the filing of the complaint,
with the assistance of not more than three commissioners. Such order fixing the just compensation shall be
final as well.
Public purpose or use
Under the new concept, public use means public advantage, convenience or benefit which tends to
contribute to the general welfare and prosperity of the whole community.
Right to take property
Only after the deposit of just compensation.
Complaint for eminent domain
A complaint which failed to mention the existence of a valid and definite offer, and that such offer was not
accepted but alleges that repeated negotiations were made but failed is sufficient to show cause of action.
C.

General powers and authority

Restraint of Trade Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot totally ban the buying and selling of all kinds of
liquor since this is tantamount to restraint of trade. Granting it may be done, it must be expressly provided
for by the law. However, in order to promote general welfare the State may interfere with personal liberty,
property, business and occupations. Thus, a person may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the State.
Compulsory Processes the contempt power of the national legislature is sui generis, as its exercise is a
matter of self-preservation (it asserts its authority as one of the three independent and coordinate branches
of the govt, independent of the judicial branch and punishes contempt) and local legislative bodies cannot
correctly claim to possess it for the same reasons the national legislature does. As the contempt power and
subpoena power partake of a judicial nature, they cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. If
there is no express statutory basis, it would run afoul of the doctrine of the doctrine of separation of powers.
This must be considered an exception to Sec. 4 of B.P. 337, which provides for liberal rules of
interpretation in favour of local autonomy.
LGUs cannot proclaim religious or local holidays such power rests within the President
Reclassificaton of Land the authority of the Sanggunian is limited to the reclassification of agricultural
lands. The power of cities and municipalities to reclassify agricultural land into commercial, industrial and
residential status is only for the purpose of assessment and real property taxation.
Reclassification power lodged with the LGU; act of allocating lands to different activities or classes of
land uses, evolved and enacted through local planning and zoning processes. DAR approval is not
necessary.
Land Conversion power lodged with DAR; actual change in land use and takes into account tenants and
farmworkers, if any, and ascertainment of disturbance compensation. HOWEVER, such power to issue
conversion clearance and/or approve/disapprove applications can only be exercised on or after June 15,
1988, the date of the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).

Role of DAR the power of DAR to approve or disapprove conversions is limited to the applications for
reclassification submitted by land owners or tenant beneficiaries. DARs authority to convert agricultural
land should be exercised in conjunction with the devolved powers of the LGUs to reclassify such land.
However, once a landholding has been acquired at redistributed to qualified beneficiaries pursuant to
CARL, it is excluded from the authority to LGUs to reclassify. Nothing in the LGC shall be construed to
repeal, modify or amend the CARL.
Prescribing penal provisions
Sangguniang barangay cannot provide for the [enalty of imprisonment for violations of barangay ordinances
LGC only provides for the imposition of a fine. Forfeiture of salary likewise cannot be validly prescribed.
Sangguniang barangay cannot enact an ordinance identical to an ordinance of the city of municipality but
with a lesser penalty, since the former is inconsistent with the latter.
Contracting Loans LGU cannot contract external or foreign loans since LGC only provides for guarantee
by the President of local or domestic loans.
Conduct of Legislative Inquiry municipal mayor cannot require that all heads of departments and EEs
obtain his clearance and permission before appearing before any governmental entity.
Scholarship Grants scholarship fund may only be applied to schools within its jurisdiction.
Legislative Voting Requirement local legislative council cannot provide for more than majority vote for
the passage of appropriations ordinances, since LGC requires only simple majority. However, sanggunian
may provide for different vote requirement for other certain ordinances.
Change of Name of Government Center prior consultation with Philippines Historical Commission
required
Requiring Performance Reports may not be reqd by sangguniang panlalawigan because it may cause
work disruption, and such function is essentially executive, not legislative.
Regulation of Property public property is outside the commerce of man, therefore cannot be the subject of
lease or contract, and constructions thereon can be summarily abated by the LGU. The power to regulate
public property is with the LGU.
Public Plaza
Public Streets road lots in a private subdivision are private property, hence local governments must first
acquire them by donation, purchase or expropriation if they wish to utilize them
Land reclaimed by the PEA for and on behalf of the State is no longer part of the public domain and public
use.
An LGU must comply with the legal conditions imposed on a donation.
Public Markets
Buildings
Disposal of Real Property is Proper When:

Public bidding is conducted


Price offered by vendee is higher than the appraised value

Deed of sale is signed by the local chief executive, with the authority of the sanggunian
Certification is issued that said lot is no longer needed for public use as duly verified by the
auditor

Transfer of Property to Local Governments lots covered by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award
(CLOA) issued pursuant to CARL can only be transferred or acquired through the DAR in order to be
reallocated to another beneficiary. The term government does not contemplate its political subdivisions.
Use of Land a municipality may change the use of a piece of land if there are no such express restrictions
in the contract to sell/contract of sale; it may also enter into a joint venture agreement with a private entity
embodied in a MOA signed by the local chief executive, a representative of the private entity and ratified by
the sanggunian; HOWEVER, a chapel may not be constructed on land owned by the govt based on the
separation of church and state
As a LESSOR LGU may file an action for illegal detention and demand eviction for violation of lease
contract and non-payment of rentals
Abatement of Public Nuisance Local government officials cannot seek cover under the general welfare
clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. This tenet applies to a nuisance
per se, which affects the immediate safety of persons and property, and may be summarily abated under the
undefined law of necessity. If it be a nuisance per accidens, it may be proven in a hearing conducted for
that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its abatement without judicial intervention. While the
Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement of a nuisance, it cannot declare a particular thing as a
nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It can only be so adjudged by judicial determination.
Land Use Planning
Logging Activities DENRs powers cannot be encroached upon by the LGU
Quarrying Activities provincial governors authority to grant and issue quarry permits extends only to
public lands
Fishing, Fishery Privileges
Maintaining Dumpsites must not endanger environment, health, safety and welfare of residents
Littering fine may be validly imposed
Power to Enter into Contracts
Contracts entered into by local chief executives have the force of law between parties and should be
complied with.
A chief executive acting pursuant to a resolution already adopted by the council in signing the deed of sale
to qualified buyers determined after public bidding was exercising a purely ministerial duty incidental to his
functions.
Council/Sanggunian authorization is a condition sine qua non for the validity of a contract entered into by a
local chief executive. Authorization may take the form of a resolution.
Traffic Regulation temporary street closures may be done through an ordinance
Issuance of Permits the issuance, revocation or cancellation of permits is a discretionary act subject to
strict implementation as to its scope

Authority to issue business permits are subject to the regulatory powers of the city mayor
Rejection of application a mayor may refuse the granting of a permit only if there are valid reasons
embodied in an appropriate ordinance or national law; in the absence of such law or ordinance, the mayor
may not validly refuse to grant the permit to a legitimate enterprise due to the principle of free enterprise
and competition; also, issuance may not be withheld based on none-payment of taxes and imposts
Cancellation of permit may not be revoked if operator was not informed of a specific violation of the
LGC, as it will be violative of due process
Franchises power to issue National Franchises lies with the National Government, devolution is only with
respect to regulatory powers within the jurisdictions concerned. However, the grant of franchises for the
establishment, construction, operation and maintenance of public markets and bus/jeepney terminals are
within the concern of the sanggunians. Although the municipality has the authority to grant franchises, the
authority to collect franchise tax is under the power of the province and not the municipality.
Coal Corporations power of regulation lies with the DOE
Casinos, Gambling power of LGUs to suppress gambling refers only to illegal gambling
Demolition
Padlocking of Premises
Local Infrastructure Projects authority of LGUs to undertake reclamation projects is limited to those
funded out of local funds; projects funded by the National Govt are lodged with the PEA; regular courts
are prohibited from issuing writs to stop any person, entity, government official or LGU from proceeding
with or continuing the execution or implementation of amn infrastructure project approved by the President
through the Executive Secretary (P.D. 3-A).
Creation of LGUs the power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature (ex.
conversion of municipal districts into regular municipalities)
Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA) is included in computation of average annual income (part of general
income of govt units)
Population requirement of 5,000 for the creation of a barangay within a highly urbanized city is mandatory
(but does not apply to those already existing)
Registered voters of highly urbanized cities shall be prohibited from voting in elections at the provincial
level, unless reclassification occurs after ratification of 1987 Constitution, but before effectivity of LGC of
1991.
Plebiscite - to be conducted in the political units directly affected, (1) meaning residents of the political
entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation have a right to vote, and (2) referring to the
plurality of political units which would participate; whole unit must participate, not merely those that form
part of the new unit

Applies only to new LGUs created for the first time under the 1987 Constitution therefore no
plebiscite is necessary in the case of a municipal corporation which has attained de facto status at
the time the 1987 Constitution took effect.
In case of a negative vote, sub-province shall continue to be part of the original province, to be
represented by officials of the original province.

There is no law authorizing the holding of special elections for the first set of barangay officials
of newly-created barangays, therefore, such election cannot be conducted together with the SK
elections.

Abolition of LGUs enactment of an ordinance by sangguniang panlalawigan or panlungsod concerned


and the conduct of a plebiscite required
Principle of non-user only applies to private corporation law; does not apply to municipal corporations
Conversion of LGUs bills of local application must originate from the House of Representatives and
initiate the legislative process which would culminate in the enactment of a Statute. A technical description
similar to those in Torrens titles is not a condition sine qua non (it would defeat the purpose of the LGC).
What is required is a reasonable ascertainment of the area.
Reapportionment of Legislative Districts may be made by a special law, such as the enactment by special
law of a charter of a new city. Congress may increase its own composition through legislative enactment.
Settling Boundary Disputes

Between barangays referred to sangguniang bayan or panlungsod concerned; Office of the


President has no jurisdiction
Between adjacent municipalities within a province elevated to sangguniang panlalawigan
Between independent component city and a municipality, or highly urbanized cities and
municipalities jointly referred to respective sanggunians

Barangay Clearances barangays are only authorized to issue clearances for business and impose
reasonable fees, but are not allowed to issue business permits or licenses. Barangay clearance cannot be
denied on grounds other than those specified in the appropriate ordinance.
Warrants of Arrest mayors are no longer authorized to issue such warrants
Election Activities COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the enforcement of the
Election Code; the transfer of officers and employees within the election period is prohibited, except for the
purpose of coping with emergencies and efficiency in the government service
Abolition of an Office express power to create local offices (absent any contrary provision), impliedly
carries with it the power to abolish said office in GOOD FAITH.
Relocation of Homeless responsibility of both LGU and National Housing Authority
Inclusion in Special Economic Zones R.A. 7227 provides that the creation of the Subic Special Economic
Zone is subject to the concurrence of concerned municipalities and cities by resolution. However, the Subic
Authority shall prevail in conflicts concerning matters affecting the zone.
Assistance to Sectors public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a
limited number of persons
Creation of Fishery Resources Management Council by way of Ordinance
Appointment to Local Offices punong barangays may appoint purok leaders, provided the appropriate
ordinance has been enacted and the council thereafter approves the appointment.
Projects, Countrywide Development Fund sanggunian is authorized to compel a congressman to seek its
prior approval before the implementation of any projects, as the LGC provides that national projects must
be approved by the sanggunian prior to their implementation. However, an appropriations ordinance is not

required to facilitate the release of funds from the Countrywide Development Fund of Representatives of
Congress. Legislation, however, must be enacted specifying the infrastructure and priority projects.
Issuance of Bonds any security issued or guaranteed by the govt or any of its political subdivisions is
exempt from registration; exempt securities
Ultra Vires Acts of Private Organizations local chief executives may file a complaint against such
organizations with the appropriate national government unit pursuant to a resolution adopted by the
sanggunians
Additional Insurance Benefits council by way of ordinance may not increase insurance benefits of
municipalities officials and EEs since this would unreasonable add up to the tax burden of the inhabitants,
resulting in the violation of the principle forbidding the appropriation of public funds for private purposes
Imposition of Curfew may be exercised pursuant to police power, but not by the local chief executive
alone. Sanggunian enact an ordinance determine the necessity, reasonableness, condition and procedures.
Inter-Local Govt Cooperation local government may group themselves and procure equipment from
domestic and foreign sources for purposes commonly beneficial to them, provided national policies,
standards and guidelines are followed.
Incorporation of Stock Corporations only natural persons can become incorporators of such corporations;
prohibition extends to its local officials being agents of the province (principal).
CHAPTER SIX: Inter-Local Government Relations
Local Separation of Powers
Doctrine of Separation of Powers and System of Checks-and-Balance apply to local governments.
It is the duty of public officers to enforce ordinances not otherwise repealed by the council nor annulled by
the courts.
Local chief executive (LCE) may validly enter into a contract only with council authorization. Prior
authorization is not the same as pre-approval of contracts. Local councils do not possess the authority to
pre-approve contracts after prior authorization has been given. Prior authorization also does not mean prior
authorization for the payment of obligations.
LCE cannot require that all requests for appropriations be endorsed by him before they can be enacted.
Designation of members of the Personnel Selection Board as determined by the sanggunian by resolution
must be approved by the LCE (merely ministerial).
Mayor has no administrative supervision over sanggunian EEs; authority to approve applications for
LOAs of sanggunian members and appointive EEs rests with the vice LCE.
Signature of governor required in the resolution adopted by sangguniang panlalawigan approving or
disapproving the ordinance or resolution enacted by sangguniang pankungsod/bayan.
While authority to regulate traffic and use of streets rests with the sanggunian, the execution of an
ordinance relating to it is the responsibility of the LCE.
The authority of the LCE of the higher supervising unit to impose preventive suspension is purely
ministerial, since the disciplinary authority over erring local legislative officials of the supervised unite is
the sanggunian of the higher unit.

Sanggunian is in the best position to determine rates of mayors permit fees to be levied are just, reasonable,
and not confiscatory.
Additional functions maybe given the vice mayor only as may be provided by law or ordinance, otherwise
he may validly refuse.
LCE is mandated by law to represent the LGU, no sanggunian authorization necessary.
Power of appointment of the vice-mayor is limited to officials and EEs of the sanggunian, as well as EEs
of the office of the vice mayor.
Authority to discipline municipal sanggunian members and EEs lies with the vice LCE, since he had
administrative supervision over EEs, being the one with the power to appoint the same.
Barangay Audit Reports to be transmitted to the vice mayor, not the LCE, for information and appropriate
action.
Mayor is administrator when drawing checks in the settlement of obligations.
Barangay kagawads perform tasks assigned pursuant to a valid resolution, and may be required to submit
monthly accomplishment forms.
Province and component city/municipality
Declaration by the sangguniang panlalawigan that a particular city or municipal ordinance or resolution is
invalid for being beyond the power conferred upon its respective sanggunians, is equivalent to a disapproval
of the subject ordinance or resolution.
When a province sells delinquent properties at a public auction, it was not only acting on its behalf but also
on behalf of the municipalities concerned. Therefore when the province buys such lot (no other bidder), the
municipalities may be considered co-owners thereof to the extent of their respective shares in the real
property taxes and penalties thereon.
The exercise of the power to tax by a (component) city also granted to a province deprives the province
from imposing a similar tax thus exclusive power is granted to the city to collect and levy the subject tax,
fees and charges.
Real property assessments made by city or municipal assessors are not subject to approval by the provincial
assessor the latter merely exercises technical supervision.
A municipality is entitled to a share in the proceeds from the real property tax and lease rentals of subject
property collected by the province.
The power to levy tax on sand and gravel exclusively belongs to the province although a component city or
municipality has a share in the proceeds if the said tax.
If franchise tax is imposed by the province, a component city of municipality has no share.
City/municipality and barangay
The power to regulate facilities rests upon the unit which owns the same.
In interpreting ambiguous provisions of the LGC, resolution is in favour of the lower LGU.

Authority to enter into contracts involving barangay roads within a municipality rests with the barangay
affected, not the municipality. The municipality only exercises regulatory powers over municipal roads.
Barangay ordinances are subject to review by the city or municipal councils and not the other way around.
A municipal mayor does not have authority to control the disbursement of barangay funds and internal
revenue allotments, nor withhold the share of the barangay from the internal revenue allotment on the basis
of an election protest. He/She also does not have the authority to control barangay projects. Such
prerogatives belong to the punong barangay.
A city/municipality possesses the POWER to SUPERVISE over component barangays. Such power,
however, does not permit infringement upon the legislative powers of the lower LGU to the extent of
dictating changes on the policies or decisions. The higher sanggunian must be guided by liberality of
construction and fundamental principles of local autonomy. This power does not include the power to
restrain, nor does it mean that the sangguniang bayan may invalidate any ordinance enacted by the
sangguniang barangay. It may only point out the defect.
Approval of vouchers is merely ministerial on the part of the mayor after the mayor after the treasurer (1)
has certified the availability of funds and (2) an appropriate ordinance has been enacted and was
subsequently approved by him/her. The mayor may not require a punong barangay to personally present
the barangay payroll.
Only a city and a municipality may issue business permits and licenses. Barangay has no such power.
The new sharing scheme provided for by the LGC does not take place automatically. An ordinance must be
enacted by the sangguniang bayan or panlungsod concerned in order to install it.
Appointment of the barangay treasurer only needs the concurrence of the sangguniang bayan concerned.
Confirmation from the sangguniang bayan is not required.
Services of the municipal engineer may be secured by a barangay in the implementation of barangay
infrastructure projects after prior representation has been made to the LCE concerned.
Sangguniang bayan may suspend all barangay officials, which authorizes the mayor to appoint temporary
replacements, provided such appointees possess all the necessary qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law.
Where there is no law which authorizes the holding of special elections to fill-in the positions created by the
incorporation of new barangays, the mayor may fill up the vacancies, there being permanent vacancies. If
there are no permanent vacancies, neither the mayor nor the punong barangay have the authority to appoint
officials.
Past and present administrations
The newly-elected LCE must abide by the contractual obligations made by the former administration since
the party-in-interest is the LGU. However, an authority to negotiate loans granted by the local legislative
council to the past LCE does not extend to the newly-elected official.
The previous LCE, not the succeeding one, has the authority to observe and evaluate the performance of the
employee concerned, where the act complained of was done during the previous administration.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS VIS A VIS NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

A.

Power of general Supervision

Drilon v. Lim
Section 187 LGC authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review the constitutionality or legality of the tax
ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. Pursuant to this, Secretary of
Justice Drilon declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code), null and void for non-compliance
with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions
contrary to law and public policy.
HELD: Section 187 of LGC is valid.
Under this provision, when the Secretary of Justice alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not
permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the
measure.
The acts of Secretary Drilon in setting aside the Manila Revenue Code, was of mere supervision, not
control:

he did not replace the MRC with his own version.


He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment.
He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law.

All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in
accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the
grant of powers to the city government under the LGC.
On the other hand, an officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed,
he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it
himself.
Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules
are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or
replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to
the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on
this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.
All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to
declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this
matter.

Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority


SC ruled that the confiscation of license plates by the MMC was not among the powers conferred upon it by
its charter (PD 1605). It was also observed by the SC that confiscation of the drivers licenses was not
directly prescribed or allowed by PD 1605. SC received several letters-complaint that peoples licenses
were confiscated. MMA issued Ordinance No. 11 authorizing itself "to detach the license plate or tow and
impound attended or unattended or abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of
traffic in Metro Manila."
HELD: Ordinance null and void for being an invalid exercise of delegated legislative power.
Test for a valid municipal ordinance:
1.

must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

must not be unfair or oppressive;


must not be partial or discriminatory;
must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
must not be unreasonable; and
must be general and consistent with public policy.

PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic
violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree
authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission to impose such sanctions. In fact, the provisions prohibit
the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila.
That the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are
able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature
(except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the
Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of
the Congress, the LGU cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal.
The enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the PD 1605, which has
the force and effect of a statute. The measures do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse,
impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact, prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and
violate and in effect partially repeal the law. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by
the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission.

Ganzon v. CA
The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed
against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority,
oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the
Constitution, and arbitrary detention. He was placed in preventive suspension for 3 times by the respondent
Secretary of Local Government on different occasions based on different administrative complaints filed
against him.
Mayor Ganzon assailed the power of the respondent to suspend him alleging that the 1987 Constitution no
longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension
and/or removal over local officials.
HELD: The Sec of Local Government, as the alter ego of the President, has the power to suspend local
officials.
Autonomy does not contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in the federal
governments of the USA. Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not
control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution - and as the
"supervision clause" itself suggest - is to wean local government units from over dependence on the central
government.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to,
among other things, the passage of a local government code, a local tax law, income distribution legislation,
and a national representation law, and measures designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also
noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general
supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the
local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise
removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the
President.

Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the
central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The
Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to
regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance selfgovernment.
However, the Court held that the successive suspensions were excessive and not proper. What bothers the
Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative
charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases
yield prima facie findings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office (assuming that
Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of
suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office.
The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above reasons, and so also,
because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension,
as we have held, is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation
with his influence and authority over possible witnesses" or to keep him off "the records and other
evidence." It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring
local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed sixty days, which is to say that it need
not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it
ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.

Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos et al


The Officer of the Treasurer of Cebu City demanded payment for realty taxes on parcels of land belonging
to petitioner MCIAA. Petitioner objected invoking its tax exemption. It also asserted that it is an
instrumentality of the government performing governmental functions, citing section 133 of the LGC which
puts limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs. The city refused insisting that petitioner is a GOCC
performing proprietary functions whose tax exemption was withdrawn by Sections 193 and 234 of the
LGC.
HELD: There can be no question that under Section 14 RA 6958 the petitioner is exempt from the payment
of realty taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies, and
instrumentalities. Nevertheless, since taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception, the exemption
may thus be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority. Tax exemptions or incentives granted to or
presently enjoyed by natural or juridical persons, including government-owned and controlled corporations,
Section 193 of the LGC prescribes the general rule, viz., they are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the
LGC, except upon the effectivity of the LGC, except those granted to local water districts, cooperatives
duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, and
unless otherwise provided in the LGC.
The terms "Republic of the Philippines" and "National Government" are not interchangeable. The former is
boarder and synonymous with "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" which the Administrative
Code of the 1987 defines as the "corporate governmental entity though which the functions of the
government are exercised through at the Philippines, including, saves as the contrary appears from the
context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether
pertaining to the autonomous reason, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivision or other forms
of local government." These autonomous regions, provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions" are
the political subdivision. On the other hand, "National Government" refers "to the entire machinery of the
central government, as distinguished from the different forms of local Governments." The National
Government then is composed of the three great departments the executive, the legislative and the judicial.
An "agency" of the Government refers to "any of the various units of the Government, including a
department, bureau, office instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local
government or a distinct unit therein;" while an "instrumentality" refers to "any agency of the National

Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction
by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy; usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions and government-owned and controlled corporations".
MCIAA is not an agency or instrumentality of the government but only a GOCC, thus, LGUs may tax them.
B.

Decentralization, local autonomy

Limbona v. Mangelin
Petitioner Speaker Alimbusat Limbona was the speaker of the regional legislative assembly of central
Mindanao. He was invited to attend a conference and hence he advised acting secretary Alimbuyao to
inform the assemblyman that there will be no session on such that he will be away.
The Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's advice. After declaring the presence of a quorum, all
present voted that the seat of the speaker be declared vacant. The petitioner then went to court praying that
judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by respondents during the session and his ouster as
null and void.
The respondents assails the jurisdiction of the Court to rule upon the issue.
HELD: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local
governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social
progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and
enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but
only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its
own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.
But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy to Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution
involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere administration is a question foreign to this
petition, since what is involved herein is a local government unit constituted prior to the ratification of the
present Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that controversy now, in this case, since no
controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in the proper case. Under the 1987
Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category is subject alone to the decree of the
organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand,
an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national
government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang
Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably, beyond the domain
of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are
beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our
jurisdiction.

An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao
persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the
central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place,
mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous
Regions." 33 the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge
chiefly administrative services.
Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question,
with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.
The expulsion of the petitioner has no force and effect. In the first place, there is no showing that the
Sanggunian had conducted an investigation, and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his defense,
assuming that there was an investigation, or otherwise given the opportunity to do so. In the second place,
the resolution appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen against the petitioner
arising from what the former perceive to be abduracy on the part of the latter. While it is within the
discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless
subject to the moderating hand of this Court in the event that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse.

San Juan v. Civil Service Commission


Petitioner governor San Juan recommended Santos to the position of Provincial Budget Officer for Rizal
Province. However, in defiance to such recommendation, DBM Regional Officer Galvez appointed
Almajosa instead. The governor protested. The DBM issued a memo ruling that petitioners protest is not
meritorious as the DBM validly exercised its prerogative in filling-up the contested position since none of
the petitioner's nominees met the prescribed requirements.
HELD: When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of the Provincial
Governor as purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions on local
autonomy. If the DBM Secretary jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the right of
local governments to develop self-reliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own funds, the goal of
meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set back.
Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared at the local level and after completion are forwarded to the
national officials for review. They are prepared by the local officials who must work within the constraints
of those budgets. They are not formulated in the inner sanctums of an all-knowing DBM and unilaterally
imposed on local governments whether or not they are relevant to local needs and resources. It is for this
reason that there should be a genuine interplay, a balancing of viewpoints, and a harmonization of proposals
from both the local and national officials. It is for this reason that the nomination and appointment process
involves a sharing of power between the two levels of government.

Ganzon v. CA (supra)
See above

Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA


EO 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the
Constitution, created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR). Petitioners argue that the creation of
CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy for provinces and cities composing it.
HELD: It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution refers to
the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the
decentralization of government authority. Local autonomy is not unique to the 1987 Constitution, it being
guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution. And while there was no express guarantee under the 1935

Constitution, the Congress enacted the Local Autonomy Act (R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act
(R.A. No. 5185), which ushered the irreversible march towards further enlargement of local autonomy in
the country.
On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is
peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative
autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government
with a basic structure consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts
with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions.
CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the
Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and
political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested
with political autonomy.

Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation


In 1992, representatives from PPC made representations with the Pagcor on the possibility of setting up a
casino in Pryce Plaza Hotel in Cagayan de Oro City. On November 1992, the parties executed a contract of
lease involving the ballroom of the hotel which would be converted into a casino.
Sangguniang Panglungsod of CDO passed several ordinances prohibiting the establishment of gambling
casinos. PPC and PAGCOR assail the authority to pass such ordinances.
HELD: Ordinances should not contravene a statute. The rational for this requirement is obvious. Municipal
governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative
powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to
the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local
government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first
place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature.
It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As
it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the
legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong,
sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it.
We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to
phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been
enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without
meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government
units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to
create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall.
True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local
government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large,
however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its
will or modify or violate it.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended
or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan
de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and
Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these

ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires
and void.

Taule v. Santos
On June 18,1989, the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes, composed
of eleven (11) members convened with six members in attendance for the purpose of holding the election of
its officers. The election proceeded with petitioner Ruperto Taule declared as president. The governor
protested to the Secretary of DILG the election of officers on the ground of irregularities. Taule assailed the
power of the Secretary of DILG to decide FABC election contests.
HELD: The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving
the election of officers of the FABC. There is no question that he is vested with the power to promulgate
rules and regulations as set forth in Section 222 of the LGC and the Administrative Code. There is neither a
statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by necessary implication conferring upon the
Secretary of Local Government the power to assume jurisdiction over an election protect involving officers
of the katipunan ng mga barangay. Presidential power over local governments is limited by the
Constitution to the exercise of general supervision "to ensure that local affairs are administered according to
law." The general supervision is exercised by the President through the Secretary of Local Government.
In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that the
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them the former may take
such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand,
means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The
fundamental law permits the Chief Executive to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said
local government or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence,
the President cannot interfere with local governments so long as the same or its officers act within the scope
of their authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an
inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body.
Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the President over local
governments, We hold that Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election
of the officers of the katipunan. To allow the Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or
the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over local government officials for it will permit
him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the
basic component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved. In
fact, his order that the new elections to be conducted be presided by the Regional Director is a clear and
direct interference by the Department with the political affairs of the barangays which is not permitted by
the limitation of presidential power to general supervision over local governments.
Indeed, it is the policy of the state to ensure the autonomy of local governments. To deny the Secretary of
Local Government the power to review the regularity of the elections of officers of the katipunan would be
to enhance the avowed state policy of promoting the autonomy of local governments. The RTCs have the
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the protest.

Binay v. Domingo
Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60. This resolution aims
to extend P500 burial assistance to poor, bereaved families, the funds to be taken out of the unappropriated
available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved Res. No. 60.
Thereafter, the Municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000 for the implementation of the
program. However, Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution and disbursement of funds. The
reasons it gave were: 1)the resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general welfare, safety,

etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; 2)it will only benefit a few individuals. Public funds should only be used
for public purposes. The issue is WON Res. No. 60, reenacted as Res. No. 243, is a valid exercise of the
police power under the general welfare clause.
HELD: Yes. Police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty inherent in the
state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there
must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature. Municipal corporations exercise police power
under the general welfare clause. Under Sec. 7 of BP 337, every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as necessary and proper for
governance such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace
and order in the LGU, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein. Police power
is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety
and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. The police
power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed,
the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as
consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense
includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. Thus, it is inadvisable to
frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power. Public purpose is not
unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. The care for the poor
is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of
police power in the promotion of the common good. There is no violation of the equal protection clause in
classifying paupers as subject of legislation because the classification is reasonable. Precious to the hearts
of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been
passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the
soil, housing the urban poor, etc.
Res. No. 60 of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice.

City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta


Sec. 9 0f Ordinance No. 6118 requires that every memorial park cemetery shall set aside at least 6% of its
total area for charity burial. For several years, this was not enforced. However, the Q.C. Council passed a
resolution instructing the City Engineer to stop selling the memorial park lots owned by those who failed to
donate the required 6% space for paupers burial. Respondent Himlayang Pilipino filed with the CFI a
petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Sec.
9 of the said ordinance, claiming that it is contrary to the Constitution, the Q.C. Charter, the Local
Autonomy Act, and the Revised Admin. Code. The Court declared said section null and void. Petitioners
argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that
the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that
the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power. On the other
hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious
because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used
for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. Is Section 9 of the
ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?
HELD: NO, it is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private
property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation. An examination of the Q.C. Charter
does not reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting
police power to the City. The power to regulate neither includes the power to prohibit nor the power to
confiscate. The ordinance not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery.
Police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or
property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property
with the exception of a few cases not obtaining here. There is no reasonable relation between the setting
aside of at least 6% of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers

and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance
is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who
are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building a public cemetery for this purpose, the city
passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The said expropriation without compensation is not covered by the Q.C. Charter which empowers the city
council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their
burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries.
When the Local Government Code, B.P. Blg. 337 states that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for
the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply
authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to
construct public cemeteries. Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc.
had incorporated, received necessary permits and commenced operating. The sequestration of 6% of the
cemetery cannot be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it
accepted the permits to commence operations.

Villanueva v. Castaneda
The Municipal Council of San Fernando adopted Res. No. 218 authorizing 24 members of the Fernandino
United Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent stalls and sell in the vicinity of the public
market of San Fernando, Pampanga along Mercado Street. The action was protested and the CFI held that
the land occupied by the petitioners/stallholders, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man
and could not be the subject of private occupancy. The decision, however, was not enforced for the
petitioners were not evicted from the place and were even assigned space allotments for which they paid
daily fees to the municipal government. Thereafter, the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers
of San Fernando filed a petition for the immediate implementation of Res. No. 29 to restore the property to
its original and customary use as a public plaza. Respondent Macalino, as officer-in-charge of the office
of the mayor of San Fernando, issued a resolution directing the municipal treasurer and engineer to
demolish the stalls. Petitioners, claiming that the area in question was leased to them by the municipal
government, filed a case for prohibition with the CFI which was denied. Do the petitioners/stallholders
have a right to the said land?
HELD: NO, the place in question is a public plaza which is beyond the commerce of man and cannot be
the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking. In Muyot vs. de la Fuente, it was held that the
City of Manila could not lease a portion of a public sidewalk, being likewise beyond the commerce of man.
In Espiritu vs. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, the Supreme Court held: The town plaza cannot be used
for the construction of market stalls or residences, and such structures constitute a nuisance subject to
abatement according to law. Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and
to be made available to the public in general. They are outside the commerce of man and cannot be
disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties.
The occupation of stallholders (now almost 200) has caused health, safety and sanitation problems. It has
deprived the stallholders in the public market of much business and has denied to the people the proper use
of the public plaza. These problems are covered by police power as delegated to the municipality under the
general welfare clause. This authorizes the municipal council to enact such ordinances, not repugnant to
law, necessary to discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the
protection of property therein. This authority was validly exercised through the adoption of a resolution by
the municipal council of San Fernando.
Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution should have effectively terminated the
agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the
medium of a contract. In fact, every contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in

that it contains an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This
power can be activated at any time to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for
the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not violate the impairment clause,
which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power.

Republic v. Gonzalez
The Republic of the Philippines is the owner of 2 parcels of land in Taong Malabon, Metro Manila (Lots 1
and 2). The said property was formerly a deep swamp until the occupants thereof, among them appellants
Gonzales and Josue, started filling it. Each of the appellants constructed a mixed residential and commercial
building on Lot 2.
Thereafter, then President Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 144, entitled "Reserving for Street Widening
and Parking Space Purposes Certain Parcels of the Public Domain Situated in the Municipality of Malabon,
Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon." Lots 1 and 2 were specifically withdrawn from sale or settlement and
reserved for the purposes stated in the Proclamation. The Municipal Council of Malabon then passed
Resolutions authorizing the filing of ejectment cases against appellants so that Proclamation No, 144 could
be implemented. Separate complaints were also filed against appellants for the recovery of the portions of
Lot 2 they were occupying.
Appellants disputed the right of the Government to recover the lots for these reasons: 1) they already filed
sales applications with the Bureau of Lands; 2) they had a municipal permit to construct a building as well
as a business license duly issued by the Office of the Mayor of Malabon; and (3) the lot occupied by them
was not needed by the Municipality of Malabon in the widening of F. Sevilla Boulevard and the setting
aside of lots for parking does not redound to the public benefit. The Trial Court ordered the appellants to
reconvey the lots to the government. Is Proc. No. 144 lawful and valid?
HELD: Yes! Proc. No. 144 was issued by the President in response to several resolutions passed by the
Municipal Council of Malabon, Rizal, to address the increasing vehicular traffic along F. Sevilla Blvd. The
Municipal Council had proposed to widen the road and reserve an area for parking space to ease up traffic
problems. The public has much to gain from the proposed road widening and from establishment of a
municipal parking area. Traffic congestion constitutes a threat to the health, welfare, safety and convenience
of the people and it can only be substantially relieved by widening streets and providing adequate parking
areas. Under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, parking in designated areas along public streets or
highways is allowed which clearly indicates that provision for parking spaces serves a useful purpose.
Appellants, however, allege that the resulting benefits, if any, will be confined to people who have cars,
hence there would be lacking the essential feature of property reserved for public use or benefit. This
conception is flawed since the number of users is not the yardstick in determining whether property is
properly reserved for public use or public benefit. To constitute public use, the public in general should
have equal or common rights to use the land or facility involved on the same terms, however limited in
number the people who can actually avail themselves of it at a given time. There is nothing in Proc. No.
144 which excludes non-car-owners from using a widened street or a parking area should they in fact
happen to be driving cars; the opportunity to avail of the use thereof remains open to the public.
Prior to the issuance of Proc. No. 144, appellants had applied for sales applications with the Bureau of
Lands over the said lots. By doing so, they are deemed to have admitted ownership by the National
Government since the said application can only be filed in respect of public land, not private land. These
applications were either not yet approved or were already rejected by the Bureau of Lands at the time the
proclamation was issued. Thus, no private rights had accrued and become vested in appellants. The lots
remained public lands and were subject to the free disposition and control of the Government. While
appellants had secured municipal permits for the construction of buildings on the lands in dispute, the Court
held that the disposition and management of lands of the public domain were directly under the executive

control of the Director of Lands, and not of local government officials. Thus, the Malabon Municipal
Mayor exceeded his authority in allowing the use of lands of the public domain to appellants.

Patalinhug v. CA
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 363 otherwise known as the
"Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City" which required that funeral parlors shall be built not less than
50 meters from any residential structures, churches, and other institutional buildings. A building permit
was issued in favor of petitioner for the construction of a funeral parlor. Thereafter, petitioner commenced
its construction. Acting on the complaint of several residents of Brgy. Agdao, Davao City that the
construction of petitioner's funeral parlor violated Ordinance No. 363, since it was allegedly situated within
a 50-meter radius from the Iglesia ni Kristo Chapel and several residences (the nearest residential structure,
owned by Mr. Tepoot is only 8 inches to the south). Private respondents filed a case for the declaration of
nullity of the building permit. The court dismissed the complaint finding that: 1) the residential building
and Iglesia ni Kristo chapel are 63.25 meters and 55.95 m respectively from the funeral parlor; 2) Although
the residential building owned by Mr. Tepoot is adjacent to the funeral parlor, said residential building is
being rented by a certain Mr. Asiaten who actually devotes it to his laundry business with machinery
thereon.
On appeal, the CA reversed the lower court by annulling the building permit issued to the petitioner. It
disagreed with the lower court's determination that Tepoot's building was commercial and ruled that
although it was used by Tepoot's lessee for a laundry business, it was a residential lot as reflected in the tax
declaration, thus paving the way for the application of Ordinance No. 363.
HELD: Petitioners operation of a funeral home constitutes permissible use within the district in Davao
City. The testimony of City Councilor Vergara shows that Mr. Tepoot's building was used for a dual
purpose both as a dwelling and as a place where a laundry business is conducted. But while its commercial
aspect has been established by the presence of laundry paraphernalia, its use as a residence, other than being
declared for taxation purposes as such, was not fully substantiated.
The reversal by the CA of the TCs decision was based on Tepoot's building being declared for taxation
purposes as residential. However, a tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning
purposes. A property may be declared by its owner as residential for real estate taxation purposes but it may
well be within a commercial zone. A discrepancy may thus exist in the determination of the nature of
property for real estate taxation purposes vis-a-vis the determination of a property for zoning purposes. A
tax declaration only enables the assessor to identify the same for assessment levels. In fact, a tax declaration
does not bind a provincial/city assessor, for under Sec. 22 of the Real Estate Tax Code, appraisal and
assessment are based on the actual use irrespective of "any previous assessment or taxpayer's valuation
thereon," which is based on a taxpayer's declaration. In fact, a piece of land declared by a taxpayer as
residential may be assessed by the provincial or city assessor as commercial because its actual use is
commercial.
The finding that Mr. Tepoot's building is commercial is strengthened by the fact that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod has declared the questioned area as commercial. Consequently, even if Tepoot's building was
declared for taxation purposes as residential, once a local government has reclassified an area as
commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must prevail. While the commercial character of the
questioned vicinity has been declared thru the ordinance, private respondents have failed to present
convincing arguments to substantiate their claim that Cabaguio Avenue, where the funeral parlor was
constructed, was still a residential zone. Unquestionably, the operation of a funeral parlor constitutes a
"commercial purpose." The declaration of the said area as a commercial zone thru a municipal ordinance is
an exercise of police power to promote the good order and general welfare of the people in the locality.
Corollary thereto, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty,
with property, and with business and occupations. Thus, persons may be subjected to certain kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the state and to this fundamental aim of

government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated. The ordinance which regulates the location of
funeral homes has been adopted as part of comprehensive zoning plans for the orderly development of the
area covered thereunder.
C.

Intergovernmental relations

Book I, Chapters 3 and 4, LGC (sec 25 36)


CHAPTER THREE: Intergovernmental Relations
Article One.

National Government and Local Government Units

Sec. 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units. (a) Consistent with the basic policy on local
autonomy, the President shall exercise general supervision over local government units to ensure that their
acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces, highly urbanized cities, and
independent component cities through the province with respect to component cities and municipalities; and
through the city and municipality with respect to barangays.
(b) National agencies and offices with project implementation functions shall coordinate with one another
and with the local government units concerned in the discharge of these functions. They shall ensure the
participation of local government units both in the planning and implementation of said national projects.
(c) The President may, upon request of the local government unit concerned, direct the appropriate national
agency to provide financial, technical, or other forms of assistance to the local government unit. Such
assistance shall be extended at no extra cost to the local government unit concerned.
(d) National agencies and offices including government-owned or controlled corporations with field units
or branches in a province, city, or municipality shall furnish the local chief executive concerned, for his
information and guidance, monthly reports including duly certified budgetary allocations and expenditures.
Sec. 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. It shall be the
duty of every national agency or government-owned or controlled corporation authorizing or involved in
the planning and implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change,
depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction of animal
or plant species, to consult with the local government units, non-governmental organizations, and other
sectors concerned and explain the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the people
and the community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that will be
undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof.
Sec. 27. Prior Consultations Required. No project or program shall be implemented by government
authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior
approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects
are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
Article Two.

Relations with the Philippine National Police

Sec. 28. Powers of Local Chief Executives over the Units of the Philippine National Police. The extent of
operational supervision and control of local chief executives over the police force, fire protection unit, and
jail management personnel assigned in their respective jurisdictions shall be governed by the provisions of
Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred seventy-five (R.A. No. 6975), otherwise known as "The

Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990", and the rules and regulations issued
pursuant thereto.
Article Three.

Inter-Local Government Relations

Sec. 29. Provincial Relations with Component Cities and Municipalities. The province, through the
governor, shall ensure that every component city and municipality within its territorial jurisdiction acts
within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions. Highly urbanized cities and independent
component cities shall be independent of the province.
Sec. 30. Review of Executive Orders. (a) Except as otherwise provided under the Constitution and special
statutes, the governor shall review all executive orders promulgated by the component city or municipal
mayor within his jurisdiction. The city or municipal mayor shall review all executive orders promulgated by
the punong barangay within his jurisdiction. Copies of such orders shall be forwarded to the governor or the
city or municipal mayor, as the case may be, within three (3) days from their issuance. In all instances of
review, the local chief executive concerned shall ensure that such executive orders are within the powers
granted by law and in conformity with provincial, city, or municipal ordinances.
(b) If the governor or the city or municipal mayor fails to act on said executive orders within thirty (30)
days after their submission, the same shall be deemed consistent with law and therefore valid.
Sec. 31. Submission of Municipal Questions to the Provincial Legal Officer or Prosecutor. In the absence
of a municipal legal officer, the municipal government may secure the opinion of the provincial legal
officer, and in the absence of the latter, that of the provincial prosecutor on any legal question affecting the
municipality.
Sec. 32. City and Municipal Supervision over Their Respective Barangays. The city or municipality,
through the city or municipal mayor concerned, shall exercise general supervision over component
barangays to ensure that said barangays act within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
Sec. 33. Cooperative Undertakings Among Local Government Units. Local government units may,
through appropriate ordinances, group themselves, consolidate, or coordinate their efforts, services, and
resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them. In support of such undertakings, the local government
units involved may, upon approval by the sanggunian concerned after a public hearing conducted for the
purpose, contribute funds, real estate, equipment, and other kinds of property and appoint or assign
personnel under such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by the participating local units through
Memoranda of Agreement.
CHAPTER FOUR: Relations with People's and Non-governmental Organizations
Sec. 34. Role of People's and Non-governmental Organizations. Local government units shall promote the
establishment and operation of people's and non-governmental organizations to become active partners in
the pursuit of local autonomy.
Sec. 35. Linkages with People's and Non-governmental Organizations. Local government units may enter
into joint ventures and such other cooperative arrangements with people's and non-governmental
organizations to engage in the delivery of certain basic services, capability-building and livelihood projects,
and to develop local enterprises designed to improve productivity and income, diversity agriculture, spur
rural industrialization, promote ecological balance, and enhance the economic and social well-being of the
people.
Sec. 36. Assistance to People's and Non-governmental Organizations. A local government unit may
through its local chief executive and with the concurrence of the sanggunian concerned, provide assistance,
financial or otherwise, to such people's and non-governmental organizations for economic, sociallyoriented, environmental, or cultural projects to be implemented within its territorial jurisdiction.

POWERS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS/L OCAL GOVERNMENTS


Municipal Corporations, Chapters VIII and IX (Martin)
CHAPTER EIGHT: Powers of municipal corporations
I.

Police Power

Nature of the Power


Is inherent in the State but not in municipal corporations. In order that a municipal corporation may exercise
police power, there must be a legislative grant which necessarily also sets the limits for the exercise of the
power.
The grant of authority to the sangguniang of the particular local government unit is what is known as the
General Welfare Clause
In Barangays, the GWC is found in Section 91 (a) of the LGC
In Municipalities, the GWC is found in Section 149 (a) of the LGC
For Provinces, the GWC is found in Section 208 (a) of the LGC
2 Branches of the General Welfare Clause
General Legislative Power the power to enact ordinances as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law
Power Power Proper the authority to enact such ordinances as shall be necessary and proper to promote
health and safety, enhance the prosperity and general welfare, improve the morals and maintain peace and
order in the particular local government unit and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants
therein
Requisites for the Exercise of Police Power
First that the interest of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require such
interference, and
Second that the means is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals
Liberal Interpretation of the General Welfare Clause
A restrictive view of the general welfare clause is not favored.
The view that the scope of the police power, and therefore of the general welfare clause, has been fixed by
traditional delineations is not quite accurate. Police power has not received a full and complete definition; it
is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not confined within the narrow
circumscription of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic
way of life

Exercise of Powers Beyond Boundary


Ordinarily, the powers of a municipal corporation can be exercised only within its own territorial limits
which are contiguous. However, statutes sometimes authorize it to exercise police powers beyond its
territorial boundaries, especially for the preservation of public health (i.e., City of Manila which is
empowered by statute to extend its ordinances over the Bay of Manila, three miles beyond the city limits
and over any vessel floating within that distance)
Power of Municipal Corporations to Legislate on the Same Subject Covered by Law
A municipal corporation, under the authority of its charter, may adopt ordinances upon subjects already
covered by general law as long as the ordinance is not repugnant to nor in conflict with the latter.
The reason for the above principle is that municipal authorities are in a better position to determine the evils
sought to be prevented by the legislature in enacting a particular statute and, therefore, to pass the
appropriate ordinance to attain the main object of the law
Effect of conviction or acquittal under either Statute or Ordinance Punishing the Same Act
The Constitution expressly provides, that if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. Hence, where it appears
that a person has already been prosecuted and convicted or acquitted of an act made punishable by an
ordinance he can invoke the defense of double jeopardy, should the government prosecute him further
under the statute punishing the same act.
II.

Power of Eminent Domain

Nature of the Power


A municipal corporation can only exercise the right of eminent domain when the same has been conferred
upon it by the legislature, expressly or by necessary implication, since the municipal corporation has no
more right than any other corporation to condemn property.
But although there is no inherent power in a municipal corporation to acquire property thru condemnation
proceedings, in nearly all jurisdictions the legislature has conferred the power of eminent domain on cities,
towns, and villages either by express provision or in a general statute or in the municipal charter.
Who may exercise the right
The right of eminent domain may be exercised either directly by the legislature or through the medium of
corporate bodies, or of individual enterprises, by virtue of a delegation of the power. The legislature, unless
limited by constitutional restriction, is entirely free to use its discretion in the selection of agents to exercise
the power
Purposes of Expropriation
The power may only be exercised for public purposes (for examples see Section 2106[f] and Section 2245
of the Revised Administrative Code)
Power of Eminent Domain as exercised by Municipal Corporation must be strictly construed
Whether the power is directly exercised by the legislature or immediately thru municipal corporations or
other public agencies, the purpose or use for which the property authorized to be appropriated must be
specified. The power cannot be enlarged by doubtful construction.

The power of eminent domain, being in derogation of private property rights, is justified only by a clear
public necessity of an urgent public policy. The power must be strictly construed against the municipal
corporation. The purpose and procedure prescribed for its exercise must be strictly followed in all
substantial matters. This rule of strict construction is mandatory and should within reasonable limits, be
inflexibly adhered to and applied.
III.

Power of Taxation

Nature of the Power as exercised by Municipal Corporations


The power to tax, although inherent in sovereignty, is not possessed by municipal corporations by the mere
fact that they are creations of the State. The Power must be expressly conferred upon them, either in their
charters or in a general law.
Requisites of Municipal Taxation
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

Municipal revenue obtainable by taxation shall be derived from such sources only as are
expressly authorized by law
Taxation shall be just and in each municipality uniform
It shall not be within the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form
whatever upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and
any attempt of an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be
void (case of Laoag Producers vs. Mun. of Laoag, says this has already been impliedly
repealed by the Local Autonomy Act)
In no case shall collection of municipal taxes be left to any person
Except as allowed by law, municipal funds, shall be devoted exclusively to local public
purpose

Power to License
Where only the power to license is given to municipal corporations, the presumption is that it is regulatory,
rather than for raising of revenue. The terms in which a municipality is empowered to grant license are
expected to indicate with sufficient precision whether the power could be exercised for revenue-raising
purposes or merely for regulation
Distinction between the Power to License and the Power to Tax
Power to License is a police measure; the power to Tax is a revenue measure
Distinction between a license tax and a general tax
A license tax is not a tax upon property, but it is a burden imposed for the right to exercise a franchise or a
privilege which could be withheld or forbidden altogether. The sum charged is merely used as the mode of
computing the amount to be paid for the exercise of the privilege.
Kinds of Municipal License
1.
2.
3.

Licenses for the regulation of useful occupations or enterprises


Licenses for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises
Licenses for revenue only

Effectivity of Tax Ordinance


A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the 15th day after its passage, unless the ordinance shall provide
otherwise: Provided, however, that the Secretary of Finance shall have the authority to suspend the

effectivity of any ordinance within one hundred and twenty days after its passage, if, in his opinion, the tax
or fee therein levied or imposed is unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory, and when the said
secretary exercises this authority the effectivity of such ordinance shall be suspended.
Condonation of Taxes
Municipal council has no right to condone taxes already accrued. This power has been withheld from
municipal councils to prevent abuse
Under the law, it is the provincial treasurer who can condone municipal taxes (Reyes vs. Cornista, 49 OG
931)
Special Assessment; Its distinguishing Features
Like general taxes, special assessments are enforced in proportionate contributions, but instead of being
imposed at regularly recurring periods to provide continuous revenue, special assessments are levied only
occasionally as required. They are imposed not upon the general body of citizens, but upon a limited class
of persons who are interested in local government, and also are specially benefited in a local improvement
to the extend of the assessment. They are imposed and collected as an equivalent, actual or presumed, of the
benefits and are required to pay for the cost of the improvement.
Distinction between a Tax and Special Assessment
1.
2.
3.
4.

SA can be levied only on land


SA cannot be made a personal liability of the person assessed
SA is based wholly on benefits
SA is exceptional both as to time and locality

CHAPTER NINE: Powers of municipal corporations


I.

Power to Appropriate and Spend Money

Nature of the Power


Unless expressly authorized by its charter or statute, a municipal corporation cannot appropriate or give
away the public money of the municipality as pure donations to any person, corporation, or private
institution, under the control of the city and having no connection with it
In the Philippines, the power of municipal corporations to appropriate and spend money is among the many
powers expressly authorized in their charters
Limitation on the Power to Appropriate and Spend
The legislature can neither compel nor authorize a municipal corporation to spend any of its funds for a
private purpose, and consequently, since practically every undertaking of a municipality does or may
require the expenditures of money, a municipal corporation cannot, even with the express legislative
sanction, embark in any private enterprise or assume any functions which are not in a legal sense public.
II.

Power to Borrow Money

Nature of the Power


The power to borrow does not belong to a municipal corporation as an incident of its creation. It exists only
when conferred by express constitutional or legislative grant or by force of legislative vestment of power,

coupled with the imposition of duties which are incapable of exercise and performance without the
borrowing of money
Limitation on the Power to Borrow
A limit to municipal indebtedness may be fixed either by statute or Constitution beyond which no
obligation could be incurred by the municipality
The purpose of limiting municipal indebtedness is to protect persons residing in municipalities from the
abuse of their creditors and the consequent operation of burdensome if not ruinous taxes
III.

Power to Issue Municipal Bonds

Subject to Judicial Examination. There are cases holding that the power to issue bonds is inherent in the
municipal corporation. Upon examination, however, most of the cases will be found as sustaining the
implied rather than the inherent power of a municipality to issue bonds
The power to issue negotiable paper will be implied from the express power to borrow money
IV.

Power to Contract

Nature and Extent of Power


The rules that municipal corporations may exercise those powers which are expressly granted, or those
essential to the carrying out of declared objects and the purposes of the corporation, is applicable with
respect to the power of the municipality to bind itself by contract
This power, however, is not to be construed as authorizing the making of contracts of all description, but
only such as are necessary and usually fit and proper, to enable the corporation to secure or carry into effect
the purposes for which it was created
Nature of the Duty of Municipal Authorities in the Execution of Contracts
The duty of the officers of the municipal corporation in the letting of municipal contracts is not merely
ministerial but of a judicial and discretionary nature. In the absence of fraud or palpable abuse of discretion,
courts have no power to control their action
Requisites Necessary for the Validity of Municipal Contracts
a.
b.

V.

First, that the Corporation has the express, implied, or inherent power to enter into the
particular contract
Second, that the contract is entered into by the proper department, board, committee, officer
or agent
Power to Acquire, Hold, and Dispose of Property

Nature of Power
While the power to acquire property for public purposes is deemed inherent in municipal corporations or
one necessarily implied from other express powers of municipal corporations, in the Philippines, this power
is expressly authorized in the corporate charters
Municipal Property, Classified

In the Philippines, properties of provinces, cities, and municipalities are divided into property for public use
and patrimonial property
Grants of Land in favor of municipal corporations by the State; Requisites
Two requisites are necessary in order to presume a grant of land to municipal corporations, namely, that the
land is one which the municipality itself can exclusively own; and that the land is used to meet public
necessity
Municipality may alienate its property
Municipal Corporations possess the incidental or implied power to alienate or dispose of their real or
personal properties of a private nature. Conversely, they cannot exercise a like power over their properties
of a public nature in violation of the trust in which such properties are held.
Power to Mortgage
Where property not charged with a trust or public use is held by the corporation without legislative
restriction as to its sale, it may mortgage it to secure any debt or obligation that it has the power to create or
enter into. The power to mortgage, if not expressly given or denies, can be considered an incident of the
power to hold and dispose of property, and to make contracts
VI.

Power to Sue and Be Sued

Nature of the Power


The power to sue and be sued is an essential attribute of Municipal Corporation. A municipality, like any
other complete corporation or person, may appeal to the court for the vindication of its right; and for any
wrong done by it, it may be sued by the injured party. The power to sue and be sued by the injured party
includes the right to settle or compromise claims of the municipality.
Municipality may file suit in behalf of the inhabitants
In many instances, a municipal corporation may bring a representative action in behalf of its inhabitants to
protect, preserve, or establish a common right.
Venue of Action
An action against a municipal corporation is inherently local. In the absence of any statutory provision to
the contrary, it must be brought in the place or province in which the municipality is situated.
The reasons for this are: That the municipal corporation remain statutory in some place, and therefore, must
be sued where they are found; that the welfare of the municipal bodies and of their citizens require that their
officers should be permitted to remain at home and discharge their public duties instead of being called
elsewhere to attend litigation.
The venue of action in the place of the municipality applies whether the cause of action arises from the
proprietary or governmental conduct of the municipality.

Compendium on Local Autonomy and Local Government, Chapter 5 (Agra)


See above

Book I, Chapter 2, LGC (Sec 6 24)

See above
A.

Police Power

Binay v. Domingo (supra)


See above

Chua Huat v. CA
Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc. requested del Rosario, the City Engineer and Building Official of Manila, to
condemn the dilapidated structures located in Paco, Manila, all occupied by petitioners. The said official
issued notices of condemnation to petitioners. The condemnation orders stated that the subject buildings
were found to be in dangerous condition and therefore condemned, subject to the confirmation of the Mayor
as required by Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila. It was stated that the
notice was not an order to demolish as the findings of the City Engineer are still subject to the approval of
the Mayor. The orders were based on inspection reports made by the Office of the City Engineer which
showed that the buildings suffered from structural deterioration of as much as 80%. The Mayor confirmed
the condemnation orders.
Petitioners protested against the notices of condemnation. Later, the City Engineer issued a demolition
order to the petitioners. The petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition, with PI or TRO against the City
Mayor, City Engineer, Building Officer and Manuel Uy and Sons Inc.
The Court issued the TRO and required respondents to comment. Respondents prayed that the petition be
dismissed claiming that: (1) the power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila falls
within the exclusive domain of the City Engineer pursuant to Sections 275 and 276 of its Compilation of
Ordinances (also Revised Ordinances 1600); and (2) the power to condemn and remove buildings and
structures is an exercise of the police power granted the City of Manila to promote public safety.
HELD: The power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the City Engineer, who is at the same time the Building Officials. The Compilation of
Ordinances of the City of Manila and the National Building Code, also provide the authority of the Building
Officials, with respect to dangerous buildings. Respondent City Engineer and Building Official can,
therefore, validly issue the questioned condemnation and demolition orders. This is also true with the
Mayor who can approve or deny the condemnation orders as provided in Section 276 of the Compilation of
Ordinances of the City of Manila.There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent City
Engineer because the orders were made only after thorough ocular inspections were conducted by the City's
Building Inspectors. The respondent Mayor's act of approving the condemnation orders was likewise done
in accordance with law. Also, the protest made by petitioners was submitted 3 months after the notices of
condemnation were issued, and clearly beyond the seven days prescribed for doing so.

Tatel v. Municipality of Virac


Due to the complaints received from the residents of barrio Sta. Elena against the disturbance caused by the
operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioners warehouse which emitted obnoxious odor and
dust, a committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter. The
committee noted that the warehouse was near residential houses and that the inflammable materials inside
created danger to the lives and properties of the people. Resolution 29 was passed by the Municipal
Council declaring the warehouse as a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the CC. The
petitioners MR was denied.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the CFI enjoining them from
enforcing Resolution 29 of the Council. The municipal officials contend that the warehouse was

constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of
houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said
block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. Petitioner contends that said
ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution
and null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law. The court ruled in favor of the
municipal council and held that the ordinance was a legitimate and valid exercise of police power by the
municipal council.
HELD: Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power.
Municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local selfgovernment and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry
out the declared objects of their creation. Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the
Administrative Code.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact
but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with
certain well established and basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that a
municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. Ordinance No. 13, meets these
criteria. The purpose of the ordinance is to avoid loss of life and property in case of accidental fire which is
one of the primordial and basic obligation of any government. Its purpose is well within the objectives of
sound government. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but
merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in the warehouse because of the danger of fire to
the lives and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As to the contention, that warehouses
similarly situated as that of the petitioner were not prosecuted, the mere fact that the municipal authorities
have not proceeded against other warehouses in the municipality allegedly violating Ordinance 13 is no
reason to claim that the ordinance is discriminatory. A distinction must be made between the law itself and
the manner in which said law is implemented by the agencies in charge with its administration/enforcement.
There is no valid reason for the petitioner to complain, in the absence of proof that the other bodegas
mentioned by him are operating in violation of the ordinance and that the complaints have been lodged
against the bodegas concerned without the municipal authorities doing anything about it.

Bayan v. Ermita
Petitioners attacked the constitutionality of the Public Assembly Act (BP 880) and the Calibrated
Preemptive Response (CPR) policy by the Arroyo administrationwhich enforced a no permit, no rally
policy and authorized the preemptive dispersal of rallies deemed unlawful by the executive branch.
Petitioners based their arguments primarily on the ground of freedom of expression. The Court upheld the
constitutionality of BP 880. It found out that the procedure prescribed in the statute does not impose an
absolute ban on rallies, but merely a time, place and manner (TPM) regulation that was content-neutral.
Since the content of the speech was not relevant, it held that it does not impose any prior restraint. The
overbreadth argument of petitioners was also dispensed with by the Court by saying that BP 880 only
regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a
clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to preventAs to the delegation of
powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient standard the clear and present danger test
stated in Sec. 6(a) [of BP 880]. The reference to imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil in Sec.
6(c) substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. However, the CPR serves no
valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it means something else
For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and
must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by
some police agents to justify abuses.
B.

Power of Taxation: Local Taxes and Real Property Tax

Sec 5 -7, Art X, 1987 Constitution


Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to
levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to
the local governments.
Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which
shall be automatically released to them.
Section 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and
development of the national wealth within their respective areas, in the manner provided by law, including
sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits.

Sec 128 283, LGC


See attachments
i.

Local Taxation

Basco v. PAGCOR
PAGCOR, a government owned and controlled corporation, is exempted by its charter from payment of all
kinds of taxes except for 5% franchise tax. Petitioners assail the grant of such exemption on the ground that
it infringes on the right of the City of Manila to impose local fees and taxes. The issue is whether or not
PAGCOR which is exempted by its charter from payment of all kinds of taxes except for the 5% franchise
tax is subject to the local fees and taxes imposed by the City of Manila. Ruling: yes. The taxing power of
local government units must always yield to an act of Congress. Local government has no inherent power of
tax but merely derives such power from Congress. In fact, local government units have no power to tax
instrumentalities of the National Government. Under its charter, PAGCOR is empowered to operate and
regulate gambling casinos. With its regulatory power, it becomes an instrumentality of the National
Government and hence, entitled to exemption from local taxes.

Philippine Petroleum Corp v. Municipality of Pililia Rizal


Philippine Petroleum Corporation is a business enterprise engaged in the manufacture of lubricated oil
basestock which is a petroleum product, with its refinery plant situated at Malaya, Pililla, Rizal. The
municipality of Pililia enacted a municipal tax ordinance which covers the business of petitioner. Petitioner
questions the imposition in view of several provincial circulars directing the municipality officers to refrain
from collecting the said taxes. The validity of the ordinance is undisputed for it is an exercise of the
constitutional power of LGUs to levy taxes. To allow the continuous effectivity of the prohibition set forth
in the circulars would be tantamount to restricting their power to tax by mere administrative issuances.
Administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. It is an ancient rule that
exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the
taxing authority.

Floro Cement Corp. v. Gorospe


The municipality of Lugait, province of Misamis Oriental, seeks to collect from Floro Cement
manufacturers and exporter's taxes. Floro Cement says that it is exempted by virtue of PD 463 which
prevents LGUs from levying taxes on mineral products. Ruling: the Court has consistently held that it is not
a mineral product but rather a manufactured product. The exemption mentioned in P.D. No. 463 refers only
to machineries, equipment, tools for production, etc., as provided in Sec. 53 of the same decree. The

manufacture and the export of cement do not fall under the said provision for it is not a mineral product.
Exemptions are construed strictly against the taxpayer.

Tuzon and Mapagu v. CA


The issue in this case is the liability of petitioners (Mayor Tuzon and Mapagu) for damages for refusing to
issue to petitioner Jurado a mayor's permit and license to operate his palay-threshing business for failure to
comply with the 1% donation. The Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan adopted a resolution
soliciting 1% donation from the thresher operatorsto help finance the continuation of the construction of
the Sports and Nutrition Center Building. Although the validity of the resolution was not in issue, the SC
observed that: it seems to make the donation obligatory and a condition precedent to the issuance of the
mayor's permit. This goes against the nature of a donation, which is an act of liberality and is never
obligatoryIf, on the other hand, it is to be considered a tax ordinance, then it must be shown in view of
the challenge raised by the private respondents to have been enacted in accordance with the requirements of
the Local Tax Code. Petitioners acted within the scope of their authority and in consonance with their
honest interpretation of the resolution in question. It was not for them to rule on its validity. In the absence
of a judicial decision declaring it invalid, its legality would have to be presumed. As executive officials of
the municipality, they had the duty to enforce it as long as it had not been repealed by the Sangguniang
Bayan or annulled by the courts.
ii.

Franchises

PLDT v. City of Davao


PLDT assails the franchise tax being imposed by the City of Davao. Its argument is based on its franchise in
relation to RA 7925 particularly the provision on the equality of treatment in the telecommunications
industry. It argues that because Smart and Globe are exempt from the franchise tax, it follows that it must
likewise be exempt from the tax being collected by the City of Davao because the grant of tax exemption to
Smart and Globe ipso facto extended the same exemption to it. In approving R.A. No. 7925, Congress did
not intend it to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all telecommunications entities. Applying the rule of
strict construction of laws granting tax exemptions and the rule that doubts should be resolved in favor of
municipal corporations in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, R.A. 7925 cannot
be considered as having amended petitioner's franchise so as to entitle it to exemption from the imposition
of local franchise taxes.

City Government of QC v. Bayantel


Bayantel claims exemption from real property taxes being imposed by Quezon City. It anchors its claim on
its legislative franchise. According to the court, the franchise distinguishes between two (2) sets of
properties, be they real or personal, owned by the franchisee, namely, (a) those actually, directly and
exclusively used in its radio or telecommunications business, and (b) those properties which are not so used.
The power to impose realty taxes by the LGUs only covers the second category. Bayantels franchise being
national in character, the "exemption" thus granted in its charter applies to all its real or personal properties
found anywhere within the Philippine archipelago. Although the enactment of the LGC withdrew
Bayantels exemption, the amendatory law of Bayantels franchise reenacted the exemption.

FELS Energy v. Province of Batangas


NPC entered into a lease contract with Polar Energy, Inc. over 3x30 MW diesel engine power barges
moored at Balayan Bay in Calaca, Batangas. The contract (Energy Conversion Agreement) was for a period
of 5 years. Article 10 states that NPC shall be responsible for the payment of taxes; other than (i) taxes
imposed or calculated on the basis of the net income of POLAR and Personal Income Taxes of its

employees and (ii) construction permit fees, environmental permit fees and other similar fees and charges.
Polar Energy then assigned its rights under the Agreement to Fels despite NPCs initial opposition.
FELS received an assessment of real property taxes on the power barges from the Provincial Assessor of
Batangas City. FELS referred the matter to NPC, reminding it of its obligation under the Agreement to pay
all real estate taxes.
FELS gave NPC the full power and authority to represent it in any conference regarding the real property
assessment of the Provincial Assessor.
NPC filed a petition with the LBAA. The LBAA ordered Fels to pay the real estate taxes. The LBAA ruled
that the power plant facilities, while they may be classified as movable or personal property, are
nevertheless considered real property for taxation purposes because they are installed at a specific location
with a character of permanency. The LBAA also pointed out that the owner of the bargesFELS, a private
corporationis the one being taxed, not NPC. A mere agreement making NPC responsible for the payment
of all real estate taxes and assessments will not justify the exemption of FELS; such a privilege can only be
granted to NPC and cannot be extended to FELS.
Fels appealed to the CBAA. The CBAA reversed and ruled that the power barges belong to NPC; since they
are actually, directly and exclusively used by it, the power barges are covered by the exemptions under
Section 234(c) of R.A. No. 7160. As to the other jurisdictional issue, the CBAA ruled that prescription did
not preclude the NPC from pursuing its claim for tax exemption in accordance with Section 206 of R.A. No.
7160. Upon MR, the CBAA reversed itself.
WON the petitioner may be assessed real property taxes
Held: Yes
The CBAA and LBAA maintain that power barges are real property and are thus subject to real property
tax. Tax assessments by tax examiners are presumed correct and made in good faith, with the taxpayer
having the burden of proving otherwise. Factual findings of administrative bodies, which have acquired
expertise in their field, are generally binding and conclusive upon the Court.
Power barges are categorized as immovable property by destination (Article 415(9) NCC), being in the
nature of machinery and other implements intended by the owner for an industry or work which may be
carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or
work.
Petitioners maintain that the power barges are exempt from real estate tax under Section 234 (c) of R.A. No.
7160 because they are actually, directly and exclusively used by petitioner NPC, a government- owned and
controlled corporation engaged in the supply, generation, and transmission of electric power.
SC affirms the findings of the LBAA and CBAA that the owner of the taxable properties is petitioner FELS,
which is the entity being taxed by the local government.
As stipulated under Section 2.11, Article 2 of the Agreement:
Ownership of power barges. POLAR shall own the Power Barges and all the fixtures, fittings, machinery
and equipment on the Site used in connection with the Power Barges which have been supplied by it at its
own cost. POLAR shall operate, manage and maintain the Power Barges for the purpose of converting Fuel
of NAPOCOR into electricity.
FELS cannot escape liability from the payment of realty taxes by invoking its exemption in Section 234 (c)
of R.A. No. 7160. Indeed, the law states that the machinery must be actually, directly and exclusively used
by the government owned or controlled corporation; nevertheless, petitioner FELS still cannot find solace in
this provision because Section 5.5, Article 5 of the Agreement provides:

Operation. POLAR undertakes that until the end of the Lease Period, subject to the supply of the necessary
Fuel pursuant to Article 6 and to the other provisions hereof, it will operate the Power Barges to convert
such Fuel into electricity in accordance with Part A of Article 7.
It is a basic rule that obligations arising from a contract have the force of law between the parties. Not being
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, the parties to the contract are bound by
its terms and conditions.
Applying the rule of strict construction of laws granting tax exemptions, and the rule that doubts should be
resolved in favor of provincial corporations, we hold that FELS is considered a taxable entity.
The mere undertaking of petitioner NPC under Section 10.1 of the Agreement, that it shall be responsible
for the payment of all real estate taxes and assessments, does not justify the exemption. The privilege
granted to petitioner NPC cannot be extended to FELS. The covenant is between FELS and NPC and does
not bind a third person not privy thereto, in this case, the Province of Batangas.
It must be pointed out that the protracted and circuitous litigation has seriously resulted in the local
governments deprivation of revenues. The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its
magnitude, acknowledging in its very nature no perimeter so that security against its abuse is to be found
only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the constituency who are to pay for it.
The right of local government units to collect taxes due must always be upheld to avoid severe tax erosion.
This consideration is consistent with the State policy to guarantee the autonomy of local governments and
the objective of the Local Government Code that they enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to
empower them to achieve their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them effective
partners in the attainment of national goals.
The power to tax is the most potent instrument to raise the needed revenues to finance and support myriad
activities of the local government units for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the
general welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people.

Digitel v. Province of Pangasinan


Section 137 LGC withdrew any exemption from the payment of franchise tax by authorizing the LGUs to
impose a franchise tax on businesses at a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of the gross annual receipts of the
business.
Section 232 also authorizes the imposition of an ad valorem tax on real property by the LGUs within the
Metropolitan Manila Area wherein the land, building, machinery and other improvement not thereinafter
specifically exempted.
Digitel was granted, under Provincial Ordinance No. 18-92, a provincial franchise to install, maintain and
operate a telecommunications system within Pangasinan.
Under the Sec 6 of the provincial franchise, the grantee is required to pay franchise and real property taxes.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan also enacted Provincial Tax Ordinance 1 (Real Property Tax Ordinance of
1992).
Section 4 expanded the application of Sec. 6 of the provincial franchise of Digitel to include machineries
and other improvements, not thereinafter exempted,.
Provincial Tax Ordinance No 4 was then enacted. Sections 4, 5 and 6 positively imposed a franchise tax on
businesses enjoying a franchise within the province of Pangasinan.

Digitel was granted by RA 7678 a legislative franchise.


Under Section 5 of its legislative franchise, DIGITEL became liable for the payment of a franchise tax as
may be prescribed by law of all gross receipts of the telephone or other telecommunications businesses
transacted under it by the grantee, as well as real property tax on its real estate, and buildings exclusive
of this franchise.
Province of Pangasinan found that Digitel had a franchise tax deficiency for the years of 1992, 1993 and
1994.
In the interregnum, on 16 March 1995, Congress passed RA 7925 (The Public Telecommunications Policy
Act of the Philippines).
Section 23 (Equality of Treatment in the Telecommunications Industry), provided for the ipso facto
application to any previously granted telecommunications franchises of any advantage, favor, privilege,
exemption or immunity granted under existing franchises, or those still to be granted, to be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to earlier grantees.
Digitel opposed Pangasinans claim on the ground that:
prior to the approval of its legislative franchise, its operation of a telecommunications system was done
under a Facilities Management Agreement it had previously executed with the DOTC. Thus, all revenues
generated from the operation of the facilities inured to the DOTC and all the fees received by petitioner
DIGITEL were purely for services rendered.
under its legislative franchise, the payment of a franchise tax to the BIR would be in lieu of all taxes on
said franchise or the earnings therefrom.
The Province of Pangasinan filed a Complaint for Mandamus, Collection of Sum of Money and Damages
before Branch 68 of the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The trial court decided the Province.
Digitel maintains that its legislative franchise being an earlier enactment, by virtue of Section 23 of
Republic Act No. 7925, the ipso facto, immediate and unconditional application to it of the tax exemption
found in the franchises of Globe, Smart and Bell.
WON Digitel is exempt from the payment of provincial franchise tax in view of Section 23 of RA 7925 in
relation to the exemptions enjoyed by other telephone companies?
Held: No
Prior to the enactment of its legislative franchise, Digitel did not enjoy and exemption from the payment of
franchise and real property taxes. In fact the provincial franchise made Digitel liable for the payment of
such taxes.
In the case of PLDT v. City of Davao, SC already clarified the confusion brought about by the effect of
Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7925 that the word exemption as used in the statute pertains merely to
an exemption from regulatory or reporting requirements of the DOTC or the NTC and not to the grantees
tax liability. Congress did not intend Section 23 to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all telcos.
PLDTs theory will leave the Government with the burden of having to keep track of all granted
telecommunications franchises, lest some companies be treated unequally. It is different if Congress enacts
a law specifically granting uniform advantages, favor, privilege, exemption, or immunity to all
telecommunications entities.
R.A. No. 7925 is a legislative enactment designed to set the national policy on telecommunications and
provide the structures to implement it to keep up with the technological advances in the industry and the
needs of the public. The thrust of the law is to promote gradually the deregulation of the entry, pricing, and

operations of all public telecommunications entities and thus promote a level playing field in the
telecommunications industry. There is nothing in the language of 23 nor in the proceedings of both the
House of Representatives and the Senate in enacting R.A. No. 7925 which shows that it contemplates the
grant of tax exemptions to all telecommunications entities, including those whose exemptions had been
withdrawn by the LGC.
In view of the passage of RA 7716 abolishing the franchise tax imposed on telecommunications companies
effective 1 January 1996 and in its place is imposed a 10% VAT, the in-lieu-of-all-taxes clause/provision
in the legislative franchises of Globe, Smart and Bell, among others, has now become functus officio, made
inoperative for lack of a franchise tax. Therefore, from 1 January 1996, Digitel ceased to be liable for
national franchise tax and in its stead is imposed a 10% VAT in accordance with Section 108 of the Tax
Code.
WON Digitel is exempt from payment of real estate tax under its legislative franchise.
Held: Yes
SECTION 5. Tax Provisions. The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes on its real estate,
buildings, and personal property exclusive of this franchise as other persons or corporations are now or
hereafter may be required by law to pay x x x.
SC qualifies that such exemption solely applies to those real properties actually, directly and exclusively
used by the grantee in its franchise.
The present issue actually boils down to a dispute between the inherent taxing power of Congress and the
delegated authority to tax of the local government borne by the 1987 Constitution.
In the PLDT v. City of Davao, SC sustained the power of Congress to grant exemptions over and above the
power of the local governments delegated taxing authority notwithstanding the source of such power.
Had Congress intended to tax each and every real property of Digitel, regardless of whether or not it is used
in the business or operation of its franchise, it would not have incorporated a qualifying phrase, which such
manifestation admittedly is.
The fact that Republic Act No. 7678 was a later piece of legislation can be taken to mean that Congress,
knowing fully well that the Local Government Code had already withdrawn exemptions from real property
taxes, chose to restore such immunity even to a limited degree.
Said exemption, however, merely applies from the time of the effectivity of petitioner DIGITELs
legislative franchise and not a moment sooner.
iii.

Real Property Taxation and Special Education Fund Tax

Sec of Finance v. Ilarde


Cipriano P. Cabaluna, Jr., was the Regional Director of Regional Office No. VI of the DOF. He co-owns
with his wife certain properties in Jaro, Iloilo City. Private respondent failed to pay the land taxes for the
years 1986 to 1992. A breakdown of the computation of the delinquent taxes showed that more than 24%
of the delinquent taxes were charged and collected from private respondent by way of penalties.
Cabaluna paid his land taxes and the receipts were issued to him by the City Treasurers Office with the
notation paid under protest. After Cabalunas retirement, he filed a formal protest with the City Treasurer
of Iloilo wherein he contends that the computation was erroneous since the rate of penalty exceed 24% in
contravention of Section 66 of P.D. No. 464 (Real Property Tax Code).

Section 66 of P.D. No. 464 fixed the maximum penalty for delinquency in the payment of real estate taxes
at 24% of the delinquent tax. The Assistant City Treasurer Rizalina Tulio turned down the protest, citing
Sec. 4(c) of Joint Assessment Regulations No. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. 2-85 of the DOF.
WON the Ministry of Finance could legally promulgate Regulations prescribing a rate of penalty on
delinquent taxes other than that provided for under PD 464, also known as the Real Property Tax Code.
Held: No
The subject Regulations must be struck down for being repugnant to Section 66 of P.D. No. 464 or the Real
Property Tax Code, which is the law prevailing at the time material to this case.
Under Section 66 of P.D. No. 464, the maximum penalty for delinquency in the payment of real property
tax shall in no case exceed 24% of the delinquent tax
Section 4(c) of the challenged Joint Assessment Regulations No. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No.
2-85 issued by respondent Secretary of Finance provides that the penalty of two percent (2%) per month of
delinquency or twenty-four percent (24%) per annum as the case may be, shall continue to be imposed on
the unpaid tax from the time the delinquency was incurred up to the time that the delinquency is paid for in
full.
The penalty imposed under the assailed Regulations has no limit inasmuch as the 24% penalty per annum
shall be continuously imposed on the unpaid tax until it is paid for in full unlike that imposed under Section
66 of the Real Property Tax Code where the total penalty is limited only to twenty-four percent of the
delinquent tax.
The Court harbors doubts on the veracity of petitioners contention that the Regulations at issue are
sanctioned by E.O. No. 73.
The underlying principle behind E.O. No. 73, is to advance the date of effectivity of the application of the
Real Property Tax Values of 1984 from 01 January 1988, the original date it was intended by E.O. No. 1019
to take effect for purposes stated therein, to 01 January 1987.
E.O. No. 73 did not, in any way, alter the structure of the real property tax assessments as provided for in
P.D. No. 464 or the Real Property Tax Code.
E.O. No. 73 did not touch at all on the topic of amendment of rates of delinquent taxes or the amendment of
rates of penalty on delinquent taxes.
E.O. No. 73, particularly in Section 2 thereof, has merely designated the Minister of Finance to promulgate
the rules and regulations towards the implementation of E.O. No. 73, particularly on the application of the
Real Property Values as of 31 December 1984, which is the general purpose for enacting said executive
order.
PD 464 in general and Section 66 in particular, remained to be good law. To accept petitioners premise
would be tantamount to saying that EO 73 has repealed or amended PD 464.
Repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed. Repeals by implication are not favored for a law cannot
be deemed repealed unless it is clearly manifest that the legislature so intended it. The failure to add a
specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. SC found no such inconsistency
or repugnancy between EO 73 and Section 66 of PD 464.
A regulation which is in itself invalid for being contrary to law cannot be validated by any act of
endorsement of any official, much less, by a subordinate of the official who issued such regulation.
Estoppel, certainly, cannot make an invalid regulation valid.

The penalties imposed by respondents City Treasurer and Assistant City Treasurer of Iloilo City on the
property of private respondent are valid only up to 24% of the delinquent taxes. The excess penalties paid
should, in view of that, be refunded by the latter.
However, from 01 January 1992 onwards, the proper basis for the computation of the real property tax
payable, including penalties or interests, if applicable, must be Rep. Act No. 7160 inasmuch as Section 534
had expressly repealed P.D. No. 464 or the Real Property Tax Code. Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 7160
provides that rights and obligations existing on the date of effectivity of the new Code and arising out of
contracts or any source of prestation involving a local government unit shall be governed by the original
terms and conditions of the said contracts or the law in force at the time such contracts were vested.

Benguet Corp v. CBAA


Benguet Corporation has bunkhouses used by its rank-and-file employees for residential purposes. The
Provincial Assessor of Benguet assessed real property tax on these bunkhouses. According to him, the tax
exemption of bunkhouses under PD 745 was already withdrawn by PD 1955. The main contention if
Benguet Corp is that the realty taxes are local taxes because these taxes are levied by LGUs per Section 39
of PD 464.
Section 39. Rates Of LevyThe provincial, city or municipal board or council shall fix a uniform rate of
real property tax applicable to their respective localities.
Benguet Corp contends that LGUs are without any authority to levy realty taxes on mines per PD 463 and
the Local Tax Code.
WON it is the LGUs and not the National Government which levy realty taxes
Held: No, it is the national government
While the local government units are changed with fixing the rate of real property taxes, it does not
necessarily follow from that authority the determination of the imposition of the tax. LGUs have no
alternative but to collect taxes as mandated by Section 38 ( Incidence of Real Property Tax) of the Real
Property Tax Code. It is clear that is the national government that levies real property tax. When LGUs are
required to fix the rates, they are merely constituted as agents of the national government in the
enforcement of the Real Property Tax Code. There is even no delegation of power to speak of because the
national government has already imposed realty tax in Section 38, leaving only the enforcement to be done
by the local governments.
Realty tax has always been imposed by the law-making body. It is enforced throughout the Philippines and
not merely in a particular municipality or city but the proceeds of the tax accrue to the province, city,
municipality and barrio where the municipality is situated. (Section 68 of PD 464) IN contrast, a local tax
is imposed by the municipality or city council pursuant to the Local Tax Code.
The provisions of the Local Tax Code and PD 463 alleged by the corporation regarding the absence of
power to levy realty taxes by LGUs on mines are mere limitations on the taxing power of the LGUs and are
not pertinent to the issue in the case at bar. It cannot affect the imposition of real property tax by the
national government.

National Development Co. v. Cebu City


National Development Company (NDC) is a GOCC authorized to engage in commercial, industrial, mining,
agricultural and other enterprises necessary or contributory to economic development or important to public
interest. It also operates subsidiary corporations one of which is National Warehousing Corporation (NWC).

In 1939, the President issued Proclamation No. 430 reserving Block no. 4, Reclamation Area No. 4, of Cebu
City for warehousing purposes under the administration of NWC. In 1940, a warehouse with a floor area of
1,940 square meters more or less, was constructed thereon. In 1947, EO 93 dissolved NWC with NDC
taking over its assets and functions. In 1948, Cebu City assessed and collected from NDC real estate taxes
on the land and the warehouse thereon. By the first quarter of 1970, a substantial amount of the taxes were
paid under protest. NDC asked for a full refund contending that the land and the warehouse belonged to the
Republic and therefore exempt from taxation.
WON the NDC is exempt from real estate taxes
Held: Yes
To come within the ambit of the exemption provided in Art. 3, par. (a), of the Assessment Law, it is
important to establish that the property is owned by the government or its unincorporated agency, and once
government ownership is determined, the nature of the use of the property, whether for proprietary or
sovereign purposes, becomes immaterial. What appears to have been ceded to NWC (later transferred to
NDC), in the case before Us, is merely the administration of the property while the government retains
ownership of what has been declared reserved for warehousing purposes under Proclamation No. 430.
A reserved land is defined as a public land has been withheld or kept back from sale or disposition. The
government does not part with its title by reserving them, but gives notice to the world that it desires them
for a certain purpose.Absolute disposition of land is not implied from reservation; it merely means a
withdrawal of a specified portion of the pubic domain from disposal under the land laws and the
appropriation for the time being to some particular use or purpose of the general government.As its title
remains with the Republic, the reserved land is clearly covered by the tax exemption provision.
However, as regards the warehouse constructed on a public reservation, a different rule should apply
because "[t]he exemption of public property from taxation does not extend to improvements on the public
lands made by pre-emptioners, homesteaders and other claimants, or occupants, at their own expense, and
these are taxable by the state . . ." Consequently, the warehouse constructed on the reserved land by NWC
(now under administration by NDC), indeed, should properly be assessed real estate tax as such
improvement does not appear to belong to the Republic.

Province of Tarlac v. Judge Alcantara


Tarlac Enterprises Inc .is the owner of a parcel of land in Mabini, Tarlac, an ice drop factory in said land,
machinery shed and other machinery. These properties were declared for purposes of taxation in the
Provincial Assessors Office. The Provincial Treasurer found that real estate taxes for the years 1974 until
1992 including penalties were not yet paid. Therefore, the Provincial Treasurer filed a complaint praying
that the company pay the said sum as well as damages. The court rendered the decision dismissing the
complaint. It ruled that P.D. No. 551 expressly exempts private respondent from paying the real property
taxes demanded, it being a grantee of a franchise to generate, distribute and sell electric current for light.
The court held that in lieu of said taxes, private respondent had been required to pay 2% franchise tax in
line with the intent of the law to give assistance to operators such as the private respondent to enable the
consumers to enjoy cheaper rates.
WON Tarlac Enterprises, Inc. is exempt from the payment of real property tax under Sec. 40 (g) of P.D. No.
464 in relation to P.D. No. 551, as amended.
Held: No
The phrase "in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever nature" in the second paragraph of Sec. 1 of
P.D. No. 551 does not expressly exempts private respondent from paying real property taxes. Said proviso
is modified and delimited by the phrase "on earnings, receipts. income and privilege of generation,
distribution and sale" which specifies the kinds of taxes and assessments which shall not be collected in

view of the imposition of the franchise tax. Said enumerated items upon which taxes shall not be imposed,
have no relation at all to, and are entirely different from real properties subject to tax.
If the intention of the law is to exempt electric franchise grantees from paying real property tax and to make
the 2% franchise tax the only imposable tax, then said enumerated items would not have been added when
PD 852 was enacted to amend P.D. No. 551. The legislative authority would have simply stopped after the
phrase "national or local authority" by putting therein a period. On the contrary, it went on to enumerate
what should not be subject to tax thereby delimiting the extent of the exemption.
It bears emphasis that P.D. No. 551 as amended by P.D. No. 852 deals with franchise tax and tariff on fuel
oils and the "earnings, receipts, income and privilege of generation, distribution and sale of electric current"
are the items exempted from taxation by the imposition of said tax or tariff duty. On the other hand, the
collection complaint filed by petitioner specified only taxes due on real properties. While P.D. No. 551 was
intended to give "assistance to the franchise holders by reducing some of their tax and tariff obligations," to
construe said decree as having granted such franchise holders exemption from payment of real property tax
would unduly extend the ambit of exemptions beyond the purview of the law.
P.D. No. 551 is not as all-encompassing as said provision of the Local Autonomy Act for it enumerates the
items which are not taxable by virtue of the payment of franchise tax.
It has always been the rule that "exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris against the
taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority" primarily because "taxes are the lifeblood of
government and their prompt and certain availability is an imperious need." Thus, to be exempted from
payment of taxes, it is the taxpayer's duty to justify the exemption "by words too plain to be mistaken and
too categorical to be misinterpreted. Private respondent has utterly failed to discharge this duty.
iv.

Shares of LGUs in National Taxes

1987 Constitution
Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which
shall be automatically released to them.
Section 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and
development of the national wealth within their respective areas, in the manner provided by law, including
sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits.

Sec 284-294, LGC


See attachments

Pimentel v. Aguirre
President Ramos issued Administrative Order 372 (Adoption of Economic Measures in Government for
Fiscal Year 1998). Section 1 provided that all government departments and agencies, including state
universities and colleges, GOCCs and LGUs will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will
replace total expenditures by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services
items. Section 4 also provided that pending assessment by the Development Budget Coordinating
Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the IRA to LGUs shall be
withheld. President Estrada issued AO 43, amending Section 4 by reducing to 5% the IRA to be withheld.
WON Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25% is valid

Held: Yes
Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it directs LGUs to reduce expenditures by at least 25% is a valid exercise
of the Presidents power of general supervision over LGUs as it is advisory only. Supervisory power,
when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any
restraining authority over such body. (Taule vs. Santos) Under existing law, LGU, in addition to having
administrative autonomy, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that local governments
have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national
taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance
with their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to
work within the constraints thereof.
Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national government intervention by way
of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national
goals. However, under the Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such policies and
programs are subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and
local government units." The President cannot do so unilaterally.
WON withholding a part of LGUs IRA is valid
Held: No
Section 4 is invalid because it interferes with local autonomy, particularly local fiscal autonomy. Local
autonomy signified a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the share of
LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by the Constitution. Section 4 orders the
withholding of 10% of IRA pending he assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget
Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation. Such withholding contravenes the Constitution
and the law. Although temporary, it Is equivalent to a holdback, which means something held back or
withheld, often temporarily. Hence, the temporary nature of the retention does not matter. Any
retention is prohibited.
C.

Abatement of Nuisance

Estate of Francisco v. CA
A quonset was constructed by the American Liberation Forces in 1944. It was purchased in 1946 by
Gregoria Francisco. It stands on a lot owned by the PPA and faces the municipal wharf. By virtue of
Proclamation No. 83 issued by President Elpidio Quirino, said land was declared for the exclusive use of
port facilities. The PPA issued to Tan Gin San, spouse of Gregoria Francisco, a permit to occupy the lot
where the building stands for a period of one (1) year, to expire on 31 December 1989. Tan Gin used the
quonset for the storage of copra.
On May 1989, the Mayor notified Tan Gin San to remove or relocate its Quonset building citing Ordinance
No. 147, noting its antiquated and dilapidated structure; and stressing the "clean-up campaign on illegal
squatters and unsanitary surroundings along Strong Boulevard." Likewise, according to the Mayor, the
building was outside the warehouse zone; hence it was a non-confirming structure. The notifications
remained unheeded; thus, the Mayor ordered the demolition on 24 May 1989. Petitioner sought a Writ of
Prohibition with Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Basilan, which denied the petition and upheld
the power of the Mayor to order the demolition without judicial authority pursuant to Ordinance 147.
On 6 September 1989, petitioner's quonset building was completely demolished. The CA reversed the
RTC and ruled that the mayor was not vested with power to order summarily without any judicial
proceeding to demolish the Quonset building which was not a nuisance per se. Upon reconsideration,
however, the CA reversed itself and ruled that the deficiency was remedied when petitioner filed a petition
for prohibition and injunction and was heard on oral argument.

WON it was proper for the Mayor to summarily, without judicial process, order the demolition of the nonconforming structure.
Held:
No (Tan Gin entitled to just compensation but not to damages)
It is not disputed that the quonset building, which is being used for the storage of copra, is located outside
the zone for warehouses. It is referred to in Ordinance as a non-conforming structure, which should be
relocated. In the event that an immediate relocation of the building can not be accomplished, Sec 16 of the
Ordinance provides: A certificate of non-conformance for all non-conforming uses shall be applied for by
the owner or agent of the property involved within 12mo from the approval of this Ordinance, otherwise the
non-conforming use may be condemned or removed at the owner's expense.
Even granting that petitioner failed to apply for a Certificate of Non-conformance, the provision should not
be interpreted as authorizing the summary removal of a non-conforming building by the municipal
government. For if it does, it must be struck down for being in contravention of the requirements of due
process, as originally held by the CA. The enforcement and administration of the provisions of the
Ordinance resides with the Zoning Administrator , who may call upon the City Fiscal to institute the
necessary legal proceedings to enforce the provisions of the Ordinance. Violation of a municipal ordinance
does not empower municipal mayor to avail of extra-judicial remedies. . On the contrary, the Local
Government Code imposes upon him the duty "to cause to be instituted judicial proceedings in connection
with the violation of ordinances".
Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances
without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se or one which affects the immediate
safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity.
The storage of copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be
injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it
may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary
abatement without judicial intervention.
While the Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement of a nuisance (Local Government Code, Sec.
149 [ee]), it can not declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. The nuisance
can only be so adjudged by judicial determination.
Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building by virtue of a permit from the PPA when
demolition was effected. It was not squatting on public land. It was entitled to an impartial hearing before a
tribunal authorized to decide whether the quonset building did constitute a nuisance in law. There was no
compelling necessity for precipitate action.
The public officials of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their authority in abating summarily petitioner's
quonset building. They had deprived petitioner of its property without due process of law.

Technology Developers Inc. v. CA


Petitioner received a letter from acting mayor Pablo N. Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the operation of
the petitioner's plant located at Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The letter requested Plant Manager Armando
Manese to bring with him to the office of the mayor the following: a) Building permit; b) Mayor's permit; c)
Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit; and of other document.
Petitioner undertook to comply with respondent's request for the production of the required documents.
Petitioner commenced to secure "Region III-DENR Anti-Pollution Permit," although among the permits
previously secured prior to the operation of petitioner's plant was a "Temporary Permit to Operate Air
Pollution Installation" issued by the then National Pollution Control Commission. Petitioner's attention

having been called to its lack of mayor's permit, it sent its representatives to the office of the mayor to
secure the same but were not entertained.
Without previous and reasonable notice upon petitioner, respondent ordered the Municipality's station
commander to padlock the premises of petitioner's plant, thus effectively causing the stoppage of its
operation. Petitioner instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction
against private respondent. The judge found that petitioner is entitled to the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction upon posting of a bond worth P50,000. During the MR, the Provincial Prosecutor
presented his evidence prepared by Marivic Guina, Due to the manufacturing process and nature of raw
materials used, the fumes coming from the factory may contain particulate matters which are hazardous to
the health of the people. As such, the company should cease operating until such a time that the proper air
pollution device is installed and operational." The lower court then set aside the order which granted a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction and dissolved the writ issued.
WON the Mayor validly issued the closure order?
Held: YES
The following circumstances militate against the maintenance of the writ of preliminary injunction sought
by petitioner:
1. No mayor's permit had been secured. The mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its
inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to
operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or
avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the emissions in the operation of the
business.
2. The Acting Mayor called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant
whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the residents in the
area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders.
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong,
Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through channels.
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made by Marivic
Guina who in her report observed that the fumes emitted by the plant goes directly to the surrounding
houses and that no proper air pollution device has been installed.
5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta. Maria, but instead presented
a building permit issued by an official of Makati on March 6, 1987.
6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National Pollution
Control Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May 25, 1988. Petitioner had
not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution
and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community.
Court takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in this dollar-earning industry. It
must be stressed however, that concomitant with the need to promote investment and contribute to the
growth of the economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the
people, from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.

Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA

Issue:
Which agency of the Government - the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the
region - should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of
permits for fishery privileges is concerned?
Held:
LLDA
Section 4 (k) of RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813, and Section 2 of EO 927, specifically provide that the
LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use or all surface water for any projects or
activities in or affecting the said region, including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish
enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the
exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant
fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a
definite zone of the municipal waters.
The provisions of RA7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter
water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly
repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the
legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear
and expressed.
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since
it evinces the legislative intent more clearly that the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an
exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are enviromental protection,
navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication that the legislative intent is for
the Authority to proceed with its mission.

There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the
Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper sharing of fees collected.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, Republic Act No.
4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of
fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to
exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.
D.

Power of Eminent Domain

Rule 67 Expropriation, Rules of Court


Section 1. The complaint. The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a verified
complaint which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of expropriation, describe the real or
personal property sought to be expropriated, and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own,
or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the separate interest of each
defendant. If the title to any property sought to be expropriated appears to be in the Republic of the
Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that
the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners, averment to that effect shall
be made in the complaint. (1a)
Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized government depositary. Upon the filing of
the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right

to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized
government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation
to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu
thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of
the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government depositary.
If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally ascertained and the amount to be deposited
shall be promptly fixed by the court.
After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place the
plaintiff in possession of the property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with
service of copies to the parties. (2a)
Sec. 3. Defenses and objections. If a defendant has no objection or defense to the action or the taking of his
property, he may file and serve a notice of appearance and a manifestation to that effect, specifically
designating or identifying the property in which he claims to be interested, within the time stated in the
summons. Thereafter, he shall be entitled to notice of all proceedings affecting the same.
If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or any objection or
defense to the taking of his property, he shall serve his answer within the time stated in the summons. The
answer shall specifically designate or identify the property in which he claims to have an interest, state the
nature and extent of the interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the taking of his
property. No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be alleged or allowed in the answer or
any subsequent pleading.
A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but the court, in the interest of justice, may
permit amendments to the answer to be made not later than ten (10) days from the filing thereof. However,
at the trial of the issue of just compensation, whether or not a defendant has previously appeared or
answered, he may present evidence as to the amount of the compensation to be paid for his property, and he
may share in the distribution of the award. (n)
Sec. 4. Order of expropriation. If the objections to and the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to
expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the
court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property
sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of
just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,
whichever came first.
A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any party aggrieved
thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be
paid.
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the
proceeding except on such terms as the court deems just and equitable. (4a)
Sec. 5. Ascertainment of compensation. Upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall
appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and
report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall
designate the time and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify
the time within which their report shall be submitted to the court.
Copies of the order shall be served on the parties. Objections to the appointment of any of the
commissioners shall be filed with the court within ten (10) days from service, and shall be resolved within
thirty (30) days after all the commissioners shall have received copies of the objections. (5a)

Sec. 6. Proceedings by commissioners. Before entering upon the performance of their duties, the
commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform their duties as
commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with the other proceedings in the case. Evidence may be
introduced by either party before the commissioners who are authorized to administer oaths on hearings
before them, and the commissioners shall, unless the parties consent to the contrary, after due notice to the
parties to attend, view and examine the property sought to be expropriated and its surroundings, and may
measure the same, after which either party may, by himself or counsel, argue the case. The commissioners
shall assess the consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such consequential
damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from the public use or purpose of the
property taken, the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the business of the
corporation or person taking the property. But in no case shall the consequential benefits assessed exceed
the consequential damages assessed, or the owner be deprived of the actual value of his property so taken.
(6a)
Sec. 7. Report by commissioners and judgment thereupon. The court may order the commissioners to report
when any particular portion of the real estate shall have been passed upon by them, and may render
judgment upon such partial report, and direct the commissioners to proceed with their work as to
subsequent portions of the property sought to be expropriated, and may from time to time so deal with such
property. The commissioners shall make a full and accurate report to the court of all their proceedings, and
such proceedings shall not be effectual until the court shall have accepted their report and rendered
judgment in accordance with their recommendations. Except as otherwise expressly ordered by the court,
such report shall be filed within sixty (60) days from the date the commissioners were notified of their
appointment, which time may be extended in the discretion of the court. Upon the filing of such report, the
clerk of the court shall serve copies thereof on all interested parties, with notice that they are allowed ten
(10) days within which to file objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire. (7a)
Sec. 8. Action upon commissioners report. Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in
the preceding section, or even before the expiration of such period but after all the interested parties have
filed their objections to the report or their statement of agreement therewith, the court may, after hearing,
accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause shown, it may recommit the
same to the commissioners for further report of facts; or it may set aside the report and appoint new
commissioners; or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order or render
such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of
expropriation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property so taken. (8a)
Sec. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there
are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation
for the property to be paid to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the same proceeding to be
entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the
defendant or the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or
purpose if entry has already been made. (9a)
Sec. 10. Rights of plaintiff after judgment and payment. Upon payment by the plaintiff to the defendant of
the compensation fixed by the judgment, with legal interest thereon from the taking of the possession of the
property, or after tender to him of the amount so fixed and payment of the costs, the plaintiff shall have the
right to enter upon the property expropriated and to appropriate it for the public use or purpose defined in
the judgment, or to retain it should he have taken immediate possession thereof under the provisions of
section 2 hereof. If the defendant and his counsel absent themselves from the court, or decline to receive the
amount tendered, the same shall be ordered to be deposited in court and such deposit shall have the same
effect as actual payment thereof to the defendant or the person ultimately adjudged entitled thereto. (10a)
Sec. 11. Entry not delayed by appeal; effect of reversal. The right of the plaintiff to enter upon the property
of the defendant and appropriate the same for public use or purpose shall not be delayed by an appeal from
the judgment. But if the appellate court determines that plaintiff has no right of expropriation, judgment

shall be rendered ordering the Regional Trial Court to forthwith enforce the restoration to the defendant of
the possession of the property, and to determine the damages which the defendant sustained and may
recover by reason of the possession taken by the plaintiff. (11a)
Sec. 12. Costs, by whom paid. The fees of the commissioners shall be taxed as a part of the costs of the
proceedings. All costs, except those of rival claimants litigating their claims, shall be paid by the plaintiff,
unless an appeal is taken by the owner of the property and the judgment is affirmed, in which event the
costs of the appeal shall be paid by the owner. (12a)
Sec. 13. Recording judgment, and its effect. The judgment entered in expropriation proceedings shall state
definitely, by an adequate description, the particular property or interest therein expropriated, and the nature
of the public use or purpose for which it is expropriated. When real estate is expropriated, a certified copy
of such judgment shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the property is situated,
and its effect shall be to vest in the plaintiff the title to the real estate so described for such public use or
purpose. (13a)
Sec. 14. Power of guardian in such proceedings. The guardian or guardian ad litem of a minor or of a person
judicially declared to be incompetent may, with the approval of the court first had, do and perform on
behalf of his ward any act, matter, or thing respecting the expropriation for public use or purpose of
property belonging to such minor or person judicially declared to be incompetent, which such minor or
person judicially declared to be incompetent could do in such proceedings if he were of age or competent.
(14a)

Sec 19, LGC


Sec. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant
to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefits
of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be
exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not
accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the
property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court
of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration
of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated
property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of
the property.

Moday v. CA
The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing its municpal
mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings against he property of Percival Moday for a farmers center and
government sports facilities. The resolution was approved by the mayor and transmitted to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan for approval. The latter disapproved it and returned it with comment to the Municipality
stating that expropriation was unnecessary because there are still available lots in Bunawan for the purpose.
The municipality filed a motion to take possession of the land and this was granted by the RTC.
The petitioner attacks the validity of the resolution because it was not approved by the province.
WON a municipalitys resolution authorizing its mayor to expropriate was rendered invalid by its
disapproval by the province
Held: No.
The law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to

declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang
Bayan or the Mayor to issue.
Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution for the
Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its
Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution. The resolution is, therefore, valid and
binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners' property.

Province of Camarines Sur v. CA


The Province of Camarines Sur authorized its governor by resolution to expropriate a piece of land
contiguous to the provincial capitol site in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional
agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees.
The governor filed expropriation cases in the RTC and then filed motions for the issuance of writs of
possessions.
The owners, San Joaquins, moved to dismiss the complaints for inadequacy of the price offered for the
property.
The RTC granted the writs of possession. The San Joaquins appealed to the CA which set aside the order
allowing CamSur to take possession. It ordered the RTC to suspend further proceedings until after CamSur
shall have obtained the requisite approval of the Dept. of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of
the land from agricultural to non-agricultural.
WON a local government unit needs the approval of the DAR to reclassify land before it can expropriate it
Held: No.
A reading of previous jurisprudence shows that the power of eminent domain is superior to the power to
distribute lands under the land reform program.
The local government units power of expropriation is a delegated power. In delegating the power, the
legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local
governments. While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits.
Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the law
conferring the power or in other legislations.
The Local Government Code does not intimate in the least that local government units must first secure the
approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to nonagricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no
provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of
agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform.
Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or
constricted by implication.
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate
agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first
applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of
these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department
of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use of
the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy.

There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how broad their terms are, do not embrace
the sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto.
The orders of the CA nullifying the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of private respondents' property and requiring the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents' property from
agricultural to non-agricultural use are set aside.

Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor


Barangay San Roque filed an expropriation suit with the Municipal Trial Court against the properties of the
respondents. It was dismissed by the MTC for lack of jurisdiction. The lower court reasoned that an action
for eminent domain is incapable of pecuniary estimation and jurisdiction should, therefore, lie with the
RTC.
The case was then filed with the RTC but it was again dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC was of
the view that an action for eminent domain involved title to real property and the value of said property is
determinative of jurisdiction. And the property involved in this case is P1,740 or less than P20,000.
Therefore, it ruled, jurisdiction is with the MTC.
Which court has jurisdiction over actions for eminent domain?
Held: RTC.
Actions for eminent domain are incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus jurisdiction properly lies with
the RTC.
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation,
the criterion is of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for
the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the
money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, such actions are cases
where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively
by RTC.
The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class of cases, besides the determination of damages,
demands an inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be more within the competence of RTC.
Actions for eminent domain involve two phases.
The first is concerned with the determination of

the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain


and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit.

It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken.

This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the
just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final,
too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court
regarding the issue.
It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or
any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the
courts determine:

the authority of the government entity,


the necessity of the expropriation,
and the observance of due process.

In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the governments exercise of eminent domain, a matter
that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is dutybound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation
suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the
expropriation.

Municipality of Paranaque v. VM Realty Corp


The Municipality of Paranaque filed a complaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation over
two parcels of land for the purpose of providing socialized housing. It authorized its mayor to file the
complaint by a resolution.
Later, the Municipality passed an Ordinance for the same purpose. It is claimed that by res judicata, the
municipality is barred from filing another expropriation proceeding.
WON authorization by a resolution is sufficient for compliance with the requisites under the LGC
Held: No.
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the
exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the
power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter's control
and restraints, imposed "through the law conferring the power or in other legislations." And Section 19 of
the LGC requires authorization by ordinance.
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent
domain:
1.

2.
3.
4.

An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
benefit of the poor and the landless.
There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought
to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

The terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are not synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a
resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a

lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a
resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently. A third reading is necessary
for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian
members.
WON res judicata may apply
HELD: All the requisites for the application of res judicata are present in this case. Be that as it may, the
principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings, cannot bar the right
of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent
power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior
judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police power, can "reach every
form of property which the State might need for public use." "All separate interests of individuals in
property are held of the government under this tacit agreement or implied reservation. Notwithstanding the
grant to individuals, the eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea of property, remains in the
government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity; and they have the right to
resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest requires it." 47 Thus, the State or its
authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by reason alone of previous noncompliance with any legal requirement.
Our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power of eminent domain through a mere resolution
will not bar it from reinstituting similar proceedings, once the said legal requirement and, for that matter, all
others are properly complied with.
However, while the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent
domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case.

City of Cebu v. CA
The City of Cebu authorized its mayor by both resolution and city ordinance to expropriate the property of
Merlita Cardeno. Cardeno filed a motion to dismiss asseverating that the allegations in the Citys complaint
do no show compliance with the condition precedent of a valid and definite offer. The allegation states,
that repeated negotiations had been made with the defendant to have the aforementioned property
purchased by the plaintiff through negotiated sale without resorting to expropriation, but said negotiations
failed.
She argues that, by definition, negotiations run the whole range of acts preparatory to concluding an
agreement, from the preliminary correspondence; the fixing of the terms of the agreement; the price; the
mode of payment; obligations of the parties may conceive as necessary to their agreement." Thus,
"negotiations" by itself may pertain to any of the foregoing and does not automatically mean the making of
"a valid and definite offer."
WON the City has complied with the condition precedent of a valid and definite offer
Held: Yes.
1.
2.

The ambiguity in the complaint is not a ground for a motion to dismiss but rather a bill of
particulars.
The RTC and CA should not have strictly applied the rule that in a motion to dismiss, no
evidence may be allowed and the issue should only be determined in the light of allegations
of the complaint. Jurisprudence has established exceptions to this rule. This case should
similarly be treated with liberality. Here an examination of the Citys Comment and
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss leave no room for doubt that petitioner had indeed
made a valid and definite offer.

3.

Also, attached to the complaint and made an integral part of it is the Ordinance authorizing
the Mayor to expropriate the property. The rule is that a motion to dismiss hypothetically
admits the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. And the Ordinance staes that the city
government has made valid and definite offer.

(The court did not decide whether or not negotiations is compliance with the requirement.)

Francia v. Municipality of Meycauyan


The Municipality of Meycauayan filed a complaint for expropriation against the petitioners to obtain
property located at a highway junction to be used as a public terminal. The Municipality deposited the
fifteen percent of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration and the RTC
granted it the writ of possession.
The petitioner claims that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ without first
conducting a hearing to determine the existence of a public purpose.
WON determination of public purpose is a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession
Held: No.
The Local Government Code states that local government unit may immediately take possession of the
property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court
of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration
of the property to be expropriated.
The requisites before a local government unit may enter into the possession of the property are only that (1)
a complaint for expropriation must have been filed sufficient in form and substance in the proper court and
(2) a deposit of 15% of the propertys fair market value based on its current tax declaration must have been
made.
The law does not make the determination of a public purpose a condition precedent to the issuance of a writ
of possession.

Heirs of Ardona v. Reyes


The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the CFI Cebu City for the expropriation of some
282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City for the development into
integrated sport complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism value. The
defendants (now petitioners) have the common allegation that the taking is not impressed with public use
under the Constitution, that there is no specific provision authorizing the taking for tourism purposes. Also,
they are claiming that the lands are under the land reform program thus it is the Court of Agrarian Relations
and not the CFI that has jurisdiction. The Court issued writs of possession authorizing the PTA to take
immediate possession upon deposit with the Philippine National Bank an amount equivalent to 10% of the
value of the properties.
HELD: Expropriation is valid.
The States power of eminent domain extends to the expropriation of land for tourism purposes although
this specific objective is not expressed in the Constitution. The policy objectives of the framers can be
expressed only in general terms. The programs to achieve these objectives vary from time to time and
according to place. The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes; it does not strictly mean
use by the public. Expropriation of several barangays for provocation of tourism and construction of sports
and hotel complex constitutes expropriation for public use. Also, the government is authorized to take
immediate possession, control and disposition of the property notwithstanding the issues pending in court
upon deposit with the PNB of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the property.

Defendants (now petitioners) failed to show that area being expropriated is land reform area. In fact, only
8,970 square meters (less than 1hec.-just 2 property owners) of 283 hectares is part of the Operation Land
Transfer. This 8,970 sq. m. is not even within the sports complex proper but forms part of the 32 hectares
resettlement area where the petitioners would be provided with proper housing, schools, etc.

Filstream International Inc. v. CA


Filstream is the property owner of parcels of lands located in Antonio Rivera St., Tondo II Manila. It filed
an ejectment suit against the occupants (private respondents) on the grounds of termination of lease and
non-payment of rentals. The ejectment suit became final and executory after the CA affirmed the decision
of the RTC.
During the pendency of the ejectment proceedings private respondents filed a complaint for Annulment of
Deed of Exchange against Filstream. The City of Manila came into the picture when it approved Ordinance
No. 7813 authorizing Mayor Alfredo Lim to initiate acquisition through legal means of certain parcels of
land. Subsequently, the City of Manila approved Ordinance No. 7855 declaring the expropriation of certain
parcels of land situated along Antonio River which formed part of the properties of Filstream. The said
properties were sold and distributed to qualified tenants pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of
the City of Manila. The City of Manila then filed a complaint for eminent domain seeking to expropriate
lands in Antonio Rivera St. the Court issued a Writ of Possession. Filstream is claiming that Ordinance No.
7813 is a void enactment for it was approved without a public hearing and violative of the constitutional
guarantee against impairment of obligations and contracts, the price was too low.
HELD: Expropriation is not valid.
The City of Manila did not comply with RA 7279, Secs. 9 and 10. The City of Manila has the power to
expropriate private property in the pursuit of its urban land reform and housing program which must be
done pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws. There are limitations with respect to
the order of priority in acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation proceedings as a means to
acquire the same. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the
same vein, expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have
been exhausted.
Also, Petitioner takes exception to the resolutions of respondent CA which ordered the dismissal of its
Petition for Certiorari for non-compliance with Sec 2(a) of Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the CA
by failing to attach to its petition other pertinent documents and papers and for attaching copies of pleadings
which are blurred and unreadable. Petitioner argues that the respondent court erred in giving more premium
to form rather than substance. A strict adherence to the technical and procedural rules in this case would
defeat rather than meet the ends of justice as it would result in the violation of the substantial rights of the
petitioner. At stake in the appeal is the exercise of their properties rights over the disputed premises which
have been expropriated and have in fact been ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila. In effect,
the dismissal of their appeal in the expropriation proceedings based on those grounds is tantamount to a
deprivation of property without due process of law as it would automatically validate the expropriation
proceedings

Hagonoy Market Vendors Association v. Mun of Hagonoy Bulacan


On Oct. 1, 1996, the Sanguniang Bayan of Hagonoy, Bulacan enacted an ordinance, Kautusan Blg. 28
which increased the stall rentals of market vendors in Hagonoy. Art.3 provided that it shall take effect upon
approval. The subject ordinance was posted from Nov. 4-25, 1996. In the last week of Nov. 1997, the
petitioners members were personally given copies of the approved Ordinance and were informed that it
shall be enforced in Jan. 1998. On Dec. 8, 1997, the petitioners President filed an appeal with the Secretary
of Justice assailing the constitutionality of the tax ordinance.

Petitioner claimed it was unaware of the posting of the ordinance. Respondent opposed the appeal. It
contended that the ordinance took effect on October 6, 1996 and that the ordinance, as approved, was
posted as required by law. Hence, it was pointed out that petitioners appeal, made over a year later, was
already time-barred.
The Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time beyond the 30
days from the effectivity of the Ordinance on Oct. 1, 1996 as prescribed under Sec.187 of the 1991 LGC.
After its motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner appealed to the CA, claiming the Sec. erred and
should have overlooked the technicality and ruled on its petition on the merits. CA dismissed its petition for
being formally deficient as it was not accompanied by certified true copies of the assailed Resolutions of the
Sec. of Justice.
HELD: Ordinance is valid & petition should be dismissed for being time-barred.
The petitioner insists that it had good reasons for its failure to comply with the rule and the CA erred in
refusing to accept its explanation. This Court agrees with the petitioner. It is clear from the records that the
petitioner exerted due diligence to get the copies of its appealed Resolution certified by the Dept. of Justice
but failed to do so on account of typhoon Loleng. Nonetheless, the Court held that the petition should be
dismissed as the appeal of the petitioner with the Sec. of Justice was already time-barred. Sec. 187 of the
1991 LGC states that an appeal of a tax ordinance or revenue measure should be made to the Sec. of Justice
within 30 days from the effectivity of the assailed ordinance shall not be suspended. In the case at bar, Mun.
Ord, No. 28 took effect in Oct. 1996. Petitioner filed its appeal only in Dec. 1997. The periods stated in Sec.
187 LGC are mandatory. Being a revenue measure, the collection of which is of paramount importance thus
it is essential that the validity of revenue measures is not left uncertain for a considerable length of time.
Petitioners cannot gripe that there was practically no public hearing conducted as its objections to the
proposed measure were not considered by the Sanguniang Bayan. Public hearings are conducted by
legislative bodies to allow interested parties to ventilate their views on a proposed law or ordinance.
However, the views are not binding on the legislative body and it is not compelled by law to adopt the
same.
Also, even on the substantive points raised, the petition must fail. Sec. 6c.04 of the 1993 Mun. Rev. Code &
Sec 191 of the LGC limiting the percentage of increase that can be imposed apply to tax rates, not rentals.
Neither can it be said that the rates were not uniformly imposed. The ordinance covered 3 public markets.
However, it excluded Bagong Munisipyo from the increase since it is only a makeshift, dilapidated place
intended for transient peddlers.

RP v. CA
Notes:
Lot to be expropriated for the broadcast operation and use of VP. Deposited amount provisionally fixed. 9
years after Court ordered condemnation and payment of just compensation.
NG failed to pay.
Santos (1) pay current zonal value or (2) return expropriated property
HELD: no right to recover
On Sept. 19, 1969, petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings before RTC Bulacan covering a total of
554,980 sq.m. of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway to be utilized for the continued
broadcast operation and use of radio trasnsmitter facilities for the Voice of the Philippines project.
Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of the
property. On Feb. 26, 1979 or nine years after the institution of the expropriation proceedings, the trial

courts issued an order condemning the properties of the defendants and ordering the plaintiff to pay the
defendants just compensation. It would appear that the National Government failed to pay the respondents
the just compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision. The respondents then filed a manifestation with a
motion seeking payment for the expropriated property. In response, the court issued a writ of execution for
the implementation thereof. Meanwhile, Pres. Estrada issued Proc. No. 22 transferring 20 hec. of the
expropriated land to the Bulacan State University. Despite the courts order, the Santos heirs remained
unpaid and no action was on their case until petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the
deposit in court of the amount P4,664,000 by way of just compensation. The Santos heirs submitted a
counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6/sq.m. as previously fixed to its current zonal value of
P5,000/sq.m. or to cause the return of the expropriated property. The RTC Bulacan ruled in favor of the
Santos heirs declaring its previous decision to be unenforceable on the ground of prescription in accordance
with Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the 1964/1997 ROC which states that a final and executory judgment or order may
be executed on motion within 5 years from the date of its entry.
HELD: Expropriation is valid; private respondents have no right to recover the property. The right of
eminent domain is the ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial
sovereignty for a public purpose. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial for the condemning
authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the
condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property and the
defendant asserts title/ interest in the property not to prove a right of possession but to prove a right to
compensation for the taking. Petitioner has occupied and has exercised dominion over the property pursuant
to the judgment. The exercise of such rights vested to it as the condemnee has amounted to atleast a partial
compliance of the 1979 decision thereby preempting any claim of bar by prescription on grounds of nonexecution.
In determining the public use, 2 approaches are used actual use by the public and public benefit/
advantage. Respondents question the public nature of the utilization since its present use differs from the
original use contemplated in the 1979 decision. This is of no moment, the property has assumed a public
character upon its expropriation. Petitioner is well within its rights to alter and decide the use of that
property.
The constitutional limitation of the just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market
value of the property fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. However, between the actual
taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests may accrue in order to place the owner in a
position as good as but not better than the position he was in before the taking occurred.
E.

Reclassification of Lands

CARP Act
See attachments

Sec 9 and 11, RA 8435


SECTION 9. Delineation of Strategic Agriculture and Fisheries Development Zones. - The Department, in
consultation with the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Department of Trade and Industry, the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Department of Science and Technology, the concerned
LGUs, the organized farmers and fisherfolk groups, the private sector and communities shall, without
prejudice to the development of identified economic zones and free ports, establish and delineate, based on
sound resource accounting, the SAFDZ within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act.
All irrigated lands, irrigable lands already covered by irrigation projects with firm funding commitments,
and lands with existing or having the potential for growing high-value crops so delineated and included
within the SAFDZ shall not be converted for a period of five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act:

Provided, however, That not more than five percent (5%) of the said lands located within the SAFDZ may
be converted upon compliance with existing laws, rules, regulations, executive orders and issuances, and
administrative orders relating to land use conversion: Provided, further, That thereafter: 1) a review of the
SAFDZ, specifically on the productivity of the areas, improvement of the quality of life of farmers and
fisherfolk, and efficiency and effectiveness of the support services shall be conducted by the Department
and the Department of Agrarian Reform, in coordination with the Congressional Oversight Committee on
Agricultural and Fisheries Modernization; 2) conversion may be allowed; if at all, on a case-to-case basis
subject to existing laws, rules, regulations, executive orders and issuances, and administrative orders
governing land use conversion; and, 3) in case of conversion, the land owner will pay the Department the
amount equivalent to the government's investment cost including inflation.
SECTION 10. Preparation of Land Use and Zoning Ordinance. - Within one (1) year from the finalization
of the SAFDZ, in every city and municipality, all cities and municipalities shall have prepared their
respective land use and zoning ordinance incorporating the SAFDZ, where applicable. Thereafter, all land
use plans and zoning ordinances shall be updated every four (4) years or as often as may be deemed
necessary upon the recommendation of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and must be
completed within the first year of the term of the mayor. If the cities/municipalities fail to comply with the
preparation of zoning and land use plans, the DILG shall impose the penalty as provided for under Republic
Act No. 7160.
SECTION 11. Penalty for Agricultural Inactivity and Premature Conversion. - Any person or juridical
entity who knowingly or deliberately causes any irrigated agricultural lands seven (7) hectares or larger,
whether contiguous or not, within the protected areas for agricultural development, as specified under
Section 6 in relation to Section 9 of this Act, to lie idle and unproductive for a period exceeding one (1)
year, unless due to force majeure, shall be subject to an idle land tax of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00)
per hectare per year. In addition, the violator shall be required to put back such lands to productive
agricultural use. Should the continued agricultural inactivity, unless due to force majeure, exceed a period
of two (2) years, the land shall be subject to escheat proceedings.
Any person found guilty of premature or illegal conversion shall be penalized with imprisonment of two (2)
to six (6) years, or a fine equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the government's investment cost, or
both, at the discretion of the court, and an accessory penalty of forfeiture of the land and any improvement
thereon.
In addition, the DAR may impose the following penalties, after determining, in an administrative
proceedings, that violation of this law has been committed:
a) Cancellation or withdrawal of the authorization for land use conversion; and
b) Blacklisting, or automatic disapproval of pending and subsequent conversion applications that they may
file with the DAR.

Fortich v. Corono
This concerns the motion for reconsideration of the courts resolution dated Nov. 17, 1998 and motion to
refer the case to the Court en banc. In the previous case, the Court voted 2-2 on the separate MRs, as a
result of which the decision was affirmed. The Court noted in a resolution dated Jan. 27, 1999 that the
movants have no legal personality to seek redress before the Court as their motion to intervene was already
denied and that the motion to refer the case to the Court en banc is akin to a second MR which is prohibited.
In this motion, both respondents and intervenors prayed the case be referred to the court en banc inasmuch
as their earlier MR was resolved by a vote of 2-2, the required number to carry a decision under the
Constitution, 3votes, was not met.

HELD: The issues presented before the Court by the movants are matters of no extraordinary import to
merit the attention of the Court en banc. Specifically the issue of whether or not the power of the local
government units to reclassify lands is subject to the approval of DAR is no longer novel, this having been
decided in Province of Camarines Sur v. CA wherein the Court held that local government units need not
obtain approval of the DAR to convert lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
Intervenors insist that they are the real parties in interest inasmuch as they have already been issued
certificates of land ownership award and that while they are seasonal farmers, they have been identified by
DAR as qualified beneficiaries of property. The issuance of CLOA to them does not grant them the
requisite standing in view of the nullity of the Win-Win Resolution. No legal rights can emanate from a
resolution that is null and void. The same is void and has no legal effect considering that the March 29,
1996 decision of the Office of the President had already become final and executory even prior to the filing
of the MR which became the basis of the said Win-Win Resolution.

Roxas and Co v. IAC


Pres. Cory promulgated Proc. No. 131 instituting CARP and EO No. 229 providing for mechanisms
necessary to implement CARP. Later when Congress formally convened, it passed RA 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Petitioner Roxas is the property owner of Haciendas Palico, Banilad
and Caylaway. Before CARL took effect, petitioner voluntarily offered to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant
to EO 229. The other two were placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance
with CARL.
Petitioner instituted a case with DAR Adjudication Bd. To cancel the CLOAs issued alleging that the place
where the haciendas are located was declared a tourist zone and that the land is not suitable for agricultural
production. DARAB held that the case involved the prejudicial question of whether the property was
subject to agrarian reform and should be submitted to the Office of the Sec. of Agrarian Reform. Petitioner
then filed a case with the CA questioning the expropriation of the properties under CARL and the denial of
due process in the acquisition of the land. CA dismissed the petition on the ground of failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
HELD: This Court can take cognizance of petitioners petition despite his failure to exhaust administrative
remedies since his action falls under the exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies since there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. The CLOAs to the farmers were issued without just
compensation to the petitioner. The transfer of possession/ ownership to the government is conditioned
upon the receipt of the landowner of the corresponding payment/ deposit by the DAR. Until then, the title
should remain with the landowner. The law provides that the deposit must be made only in cash or LBP
bonds. Resp. DARs opening of a trust account deposit in petitioners name with the Land Bank of the Phil.
does not constitute payment under the law.
The acquisition proceedings over the 3 haciendas are invalid. (1) There was improper service of Notice of
Acquisition Sec. 16 of CARL requires that the said notice be sent to the landowner by personal delivery
or registered mail. The Revised Rules of Proc. of DARAB states that notices and pleadings are served on
private corporations through its president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors or
partners. Jaime Pimentel to whom the Notice was served was neither of those. (2) Parcels of land were not
properly identified before they were taken by DAR under the law, a landowner may retain not more than
5 hec. the right to choose the retained land pertains to the landowner. Upon the receipt of Notice of
Acquisition, petitioner corporation had no idea which portions of its estate were subject to compulsory
acquisition.
Court has no jurisdiction to rule on the reclassification of land from agricultural to non-agricultural. DARs
failure to observe due process does not ipso facto give the Court the power to adjudicate over petitioners
application for conversion of its haciendas from agricultural to non. The agency charged with the mandate
of approving applications for conversion is DAR.

F.

Closure and Opening of Roads

Sec 21, LGC


Sec. 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. (a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance,
permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction:
Provided, however, That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be approved by at least twothirds (2/3) of all the members of the sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the public
facility that is subject to closure is provided.
(b) No such way or place or any part thereof shall be permanently closed without making provisions for
the maintenance of public safety therein. A property thus permanently withdrawn from public use may be
used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local government unit
concerned may be lawfully used or conveyed: Provided, however, That no freedom park shall be closed
permanently without provision for its transfer or relocation to a new site.
(c) Any national or local road, alley, park, or square may be temporarily closed during an actual
emergency, or fiesta celebrations, public rallies, agricultural or industrial fairs, or an undertaking of public
works and highways, telecommunications, and waterworks projects, the duration of which shall be specified
by the local chief executive concerned in a written order: Provided, however, That no national or local road,
alley, park, or square shall be temporarily closed for athletic, cultural, or civic activities not officially
sponsored, recognized, or approved by the local government unit concerned.
(d) Any city, municipality, or barangay may, by a duly enacted ordinance, temporarily close and regulate
the use of any local street, road, thoroughfare, or any other public place where shopping malls, Sunday, flea
or night markets, or shopping areas may be established and where goods, merchandise, foodstuffs,
commodities, or articles of commerce may be sold and dispensed to the general public.

Cabrera v. CA
The Provincial Board of Catanduanes adopted Resolution No. 158 which provided for the closure of an old
road leading to the new Capitol Bldng. and giving the owners of the properties traversed by the new road
equal area from the old road adjacent to the respective remaining portion of their property. Pursuant thereto,
Deeds of Exchange were executed under which the Province of Catanduanes conveyed to the private
respondents portions of the closed road.
In 1978, part of the northern end of the old road fronting the petitioners house was planted with vegetables
by one of the private respondents. Another private respondent converted a part of the old road into a piggery
farm. Learning about Res. 158, petitioner filed a complaint for Restoration of Public Road and/or
Abatement of Nuisance, Annulment of Resolutions and Documents for Damages. Petitioner alleges that the
land fronting his house was a public road owned by the Province of Catanduanes in its governmental
function and therefore beyond the commerce of man. He contends that Res. No. 158 and the deeds of
exchange were invalid as so too was the closure of the northern portion of the said road.
HELD: Closure is valid.
The closure of a provincial road is within the powers of the Provincial Bd. It is the authority competent to
determine whether or not a certain property is still necessary to public use. Such power to vacate a street is
discretionary and such will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts absent a plain case
of abuse or fraud. The Board has the duty of maintaining such roads for the comfort and convenience of the
inhabitants of the province. This authority is inferable from the grant by the national legislature of the funds
to the Province for the construction of roads.
Petitioner is not entitled to damages. The general rule is that one whose property does not abut on the
closed section of a street has no right of compensation for the closing or vacation of the street. To warrant

recovery, the property owner must show that the situation is such that he has sustained special damages
differing in kind and not merely in degree from those sustained by the public generally. The construction of
the new road was undertaken under the general welfare clause. Whatever inconvenience petitioner suffered
pales in significance to the greater convenience the new road has been giving the public.

MMDA v. Bel Air Village Association Inc.


MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila, while BAVA is
a non-stock non-profit corporation whose members are home owners in Bel-Air Village, a private
subdivision in Makati City. BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
On 26 Dec 1995 BAVA received from MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta a notice requesting it to open
Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting 2 Jan 1996. BAVA was also informed that the perimeter
wall separating the subdivision from adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. On 2 Jan 1996,
BAVA instituted a petition before the RTC Makati City Br 136 for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary
injunction enjoining the opening of said street and the demolition of the wall. The TRO was issued the
following day. But on 23 Jan 1996, after due hearing, it denied the preliminary injunction. BAVA appealed.
CA conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune Street and on 13 Feb 1996 it issued a writ of preliminary
injunction. It later on granted the petition (making the writ permanent), reasoning that MMDA had no
authority to order the opening of a private subdivision road nor to demolish the subdivisions perimeter
wall. MR was denied.
WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic without an ordinance enacted by
Makati City
HELD: No
MMDA is not a local government which is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted
by law and has substantial control of local affairs. MMDAs charter RA 7924 limited MMDAs function to
the delivery of seven basic services, one of which is transport and traffic management. It is limited to the
following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in RA 7924
that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. All its functions are administrative in
nature. MMDA is not the same entity as its predecessor, the Metro Manila Commission because the charter
of MMC (PD 824) shows that MMC possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on MMDA.
Unlike MMC, MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the LGUs,
acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative and police power. In this case,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening
of Neptune Street; hence, its proposed opening by MMDA is illegal.

Sangalang v. IAC
Buyers of lots in Bel-Air Village, owned and operated by Makati Development Corporation (later on
merged with Ayala Corporation) were required to comply with certain deed restrictions, one of which is that
the lots shall be used only for residential purposes. On 4 Apr 1975 the municipal council of Makati enacted
Ordinance 81 (zonification of Makati), wherein Bel-Air Village was classified as a Class A Residential
Zone, with its boundary extending to the center line of Jupiter Street. A subsequent Ordinance 81-01 of the
Metro Manila Commission however showed that Bel-Air Village was simply bound by Jupiter Street, and
the area on the other side was classified as a High Intensity Commercial Zone. Due to the reclassification,
commercial establishments appeared along Jupiter Street, in violation of the deed restrictions. The Office of
the Mayor of Makati wrote the Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA), directing that, in the interest of
public welfare, certain streets should be opened to ease traffic congestion. The Makati municipal officials
allegedly opened, destroyed and removed the gates forcibly, and opened the entire length of Jupiter Street to
public traffic. Ayala Corporation donated the entire Jupiter Street to BAVA, but even before 1978 the
Makati Police and the security force of BAVA were already the ones regulating the traffic along Jupiter
Street after the gates were opened in 1977. Residents of Jupiter Street (the Sangalang spouses, Gaston

spouses, and Briones spouses) and the Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) filed separate actions
against Ayala Corporation and the lot owners who allowed their lots to be used for commercial purposes.
Three of the five trial courts in the five petitions ruled in favor of the petitioners, while two were dismissed
on procedural and substantive grounds. On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed all five petitions, on the
ground that the ordinances, both being valid as a legitimate exercise of police power, allowed the use of
Jupiter Street for commercial purposes.
WON there was a violation of the deed restrictions
HELD: No
There was no violation of the deed restrictions as Jupiter Street, which was the common boundary for the
commercial and residential zones, was never exclusively for residential or commercial purposes only. This
is confirmed by the fact that both ordinances as well as the BAVA Articles of Incorporation treat Jupiter
Street as the boundary line making it clear that Jupiter Street was intended for use by both commercial
and residential blocks from the very beginning.
WON the MMC Ordinance, raised by Ayala Corporation as an affirmative defense, was a legitimate
exercise of police power
HELD: Yes
The National Government itself, through the MMC, had reclassified Jupiter Street into a high density
commercial zone pursuant to its Ordinance 81-01. Hence, the petitioners have no cause of action on the
strength alone of the deed restrictions. This is not to say that restrictive easements are invalid or ineffective.
As far as Bel-Air Village is concerned, they are valid and enforceable. But they are, like all contracts,
subject to the overriding demands, needs, and interests of the greater number as the State may determine in
the legitimate exercise of police power. The sanctity of contract cannot be raised as a deterrent to police
power, which is designed precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the common good, at the
expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary. Absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness
on the part of MMC, the ordinance reclassifying Jupiter Street should be upheld.

Macasiano v. Diokno
On 13 Jun 1990, the Municipality of Paraaque passed Ordinance 86 (Series of 1990) which authorized the
closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt Garcia Extension and Opena Streets in Baclaran and the
establishment of a flea market thereon. This ordinance was approved by the municipal council pursuant to
the Metro Manila Commission Ordinance 2 (Series of 1979) authorizing and regulating the use of certain
city and/or municipal streets, roads and open spaces within Metro Manila as sites for flea market and/or
vending areas under certain terms and conditions. The municipal council on 20 Jun 1990 issued a resolution
authorizing Paraaque Mayor Walfrido Ferrer to enter into contract with any service cooperative for the
establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vending areas. On 8 Aug
1990, Palanyag Kilusang Bayan for Service (Palanyag), a service cooperative was made a flea market
operator subject to municipality dues for such operation. On 13 Sep 1990, Brig Gen Levy Macasiano (PNP
Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command) ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls
along G.G. Cruz and J Gabriel Streets. B/Gen Macasiano on 16 Oct 1990 gave notice to Palanyag that it had
10 days to discontinue the flea market; otherwise the market stalls would be dismantled. The Municipality
and Palanyag filed with RTC Makati Br 62 (Judge Roberto Diokno presiding) a petition for prohibition and
mandamus with damages and a prayer for preliminary injunction. RTC issued a TRO against Macasiano
pending the hearing, and later on upheld the validity of the ordinance.
WON an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of Paraaque authorizing the lease and use
of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid
HELD: No
Said streets which were closed off are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered

public properties of the municipality. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public
service are deemed public and under the absolute control of Congress. Local governments have no authority
to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.
Sec 10, Loc Gov Code (BP 337, which was the applicable law at the time)empowers the local governments
to close roads, but this provision should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already
established by law:
1. Art 424, CC: Properties of public dominion devoted to public use and made available to the public in
general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by the LGU to private
persons.
2. To withdraw a property from public use, the requirement of due process should be complied with, and
circumstances should show that the property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public
service. (When the property is withdrawn from public use, it becomes patrimonial property of the LGU.)
The Municipality has not shown that it has complied with the conditions precedent set by the Metropolitan
Manila Authority for the latter to approve of such ordinance. (Conditions are that the streets are not used
for vehicular traffic and that majority of the residents are not opposed to the establishment of a flea
market/vending area, and that there is a time schedule in during which the flea market would operate.)
Furthermore, the powers of a LGU should be subservient to paramount considerations of health and wellbeing of the members of the community. It is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran are congested
with people, houses and traffic brought about by the proliferation of vendors occupying the streets. Thus,
allowing the flea market would be contrary to the local governments sworn obligation to enact measures
that will enhance the public health and safety of the municipalitys inhabitants.
G. Corporate Powers
Sec. 22. Corporate Powers. (a) Every local government unit, as a corporation, shall have the following
powers:
(1) To have continuous succession in its corporate name;
(2) To sue and be sued;
(3) To have and use a corporate seal;
(4) To acquire and convey real or personal property;
(5) To enter into contracts; and
(6) To exercise such other powers as are granted to corporations, subject to the limitations provided in this
Code and other laws.
(b) Local government units may continue using, modify, or change their existing corporate seals:
Provided, That newly established local government units or those without corporate seals may create their
own corporate seals which shall be registered with the Department of the Interior and Local Government:
Provided, further, That any change of corporate seal shall also be registered as provided herein.
(c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be entered into by the local chief executive in
behalf of the local government unit without prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned. A legible
copy of such contract shall be posted at a conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the city, municipal
or barangay hall.

(d) Local government units shall enjoy full autonomy in the exercise of their proprietary functions and in
the management of their economic enterprises, subject to the limitations provided in this Code and other
applicable laws.
H. Liability for damages
Sec. 24. Liability for Damages. Local government units and their officials are not exempt from liability
for death or injury to persons or damage to property.
I.

Authority to negotiate and secure grants; receive donations; float bonds; build-operatetransfer

Sec. 23. Authority to Negotiate and Secure Grants. Local chief executives may, upon authority of the
sanggunian, negotiate and secure financial grants or donations in kind, in support of the basic services or
facilities enumerated under Section 17 hereof, from local and foreign assistance agencies without necessity
of securing clearance or approval therefor from any department, agency, or office of the National
Government of from any higher local government unit: Provided, That projects financed by such grants or
assistance with national security implications shall be approved by the national agency concerned:
Provided, further, That when such national agency fails to act on the request for approval within thirty (30)
days from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed approved.
The local chief executive shall, within thirty (30) days upon signing of such grant agreement or deed of
donation, report the nature, amount, and terms of such assistance to both Houses of Congress and the
President.
J.

Mayors power over the police: Operational control; suspension

RA 8551
See attachments

Sec 28, LGC


Sec. 28. Powers of Local Chief Executives over the Units of the Philippine National Police. The extent of
operational supervision and control of local chief executives over the police force, fire protection unit, and
jail management personnel assigned in their respective jurisdictions shall be governed by the provisions of
Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred seventy-five (R.A. No. 6975), otherwise known as "The
Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990", and the rules and regulations issued
pursuant thereto.

Part III
Elective Officials, Vacancies, Succession, Disciplinary Actions
ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
Sec 39 75, LGC
Qualifications of elective officials (Sec. 39)
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

citizen of the Philippines


registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or district (only in the case of a
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan)
where he intends to be elected
a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election
able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
Age requirements for candidates, as of election day:
a. governor, vice-governor, or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vicemayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities - at least 23
years old
b. mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities, component cities, or
municipalities - at least 21 years old
c. punong barangay , member of the sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, or
sangguniang barangay - at least 18 years old
d. sangguniang kabataan - at least 15 years old but not more than 21 years old

Certificates of candidacy to be taken at face value


COMELEC may not deny due course or cancel a certificate without proper proceedings. To receive and
acknowledge receipt of the certificates of candidacy is a ministerial duty of COMELEC. The COMELEC
does not have discretion to give or not to give due course to the certificate. It may not look into matters not
appearing on their face (Cipriano v. COMELEC [2004]).
Rationale of residency requirement
The residence requirement is rooted in the desire that officials of districts or localities be acquainted with
the needs, difficulties, and other matters vital to the common welfare of the constituents. The actual,
physical and personal presence is substantial enough to show his intention to fulfill the duties of mayor and
for the voters to evaluate his qualifications for the mayorship. A very legalistic, academic and technical
approach to the residence requirement does not satisfy the rationale for the said requirement (Torayno v.
COMELEC [2000]).
Disqualifications of elective officials (Sec. 40)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence
Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case
Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic
Those with dual citizenship
Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad

6.
7.
8.

Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad
and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
The insane or feeble-minded.
Other grounds for disqualification:
a. Vote-buying, upon determination in a summary administrative proceeding. (Nolasco v.
COMELEC [1997]).
b. Previously-elected official. Any elective official who has resigned from his office,
which he previously occupied but has caused to become vacant due to his resignation
(by accepting an appointive office or for whatever reason), is disqualified from running
in a special election (from RA 8295, An act providing for the proclamation of a lone
candidate for any elective office in a special election, and for other purposes).
c. Politically-motivated acts. Any person who, directly or indirectly, coerces, bribes,
threatens, harasses, intimidates or actually causes, inflicts or produces any violence,
injury, punishment, torture, damage, loss or disadvantage to any person or persons
aspiring to become a candidate or that of the immediate member of his family, his
honor or property that is meant to eliminate all other potential candidate, where
evidence of guilt is strong (also from RA 8295).

Term of Office (Sec. 43)


1.

2.
3.
4.

For all elective officials except barangay officials: 3 years, starting from noon of June 30,
1992 or such date as may be provided for by law.
a.
all local officials first elected during the local elections immediately following the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992
For barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan: 3 years, which shall begin
after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994.
No local elective official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service

See also Sec. 8, Art. X, 1987 Constitution: The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Elections (Sec. 41, 42)
Unless otherwise provided by law, the elections for local officials shall be held every 3 years on the second
Monday of May.

Official
Governor, vice-governor, mayor, vicemayor, punong barangay

How elected
At large, by all the qualified voters in
their respective units

Sangguniang kabataan chairman

By the registered voters of the katipunan


ng kabataan1

Members of the sangguniang


panlalawigan, panlungsod, bayan

By the qualified voters in their district

Sec. 424, LGC: Katipunan ng Kabataan. The katipunan ng kabataan shall be composed of all citizens of the
Philippines actually residing in the barangay for at least 6 months, who are 15 but not more than 21 years of age, and
who are duly registered in the list of the sangguniang kabataan or in the official barangay list in the custody of the
barangay secretary.

Members of the sangguniang barangay

At large

Other members of the various sanggunian


1.
2.

3.

The presidents of the leagues of sanggunian members of component cities and municipalities shall
serve as ex officio members of the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.
The presidents of the "liga ng mga barangay and the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan"
elected by their respective chapters shall serve as ex officio members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang bayan
There shall be one (1) sectoral representative from the women, one (1) from the workers, and one
(1) from any of the following sectors: the urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, disabled
persons, or any other sector as may be determined by the sanggunian concerned within ninety
(90) days prior to the holding of the next local elections as may be provided for by law.

Vacancies and Succession of Elective OFficials


Permanent Vacancies (Sec. 44)
Arises when an elective local official:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

fills a higher vacant office


refuses to assume office
fails to qualify
dies
is removed from office
voluntarily resigns
is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office

Filling of vacancy by automatic succession (Sec. 44)


Permanent Vacancy
1. Office of the governor, mayor
2. Offices of governor & vice-governor, or mayor &
vice-mayor
3. Office of the punong barangay

Successor
Vice-governor, vice-mayor
- Highest-ranking sanggunian member, or in case of
his permanent inability,
- The second highest-ranking sanggunian member
- Highest-ranking sanggunian member, or in case of
his permanent inability,
- The second highest-ranking sanggunian member

For purposes of succession, ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of
votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in the
immediately preceding local election.
A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved by the drawing of lots
The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their predecessors.
Filling of vacancy by appointment (Sec. 45)
Resorted to when automatic succession provided in Sec. 44 does not apply

Permanent Vacancy
1. Sangguniang panlalawigan; sangguniang
panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and
independent component cities
2. Sangguniang panlungsod of component cities;
sangguniang bayan
3. Sangguniang barangay

Appointing Power
President, through the Executive Secretary

Governor
City or municipal mayor, upon recommendation
of the sangguniang barangay concerned

General Rule: the appointee shall come from the same political party as that of the sanggunian member
who caused the vacancy and shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office. To ensure this, a
nomination and a certificate of membership of the appointee from the highest official of the political party
concerned are conditions sine qua non.
Effects if nomination and certificate are absent:
a.
b.

any appointment without such shall be null and void ab initio


ground for administrative action against the official responsible therefor

Exceptions: In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a sanggunian member who does not belong to any
political party, the local chief executive shall, upon recommendation of the sanggunian concerned, appoint
any qualified person to fill the vacancy
In case of vacancy in the representation of the youth and the barangay in the sanggunian, said vacancy shall
be filled automatically by the official next in rank of the organization concerned.
Temporary Vacancy in the Office of the Local Chief Executive (Sec. 46)
Arises when the local chief executive (governor, mayor, or punong barangay):
1.
2.
3.
4.

is on leave of absence
is on travel abroad
is suspended from office
is otherwise temporarily incapacitated to perform his duties for physical or legal reasons

General rule: the vice-governor, city/municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking sangguniang barangay
member shall automatically exercise the powers, and perform the duties and functions, of the local chief
executive.
Exception: The power to appoint/suspend/dismiss employees, which can be exercised only if the period of
temporary incapacity exceeds 30 working days.
General rule: The local chief executive cannot authorize any local official to assume the
powers/duties/functions of his office, other than the vice-governor, city/municipal vicemayor, or highest
ranking sangguniang barangay member.
Exception: If the local chief executive is traveling within the country but outside his territorial jurisdiction
for a period not exceeding 3 consecutive days, he may designate in writing the officer-in-charge. The
authorization shall specify the powers and functions that the officer-in-charge shall exercise, which does not
include the power to appoint/suspend/dismiss EEs.

Exception to the exception: If the local chief executive fails/refuses to issue the authorization, the vicegovernor, city/municipal vice-mayor, or highest ranking sangguniang barangay member has right to assume
the powers/duties/functions of the office on the 4th day of absence.
The temporary incapacity shall terminate upon submission to the appropriate sanggunian of a written
declaration by the local chief executive concerned that he has reported back to office. In cases where the
temporary incapacity is due to legal causes, the local chief executive concerned shall also submit necessary
documents showing that said legal causes no longer exist.
Acting governor cannot simultaneously act as vice-governor. A vice-governor who is concurrently an
acting governor is actually a quasi-governor. Being the acting governor, the vice cannot continue to
simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office, since the nature of the duties of the governor for a
full-time occupant to discharge them. Hence, there is an inability on the part of the regular presiding
officer (vice-governor) to preside during the sanggunian sessions, which calls for the election of a
temporary presiding officer (Gamboa v. Aguirre [1999]).
The governor has the power to fill vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan caused by a member not belonging to
any political party. It is the same manner as where the member belonged to a political party. Where there is
no political party to make the nomination, the Sanggunian, where the vacancy occurs, must be considered
authority for making the recommendation. The appointing authority is limited to the appointment of those
recommended to the governor. The recommendation is a condition sine qua non for the validity of the
appointment (Farias v. Barba [1996]).
Leaves of Absence (Sec. 47)
LOA of
1. Governor; mayor of a highly urbanized city or an
independent component city
2. Vice-governor; city / municipal vice-mayor
3. Members of the sanggunian and its employees
4. Mayor or component city / municipality
5. Punong barangay
6. Sangguniang barangay members

To be approved by
The President or his duly authorized representative
Local chief executive concerned
Vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned
Governor
City / municipal mayor
Punong barangay

Whenever the application for leave of absence hereinabove specified is not acted upon within five (5)
working days after receipt thereof, the application for leave of absence shall be deemed approved.
Local Legislation
Where local legislative power vests (Sec. 48)
1.
2.
3.
4.

sangguniang panlalawigan for the province


sangguniang panlungsod for the city
sangguniang bayan for the municipality
sangguniang barangay for the barangay

Presided over by the vice-governor, vice-mayor, or punong barangay. And because the presider is not a
member of the Sanggunian, he can vote only in case of a tie (Perez v. Dela Cruz [1969]).
Should the vice-governor, vice-mayor or punong barangay be unable to preside, the members present and
constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding officer.

The temporary presiding officer shall certify, within 10 days from the passage of ordinances enacted and
resolutions adopted, such ordinances and resolutions in the session over which he temporarily
See also Sec. 20, Art. X, 1987 Constitution. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions
of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative
powers over:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Administrative organization;
Creation of sources of revenues;
Ancestral domain and natural resources;
Personal, family, and property relations;
Regional urban and rural planning development;
Economic, social, and tourism development;
Educational policies;
Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the
people of the region.

Internal Rules of Procedure (Sec. 50)


Every sanggunian must adopt or update its existing rules of procedure, on the first regular session
following the election of its members and within 90 days thereafter
The rules of procedure shall provide for the following:
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

7.

The organization of the sanggunian and the election of its officers


the creation of standing committees (eg., committees on appropriations, women and family,
human rights, youth and sports development, environmental protection, cooperatives, etc.), their
general jurisdiction, their chairpersons, and their members
The order and calendar of business for each session
The legislative process
The parliamentary procedures which include the conduct of members during sessions
The discipline of members for disorderly behavior and absences without justifiable cause for four
(4) consecutive sessions,
a. the penalty of suspension or expulsion shall require the concurrence of at least twothirds (2/3) vote of all the sanggunian members
b. a member convicted by final judgment to imprisonment of at least one (1) year for any
crime involving moral turpitude shall be automatically expelled from the sanggunian;
and
Such other rules as the sanggunian may adopt

Quorum (Sec. 53)


A majority of all the members of the sanggunian who have been elected and qualified shall constitute a
quorum to transact official business
Should a question of quorum be raised during a session, the presiding officer shall immediately proceed to
call the roll of the members and thereafter announce the results
Where there is no quorum, the presiding officer may declare a recess until such time as a quorum is
constituted, or a majority of the members present may adjourn from day to day
Majority of the members present may compel the immediate attendance of any member absent without
justifiable cause by designating a member of the sanggunian to be assisted by the police force assigned in
the territorial jurisdiction of the LGU concerned, to arrest the absent member and present him at the session

If there is still no quorum despite this, no business shall be transacted. The presiding officer, upon proper
motion duly approved by the members present, shall then declare the session adjourned for lack of quorum
Sessions (Sec. 52)
Regular Sessions. The sanggunian shall, by resolution, fix the day, time, and place of its regular sessions on
the first session day immediately after the election of its members.
The minimum numbers of regular sessions shall be:

once a week for the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang bayan
twice a month for the sangguniang barangay

Special Sessions. Special sessions may be called by the local chief executive or by a majority of the
members of the sanggunian whenever public interest so demands.
In the case of special sessions, a written notice to the members shall be served personally at the member's
usual place of residence at least 24 hours before the special session is held. And unless otherwise concurred
in by two-thirds (2/3) vote of the sanggunian members present, there being a quorum, no other matters may
be considered at a special session except those stated in the notice.
General rule: all sessions shall be open to the public
Exception: unless a closed-door session is ordered by an affirmative vote of majority of the members
present, there being a quorum
Reasons for closed-door session: public interest, reasons of security, decency, or morality.
No two (2) sessions, regular or special, may be held in a single day.
Each sanggunian shall keep a journal and record of its proceedings, which may be published upon
resolution of the sanggunian concerned.
Full disclosure of conflict of interest of members (Sec. 51)
Conflict of interest refers in general to one where it may be reasonably deduced that a member of a
sanggunian may not act in the public interest due to some private, pecuniary, or other personal
considerations that may tend to affect his judgment to the prejudice of the service or the public.
Every sanggunian member shall, upon assumption to office, make a full disclosure of:

his business and financial interests


professional relationship, or
any relation by affinity or consanguinity within the fourth civil degree

with any person, firm, or entity affected by any ordinance or resolution under consideration by the
sanggunian of which he is a member, which relationship may result in conflict of interest.
Such relationship shall include:

Ownership of stock or capital, or investment, in the entity or firm to which the ordinance or
resolution may apply
Contracts or agreements with any person or entity which the ordinance or resolution under
consideration may affect

The disclosure required under this Act shall be made in writing and submitted to the secretary of the
sanggunian or the secretary of the committee of which he is a member.
The disclosure shall form part of the record of the proceedings and shall be made:

before the member participates in the deliberations on the ordinance or resolution under
consideration
before voting on the ordinance or resolution on second and third readings, if the member did not
participate during the deliberations
when a member takes a position or makes a privilege speech on a matter that may affect the
business interest, financial connection, or professional relationship described herein

Approval and Vetoing of Ordinances (Sec. 54, 55)


1.

Ordinances enacted by the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod, or bayan:


a. Every ordinance enacted by the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod, or bayan shall
be presented to the local chief executive (i.e., the governor or mayor).
b. If the local chief executive approves the same, he shall affix his signature on each and
every page thereof.
c. Otherwise, he shall veto it within 15 days (in case of a province) or 10 days (in case of a
city or municipality) and return the same with his written objections to the sanggunian,
which may proceed to reconsider the same.
i. Grounds for vetoing: the ordinance is ultra vires, or prejudicial to the public
welfare
ii. Item-vetoing: the local chief executive shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items of
1. an appropriations ordinance
2. an ordinance or resolution adopting a local development plan and
public investment program, or
3. an ordinance directing the payment of money or creating liability

In such a case, the veto shall not affect the item or items which are not objected to. The vetoed item or items
shall not take effect unless the sanggunian overrides the veto; otherwise, any item/s in the appropriations
ordinance of the previous year corresponding to those vetoed shall be deemed reenacted.
iii. The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or resolution only once.
The sanggunian concerned may override the veto of the local chief executive by twothirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance or resolution
effective for all legal intents and purposes, even without the approval of the local chief
executive concerned.
e. If the ordinance is not returned by the local chief executive within the time prescribed,
the ordinance shall be deemed approved as if he had signed it.
Ordinances enacted by the sangguniang barangay
a. Must be signed by the punong barangay upon approval by the majority of all the
sanggunian members.
b. The punong barangay has no veto power.
d.

2.

Review of Ordinances and Resolutions (Sec. 56-58)


Ordinances and resolutions by the
sangguniang panlungsod / sangguniang
bayan

Ordinances by the sangguniang


barangay

Reviewed by

What may be
reviewed

Period for submitting


copies by the secretary
of the sanggunian
concerned
Period for review

Sangguniang panlalawigan
1. Approved ordinances
2. Resolutions approving
a. local development plans
b. public investment programs
formulated by local
development councils
Within 3 days after approval

Sangguniang panlungsod / bayan


All barangay ordinances

Within 30 days after receipt of copies of


ordinances and resolutions

Within 30 days from receipt of


copies of the ordinances and
resolutions
By itself

1.
2.
Manner of review

1.

2.

Ground/s for
invalidating, and
action to be taken

Effect of inaction

3.

By itself, or
With the help of the provincial attorney
/ provincial prosecutor. The latter must
submit his written comments or
recommendations to the sangguniang
panlalawigan within 10 days from
receipt of the documents to be examined
If the sangguniang panlalawigan finds
that such an ordinance or resolution is
ultra vires, it shall declare such
ordinance or resolution invalid in whole
or in part.
The sangguniang panlalawigan shall
enter its action in the minutes and shall
advise the corresponding city or
municipal authorities of the action it has
taken.
Any attempt to enforce any ordinance or
any resolution approving the local
development plan and public investment
program, after the disapproval thereof,
shall be sufficient ground for the
suspension or dismissal of the official or
employee concerned.

If no action has been taken within 30 days


after submission of such an ordinance or
resolution, the same shall be presumed
consistent with law and therefore valid

Effectivity of Ordinances or Resolutions (Sec. 59)

Within 10 days after enactment

1.

If the sangguniang
panlungsod / bayan finds
that such ordinance or
resolution is inconsistent
with law and
city/municipal ordinances,
it shall return the same with
its comments and
recommendations to the
sangguniang barangay for
adjustment, amendment, or
modification
2. In this case, the effectivity
of the barangay ordinance is
suspended until such time as
the revision called for is
effected.
3. Any attempt to enforce any
ordinance after the
disapproval thereof, shall be
sufficient ground for the
suspension or dismissal of
the official or employee
concerned.
If no action is taken within thirty
(30) days from receipt of the
ordinances, the same shall be
deemed approved

1.

Ordinance or resolution approving the local development plan and public investment
program

Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or resolution approving the local development plan and public
investment program, the same shall take effect after ten (10) days from

Posting, by the secretary, of a copy thereof in a bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial
capitol / city, municipal, or barangay hall, which must be done not later than 5 days after its
approval; and
in at least 2 other conspicuous places in the LGU concerned

The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and posted in Filipino or English and in the
language understood by the majority of the people in the LGU concerned
The secretary to the sanggunian shall record such fact in a book kept for the purpose, stating the dates of
approval and posting
2.

Ordinances with penal sanctions

The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation
within the province where the local legislative body concerned belongs.
In the absence of any newspaper of general circulation within the province, posting of such ordinances shall
be made in all municipalities and cities of the province where the sanggunian of origin is situated.
3.

Ordinances enacted by the local legislative bodies of highly urbanized and independent
component cities

The main features of the ordinance or resolution duly enacted or adopted shall, in addition to being posted,
be published once in a local newspaper of general circulation within the city
In the absence of a local newspaper, the ordinance or resolution shall be published in any newspaper of
general circulation
Disciplinary Actions
Grounds (Sec. 60)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.

Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;


Culpable violation of the Constitution;
Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;
Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least
prision mayor;
Abuse of authority;
Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, Sangguniang bayan,
and Sangguniang Barangay;
Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an
immigrant of another country; and
Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.

Removal of elective officials based on these grounds may only be done by ORDER of proper court.

Form and Filing of administrative complaint (sec. 61)

Form of Complaint: It must be VERIFIED

Where to File:
(1) Against an elective official of a province, highly-urbanized city, independent component city or
component city Office of the President (OP);
(2) Against an elective municipal official Sangguniang Panlalawigan, appealable to the Office of
the President (OP);
(3) Against an elective barangay official Sangguniang Panlungsod or Bayan as the case may be,
non appealable.
Notice of hearing (Sec. 62)
The notice of hearing must be sent to the elective official complained of within seven (7) days from filing of
verified complaint which indicates that:

An administrative complaint is lodged against him;


Requiring him to submit his VERIFIED ANSWER within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice

The disciplining authority shall commence the investigation of the case within ten (10) days after receipt of
the respondents answer.
NOTE:
(1) No investigation shall be held within ninety (90) days immediately prior to any LOCAL ELECTION,
and no preventive suspension shall be imposed within the same period.
(2) If a preventive suspension has been imposed prior to 90-day period immediately preceding local
election, it shall be deemed AUTOMATICALLY LIFTED upon start of aforesaid period.
Preventive suspension of local elective officials (Sec. 63)
Who may impose:

Against an elective official of a PROVINCE, HIGHLY-URBANIZED CITY, INDEPENDENT


COMPONENT CITY The President thru the DILG Secretary;
Against an elective municipal official or an elective official of a component city The
Provincial Governor;
Against an elective barangay official The Mayor

When to impose:

At any time after the issues have been joined, when the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the
gravity of offense, then is great possibility that the continuance in office of the respondent could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence.

Duration of Preventive Suspension:

Any single preventive suspension of local elective official SHALL NOT extend beyond sixty (60)
days.
In the event that several administrative cases are filed against an elective official, he cannot be
preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or
grounds existing and known at the time of the first suspension.

What happens after preventive suspension:

The suspended elective official shall be deemed REINSTATED IN OFFICE without prejudice to
the continuation of the proceedings against him

Duration of Administrative Proceedings (Rendition of Judgment):

One hundred twenty (120) days from the time the respondent was formally notified of the case
against him.

NOTE: If the delay in the proceedings of the case of the case is due to his FAULT, NEGLECT, or
REQUEST, other than the appeal duly filed, the duration of such delay shall not be counted in computing
the time of termination of the case.

Any abuse of the exercise of the power of preventive suspension shall be penalized as ABUSE
OF AUTHORITY.

Salary of respondent pending suspension (Sec 64)

The suspended official shall not receive any salary or compensation during the pendency of the
suspension

If found GUILTY after the


proceeding

No compensation will be given

If found NOT GUILTY


after the proceeding
The suspended official
shall be paid FULL
salary or compensation
including other
emoluments accruing
during the suspension

Rights of respondent official (Sec 65)


1.
2.
3.

To appear and defend himself in person or by counsel;


To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him;
To require the attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence in his favor
through the compulsory process of sub poena or sub poena duces tecum

Form and Notice of decision (Sec 66)


The investigation of the case SHALL be terminated within 90 days from the start thereof.
The disciplining authority shall render its decision within 30 days after the end of the investigation.
Form of decision:

It shall be in writing;
It shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the reasons for the decision.

Notice of decision:

The notice together with the copies of the decision shall IMMEDIATELY be furnished the
respondent and all interested parties.

Imposable penalty:

SUSPENSION

REMOVAL

It shall not exceed: (1) the unexpired term of


the respondent; or (2) a period of six (6)
months for every administrative offense

It shall NOT be a bar to the candidacy of the


respondent so suspended as long as he meets
the qualifications required for the office

Amounts to a bar to the candidacy of the


respondent for ANY elective position

Administrative appeals (Sec 67)


Period to appeal:

Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the decision.

Where to appeal:

Sangguniang Panlalawigan

Office of the President

For the decisions of Sangguniang Panlungsod of


Component Cities and Sangguniang Bayan2

For the decisions of Sangguniang Panlalawigan and


the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Highly Urbanized
Cities (HUC) and Independent Component Cities

Decisions of the Office of the President shall be final and executory. (see Calingin v. CA, July 12, 2004)
Execution pending appeal3 (Sec 68)

The provision is not explicit whether the decision of Sangguniang Bayan and Sangguniang Panlungsod of Component
Cities after appeal to Sangguniang Panlalawigan can be further appealed to the Office of the President. But the
author of this reviewer humbly believes that pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies in
Administrative Law, it can be further appealed to the Office of the President. This view is also bolstered by the last
sentence of the same provision which states that Decisions of the Office of the President shall be final and
executory. The said statement begs the question: If the decision of the Office of the President is final and executory,
how about that of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan?

This provision is poorly worded. The drafter might be drunk when he/she wrote this provision. The first and second
sentences, as written, do not make any sense. One might ask regarding the first sentence, Why appeal if the decision
will become final and executory notwithstanding the filing of an appeal? The author humbly submits that the second
and third sentences of this provision should have been written or was intended to be written this way: The respondent
shall be considered as having been placed under preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal[.] in the event
he wins such appeal. In the event the appeal results in an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such emoluments
during the pendency of the appeal

An appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory.
The respondent official shall be considered as having been placed under preventive suspension
during the pendency of an appeal in the event he wins such appeal.
In the event the appeal results in EXONERATION, he shall be paid his salary and such other
emoluments during the pendency of the appeal.

Recall
By whom exercised (Sec 69)
It shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official
subject to such recall belongs.
Ground: Loss of Confidence
Initiation of Recall Process (Sec 70)
Contents of the Petition:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The names and addresses of the petitioner written in legible form and their signatures
The barangay, city or municipality, local legislative district and the province to which the
petitioners belong
The name of the official sought to be recalled
A brief narration of the reasons and justifications therefore.

Process:
1.

2.
3.

4.

5.

Petition of a registered voter in the LGU concerned, supported by percentage of registered voters
during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled is elected filed with the
COMELEC thru its office in the LGU concerned. (Percentage decreases as population of people
in area increases. Also, the supporting voters MUST sign the petition)
Within 15 days after filing, COMELEC must certify the sufficiency of the required number of
signatures. Failure to obtain required number automatically nullifies the petition.
Within 3 days of certification of sufficiency form and substance of the petition, the COMELEC
shall provide the official with a copy of the petition and causes its publication for 3 weeks (once a
week) in a national newspaper and a local newspaper of general circulation. Petition must also be
posted for 10 to 20 days at conspicuous places. Protest should be filed at this point and shall be
ruled with finality within 15 days from filing of such protest or challenge.
COMELEC then verifies and authenticates the signatures gathered. Representatives of the
petitioners as well as the official sought to be recalled shall be duly notified and shall have the
right to participate therein as mere observers.
COMELEC shall announce the acceptance of candidates to the position and thereafter prepare the
list of candidates which shall include the name of the official sought to be recalled.

Election on recall (Sec 71)


Prescribed date of Recall Election:

For recall of barangay, city, or municipal officials

For recall of provincial officials

Shall not be later than thirty (30) days upon the


completion of the procedure for initiation of recall
process
Shall not be later than forty-five (45) days upon the
completion of the procedure for initiation of recall
process

The official sought to be recalled shall automatically be considered as duly registered candidate or
candidates to the pertinent positions and, like other candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon.
Effectivity of recall (Sec 72)
The recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon the election and proclamation of the
candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the recall election.
Should the official sought to be recalled receive the highest number of votes, confidence in him is thereby
affirmed and he shall continue in office.
Prohibition from resignation (Sec 73)
The elective local official sought to be recalled shall not be allowed to resign while the recall process is in
progress.
Limitation on recall (sec 74)
Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office
No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one (1)
year immediately preceding a regular local election.
Expenses incident to recall election (Sec 75)
All expenses incident to recall elections shall be borne by the COMELEC.
For this purpose, there shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act a contingency fund for
the conduct of recall elections.
A.

Qualifications

Sec 39, LGC


See above

Abella v. Comelec
Benjamin Abella was a candidate for Leyte governor for the 1988 elections. Emeterio Larrazabal was also a
candidate for Leyte governor, but was disqualified for lack of residence. On the day before the elections, his
wife Adelina Larrazabal then filed her candidacy as his substitute. The following day Silvestre de la Cruz, a
registered voter of Tacloban City, filed a petition to disqualify her, on the ground that she misrepresented
her residence as Kananga, Leyte when in fact she was a resident of Ormoc City like her husband. She was
however proclaimed as the winning candidate, and thus assumed office while the hearings on her
disqualification case continued. She was later on declared by the COMELEC as disqualified from running
as governor. The incumbent vice-governor Leopoldo Petilla then took his oath as Leyte Governor and
assumed office, which COMELEC resolved by ordering Petilla to maintain status quo ante and refrain from
assuming the office of governor.
WON Adelina Larrazabal was qualified to run as governor of Leyte

HELD: No
Adelina Larrazabal lacked the required residence because she has established her residence at Ormoc City
since 1975 and not at Kananga. Her attempt to purportedly change her residence one year before the
election by registering at Kananga clearly shows that she considers herself as an Ormoc City resident. There
is no evidence to prove that the petitioner temporarily left her residence to pursue any calling, profession or
business to satisfy the principle of animus revertendi. The fact that she occasionally visits Kananga through
the years does not signify an intention to continue her residence therein. Having thus been established as an
Ormoc City resident, she is disqualified from running as Leyte governor since Ormoc Citys charter
prohibits its voters from voting for provincial elective officials, since it is treated like a highly urbanized
city which is outside the supervisory power of the province to which it is geographically attached. The
provision in the charter connotes two prohibitions: one from running and the other from voting for any
provincial elective official. (Since there was a vacancy in the Office of the Governor, the vice-governor
assumed office.)

Frivaldo v. Comelec (1989)


Juan Frivaldo assumed office as Sorsogon governor in 1988. On 27 Oct 1988 the League of Municipalities
Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its president Salvador Estuye (also suing in his personal capacity) filed
with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldos election on the ground that he was not a
FIipino citizen. Frivaldo admitted he was naturalized in the US, but explained that such was only to protect
himself against President Marcos. He said he could not have repatriated himself since the Special
Committee on Naturalization (created by LOI 270) had not yet been organized. He argued that his oath in
his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born citizen was a sufficient act of repatriation, and that his
active participation in the 1987 elections had divested him of American citizenship under US laws, thus
restoring his Filipino citizenship.
WON Frivaldo was a Filipino citizen at the time of his election as Sorsogon governor
HELD: No
The alleged forfeiture of his American citizenship due to his active participation in Philippine politics does
not automatically restore his Filipino citizenship. If the Committee tasked to handle the repatriation had not
yet been constituted, it only meant that Frivaldo should have waited until this was done, or else he should
have sought reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship through other means (i.e., direct act of Congress or
applied for naturalization). Frivaldo was then not a Filipino citizen, and thus disqualified to vote and run
for office since Filipino citizenship is one of the qualifications for voting and for being a candidate for local
elective office. (There was then a vacancy in the Office of the Governor, thus the elected vice-governor
assumed office.)

Labo v. Comelec (1989)


Ramon Labo Jr married an Australian citizen in the Philippines. As the spouse of an Australian citizen, he
was not required to meet normal requirements for the grant of citizenship, and was granted Australian
citizenship on 28 Jul 1976. His marriage was later declared void for being bigamous. He returned to the
Philippines using an Australian passport and obtained an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). He
applied for a change in status from immigrant to returning Filipino citizen, but was denied by the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation since he has not applied for reacquisition of his Filipino
citizenship. He later on ran for and won as Mayor of Baguio City. The second-placer Luis Lardizabal filed a
petition for quo warranto, alleging that Labo is disqualified from holding public office on the ground that
Labo was an alien, and asking that Labos proclamation as Mayor be annulled.
WON Labo is a Filipino citizen and hence qualified to be Mayor
HELD: No
Labo is not a Filipino citizen because he has lost his Filipino citizenship by all three modes specified in the

Constitution: (1) naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express renunciation of citizenship, and (3)
subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. Even if it be
assumed that his Australian citizenship was annulled because his marriage was void for being bigamous,
that circumstance alone does not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. It does not appear that
Labo sought to reacquire his Filipino citizenship through any of the three modes provided by our laws:
direct act of Congress, naturalization or repatriation. (Also, the earlier contrary COMELEC decision can
also be reversed since res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship.) Not being a Filipino citizen,
Labo is disqualified to run for mayor. (There was then a vacancy in the Office of Mayor, thus the Vice
Mayor assumed office.)

Labo v. Comelec (1992)


Ramon Labo Jr filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baguio City in the 1992 elections. Roberto
Ortega also filed his certificate of candidacy for the same office, and also subsequently filed for Labos
disqualification before the COMELEC on the ground that Labo was an alien. Labo failed to Answer and
present evidence; COMELEC subsequently cancelled Labos certificate of candidacy. Labo then moved to
stay the implementation of the COMELEC decision, which was granted with COMELEC issuing an Order
that Labo may still continue to be voted upon as mayor in the 1992 elections, but it resolved to suspend
Labos proclamation in the event he wins the elections.
WON Labo is a Filipino citizen and hence qualified to be Mayor
HELD: No
Labo failed to submit proof that he has reacquired his Philippine citizenship. He claims that he has
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by citing his application for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship filed
before the OSG, but despite favorable recommendation by the Solicitor General, the Special Committee on
Naturalization had yet to act upon his application for repatriation. In the absence of any official action or
approval by the proper authorities, a mere application for repatriation does not, and cannot, amount to an
automatic reacquisition of the applicants Philippine citizenship. (Note: Second-placer Ortega is not entitled
to be proclaimed as Mayor because he was not the choice of the sovereign will. The ineligibility of a
candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number
of votes to be declared elected.)

Frivaldo v. Comelec (1996)


On 20 Mar 1995, Juan Frivaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for Sorsogon governor in the 1995
elections. Three days later, another Sorsogon governor candidate, Raul Lee filed for the cancellation of his
Frivaldos certificate of candidacy on the ground that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen. COMELEC
granted the petition. Frivaldo filed a MR, which was not acted upon until after the elections. His candidacy
then continued and was thus voted upon (he received the highest number of votes). It was only after the
elections that the COMELEC en banc affirmed the resolution of its Second Division. By order of
COMELEC, Lee was proclaimed as governor at 830 PM on 30 Jun 1995. On 6 Jul 1995, Frivaldo filed a
petition with the COMLEC praying for the annulment of Lees proclamation, claiming that since he took
his oath of allegiance to the Philippines at 2PM on 30 Jun 1995, there was no more impediment to his being
proclaimed as governor. In the alternative, he averred that it was the Vice-Governor-elect that should
assume the office and not Lee.
WON Frivaldo was qualified to be elected as Sorsogon governor
HELD: Yes
The law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship. Sine
Frivaldo reassumed his citizenship on 30 June 1995 the very day the term of office of governor began
he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and
responsibilities as of said date. Furthermore, Frivaldos repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of his

application on 17 Aug 1994, since laws which create new rights are given retroactive effect. And even if
Frivaldo was previously declared as not a Filipino citizen by the Supreme Court, such decisions declaring
the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a persons future status with finality, because a person
may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by
law for the purpose.
SC adds, And let it not be overlooked that Frivaldos demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to
reassume his nationality of birth despite several setbacks speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth
than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention and burning desire to re-embrace his native
Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years.
Justice Davide DISSENTED, saying that Section 39 of the Local Government Code of 1991 refers to no
other than the qualifications of candidates for elective local offices and their election. Hence, in no way may
the section be construed to mean that possession of qualifications should be reckoned from the
commencement of the term of office of the elected candidate. Also, it is only upon taking the oath of
allegiance that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had
intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then it should not have
explicitly provided otherwise.

Mercado v. Manzano
In the 1998 elections, 3 candidates for vice-mayor competed for the post: Eduardo Manzano, Ernesto
Mercado and Gabriel Daza III. Manzano won the elections but his proclamation was suspended due to a
pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that Manzano was not a Filipino
citizen but was instead a US citizen. Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, USA and thus
acquired US citizenship by operation of the US Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli. He was
also a natural-born Filipino citizen by virtue of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother
were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of 6, his parents brought him to the Philippines using an
American passport. His parents registered his as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and
was thus issued an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). When he attained the age of majority, he
registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998. On 7 May 1998,
COMELEC granted Mamarils petition and cancelled Manzanos certificate of candidacy on the ground that
he was a dual citizen and thus disqualified from running for any elective position. On 8 May 1998,
Manzano moved for reconsideration of the decision, and the motion remained pending even until after the
elections. On 31 Aug 1998 the COMELEC en banc declared that Manzano was qualified to run for vice
mayor.
(1) WON Manzano possesses dual citizenship, and (2) WON he is disqualified from running for and being
elected as vice mayor
HELD: (1) Yes and (2) No
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by
the said states. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently
considered a citizen of both states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a
person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition. In including Section 5 in Article IV of
the Constitution (Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law.), the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized
citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the
phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) Sec 40(d) and RA 7854 (Makati
City Charter) Sec 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Thus, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

The oath of allegiance contained in Manzanos certificate of candidacy is sufficient to constitute


renunciation of his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual
citizen. There is no merit to the contention that to be effective, such renunciation should have been made
upon Manzanos reaching the age of majority, since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to
be made upon attainment of the age of majority.
Manzanos oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth
and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections
in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

Coquilla v. Comelec
Coquilla was born of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He resided there until 1965, when he joined
the United States Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen. On October 15, 1998, petitioner
came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate but still made several trips to the US. On
November 10, 2000, he was repatriated and he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. On February 27,
2001, after his application for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar was approved, he filed
his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for two (2)
years.
Respondent Alvarez (incumbent mayor of Oras and who was running for reelection) sought the cancellation
of petitioners certificate of candidacy on the ground that the Coquilla had made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years
when in truth he had resided therein for only about six months since November 10, 2000, when he took his
oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the case before the elections on May 14, 2001.
Meanwhile, petitioner was elected by a margin of 379 votes, was proclaimed mayor, and subsequently took
his oath of office.
HELD: Petitioner had NOT been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one (1) year before the elections
held on May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy.
An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least
one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other
local language or dialect. (Sec. 39(a), LGC)
The term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to dwelling or
habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence, that is, the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every
person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents reside and continues until the same is
abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). Petitioner lost his domicile of origin in
Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November
10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in
the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident
alien.
It is not true, as petitioner contends, that he reestablished residence in this country in 1998 when he came
back to prepare for the mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a Community Tax Certificate in that year
and by constantly declaring to his townmates of his intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor in the
May 14, 2001 elections. Evidence shows that when petitioner entered the country in 1998, he did so as a

visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was valid for one year only. Hence, petitioner can be held
to have waived his status as an alien and as a non-resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath
as a citizen of the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171. He lacked the requisite residency to qualify him for the
mayorship of Oras, Eastern, Samar.

Case of Mayor Jesse Robredo


CA case
B.

Disqualifications

Sec 40, LGC


See above

Caasi v. CA
Merito Miguel was elected as the municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan in the local elections of January
18, 1988. Caasi filed a disqualification case against Miguel on the ground that he is a green card holder hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao in violation of Sec. 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
In his "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No.
21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was,
"Permanently." The green card that was subsequently issued identified him in clear bold letters as a
RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper portion, the following information is printed:
Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the United States.
HELD: Miguel is disqualified under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code on the ground that he is a green
card holder.
An immigrant is a person who moves into a country for the purpose of permanent residence. Miguel's
immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines. He entered the United States with the intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his
application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes
temporary and local allegiance to the U.S., the country in which he resides.
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines provides that any person who is a permanent
resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office unless
said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance
with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a
green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country."
Miguels act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines did not of itself
constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of
his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his
candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was disqualified to run for any
elective office. The records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before
he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988.
In addition, residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year
at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective
public office must possess. Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of

the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his
return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18,
1988. The Court therefore holds that he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office.

Marquez v. Comelec
At the time private respondent Eduardo Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy for Governor of
Quezon, a criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal
property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los
Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be
served on private respondent on account of his alleged "flight" from that country. Private respondent was
proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992.
Petitioner Bienvenido Marquez, the defeated candidate for the elective position of Governor in the Province
of Quezon in the 11th May 1992 elections, argues that Rodriguez is disqualified from being a candidate by
virtue Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code which states that a fugitive from justice in criminal or
non-political cases here or abroad is disqualified from running for any elective local position.
Rodriguez argues that that term fugitive from justice is limited to one who has been convicted by final
judgment. His basis is Article 73(b) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991. It states that fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final
judgment." The issue in this case is the meaning of fugitive from justice. Note: the issue of WON
Rodriguez is disqualified for being a fugitive from justice was decided by the Court in the succeeding case
of Rodriguez v. COMELEC.
HELD: The law needs no further interpretation and construction. Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160 is
clear and it disqualifies "fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad" from
seeking any elective local office. The phrase "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This
definition truly finds support from jurisprudence and it may be so conceded as expressing the general and
ordinary connotation of the term. Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a
person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment," is an inordinate and undue
circumscription of the law.

Rodriguez v. Comelec

(See Marquez v. COMELEC for background. The Marquez decision was promulgated for the
1992 elections. This case involves the 1995 elections)

In the May 8, 1995 election, Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the same position of
governor. This time, Marquez challenged Rodriguez' candidacy via petition for disqualification before the
COMELEC, based principally on the same allegation that Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice."
The COMELEC, allegedly having kept in mind the Marquez Decision definition of "fugitive from justice",
found Rodriguez to be one. Such finding was essentially based on Marquez' documentary evidence
consisting of an authenticated copy of the November 12, 1995 warrant of arrest issued by the Los Angeles
Municipal Court against Rodriguez, and an authenticated copy of the felony complaint.
Rodriguezs defense is that long before the felony complaint was allegedly filed, respondent was already in
the Philippines and he did not know of the filing of the same nor was he aware that he was being proceeded
against criminally. In a sense, thru this defense, respondent implicitly contends that he cannot be deemed a
fugitive from justice, because to be so, one must be aware of the filing of the criminal complaint, and his

disappearance in the place where the long arm of the law, thru the warrant of arrest, may reach him is
predicated on a clear desire to avoid and evade the warrant.
HELD: Rodriguez is NOT a fugitive from justice.
To reiterate, a "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment
but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution (from Marquez Decision). The definition
thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular
jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is
knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of
conviction.
Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. He arrived in the Philippines from the US on June 25, 1985
while the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court was filed and the warrant of arrest was issued only on
November 12, 1985, almost five (5) months after. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known
about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint
and arrest warrant much less conviction to speak of yet at such time. What prosecution or
punishment then was Rodriguez deliberately running away from with his departure from the US? The very
essence of being a "fugitive from justice" under the MARQUEZ Decision definition, is just nowhere to be
found in the circumstances of Rodriguez. The evidence of petitioner Rodriguez sufficiently proves that his
compulsion to return to the Philippines was due to his desire to join and participate vigorously in the
political campaigns against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and not to evade any charge against him
in the US.
When, in good faith, a person leaves the territory of a state not his own, homeward bound, and learns
subsequently of charges filed against him while in the relative peace and service of his own country, the fact
that he does not subject himself to the jurisdiction of the former state does not qualify him outright as a
fugitive from justice.

Dela Torre v. Comelec


De La Torre was disqualified by COMELEC from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in
the May 8, 1995 elections citing as the ground therefor, Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code which
provides that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment within two (2) years after serving sentence are
disqualified from running for any elective local position. De La Torre was found guilty (his conviction
became final on January 18, 1991) for violation of P.D. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-fencing Law.
De La Torre, however, argues that the crime of fencing does not involve moral turpitude and that Section 40
(a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to his case inasmuch as the probation granted him by the
MTC on December 21, 1994 which suspended the execution of the judgment of conviction and all other
legal consequences flowing therefrom, rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well.
HELD: The crime of fencing involves moral turpitude. Blacks Law Dictionary of moral turpitude as an
act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
The elements of the crime of fencing, as defined under P.D. 1612, are:
5.
6.

A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;


The accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime of robbery or theft, buys,
receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in
any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which have been
derived from the proceeds of the said crime;

7.
8.

The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything
of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.

Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by the fence of the fact that
property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of ones rightful property as
that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. And
although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point in time and in degree, both
the fence and the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded ones peaceful dominion for gain thus deliberately reneging in the process private duties they owe their fellowmen or society in a
manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty, or good morals
The same underlying reason holds even if the fence did not have actual knowledge, but merely should
have known the origin of the property received. The words should know denote the fact that a person of
reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in the performance of his duty to another or
would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists.
As to WON a grant of probation affects Sec. 40(a)s applicability, the legal effect of probation is only to
suspend the execution of the sentence. Petitioners conviction of fencing subsists and remains totally
unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso
facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution
of the application for probation.

Magno v. Comelec
A petition was filed by Montes for the disqualification of petitioner Nestor Magno as mayoralty candidate
(in the 2001 election) on the ground that petitioner was previously convicted of direct bribery of which he
was discharged after application for parole on March 5, 1998. COMELEC granted the petition of MONTES
and declared MAGNO disqualified citing Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code.
WON the crime of direct bribery did not involve moral turpitude and WON that Local Government Code,
(citing Section 40 ) and not the Omnibus Election Code that should apply in this situation.
HELD: Direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.
The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or
refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the
part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also, the
fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by
the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good
morals.
The Local Government Code and not the Omnibus Election Code that applies in this situation. Article 12 of
the Omnibus Election Code must yield to Article 40 of the Local Government Code.
The Omnibus Election Code was approved on December 3, 1985 while the Local Government Code took
effect on January 1, 1992. In case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment must
prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant.
In accordance therewith, Section 40 of RA 7160 is deemed to have repealed Section 12 of BP 881.
Section 40 of RA 7160, insofar as it governs the disqualifications of candidates for local positions, assumes
the nature of a special law which ought to prevail. The court Citied David vs. COMELEC: RA 7160 is a
codified set of laws that specifically applies to local government units. Section 40 thereof specially and
definitively provides for disqualifications of candidates for elective local positions. It is applicable to them

only. On the other hand, Section 12 of BP 881 speaks of disqualifications of candidates for any public
office.
The resolution of the COMELEC declaring Magno disqualified from the 2001 mayoral elections is hereby
reversed and set aside.

Lingating v. Comelec
Lingating filed a petition for disqualification against SULONG (May 2001 mayoral candidate) alleging that
Sulong was administratively charged, found guilty (by a Sangguniang Panlalawigan February 4, 1992
decision) and ordered removed from office. Sulong denied that the decision had become final and executory
since he filed a motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal thereof on February 18, 1992. He also
denied having been removed from office.
Because COMELEC was unable to render judgment before the May 2001 elections, Sulong was voted for
and proclaimed mayor.
COMELEC (First Division) then declared Sulong disqualified citing Section 40(b) of the LGC THEN the
COMELEC en banc reversed the resolution of its First Division, dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
The COMELEC en banc found that after having been found guilty by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Sulong was re-elected mayor of Lapuyan Zamboanga del Sur in May 1992 & 1995 elections. Applying
Aguinaldo vs. Santos ruling that re-election renders an administrative case moot and academic the
COMELEC en banc held that the re-election of Sulong in the 1992 and 1995 elections would be tantamount
to a condonation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan decision finding him guilty of dishonesty, malversation
of public funds etc.
Lingating, in this Petition for Certiorari, contends that the COMELEC en banc erred in applying the ruling
in Aguinaldo v. Commission on Elections. He cites Reyes v. Commission on Elections which held that an
elective local executive officer, who is removed before the expiration of the term for which he was elected,
is disqualified from being a candidate for a local elective position under Sec. 40(b) of the LGC.
HELD: Sulong is not disqualified from holding the position of mayor of Lapuyan.
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections cannot be applied to this case because the 1992 decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan has not until now become final. The filing of his motion for reconsideration
prevented the decision of Sangguniang Panlalawigan from becoming final. While R.A. No. 7160 on
disciplinary actions is silent on the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the same cannot be interpreted as
a prohibition against the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Indeed, considering the failure of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan to resolve respondents motion, it is unfair to the electorate to be told after they
have voted for respondent Sulong that after all he is disqualified.
There being no prohibition against a motion for reconsideration there can thus also be no decision finding
respondent guilty to speak of.
Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED; Resolution of the COMELEC en banc is AFFIRMED

Flores v. Drilon
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d) , of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was
appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is
challenged in this petition.
Petitioners, maintain that the proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 infringes on Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the
Constitution, which states that "no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any

capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure, because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an
elective official and the subject posts are public offices;
HELD: Gordon is ineligible for appointment as SBMA Chairman in light of the fact that he is the elective
mayor of Olongapo.
The proviso in Sec. 13 (d) of R.A. 7227 violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or
designation of elective officials to other government posts.
Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution expresses the policy against the concentration of several public
positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be
efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time job. Since
this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the
imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B of the Constitution. The
fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic
is of no moment.
It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC) permits the appointment of a local elective
official to another post if so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office. But, the contention is
fallacious. Section 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A.
7227, for no legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of the land.
In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his office ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of
Sec. 7 Art. IX-B of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by
an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph
appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation
of an elective official to the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself,
e.g., the President as head of the economic and planning agency; the Vice-President, who may be appointed
Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council.
The distinction being clear, the exemption allowed to appointive officials in the second paragraph cannot be
extended to elective officials who are governed by the first paragraph. The phrase "shall be appointed" in
the proviso unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to
the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Had it been the legislative intent to make the subject positions ex
officio, Congress would have, at least, avoided the word "appointed" and, instead, "ex officio" would have
been used. Therefore, as an incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to
the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA.
C.

Election cases involving Local Elective Officials

Galido v. Comelec
Petitioner Galido and private respondent Galeon were candidates during the January 1988 local elections
for mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol. Petitioner was proclaimed duly-elected Mayor. Private respondent
filed an election protest before the RTC which upheld the proclamation of petitioner. Private respondent
appealed RTC decision to the COMELEC. Its First Division reversed the RTC decision and declared
private respondent the duly-elected mayor. After the COMELEC en banc denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration and affirmed the decision of its First Division. The COMELEC held that the 15 ballots in
the same precinct containing the initial C after the name Galido were marked ballots and, therefore,
invalid.

Undaunted, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari and injunction before SC and succeeded in
getting a temporary restraining order. In his comment to the petition, private respondent moved for
dismissal, citing Article IX (C), Section 2(2), paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution, that Final decisions,
orders or rulings of the COMELEC in election contests involving elective municipal offices are final and
executory, and not appealable.
HELD: That decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving elective municipal
and barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to this Court by
way of a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65. Article IX (A), Section 7, 1987 Constitution:
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
(Constitutional) Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt thereof.
The function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court or tribunal (such as the COMELEC in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial powers) within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, SC found no GAD in
COMELECs part.

Rivera v. Comelec
Petitioner Juan Garcia Rivera and private respondent Juan Mitre Garcia II were candidates for the position
of Mayor of Guinobatan, Albay, during the local elections in January 1988. The Municipal Board of
Canvassers proclaimed Rivera as Mayor by a majority of ten votes. Garcia filed an election protest with the
RTC, Legazpi City which found Garcia to have obtained 6,376 votes as against Rivera's 6,222. Rivera
appealed to the COMELEC which affirmed the RTC decision. Garcia commenced to discharge the duties
and functions of Mayor of Guinobatan on 10 October 1990, by virtue of a writ of execution implementing
the COMELEC decision of 6 September 1990. Rivera filed this petition for certiorari.
HELD: The main thrust of the present petition for certiorari is that the respondent COMELEC en banc
committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the decision of its First Division, promulgated on 2
May 1990, annulling the proclamation of the petitioner as the duly elected Mayor of Guinobatan, Albay and
when it did not exclude from the total votes of Garcia at least ten (10) votes which were allegedly
misappreciated in Garcia's favor. We have closely scrutinized the challenged COMELEC decision and find
that the said decision was not arrived at capriciously or whimsically by respondent COMELEC. A
painstaking re-evaluation of the questioned 67 ballots was made by the COMELEC en banc. Moreover, the
appreciation and re-evaluation of ballots are factual determinations. It is settled that in a petition for
certiorari, findings of fact of administrative bodies are final unless grave abuse of discretion has marred
such factual determinations.
D.

Term of Office: 3-Term Limit Rule

Sec 8, Art X, Constitution


Section 8, Art. X, Constitution: The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Sec 43, LGC


Section 43. Term of Office. (a) The term of office of all local elective officials elected after the effectivity of this Code shall be three (3)
years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may be provided for by law, except that of

elective barangay officials: Provided, That all local officials first elected during the local elections
immediately following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3)
years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994.

Rivera v. Comelec
In the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections, respondent Marino "Boking" Morales ran as
candidate for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007.
Petitioners,filed with the COMELEC a petition to cancel respondent Morales Certificate of Candidacy on
the ground that he was elected and had served three previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat.
They alleged that his candidacy violated Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of RA
7160. respondent Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term commencing July
1, 1995 to June 30, 1998 (first term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third term), but he served the
second term from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer"
since his proclamation as mayor was declared void by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
HELD: For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites
must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the
same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
Respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He
served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of
the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. Respondent
Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break
since July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve
(12) continuous years. The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to establish
some safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms. Therefore,
having found respondent Morales ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 should
be cancelled. Not being a candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be
considered stray votes.

Montebon v. Comelec
Petitioners Montebon and Ondy and respondent Potencioso, Jr. were candidates for municipal councilor of
the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections. On
April 30, 2007, petitioners and other candidates for municipal councilor filed a petition for disqualification
against respondent with the COMELEC alleging that respondent had been elected and served three
consecutive terms as municipal councilor in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. Thus, he is proscribed
from running for the same position in the 2007 elections as it would be his fourth consecutive term.
Respondent claimed that the service of his second term in 2001-2004 was interrupted on January 12, 2004
when he succeeded as vice mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Petronilo L. Mendoza.
Consequently, he is not disqualified from vying for the position of municipal councilor in the 2007 elections
HELD: While it is undisputed that respondent was elected municipal councilor for three consecutive terms,
the issue lies on whether he is deemed to have fully served his second term in view of his assumption of
office as vice-mayor of Tuburan on January 12, 2004. Succession in local government offices is by
operation of law. Section 44 of Republic Act No. 7160, provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the
office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor. In this case, a

permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice mayor due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza.
Respondent, being the highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance with law. It is
clear therefore that his assumption of office as vice-mayor can in no way be considered a voluntary
renunciation of his office as municipal councilor. Thus, it is an involuntary severance from his office as
municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term.

Borja v. Comelec
Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term
ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the
incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which
ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending
June 30, 1998. Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998
elections. Petitioner Borja, Jr., also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the theory
that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would
therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that. The COMELEC en banc declared Capco eligible
to run as he was not elected to the position of Mayor in the 1988 election, but succeeded by operation of
law. Thus, it is not counted as 1 term for the computation of the 3 term limitation.
HELD: A textual analysis supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, 8 contemplates service by
local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of the term of
office of elective local officials and bars such official[s] from serving for more than three consecutive
terms.
The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served his full
term of office, states that voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
The term served must therefore be one for which [the official concerned] was elected. The purpose of
this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may
serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the
service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term now
withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as
well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has
served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same
position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

Adormeo v. Comelec
Mayor Adormeo was elected in two consecutive elections and served out the full terms. The third time he
ran, he lost. However during the term of the winning candidate, there was a recall election, which Adormeo
won. He served the unexpired term. Adormeo wants to run again in the next immediately succeeding
elections.
HELD: The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as
the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served
three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for
the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. COMELECs ruling that private respondent
was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly two years he was a private
citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. The time
between his second term and the recall election is sufficient interruption. Thus, there was no three
consecutive terms as contemplated in the disqualifications in the LGC.

Socrates v. Comelec
A recall was initiated for the position of Victorino Dennis M. Socrates who assumed office as Puerto
Princesas mayor on June 30, 2001. Edward M. Hagedorn (Hagedorn for brevity) filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor in the recall election. A petition was filed to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the
recall election and to cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is disqualified from running
for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3)
consecutive full terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post.
HELD: These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an elective
local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive
terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of
office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary
severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before
and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms
After three consecutive terms, an elective official cannot immediate re-election for a fourth term, The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the
next regular election for the same office following the same office following the third consecutive term.
Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons:
1.
2.

A subsequent election like a recall election, is no longer an immediate reelection after the
three consecutive terms.
The intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

Mendoza v. Comelec
Petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra seek to declare respondent Leonardo B. Romans
election as governor of Bataan on May 14, 2001 as null and void for allegedly being contrary to Art. X, 8
of the Constitution.
HELD: The Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than three
consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term limit interruptions in the continuity of
service, so long as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation of the office by an
incumbent. Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during which respondent Leonardo B.
Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election held in 1993, should not be counted.
Since on May 14, 2001 respondent had previously served as governor of Bataan for only two consecutive
terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001), his election on that day was actually only his third term for the same
position.
A recall term should not be considered as one full term, because a contrary interpretation would in effect cut
short the elected officials service to less than nine years and shortchange his constituents. The desire to
prevent monopoly of political power should be balanced against the need to uphold the voters obvious
preference who, in the present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of the votes cast.
E.

Tenure of Office

Osmena v. Comelec
Petition assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 7056, which desynchronized the national and local elections.
This, in effect, shortened the terms of local officials to be elected on November 1992.
WON R.A. 7056 is unconstitutional.

Held: Yes.
R.A. 7056 contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution which provides for the
synchronization of national and local elections. The said law, on the other hand, provides for the desynchronization of election by mandating that there be two separate elections in 1992. The term
synchronization in the mentioned constitutional provision was used synonymously as the phrase holding
simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or
occasion. This common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years.
R.A. 7056 also violated Sec. 2, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the local official
first elected under the Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056,
these incumbent local officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors
shall have been duly elected and qualified. The Supreme Court, quoting Corpus Juris Secundum, states that
it is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over
until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication
prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is
no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify
within the time.
R.A. 7056 also violated the clear mandate of Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987 Constitution which fixed the term of
office of all elective local officials, except barangay officials, to three (3) years. If the local election will be
held on the second Monday of November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected will be serving for only
two years and seven months, that is, from November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not three years.
F.

Vacancies and Succession

Sec 44 47, LGC


See above

Jainal v. Comelec
Mayor Salip Aloy Jainal and Julhatab J. Talib were candidates for Mayor of Indanan, Sulu Jainal was
proclaimed the winning candidate. Talib filed a pre-proclamation case with the COMELEC, praying for the
annulment of certain election returns. Talib claimed that his official watchers were asked to leave the
precincts before the counting and the preparation of the election returns. Furthermore, the election returns
for these precincts did not bear the signatures of the members of the Board of Election, and the number of
votes cast exceeded the number of voters. The COMELEC then issued a Resolution annulling the
proclamation and ordering a recount. The COMELEC issued an Order directing the Vice-Mayor or any
councilor to cease and desist from assuming the position of Acting Mayor. Said Order was issued during the
pendency of the present petition and after Ahajan had already taken his oath and assumed office as Acting
Mayor pursuant to resolutions issued by the COMELEC.
WON the COMELEC Order is valid.
Held: No.
With the nullification of Jainals proclamation, the position of Municipal Mayor of Indanan, Sulu became
vacant. Sec. 44 of R.A. No. 7160 and Art. 83, Rule XIV of the Implementing Rules of the LGC then apply
the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become mayor, a tie between or among the highest ranking
sanggunian members shall be resolved by the drawing of lots, and the successor shall serve only the
unexpired terms of their predecessors.
A permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume
office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.

Ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each
winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding
local election.
The vacancy created by the nullification of Jainals proclamation is in the nature of a permanent vacancy
and may be qualified as a "permanent incapacity to discharge the functions of his office. However, Ahajans
assumption of the office of Mayor should be understood as subject to the result of the recount to be
conducted in accordance with the issuances of the COMELEC.

Labo v. Comelec (supra)


Ramon Labo, Jr. was disqualified as Mayor of Baguio City for non-compliance with the citizenship
requirement of the Constitution.
WON the person with the second highest number of votes cast may assume the position of Mayor.
Held: No.
The candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes cannot occupy the office that was vacant as
a result of the disqualification of the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. The simple
reason is that, obtaining the second highest number of votes, he was obviously not the choice of the people.
It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as a
representative of the constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that
they do not choose him.

Menzon v. Petilla
As no Governor had been proclaimed in the province of Leyte, the Secretary of Local Government
designated Vice-Governor Leopoldo Petilla as Acting Governor and Aurelio Menzon, a senior member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as Vice-Governor. Menzon took his oath of office before Sen. Alberto
Romulo. However, in Resolution No. 505 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Menzons appointment was
held to be invalid. In the meantime, Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimed Governor.
WON (1) there is a vacancy, (2) the Secretary of Local Government had the authority to designate, and (3)
the designation of Menzon is valid.
Held: Yes.
(1) There is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the
duties of the office. The office of Vice-Governor was left vacant when Petilla was appointed as Governor.
(2) Under CA No. 558 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make
temporary appointments in certain public offices in case of any vacancies that may occur. Considering the
silence of the LGC as regards the filling up of vacancies in the position of Governor, the Court rules that, in
order to obviate the dilemma resulting from an interregnum, the President, acting through her alter ego, the
Secretary of Local Government, may remedy the situation. The Secretary of Government therefore had the
authority to designate Menzon as Acting Vice-Governor.
(3) The mode of succession provided for in permanent vacancies may likewise be observed in case of a
temporary vacancy. Menzons appointment is in full accord with the intent of the LGC the contingency of
having vacancies in office cannot be set aside. In a republican form of government, the majority rules
through a chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent, the management of governmental
affairs will be hampered.

The right to be paid the salary attached to the Office of the Vice-Governor is indubitable Menzon is a de
facto officer entitled to compensation.

Docena v. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar


Luis Capito, elected as a member of the SPES, died in office. Agustin Docena was appointed by the
Secretary of Local Government to replace him. Docena took his oath of office before Speaker Ramon Mitra
of the House of Representatives and thereafter assumed office. Socrates Alar was subsequently appointed
by the Secretary of Local Government to the position already occupied by Docena. In a First Indorsement
signed by the Department of Local Government, Alars appointment was recalled on the basis of the earlier
appointment of Docena. The SPES then passed Resolution No. 1, reiterating the recognition of Alar.
WON Docenas appointment was permanent.
Held: Yes.
The appointment, having been issued by the Secretary of Local Government and accepted by Docena, had
already become complete and enforceable for all legal intents and purposes at the time it was supposed to
have been superseded by the appointment in favor of Alar. Docenas appointment was intended to be
permanent and as such was valid for the unexpired portion of the term of the deceased SPES member.
Docena had already acquired security of tenure in the position and could only be removed therefrom for the
causes and conformably to the procedure prescribed by the LGC.

APPOINTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS COMMON TO ALL MUNICIPALITIES , CITIES


AND PROVINCES
Sec 469 490, LGC
Position
1. Secretary to the
Sanggunian

Necessity
mandatory position

Qualifications
Qualifications
a. Citizen of the Philippines
b. Resident of the LGU concerned
c. Of good moral character
d. A holder of a college degree
preferably in law, commerce or
public administration from a
recognized college or university,
and
e. A first grade civil service
eligible or its equivalent. (Sec
469[b])

Duties
a. Attend meetings of the sanggunian and keep a
journal of its proceedings;
b. Keep the seal of the LGU and affix the same
with his signature to all ordinances, resolutions, and
other official acts of the sanggunian and present the
same to the presiding officer for his signature;
c. Forward to the governor or mayor for approval,
copies of ordinances enacted by the sanggunian and
duly certified by the presiding officer;
d. Forward to the sanggunian panlungsod or bayan
or the sangguniang panlungsod of component cities
or sangguniang bayan, copies of duly approved
ordinances;
e. Furnish certified copies of records of public
character in his custody;
f. Record in a book kept for the purpose, all
ordinances and resolutions enacted or adopted by
the sanggunian, with the dates of passage and
publication thereof;
g. Keep his office and all non-confidential records
therein open to the public during the usual business
hours;
h. Translate into the dialect used by the majority of
the inhabitants all ordinances and resolutions
immediately after their approval, and cause the
publication of the same;
i. Take custody of the local archives and, where
applicable, the local library and annually account
for the same; and

2. Treasurer

mandatory position
Appointed by the
Secretary
of
Finance from a list
of at least 3
ranking,
eligible
recommendees of
the governor or
mayor, as the case
may be (Sec 470
[a])

3.
Assistant
Treasurer

optional position
Appointed by the
Secretary
of
Finance from a list
of at least 3
ranking,
eligible
recommendees of
the governor or
mayor (Sec 471[a])

4. Assessor

mandatory position

a. Citizen of the Philippines


b. A resident of the LGU
concerned
c. Of good moral character
d. A holder of a college degree
preferably in commerce, public
administration or law from a
recognized college or university,
and
e. A first grade civil service
eligible or its equivalent.
f. Acquired experience in treasury
or accounting service for at least 5
years in the case of the city or
provincial treasurer, and 3 years in
the case of the municipal treasurer.
(Sec 470[c])

a. A citizen of the Philippines,


b. Resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree
preferably in commerce, public
administration, or law from a
recognized college or university,
e. A first grade civil service
eligible or its equivalent,
f. Acquired at least 5 years
experience in the treasury or
accounting service in the case of
the city or provincial assistant
treasurer, and 3 years in the case of
the municipal assistant treasurer.
(Sec 471[b])
a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU
concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree
preferably in civil or mechanical
engineering, commerce, or any
other related course from a
recognized college or university,
e. A first grade civil service
eligible or its equivalent.
f. Acquired experience in real
property assessment work or in
any related field for at least 5years
in the case of the city or provincial
assessor, and 3 years in the case of
the municipal assessor.
(Sec
472[a])

j. Exercise such other powers and perform such


other duties and functions as may be prescribed by
law or ordinance relative to his position. (Sec.
469[c])
a. Perform the duties provided for under Book II of
the Code
b. Advise the governor or mayor, sanggunian, and
other local government and national officials
regarding disposition of local government funds,
and other matters relative to public finance;
c. Take custody of and exercise proper management
of the funds of LGU;
d. Take charge of the disbursement of all local
government funds and such other funds the custody
of which may be entrusted to him;
e. Inspect private commercial and industrial
establishments in relation to the implementation of
tax ordinances;
f. Maintain and update the tax information system
of the LGU;
g. In the case of the provincial treasurer, exercise
technical supervision over all treasury offices of
component cities and municipalities; and
h. Exercise such other powers and perform such
other duties and functions as may be prescribed by
law or ordinance. (Sec 470[d])
a. Assist the treasurer and perform such duties as
the latter may assign to him.
b. Administer oaths concerning notices and
notifications to those delinquent in the payment of
the real property tax and concerning official matters
relating to the accounts of the treasurer or arising in
the offices of the treasurer and the assessor. (Sec
471[c])

a. Take charge of the assessor's office,


b. Perform the duties provided for under Book II of
the Code,
c. Ensure that all laws and policies governing the
appraisal and assessment of real properties for
taxation purposes are properly executed;
d. Initiate, review, and recommend changes in
policies and objectives, plans and programs,
techniques, procedures and practices in the
valuation and assessment of real properties for
taxation purposes;
e. Establish a systematic method of real property
assessment;
f. Install and maintain a real property identification
and accounting system,
g. Prepare, install and maintain a system of tax
mapping;
h. Conduct frequent physical surveys to verify and
determine whether all real properties within the
province are properly listed in the assessment rolls;
i. Exercise the functions of appraisal and
assessment primarily for taxation purposes of all
real properties in the LGU;
j. Prepare a schedule of the fair market value for the
different classes of real properties;
k. Issue certified copies of assessment records of
real property and all other records relative to its
assessment;

5.
Assistant
Assessor

optional position

6. Accountant

mandatory position

a. Citizen of the Philippines,


b. Resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree
preferably in civil or mechanical
engineering, commerce, or any
related course from a recognized
college or university
e. A first grade civil service
eligible or its equivalent.
f.
Acquired
experience
in
assessment or in any related field
for at least 3years in the case of the
city or provincial assistant
assessor, and 1 year in the case of
the city or provincial assistant
assessor. (Sec 473[a])
a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU
concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A certified public accountant.
e. Acquired experience in the
treasury or accounting service for
at least 5 years in the case of the
provincial or city accountant, and
3 years in the case of the
municipal accountant. (Sec 474[a])
f. Incumbent chief accountant in
the office of the treasurer shall be
given
preference
in
the
appointment to the position of
accountant.(Sec 474[c])

l. Submit every semester a report of all


assessments, cancellations and modifications of
assessments to the local chief executive and the
sanggunian;
m. In the case of the assessor of a component city
or municipality attend sessions of the local board of
assessment appeals whenever his assessment is the
subject of the appeal;
n. In the case of the provincial assessor, exercise
technical supervision and visitorial functions over
all component city and municipal assessors,
coordinate with component city or municipal
assessors in the conduct of tax mapping operations
and all other assessment activities, and provide all
forms of assistance; (Sec 472[b])
o.
Exercise such other powers and
perform such other duties and functions as may be
prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec 472[c])
a. Assist the assessor and perform such other duties
as the latter may assign to him
b. Administer oaths on all declarations of real
property for purposes of assessment. (Sec 473[b])

a. Take charge of both the accounting and internal


audit services of the LGU;
b. Install and maintain an internal audit system in
the local LGU;
c. Prepare and submit financial statements to the
governor or mayor and to the sanggunian;
d. Apprise the sanggunian and other local
government officials on the financial condition and
operations of the LGU;
e. Certify to the availability of budgetary allotment
to which expenditures and obligations may be
properly charged;
f. Review supporting documents before preparation
of vouchers to determine completeness of
requirements;
g. Prepare statements of cash advances, liquidation,
salaries,
allowances,
reimbursements
and
remittances;
h. Prepare statements of journal vouchers and
liquidation of the same and other adjustments;
i. Post individual disbursements to the subsidiary
ledger and index cards;
Maintain individual ledgers for officials and
employees pertaining to payrolls and deductions;
j. Record and post in index cards details of
purchased furniture, fixtures, and equipment,
including disposal thereof, if any;
k. Account for all issued requests for obligations
and maintain and keep all records and reports
related thereto;
l. Prepare journals and the analysis of obligations
and maintain and keep all records and reports
related thereto; and
m. Exercise such other powers and perform such
other duties and functions as may be provided by

7. Budget Officer

mandatory position

a. Citizen of the Philippines,


b. Resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree
preferably
in
accounting,
economics, public administration
or any related course from a
recognized college or university,
e. A first grade civil service
eligible or its equivalent.
f.
Acquired
experience
in
government budgeting or in any
related field for at least 5 years in
the case of the provincial or city
budget officer, and at least 3 years
in the case of the municipal budget
officer. (Sec 475[a])

8. Planning
Development
Coordinator

mandatory position

a. Citizen of the Philippines


b. A resident of the LGU
concerned
c. Of good moral character
d. A holder of a college degree
preferably in urban planning,
development studies, economics,
public administration, or any
related course from a recognized
college or university
e. A first grade civil service
eligible or its equivalent
f.
Acquired
experience
in
development planning or in any
related field for at least 5 years in
the case of the provincial or city
planning
and
development
coordinator, and 3 years in the
case of the municipal planning and
development coordinator.
(Sec
476[a])

mandatory position

a. Citizen of the Philippines,


b. A resident of the LGU
concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A licensed civil engineer
e. Acquired experience in the
practice of his profession for at
least 5 years in the case of the
provincial or city engineer, and 3
years in the case of the municipal
engineer. (Sec 477[a])

9. Engineer

and

law or ordinance. (Sec 474[b])


a. Take charge of the budget office;
b. Prepare forms, orders, and circulars embodying
instructions on budgetary and appropriation matters
for the signature of the governor or mayor,
c. Review and consolidate the budget proposals of
different departments and offices;
d. Assist the governor or mayor in the preparation
of the budget and during budget hearings;
e. Study and evaluate budgetary implications of
proposed legislation and submit comments and
recommendations thereon;
f. Submit periodic budgetary reports to the DBM;
g. Coordinate with the treasurer, accountant, and
the planning and development coordinator for the
purpose of budgeting;
h. Assist the sanggunian concerned in reviewing the
approved budgets;
i. Coordinate with the planning and development
coordinator in the formulation of the local
government unit development plan; (Sec 475 [b])
j. Exercise such other powers and perform such
other duties and functions as may be prescribed by
law or ordinance. (Sec 475[c])
a. Take charge of the planning and development
office
b. Formulate integrated economic, social, physical,
and other development plans and policies for
consideration of the local government development
council;
c. Conduct continuing studies, researches, and
training programs necessary to evolve plans and
programs for implementation;
d. Integrate and coordinate all sectoral plans and
studies undertaken by the different functional
groups or agencies;
e. Monitor and evaluate the implementation of the
different development programs, projects, and
activities in the local government unit concerned in
accordance with the approved development plan;
f. Prepare comprehensive plans and other
development planning documents for the
consideration of the local development council;
g. Analyze the income and expenditure patterns,
and formulate and recommend fiscal plans and
policies for consideration of the finance committee
of LGU;
h. Promote people participation in development
planning within the LGU;
i. Exercise supervision and control over the
secretariat of the local development council; and
(Sec 476[b])
a. Act as the local building official (Sec 477[a])
b. Initiate, review and recommend changes in
policies and objectives, plans and programs,
techniques,
procedures
and
practices
in
infrastructure development and public works in
general;
c. Advise the governor or mayor on infrastructure,
public works, and other engineering matters;
d. Administer, coordinate, supervise, and control
the construction, maintenance, improvement, and
repair of roads, bridges, and other engineering and
public works projects;
e. Provide engineering services to the LGU,
including investigation and survey, engineering
designs,
feasibility
studies,
and
project
management;
f. In the case of the provincial engineer, exercise
technical supervision over all engineering offices of

10. Health Officer

mandatory position

a. Citizen of the Philippines,


b. A resident of the LGU
concerned,
c. Of good moral character, and
d. A licensed medical practitioner.
e. Acquired experience in the
practice of his profession for at
least 5 years in the case of the
provincial or city health officer,
and 3 years in the case of the
municipal
health
officer.
(Sec478[a])

11. Civil Registrar

mandatory: city and


municipal

a. Citizen of the Philippines,


b. A resident of the LGU
concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree
from a recognized college or
university,
e. A first grade civil service
eligible or its equivalent.
f. Acquired experience in civil
registry work for at least 5 years in
the case of the city civil registrar
and 3 years in the case of the
municipal
civil
registrar.
(Sec479[a])

component cities and municipalities; and (Sec


477[b])
g. Exercise such other powers and perform such
other duties and functions as may be prescribed by
law or ordinance. (Sec477[c])
a. Take charge of the office on health services,
supervise the personnel and staff of said office,
formulate program implementation guidelines and
rules and regulations for the operation of the said
b. Formulate measures for the consideration of the
sanggunian and provide technical assistance and
support to the governor or mayor in carrying out
activities to ensure the delivery of basic services
and provision of adequate health facilities;
c. Develop plans and strategies, implement the
same, particularly those which have to do with
health programs and projects which the governor or
mayor, is empowered to implement and which the
sanggunian is empowered to provide for;
d. Formulate and implement policies, plans,
programs and projects to promote the health of the
people;
e. Advise the governor or mayor and the
sanggunian on matters pertaining to health;
f. Execute and enforce all laws, ordinances and
regulations relating to public health;
g. Recommend to the sanggunian, through the local
health board, the passage of such ordinances as he
may deem necessary for the preservation of public
health;
h. Recommend the prosecution of any violation of
sanitary laws, ordinances or regulations;
i. Direct the sanitary inspection of all business
establishments selling food items or providing
accommodations such as hotels, motels, lodging
houses, pension houses, and the like, in accordance
with the Sanitation Code;
j. Conduct health information campaigns and
render health intelligence services;
k. Coordinate with other government agencies and
non-governmental organizations involved in the
promotion and delivery of health services;
l. In the case of the provincial health officer,
exercise general supervision over health officers of
component cities and municipalities; and
m. Be in the frontline of health services delivery,
particularly during and in the aftermath of manmade and natural disasters and calamities; and
(Sec478[b])
n. Exercise such other powers and perform such
other duties and functions as may be prescribed by
law or ordinance. (Sec478[c])
a. Responsible for the civil registration program
pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, the Civil Code,
and other pertinent laws, rules and regulations
(Sec479[b])
b. Take charge of the office of the civil registry
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the
same, particularly those which have to do with civil
registry programs and projects which the mayor is
empowered to implement and which the
sanggunian is empowered to provide for
d. Accept all registrable documents and judicial
decrees affecting the civil status of persons;
e. File, keep and preserve in a secure place the
books required by law;
f. Transcribe and enter immediately upon receipt all
registrable documents and judicial decrees affecting
the civil status of persons in the civil registry
books;

12. Administrator

mandatory:
provincial and city,
optional: municipal

a. Citizen of the Philippines,


b. A resident of the LGU
concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree
preferably
in
public
administration, law, or any other
related course from a recognized
college or university,
e. A first grade civil service
eligible or its equivalent
f.
Acquired
experience
in
management and administration
work for at least 5 years in the case
of the provincial or city
administrator, and 3 years in the
case
of
the
municipal
administrator.
g. Term is coterminous with that
of his appointing authority
(Sec480[a])

13. Legal Officers

mandatory:
provincial and city,
optional: municipal

a. Citizen of the Philippines,


b. A resident of the LGU,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A member of the Philippine Bar
e. Practiced his profession for at
least 5 years in the case of the
provincial and city legal officer,
and 3years in the case of the
municipal legal officer
f. Term of the legal officer shall be
coterminous with that of his
appointing authority.(Sec481[a])

g. Transmit to the Office of the Civil RegistrarGeneral duplicate copies of registered documents
required by law;
h. Issue certified transcripts or copies of any
certificate or registered documents upon payment
of the prescribed fees to the treasurer;
i. Receive applications for the issuance of a
marriage license and issue the license upon
payment of the authorized fee to the treasurer;
g. Coordinate with the NSO in conducting
educational campaigns for vital registration and
assist in the preparation of demographic and other
statistics (Sec479[c])
h. Exercise such other powers and perform such
other duties and functions as may be prescribed by
law or ordinance. (Sec479[d])
a. Take charge of the office of the administrator
b. Develop plans and strategies and implement the
same particularly those which have to do with the
management and administration-related programs
and projects which the governor or mayor is
empowered to implement and which the
sanggunian is empowered to provide for;
c. Assist in the coordination of the work of all the
officials of the LGU, under the supervision,
direction, and control of the governor or mayor, and
convene the chiefs of offices and other officials of
the local government unit;
d. Establish and maintain a sound personnel
program for the LGU designed to promote career
development and uphold the merit principle in the
local government service;
e.
Conduct
a
continuing
organizational
development of the LGU with the end in view of
instituting effective administrative reforms;
f. Be in the frontline of the delivery of
administrative support services, particularly those
related to the situations during and in the aftermath
of man-made and natural disasters and calamities;
g. Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the
governor and mayor on all other matters relative to
the management and administration of the LGU
(Sec480[b])
h. Exercise such other powers and perform such
other duties and functions as may be prescribed by
law or ordinance. (Sec480[c])
a. Take charge of the office of legal services
b. Formulate measures for the consideration of the
sanggunian and provide legal assistance and
support to the governor or mayor, in carrying out
the delivery of basic services and provisions of
adequate facilities
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the
same, particularly those which have to do with
programs and projects related to legal services
which the governor or mayor is empowered to
implement and which the sanggunian is empowered
to provide
d. Represent the local government unit in all civil
actions and special proceedings wherein the LGU
or any official thereof, in his official capacity, is a
party;
e. Draft ordinances, contracts, bonds, leases and
other instruments, involving any interest of the
LGU; and provide comments and recommendations
on any instruments already drawn;
f. Render his opinion in writing on any question of
law when requested to do so by the governor,
mayor, or sanggunian;
g. Investigate or cause to be investigated any local

14. Agriculturist

mandatory:
provincial;
optional: city and
municipal

a. Citizen of the Philippines,


b. A resident of the LGU
concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree in
agriculture or any related course
from a recognized college or
university,
e. A first grade civil service
eligible or its equivalent.
f. Practiced his profession in
agriculture or acquired experience
in a related field for at least 5 years
in the case of the provincial and
city agriculturist, and 3years in the
case of the municipal agriculturist.
(Sec482[a])

official or employee for administrative neglect or


misconduct in office, and recommend appropriate
action;
h. Investigate or cause to be investigated any
person, firm or corporation holding any franchise or
exercising any public privilege for failure to
comply with any term or condition in the grant of
such franchise or privilege, and recommending
appropriate action to the governor, mayor or
sanggunian, as the case may be;
i. Initiate and prosecute in the interest of the LGU
any civil action on any bond, lease or other contract
upon any breach or violation thereof;
j. Review and submit recommendations on
ordinances approved and executive orders issued by
component units;
k. Recommend measures to the sanggunian and
advise the governor or mayor as the case may be on
all other matters related to upholding the rule of
law ;
l. Be in the frontline of protecting human rights and
prosecuting any violations thereof, particularly
those which occur during and in the aftermath of
man-made or natural disasters or calamities; and
(Sec481[b])
m. Exercise such other powers and perform such
other duties and functions as may be prescribed by
law or ordinance. (Sec481[c])
a. Take charge of the office for agricultural service
b. Formulate measures and provide technical
assistance and support in carrying out said
measures to ensure the delivery of basic services
and provision of adequate facilities relative to
agricultural services as provided for under Section
17
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the
same, particularly those which have to do with
agricultural programs and projects which the
governor or mayor is empowered to implement and
which the sanggunian us empowered to provide for
d. Ensure that maximum assistance and access to
resources in the production, processing and
marketing of agricultural and aqua-cultural and
marine products are extended to farmers, fishermen
and local entrepreneurs;
e. Conduct or cause to be conducted locationspecific agricultural researches and assist in making
available the appropriate technology arising out of
and disseminating information on basic research on
crops, preventive and control of plant diseases and
pests, and other agricultural matters
f. Assist in the establishment and extension services
of demonstration farms or aqua-culture and marine
products;
g. Enforce rules and regulations relating to
agriculture and aquaculture;
h. Coordinate with government agencies and NGOs
which promote agricultural productivity through
appropriate
technology
compatible
with
environmental integrity;
i. Be in the frontline of delivery of basic
agricultural services, particularly those needed for
the survival of the inhabitants during and in the
aftermath of man-made and natural disasters;
j. Recommend and advise on all matters related to
agriculture and aqua-culture which will improve the
livelihood and living conditions of the inhabitants;
(Sec482[b])
k. Exercise such other powers and perform such
other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

15. Social Welfare


and Development
Officer

mandatory:
provincial and city;
optional: municipal

a. Citizen of the Philippines,


b. A resident of the LGU
concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A duly licensed social worker or
a holder of a college degree
preferably in sociology or any
other related course from a
recognized college or university,
e. A first grade civil service
eligible or its equivalent
f. Acquired experience in the
practice of social work for at least
5 years in the case of the
provincial or city social welfare
and development officer, and 3
years in the case of the municipal
social welfare and development
officer. (Sec483[a])

16.
Environment
and
Natural
Resources Officer

optional position

a. A citizen of the Philippines,


b. Resident of the
local
government unit concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. Holder of a college degree
preferably
in
environment,
forestry, agriculture or any related
course from a recognized college
or university,
e. A first grade civil service
eligible or its equivalent
f.
Acquired
experience
in
environmental
and
natural
resources
management,
conservation, and utilization, of at
least 5 years in the case of the

law or ordinance. (Sec482[c])


a. Take charge of the office on social welfare and
development services
b. Formulate measures and provide technical
assistance and support in carrying out measures to
ensure the delivery of basic services and provision
of adequate facilities relative to social welfare and
development services as provided for under Section
17
c. Develop plans and strategies and mplement the
same particularly those which have to do with
social welfare programs and projects which the
governor or mayor is empowered to implement and
which the sanggunian is empowered to provide for
d. Identify the basic needs of the needy, the
disadvantaged and the impoverished and develop
and implement appropriate measures to alleviate
their problems and improve their living conditions;
e. Provide relief and appropriate crisis intervention
for victims of abuse and exploitation and
recommend appropriate measures to deter further
abuse and exploitation;
f. Assist the governor or mayor in implementing the
barangay level program for the total development
and protection of children up to six (6) years of age;
g. Facilitate the implementation of welfare
programs for the disabled, elderly, and victims of
drug addiction, the rehabilitation of prisoners and
parolees, the prevention of juvenile delinquency
and such other activities which would eliminate or
minimize the ill-effects of poverty;
h. Initiate and support youth welfare programs that
will enhance the role of the youth in nationbuilding;
i. Coordinate with government agencies and NGOs
which have for their purpose the promotion and the
protection
of
all
needy,
disadvantaged,
underprivileged or impoverished groups or
individuals, particularly those identified to be
vulnerable and high-risk to exploitation, abuse and
neglect;
j. Be in the frontline of service delivery,
particularly those which have to do with immediate
relief during and assistance in the aftermath of
man-made and natural disaster and natural
calamities;
k. Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the
governor or mayor on all other matters related to
social welfare and development services which will
improve the livelihood and living conditions of the
inhabitants; (Sec483[b])
l. Exercise such other powers and perform such
other duties and functions as may be prescribed by
law or ordinance. (Sec483[c])
a. Take charge of the office on environment and
natural resources
b. Formulate measures and provide technical
assistance and support in carrying out measures to
ensure the delivery of basic services and provision
of adequate facilities relative to environment and
natural resources services as provided for under Sec
17;
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the
same, particularly those which have to do with
environment and natural resources programs and
projects which the governor or mayor is
empowered to implement and which the
sanggunian is empowered to provide for;
d. Establish, maintain, protect and preserve
communal forests, watersheds, tree parks,

provincial or city environment and


natural resources officer, and 3
years in the case of the municipal
environment and natural resources
officer. (Sec484[a])

17. Architect

optional position

a. Citizen of the Philippines,


b. A resident of the LGU
concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A duly licensed architect.
e. Practiced his profession for at
least 5 years in the case of the
provincial or city architect, and 3
years in the case of the municipal
architect. (Sec485[a])

mangroves, greenbelts and similar forest projects


and commercial forest;
e. Provide extension services to beneficiaries of
forest development projects and technical, financial
and infrastructure assistance;
f. Manage and maintain seed banks and produce
seedlings for forests and tree parks;
g. Provide extension services to beneficiaries of
forest development projects and render assistance
for natural resources-related conservation and
utilization activities consistent with ecological
balance;
h. Promote the small-scale mining and utilization of
mineral resources, particularly mining of gold;
i. Coordinate with government agencies and NGOs
in the implementation of measures to prevent and
control land, air and water pollution with the
assistance of the DENR;
j. Be in the frontline of the delivery of services
concerning the environment and natural resources,
particularly in the renewal and rehabilitation of the
environment during and in the aftermath of manmade and natural calamities and disasters;
k. Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the
governor or mayor on all matters relative to the
protection, conservation, maximum utilization,
application of appropriate technology and other
matters related to the environment and natural
resources; and (Sec484[b])
l. Exercise such other powers and perform such
other duties and functions as may be prescribed by
law or ordinance. (Sec484[c])
a. Take charge of the office on architectural
planning and design
b. Formulate measures for the consideration of the
sanggunian and provide technical assistance and
support to the governor or mayor in carrying out
measures to ensure the delivery of basic services
and provision of adequate facilities relative to
architectural planning and design as provided for
under Section 17;
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the
same, particularly those which have to do with
architectural planning and design programs and
projects which the governor or mayor is
empowered to implement and which the
sanggunian is empowered to provide for under this
Code;
d. Prepare and recommend for consideration of the
sanggunian the architectural plan and design for the
local government unit or a part thereof, including
the renewal of slums and blighted areas, land
reclamation activities, the greening of land, and
appropriate planning of marine and foreshore areas;
e. Review and recommend for appropriate action
of the sanggunian, governor or mayor the
architectural plans and design submitted by
governmental and non-governmental entities or
individuals, particularly those for undeveloped,
underdeveloped, and poorly-designed areas;
f. Coordinate with government and NGOs and
individuals involved in the aesthetics and the
maximum utilization of the land and water within
the jurisdiction of the LGU, compatible with
environmental integrity and ecological balance.
g. Be in the frontline of the delivery of services
involving architectural planning and design,
particularly those related to the redesigning of
spatial distribution of basic facilities and physical
structures during and in the aftermath of man-made

18.
Information
Officer

optional position

a. Citizen of the Philippines,


b. A resident of the LGU
concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree
preferably in journalism, mass
communication or any related
course from a recognized college
or university,
e. A first grade civil service
eligible or its equivalent.
f. Have experience in writing
articles and research papers, or in
writing for print, television or
broadcast media of at least 3 years
in the case of the provincial or city
information officer, and at least 1
year in the case of municipal
information officer.
g. Term of the information officer
is
co-terminous
with
his
appointing authority. (Sec486[a])

19.
Cooperative
Officer

optional: provincial
and city

a. Citizen of the Philippines,


b. A resident of the LGU
concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. Holder of a college degree
preferably
in
business
administration
with
special
training in cooperatives or any
related course from a recognized
college or university,
e. First grade civil service eligible
or its equivalent
f. Have experience in cooperatives
organization and management of at
least 5 years in the case of the
provincial or city cooperatives
officer, and 3 years in the case of
municipal cooperatives officer.
(Sec487[a])

and natural calamities and disasters;


h. Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the
governor or mayor on all other matters relative to
the architectural planning and design as it relates to
the total socioeconomic development of the local
government unit; and (Sec 485[b])
i. Exercise such other powers and perform such
other duties and functions as may be prescribed by
law or ordinance. (Sec485[c])
a. Take charge of the office on public information
b. Formulate measures and provide technical
assistance and support in providing the information
and research data required for the delivery of basic
services and provision of adequate facilities so that
the public becomes aware of said services and may
fully avail of the same;
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the
same, particularly those which have to do with
public information and research data to support
programs and projects which the governor or mayor
is empowered to implement and which the
sanggunian is empowered to provide for;
d. Provide relevant, adequate, and timely
information to the LGU and its residents;
e. Furnish information and data on LGUs to
government agencies or offices as may be required
by law or ordinance; and NGOs to be furnished to
said agencies and organizations;
f. Maintain effective liaison with the various sectors
of the community on matters and issues that affect
the livelihood and the quality of life of the
inhabitants and encourage support for programs of
the local and national government;
g. Be in the frontline in providing information
during and in the aftermath of manmade and natural
calamities and disasters, with special attention to
the victims thereof, to help minimize injuries and
casualties during and after the emergency, and to
accelerate relief and rehabilitation;
h. Recommend and advise on all other matters
relative to public information and research data as it
relates to the total socioeconomic development of
the LGU; (Sec486[b])
i. Exercise such other powers and perform such
other duties and functions as may be prescribed by
law or ordinance. (Sec486[c])
a. Take charge of the office for the development of
cooperatives
b. Formulate measures and provide technical
assistance and support in carrying out measures to
ensure the delivery of basic services and provision
of facilities through the development of
cooperatives, and in providing access to such
services and facilities;
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the
same, particularly those which have to do with the
integration of cooperatives principles and methods
in programs and projects which the governor or
mayor is empowered to implement and which the
sanggunian is empowered to provide for;
d. Assist in the organization of cooperatives;
e. Provide technical and other forms of assistance
to existing cooperatives to enhance their viability as
an economic enterprise and social organization;
f. Assist cooperatives in establishing linkages with
government agencies and NGOs involved in the
promotion and integration of the concept of
cooperatives in the livelihood of the people and
other community activities;
g. Be in the frontline of cooperatives organization,

20.
Population
Officer

optional position

a. Citizen of the Philippines,


b. A resident of the LGU
concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree
with specialized training in
population development from a
recognized college or university,
e. A first grade civil service
eligible or its equivalent.
f. Have experience in the
implementation of programs on
population
development
or
responsible parenthood for at least
5 years in the case of the
provincial or city population
officer and 3 years in the case of
the municipal population officer.
(Sec488[a])

21. Veterinarian

mandatory:
provincial and city

a. Citizen of the Philippines,


b. A resident of the local
government concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A licensed doctor of veterinary
medicine,
e. Have practiced his profession
for at least 3 years in the case of
provincial or city veterinarian and
at least 1 year in the case of the
municipal
veterinarian.
(Sec489[a])

rehabilitation or viability-enhancement, particularly


during and in the aftermath of man-made and
natural calamities and disasters, to aid in their
survival and, if necessary subsequent rehabilitation;
h. Recommend and advise on all other matters
relative to cooperatives development and viabilityenhancement which will improve the livelihood and
quality of life of the inhabitants; (Sec487[b])
i. Exercise such other powers and perform such
other duties and functions as may be prescribed by
law or ordinance. (Sec487[c])
a. Take charge of the office on population
development
b. Formulate measures and provide technical
assistance and support in carrying out measures to
ensure the delivery of basic services and provision
of adequate facilities relative to the integration of
the population development principles and in
providing access to said services and facilities;
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the
same, particularly those which have to do with the
integration of population development principles
and methods in programs and projects which the
governor or mayor is empowered to implement and
which the sanggunian is empowered to provide for;
d. Assist the governor or mayor in the
implementation of the Constitutional provisions
relative to population development and the
promotion of responsible parenthood;
e. Establish and maintain an updated data bank for
program operations, development planning and an
educational program to ensure the people's
participation in and understanding of population
development;
f. Implement appropriate training programs
responsive to the cultural heritage of the
inhabitants; (Sec488[b])
g. Exercise such other powers and perform such
other duties and functions as may be prescribed by
law or ordinance. (Sec488[c])
a. Take charge of the office for veterinary services;
b. Formulate measures and provide technical
assistance and support in carrying out measures to
ensure the delivery of basic services and provision
of adequate facilities pursuant to Section 17;
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the
same particularly those which have to do with the
veterinary-related activities which the governor or
mayor is empowered to implement and which the
sanggunian is empowered to provide for
d. Advise the governor or the mayor on all matters
pertaining to the slaughter of animals for human
consumption and the regulation of slaughterhouses;
e. Regulate the keeping of domestic animals;
f. Regulate and inspect poultry, milk and dairy
products for public consumption;
g. Enforce all laws and regulations for the
prevention of cruelty to animals;
h. Take the necessary measures to eradicate,
prevent or cure all forms of animal diseases;
i. Be in the frontline of veterinary related activities,
such as in the outbreak of highly-contagious and
deadly diseases, and in situations resulting in the
depletion of animals for work and human
consumption, particularly those arising from and in
the aftermath of man-made and natural calamities
and disasters;
j. Recommend and advise on all other matters
relative to veterinary services which will increase
the number and improve the quality of livestock,

22.
General
Services Officer

mandatory:
provincial and city

a. Citizen of the Philippines,


b. A resident of the local
government unit concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree on
public administration, business
administration and management
from a recognized college or
university,
e. A first grade civil service
eligible or its equivalent.
f. Have acquired experience in
general
services,
including
management of supply, property,
solid waste disposal, and general
sanitation, of at least 5 years in the
case of the provincial or city
general services officer, and at
least 3 years in the case of the
municipal general services officer.
(Sec490[a])

poultry and other domestic animals used for work


or human consumption; (Sec489[b])
k. Exercise such other powers and perform such
other duties and functions as may be prescribed by
law or ordinance. (Sec489[c])
a. Take charge of the office on general services;
b. Formulate measures and provide technical
assistance and support in carrying out measures to
ensure the delivery of basic services and provision
of adequate facilities pursuant to Section 17 and
which require general services expertise and
technical support services;
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the
same, particularly those which have to do with the
general services supportive of the welfare of the
inhabitants which the governor or mayor is
empowered to implement and which the
sanggunian is empowered to provide for;
d. Take custody of and be accountable for all
properties, real or personal, owned by the LGU and
those granted to it in the form of donation,
reparation, assistance and counterpart of joint
projects;
e. Assign building or land space to local officials or
other public officials, who by law, are entitled to
such space;
f. Recommend the reasonable rental rates for local
government properties, whether real or personal,
which will be leased to public or private entities
g. Recommend reasonable rental rates of private
properties which may be leased for the official use
of the local government unit;
h. Maintain and supervise janitorial, security,
landscaping and other related services in all local
government public buildings and other real
property
i. Collate and disseminate information regarding
prices, shipping and other costs of supplies and
other items commonly used by the LGU;
j. Perform archival and record management with
respect to records of offices and departments of the
LGU
k. Perform all other functions pertaining to supply
and property management performed by the local
government treasurer; and enforce policies on
records creation, maintenance, and disposal;
l. Be in the frontline of general services related
activities, such as the possible or imminent
destruction or damage to records, supplies,
properties, and structures and the orderly and
sanitary clearing up of waste materials or debris,
particularly during and in the aftermath of manmade and natural calamities and disasters;
m. Recommend and advise on all other matters
relative to general services; (Sec490[b])
n. Exercise such other powers and perform such
other duties and functions as may be prescribed by
law or ordinance. (Sec490[c])

De Rama v. CA
Mayor Conrado de Rama sought for the recall of 14 municipal employees on the ground that they were
midnight appointees of the former mayor, in violation of Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution. The Civil
Service Commission declared the appointments in accordance with law and valid (approved by the head of
the CSC Field Office of Lucena City).

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments were unconstitutional. Held: No.


RULING: Rule VI, Sec. 20 of the Omnibus Implementing Rules of the Revised Administrative Code
provides that appointments may be recalled on the following grounds: (1) non-compliance with procedure,
(2) failure to pass through Selection Board, (3) violation of agreement relative to promotion, (4 violation of
other existing civil service laws.
No law prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.
The midnight appointments prohibited by Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution applies only to
appointments made by the President. There were no allegations of fraud on the part of the outgoing mayor
or that the appointments were tainted by irregularities only belatedly, as a supplemental pleading on
appeal, was it alleged that CSC procedures were not followed (rules on screening, posting of notices, merit
and fitness). Failure to raise these grounds in the original pleading constitutes a waiver.
Upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointees assumption of position, he acquires a legal and
not only equitable right to the position, which cannot be taken away either by revocation or by removal
without cause and previous notice and hearing. There is no showing that any of the appointees were not
qualified. They assumed their appointive positions this cannot be unilaterally revoked.
Rule V, Sec. 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Rules of the Revised Administrative Code provides that an
appointment accepted cannot be revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and effect
until disapproved by the CSC.
a.

Leagues of Local Barangay Units and Elective Officials

Sec 491 510, LGC


Article One. Liga ng Mga Barangay
Sec. 491. Purpose of Organization. There shall be an organization of all barangays, to be known as the
Liga ng mga Barangay, for the primary purpose of determining the representation of the liga in the
sanggunians and for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government
administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.
Sec. 492. Representation, Chapters, National Liga. Every barangay shall be represented in said liga by the
punong barangay, or in his absence or incapacity, by a sanggunian member duly elected for the purpose
among its members, who shall attend all meetings or deliberations called by the different chapters of the
liga.
The liga shall have chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan political subdivision levels.
The municipal and city chapters of the liga shall be composed of the barangay representatives of municipal
and city barangays, respectively. The duly elected presidents of component municipal and city chapters
shall constitute the provincial chapter or the metropolitan political subdivision chapter. The duly elected
presidents of highly-urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the Metropolitan Manila chapter and metropolitan
political subdivision chapters shall constitute the National Liga ng mga Barangay.
Sec. 493. Organization. The liga at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and
national levels directly elect a president, a vice-president, and five (5) members of the board of directors.
The board shall appoint its secretary and treasurer and create such other positions as it may deem necessary
for the management of the chapter. A secretary-general shall be elected from among the members of the
national liga and shall be charged with the overall operation of the liga on the national level. The board
shall coordinate the activities of the chapters of the liga.

Sec. 494. Ex Officio Membership in Sanggunians. The duly elected presidents of the liga at the municipal,
city and provincial levels, including the component cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, shall
serve as ex-officio members of the sangguniang bayan, sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang
panlalawigan, respectively. They shall serve as such only during their term of office as presidents of the liga
chapters, which in no case shall be beyond the term of office of the sanggunian concerned.
Sec. 495. Powers, Functions and Duties of the Liga ng mga Barangay. The Liga ng mga Barangay shall:
(a) Give priority to programs designed for the total development of the barangays and in consonance with
the policies, programs and projects of the National Government;
(b) Assist in the education of barangay residents for people's participation in local government
administration in order to promote united and concerted action to achieve country wide development goals;
(c) Supplement the efforts of government in creating gainful employment within the barangay;
(d) Adopt measures to promote the welfare of barangay officials;
(e) Serve as a forum of the barangays in order to forge linkages with government and non-governmental
organizations and thereby promote the social, economic and political well-being of the barangays; and
(f) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions which will bring about
stronger ties between barangays and promote the welfare of the barangay inhabitants.
Article Two. League of Municipalities
Sec. 496. Purpose of Organization. There shall be an organization of all municipalities, to be known as the
League of Municipalities, for the primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues
affecting municipal government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions
thereto.
The league shall form provincial chapters composed of the league presidents for all component
municipalities of the province.
Sec. 497. Representation. Every municipality shall be represented in the league by the municipal mayor
or, in his absence, by the vice mayor or a sanggunian member duly elected for the purpose by the members,
who shall attend all meetings and participate in the deliberations of the league.
Sec. 498. Powers, Functions and Duties of the League of Municipalities. The League of Municipalities
shall:
(a) Assist the National Government in the formulation and implementation of policies, programs and
projects affecting municipalities as a whole;
(b) Promote local autonomy at the municipal level;
(c)

Adopt measures for the promotion of the welfare of all municipalities and its officials and employees;

(d) Encourage people's participation in local government administration in order to promote united and
concerted action for the attainment of country wide development goals;
(e) Supplement the efforts of the National Government in creating opportunities for gainful employment
within the municipalities;

(f) Give priority to programs designed for the total development of the municipalities in consonance with
the policies, programs and projects of the National Government;
(g) Serve as a forum for crystallizing and expressing ideas, seeking the necessary assistance of the
National Government, and providing the private sector avenues for cooperation in the promotion of the
welfare of the municipalities; and
(h) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as the league may prescribe
for the welfare of the municipalities.
Article Three.

League of Cities

Sec. 499. Purpose of Organization. There shall be an organization of all cities, to be known as the League
of Cities, for the primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting city
government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.
The league may form chapters at the provincial level for the component cities of a province. Highlyurbanized cities may also form a chapter of the league. The National League shall be composed of the
presidents of the league of highly-urbanized cities and the presidents of the provincial chapters of the league
of component cities.
Sec. 500. Representation. Every city shall be represented in the league by the city mayor or, in his
absence, by the city vice mayor or a sanggunian member duly elected for the purpose by the members, who
shall attend all meetings and participate in the deliberations of the league.
Sec. 501. Powers, Functions and Duties of the League of Cities. The League of Cities shall:
(a) Assist the National Government in the formulation and implementation of the policies, programs and
projects affecting cities as a whole;
(b) Promote local autonomy at the city level;
(c)

Adopt measures for the promotion of the welfare of all cities and its officials and employees;

(d) Encourage people's participation in local government administration in order to promote united and
concerted action for the attainment of country wide development goals;
(e) Supplement the efforts of the National Government in creating opportunities for gainful employment
within the cities;
(f) Give priority to programs designed for the total development of cities in consonance with the policies,
programs and projects of the National Government;
(g) Serve as a forum for crystallizing and expressing ideas, seeking the necessary assistance of the
National Government and providing the private sector avenues for cooperation in the promotion of the
welfare of the cities; and
(h) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as the league may prescribe
for the welfare of the cities.
Article Four. League of Provinces
Sec. 502. Purpose of Organization. There shall be an organization of all provinces, to be known as the
League of Provinces, for the primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting
provincial and metropolitan political subdivision government administration and securing, through proper

and legal means, solutions thereto. For this purpose, the Metropolitan Manila Area and any metropolitan
political subdivision shall be considered as separate provincial units of the league.
Sec. 503. Representation. Every province shall be represented in the league by the provincial governor, or
in his absence, by the provincial vice mayor or a sanggunian member duly elected for the purpose by the
members, who shall attend all meetings and participate in the deliberations of the league.
Sec. 504. Powers, Functions and Duties of the League of Provinces. The league of Provinces shall:
(a) Assist the National Government in the formulation and implementation of the policies, programs and
projects affecting provinces as a whole;
(b) Promote local autonomy at the provincial level;
(c)

Adopt measures for the promotion of the welfare of all provinces and its officials and employees;

(d) Encourage people's participation in local government administration in order to promote united and
concerted action for the attainment of countrywide development goals;
(e) Supplement the efforts of the National Government in creating opportunities for gainful employment
within the province;
(f) Give priority to programs designed for the total development of the provinces in consonance with the
policies, programs and projects of the National Government;
(g) Serve as a forum for crystallizing and expressing ideas, seeking the necessary assistance of the
national government and providing the private sector avenues for cooperation in the promotion of the
welfare of the provinces; and
(h) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as the league may prescribe
for the welfare of the provinces and metropolitan political subdivisions.
Article Five.

Provisions Common to all Leagues

Sec. 505. Funding. (a) All leagues shall derive its funds from contributions of member local government
units and from fund-raising projects and activities without the necessity of securing permits therefor:
Provided, That the proceeds from said fund-raising projects and activities shall be used primarily to fund the
projects for which the said proceeds have been raised, subject to the pertinent provisions of this Code and
the Omnibus Election Code.
(b) All funds of leagues shall be deposited as trust funds with its treasurer and shall be disbursed in
accordance with the board of director's resolutions, subject to pertinent accounting and auditing rules and
regulations: Provided, That the treasurer shall be bonded in an amount to be determined by the board of
directors. The funds of a chapter shall be deposited as chapter funds and funds of the national league shall
be deposited as national funds.
Sec. 506. Organizational Structure. To ensure the effective and efficient administration, the leagues for
municipalities, cities and provinces shall elect chapter-level and national-level boards of directors and a set
of officers headed by the president. A secretary-general shall be chosen from among the national league
members to manage the day to day operation and activities of the national league. The board of directors on
the chapter or national level may create such other positions as may be deemed necessary for the
management of the chapters and of the national league. The national board directors of the leagues for
municipalities, cities or provinces shall coordinate programs, projects and activities of the chapter and the
national-level league.

Sec. 507. Constitution and By-laws of the Liga and the Leagues. All other matters not herein otherwise
provided for affecting the internal organization of the leagues of local government units shall be governed
by their respective constitution and by-laws which are hereby made suppletory to the provision of this
Chapter: Provided, That said constitution and by-laws shall always conform to the provisions of the
Constitution and existing laws.
CHAPTER 2.

Leagues and Federations of Local Elective Officials

Sec. 508. Organization. (a) Vice governors, vice mayors, sanggunian members of barangays,
municipalities, component cities, highly-urbanized cities and provinces, and other elective local officials of
local government units, including those of the Metropolitan Manila area and any metropolitan political
subdivisions, may form their respective leagues or federations, subject to applicable provisions of this Title
and pertinent provisions of this Code;
(b) Sanggunian members of component cities and municipalities shall form a provincial federation and
elect a board of directors and a set of officers headed by the president. The duly elected president of the
provincial federation of sanggunian members of component cities and municipalities shall be an ex officio
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned and shall serve as such only during his term of office
as president of the provincial federation of sanggunian members of component cities and municipalities,
which in no case shall be beyond the term of office of the sanggunian panlalawigan concerned.
Sec. 509. Constitution and By-laws. The leagues or federations shall adopt a constitution and by-laws
which shall govern their internal organization and operation: Provided, That said constitution and by-laws
shall always conform to the provision of the Constitution and existing laws.
Sec. 510. Funding. The leagues and federations may derive funds from contributions of individual league
or federation members or from fund-raising projects or activities. The local government unit concerned may
appropriate funds to support the leagues or federation organized pursuant to this Section, subject to the
availability of funds.

David v. Comelec
Petitioners seek to declare as unconstitutional Sec. 43(c) of R.A. 7160, which limited the term of office of
Barangay officials to three years. Petitioners contend that under Sec. 2 of RA 6653 the term of office of
barangay officials shall be for five years. This is reiterated in R.A. 6679. Petitioners further aver that
although Sec. 43 of RA 7160 reduced the term of office of all local elective officials to three years, such
reduction does not apply to barangay officials because (1) RA 6679 is a special law applicable only to
barangays while RA 7160 is a general law which applies to all other local government units; (2) RA 7160
does not expressly or impliedly repeal RA 6679 insofar as the term of barangay officials is concerned; (3)
while Sec. 8 of Article X of the 1987 constitution fixes the term of elective local officials at three years, the
same provision states that the term of barangay officials "shall be determined by law"; and (4) thus, it
follows that the constitutional intention is to grant barangay officials any term, except three years.
The COMELEC maintains that RA 7160 repealed all other special laws relied upon by the Petitioner.
WON the term of the barangay officials should be limited only to three years.
Held: Yes.
R.A. 7160 was enacted later than RA 6679. In case of an irreconciliable conflict between two laws of
different vintages, the later enactment prevails. Also, R.A. 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically
applies to local government units. It specifically provides that the term of office of barangay officials shall
be for three years. With such particularity, the provision cannot be deemed a general law.

Petitioners posit that by excepting barangay officials whose "term shall be determined by law" from the
general provision fixing the term of "elective local officials" at three years, the Constitution thereby
impliedly prohibits Congress from legislating a three year term for such officers. This is legally flawed. The
Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for barangay officials. It
merely left the determination of such term to the lawmaking body, without any specific limitation or
prohibition, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in accordance with the
exigencies of public service.
b.

Private counsel/lawyers for elective local officials

Alinsug v. RTC-Negros Occidental


Zonsayda Alinsug was a regular employee of the Office of the Mayor of Escalante Negros Occidental.
Mayor Ponsica issued Office Order No. 31, suspending Zonsayda for one month and one day for simple
misconduct categorized as an act of insubordination.
Zonsayda filed with the RTC a petition for injunction with damages. Mayor Ponsica, through private
practitioner Samuel SM Lezama, claimed that Zonsayda had not yet exhausted administrative remedies and
that her suspension was in accordance with law. Alinsug moved that the respondents be all declared in
default on the ground that, since the respondents were sued in their official capacities, they should have
been represented by either the municipal legal officer or the provincial legal officer or prosecutor as
provided for by Sec. 481 (b) [i] and [3] of the Local Government Code. The respondents opposed the
motion manifesting that the municipality of Escalante has no legal officer.
WON private counsel may represent municipal officials sued in their official capacities.
Held: Yes.
It appears that the law allows a private counsel to be hired by a municipality only when the municipality is
an adverse party in a case involving the provincial government or another municipality or city within the
province. This has its apparent origin in De Guia v. The Auditor General where the Court held that the
municipality's authority to employ a private attorney is expressly limited only to situations where the
provincial fiscal would be disqualified to serve and represent it.
But would these proscriptions include public officials? Not necessarily. It can happen that a government
official, ostensibly acting in his official capacity and sued in that capacity, is later held to have exceeded his
authority. On the one hand, his defense would have then been underwritten by the people's money which
ordinarily should have been his personal expense. On the other hand, personal liability can attach to him
without, however, his having had the benefit of assistance of a counsel of his own choice.
In the discharge of governmental functions, municipal corporations are responsible for the acts of its
officers, except if and when, the only to the extent that, they have acted by authority of the law, and in
conformity with the requirements thereof. Also, a government official sued in his official capacity may
engage the services of private counsel when the complaint contains other allegations and a prayer for moral
damages, which, if due from the defendants, must be satisfied by them in their private capacity.
The key then to resolving the issue of whether a local government official may secure the services of
private counsel, in an action filed against him in his official capacity, lies on the nature of the action and the
relief that is sought.
While the petition below was filed against respondents as public officials, its allegations were also aimed at
questioning certain acts that can well bring the case beyond the mere confines of official functions; thus
The petition then went on to claim moral and exemplary damages, as well as litigation expenses, as shown
by its prayer. Moral damages cannot generally be awarded unless they are the proximate result of a

wrongful act or omission. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are not awarded if the defendant had not
acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner nor in the absence of gross or reckless negligence. A
public official, who in the performance of his duty acts in such fashion, does so in excess of authority, and
his actions would be ultra vires that can thereby result in an incurrence of personal liability.

Municipality of Pililia v. CA
RTC rendered judgment in favor of the Municipality of Pililla, Rizal, against the Philippine Petroleum
Corporation, ordering the latter defendant to pay the amount of P5,301,385.00 representing the tax on
business due from the defendant under Section 9(A) of Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1 of said
municipality.
When Atty. Mendiola ffiled a petition for certiorari with the SC, the PPC filed a motion questioning his
authority to represent petitioner municipality. The CA dismissed the petition for having been filed by a
private counsel in violation of law and jurisprudence but without prejudice to the filing of a similar petition
by the Municipality of Pililla through the proper provincial or municipal legal officer.
WON Atty. Mendiola has the authority to file the petition in behalf of the municipality.
Held: No.
Private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in lawsuits; only the provincial fiscal and the
municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory.
The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the
provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. The fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle
the case must appear on record. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record to show that the provincial
fiscal is disqualified; the appearance of herein private counsel is without authority of law.
Also, the fiscal's refusal to represent the municipality is not a legal justification for employing the services
of private counsel. A fiscal cannot refuse to perform his functions on grounds not provided for by law
without violating his oath of office. Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal
council should request the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the
provincial fiscal who has declined, (Sec. 1679, Administrative Code).
Furthermore, even assuming that the representation of the municipality by Atty. Mendiola was duly
authorized, said authority is deemed to have been revoked by the municipality when the latter, through the
municipal mayor and without said counsel's participation, entered into a compromise agreement with the
respondent. A client, by appearing personally and presenting a motion by himself, is considered to have
impliedly dismissed his lawyer.

Ramos v. CA
A petition was filed for the Declaration of Nullity of Municipal Ordinances and the contract of lease over a
commercial arcade to be constructed in the municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan. Atty. Romanillos manifested
that he was counsel for the municipality filing a motion to dismiss and an amended answer. The provincial
attorney, Atty. Regalado, who first filed the answer, appeared as collaborating counsel. However, the
Provincial Fiscal (Regalado) did not appear. It was Atty. Romanillos who worked the case for the
municipality.
The petitioners questioned the personality of Atty. Romanillos to appear as counsel of the municipality. In
a joint statement, Atty. Romanillos withdrew as counsel for the municipality and Atty. Regalado, as
collaborating counsel adopted the entire proceedings participated in/undertaken by Atty. Romanillos. The
judge denied the petitioners motion to disqualify.
WON private lawyer is authorized to represent the Municipality in its Lawsuits?

Held: NO
General Rule: Private counsel may not represent municipality or province in lawsuits.
Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that it is the duty of fiscal to represent provinces
and provincial subdivisions in litigation EXCEPT in cases where:
1.
2.
3.

Original jurisdiction is vested in the SC


The municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government
or to some other municipality or municipal district in the same province.
He, or his wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved, as heir legatee, creditor or otherwise.

The above provision is complemented by Section 3, RA 2264, the Local Autonomy Law. The provision is
mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations
where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. This strict coherence to the letter of the law
appears to have been dictated by the fact that the municipality should not be burdened with expenses of
hiring a private lawyer and that the interests of the municipality would be best protected if a government
lawyer handles its litigations.
None of the exemptions are present in this case. In addition, for the exceptions to apply, the fact that the
provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the municipality's case must appear on record. There is nothing
in the records to show that the provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel for the Municipality. There
is also no estoppel on the part of the plaintiffs because the legality of the representation of an unauthorized
counsel may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
WON Collaboration with private counsel is allowed?
Held: NO
General rule: Private counsel may not represent the municipality/province even if only in collaboration with
authorized government lawyers.
EXCEPT that in interest of substantial justice, the municipality may adopt the work already performed in
good faith by such private lawyer, which work is beneficial to it, provided:
1.
2.

No injustice it thereby heaped on the adverse party;


No compensation in any guise is paid therefor by said municipality to the private lawyer.

Unless so expressly adopted, the private lawyers work cannot bind the municipality. The proceedings
already done are declared null and void for being participated in by unauthorized counsel.
The Court believes that conferring legitimacy to the appearance of Atty. Romanillos would not cause
substantial prejudice on petitioners. Requiring a new trial on the mere legal technicality that the
municipality was not represented by a legally authorized counsel would not serve the interest of justice.

Salalima v. Guingona
An administrative complaint was filed against Albay Governor Salalima, Vice-Governor Azafla, and
several members of the Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan because of the retainer contract for legal services
entered into between the Province of Albay and Atty. Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm (private
lawyers), and the disbursement of public funds in payment thereof.
WON respondents have incurred administrative liability in entering into the retainer agreement and making
payments pursuant thereto. (The retainer was for a case filed by NPC against the province).

Held: Yes
Sec. 481 of the Local Government Code which is based on Section 1681 of the Revised Administrative
Code requires the appointment of a legal officer to represent the local government unit in all civil actions
and special proceedings wherein the local government unit or any official thereof, in his official capacity is
a party; EXCEPT that in actions or proceeding where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to
the provincial government or to another component city or municipality, a special legal officer may be
employed to represent the adverse party.
Local government units cannot be represented by private lawyers and it is solely the Provincial Fiscal who
can rightfully represent them. Moreover, the entire transaction was attended by irregularities (i.e. No prior
written approval of Solicitor General and COA before the disbursements were made, the resolution passed
only authorized the governor to sign a retainer contract with the Cortes & Reyna Loaw Firm yet he also
signed with Atty. Cornago which is a different entity, the province disbursed money to the Cortes & Reyna
Law Firm although the latter did not appear as counsel for the Province in the SC case, the attorneys fees
were unreasonable = P38.5 Million).

DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
A.

Sec 60 68, LGC

See above

Ganzon v. CA and Artieda v. Santos (joint case)


A series of administrative complaints (10) were filed against Mayor Ganzon (Mayor of Iloilo City) by city
officials on various charges: abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct and others. Secretary of
Local Government, Hon. Santos, issued a preventive suspension order for 60 days. A second 60 day
suspension was ordered but Mayor Ganzon was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction in the RTC. The second preventive suspension was not enforced.
Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against the
respondent in the RTC. Meanwhile, the respondent issued a third order for another 60 day preventive
suspension (3rd time in 20 months), designating Vice-Mayor Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor
Ganzon commenced before the CA, a petition for prohibition. The CA rendered judgment dismissing the
cases.
WON the several suspensions imposed upon Mayon Ganzon are proper.
Held: No
The plain truth is that this Court has been uncomfortable with suspensions because it is out of the ordinary
to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension is simply "to prevent the accused
from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible
witnesses" or to keep him off "the records and other evidence." It is a means, and no more, to assist
prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the LGC (section 63), a
suspension cannot exceed sixty days. It need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is sufficient
and it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.
Suspension is temporary. It may be imposed for no more than sixty days, a longer suspension is unjust and
unreasonable, and nothing less than tyranny. Since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the
Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima
facie findings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office but it is certainly another
question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. The
Court is aware that only the third suspension is under questions, and that any talk of future suspensions is in

fact premature. The fact remains, however, that Mayor Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days
of suspension and the possibility of sixty days more is arguably around the corner which amounts to a
violation of the Local Government Code which brings to light a pattern of suspensions intended to suspend
the Mayor the rest of his natural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to us as a concerted
effort of the State to perpetuate an arbitrary act.

Espiritu v. Melgar
Garing filed a sworn letter-complaint to the Secretary Santos of DILG, the Provincial Governor of Oriental
Mindoro Espiritu and to the Presidential Action Center, charging Mayor Melgar of Naujan. Oriental
Mindoro, with grave misconduct, oppression, abuse of authority, culpable violation of the Constitution and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the public service. Melgar allegedly assaulted Garing and ordered
his arrest and detention without filing any charges until his release the following day.
Mayor Melgar submitted his answer wherein he said that while he was delivering a speech during a
graduation ceremony, Garing suddenly clapped causing disturbance on the part of the audience. When the
Mayor ended his speech, he instructed a policeman to investigate Garing. It appeared that Garing was
drunk. The mayor informed Garing to go home but he refused to go and only did so the following morning.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro passed Resolution No 55, recommending to the
Provincial Governor that the Mayor be preventively suspended for 45 days pending the investigation of the
administrative complaint. When the mayor received the order of suspension, he filed a Petition for
Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction with prayer for Restraining Order in the RTC. The RTC judge issued
a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Governor Espiritu from implementing the Order of suspension
against Mayor Melgar. On appeal, Governor Espiritu contends that the trial judge erred in granting the
preliminary injunction since the Governor is empowered to place an elective municipal official under
preventive suspension pending decision of an administrative case against the elective municipal official.
WON the governor has the power to suspend the mayor
Held: Yes
Under Section 63 LGC, the provincial governor is authorized by law to preventively suspend the municipal
mayor anytime after the issues had been joined and any of the following grounds were shown to exist:
1.
2.
3.
4.

When there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts
complained of.
When the evidence of culpability is strong.
When the gravity of the offense so warrants.
When the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to
the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.

There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before the charges against him are heard and before he
is given an opportunity to prove his innocence. Preventive suspension is allowed so that the respondent may
not hamper the normal course of the investigation through the use of his influence and authority over
possible witnesses.Since the mayor believed that his preventive suspension was unjustified and politically
motivated, he should have sought relief first from the Secretary of DILG, not from the courts. Mayor
Melgar's direct recourse to the courts without exhausting administrative remedies was premature. The RTC
had no jurisdiction over Special Civil Action No. R-5003 and gravely abused its discretion in refusing to
dismiss the case. As a general rule, the office or body that is invested with the power of removal or
suspension should be the sole judge of the necessity and sufficiency of the cause. However, in this case,
since the 60-day preventive suspension of Mayor Melgar was maintained by the TRO and therefore has
already been served, he is deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the
administrative investigation of the charges against him.

Aguinaldo v. Santos
Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan. After the December 1989 coup d'etat
was crushed, the DILG Secretary Santos sent a telegram & letter to Governor Aguinaldo requiring him to
show cause why he should not be suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the Republic. A sworn
complaint was also filed by Mayors of several municipalities in Cagayan against Aguinaldo for acts
committed during the coup. Aguinaldo denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively
participating in its execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers.
The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60 days from notice, pending the outcome of the formal
investigation. Later, the Secretary rendered a decision finding petition guilty as charged and ordering his
removal from office. The Vice Governor Vargas was installed as Governor. Aguinaldo appealed. While the
case was pending before the SC, Aguinaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of
Cagayan. Three petitions for disqualification were filed against him on the ground that he had been
removed from office. The Comelec granted the petition. Later, this was reversed on the ground that the
decision of the Secretary has not yet attained finality and is still pending review with the Court. As
Aguinaldo won by a landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved the way for his eventual
proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.
WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove local government officials as alter ego of the
President
Held: Yes
The power of the Secretary to remove local government officials is anchored on both the Constitution and a
statutory grant from the legislative branch. The constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17) and X
(4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President the power of control over all executive departments,
bureaus and offices and the power of general supervision over local governments. It is a constitutional
doctrine that the acts of the department head are presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly
rejected by him. Furthermore, it cannot be said that BP337 was repealed by the effectivity of the present
Constitution as both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution grants to the legislature the power and authority to
enact a local government code, which provides for the manner of removal of local government officials.
The power of the DILG secretary to remove local elective government officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61
of BP 337. As to Aguinaldos argument of the want of authority of the Secretary to appoint Vargas as
Governor, Section 48 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337 shows otherwise. Equally without merit is petitioner's claim that
before he could be suspended or removed from office, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required because
he is charged with a penal offense of disloyalty to the Republic which is defined and penalized under
Article 137 of the RPC. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally, but administratively where the
quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence.
Aguinaldos re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administrative case
pending before Us moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the
most number of votes among the candidates for governor of Cagayan province. The rule is that a public
official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off
the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases
pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.

Reyes v. Comelec
Reyes was the incumbent mayor of the municipality of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. An administrative
complaint was filed against him with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan by Dr. Manalo. It was alleged that
Reyes exacted and collected P50,000,00 from each market stall holder in the Bongabong Public Market.
Also, that certain checks issued to him by the National Reconciliation and Development Program of the
DILG were never received by the Municipal Treasurer nor reflected in the books of accounts of the same

officer; and that he took 27 heads of cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program. The
Sangguniang Panlalawigan found petitioner guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office.
Reyes filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the RTC of Oriental Mindoro. Later, the
Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued an order for Reyes to vacate the position of
mayor and to turn over the office to the incumbent vice mayor but he refused to accept the service of the
order. Thereafter, Reyes filed a certificate of candidacy with the Comelec but a petition for disqualification
was filed against him. Thus, the Comelec canceled Reyess certificate of candidacy. However, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong unaware of the disqualification of Reyes by the Comelec,
proclaimed him the duly-elected mayor. The Comelec en banc affirmed. Reyes argues that his election on
May 8, 1995 is a bar to his disqualification.
Garcia, who obtained the highest number of votes next to Reyes intervened, contending that because Reyes
was disqualified, he was entitled to be proclaimed mayor. The Comelec en banc denied Garcias prayer.
WON the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is not yet final because he has not been served a copy
thereof.
Held: No
The failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to deliver a copy of its decision was due to the refusal of
petitioner and his counsel to receive the decision. Repeated attempts had been made to serve the decision on
Reyes personally and by registered mail, but Reyes refused to receive the decision. If a judgment or
decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him, service is deemed completed and the
judgment or decision will be considered validly served as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver
it to him would be valid were it not for his or his counsel's refusal to receive it. Reyess refusal to receive
the decision may, therefore, be construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy of the decision.
Petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision. Rather than resist the service, he should have received
the decision and taken an appeal to the Office of the President in accordance with R.A. No. 7160 Section
67. But petitioner did not do so. Accordingly, the decision became final 30 days after the first service upon
petitioner. Thus, when the elections were held the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had already
become final and executory. The filing of a petition for certiorari with the RTC did not prevent the
administrative decision from attaining finality. An original action of certiorari is an independent action and
does not interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of the reglementary period involved in
the proceeding.
Consequently, to arrest the course of the principal action during the pendency of the certiorari proceedings,
there must be a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate court directed to the
lower court. In the case at bar, although a temporary restraining order was issued by the Regional Trial
Court, no preliminary injunction was subsequently issued. The temporary restraining order issued expired
after 20 days. From that moment on, there was no more legal barrier to the service of the decision upon
petitioner.
WON petitioners reelection rendered the administrative charges against him moot and academic
Held: No
This case is different from Aguinaldo v. Santos. Here, although Reyes brought an action to question the
decision in the administrative case, the TRO issued in the action he brought lapsed with the result that the
decision was served on petitioner and became final. Thus, because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office
of the President, he was validly removed from office and, pursuant to Section 40(b) of the LGC, he was
disqualified from running for reelection.
It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there was no provision similar to Section
40(b) which disqualifies any person from running for any elective position on the ground that he has been
removed as a result of an administrative case. R.A. No. 7160 could not be given retroactive effect.

Furthermore, the Aguinaldo decision has not yet attained finality. As indicated earlier, the decision of the
then Secretary of Local Government was questioned by the petitioner in this Court and that to date, the
petition remains unresolved.
Garcia's plea that the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The candidate who obtains the
second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified.
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute
our judgment for the mind of the voter. The votes cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the
belief that Reyes was qualified and for that reason cannot be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. The
subsequent finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to invalidate the
votes cast for him.

Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole
Criminal and administrative complaints were filed in the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman against Mayor
Ouano, Vice-Mayor Caete and Sangguniang Panlungsod Member Mayol of Mandaue City, by Mandaue
City Councilors. The respondents were charged with having violated R.A No. 3019, as amended; Articles
170 and 171 RPC; and R.A. No. 6713. Councilors Dionson and Bercede averred that respondent officials,
acting in conspiracy, had caused the alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing
the allocated appropriation therein without authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City.
Aside from opposing the motion for preventive suspension, respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman Hagad supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear
and decide the administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 LGC, the power to investigate
and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect their preventive
suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the President. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
denied the motion to dismiss and recommended the preventive suspension of respondent officials, except
City Budget Officer Guido, until the administrative case would have been finally resolved by the
Ombudsman.
A petition for prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order
was filed by respondent officials with the RTC. The RTC issued a restraining order directed at the
Ombudsman, enjoining him from enforcing the preventive suspension.
WON the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the present case
Held: Yes
The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed by Section 13(1,) Article X1, of the 1987
Constitution, while his statutory mandate to act on administrative complaints is contained in Section 19 of
R.A. No. 6770. Section 21 of the same statute names the officials who could be subject to the disciplinary
authority of the Ombudsman. Taken in conjunction with Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the Office of the
Ombudsman correspondingly has the authority to decree preventive suspension on any public officer or
employee under investigation by it.
The argument of the respondents that the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over local officials has
been removed by the subsequent enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 is without merit.
Although Section 63 of the Local Government Code provides that preventive suspension can only be
imposed by: ". . . the President if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or
an independent component city; . . ." There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed, whether
expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific
matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and
strike down the other. Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, and that
courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible,
and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is

expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus esf optimus interpretendi: every statute must be
so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. All
doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize
and give effect to all laws on the subject.
The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over elective
provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became
concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A No. 6770 (Sec. 21 & 24), to the extent of the
common grant, the LGC did not effect a change from what already prevailed, the modification being only in
the substitution of the Secretary of Local Government by the Office of the President.
Respondent local officials contend that the 6-month preventive suspension without pay under Section 24 of
the Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to the 60-day preventive suspension provided by Section 63
LGC to even now maintain its application. This contention is without merit. The two provisions govern
differently and there is justification for the imposition of the 6 month preventive suspension.
Ombudsman

RA 7160

6 month preventive suspension

60 day preventive suspension, at any time after the issues have been
joined

All public officials (Elective or appointive) under investigation.

Elective officials only after the issues are joined.

Grounds for preventive suspension: (S. 24, RA 9770)

Grounds for preventive suspension:

1.

The evidence of guilt should be strong, AND


a.
The charge against the officer or employee
should involve dishonestly, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of
duty, or
b.
The charges should warrant removal from the
service, or
c.
The respondents continued stay in office
would prejudice the case filed against him

1.

2.
3.
4.

There is a reasonable ground to believe that the


respondent has committed the act or acts complained
of
The evidence of guilt is strong
The gravity of the offense so warrants
The continuance in office of the respondent could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety
and integrity of the records and other evidence

Salalima v. Guingona (supra)


Administratrive Order No. 153 was signed by the President and respondent Teofisto Guingona, which
approved the findings of an Ad Hoc Committee holding Salalima et al liable in four (4) consolidated
administrative cases. Petitioners were elective officials of the Province of Albay, and were handed out
penalties in the following manner: 1) 5 months suspension for Albay Governor Salalima and 4 months
suspension for the other respondents for abuse of authority, due to the passage of an illegal ordinance which
deprived the barangays of Tiwi and Daraga of their share in delinquency payments made by Napocor to the
government; 2) 6 months suspension for Salalima and Azana, 4 months for all the other respondents for
abuse of authority under Section 60 of the LGC, when they hired private lawyers (Cortes & Reyna Law
Firm) to represent them in their case in the Supreme Court and disbursed public money to do so; 3) 4
months suspension each for oppression and abuse of authority, when they assumed jurisdiction and hastily
and arbitrarily meted out suspensions to Tiwi Mayor Corral pending the administrative cases she had filed
against the respondents; and 4) 5 months suspension to Governor Salalima for abuse of authority and gross
negligence for failing to impose and collect damages from RYU Construction Corp when the latter incurred
in delay. Petitioners challenge AO 153 on the grounds that: 1) the AO effectively suspends petitioners for
periods ranging from twelve to twenty months; 2) the Office of the President committed grave abuse of
discretion in suspending petitioners for administrative offenses allegedly committed during prior terms.
Held: 1) Petitioners contend that the challenged administrative order deprived them of their respective
offices without procedural and substantive due process. Their suspensions ranging from twelve months to

twenty months or for the entire duration of their unexpired term, which was then only seven months,
constituted permanent disenfranchisement or removal from office in clear violation of Section 60 of R.A.
No. 7160 which mandates that an elective local official may be removed from office by order of the court.
However, Section 66(b) of R. A. No. 7160 expressly provides that the penalty of suspension shall not
exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every administrative offense,
nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the
qualifications for the office. Administrative Offense means every act or conduct or omission which amounts
to, or constitutes any of the grounds for disciplinary action. The Office of the President committed no grave
abuse of discretion in imposing the penalty of suspension, although the aggregate thereof exceeded six
months and the unexpired portion of the petitioners' term of office. The fact remains that the suspension
imposed for each administrative offense did not exceed six months and there was an express provision that
the successive service of the suspension should not exceed the unexpired portion of the term of office of the
petitioners. 2) Governor Salalima could no longer be held liable in connection with the negotiated contract
RYU Construction, nor could the petitioners be held administratively liable for the execution in November
1989 of the retainer contract with Atty. Jesus Cornago and the Cortes and Reyna Law Firm. This is so
because public officials cannot be subject to disciplinary action for administrative misconduct committed
during a prior term. His reelection to office operates a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to
the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation
cannot, however, apply to criminal acts which the reelected official may have committed during his
previous term. 3) The grant of the power to remove elective local officials by the Oversight Committee to
the disciplining authority in drafting the Implementing Rules for the LGC is ultra vires; such power is
vested only with the court.

Grego v. Comelec
October 31, 1981 (before the effectivity of the LGC), Basco was removed from his position as Deputy
Sheriff (with prejudice to reinstatement to any position in the national or local government and its agencies
and instrumentalities or GOCCs, in the words of the Court) upon a finding of serious misconduct in an
administrative complaint lodged by Nena Tordesillas. Basco then ran as a candidate for Councilor on two
consecutive occasions and won, with subsequent challenges to his election having been dismissed. On the
third instance when Basco was again elected Councilor, petitioner Grego filed with the COMELEC a
petition praying for Basco's disqualification, for the suspension of his proclamation, and for the declaration
of seventh placer Romualdo S. Maranan as the sixth duly elected Councilor of Manila's Second District.
While the case was ongoing, the Manila City Board of Canvassers proclaimed Basco as a duly elected
councilor for the Second District of Manila, placing sixth among several candidates who vied for the seats.
Basco immediately took his oath of office before the Honorable Ma. Ruby Bithao-Camarista, Presiding
Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch I, Manila.
HELD: Section 40 (b) of the LGC disqualifies those removed from office as a result of an administrative
case from running for any elective position. However, it does NOT apply retroactively to those removed
from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992. Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature
has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously
vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so
as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied
from the language of the enactment. There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that
the same operates retroactively. Lex prospicit, non respicit. As such, the issue of whether or not Bascos
election to office in the 1988, 1992 and 1995 elections wipe away and condone the administrative penalty
against him is beside the point since he is deemed NOT subject to disqualification under Sec 40 (b) of the
LGC. Also, Basco is deemed NOT to have circumvented the prohibition in the Tordesillas decision since
under the former Civil Service Decree, (the law applicable at the time of the decision) reinstatement
referred only to an appointive position. Moreover, there is no reason why the Manila City BOC should not
have proclaimed Basco as the sixth winning City Councilor. Absent any determination of irregularity in the
election returns, as well as an order enjoining the canvassing and proclamation of the winner, it is a
mandatory and ministerial duty of the Board of Canvassers concerned to count the votes based on such

returns and declare the result. Lastly, Romualdo S. Maranan, the seventh placer, may NOT be legally
declared a winning candidate since Basco was not disqualified.

Joson v. Executive Secretary Torres


Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Nueva Ecija filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the
President charging petitioner Governor Joson with grave misconduct and abuse of authority, praying for his
suspension and removal from office. Governor Joson had allegedly barged into the Hall during a scheduled
session of the SP and angrily kicked the door and chairs in the Hall and uttered threatening words at
respondents while men with firearms encircled the area. Acting on the complaint, President Ramos ordered
Secretary of Internal and Local Government Robert Barbers take appropriate preemptive and investigative
actions, but to break not the peace. Upon recommendation of Secretary Barbers, Executive Secretary
Ruben Torres issued an order, by authority of the President, placing petitioner under preventive suspension
for sixty (60) days pending investigation of the charges against him. Joson filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals challenging the order of preventive suspension and the order of
default, which was dismissed. Petitioner alleges that subsequent to the institution of this petition, the SILG
rendered a resolution on the case finding him guilty of the offenses charged, whose finding was based on
the position papers and affidavits of witnesses submitted by the parties. The Executive Secretary, by
authority of the President, then adopted the findings and recommendation of the DILG Secretary and
imposed a six-month suspension. Joson now questions the CA decision affirming his preventive suspension
and the implementation of the SILG Resoultion without formal investigation.
HELD: An administrative complaint against an elective official must be verified and filed with the proper
government office. A complaint against an elective provincial or city official must be filed with the Office
of the President, one against an elective municipal official must be filed with the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, while that of a barangay official must be filed before the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan. Joson is an elective provincial official, thus the complaint against him was properly
filed with the Office of the President. According to petitioner, the complaint was not verified by private
respondents. However, the defect was not fatal. The requirement was deemed waived by the President
himself when he acted on the complaint. Petitioner also claims undue delegation of the disciplining
authority to the DILG. Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials is
lodged in two authorities: the Disciplining Authority (the President or the Executive Secretary) and the
Investigating Authority (the DILG, as per A. O. No. 23). What is delegated is the power to investigate, not
the power to discipline. The DILG did not err when it recommended preventive suspension, which may be
imposed by the Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after the issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of
guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the respondent, who
continues to hold office, could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records and other evidence. However, the rejection of petitioner's right to a formal investigation denied him
procedural due process. The records show that petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation. An erring
elective local official has rights akin to the constitutional rights of an accused. These rights are essentially
part of procedural due process. The local elective official has the (1) right to appear and defend himself in
person or by counsel; (2) the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him; and (3) the
right to compulsory attendance of witness and the production of documentary evidence. Petitioner's right to
a formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint against him was decided on the basis of
position papers. The procedure of requiring position papers in lieu of a hearing in administrative cases is
expressly allowed with respect to appointive officials but not to those elected. An elective official, elected
by popular vote, is directly responsible to the community that elected him. Suspension and removal are thus
imposed only after the elective official is accorded his rights and the evidence against him strongly dictates
their imposition.

Conducto v. Monzon
Judge Iluminado Monzon was charged with ignorance of the law for deliberately refusing to suspend a
barangay chairman who was charged with unlawful appointment before his sala. Barangay chairman

Benjamin Maghirang was charged with violation of Section 394 of the Local Government Code and Article
244 of the Revised Penal Code for appointing his sister-in-law as barangay secretary. The Office of the
City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint, stating that the appointment was made before the effectivity of the
Local Government Code of 1991. Complainant was later able to secure an Opinion from the DILG Director
Jacob Montesa, which declared that the appointment issued by Maghirang to his sister-in-law violated the
Local Government Code in effect prior to that of 1991. This prompted the Office of the City Prosecutor to
file an information with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pablo. Respondent judge issued a warrant for
Maghirangs arrest. A motion for suspension was filed pursuant to Sec. 13 of RA 3019 or the Anti Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (which provides that any incumbent public officer or official under criminal
prosecution under Title 7, Book II of the RPC shall be suspended). Respondent judge denied the motion on
the ground that offenses committed during a prior term shall not be cause for suspension during the present
term. In denying a motion for reconsideration of the same, Monzon stated that preventive suspension only
applies if there is an administrative case against the official filed at the same time as the criminal charge.
HELD: There is misplaced reliance by the judge upon the case of Pascual vs Provincial Board of Nueva
Ecija. The doctrine of forgiveness or condonation finds no application in criminal liability. It was
subsequently held in Ingco vs. Sanchez that the reelection of a public officer does not wipe away any
criminal liability incurred by him in a previous term. Section 13 of RA 3019 makes it mandatory upon the
Court to suspend any public officer against whom a valid information is filed for a violation of Title 7,
Book II of the RPC or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property.
Respondent judge is fined P5,000 for ignorance of the law and given a warning against committing similar
acts in the future.

Pablico v. Villapando
An administrative complaint was filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan against then Mayor
of San Vicente, Palawan Alejandro Villapando for abuse of authority and culpable violation of the
Constitution because he entered into a consultancy agreement with Orlando Tiape, a defeated mayoralty
candidate. Complainants argue that this amounted to appointment to a government position within the
prohibited one-year period under Article IX-B, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Sangguniang
Panlalawigan found respondent guilty and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from service, and was
affirmed by the Office of the President. Vice-mayor Pablico took his oath as municipal mayor in place of
Villapando. The Court of Appeals declared the decisions of the SP and OP void, and ordered Pablico to
vacate the Office of the Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan.
HELD: The last paragraph of Sec. 60 of the Local Government Code clearly provides that the dismissal
from service of an erring elective local official may only be decreed by a court of law. Although Article
124(b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code adds that such
removal may be had by the disciplining authority (pertaining to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan), no rule or
regulation may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law such as the LGC. Such power to remove
elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts.

Sangguniang Barangay of Don Mariano v. Punong Barangay Martines


Severino Martinez was administratively charged with Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption by petitioner
through the filing of a verified complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan as the disciplining authority over
elective barangay officials pursuant to Section 64 of RA 7160. The complaint was later amended for
Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decision which imposed upon Martinez the penalty of removal from
office. The decision was conveyed to the mayor of Bayombong, Nueva Ecija. The mayor, however, issued a
Memo wherein he stated that the Sangguniang Bayan has no power to order Martinez removal from office.
However, the decision remains valid until reversed.

WON the Sanggunian may remove Martinez, an elective local official, from office.
Held: No.
Section 60 of the Local Government Code conferred upon the courts the power to remove elective local
officials from office. During the deliberations of the Senate on the Local Government Code,[16] the
legislative intent to confine to the courts, i.e., RTCs, the Sandiganbayan and the appellate courts,
jurisdiction over cases involving the removal of elective local officials was evident.
In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., the Court en banc categorically ruled that the Office of the President is without
any power to remove elected officials, since the power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as
expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of the LGC. It further invalidated Article 125,
Rule XIX of IRR. The Court nullified the rule since the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and
Regulations of the Local Government Code exceeded its authority when it granted to the disciplining
authority the power to remove elective officials, a power which the law itself granted only to the proper
courts. Thus, it is clear that under the law, the Sangguniang Bayan is not vested with the power to remove
Martinez.
Petitioner contends that administrative cases involving elective barangay officials may be filed with, heard
and decided by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, which can, thereafter,
impose a penalty of removal from office. It further claims that the courts are merely tasked with issuing the
order of removal, after the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan finds that a penalty of removal
is warranted.
The aforementioned position put forward by the petitioner would run counter to the rationale for making the
removal of elective officials an exclusive judicial prerogative. In Pablico v. Villapando, the court declared
that:The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied,
and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good
faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the
exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or
partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to
suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the
power to remove. (Emphasis supplied.)
The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local official from office is
intended as a check against any capriciousness or partisan activity by the disciplining authority.
As the law stands, Section 61 of the Local Government Code provides for the procedure for the filing of an
administrative case against an erring elective barangay official before the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan. However, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan cannot order the
removal of an erring elective barangay official from office, as the courts are exclusively vested with this
power under Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the
barangay official are of a grave nature and, if found guilty, would merit the penalty of removal from office,
the case should be filed with the regional trial court. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it retains
jurisdiction over the case even if it would be subsequently apparent during the trial that a penalty less than
removal from office is appropriate. On the other hand, the most extreme penalty that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring elective barangay official is suspension; if it
deems that the removal of the official from service is warranted, then it can resolve that the proper charges
be filed in court.
The doctrine of separation of powers is not absolute in its application; rather, it should be applied in
accordance with the principle of checks and balances. The removal from office of elective officials must not
be tainted with partisan politics and used to defeat the will of the voting public. The local government units
are not deprived of the right to discipline local elective officials; rather, they are prevented from imposing
the extreme penalty of dismissal.

Cases of Sexual Harassment versus elective local government officials and local
government employees, heads of departments
Civil Service Administrative Rule on Sexual Harassment and RA No 7877
See attachments

Book I, Title 2, Chapter 4, LGC (Sec 60 68)


See above
B.

Disciplinary Actions over Local Appointive Officials

Sec 84 89, LGC


Administrative discipline (Sec 84)
Investigation and adjudication of administrative complaints against appointive local officials and employees
as well as their suspension and removal shall be in accordance with the civil service law and rules and other
pertinent laws.
The results of such administrative investigations shall be reported to the Civil Service Commission.
Preventive suspension of appointive local officials and employees (Sec 85)
Who may impose:

The local chief executive

When to impose:

Pending investigation after filing of administrative charges against the subordinate official or
employee which involves:
o Dishonesty
o Oppression
o Grave misconduct
o Neglect in the performance of duty
o If there is reason to believe that the respondent is guilty of the charges which would
warrant his removal from the service

Duration of Preventive Suspension:

Not exceeding sixty (60) days

What happens after preventive suspension:


The suspended official shall be automatically reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of
the administrative proceedings against him until its termination.
NOTE: If the delay in the proceedings of the case of the case is due to the fault, neglect, or request of the
respondent, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein
provided.

Administrative investigation (Sec 86)


Who may perform:

Any person or committee duly authorized by the local chief executive

How performed:
The person or committee duly authorized shall conduct hearings on the cases brought against appointive
local officials and employees.
The investigating body shall submit their findings and recommendations to the local chief executive
concerned within fifteen (15) days from conclusion of the hearings.
Duration of Administrative Proceedings (Rendition of Judgment):

90 days from the time the respondent is formally notified of the charges.

Disciplinary jurisdiction (Sec 87)


Imposable penalties:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Removal from service


Demotion in rank
Suspension for not more than one (1) year without pay
Fine in an amount not exceeding six (6) months salary
Reprimand
Other disciplinary actions

Appeal4
APPEALABLE
If the penalty imposed is heavier
than suspension of thirty (30)
days

NOT APPEALABLE
If the penalty imposed is
suspension without pay
for not more than thirty
(30) days

Where to appeal:
Civil Service Commission (judgment must be rendered within 30 days from receipt of appeal)
Execution pending appeal (Sec 88)
An appeal shall not prevent the execution of a decision of removal or suspension of a respondent-appellant.
In case the respondent-appellant is EXONERATED, he shall be reinstated to his position with all the rights
and privileges appurtenant thereto from the time he had been deprived thereof.
Prohibited business and pecuniary interest (Sec 89)

The provision is unclear whether the imposition of demotion, reprimands etc. are also final and not appealable. The
provision speaks only of suspension without pay for not more than thirty days which is not appeable.

1.

Engage in any business transaction with the local government unit in which he is:
a. an official, or
b. employee, o
c. over which he has the power of supervision, or with any of its
d. authorized boards,
e. officials,
f. agents, or
g. attorney,

whereby money is to be paid, or property or anything of value is to be transferred, directly or indirectly, out
of the resources of the LGU to such person or firm;
2.
3.

4.
5.

Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by an LGU;


Purchase any real estate or other property forfeited in favor of such LGU
a. for unpaid taxes or assessment, or
b. by virtue of a legal process at the instance of the said local official;
Be a surety for any person contracting or doing business with the LGU for which a surety is
required; and
Possess or use any public property of the LGU for private purposes.

Other prohibited businesses and interests as provided under R.A. 6713 shall also be applicable.

Mendez v. CSC
Then Acting Register of Deeds of Quezon City Vicente N. Coloyan filed an administrative complaint
against the petitioner, a legal research assistant in the Quezon City Office of the City Attorney, for Gross
Misconduct and Dishonesty, allegedly for having torn off a portion of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
209287 from the registry book of Quezon City and for having pocketed it. After three months of
investigation, then Quezon City Mayor Adelina Rodriguez dismissed the said complaint against the
petitioner for insufficiency of evidence. Coloyan appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB)
reversed the decision of the Mayor and dismissed Mendez from the service. The CSC affirmed the MSPB
decision. Mendez filed a motion for reconsideration, assailing the reversal of the city mayor's decision by
the MSPB and the CSC on the ground that Coloyan is not an aggrieved party or "party adversely affected
by the decision" allowed by law to file an appeal. Moreover, the petitioner claimed that his exoneration by
the city mayor is unappealable pursuant to Section 37, paragraph (b) of P.D. 807.
HELD: P.D. 807, otherwise known as The Philippine Civil Service Law, does not contemplate a review of
decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges. Section 37 paragraph (a) thereof,
provides: "The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days'
salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office " Said provision must be
read together with Section 39 paragraph (a) of P.D. 805 which contemplates: "Appeals, where allowable,
shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision . . ." The phrase "party adversely affected by
the decision" refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the
purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer,
removal or dismissal from office. In the instant case, Coloyan, who filed the appeal, cannot be considered
an aggrieved party because he is not the respondent in the administrative case below. Moreover, The
remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is found guilty of the charges filed
against him. But when the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in this case, there is no occasion for
appeal. The CSC decision is set aside and the decision of the Quezon City Mayor is reinstated (Complaint
against Mendez dismissed).

Macalingag and Carlos v. Chang

Pursuant to an administrative charge against him for dishonesty, neglect of duty, and act prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, an Order of Preventive suspension was issued against Roberto Chang, then the
acting municipal treasurer of Makati. Said Order was signed by Lorinda Carlos, the Executive director of
the Bureau of Local Government, and Victor Macalincag, Undersecretary of Finance, who was then the
acting Secretary. Chang filed a complaint for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the lower court.
The trial court found in that in order for preventive suspension to take effect, there are two steps involved:
1) service of the copy the order on the respondent, and 2) designation of his replacement. The order of
preventive suspension was held to have been incomplete and without effect since an acting municipal
treasurer had yet to be appointed to replace Chang.
HELD: Preventive suspension is governed by Sec. 41 of P.D. 807 or the Civil Service Law, which does not
require a replacement to be designated for the Order to take effect. BP 337 (the LGC in effect at the time)
provides for the automatic assumption of the assistant municipal treasurer or next in rank officer in case of
suspension of the municipal treasurer. There can be no question that the Order of Preventive Suspension
became effective upon respondent Changs receipt thereof. Chang argues that EO 392, which gave rise to
the creation of the Metropolitan Manila Authority, vested in the President of the Philippines the power to
appoint the municipal treasurer, and thus only the President may suspend or remove him. However, Section
8 of EO 392 provides that the appointments made by the President of the Philippines shall be subject to the
Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. Moreover, the Office of the Municipal Treasurer unquestionably
falls under the Department of Finance. Hence, the Secretary of Finance is the proper disciplining authority
to issue the preventive suspension order. Even assuming that the power to appoint includes the power to
discipline (as argued by Chang), Acting Secretary Macalingag, as Secretary of Finance, is the alter ego of
the President. It is therefore within his authority to preventively suspend Chang.

Garcia v. Pajaro and the City of Dagupan


Sebastian Garcia is an employee at the City Treasurers Office, Dagupan City. He was ordered suspended
by City Treasurer Juanito Pajaro and directed the withholding of his salary because of the Formal Charge
filed against him. However, Pajaro continued reporting for work because he did not honor the suspension
order as the City Treasurer acted as the complainant and that there was no complaint against him from the
Office of the City Mayor.
Juanito Pajaro, the City Treasurer of Dagupan City, claimed that Garcia has been rating unsatisfactory in his
performance for several semesters, which is the reason why he was formally charged. Garcia was
preventively suspended for ninety days since the charge is a major offense. An investigation was scheduled
but Garcia failed to appear and testify. Garcia also did not answer the subpoena. So, Pajaro proceeded with
an ex parte investigation. The Bureau of Local Government Finance favorably approved the suspension.
This was affirmed by the Regional Director. Affirming the RTC Decision, the CA held that private
respondent was vested with legal power and authority to institute disciplinary action against subordinate
officers and employees. The appellate court further held that the requisites of administrative due process
had been fully observed by Pajaro while investigating petitioner. But despite being informed of the charges
against him and being given the opportunity to be heard in a formal investigation, petitioner chose not to
answer those charges.
HELD: Under the old and the present Local Government Codes, appointive officers and employees of local
government units are covered by the Civil Service Law; and such rules, regulations and other issuances duly
promulgated pursuant thereto, unless otherwise specified. Moreover, the investigation and the adjudication
of administrative complaints against appointive local officials and employees, as well as their suspension
and removal, shall be in accordance with the Civil Service Law and rules and other pertinent laws.
The Administrative Code of 1987, -- specifically Book V on the civil service -- is the primary law
governing appointive officials and employees in the government. They may be removed or dismissed
summarily (1) [w]hen the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong; (2) [w]hen the respondent is
a recidivist x x x; and (3) [w]hen the respondent is notoriously undesirable. Technical rules of procedure

and evidence are not strictly applied; due process in the administrative context cannot be fully equated with
that in the strict judicial sense.
The power to discipline is specifically granted by Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987 to heads
of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces and cities. On the other hand, the power to
commence administrative proceedings against a subordinate officer or employee is granted by Section 34 of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the said Administrative Code to the secretary of a department,
the head of office of equivalent rank, the head of a local government unit, the chief of an agency, the
regional director or a person with a sworn written complaint. Further, the city treasurer may institute, motu
propio, disciplinary proceedings against a subordinate officer or employee. Local Administrative
Regulations (LAR) No. 2-85, which was issued by the Ministry of Finance on March 27, 1985, authorized
the minister (now secretary) of finance, the regional director, and head of a local treasury or an assessment
office to start administrative disciplinary action against officers or employees subordinate to them. In the
case at bar, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority referred to in Section 47 of the
Administrative Code of 1987. The term agency refers to any of the various units of the government
including a department, a bureau, an office, an instrumentality, a government-owned or controlled
corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein. Respondent Pajaro, as the city treasurer, was
the head of the Office of the Treasurer; while petitioner, a senior revenue collector, was an officer under
him. Thus, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority who could investigate petitioner and issue a
preventive suspension order against him.
Likewise, the old Local Government Code does not vest in city mayors the sole power to discipline and to
institute criminal or administrative actions against any officers or employees under their jurisdiction. In
fact, there is no provision under the present Local Government Code expressly rescinding the authority of
the Department of Finance to exercise disciplinary authority over its employees. By the same token, there is
nothing that prohibits the city treasurer from filing a complaint against petitioner.
Due process has not been violated. In an administrative proceeding, the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain ones side. Such process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before
judgment is rendered. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation in an oral argument, but also -and perhaps even many times more creditably and practicably -- through pleadings. So long as the parties
are given the opportunity to explain their side, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied
with. This constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of an action or a ruling.
In the case at bar, the administrative proceedings were conducted in accordance with the procedure set out
in the 1987 Administrative Code and other pertinent laws. First, petitioner was furnished a copy of the May
30, 1990 formal charge against him. Second, Pajaro requested the approval of the Order of Preventive
Suspension in his June 1, 1990 letter addressed to the Bureau of Local Government Finance regional
director, who approved the Order in the First Indorsement dated June 4, 1990. Third, a subpoena dated July
31, 1990 was issued to petitioner ordering him to testify during an investigation on August 15, 1990.
However, he admittedly refused to attend the investigation; thus, it was conducted ex parte. Fourth, the
Department of Finance affirmed Respondent Pajaros findings in its August 1, 1991 Decision.

Recall
Sec 69-75, LGC
See above

RA 9244

See attachments
This amends Sec 70 71 of the LGC

Rivera v. Comelec
In the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections, Marino Morales ran as candidate for mayor of
Mabalacat. On January 5, 2004, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy. On January 10, petitioners filed
before the COMELEC a petition to cancel Morales certificate of candidacy on the ground that the was
elected and had served three previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat contrary to RA 43(b) of RA
7160.Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term commencing July 1, 1995 to
June 30, 1998 (first term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third term), but he served the second term
from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 only as a caretaker of the office or as a de facto officer because he
was not validly elected as his proclamation as mayor was declared void by the RTC and thereafter, he was
preventively suspended by the ombudsman. The COMELEC ruled that Morales was disqualified to run for
public office. Morales MR was however granted. The COMELEC ruled that his proclamation before was
void and that the discharge of the duties is that of a de facto mayor.
In the other case filed by Anthony Dee: After Morales was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor, Anthony
Dee filed a petition for quo warranto before the RTC. Dee reiterated the previous arguments of petitioners.
The RTC dismissed Dees petition for quo warranto on the ground that Morales did not serve the three-term
limit since he was not the duly elected mayor of Mabalacat, but Dee in the May 1998 elections for the term
1998 to 2001. Comelec affirmed.
HELD: Morales is disqualified from running as mayor. In Ong v. Alegre the Court held, thus:
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must
concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same
local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
Here, Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served
as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC
in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. To reiterate, as held
in Ong v. Alegre, such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term. Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution can not be more clear and explicit. Respondent Morales is now serving his
fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1, 1995. In just
over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years.
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples
freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating
excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office.

Morales maintains that he served his second term (1998 to 2001) only as a caretaker of the office or as a
de facto officer. Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and its purpose defeated when an
official serves in the same position for three consecutive terms. Whether as caretaker or de facto
officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables him to stay on
indefinitely. Morales should be promptly ousted from the position of mayor of Mabalacat. Having found
respondent Morales ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 should be cancelled.
In the light of the foregoing, Morales cannot be considered a candidate in the May 2004 elections. Not
being a candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be considered stray
votes. Since respondent Morales is DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as mayor of Mabalacat, the
instant petition for quo warranto has become moot.
In Labo v. Comelec, this Court has ruled that a second place candidate cannot be proclaimed as a substitute
winner. As a consequence of petitioners ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested office has
occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor in accordance with Section 44 of the Local
Government Code.

Evardone v. Comelec
Felipe Evardone the mayor of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having been elected to the position during the 1988
local elections. He assumed office immediately after proclamation. In 1990, Alexander R. Apelado,
Victozino E. Aclan and Noel A. Nival filed a petition for the recall of Evardone with the Office of the
Local Election Registrar, Municipality of Sulat. The Comelec issued a Resolution approving the the
recommendation of Election Registrar Vedasto Sumbilla to hold the signing of petition for recall against
Evardone. Evardone filed a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer of restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. Later, in an en banc resolution, the Comelec nullified the signing process for being
violative of the TRO of the court. Hence, this present petition.
HELD: Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution express provides that all existing laws not
inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until amended, repealed or revoked.
Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the Local Government Code of 1991, approved by the President on 10
October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But the
Local Government Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old Local
Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is still the law applicable to the present case. Prior to the enactment of
the new Local Government Code, the effectiveness of B.P. Blg. 337 was expressly recognized in the
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. We therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272
promulgated by the COMELEC is valid and constitutional. Consequently, the the COMELEC had the
authority to approve the petition for recall and set the date for the signing of said petition.
In the present case, the records show that Evardone knew of the Notice of Recall filed by Apelado, on or
about 21 February 1990 as evidenced by the Registry Return Receipt; yet, he was not vigilant in following
up and determining the outcome of such notice. Despite his urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO,
Evardone filed the petition for prohibition only on 10 July 1990. The Court issued a TRO on 12 July 1990
but the signing of the petition for recall took place just the same on the scheduled date through no fault of
the COMELEC and Apelado. The signing process was undertaken by the constituents of the Municipality
of Sulat and its Election Registrar in good faith and without knowledge of the TRO earlier issued by this
Court. As attested by Election Registrar Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the 6,090 registered voters of Sulat,
Eastern Samar or about 34% signed the petition for recall. The right to recall is complementary to the right
to elect or appoint. It is included in the right of suffrage. It is based on the theory that the electorate must
maintain a direct and elastic control over public functionaries. It is also predicated upon the idea that a
public office is "burdened" with public interests and that the representatives of the people holding public
offices are simply agents or servants of the people with definite powers and specific duties to perform and
to follow if they wish to remain in their respective offices. Whether or not the electorate of Sulat has lost
confidence in the incumbent mayor is a political question. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people are the judge. Loss of confidence is the formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a person's

ability to discharge his office previously bestowed on him by the same electorate. The constituents have
made a judgment and their will to recall Evardone has already been ascertained and must be afforded the
highest respect. Thus, the signing process held last 14 July 1990 for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone
of said municipality is valid and has legal effect.
However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P.
Blg, 337. The Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local election prior to 30 June 1992,
or more specifically, as provided for in Article XVIII, Sec. 5 on the second Monday of May, 1992. Thus, to
hold an election on recall approximately seven (7) months before the regular local election will be violative
of the above provisions of the applicable Local Government Code

Garcia v. Comelec
Enrique Garcia was elected governor of the province of Bataan. Some mayors, vice-mayors and members of
the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province constituted themselves into a
Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of Garcia. The mayor of Mariveles, Honorable
Oscar, de los Reyes, and the mayor of Dinalupihan, the Honorable Lucila Payumo, were chosen as
Presiding Officer and Secretary of the Assembly, respectively. Thereafter, the Vice-Mayor of Limay, the
Honorable Ruben Roque, was recognized and he moved that a resolution be passed for the recall of the
petitioner on the ground of "loss of confidence." The motion was "unanimously seconded." Petitioners filed
with the COMELEC a petition to deny due course to the Resolution for failure to comply with the
requirements under the LGC, which dismissed the petition and scheduled the recall election. Petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC on the ground that section 70 of R.A. 7160
allowing recall through the initiative of the PRAC is unconstitutional because: (1) the people have the sole
and exclusive right to decide whether or not to initiate proceedings, and (2) that the initiation of a recall
through the PRA had de facto recalled Garcia from office and it effectively shortens and ends the term of
the incumbent local officials and (3 )it violated the right of elected local public officials belonging to the
political minority to equal protection of law. They also argued that the proceedings followed by the PRAC
in passing Resolution No. I suffered from numerous defects, the most fatal of which was the deliberate
failure to send notices of the meeting to sixty-five (65) members of the assembly. The Court granted
petition on the narrow ground that sending of selective notices to members of the PRAC violated the due
process protection of the Constitution and fatally flawed the enactment of Resolution No. 1. Requirement of
notice is mandatory and its non-observance is fatal to the validity of the resolution to recall Garcia as
Governor. Petitioners then filed again Urgent Petition reiterating their contention that section 70 of RA
7160 is unconstitutional.
HELD: Section 70 of R.A. 7160 allowing recall through the initiative of the PRAC is constitutional. As to
the first contention, the Court stated that the legislative records reveal there were two (2) principal reasons
why this alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish
the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses. Our
lawmakers took note of the undesirable fact that the mechanism initiating recall by direct action of the
electorate was utilized only once in the City of Angeles, Pampanga, but even this lone attempt to recall the
city mayor failed. This initiatory process by direct action of the people was too cumbersome, too expensive
and almost impossible to implement. Consequently, our legislators added in the a second mode of initiating
the recall of local officials thru a preparatory recall assembly. To be sure, there is nothing in the
Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the "sole and exclusive right to decide on
whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single
mode, of initiating recall elections. Neither did it prohibit the adoption of multiple modes of initiating recall
elections. The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum . . ." By
this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of
recall as its discernment dictates. Using its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise to
enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the former mode of initiation by direct

action of the people. Congress has made its choice as called for by the Constitution and it is not the
prerogative of this Court to supplant this judgment. The choice may be erroneous but even then, the remedy
against a bad law is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of
powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.
As to the second contention, the Court held that Petitioners have misconstrued the nature of the initiatory
process of recall by the PRAC. They have embraced the view that initiation by the PRAC is not initiation
by the people. This is a misimpression for initiation by the PRAC is also initiation by the people, albeit
done indirectly through their representatives. It is not constitutionally impermissible for the people to act
through their elected representatives. Nothing less than the paramount task of drafting our Constitution is
delegated by the people to their representatives, elected either to act as a constitutional convention or as a
congressional constituent assembly. More far out is petitioners' stance that a PRA resolution of recall is the
recall itself. It cannot be seriously doubted that a PRA resolution of recall merely, starts the process. It is
part of the process but is not the whole process. This ought to be self evident for a PRA resolution of recall
that is not submitted to the COMELEC for validation will not recall its subject official. Likewise, a PRA
resolution of recall that is rejected by the people in the election called for the purpose bears no effect
whatsoever. The initiatory resolution merely sets the stage for the official concerned to appear before the
tribunal of the people so he can justify why he should be allowed to continue in office. Before the people
render their sovereign judgment, the official concerned remains in office but his right to continue in office
is subject to question. This is clear in section 72 of the Local Government Code which states that "the recall
of an elective local official shall be effective only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the
person of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on recall."
As to the third contention, the fear is expressed that the members of the PRAC may inject political color in
their decision as they may initiate recall proceedings only against their political opponents especially those
belonging to the minority. A careful reading of the law, however, will ineluctably show that it does not give
an asymmetrical treatment to locally elected officials belonging to the political minority. First to be
considered is the politically neutral composition of the preparatory recall assembly, all mayors, vice-mayors
and sangguniang members of the municipalities and component cities are made members of the preparatory
recall assembly at the provincial level. Its membership is not apportioned to political parties. No
significance is given to the political affiliation of its members. Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at
the provincial level includes all the elected officials in the province concerned. Considering their number,
the greater probability is that no one political party can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the Code
provides that the only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of confidence of the people.
The members of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in representation of their political parties but as
representatives of the people. By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on mere
differences in political party affiliation. There is only one ground for the recall of local government
officials: loss of confidence. This means that the people may petition or the Preparatory Recall Assembly
may resolve to recall any local elective officials without specifying any particular ground except loss of
confidence. There is no need for them to bring up any charge of abuse or corruption against the local
elective officials who are the subject of any recall petition.

Paras v. Comelec
Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City. A petition for his recall as
Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. The COMELEC scheduled the petition
signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13,1995. At least 29.30% of the
registered voters signed the petition, above the 25% requirement provided by law. To prevent the holding of
the recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC petition for injunction. After conducting a summary
hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his
counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall
election was without COMELEC approval.

The Comelec again re-scheduled the recall election, hence the instant petition for certiorari with urgent
prayer for injunction the issue being WON the recall election to be held on January 13, 1996 is barred by
the SK election to be held on May 1996.
HELD: The issue on recall has become moot and academic. But the Court held that it would be more in
keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring
to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and
be filled by the electorate.
Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year from
the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local
election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996,
and every three years thereafter. The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to
recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely
designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the
second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local
election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government
Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term.
And if the SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be
deemed within the purview of the phrase "regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then
no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the LGC. In the interpretation of
a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law,
and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. An interpretation
should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as
otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant,
meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute
should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local
Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional
mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a local government code which shall provide
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanism of recall, initiative, and referendum . . . ." Finally, recall election
is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional
expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the
regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of
the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the official's replacement in the said
election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. It
would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular
local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be
recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate. Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer
possible because of the limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular
election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been
scheduled on May 1997.

Malonzo v. Comelec
Petitioner was duly elected as Mayor, winning over former Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr. Barely one year into
his term, 1,057 Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members and SK chairmen, constituting a
majority of the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City of Caloocan, met, and upon
deliberation and election, voted for the approval of Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution No. 01-96,
expressing loss of confidence in Mayor Malonzo, and calling for the initiation of recall proceedings against
him. The Comelec declared the recall proceedings to be in order. Mayor Malonzo filed a petition for
certiorari with a prayer for TRO assailing the Comelecs resolution. The Petition, in the main, raises the

issue of the validity of the institution and proceedings of the recall, putting to fore the propriety of the
service of notices to the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, and the proceedings held, resulting
in the issuance of the questioned Resolution.
HELD: The Court ruled that notices were properly sent to the members of the PRA and that the proceedings
held by the PRA are valid. The Commission regards the sending of notice one thing, and the completion of
service thereof another, for indeed, the requirement of notice can only be fully satisfied, if there was not
only service, but also completion of service thereof. Personal services were acknowledged by receipts
signed, if not by the addressee himself, then, as indicated thereon, by his or her spouse, nearest relative or a
person of sufficient discretion in the member 's residence or office. Service by registered mail was evinced
by the return card duly signed by the addressee or by persons acting for him. There were instances when
notices were served but were refused, this fact noted in the acknowledgment receipt by the server and his
witnesses. The circumstances being thus, it was held that there was complete service of the notices as
contemplated in Section 8, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. That it was Alex David, President of the LIGA ng
mga Barangay who sent the notices is of no moment. As member of the PRA, he can legally exercise the
prerogatives attached to his membership in the Preparatory Recall Assembly, sending notices to the other
members of its scheduled convening. It is evident from the foregoing and, therefore, the Commission so
holds that the requirements of notice had been fully complied with. Needless to state, the issue of propriety
of the notices sent to the PRA members is factual in nature, and the determination of the same is therefore a
function of the COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious inconsistencies in the findings, the
Court should not disturb the same.
Petitioner's insistence, that the initiation of the recall proceedings was infirm since it was convened by the
Liga ng mga Barangays, is misplaced. Petitioner observes that "respondent Liga is an organization of all
barangays. It is not an organization of barangay captains and kagawads. The barangays are represented in
the Liga by the barangay captains as provided under Section 492 LGC. It also provides that the Kagawad
may represent the barangay in the absence of the barangay chairman." The Liga ng mga Barangay is
undoubtedly an entity distinct from the Preparatory Recall Assembly. It just so happens that the
personalities representing the barangays in the Liga are the very members of the Preparatory Recall
Assembly, the majority of whom met on July 7, 1996, and voted in favor of the resolution calling for the
recall of Mayor Malonzo, after deliberation reported in the record, in accordance with the existing law.
Thus, the Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members convened and voted as members of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly of Caloocan, and not as members of the Liga ng mga Barangay. The recall
proceedings, therefore, cannot be denied merit on this ground. Any doubt as to the propriety of the
proceedings held during the recall assembly should be laid to rest. As the COMELEC pertinently observes:
The Minutes of the session of the Preparatory Assembly indicated that there was a session held. Attendees
constitute the majority of all the members of the Preparatory Assembly, as we shall later on establish. Rules
of procedure, simple they may be were formulated. Deliberations were conducted on the main issue, which
was that of petitioner's recall. The members were given the opportunity to articulate on their resolve about
the matter. More importantly, their sentiments were expressed through their votes signified by their
signatures and thumbmarks affixed to the Resolution. No proof was adduced by Petitioner to substantiate
his claim that the signatures appearing thereon represented a cause other than that of adopting the
resolution.
The charges of graft and corruption, violence and irregularities, before and during the session of the
preparatory recall assembly are largely uncorroborated, and cannot override the substantiated findings of
the respondent COMELEC.

Claudio v. Comelec
Jovito Claudio was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections. On May 19, 1999,
several barangay chairs formed an ad hoc committee for the purpose of convening the PRA. Richard
Advincula was designated chair. The members of the PRA adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999, initiating

Claudios recall. The petition for recall was filed in the Office of the City Mayor. The COMELEC also
posted the petition on the bulletin boards of certain public places.
Oppositions to the petition were filed by Jovito Claudio, Rev. Ronald Langub, and Roberto L. Angeles,
alleging procedural and substantive defects in the petition, to wit: (1) the signatures affixed to the resolution
were actually meant to show attendance at the PRA meeting; (2) most of the signatories were only
representatives of the parties concerned who were sent there merely to observe the proceedings; (3) the
convening of the PRA took place within the one-year prohibited period; (4) the election case, filed by
Wenceslao Trinidad in this Court, seeking the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner Claudio as
mayor of Pasay City, should first be decided before recall proceedings against petitioner could be filed; and
(5) the recall resolution failed to obtain the majority of all the members of the PRA, considering that 10
were actually double entries, were not duly accredited members of the barangays, 40 Sangguniang
Kabataan officials had withdrawn their support, and 60 barangay chairs executed affidavits of retraction.
The COMELEC granted the petition and dismissed the opposition. It ruled that the 1,073 members who
attended the May 29, 1999 meeting were more than necessary to constitute the PRA, considering that its
records showed the total membership of the PRA was 1,790, while the statistics of the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG) showed that the total membership of the PRA was 1,876. In either
case, since only a majority is required to constitute the PRA, clearly, a majority had been obtained in
support of the recall resolution. Hence, this petition.
WON the word "Recall" in Paragraph (b) of 74 of the Local Government Code Includes the Convening of
the Preparatory Recall Assembly and the Filing by it of a Recall Resolution
Held: Yes.
Recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory, recall assembly or the gathering of
the signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local government unit, and then proceeds to the
filing of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such resolution or petition,
the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the holding of the election on the scheduled date. However,
as used in paragraph (b) of 74, "recall" refers to the election itself by means of which voters decide
whether they should retain their local official or elect his replacement. Several reasons can be cited in
support of this conclusion.
First, 74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. It is in fact entitled "Limitations on Recall." On the
other hand, 69 provides that "the power of recall ...shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local
government unit to which the local elective official belongs." Since the power vested on the electorate is not
the power to initiate recall proceedings but the power to elect an official into office, the limitations in 74
cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. In other words, the term "recall" in paragraph
(b) refers only to the recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition for
recall with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of the voters for a petition for
recall.
Thus, there may be several PRAs held or petitions for recall filed with the COMELEC - there is no legal
limit on the number of times such processes may be resorted to. These are merely preliminary steps for the
purpose of initiating a recall. The limitations in 74 apply only to the exercise of the power of recall which
is vested in the registered voters. It is this - and not merely, the preliminary steps required to be taken to
initiate a recall - which paragraph (b) of 74 seeks to limit by providing that no recall shall take place
within one year from the date of assumption of office of an elective local official.
The second reason why the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to recall election is to be found in the
purpose of the limitation itself. There are two limitations in paragraph (b) on the holding of recalls: (1) that
no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of the official concerned,
and (2) that no recall shall take place within one year immediately preceding a regular local election.

The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the performance of an "The
only logical reason which we can ascribe for requiring the electors to wait one year before petitioning for a
recall election is to prevent premature action on their part in voting to remove a newly elected official
before having had sufficient time to evaluate the soundness of his policies and decisions." The one-year
limitation was reckoned as of the filing of a petition for recall because the Municipal Code involved in that
case expressly provided that "no removal petition shall be filed against any officer or until he has actually
held office for at least twelve months." But however the period of prohibition is determined, the principle
announced is that the purpose of the limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for evaluating the
performance of an elective local official. Hence, in this case, as long as the election is held outside the oneyear period, the preliminary proceedings to initiate a recall can be held even before the end of the first year
in office of a local official.
Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the convening of the PRA for the purpose
of discussing the performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly restrict the
constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its members. The people cannot just be asked on the day
of the election to decide on the performance of their officials. The crystallization and formation of an
informed public opinion takes time. To hold, therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b) includes the
holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and opinions among citizens is to unduly curtail one of the
most cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it is wrong to assume that such assemblies will always
eventuate in a recall election. To the contrary, they may result in the expression of confidence in the
incumbent.
To sum up, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to the recall election and not to the preliminary
proceedings to initiate recall 1. 1. Because 74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which, according to 69, is a power which shall be
exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit. Since the voters do not exercise such right
except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within the one-year
period provided in paragraph (b);
2. Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide voters a sufficient basis for
judging an elective local official, and final judging is not done until the day of the election; and
3. Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the initiation of recall proceedings would
unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed in the Constitution.
As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000, more than one year after petitioner assumed
office as mayor of that city, we hold that there is no bar to its holding on that date.
WON the Phrase "Regular Local Election" in the Same Paragraph (b) of 74 of the LGC includes the
election period or campaign period?
Held: No.
The law is unambiguous in providing that "[n]o recall shall take place within . . . one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election." Had Congress intended this limitation to refer to the campaign period,
which period is defined in the Omnibus Election Code, it could have expressly said so. Petitioner's
interpretation would severely limit the period during which a recall election may be held. Actually, because
no recall election may be held until one year after the assumption of office of an elective local official,
presumably on June 30 following his election, the free period is only the period from July 1 of the following
year to about the middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a period of only nine months and 15 days,
more or less. To construe the second limitation in paragraph (b) as including the campaign period would
reduce this period to eight months. Such an interpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalize the
right of recall which is designed to make local government units" more responsive and accountable."
Indeed, there is a distinction between election period and campaign period. Under the Omnibus Election
Code, unless otherwise fixed by the COMELEC, the election period commences ninety (90) days before the

day of the election and ends thirty (30) days thereafter. Thus, to follow petitioner's interpretation that the
second limitation in paragraph (b) includes the "election period" would emasculate even more a vital right
of the people.
WON the Recall RESOLUTION was Signed by a Majority of the PRA and Duly Verified
Held: Yes.
Petitioner contends that a majority of the signatures of the members of the PRA was not obtained because
74 members did not really sign the recall resolution. According to petitioner, the 74 merely signed their
names on pages 94-104 of the resolution to signify their attendance and not their concurrence. Petitioner
claims that this is shown by the word "Attendance" written by hand at the top of the page on which the
signatures of the 74 begin.
This contention has no basis. To be sure, this claim is being raised for the first time in this case. It was not
raised before the COMELEC. Although the word "Attendance" appears at the top of the page, it is apparent
that it was written by mistake because it was crossed out by two parallel lines drawn across it. Apparently, it
was mistaken for the attendance sheet which is a separate document. It is absurd to believe that the 74
members of the PRA who signed the recall resolution signified their attendance at the meeting twice. It is
more probable to believe that they signed pages 94-104 to signify their concurrence in the recall resolution
of which the pages in question are part. The other point raised by petitioner is that the recall petition filed in
the COMELEC was not duly verified, because Atty. Nelson Ng, who notarized it, is not commissioned as
notary public for Pasay City but for Makati City. As in the case of the first claim, this issue was not raised
before the COMELEC itself. It cannot, therefore, be raised now.

Human Resources and Development


Book I, Title 3, LGC (Sec 76 97)

For Sec 84 89, see above

Title III Human Resources and Development


Organization structure and staffing pattern (Sec 76)
In designing and implementing the organizational structure and staffing pattern by the LGU the following
factors shall be considered:
1.
2.

Service Requirements of the LGU;


Financial Capability of the LGU

Subject to the guidelines prescribed by the Civil Service Commission

Responsibility for human resources and development (Sec 77)


The local chief executive of every LGU shall be responsible for human resources and development of the
said LGU.
The local chief executive shall take all personnel actions in accordance with the Constitution, pertinent
laws, rules and regulations including such policies, guidelines and standards as may be established by the
Civil Service Commission.
The local chief executive may employ emergency or casual employees or laborers paid on a daily wage,
piecework, or per job order basis for local projects authorized by the Sangguniang concerned, without the
need for approval or attestation by the Civil Service Commission BUT the period of employment of these
workers SHALL NOT exceed six (6) months.
Civil Service Law, rules and regulations, and other related issuances (Sec 78)
General rule: All matters pertaining to human resources and development in LGUs shall be governed by
the Civil Service Law and such rules and regulations and other issuances promulgated pursuant thereto.
Exception: When specified otherwise by the Local Government Code.
Limitation on appointment (Sec 79)
No person shall be appointed in the career service of the local government if he is related within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to the appointing or recommending authority.
Public notice of vacancy; Personnel Selection Board (Sec 80)
Requirement in filling up a vacant career position:
Posting of notice of the vacancy in at least three (3) conspicuous public places in the LGU concerned for a
period of not less than fifteen (15) days.

Personnel Selection Board


Functions:
1.
2.

To assist the local chief executive in the judicious and objective selection of personnel for
employment and for promotion;
To assist the local chief executive in the formulation of policies that would contribute to
employee welfare.

Composition:

Headed by the Local Chief Executive;


Members shall be determined by resolution of the sanggunian concerned;
A representative of the Civil Service Commission as an ex-officio member;
The personnel officer of the LGU also as an ex-officio member.

Compensation of local officials and employees (Sec 81)


General rule: It shall be determined by the sanggunian of their respective LGU.
Limitations of the rule:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The increase in compensation of elective local officials shall take effect only after the terms of
office of those approving such increase shall have expired;
The increase in the compensation of the appointive officials and employees shall take effect as
provided in the ordinance authorizing the such increase;
The increases as provided shall not exceed the limitations on budgetary allocations for personal
services provided under Title 5, Book 2 of LGC;
The compensation as provided may be based upon the pertinent provisions of R.A. 6758.

Exception: The punong barangay, the sangguniang barangay members, the SK chairman, the barangay
treasurer, and the barangay secretary shall be entitled to such compensation, allowances, emoluments, and
such other privileges as provided under Title 1, Book 3 of LGC. (see Sec. 393, LGC)
Elective local officials shall be entitled to the same leave privileges as those enjoyed by appointive local
officials, including the cumulation and commutation thereof.
Resignation of elective local officials (Sec 82)
Resignation by elective local officials shall be deemed effective only upon acceptance of the proper
authorities as shown below:
Officials tendering resignation

Proper Authority to accept the resignation

Governors, vice-governors, and mayors and vicemayors of highly urbanized cities and independent
component cities

President of the Philippines

Municipal mayors, municipal vice-mayors, city


mayors and city vice-mayors of component cities

Governor

Sanggunian member

Sanggunian to which he/she belongs

Barangay officials

City or municipal mayor

Copies of the resignation letters of elective local officials, together with the action taken by the proper
authorities accepting the resignation shall be furnished the DILG.
The resignation shall be deemed accepted if not acted upon by the authority concerned within fifteen (15)
working days from receipt thereof.
Irrevocable resignations by sanggunian members shall be deemed accepted upon presentation before an
open session of the sanggunian concerned and duly entered in its records.
Exceptions:
1.
2.

The above rule does not apply to sanggunian members subject to recall election;
The same does not apply in cases where existing laws prescribe the manner of acting upon such
resignations.

Grievance procedure (Sec 83)


The local chief executive, of every LGU shall establish a procedure to inquire into, act upon, resolve or
settle complaints and grievances presented by local government employees.
Practice of profession (Sec 90)
Governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any
business other than the exercise of their function as local chief executives.
Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools.
Exception: During session hours.
Exception to the exception: Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of
work ONLY on occasion of emergency PROVIDED; they do not derive any monetary compensation
therefrom.
Special rules for Sanggunian members who are also lawyers:
1.
2.
3.
4.

They shall not appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein an LGU or any office,
agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
They shall not appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the
national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
They shall not collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the
local government unit of which he is an official;
They shall not use property and personnel of the Government except when they are defending the
interest of the Government.

Statement of assets and liabilities (Sec 91)


Officials and employees of LGUs shall file their:
1.
2.
3.

Sworn statements of assets, liabilities and net worth


Lists of relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity in government service;
Financial and business interests;

4.

Personal data sheets as required by law.

Oath of office (Sec 92)


All elective and appointive local officials and employees shall, upon assumption to office, subscribe to an
oath or affirmation of office in the prescribed form.
The oath or affirmation shall be filed with the office of the local chief executive concerned.
A copy of the oath or affirmation of office of all elective and appointive local officials and employees shall
be preserved in the individual personal records file under the custody of the personnel office, division, or
section of the LGU concerned.
Partisan political activity (Sec 93)
No local official or career civil service employee shall:
1.
2.

Engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity or take part in any election,
initiative, referendum, plebiscite, or recall EXCEPT to vote;
Use his official authority or influence to cause the performance of any political activity by any
person or body.

Local officials or career civil service employees MAY express his views on current issues, or mention the
names of certain candidates for public office whom he supports.
Elective local officials may take part in partisan political and electoral activities BUT it shall be unlawful
for them to solicit contributions from their subordinates or subject these subordinates to any of the
prohibited acts under the Omnibus Election Code.
Appointment of elective and appointive local officials; candidates who lost in an election (Sec 94)
No elective of appointive local official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to
any public office or position during his tenure.
No elective or appointive local official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality including government owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
Exception: When otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position (Ex officio
positions)
No candidate who lost in any election shall, within one (1) year after such election, be appointed to any
office in the Government or any government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Exception: Losers in the barangay elections.
Additional or double compensation (Sec 95)
No elective or appointive local official or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation.
Exception: When specifically allowed by law.
No elective or appointive local official or employee shall accept any present, emoluments, office, or title of
any kind from any foreign government.

Exception: When Congress gives consent.


Pension and gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.
Permission to leave station (sec 96)
Provincial, city, municipal, and barangay appointive officials going on OFFICIAL TRAVEL shall apply
and secure written permission from their respective local chief executives before departure.
The application (for permission to leave station) shall specify the reason for the travel.
The permission shall be given or withheld based on:
1.
2.
3.

considerations of pubic interest;


financial capability of the local government unit concerned; and
urgency of the travel.

Should the local chief executive concerned fail to act upon the application within four (4) working days
from receipt thereof, it shall be deemed APPROVED.
Mayors of component cities and municipalities shall secure the permission of the governor concerned for
any travel outside the province.
Local government officials TRAVELING ABROAD shall notify their respective sanggunian PROVIDED
that when the period of travel extends to MORE THAN THREE (3) MONTHS, during periods of
emergency or crisis or when the travel involves the use of public funds, permission from the Office of the
President shall be secured.
Field officers of national agencies or offices assigned in provinces, cities, municipalities shall not leave
their official stations without giving PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE to the local chief executive concerned.
The written notice shall state the duration of the travel and the name of the officer whom he shall designate
to act for and in his behalf during his absence.
Annual report (Sec 97)
On or before March 31 of every year, every local chief executive shall submit an annual report to the
sanggunian concerned on the socio-economic, political and peace and order conditions, and other matters
concerning the local government unit, which shall cover the immediately preceding calendar year.
A copy of the report shall be forwarded to the DILG.
Component cities and municipalities shall likewise provide the sangguniang panlalawigan copies of their
respective annual reports.
I.

Practice of Profession by Mayors, Governors and other elective officials

Sec 90, LGC


See above

Javellana v. DILG

Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Council or of Bago City, Negros Occidental. City
Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed Administrative Case against Javellana. Divinagracia's complaint
alleged that Javellana has continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority for that
purpose from the Regional Director, Department of Local Government, as required by DLG Memorandum
Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same department: that on
July 8, 1989, Javellana, as counsel for Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang, filed a case against City
Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia of Bago City for "Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with Damages"
putting him in public ridicule: that Javellana also appeared as counsel in several criminal and civil cases in
the city, without prior authority of the DLG Regional Director, in violation of DLG Memorandum Circular
No. 80-38. Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case against him on the ground mainly
that DLG Memorandum Circular Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are unconstitutional because the Supreme Court has
the sole and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law. The motion to dismiss was denied.
A few months later, the LGC was enacted which provides: "SEC. 90. Practice of Profession.
"(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools
except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are also members of the Bar shall
not:
"(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local
government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
"(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local
government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office:
"(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit
of which he is an official; and
"(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is
defending the interest of the Government.
Javellana thereupon filed this petition for certiorari praying that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38
and 90-81 and Section 90 of RA 7160 be declared unconstitutional and null and void.
HELD: The Memorandum Circulars and Section 90 of RA 7160 are constitutional. In the first place,
complaints against public officers and employees relating or incidental to the performance of their duties
are necessarily impressed with public interest for by express constitutional mandate, a public office is a
public trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer
Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City Government of Bago City, their real employer, of
which petitioner Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia, would
actually be a judgment against the City Government. By serving as counsel for the complaining employees
and assisting them to prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated
Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of RA 6713) prohibiting a government
official from engaging in the private practice of his profession, if such practice would represent interests
adverse to the government. Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991
and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII. Section 5 of the Constitution is completely
off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to
prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No.
90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the
discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law
allows it. Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It
applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90
explicitly provides that Sanggunian Members "may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours." If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to

lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or
affect, the area of public service.
II.

Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations; Limitations on Appointments; Resignation


of Elective Local Officials; Preventive Suspension of Local Officials and Employees;
Administrative Investigation; Disciplinary Jurisdiction; Additional or Double
Compensation

Local Boards and Councils


Book I, Titles 4-7 (Sec 98 116)
Title IV Local School Boards
There shall be established in every province, city, or municipality a provincial, city or municipal school
board respectively.
Composition
i.

Provincial School Board

Co - Chairmen

1.
2.

Members

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

ii.

Provincial Governor
Provincial Division Schools
Superintendent
Chairman of Education Committee in the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Provincial Treasurer
SK Federation Representative in the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan
President of the Provincial Federation of
PTA
Representative of the teachers
organization in the province
Representative of the non-academic
personnel of public schools in the province

City School Board

Co Chairmen

1.
2.

City Mayor
City Division Schools Superintendent

Members

1.

Chairman of Education Committee in the


Sangguniang Panlungsod
City Treasurer
SK Federation Representative in the
Sangguniang Panlungsod
President of the City Federation of PTA
Representative of the teachers
organization in the city
Representative of the non-academic
personnel of public schools in the city

2.
3.
4.
5.

iii.

Municipal School Board

Co Chairmen

1.
2.

Municipal Mayor
District Supervisor

Members

1.

2.
3.

4.

5.

Chairman of Education
Committee in the
Sangguniang Bayan
Municipal Treasurer
SK Federation
Representative in the
Sangguniang Bayan
President of the
Municipal Federation of
PTA
Representative of the
teachers organization in
the municipality
Representative of the
non-academic personnel
of public schools in the
municipality

In the event that a province or a city has two (2) or more school superintendents, and in the event that a
municipality has two (2) or more district supervisors, the co-chairmen of the local school board shall be
determined as follows:
1.
2.

The DepEd shall designate the co-chairman for the provincial or city schools board; and
The Schools Division Superintendent shall designate the district supervisor who shall serve as cochairman as in the municipal school board

The performance of the duties and responsibilities of the abovementioned officials in their respective school
boards shall no be delegated.
Functions of a local school board
1.

2.

3.

4.

To determine in accordance with the criteria set by the DepEd, the annual supplementary
budgetary needs for the operation and maintenance of public schools within the province, city, or
municipality, as the case may be, and the supplementary local costs of meeting such needs, which
shall be reflected in the form of an annual school board budget corresponding to its share of the
proceeds of the special levy on real property constituting the Special Education Fund and such
other sources of revenue as this Code and other laws or ordinances may provide;
To authorize the provincial, city or municipal treasurer, as the case may be, to disburse funds
from the Special Education Fund pursuant to the budget prepared and in accordance with existing
rules and regulations;
To serve as an advisory committee to the sanggunian concerned on educational matters such as,
but not limited to, the necessity for and the uses of local appropriations for educational purposes;
and
To recommend changes in the names of public schools within the territorial jurisdiction of the
local government unit for enactment by the sanggunian concerned.

The DepEd shall consult the local school board on the appointment of division superintendents, district
supervisors, school principals, and other officials.
Meetings and quorum
The local school board shall meet at least once a month or as often as may be necessary.

Any of the co-chairmen may call a meeting.


A majority of all its members shall constitute a quorum. However, when both co-chairmen are present in a
meeting, the local chief executive concerned, as a matter of protocol, shall be given preference to preside
over the meeting.
The division schools superintendent, city schools superintendent or district supervisor, as the case may be,
shall prepare the budget of the school board concerned. Such budget shall be supported by programs,
projects, and activities of the school board for the ensuing fiscal year.
The affirmative vote of the majority of all the members shall be necessary to approve the budget.
Priorities in the school board budget
1.
2.
3.

Construction, repair, and maintenance of school buildings and other facilities of public
elementary and secondary schools;
Establishment and maintenance of extension classes where necessary; and
Sports activities at the division, district, municipal, and barangay levels.

Title V Local Health Boards


There shall be established a local health boards in every province, city, or municipality.
Composition:
i.

Provincial Health Board

Chairman

Provincial Governor

Vice Chairman

Provincial health officer


1. Chairman of the committee on health of the
sangguniang panlalawigan
2. Representative from Private sector or NGO
involved in health services
3. Representative from the DOH in the province

Members

ii.

City Health Board

Chairman

City Mayor

Vice Chairman

City Health Officer


1. Chairman of the committee on health of the
Sangguniang panlalawigan
2. Representative from Private sector or NGO
involved in health services
3. Representative from DOH in the province

Members

iii.
Chairman

Municipal Health Board


Municipal Mayor

Vice chairman

Members

Municipal health officer


1. Chairman of the committee on health of the
sangguniang panlalawigan
2. Representative from Private sector or NGO
involved in health services
3. Representative from the DOH in the province

Functions of a local health board


1.

2.

3.

To propose to the sanggunian concerned, in accordance with standards and criteria set by the
DOH, annual budgetary allocations for the operation and maintenance of health facilities and
services within the municipality, city, or province, as the case may be;
To serve as an advisory committee to the sanggunian concerned on health matters such as, but not
limited to, the necessity for, and application of, local appropriations for public health purposes;
and
To create committees, consistent with the technical standards and administrative standards of the
DOH, which shall advise local health agencies on matters such as but not limited to:
a. personnel selection and promotion
b. bids and awards
c.
grievance and complaints
d. personnel discipline
e.
budget review
f.
operations review
g.
other similar functions.

Meetings and quorum


The board shall meet at least once a month or as may be necessary.
A majority of the members of the board shall constitute a quorum but the chairman or the vice-chairman
must be present during meetings where budgetary proposals are being prepared or considered.
The affirmative vote of all the majority of the members shall be necessary to approve such in proposals.
Compensation and remuneration
General Rule: The chairman, vice-chairman and members of the local health board shall perform their
duties without compensation or remuneration.
Exception: Members of the local health board who are not government officials or employees shall be
entitled to necessary traveling expenses and allowances chargeable against the funds of the local health
board concerned, subject to the existing accounting and auditing rules and regulations.
Direct national supervision and control by the Secretary of Health (Sec 105)
General Rule: The local health matters in a particular LGU shall be directly controlled and supervised by
the local health board.
Exception: In cases of epidemics, pestilence, and other widespread public health dangers, the Secretary of
Health may, upon the direction of the President and in consultation with the LGU concerned, temporarily
assume direct supervision and control over health operations in any LGU for the duration of the emergency,
but in no case exceeding six (6) months. With the concurrence of the LGU concerned, the period for such
direct supervision and control may be further extended.

Title VI Local Development Councils


Section 106. Local Development Councils. Each local government unit shall have a comprehensive
multisectoral development plan to be initiated by its development council and approved by its sanggunian.
For this purpose, the development council at the provincial, city, municipal or barangay level, shall assist
the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and
coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.
Comments: The Code has established a local development council for every province, city, municipality
and barangay. Its primary duty is to initiate a comprehensive multisectoral development plan for the LGU
concerned, which is submitted to the proper sanggunian for its approval.
By initiating the development plan for the LGU concerned, the local development council sets the direction
of economic and social development and coordinates development efforts within the said local government
unit. It is not specifically directed by the Code that development planning should start from below, the local
people, and not imposed from the top, the central government.
Section 107. Composition of Local Development Councils. The composition of the local development
council shall be as follows:
(a)The barangay development council shall be headed by the punong barangay and shall be composed of
the following members:
1.
2.
3.

Members of the Sangguniang Barangay;


Representatives of nongovernmental organizations operating in the barangay, who shall constitute
not less than one fourth (1/4) of the members of the fully organized council;
A representative of the congressman.

(b)The City or Municipal Development Council shall be headed by the mayor and shall be composed of the
following members:
1.
2.
3.
4.

All punong barangays in the city or municipality;


The chairman of the committee on appropriations of the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang
Bayan concerned;
The congressman or his representative; and
Representatives of nongovernmental organizations operating in the city or municipality, as the
case may be, who shall constitute not less than one-fourth (1/4) of the members of the fully
organized council.

(c) The Provincial Development Council shall be headed by the governor and shall be composed of the
following members:
1.
2.
3.
4.

All mayors of component cities and municipalities;


The chairman of the committee on appropriations of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan;
The congressman or his representative; and
Representatives of nongovernmental organizations operating in the province, who shall constitute
not less than one-fourth (1/4) of the members of the fully organized council.

(d) The local development councils may call upon any local official concerned or any official of national
agencies or offices in the local government unit to assist in the formulation of their respective development
plans and public investment programs.
Comments: The local chief executives chair the local development councils: (a) the governor for the
Provincial Development Council, (b) the mayor for the City or Municipal Development Council and (c) the
punong barangay for the Barangay Development Council.

NGO Members
The Code gives the NGOs a sizable number of representatives (not less than of the total number of
council members) in the LDCs in recognition of the vital role that the private sector plays in the
development of the different provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. As members of the LDCs,
NGOs can play a substantial role in defining the thrusts of local development.
Power to Summon Assistance
The local development councils have the power to summon any official of an LGU concerned or of the
national government agency or office in the said LGU to assist them in the formulation of their respective
development plans and public investment programs.
Section 108. Representation of Nongovernmental Organizations. Within a period of sixty (6) days from the
start of organization of local development councils, the nongovernmental organizations shall choose from
among themselves their representatives to said councils. The local sanggunian concerned shall accredit
nongovernmental organizations subject to such criteria as may be provided by law.
Comments:
Period to Choose NGO Representatives
This section directs that within 60 days from the organization of the LDC, the NGOs shall choose their
representatives to the council from among themselves.
It bears repeating that NGO representatives are chosen by them. They are not to be appointed by the mayor,
the governor nor any other politician.
Accreditation of NGOs
This section deals with the accreditation of the NGOs by the local sanggunian concerned according to such
criteria as may be provided by law. Till this date, there is no such law yet. The IRR, however, indicate some
criteria for the accreditation of NGOs. The criteria laid down by the IRR are helpful guides for
accreditation.
Section 109. Functions of Local Development Councils.
(a)The Provincial, City and Municipal Development Councils shall exercise the following functions:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Formulate long-term, medium-term, and annual socioeconomic development plans and policies;
Formulate the medium-term and annual public investment programs;
Appraise and prioritize socioeconomic development programs and projects;
Formulate local investment incentives to promote the inflow and direction of private investment
capital;
Coordinate, monitor and evaluate the implementation of development programs and projects; and
Perform such other functions as may be provided by law or competent authority.

(b) The barangay development council shall exercise the following functions:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Mobilize peoples participation in local development efforts;


Prepare barangay development plans based on local requirements;
Monitor and evaluate the implementation of national or local programs and projects; and
Perform such other functions as may be provided by law or competent authority.

Comments: The Barangay Development Council does essentially the same things for the barangay,
although there is one thing that it is explicitly empowered to do which the other development councils have
not been expressly authorized to do to mobilize peoples participation in local development efforts. It does
not mean, however, that other LDCs cannot mobilize popular participation in local development. In fact,
they should do so because without popular involvement and support, there will be no substantial
development in their community.
Section 110. Meetings and Quorum. The local development council shall meet at least once every six (6)
months or as often as may be necessary.
Section 111. Executive Committee.
(a) Each local development council shall create an executive committee to represent it and act in its behalf
when it is not in session. The composition of the executive committee shall be as follows:
1.

2.

3.

The executive committee of the Provincial Development Council shall be composed of the
governor as chairman, the representative of component city and municipal mayors to be chosen
from among themselves, the chairman of the committee on appropriations of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, the president of the provincial league of barangays, and a representative of nongovernmental organizations that are represented in the council, as members;
The executive committee of the City or Municipal Development Council shall be composed of the
mayor as chairman, the chairman of the committee on appropriations of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, the president of the city or municipal league of barangays, and a representative of
nongovernmental organizations that are represented in the council, as members; and
The executive committee of the barangay development council shall be composed of the punong
barangay as chairman, a representative of the Sangguniang Barangay to be chosen from among its
members, and a representative of nongovernmental organizations that are represented in the
council, as members.

(b) The executive committee shall exercise the following powers and functions:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Ensure that the decision of the council are faithfully carried out and implemented;
Act on matters requiring immediate attention or action by the council;
Formulate policies, plans and programs based on the general principles laid down by the council;
and
Act on other matters that may be authorized by the council.

Comments:
Excom Functions
The main function of the executive committee of a local development council is to represent it and act in its
behalf when the council is not meeting.
Section 112. Sectoral or Functional Committee. The local development councils may form sectoral or
functional committees to assist them in the performance of their functions.
Comments: Sectoral/Functional Committees. The Code allows the LDCs to create sectoral or functional
committees to assist them. A sectoral committee may be composed of members who come from a particular
sector of society, for example, an urban poor committee or a committee of fisherfolk. Functional
committees may encompass definite duties like a committee on ways and means or a committee on
beautification.
Section 113. Secretariat. There is hereby constituted for each local development council a secretariat which
shall be responsible for providing technical support, documentation of proceedings, preparation of reports

and such other assistance as may be required in the discharge of its functions. The local development
council may avail of the services of any nongovernmental organization or educational or research institution
for this purpose.
The secretariats of the Provincial, City and Municipal Development Councils shall be headed by their
respective planning and development coordinators. The secretariat of the barangay development council
shall be headed by the barangay secretary who shall be assisted by the city or municipal planning and
development coordinator concerned.
Comments: LDC Secretariat. The Code does not define the membership of the secretariat of the LDCs but it
must be headed by the provincial, city or municipal Development Coordinators in the case of a province,
city or municipality and by the barangay secretary in the case of a barangay. The barangay secretary as head
of the Barangay Secretariat shall be assisted by the city or municipal planning and development coordinator
concerned. The reason is that very few, if any, barangay secretaries would have the expertise to discharge
the duties of the head of the barangay secretariat on socioeconomic planning.
Section 114. Relation of Local Development Councils to the Sanggunian and the Regional Development
Council.
(a) The policies, programs and projects proposed by local development councils shall be submitted to the
sanggunian concerned for appropriate action. The local development plans approved by their respective
sanggunian may be integrated with the development plans of the next higher level of local development
council.
(b) The approved development plans of provinces, highly urbanized cities and independent component
cities shall be submitted to the Regional Development Council, which shall be integrated into the regional
development plan for submission to the National Economic and Development authority, in accordance with
existing laws.
Comments:
Sanggunian Approval Needed. Plans, programs and projects prepared by LDCs do not automatically
acquire the force of law. They must be submitted to the sanggunian concerned, which enacts the
corresponding ordinance to make them enforceable within the territory of the LGU concerned. The
Sanggunian may or may not adopt the said plans, programs and projects.
Integration with Higher Level LDC Plans. If adopted by the Sanggunian, the said plans, programs and
projects may be integrated with the development plans of the next higher LDC. For example, if the
development plans of a Municipal Development Council is adopted by the municipal Sanggunian, the plans
may be made a part of the provincial development plan by the Provincial Development Council.
Submission to Regional Development Council. Development plans approved by the Sanggunian of a
province, a highly urbanized city or an independent component city shall be submitted to the Regional
Development Council which shall integrate them into the regional development plan for submission to the
NEDA in accordance with existing laws.
The regional development Council has no authority to disapprove a provincial, city or municipal
development plan but it may make its implementation difficult by recommending its disapproval for
funding.
Section 115. Budget Information. The Department of Budget and Management shall furnish the various
local development councils information on financial resources and budgetary allocations applicable to their
respective jurisdictions to guide them in their planning functions.
Comments:

It is not a requirement for the Department of Budget and Management to furnish LDCs with information on
financial resources of and budgetary allocations to the LGUs to guide them in the discharge of their
functions.
Title VII Local Peace and Order Council
Section 116. Organization. There is hereby established in every province, city, and municipality a local
peace and order council, pursuant to Executive Order Numbered Three hundred nine (EO No. 309), as
amended, Series of 1988. The local peace and order councils shall have the same composition and functions
as those prescribed by the said executive board.
Comments:
Composition of Peace and Order Council
Executive Order No. 309 as amended, Series of 1988, defines the membership of the local peace and order
council.
Provincial Peace and Order Council Composition
The peace and order council of the province is composed of the following: (a) the governor as chair; (b) the
representative of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, chosen by its members; (c) the Social Welfare and
Development Officer; (d) the Information Officer; (e) the Health Officer; and (f) the representatives of the
central government office or agency in the province who are appointed by their respective heads, such as (i)
the PNP director of the province; (ii) the Commission on Human Rights in the province, (iii) the
commanding general or officer of the armed forces, if any, in the province; (iv) the NBI provincial office;
(v) the National Security Council, if any, in the province; (vi) the provincial prosecutors office; (vii) the
DILK, if any, in the province; (viii) the executive director of the Dangerous Drugs Board; and (ix) 3
representatives of the NGOs and Pos in the province, representing the academic, civic and religious
organizations, who are appointed by the governor.
City/Municipal Peace and Order Council Composition
The peace and order council of the city or municipality is composed of the following: (a) the mayor as
chair; (b) the Sangguniang Panglungsod or Sangguniang Bayan representative, chosen by the sanggunian
from among its members; (c) the SWDO; (d) the Information Officer; (e) the Health Officer; and (f) the
representatives of the central government office or agency in the city or municipality who are appointed by
their respective heads, such as (i) the chief of police; (ii) the Commission on Human Rights, if any, in the
city or municipality; (iii) the commanding general or officer of the armed forces, if any, in the city or
municipality; (iv) the NBI city or provincial office; (v) the National Security Council; (vi) the city or
municipal prosecutors office or in their absence, the city or municipal attorney; (vii) the DILG, if any;
(viii) the executive director of the Dangerous Drugs Board; and (ix) 3 representatives of the NGOs and Pos,
representing the academic, civic and religious organizations in the city or municipality, who are appointed
by the mayor upon consultation with the members of the Council.
Local Peace and Order Council Functions
The provincial, city and municipal peace and order councils have the following duties and functions:
(a)
Formulate plans and recommend such measures to improve or enhance peace and order and
public safety in their respective areas;
(b)
Monitor the implementation of peace and order programs and projects at the provincial, city or
municipal levels, and the operation of Civilian Volunteer Self-Defense Organizations and such other
counter-insurgency programs and activities;

(c)
Make periodic assessments of the prevailing peace and order situation in their respective areas
and submit a report thereon with recommendations to the chair of the national peace and order council; and
(d)

Perform all other functions assigned by law to the peace and order council.

Regional Peace and Order Council


In between the national and the local peace and order councils, there is another council called the Regional
Peace and Order Council, which is composed of their counterpart members of the local peace and order
councils. The Regional Peace and Order Council performs essentially the same functions as those of the
local peace and order councils.

Osea v. Malaya
Petitioner filed a protest case with the Civil Service Commission alleging that she was appointed as Officerin-Charge, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, by the then Secretary of DECS,
upon the endorsement of the Provincial School Board of Camarines Sur. However, despite this, President
Fidel Ramos, appointed respondent to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur.
Petitioner claims that the appointment of respondent was made without prior consultation with the
Provincial School Board, in violation of Section 99 of the Local Government Code as well as her vested
right as the Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur.
HELD: Section 99 of the LGC applies to appointments made by the DECS because at the time of the
enactment of the LGC, schools division superintendents were appointed by the DECS to specific division or
location. However, in 1994, the Career Executive Service Board issued a Memorandum Circular placing the
positions of schools division superintendent and assistant schools division superintendent within the career
executive service. Consequently, the power to appoint persons to career executive service positions was
transferred from the DECS to the President.
In addition, under the circumstances, the designation of respondent as Schools Division Superintendent of
Camarines Sur was not a case of appointment but rather in the nature of reassignment. Therefore, Section
99 of the LGC, which requires prior consultation with the local school board does not apply.
Appointment should be distinguished from reassignment. An appointment may be defined as the selection,
by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office.
When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person
chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office.
On the other hand, a reassignment is merely a movement of an employee from one organizational unit to
another in the same department or agency which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and
does not require the issuance of an appointment. In the same vein, a designation connotes merely the
imposition of additional duties on an incumbent official
Petitioner's designation as Officer-in-Charge, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent, was expressly
made subject to further advice from the DECS. Thus, her designation was temporary. In fact, there was a
need to recommend her to the President for appointment in a permanent capacity. Inasmuch as she occupied
her position only temporarily, petitioner can be transferred or reassigned to other positions without violating
her right to security of tenure. Indeed, petitioner has no vested right to the position of Schools Division
Superintendent of Camarines Sur.

Local Taxation and Fiscal Matters


Book II Title 3, LGC
See above

Shares of LGUs in national taxes


Pimentel v. Aguirre (supra)
See above

Local Government Units

THE BARANGAY
Sec 384-439
CHAPTER I - Role and creation of the Barangay
Section 384. Role of the Barangay. As the basic political unit, the barangay serves as the primary planning
and implementing unit of government policies, plans, programs, projects and activities in the community,
and as a forum wherein the collective views of the people may be expressed, crystallized and considered,
and where disputes may be amicably settled.
Comments:
The barangay discharges three seminal functions:
(a) as a basic political unit the barangay is the smallest political entity used for governance in the
country.
(b) as a primary planning and implementing unit the barangay is mandated to plan development projects
in its territory and to deliver some basic services of the government to its people.
(c) as a forum the barangay gets soundings of the views of the people on various topics. It also provides
a venue for the settlement of disputes amicably.
Section 385. Manner of Creation. - A barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, by law or by an ordinance of the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang
panlungsod, subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be conducted by the
Comelec in the local government unit or units directly affected within such period of time as may be

determined by the law or ordinance creating said barangay. In the case of the creation of barangays by the
sangguniang panlalawigan, the recommendation of the sangguniang bayan concerned shall be necessary.
Section 386. Requisites for Creation.
(a) A barangay maybe created out of a contiguous territory which has apopulation of at least two thousand
(2,000) inhabitants ascertified by the National Statistics Office except in cities and municipalities within
Metro Manila and other metropolitan political subdivisions or in highly urbanized cities where such
territory shall have a certified population of at least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants: Provided, That the
creation thereof shall not reduce the population of the original barangay or barangays to less than the
minimum requirement prescribed herein.
To enhance the delivery of basic services in the indigenous cultural communities, barangays may be created
in such communities by an Act of Congress, notwithstanding the above requirement.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of the new barangay shall be properly identified by metes and bounds or by
more or less permanent natural boundaries. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or
more islands.
(c) The governor or city mayor may prepare a consolidation plan for barangays, based on the criteria
prescribed in this Section, within his territorial jurisdiction. The plan shall be submitted to the sangguniang
panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned for appropriate action. In the case of municipalities
within the Metropolitan Manila area and other metropolitan political subdivisions, the barangay
consolidation plan shall be prepared and approved by the sangguniang bayan concerned.
Comments:
Unlike provinces, cities or municipalities which need a definite territorial size to be created, all that the
Code requires in terms of area for newly created barangays is that it be contiguous. The Code takes into
account the fact that when barangays were created during the Marcos years, their territories were not
defined by specific metes and bounds and therefore came in different sizes, some comprising only a block
or two in the city and others covering areas larger than some municipalities. Now, the Code directs that the
territory of the new barangay shall be identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent
boundaries.
The requirement of contiguity of barangay areas is not mandatory when the barangay comprises two or
more islands.
Population Requirement
In general, at least 2,000 inhabitants are needed to qualify a barangay for creation. But when the barangay
being created is within highly urbanized cities or in cities and municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila
Area or other metropolitan political subdivisions, the population requirement is 5,000. The population
required must be certified by the NSO.
It is also required that the population of the new barangay does not reduce the population of the original
barangay from which it is being created to levels below the numbers now required by the Code.
Nonetheless, barangays may be created by law within areas occupied by indigenous cultural communities
even if their population may be below the required numbers stipulated in the Code. The reason for this
exemption is to enhance the delivery of basic services.
Consolidation of Barangays
With an appropriate plan for consolidation of barangays prepared by the governor or city mayor, the local
sanggunian may consolidate barangays within its territory based upon the criteria set forth in this section.

Consolidation may be the only way to solve the problem of hundreds of barangays throughout the country
whose territorial jurisdictions are ill-defined and which in the urban centers may comprise only a block or
two.
In the Metropolitan Manila Area, the consolidation plan for barangays shall be approved by the
Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities and Sangguniang Panlungsod of the cities.
CHAPTER II - Barangay officials and offices
Section 387. Chief Officials and Offices.
(a) There shall be in each barangay a punong barangay, seven (7) sangguniang barangay members, the
sangguniang kabataan chairman, a barangay secretary, and a barangay treasurer.
(b) There shall also be in every barangay a lupong tagapamayapa. The sangguniang barangay may form
community brigades and create such other positions or offices as may be deemed necessary to carry out the
purposes of the barangay government in accordance with the needs of public service, subject to the
budgetary limitations on personal services prescribed under Title Five, Book II of this Code.
Comments:
Aside from the principal officials for the barangay, namely the punong barangay and the seven
Sangguniang Barangay members, the Sangguniang Kabataan chair, the barangay secretary and the barangay
treasurer, there are other important officials in the barangay, namely the members of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa and the Community Brigades such as the Tanod Brigade and the Disaster Brigade.
Section 388. Persons in Authority. - For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay,
sangguniang barangay members, and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be
deemed as persons in authority in their jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and members who may
be designated by law or ordinance and charged with the maintenance of public order, protection and
security of life and property, or the maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment, and any barangay
member who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed agents of persons in authority.
Comments:
Punong barangays, members of Sangguniang Barangays and Lupong Tagapamayapa are considered persons
in authority under this section. For purposes of the Code, the definition of a person in authority in the
Revised Penal Code is relevant.
Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code states that any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as
an individual or as a member of some court or governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be
deemed a person in authority. A barangay captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in
authority.
The article also defines an agent of a person in authority as: Any person who, by direct provision of law or
by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and
the protection and security of life and property, such as a barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay
leader and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority
Definition Modified
That definition is now modified. In addition to the punong barangay, the members of the Sangguniang
Barangay and the Lupong Tagapamayapa are now considered not merely as agents of but as persons in
authority in the Code. But other barangay officials and members who may be designated by law or
ordinance and charged with the maintenance of public order, protection and security of life and property, or

the maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment, and any barangay member who comes to the aid
of persons in authority continue to be deemed agents of persons in authority.
Section 388 of the Code provides that for purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay, the
Sangguniang Barangay members and the members of the Lupong Tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be
deemed as persons in authority in their jurisdictions This law expands the definition of a person in
authority under the Revised Penal Code, wherein among the barangay officials, only the barangay captain
or chairman, now called the punong barangay, is expressly considered a person in authority, as provided in
Article 152 thereof. Thus, in addition to the punong barangay, the members of the Sangguniang Barangay
or kagawads and members of the Lupong Tagapamayapa are now considered not merely agents of, but as
persons, in authority.
Protecting Environment as Agents of Persons in Authority
Barangay officials and members designated by law or ordinance to maintain a desirable and balanced
environment or who come to the aid of persons in authority who protect the environment are considered
agents of persons in authority.
Consequences of Being Persons in Authority/Agents of Persons in Authority
As persons in authority, they are entitled to respect and may request assistance from barangay residents in
the performance of their duties. Also, because they are considered persons in authority, if they are
physically harmed, the person responsible may be charged for higher degree felonies than would otherwise
be the case. For example, if a barangay resident is attacked physically but without any intent to kill and he
suffers some injuries, the attacker may be charged for physical injuries. But if the victim is a barangay
official, the charge may be for the more serious offense of assault upon a person in authority or upon an
agent of a person in authority for which a higher penalty is imposable.
Power to Arrest and Detain
A barangay captain (now called punong barangay) is a peace officer in the barrio (barangay) and is
considered under the law as a person in authority. As such, he may make arrests and detain persons within
legal limits but if the detention is without legal grounds, the punong barangay may be charged for arbitrary
detention as defined in Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code.
CHAPTER III - The Punong Barangay
Section 389. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties and Functions.
(a)The punong barangay, as the chief executive of the barangay government, shall exercise such powers and
perform such duties and functions, as provided by this Code and other laws.
(b)For efficient, effective and economical governance, the purpose of which is the general welfare of the
barangay and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the punong barangay shall:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Enforce all laws and ordinances which are applicable within the barangay;
Negotiate, enter into, and sign contracts for and in behalf of the barangay, upon authorization of
the sangguniang barangay;
Maintain public order in the barangay and, in pursuance thereof, assist the city or municipal
mayor and the sanggunian members in the performance of their duties and functions;
Call and preside over the sessions of the sangguniang barangay and the barangay assembly, and
vote only to break a tie;
Upon approval by a majority of all the members of the sangguniang barangay, appoint or replace
the barangay treasurer, the barangay secretary, and other appointive barangay officials;

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

14.
15.

Organize and lead an emergency group whenever the same may be necessary for the maintenance
of peace and order or on occasions of emergency or calamity within the barangay;
In coordination with the barangay development council, prepare the annual executive and
supplemental budgets of the barangay;
Approve vouchers relating to the disbursement of barangay funds;
Enforce laws and regulations relating to pollution control and protection of the environment;
Administer the operation of the Katarungang Pambarangay in accordance with the provisions of
this Code;
Exercise general supervision over the activities of the sangguniang kabataan;
Ensure the delivery of basic services as mandated under Section 17 of this Code;
Conduct an annual palarong barangay which shall feature traditional sports and disciplines
included in national and international games, in coordination with the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports;
Promote the general welfare of the barangay; and
Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by
law or ordinance.

(c) In the performance of his peace and order functions, the punong barangay shall be entitled to possess
and carry the necessary firearm within his territorial jurisdiction, subject to appropriate rules and
regulations.
Comments:
Barangay Chief Executive
To a lesser extent, the punong barangay is the equivalent of the governor of a province or the mayor of a
city or municipality as chief executive for his barangay.
Power of Appointment
The appointment of barangay officials by the punong barangay is subject to confirmation by the majority of
all the members of the Sangguniang Barangay.
Some Powers of Punong Barangay

Among the more important powers attached to his office by the Code are the (a)
enforcement of laws relative to pollution control and protection of the environment; (b)
administration of barangay justice or Katarungang Pambarangay; and (c) holding of
annual palarong barangay in coordination with the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports.
Enforcement of Anti-Pollution Laws. The punong barangay has the power to protect the
environment and to enforce laws against pollution
Palarong Barangay. The punong barangay has the power to conduct the annual Palarong
Barangay. The idea is to encourage the youth of the land, including those living in the
remotest areas, to participate in sports activities. It is hoped that through the palarong
barangay, they may develop into national, if not international, class athletes.
Right to Carry Firearms. The punong barangay is entitled to possess and carry a firearm
within his barangay while discharging his duties.

CHAPTER IV - The Sangguniang Barangay


Section 390. Composition. The Sangguniang Barangay, the legislative body of the barangay, shall be
composed of the punong barangay as presiding officer, and the seven (7) regular Sangguniang Barangay
members elected at large and Sangguniang Kabataan chairman, as members.

Comments:
The punong barangay is a part of the Sangguniang Barangay of which he is the presiding officer.
The Supreme Court has stressed that [a] petition or protest contesting the election of barangay officer
should be decided by the municipal or metropolitan trial court within 15 days from filing thereof. xxx
Election cases, unlike ordinary actions, involve public interest. Time is of the essence in its disposition
since the uncertainty as to who is the real choice of the people for the position must soonest be dispelled. It
is neither fair nor just that one of whose right to the office is in doubt should remain in that office for an
uncertain period.
Section 391. Powers, Duties and Functions.
(a) The sangguniang barangay, as the legislative body of the barangay, shall:
1.

Enact ordinances as may be necessary to discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law or
ordinance and to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants therein;
2. Enact tax and revenue ordinances, subject to the limitations imposed in this Code;
3. Enact annual and supplemental budgets in accordance with the provisions of this Code;
4. Provide for the construction and maintenance of barangay facilities and other public works
projects chargeable to the general fund of the barangay or such other funds actually available for
the purpose;
5. Submit to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan such suggestions or
recommendations as it may see fit for the improvement of the barangay or for the welfare of the
inhabitants thereof;
6. Assist in the establishment, organization, and promotion of cooperative enterprises that will
improve the economic condition and well-being of the residents;
7. Regulate the use of multi-purpose halls, multi- purpose pavements, grain or copra dryers, patios
and other post-harvest facilities, barangay waterworks, barangay markets, parking areas or other
similar facilities constructed with government funds within the jurisdiction of the barangay and
charge reasonable fees for the use thereof;
8. Solicit or accept monies, materials and voluntary labor for specific public works and cooperative
enterprises of the barangay from residents, land owners, producers and merchants in the barangay;
monies from grants-in-aid, subsidies, contributions, and revenues made available to the barangays
from national, provincial, city or municipal funds; and monies from other private agencies and
individuals: Provided, however, That monies or properties donated by private agencies and
individuals for specific purposes shall accrue to the barangay as trust fund;
9. Solicit or accept, in any or all the foregoing public works and cooperative enterprises, such
cooperation as is made available by national, provincial, city, or municipal agencies established
by law to render financial, technical, and advisory assistance to barangays and to barangay
residents: Provided, however, That in soliciting or accepting such cooperation, the sangguniang
barangay need not pledge any sum of money for expenditure in excess of amounts currently in the
barangay treasury or encumbered for other purposes;
10. Provide compensation, reasonable allowances or per diems as well as travel expenses for
sangguniang barangay members and other barangay officials, subject to the budgetary limitations
prescribed under Title Five, Book II of this Code: Provided, however, That no increase in the
com- pensation or honoraria of the sangguniang barangay members shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all members of the sangguniang barangay approving such increase;
11. Hold fund-raising activities for barangay projects without the need of securing permits from any
national or local office or agency. The proceeds from such activities shall be tax-exempt and shall
accrue to the general fund of the barangay: Provided, That in the appropriation thereof, the
specific purpose for which such fund-raising activity has been held shall be first satisfied:
Provided, further, That no fund-raising activities shall be held within a period of sixty (60) days
immediately preceding and after a national or local election, recall, referendum, or plebiscite:

12.
13.

14.
15.
16.
17.

18.
19.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Provided, finally, That said fund-raising activities shall comply with national policy standards and
regulations on morals, health, and safety of the persons participating therein. The sangguniang
barangay, through the punong barangay, shall render a public accounting of the funds raised at the
completion of the project for which the fund-raising activity was under- taken;
Authorize the punong barangay to enter into contracts in behalf of the barangay, subject to the
provisions of this Code;
Authorize the barangay treasurer to make direct purchases in an amount not exceeding One
thousand pesos (P1,000.00) at any one time for the ordinary and essential administrative needs of
the barangay;
Prescribe fines in amounts not exceeding One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for violation of
barangay ordinances;
Provide for the administrative needs of the lupong tagapamayapa and the pangkat ng
tagapagkasundo;
Provide for the organization of community brigades, barangay tanod, or community service units
as may be necessary;
Organize regular lectures, programs, or fora on community problems such as sanitation, nutrition,
literacy, and drug abuse, and convene assemblies to encourage citizen participation in
government;
Adopt measures to prevent and control the proliferation of squatters and mendicants in the
barangay;
Provide for the proper development and welfare of children in the barangay by promoting and
supporting activities for the protection and total development of children, particularly those below
seven (7) years of age;
Adopt measures towards the prevention and eradication of drug abuse, child abuse, and juvenile
delinquency;
Initiate the establishment of a barangay high school, whenever feasible, in accordance with law;
Provide for the establishment of a non-formal education center in the barangay whenever feasible,
in coordination with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, ;
Provide for the delivery of basic services; and
Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by
law or ordinance.

Comments:
Wider powers are now enjoyed by the Sangguniang Barangay than was previously the case.
Among the more noteworthy of its powers are: (a) to enact tax and other revenue measures authorized by
the Code; (b) to regulate and charge fees for the use of barangay facilities, including parking areas, markets,
copra dryers, multipurpose halls and the like; (c) to assist in the establishment of cooperatives to improve
the economic well-being of the barangay residents; (d) to provide compensation, allowances, per diems and
travel expenses for barangay officials subject to the limitations provided for in this Code; (e) to authorize
direct purchases by the barangay treasurer of not more than P1,000 worth of items at any one time that are
ordinarily and essentially needed by the barangay; (f) to prescribe fines of not more than P1,000 for
violations of barangay ordinances; (g) to adopt measures to combat drug abuse, child abuse and juvenile
delinquency; (h) to provide for the establishment of non-formal education centers; and (i) to provide for the
delivery of basic services.
Section 392. Other Duties of Sangguniang Barangay Members. In addition to their duties as members of the
Sangguniang Barangay, Sangguniang Barangay members may:
(a) Assist the punong barangay in the discharge of his duties and functions;
(b) Act as peace officers in the maintenance of public order and safety; and
(c) Perform such other duties and functions as the punong barangay may delegate.

Section 393. Benefits of Barangay Officials.


(a) Barangay officials, including barangay tanods and members of the lupong tagapamayapa, shall receive
honoraria, allowances, and such other emoluments as may be authorized by law or barangay, municipal or
city ordinance in accordance with the provisions of this Code, but in no case shall it be less than One
thousand pesos (P=1,000.00) per month for the punong barangay and Six hundred pesos (P=600.00) per
month for the sangguniang barangay members, barangay treasurer, and barangay secretary: Provided,
however, That the annual appropriations for personal services shall be subject to the budgetary limitations
prescribed under Title Five, Book II of this Code;
(b) The punong barangay, the sangguniang barangay members, the barangay treasurer, and the barangay
secretary shall also:
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Be entitled to Christmas bonus of at least One thousand pesos (P=1,000.00) each, the funds
for which shall be taken from the general fund of the barangay or from such other funds
appropriated by the national government for the purpose;
Be entitled, during their incumbency, to insurance coverage which shall include, but shall not
be limited to temporary and permanent disability, double indemnity, accident insurance,
death and burial benefits, in accordance with Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred
forty-two (R.A. No. 6942), entitled "An Act Increasing the Insurance Benefits of Local
Government Officials and Providing Funds Therefor";
Be entitled to free medical care including subsistence, medicines, and medical attendance in
any government hospital or institution: Provided, That such hospital care shall include
surgery or surgical expenses, medicines, X-rays, laboratory fees, and other hospital expenses;
In case of extreme urgency where there is no available government hospital or institution, the
barangay official concerned may submit himself for immediate medical attendance to the
nearest private clinic, hospital or institution and the expenses not exceeding Five thousand
pesos (P=5,000.00) that may be incurred therein shall be chargeable against the funds of the
barangay concerned;
Be exempted during their incumbency from paying tuition and matriculation fees for their
legitimate dependent children attending state colleges or universities. He may likewise avail
of such educational benefits in a state college or university located within the province or
city to which the barangay belongs; and
Be entitled to appropriate civil service eligibility on the basis of the number of years of
service to the barangay, pursuant to the rules and regulations issued by the Civil Service
Commission.

(c) Elective barangay officials shall have preference in appointments to any government position or in any
government-owned or -controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries, after their tenure of office,
subject to the requisite qualifications and the provisions of the immediately preceding paragraph.
(d) All duly appointed members of the barangay tanod brigades, or their equivalent, which shall number not
more than twenty (20) in each barangay, shall be granted insurance or other benefits during their
incumbency, chargeable to the barangay or the city or municipal government to which the barangay
belongs.
Comments:
Barangays may now grant honoraria, allowances and other emoluments to their barangay officials, barangay
tanods and members of the Lupong Tagapamayapa.
The minimum is P1,000 per month for the punong barangay and P600 for the Sangguniang Barangay
members, Barangay Treasurers and Barangay Secretaries subject, however, to the requirement that not more
than 55% of the total annual income actually realized by the barangay from local sources during the next
preceding fiscal year shall be set aside for personal services. Increase of honoraria or compensation

awarded by the Sangguniang Barangay for their elective members cannot take effect until after their term is
over as provided for under Section 391(10).
Among the more noteworthy benefits to which barangay officials are entitled are the following: (a) a
Christmas bonus of at least P1,000 each; (b) insurance coverage; (c) free medical care in government
hospitals, (d) free education for their legitimate dependent children in state colleges or universities and for
themselves in state colleges or universities located in the province or city where their barangays belong; (e)
appropriate civil service eligibility on the basis of their length of service to their barangays; and (f) after
their tenure of office, preference in appointments to government-owned or controlled corporations.
The insurance for barangay officials includes disability benefits, double indemnity, accident coverage, death
and burial benefits pursuant to the law that increases the insurance benefits of local government officials
(R.A. 6942).
The free medical care to which these officials are entitled includes surgery or surgical expenses, medicines,
x-rays, laboratory fees and other hospital expenses in government hospitals.
There is no limit as to the number of legitimate dependent children of barangay officials who are entitled to
free tertiary education in state colleges or universities.
Barangay tanods are also entitled to insurance coverage and other benefits chargeable to the barangay
concerned or to the city or municipality to which the barangay belongs.
CHAPTER V - Appointive barangay officials
Section 394. Barangay Secretary: Appointment, Qualifications, Powers and Duties.
(a)The barangay secretary shall be appointed by the punong barangay with the concurrence of the majority
of all the sangguniang barangay members. The appointment of the barangay secretary shall not be subject to
attestation by the Civil Service Commission.
(b) The barangay secretary shall be of legal age, a qualified voter and an actual resident of the barangay
concerned.
(c) No person shall be appointed barangay secretary if he is a sangguniang barangay member, a government
employee, or a relative of the punong barangay within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
(d) The barangay secretary shall:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Keep custody of all records of the sangguniang barangay and the barangay assembly
meetings;
Prepare and keep the minutes of all meetings of the sangguniang barangay and the barangay
assembly;
Prepare a list of members of the barangay assembly, and have the same posted in
conspicuous places within the barangay;
Assist in the preparation of all necessary forms for the conduct of barangay elections,
initiatives, referenda or plebiscites, in coordination with the Comelec;
Assist the municipal civil registrar in the registration of births, deaths, and marriages;
Keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay containing the following items of
information: name, address, place and date of birth, sex, civil status, citizenship, occupation,
and such other items of information as may be prescribed by law or ordinances;
Submit a report on the actual number of barangay residents as often as may be required by
the sangguniang barangay; and
Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be
prescribed by law or ordinance.

Comments:
Mandatory Barangay Appointive Officials
The barangay secretary and the barangay treasurer are mandatory officers who are to be appointed by the
Punong Barangay subject to the approval of the majority of all the members of the Sangguniang Barangay
concerned. There are other mandatory barangay officials like the Lupong Tagapamayapa and the Pangkat
ng Tagapagkasundo who are mentioned specifically by the Code.
The barangay may create other positions which may be filled by appointment by the punong barangay
subject to approval of a majority of the members of the Sangguniang Barangay.
Civil Registrar Duties of Barangay Secretary
One of the more important duties of the barangay secretary is to assist the municipal civil registrar in the
registration of births, deaths and marriages. Another is to keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the
barangay containing their names, addresses, places of birth, sexes, civil statuses, citizenships, occupations
and other items of information as may be prescribed by law or ordinance.
Section 395. Barangay Treasurer: Appointment, Qualifications, Powers and Duties.
(a) The barangay treasurer shall be appointed by the punong barangay with the concurrence of the majority
of all the sangguniang barangay members. The appointment of the barangay treasurer shall not be subject to
attestation by the Civil Service Commission.
(b) The barangay treasurer shall be of legal age, a qualified voter, and an actual resident of the barangay
concerned.
(c) No person shall be appointed barangay treasurer if he is a sangguniang barangay member, a government
employee, or a relative of the punong barangay within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
(d) The barangay treasurer shall be bonded in accordance with existing laws in an amount to be determined
by the sangguniang barangay but not exceeding Ten thousand pesos (P=10,000.00), premiums for which
shall be paid by the barangay.
(e) The barangay treasurer shall:
1.
2.

3.
4.

5.

6.
7.
8.

Keep custody of barangay funds and properties;


Collect and issue official receipts for taxes, fees, contributions, monies, materials, and all other
resources accruing to the barangay treasury and deposit the same in the account of the barangay
as provided under Title Five, Book II of this Code;
Disburse funds in accordance with the financial procedures provided in this Code;
Submit to the punong barangay a statement covering the actual and estimates of income and
expenditures for the preceding and ensuing calendar years, respectively, subject to the provisions
of Title Five, Book II of this Code;
Render a written accounting report of all barangay funds and property under his custody at the
end of each calendar year, and ensure that such report shall be made available to the members of
the barangay assembly and other government agencies concerned;
Certify as to the availability of funds whenever necessary;
Plan and attend to the rural postal circuit within his jurisdiction; and
Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by
law or ordinance.

Comments:

Barangay treasurers are appointed by the punong barangay subject to the approval of the majority of the
members of the Sangguniang Barangay.
The Code prohibits the appointment of a person as barangay treasurer if he is a member of the Sangguniang
Barangay, a government employee or a relative of the punong barangay within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity.
It is absolute only in the case of a relative of the punong barangay within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity. It is not absolute in the case of a member of the Sangguniang Barangay or a
government employee who can resign as such and then accept appointment as barangay treasurer.
The barangay treasurer shall be bonded in an amount not exceeding P10,000.
Section 396. Other Appointive Officials. The qualifications, duties and functions of all other barangay
officials appointed by the punong barangay shall be governed by the provisions of this Code and other laws
or by barangay ordinances.
CHAPTER VI - Barangay Assembly
Section 397. Composition; Meetings.
(a) There shall be a barangay assembly composed of all persons who are actual residents of the barangay for
at least six (6) months, fifteen (15) years of age or over, citizens of the Philippines, and duly registered in
the list of barangay assembly members.
(b) The barangay assembly shall meet at least twice a year to hear and discuss the semestral report of the
sangguniang barangay concerning its activities and finances as well as problems affecting the barangay. Its
meetings shall be held upon call of the punong barangay or of at least four (4) members of the sangguniang
barangay, or upon written petition of at least five percent (5%) of the assembly members.
(c) No meeting of the barangay assembly shall take place unless a written notice is given one (1) week prior
to the meeting except on matters involving public safety or security, in which case notice within a
reasonable time shall be sufficient. The punong barangay, or in his absence, the sangguniang barangay
member acting as punong barangay, or any assembly member selected during the meeting, shall act as
presiding officer in all the meetings of the assembly. The barangay secretary, or in his absence, any member
designated by the presiding officer to act as secretary, shall discharge the duties of secretary of the barangay
assembly.
Comments:
Barangay Assembly Composition
Actual residents of a barangay for at least 6 months who are citizens of the Republic, at least 15 years of
age and are registered in the list of barangay assembly members compose the Barangay Assembly.
Barangay Assembly Meetings
Mandatory meetings of the Barangay Assembly are at least twice a year.
Meetings may be called by the punong barangay or by at least four members of the Sangguniang Barangay
or upon petition of at least 5% of the assembly members.
Written notice is required to be sent at least one week before the meeting is held except when matters
involving public safety or security are the main agenda of the meeting, in which case, notice for a shorter
period is allowed.

The punong barangay presides at the Barangay Assembly meetings. If he is absent, the acting punong
barangay takes over or any assembly member selected during the meeting may act as president officer.
Section 398. Powers of the Barangay Assembly. The barangay assembly shall:
(a) Initiate legislative processes by recommending to the sangguniang barangay the adoption of measures
for the welfare of the barangay and the city or municipality concerned;
(b) Decide on the adoption of initiative as a legal process whereby the registered voters of the barangay may
directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance; and
(c) Hear and pass upon the semestral report of the sangguniang barangay concerning its activities and
finances.
Comments:
Assemblies as Forums. Barangay Assemblies provide the forum for the discussion of barangay
development plans or petitions for the adoption of initiative to enact or amend a barangay ordinance.
CHAPTER VII Katarungang Pambarangay
Section 399. Lupong Tagapamayapa
What
(a) There is hereby created in each barangay a lupong tagapamayapa, composed of

the Punong Barangay, as chairman


ten (10) to twenty (20) members.
The lupon shall be constituted every three (3) years in the manner provided herein.

Who
(b) Any person

actually residing or working


in the barangay
not otherwise expressly disqualified by law
and possessing integrity, impartiality, independence of mind, sense of fairness, and
reputation for probity, may be appointed a member of the lupon.

How
(c) A notice to constitute the lupon

which shall include the names of proposed members


who have expressed their willingness to serve
shall be prepared by the punong barangay
within the first fifteen (15) days from the start of his term of office
Notice shall be posted in three (3) conspicuous places in the barangay continuously for
a period of not less than three (3) weeks

Appointment, when discretionary


(d) Taking into consideration any opposition to the proposed appointment or any recommendations for
appointment as may have been made within the period of posting, the Punong Barangay

shall within ten (10) days thereafter


appoint as members those whom he determines to be suitable therefor
Appointments shall be in writing, signed by the punong barangay, and attested to by the
barangay secretary.

(e) The list of appointed members shall be posted in three (3) conspicuous places in the barangay for the
entire duration of their term of office; and
(f) In barangays where majority of the inhabitants are members of indigenous cultural communities, local
systems of settling disputes through their councils of datus or elders shall be recognized without prejudice
to the applicable provisions of this Code.
Section 400. Oath and Term of Office.
1.

Upon appointment, each lupon member shall take an oath of office before the punong barangay.

2.

He shall hold office until a new lupon is constituted on the third year following his appointment
unless sooner terminated by resignation, transfer of residence or place of work, or withdrawal of
appointment by the punong barangay with the concurrence of the majority of all the members of
the lupon.

Section 401. Vacancies.


Punong barangay shall immediately appoint a qualified person who shall hold office only for the unexpired
portion of the term.
Section 402. Functions of the Lupon.
(a) Exercise administrative supervision over the conciliation panels provided herein;
(b) Meet regularly once a month to

provide a forum for exchange of ideas among its members and the public on matters
relevant to the amicable settlement of disputes,
to enable various conciliation panel members to share with one another their
observations and experiences in effecting speedy resolution of disputes; and

(c) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or
ordinance.
Section 403. Secretary of the Lupon.

The barangay secretary concurrently serves as the secretary of the lupon.


Records the results of mediation proceedings before the punong barangay
Submits a report thereon to the proper city or municipal courts.
Receives and keeps the records of proceedings submitted to him by the various
conciliation panels.

Section 404. Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. (Conciliation Panel)


(a) Constituted for each dispute brought before the lupon

consisting of three (3) members


chosen by the parties to the dispute from the list of members of the lupon.
Should the parties fail to agree on the pangkat membership, the same shall be
determined by lots drawn by the lupon chairman.

(b) The three (3) members constituting the pangkat shall elect from among themselves the chairman and the
secretary.

Pangkat Secretary Functions

prepares minutes of the pangkat proceedings


submits a copy duly attested to by the chairman to the lupon secretary and to the proper
city or municipal court
issue and cause to be served notices to the parties concerned.

The lupon secretary shall issue certified true copies of any public record in his custody that is not by law
otherwise declared confidential.
Section 405. Vacancies in the Pangkat.
Chosen by the parties to the dispute from among the other lupon members.
Should the parties fail to agree on a common choice, the vacancy shall be filled by lot to be drawn by the
lupon chairman.
Section 406. Character of Office and Service of Lupon Members.
(a) The lupon members deemd as persons in authority (as defined in the RPC) while in the performance of
their official duties or on the occasion thereof.
(b) Lupon and pangkat members serve without compensation without prejudice to incentives.. The DILG
shall provide for a system of granting economic or other incentives to the lupon or pangkat members who
adequately demonstrate the ability to judiciously and expeditiously resolve cases referred to them.
While in the performance of their duties, the lupon or pangkat members, whether in public or private
employment, shall be deemed to be on official time, and shall not suffer from any diminution in
compensation or allowance from said employment by reason thereof.
Section 407. Legal Advice on Matters Involving Questions of Law.
The provincial, city legal officer or prosecutor or the municipal legal officer shall render legal advice on
matters involving questions of law to the punong barangay or any lupon or pangkat member

whenever necessary
in the exercise of his functions in the administration of the katarungang pambarangay.

Section 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto.


The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same
city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
(a) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his
official functions;
(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00);
(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;
(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties
thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except
where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to
amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of Justice or upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under this Code are filed
may, at any time before trial motu propio refer the case to the lupon concerned for amicable settlement.
Section 409. Venue.
(a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable
settlement before the lupon of said barangay.
(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be
brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of
the complaint.
(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the
real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.
(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the institution where
such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is
located.

OBJECTIONS to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the punong
barangay; otherwise, the same shall be deemed WAIVED.
Any legal question which may confront the punong barangay in resolving objections to
venue may be submitted to the Secretary of Justice, or his duly designated
representative, whose ruling thereon shall be binding.

Section 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement.


(a) Who may initiate proceeding

Upon payment of the appropriate filing fee


any individual who has a cause of action against another individual
involving any matter within the authority of the lupon
may complain, orally or in writing, to the lupon chairman of the barangay.

(b) Mediation by lupon chairman

Upon receipt of the complaint, the lupon chairman shall within the next working day
summon the respondent(s), with notice to the complainant(s) for them and their
witnesses
to appear before him for a mediation of their conflicting interests.
If he fails in his mediation effort within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the
parties before him
he shall forthwith set a date for the constitution of the pangkat.

(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses

While dispute is under mediation, conciliation, or arbitration, the prescriptive periods


for offenses and cause of action INTERRUPTED upon filing the complaint with the
punong barangay. Period RESUMES upon receipt by the complainant of the
complainant or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued
by the lupon or pangkat secretary:
Interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint with the
punong barangay.

(d) Issuance of summons; hearing; grounds for disqualification

The pangkat shall convene not later than three (3) days from its constitution
on the day and hour set by the lupon chairman

to hear both parties and their witnesses, simplify issues, and explore all possibilities for
amicable settlement.
For this purpose, the pangkat may issue summons for the personal appearance of parties
and witnesses before it.
If party moves to disqualify any member of the pangkat by reason of relationship, bias,
interest, or any other similar grounds discovered AFTER the constitution of the
pangkat, the matter shall be resolved by the affirmative vote of the majority of the
pangkat whose decision shall be final.
Should disqualification be decided upon, the resulting vacancy shall be filled as herein
provided for.

(e) Period to arrive at a settlement Within fifteen (15) days from the day the pangkat convenes in accordance with this section. This period is
extendible at the discretion of the pangkat, which shall not exceed fifteen (15) days, except in clearly
meritorious cases.
Section 411. Form of settlement.

All amicable settlements shall be in writing


in a language or dialect known to the parties
signed by them
and attested to by the lupon chairman or the pangkat chairman, as the case may be.
When the parties to the dispute do not use the same language or dialect, the settlement
shall be written in the language known to them.

Section 412. Conciliation.


(a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court.

No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority
of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office
for adjudication
unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or
the pangkat
and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon
secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman
or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.

(b) Where Parties May Go Directly to Court.


The parties may go directly to court in the following instances:
1.

Where the accused is under detention;

2.

Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus
proceedings;

3.

Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment,
delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and

4.

Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.

(c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural communities.


Customs and traditions of indigenous cultural communities SHALL be applied in settling disputes between
members of the cultural communities.
Section 413. Arbitration.

(a) The parties may, at any stage of the proceedings, agree in writing that they shall abide by the arbitration
award of the lupon chairman or the pangkat.

Such agreement to arbitrate may be repudiated within five (5) days from the date
thereof for the same grounds and in accordance with the procedure hereinafter
prescribed.
Arbitration award shall be made after the lapse of the period for repudiation and within
ten (10) days thereafter.

(b) The arbitration award shall be in writing in a language or dialect known to the parties. When the parties
to the dispute do not use the same language or dialect, the award shall be written in the language or dialect
known to them.
Section 414. Proceedings Open to the Public; Exception.
All proceedings for settlement shall be public and informal.
Provided, however, That the lupon chairman or the pangkat chairman, as the case may be, may motu
proprio or upon request of a party, exclude the public from the proceedings in the interest of privacy,
decency, or public morals.
Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person.
Parties must appear in person without the assistance of counsel or representative, except for minors and
incompetents who may be assisted by their next-of-kin who are not lawyers.
Section 416. Effect of Amicable Settlement and Arbitration Award.
The amicable settlement and arbitration award shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court
upon the expiration of ten (10) days from the date thereof

unless repudiation of the settlement has been made or a petition to nullify the award has
been filed before the proper city or municipal court.
This provision shall not apply to court cases settled by the lupon, in which case the
compromise or the pangkat chairman shall be submitted to the court and upon approval
thereof, have the force and effect of a judgment of said court.

Section 417. Execution.


The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6)
months from the date of the settlement.
After the lapse of such time, the settlement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal
court.
Section 418. Repudiation.
Any party to the dispute may, within ten (10) days from the date of the settlement, repudiate the same

by filing with the lupon chairman


a statement to that effect sworn to before him
where the consent is vitiated by fraud, violence, or intimidation.
Such repudiation shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of the certification for filing a
complaint.

Section 419. Transmittal of Settlement and Arbitration.


Award to the Court. - The secretary of the lupon shall transmit the settlement or the arbitration award to the
appropriate city or municipal court

within five (5) days from the date of the award

or from the lapse of the ten-day period repudiating the settlement


and shall furnish copies thereof to each of the parties to the settlement and the lupon
chairman.

Section 420. Power to Administer Oaths.


The punong barangay, as chairman of the lupong tagapamayapa, and the members of the pangkat are hereby
authorized to administer oaths in connection with any matter relating to all proceedings in the
implementation of the katarungang pambarangay.
Section 421. Administration; Rules and Regulations.
The city or municipal mayor, as the case may be, shall see to the efficient and effective implementation and
administration of the katarungang pambarangay.
The Secretary of Justice shall promulgate the rules and regulations necessary to implement this Chapter.
Section 422. Appropriations.
Such amount as may be necessary for the effective implementation of the katarungang pambarangay shall
be provided for in the annual budget of the city or municipality concerned.
CHAPTER VIII - Sangguniang Kabataan
Section 423. Creation and Election. (a) There shall be in every barangay a sangguniang kabataan to be composed of

a chairman
seven (7) members
a secretary
a treasurer

(b) A sangguniang kabataan official who, during his term of office, shall have passed the age of twenty-one
(21) years shall be allowed to serve the remaining portion of the term for which he was elected.
Section 424. Katipunan ng Kabataan.
Composed of

all citizens of the Philippines actually residing in the barangay for at least six (6)
months
who are fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age
duly registered in the list of the sangguniang kabataan or in the official barangay list in
the custody of the barangay secretary.

Section 425. Meetings of the Katipunan ng Kabataan.

At least once every three (3) months


or at the call of the chairman of the sangguniang kabataan
or upon written petition of at least one-twentieth (1/20) of its member
to decide on important issues affecting the youth of the barangay.

Section 426. Powers and Functions of the Sangguniang Kabataan.


The sangguniang kabataan shall:
(a) Promulgate resolutions necessary to carry out the objectives of the youth in the barangay in accordance
with the applicable provisions of this Code;
(b) Initiate programs designed to enhance the social, political, economic, cultural, intellectual, moral,

spiritual, and physical development of the members;


(c) Hold fund-raising activities, the proceeds of which shall be tax-exempt and shall accrue to the general
fund of the sangguniang kabataan: Provided, however, That in the appropriation thereof, the specific
purpose for which such activity has been held shall be first satisfied;
(d) Create such bodies or committees as it may deem necessary to effectively carry out its programs and
activities;
(e) Submit annual and end-of-term reports to the sangguniang barangay on their projects and activities for
the survival and development of the youth in the barangay;
(f) Consult and coordinate with all youth organizations in the barangay for policy formulation and program
implementation;
(g) Coordinate with the appropriate national agency for the implementation of youth development projects
and programs at the national level;
(h) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as the sangguniang barangay
may determine or delegate; and
(i) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or
ordinance.
Section 427. Meetings of the Sangguniang Kabataan.
Meet regularly once a month on the date, time, and place to be fixed by the said sanggunian.
Special meetings may be called by the sangguniang kabataan chairman or any three (3) of its members

by giving written notice to all members of the date, time, place and agenda of the
meeting at least one (1) day in advance.
Notices of regular or special meetings shall be furnished the punong barangay and the
sangguniang barangay.

A majority of the members of the sangguniang kabataan shall constitute a quorum.


Section 428. Qualifications.
An elective official of the sangguniang kabataan must be

a citizen of the Philippines


a qualified voter of the katipunan ng kabataan
a resident of the barangay for at least one (1) year immediately prior to election
at least fifteen (15) years but not more than twenty- one (21) years of age on the day of
his election
able to read and write Filipino, English, or the local dialect
must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

Section 429. Term of Office.


Three (3) years, unless sooner removed for cause as provided by law, permanently incapacitated, die or
resign from office.
Section 430. Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman.
The registered voters of the katipunan ng kabataan shall elect the chairman of the sangguniang kabataan
who shall automatically serve as an ex officio member of the sangguniang barangay upon his assumption to
office.
As such, he shall exercise the same powers, discharge the same duties and functions, and enjoy the same

privileges as the regular sangguniang barangay members, and shall be the chairman of the committee on
youth and sports development in the said sanggunian.
Section 431. Powers and Duties of the Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman.
(a) Call and preside over all meetings of the katipunan ng kabataan and the sangguniang kabataan;
(b) Implement policies, programs, and projects within his jurisdiction in coordination with the sangguniang
barangay;
(c) Exercise general supervision over the affairs and activities of the sangguniang kabataan and the official
conduct of its members, and such other officers of the sangguniang kabataan within his jurisdiction;
(d) With the concurrence of the sangguniang kabataan, appoint from among the members of the
sangguniang kabataan, the secretary and treasurer and such other officers as may be deemed necessary; and
(e) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or
ordinance.
Section 432. Sangguniang Kabataan Secretary.
(a) Keep all records of the katipunan ng kabataan and sangguniang kabataan;
(b) Prepare and keep the minutes of all meetings of the katipunan ng kabataan and sangguniang kabataan;
(c) Prepare all forms necessary for the conduct of registrations, elections, initiatives, referenda, or
plebiscites, in coordination with the barangay secretary and the COMELEC; and
(d) Perform such other duties and discharge such other functions as the chairman of the sangguniang
kabataan may prescribe or direct.
Section 433. Sangguniang Kabataan Treasurer.
(a) Take custody of all sangguniang kabataan property and funds not otherwise deposited with the city or
municipal treasurer;
(b) Collect and receive contributions, monies, materials, and all other sources intended for the sangguniang
kabataan and katipunan ng kabataan;
(c) Disburse funds in accordance with an approved budget of the sangguniang kabataan;
(d) Certify to the availability of funds whenever necessary;
(e) Submit to the sangguniang kabataan and to the sangguniang barangay certified and detailed statements
of actual income and expenditures at the end of every month; and
(f) Perform such other duties and discharge such other functions as the chairman of the sangguniang
kabataan may direct.
Section 434. Privileges of Sangguniang Kabataan Officials.

Same privileges enjoyed by other sangguniang barangay officials under this Code
subject to such requirements and limitations provided herein.
During their incumbency, sangguniang kabataan officials exempt from payment of
tuition and matriculation fees while enrolled in public tertiary schools, including state
colleges and universities.
The national government shall reimburse said college or university the amount of the
tuition and matriculation fees: Provided, That, to qualify for the privilege, the said
officials shall enroll in a state college or university within or nearest their area of
jurisdiction.

Section 435. Succession and Filling of Vacancies.

(a) In case a sangguniang kabataan chairman

refuses to assume office


fails to qualify
is convicted of a felony
voluntarily resigns
dies
is permanently incapacitated
is removed from office
or has been absent without leave for more than three (3) consecutive months

the sangguniang kabataan member who obtained the next highest number of votes in the election
immediately preceding shall assume the office of the chairman

for the unexpired portion of the term


discharge the powers and duties
enjoy the rights and privileges appurtenant to the office.

In case the said member refuses to assume the position or fails to qualify, the sangguniang member
obtaining the next highest number of votes shall assume the position of the chairman for the unexpired
portion of the term.
(b) Where two (2) or more sangguniang kabataan members obtained the same next highest number of votes,
the other sangguniang kabataan members shall conduct an election to choose the successor to the chairman
from among the said members.
(c) After the vacancy shall have been filled, the sangguniang kabataan chairman shall call a special election
to complete the membership of said sanggunian. Such sangguniang kabataan member shall hold office for
the unexpired portion of the term of the vacant seat.
(d) In case of suspension of the sangguniang kabataan chairman, the successor, as determined in subsections
(a) and (b) of this Section shall assume the position during the period of such suspension.
CHAPTER IX - Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan
Section 436. Pederasyon ng mga Kabataan.
(a) There shall be an organization of all the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan to be known as
follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

in municipalities pambayang pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan;


in cities, panlungsod na pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan;
in provinces, panlalawigang pederasyon ng mga kabataan;
in special metropolitan political subdivisions, pangmetropolitan pederasyon ng mga sangguniang
kabataan; and
on the national level pambansang pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan.

(b) The pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan shall, at all levels, elect from among themselves the
president, vice- president and such other officers as may be necessary and shall be organized in the
following manner:
1.
2.
3.

The panlungsod and pambayang pederasyon shall be composed of the sangguniang kabataan
chairmen of barangays in the city or municipality, respectively;
The panlalawigang pederasyon shall be composed of presidents of the panlungsod and
pambayang pederasyon;
The pangmetropolitang pederasyon shall be composed of presidents of the panlungsod and
pambayan pederasyon;

(c) The elected presidents of the pederasyon at the provincial, highly urbanized city, and metropolitan
political subdivision levels shall constitute the pambansang katipunan ng mga sangguniang kabataan.
Section 437. Constitution and By-Laws.
The term of office, manner of election, removal and suspension of the officers of the pederasyon ng mga
sangguniang kabataan at all levels shall be governed by the constitution and by-laws of the pederasyon in
conformity with the provisions of this Code and national policies on youth.
Section 438. Membership in the Sanggunian.
(a) A sangguniang kabataan chairman shall, upon certification of his election by the COMELEC and during
his tenure of office is elected as pederasyon president, serve as an ex-officio member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, without need of further
appointment.
(b) The vice-president of the pederasyon whose president has been elected as president of a higher
pederasyon shall serve as ex-officio member of the sanggunian concerned without need of further
appointment.
(c) The pederasyon president or vice-president, as the case may be, shall be the chairman of the committee
on youth and sports development of the sanggunian concerned.
CHAPTER X - Linggo ng Kabataan
Section 439. Observance of Linggo ng Kabataan. (a) Every barangay, municipality, city and province shall, in coordination with the pederasyon ng mga
sangguniang kabataan at all levels, conduct an annual activity to be known as the Linggo ng Kabataan on
such date as shall be determined by the Office of the President.
(b) The observance of the Linggo ng Kabataan shall include the election of the counterparts of all local
elective and appointive officials, as well as heads of national offices or agencies stationed or assigned in the
territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit, among in-school and community youth residing in the
local government unit concerned from ages thirteen (13) to seventeen (17). During said week, they shall
hold office as boy and girl officials and shall perform such duties and conduct such activities as may be
provided in the ordinance enacted pursuant to this Chapter.

A. Katarungang Pambarangay

Sec 399 422, LGC


See above

The Laws on VAW in the Philippines (expert paper of Mam Guanzon)


See attachments

Sec 14, Sec 5, RA 9262


SECTION 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. - Barangay Protection
Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to
desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives
applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte
determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application
for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by
a Barangay Kagawad the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the

Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time for the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for
fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay
Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to
effect is personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women
and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
a. Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
b. Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
c. Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
d. Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;
e. Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include,
but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
i. Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of
custody to her/his family;
ii. Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial
support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's
children insufficient financial support;
iii. Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;
iv. Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity or controlling the victim's own mon4ey or properties, or
solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties;
f. Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of
controlling her actions or decisions;
g. Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity
which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through
intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate family;
h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another,
that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or
her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
i. Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
ii. Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her
child;
iii. Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her
child against her/his will;
iv. Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals
or pets of the woman or her child; and
v. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
i.
Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or
her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial
of financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's
child/children.

Aquino v. Aure

Aure and E.S. Aure Lending Investors, Inc. (Aure Lending) filed a Complaint for ejectment against Aquino
before the MeTC, alleging that they acquired the subject property from the spouses Aquino by virtue of a
Deed of Sale. However, after the spouses Aquino received substantial consideration for the sale of the
subject property, they refused to vacate the same. In her Answer, Aquino countered that Aure Lending do
not have any legal right over the property, as per their Memorandum of Agreement, Aure shall secure a loan
from a bank or financial institution in his own name using the subject property as collateral and turn over
the proceeds thereof to the spouses Aquino. However, even after Aure successfully secured a loan, the
spouses Aquino did not receive the proceeds thereon or benefited therefrom.
MeTC decided in favor of Aquino on the ground of non-compliance with the barangay conciliation process.
RTC Affirmed this decision. However, the Court of Appeals REVERSED and reasoned that the failure of
Aure to undergo barangay conciliation is not a jurisdictional flaw and it will not affect the sufficiency of
Aures Complaint since Aquino failed to seasonably raise such issue in her Answer.
HELD: The primordial objective of barangay conciliations is to reduce the number of court litigations and
prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought by the indiscriminate filing of
cases in the courts. To ensure this, the law requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process as a
precondition to filing a complaint in court subject to certain exceptions which are inapplicable to this case.
This has been declared compulsory in nature.
However, the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that non-compliance therewith
cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the
person of the defendant; in other words, the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from
exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants, as in this case, failed to
object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo.
In the case at bar, Aquino cannot be allowed to attack the jurisdiction of the MeTC after having submitted
herself voluntarily thereto. An examination of Aquinos Answer before the MeTC shows that there is utter
lack of any objection on her part to any deficiency in the complaint which could oust the MeTC of its
jurisdcition. The fact that Aquino raised such objection during the pre-trial and in her Position Paper is of
no moment, for the issue of non-recourse to barangay mediation proceedings should be impleaded in her
Answer. Thus, although Aquinos defense is meritorious, procedurally, such defense is no longer available
for failure to plead the same in the Answer as required by the omnibus motion rule.
Neither could the MeTC dismiss the case motu proprio. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide only
three instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim. It is clear that a court may not motu
proprio dismiss a case on the ground of failure to comply with the requirement for barangay conciliation,
this ground not being among those mentioned for the dismissal by the trial court of a case on its own
initiative.

Morata v. Go
Respondents Victor Go and Flora D. Go filed in the CFI of Cebu a complaint against petitioners Morata for
recovery of a sum of money plus damages. On the basis of the allegation in the complaint that the partieslitigants are all residents of Cebu City, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, citing as ground the failure of
the complaint to allege prior availment by the plaintiffs of the barangay conciliation process required by
P.D. 1508, as well as the absence of a certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation
or settlement had been reached by the parties.
HELD: Except in the instances enumerated in sections 2 and 6 of the law, the Lupon has the authority to
settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same city or municipality.
The law makes no distinction whatsoever with respect to the classes of civil disputes that should be
compromised at the barangay level. In fact, in defining the Lupon's authority, Section 2 of said law
employed the universal and comprehensive term "all", to which usage the court should neither add nor

subtract in consonance with the rudimentary precept in statutory construction that "where the law does not
distinguish, the court should not distinguish.
The conciliation process at the barangay level is designed to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in
court in order to decongest its clogged dockets and, in the process, enhance the quality of justice dispensed
by it. Thus, to say that the authority of the Lupon is limited to cases exclusively cognizable by the inferior
courts is to lose sight of this objective.
Moreover, if it is the intention of the law to restrict its coverage only to cases cognizable by the inferior
courts, then it would not have provided in Section 3 thereof the rule on Venue, which looks to the location
of the real property in the determination of venue, for it should be noted that, traditionally and historically,
jurisdiction over cases involving real property or any interest therein, except forcible entry and detainer
cases, has always been vested in the courts of first instance [now regional trial court].
Sections 11, 12 and 14, relied upon by respondent judge, deal with the nullification or execution of the
settlement or arbitration awards obtained at the barangay level. These sections conferred upon the city and
municipal courts the jurisdiction to pass upon and resolve petitions or actions for nullification or
enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards issued by the Lupon, regardless of the amount involved or the
nature of the original dispute. But there is nothing in the context of said sections to justify the thesis that the
mandated conciliation process in other types of cases applies exclusively to said inferior courts.
Lastly, the circular issued by then Chief Justice embodying the directive "to desist from receiving
complaints, petitions, actions and proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons," has
been addressed not only to judges of city and municipal courts, but also to all the judges of the courts of
first instance, circuit criminal courts, juvenile and domestic courts and courts of agrarian relations, now
known as regional trial courts. This clearly shows that conciliation process at the barangay level, prescribed
by P.D. 1508 as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court, is compulsory not only for cases falling
under the exclusive competence of the metropolitan and municipal trial courts, but for actions cognizable by
the regional trial courts as well.

Uy v. Contreras
An argument arose between the petitioner and respondent when the former sought to withdraw from
premises of the latter certain movable properties that the petitioner failed to remove despite the expiry of
their sublease agreement. This led to a scuffle between the parties respective employees, which allegedly
resulted in injuries inflicted on the private respondents. The private respondents then filed a complaint with
the barangay captain of Valenzuela, Makati, however, during their scheduled confrontation before the
barangay captain, only the petitioner appeared. The prosecutor then filed two informations for slight
physical injuries against the petitioner with the MTC of Makati.
Petitioner alleged in a motion to dismiss the prematurity of the filing of the criminal cases for failure to
undergo conciliation proceedings. On the other hand, private respondents contend that a denial of motion to
dismiss is proper because prior referral of the dispute to the lupon is not applicable since she and petitioner
are not residents of barangays in the same city or municipality or of adjoining barangays in different cities
or municipalities and that referral to the lupon is not likewise required if the case may otherwise be barred
by the statute of limitations. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that prior referral to the lupon applies to
the case of private respondent, the latter had, nevertheless, substantially complied with the requirement with
the subsequent certification of the barangay to file the action.
HELD: While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the L GC of 1991, the jurisprudence built thereon
regarding prior referral to the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing of an action in court remains applicable
because its provisions on prior referral were substantially reproduced in the Code. In view of the
respondents' failure to appear at the scheduled mediation, no complaint for slight physical injuries could be

validly filed with the MTC of Makati at any time before such date. The filing then of criminal cases was
premature.
In addition, Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (more properly, Section 412(b)(4) of the LGC) which states that the
parties may go directly to court where the action is about to prescribe, cannot justify the dismissal of the
case. This is because pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code, the prescriptive period was
automatically suspended for a maximum period of sixty days.
Moreover, having brought the dispute before the lupon of barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private
respondents are estopped from disavowing the authority of the body which they themselves had sought.
Their act of trifling with the authority of the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the scheduled mediation
hearings and instead filing the complaint right away with the trial court cannot be countenanced for to do so
would wreak havoc on the barangay conciliation system.
Neither is the argument that petitioner "had already waived the right to a reconciliation proceedings before
the barangay, persuasive. The petitioner did not waive the reconciliation proceedings before the lupon of
Valenzuela, Makati; she submitted to it and attended the scheduled conciliation and invoked the precondition of referral to the lupon in her counter-affidavit.
Lastly, nor could the Court accept the contention of the respondent that the parties could not agree on a
compromise and that they had to request the barangay captain to issue a certification to file action. The
request was nearly one and a half months after criminal cases were filed with the court a quo. Evidently,
this was done to support their contention that, in any event, there was substantial compliance with the
requirement of referral to the lupon. It must be stressed that the private respondents, after failing to appear
at the initial confrontation and long after the criminal cases were filed, had no right to demand the issuance
of a certification to file action.

Wingarts v. Mejia
These administrative complaints were an offshoot of criminal cases decided by the respondent judge. The
respondent judge is charged with incompetence, ignorance of the law and abuse of authority for taking
cognizance of a criminal case for grave threats and issuing a warrant of arrest against the accused despite
the lack of prior barangay conciliation.
The respondent judge explained that he took cognizance of the criminal case in the belief that there had
been substantial compliance of the requirements of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law since a certification
of the barangay captain regarding a confrontation of the partiesd, the fact that no amicable settlement was
reached by them, and that he was endorsing the filing of the case in court, had been duly submitted to
respondent judge.
HELD: Under the LGC of 1991, offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or a fine not
exceeding Php5,000 require prior barangay conciliation. The crime of grave threats punishable under Art.
282 of the Revised Penal Code fall within the purview of this section. Furthermore, Sec. 412 (a) also
requires the same mandate. Therefore, respondent judge should have remanded the case to the lupon instead
of taking cognizance thereof and prematurely issuing a warrant of arrest against the accused.
The respondent judge is liable for incompetence and ignorance of the law for taking cognizance of this case
especially since judges are directed from improvidently receiving and acting on complaints in cases falling
within the authority of the Lupon. It is a well-settled rule that proceedings before the lupon are a
precondition to the filing of any action or proceeding in court or other government office. Such an initiatory
pleading, if filed without compliance with the precondition, may be dismissed on the motion of any
interested party on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action.

Although there is no clear proof of malice or bad faith, respondent judge should have exercised the requisite
prudence, which he owes to the public and his profession, especially in a case where personal liberty of the
accused is involved.

Corpuz v. CA
Carlito Corpuz filed an action for unlawful detainer against private respondent Juanito Alvarado with the
MTC of Manila, for recovery of possession of the room being occupied by the latter, which Corpuz
children allegedly needed for their own use. Finding the defenses of Alvarado to be without merit, the
MTC ordered Alvarado to vacate the room.
Alvarado raises the issue in the instant petition that the ejectment suit was not referred to the Lupon
Tagapayapa as required by P.D. No. 1508
HELD: Alvarados defense was only stated in a single short sentence in his answer. In Dui vs. CA, the
Court held that failure of a party to specifically allege the fact that there was no compliance with the
barangay conciliation procedure constitutes waiver of that defense. A perusal of Alvarados answer reveals
that no reason or explanation was given to support his allegation, which is deemed a mere general averment.
In any event, the proceeding outlined in P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance
therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower court has already acquired over the subject matter
and the parties therein.

Bonifacio Law Office v. Judge Bellosillo


In a letter-complaint, Atty. Salomon, Jr. charged Judge Bellosillo with ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
discretion and obvious partiality and assailed the order of the said judge, which referred an ejectment case
back to the barangay for conciliation proceedings despite the fact that it was alleged in the verified
complaint, that the matter had already been referred to the barangay and that a copy of the Certification to
File Motion was attached.
In its Answer, the judge denied the charges and averred that there was premature issuance of the Certificate
to File Action considering that there is no proof to show that the Pangkat was duly constituted before the
said certificate was issued. Moreover, the belated submission by complainant of the Minutes of
Proceedings before the Barangay Chairman, which was inaccurate and difficult to decipher reveals the noncompliance of complainant with the requirement of the law.
HELD: The records reveal that the Certification to File Action was improperly and prematurely issued as it
clearly shows that no personal confrontation before a duly constituted Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo took
place. This supports the respondents position that the Pangkat was not constituted, and that no face to face
conciliation of the parties had taken place before it is substantiated by the Minutes submitted by
complainant. Evidently, complainant failed to complete the barangay conciliation proceedings.
In addition, the Complaint before the barangay was dated February 16, 1996. Records show that the
hearing was scheduled for February 26, 1996 and was reset for February 29, 1996. And yet, the
Certification to File Action was issued on March 1, 1996, less than fifteen days after the first scheduled
hearing before the barangay chairman in contravention of Section 410 (b) of the LGC, requiring a mediation
effort within 15 days from the first meeting.
Evidently, the barangay failed to exert enough effort required by law to conciliate between the parties and
to settle the case before it. Hence, respondent judge was correct in remanding the case to it for completion
of the mandated proceedings. We cannot fault him for seeking to promote the objectives of barangay
conciliation and for taking to heart the provisions of Supreme Court Circular No. 14-93. His referral of the

case back to the barangay cannot be equated with gross ignorance of the law. Neither does it constitute
grave abuse of discretion or obvious partiality.
Despite this, however, respondent judge failed to comply with the requirements of the Rules on Summary
Procedure when, acting on the complainants motion to consider the proceedings already held before the
barangay as substantial compliance with the requirements of law, he chose to continue with the proceedings
of the case, and failed to render a judgment within 30 days from the failure of the respondents to answer.
This undue delay constitutes a less serious charge of gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanction.

Mendoza v. Judge Afable


Mendoza alleged that on February 18, 1998, he filed with the Office of the Barangay Chairman a complaint
for slight physical injuries against Palada, however, despite the hearings conducted thereon, the parties
failed to reach an amicable settlement. Therefore, on May 4, 1998 complainant Mendova filed a complaint
for slight physical injuries before the MTC. However, the case was dismissed by Judge Afable on the
ground of prescription (the complaint alleging a light offense, which prescribes in two months).
In this administrative case, the complainant alleged that, in dismissing the case, Judge Afable showed his
ignorance of the law when he did not apply the provisions of Section 410(c) of the LGC, which suspends
the prescriptive period of offences upon the filing of the complaint with the Punong Barangay. In his
Answer, Judge Afable merely admitted his error and claimed a mere mental lapse on his part.
HELD: It is axiomatic that an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or
erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for
reconsideration, or an appeal. For, obviously, if subsequent developments prove the judges challenged act
to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against him at all. Besides, to hold a judge
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming he has erred,
would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable. To hold otherwise
would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in
the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. It is only where the error is so gross,
deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith that administrative sanctions may be imposed
against the erring judge.
In the present case, the complainant did not bother at all to file a motion for reconsideration of respondent
judges decision dismissing the criminal case. No reason was advanced by complainant why he failed to do
so. Thus, following our settled pronouncements cited above, his instant administrative complaint is
premature.
In addition, records fail to show when complainant received the Barangay Certification to File Action. The
undated certification he submitted merely states that the case was set for hearing before the barangay on
March 16, 22 and 29, 1998, but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. When he filed on May 4,
1998 the criminal case for slight physical injuries with respondent's court, until the dismissal of the case on
November 3, 1998, he still failed to present proof of his receipt of the Barangay Certification to File Action.
Clearly, he cannot now fault respondent judge for dismissing the case on the ground of prescription.
While respondent admitted his mistake, the same may not be considered ignorance of the law. If at all, it
can only be an error of judgment.
Finally, we noted that the complaint does not allege any bad faith or malice on the part of respondent judge
when he dismissed the criminal case.
B. Sangguniang Kabataan

Sec 423 439, LGC


See above

Monteclaros v. Comelec
SK, previously known as the Kabataang Barangay is a youth organization established by PD 684. The KB
was composed of residents less than 18 years old, with no minimum age specified. The LGC renamed the
KB to SK and limited membership to those aged 15-21 years. It is tasked to initiate programs to enhance
the social, political, economic cultural, intellectual, moral, spiritual, and physical development of the
youth. It is composed of a chairperson and 7 members to be elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan, in turn
composed of citizens actually residing in the barangay for at least 6 months who meet the age requirement.
RA 7808 scheduled the SK elections on the 1st Monday of 1996 and every 3 years thereafter. The next
elections are supposed to be held on May 6, 2002. A bill by the Bicameral Committee however reset the SK
and barangay elections to July 15, 2002. The said bill also lowered the membership age to at least 15 but
not more than 18 years old. Montesclaros et al. filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with prayer for TRO or preliminary injunction to: 1) prevent the postponement of the SK elections
originally scheduled for May 6, 2002, 2) to prevent respondents from passing laws that reduce the age
requirement membership in the SK, and 3) to compel respondents to allow those who have turned 21 on
May 2002 to participate in any rescheduled SK elections. They allege that those aged 18-21 will be unduly
dismembered, unfairly discriminated, unnecessarily disenfranchised, unjustly associated and obnoxiously
disqualified from the SK. They also allege grave abuse of discretion on the COMELECs part. The bill
was approved by Congress and signed into law as RA 9164 on March 19, 2002.
HELD: The petition is bereft of merit. There is no actual controversy as to the date of the elections that
requires judicial intervention. Neither was there grave abuse of discretion in the postponement of the
elections. The prayer to prevent Congress from enacting laws that lower the age requirement cannot be
granted because a proposed bill is not subject to judicial review. The court can only exercise judicial review
after and not before a law is enacted, lest it resort to rendering advisory opinions. Absent a clear violation of
constitutional rights, Courts cannot exercise review over the internal processes of Congress. The Court has
no power to dictate the object or subject of bills that Congress should enact into law.
Public office is a public trust. It is not a property right. No one has a vested right to any public office, much
less the expectancy of holding a public office. While the state encourages the youths involvement in public
affairs, the policy refers to those who belong to the class of people defined as the youth. Congress has the
power to define who are the youth qualified to join the SK. Every law is subject to amendment or repeal and
those who no longer qualify for the SK because they are past the age limit cannot insist on being part of the
youth. Under PD 9164, Congress merely restored the maximum age requirement of 18 years in PD684,
SKs original charter. RA 9164 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality.

THE MUNICIPALITY, CITY AND PROVINCE

MUNICIPALITY
a. Composition
Group of barangays [440]
b. Role
As a general-purpose government for the
coordination and delivery of basic, regular
and direct services and effective
governance of the inhabitants within its

CITY

PROVINCE

Group of more urbanized and developed


barangays [448]

Cluster of municipalities, or municipalities


and component cities [459]

Same as the municipality[448]

As a political and corporate of government


serves as a dynamic mechanism for
developmental processes and effective
governance of LGUs within its territorial

territorial jurisdiction [440]


c. How created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered
Only by an Act of Congress and subject to
Same as the municipality [449]
the approval by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite conducted by the
COMELEC in the LGU/s directly affected
The plebiscite shall be held 120 days
from the date of its effectivity except as
may otherwise be provided in the Act.
[441]
d. Requisites for creation
Ave. annual income of at least
Ave. annual income of at least
P2,500,000.00 for the last 2 consecutive
P20,000,000.00 for the last 2 consecutive
years based on the 1991 constant prices, as
years based on the 1991 constant prices, as
certified by the DOF
certified by the DOF
- includes the income accruing to the
- includes the income accruing to the
gen. fund
gen. fund
- excludes special funds, transfers
- excludes special funds, transfers
and non-recurring income
and non-recurring income
Population of at least 25,000 inhabitants
Either of:
as certified by the NSO
Population of at least 150,000 inhabitants
A contiguous territory of at least 50 sq.
as certified by the NSO
kms. as certified by the LMB
A contiguous territory of at least 100 sq.
kms. as certified by the LMB
should be properly identified by
metes and bounds
should be properly identified by
metes and bounds
does not apply if there is 1 or
does not apply if there is 1 or
more islands
more islands
need not be contiguous if thereare
2 or more islands
need not be contiguous if there are
2 or more islands
Municipalities existing as of the date of the
Provided, that, the creation thereof shall
effectivity of the LGC shall continue to
not reduce the land area, population, and
exist and operate as such. Existing
income of the original unit/s at the time
municipal districts organized prusuant to
of said creation to less than the min.
presidential issuances or EOs and which
reqts. prescribed. [450]
have their respective set of elective
municipal officials holding office at the
For HIGHLY URBANIZED CITIES:
time of the effectivity of the LGC shall be
Ave. annual income of at least
considered as regular municipalities. [442]
P50,000,000.00 for the last 2 consecutive
years based on the 1991 constant prices, as
certified by the DOF
Population of at least 200,000 inhabitants
as certified by the NSO
[452]

jurisdiction [459]
Same as the municipality [460]

Ave. annual income of at least


P20,000,000.00 for the last 2 consecutive
years based on the 1991 constant prices, as
certified by the DOF
- includes the income accruing to the
gen. fund
- excludes special funds, transfers
and non-recurring income
Either of:
Population of at least 250,000 inhabitants
as certified by the NSO
A contiguous territory of at least 2,000
sq. kms. as certified by the LMB
should be properly identified by
metes and bounds
does not apply if there is 1 or
more islands
need not be contiguous if there are
2 or more islands
Provided, that, the creation thereof shall
not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit/s at the time
of said creation to less than the min.
reqts. prescribed. [461]
Existing sub-provinces are converted into
regular provinces upon approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to
be held in the said sub-provinces and the
original provinces directly affected. The
plebiscite shall be conducted by the
COMELEC simultaneously with the
national elections following the effectivity
of the LGC. [462]

* It shall be the duty of the President to


declare a city as highly urbanized within 30
days after it shall have met the min. reqts.
upon properapplication therefor and
ratification in a plebiscite by qualified
voters therein. [453]
e. Officials
mayor
vice-mayor
sangguniang bayan members
secretary to the sangguniang bayan
treasurer
assessor
accountant
budget officer
planning and devt. coordinator
engineer/building official
health officer
civil registrar
Optional:
administrator
legal officer
agriculturist

mayor
vice-mayor
sangguniang panlungsod members
secretary to the sangguniang panlungsod
treasurer
assessor
accountant
budget officer
planning and devt. coordinator
engineer
health officer
civil registrar
administrator
legal officer
social welfare and devt. officer
gen. services officer
veterinarian

governor
vice-governor
sangguniang panlalawigan members
secretary to the sangguniang
panlalawigan
treasurer
assessor
accountant
budget officer
planning and devt. coordinator
engineer
health officer
administrator
legal officer
social welfare and devt. officer
gen. services officer
agriculturist

environment and natural resources


officer
social welfare and devt. officer
architect
information officer
The sangguniang bayan may:
1. maintain existing offices not mentioned
above
2. create such other offices as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of the
provincial government
3. consolidate the functions of any office
with those of another in the interest of
efficiency and economy
Unless, otherwise provided herein, heads of
departments and offices shall be appointed
by the municipal mayor with the
concurrence of the majority of all the
sangguniang bayan members, subject to
civil service law, rules and regulations.
The sangguniang bayan shall act on the
appointment within 15 days from the date
of its submission; otherwise, the same shall
be confirmed. [443]

f. Composition of the sanggunian


Presiding officer: municipal vice-mayor
Members:
the regular sanggunian members
the president of the municipal chapter of
the liga ng mga barangay
the president of the pambayang
pederasyon ng mga SK
sectoral representatives
1.
1 from the women
2.
1 from the agricultural or
industrial workers
3.
1 from other sectors, including the
urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, or disabled persons
[446]

veterinarian
Optional:
architect
information officer
agriculturist
population officer
- cities which have existing population
offices shall continue to maintain such
ofices for 5 years from the date of
effectivity of the LGC, after which said
office shall become optional
environment and natural resources
officer
cooperatives officer
population officer

Optional:
population officer
- cities which have existing
population offices shall continue to
maintain such ofices for 5 years from
the date of effectivity of the LGC,
after which said office shall become
optional
natural resources and envrionment
officer
cooperative officer
architect
information officer

The sangguniang panlungsod may:


1. maintain existing offices not mentioned
above
2. create such other offices as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of the
provincial government
3. consolidate the functions of any office
with those of another in the interest of
efficiency and economy

The sangguniang panlalawigan may:


1. maintain existing offices not mentioned
above
2. create such other offices as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of the
provincial government
3. consolidate the functions of any office
with those of another in the interest of
efficiency and economy

Unless, otherwise provided herein, heads of


departments and offices shall be appointed
by the city mayor with the concurrence of
the majority of all the sangguniang
panlungsod members, subject to civil
service law, rules and regulations. The
sangguniang panlungsod shall act on the
appointment within 15 days from the date
of its submission; otherwise, the same shall
be confirmed. [454]

Unless, otherwise provided herein, heads


of departments and offices shall be
appointed by the governor with the
concurrence of the majority of all the
sangguniang panlalawigan members,
subject to civil service law, rules and
regulations. The sangguniang
panlalawigan shall act on the appointment
within 15 days from the date of its
submission; otherwise, the same shall be
confirmed. [463]

Presiding officer: city vice-mayor


Members:
the regular sanggunian members,the
president fothe city chapter of the liga ng
mga barangay
the president of the panlungsod na
pederasyon ng mga SK
the sectoral representatives
1.
1 from the women
2.
1 from the agricultural or
industrial workers
3.
1 from other sectors, including the
urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, or disabled persons
[457]

Presiding officer: provincial vice-governor


Members:
the regular sanggunian members
the president of the provincial chapter of
the liga ng mga barangay
the president of the panlalawigang
pederasyon ng mga SK
the president of the provincial federation
of sangguniang members of municipalities
and component cities
sectoral representatives
1.
1 from the women
2.
1 from the agricultural or
industrial workers
3.
1 from other sectors, including the
urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, or disabled persons
[467]

g. Salary grades as prescribed under RA 6758


Municipal mayor: Salary Grade 27
City mayor: Salary Grade 30 [455(d)]
[444(d)]
City vice-mayor of a highly urbanized city:
Muncipal vice-mayor: Salary Grade 25
Salary Grade 28
[445(b)]
City vice-mayor of a component city:
Members of the sangguniang bayan:
Salary Grade 26 [456(b)]
Salary Grade 24
Members of the sangguniang panlungsod:
Members of the sanggunian of
Salary Grade 25
municipalities in Metropolitan Manila Area
and other metropolitan political
Members of the sanggunian of highly-

Provincial governor: Salary Grade 30


[465(c)]
Vice-governor:Salary Grade 28 [466(b)]
Members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan: Salary Grade 27 [468(b)]

subdivisions: Salary Grade 25 [447(b)]

urbanized cities: Salary Grade 27 [458(b)]

Classes of cities:
a. Component
1. Dependent component cities
2. Independent component cities - those component cities whose charters prohibit their voters
from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent component cities shall be
independent of the province
b. Highly-urbanized
- Voters of highly urbanized cities shall remain excluded from voting for elective provincial
officials.
Duties and Functions of the Municipal Mayor, City Mayor, Governor (Sec 444, 455, 465)
a.
b.
c.

Such duties and functions as provided by the LGC and other laws
Efficient, effective and economical governance for the general welfare (see Sec.16) of the
(municipality/city/province) and its inhabitants
Hold office in the (municipal/city/provincial) hall during his incumbency

Under the efficient, effective and economical governance:


A. Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the
(municipal/city/provincial) government, and in this connection shall:
1.
Determine the guidelines of (municipal/city/provincial) policies and be responsible to the
sanggunian for the program of the government;
2.1. Direct the formulation of the (municipal/city/provincial) development plan, with the assistance of
the (municipal/city/provincial) development council
2.2. Implement the (municipal/city/provincial) development plan upon approval thereof by the
sanggunian
3.
At the opening of the regular session of the sanggunian for every calendar year, and as may be
deemed necessary, present the program of government and propose policies and projects for the
consideration of the sangguian as the general welfare of the inhabitants and the needs of the
(municipal/city/provincial) government may require;
4.1. Initiate and propose legislative measures to the sanggunian
4.2. Provide such information and data needed or requested by said sanggunian in the performance of
its legislative functions, from time to time as the situation may require
5.
Appoint all officials and employees whose salaries and wages are wholly or mainly paid out of
(municipal/city/provincial) funds and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in the
LGC, as well as those he may be authorized by law to appoint;
6.1. Represent the (municipality/city/province) in all its business transactions upon authorization by
the sanggunian
6.2. Sign on behalf of the (municipality/city/province) all bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such
other documents made pursuant to law or ordinance upon authorization by the sanggunian
7.
Carry out such emergency measures as may be necessary during and in the aftermath of manmade and natural disasters and calamities;
8.
Determine, according to law or ordinance, the time, manner and place of payment of salaries or
wages of the officials and employees of the (municipality/city/province)
9.
Allocate and assign office space to (municipal/city/provincial) and other officials and employees
who, by law or ordinance, are entitled to such space in the municipal hall and other buildings
owned or leased by the (municipal/city/provincial) government;
10.1. Ensure that all executive officials and employees of the municipality faithfully discharge their
duties and functions as provided by law and the LGC;
10.2. Cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings against any official or employee of
the (municipality/city/province) who may have committed an offense in the performance of his
official duties;

11.1.

Examine the books, records and other documents of all offices, officials, agents or employees of
the (municipality/city/province)
11.2. Require all national officials and employees stationed in or assigned to the
(municipality/city/province) to make available to him such books, records, and other documents
in their custody, in aid of his executive powers and authority, except those classified by law as
confidential
12.
Furnish copies of EOs issued by him within 72 hours after their issuance
a. if municipal mayor, to the provincial governor
b. if mayor of a municipality of Metropolitan Manila Area and that of any metropolitan
political subdivision, to the metropolitan authority council chairman and to the Office of the
President
c. if component city mayor, to the provincial governor
d. if highly-urbanized city mayor, to the Office of the President
e. if mayor of a city in the Metropolitan Manila Area and other metropolitan political
subdivision, to the metropolitan authority council chairman
f. if governor, to the Office of the President
13.
Visit component (barangays/barangays/cities and municipalities) of the
(municipality/city/province) at least once in every 6 months to deepen his understanding of
problems and conditions therein, listen and give appropriate counsel to local officials and
inhabitants, inform the officials and inhabitants of the component (barangays/barangays/cities and
municipalities) general laws and ordinances which especially concern them, and otherwise
conduct visits and inspections to the end that the governance of the (municipality/city/province)
will improve the quality of life of the inhabitants;
14.
Act on leave applications of officials and employees appointed by him and the commutation of
the monetary value of leave credits according to law;
15.
Authorize official trips outside of the (municipality/city/province) of (municipal/city/provincial)
officials and employees for a period not exceeding 30 days;
16.1. Call upon any national office or employee stationed in or assigned to the
(municipality/city/province) to advise him on matters affecting the (municipality/city/province)
and to make recommendations thereon, or to coordinate in the formulation and implementation of
plans, programs, projects,
16.2. Initiate an administrative or judicial action against a national government official or employee
who may have committed an offense in the performance of his official duties while stationed in or
assigned to the LGU concerned, when appropriate
17.
Authorize payment of medical care, necessary transportation, subsistence, hospital or medical
fees of (municipal/city/provincial) officials and employees who are injured while in the
performance of their official duties and functions, subject to the availability of funds;
18.
Solemnize marriages, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding;
19.
Conduct a palarong (bayan/panlungsod/panlalawigan) in coordination with the DECS, as an
annual activity which shall feature traditional sports and disciplines included in national and
international games; and
20.
Submit the following reports: (same receivers as in NO. 12)

an annual report containing a summary of all matters pertaining to the management,


administration and development of the (municipality/city/province) and all information and
data relative to its political, social and economic conditions;

and supplemental reports when unexpected events and situations arise at any time during the
year, particularly when man-made or natural disasters or calamities affect the general welfare
of the municipality, province, region or country.
B. Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the (municipality/city/province) and the
exercise of its corporate powers (See Sec. 22), implement all approved policies, programs, projects, services
and activities of the (municipality/city/province) and, in addition shall:

1.

2.

3.
4.
5.

6.

Ensure that the acts of the component (barangays/barangays/cities and municipalities) of the
(muncipality/city/province) and of its officials and employees are within the scope of their
prescribed powers, functions, duties and responsibilites;
Call conventions, conferences, seminars or meetings of any elective and appointive officials of
the (municipality/city/province), including provincial officials and national officials and
employees stationed in or assigned to the (municipality/city/province) at such time and place and
on such subject as he may deem important for the promotion of the general welfare of the LGU
and its inhabitants;
Issue such EOs as are necessary for the proper enforcement and execution of laws and ordinances;
Be entitled to carry the necessary firearm within his territorial jurisdiction;
Act as the deputized representative of the National Police Commission, formulate the peace and
order plan of the (municipality/city/province) and upon its approval, implement the same and
exercise general and operational control and supervision over the local police forces in the
(municipality/city/province) in accordance with RA 6975 (DILG Act of 1990)
Call upon the appropriate law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence,
rebellion or sedition or to apprehend violators of the law when public interest so requires and the
(municipal/city/provincial) police forces are inadequate to cope with the situation or the violators;

C. Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the
implementation of development plans, programs objectives and priorities (see Sec. 18), particularly those
resources and revenues programmed for agro-industrial development and country-wide growth and
progress, and relative thereto shall:
1.
Require each head of an office or department to prepare and submit an estimate of appropriations
for the ensuing calendar year, in accordance with the budget preparation process
2.
Prepare and submit to the sanggunian for approval the executive and supplemental budgets of the
(municipality/city/province) for the ensuing calendar year
3.
Ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the (municipality/city/province) are collected, and that
(municipal/city/provincial) funds are applied to the payment of expenses and settlement of
obligations of the (municipality/city/province), in accordance with law or ordinance;
4.
Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions
upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance;
5.
Issue permits, without need of approval therefor from any national agency, for the holding of
activities for any charitable or welfare purpose, excluding prohibited games of chance or shows
contrary to law, public policy and public owners;
(does not apply to governors)
6.
Require owners of illegally constructed houses, buildings or other structures to obtain the
necessary permit, subect to such fines and penalties as may be imposed by law or ordinance, to
make necessary changes in the construction of the same when said construction violates any law
or ordinance, or to order the demolition or removal of said house, building or structure within the
period prescribed by law or ordinance;
(does not apply to governors)
7.1. Adopt adequate measures to safeguard and conserve land, mineral, marine, forest, and other
resources for the (municipality/city/province in coordination with the mayors of component cities
and municipalities);
7.2. Provide efficient and effective property and supply management in the
(municipality/city/province);
7.3. Protect funds, credits, rights, and other properties of the (municipality/city/province);
8.1. Institute or cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings for the violation of
ordinances in the collection of taxes, fees or charges, and for the recovery of funds and property;
8.2. Cause the (municipality/city/province) to be defended against all suits to ensure that its interests,
resources and rights shall be adequately protected;
D. Ensure the delivery of basic services and the provision of adequate facilities (see Sec. 17 (B) (2)), and in
addition thereto, shall:

1.

2.

Ensure that the construction and repair of roads and highways funded by the National
Government shall be, as far as practicable, carried out in a spatially contiguous manner and in
coordination with the construction and repair of the roads and bridges of the (municipality/city
and the province/province and its component cities and municipalities);
Coordinate the implementation of technical services, including public works and infrastructure
programs in the municipality
a. rendered by national and provincial offices in the case of municipalities
b. rendered by national offices in the case of highly urbanized and independent component
cities
c. rendered by national and provincial offices in the case of component cities
d. rendered by national offices for the province and its component cities and municipalities

Power, duties of the Municipal Vice-Mayor, City Vice-Mayor, Vice Governor (Sec 445, 456, 466)
1. Be the presiding officer of the sanggunian and sign all warrants drawn on the
(municipal/city/provincial) treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the
sanggunian
2. Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, appoint all officials and employees of the
sanggunian, except those whose manner of appointment is specifically provided in the LGC
3. Assume the office of the (municipal mayor/city mayor/governor) for the unexpired term of the
latter in the event of permanent vacancy
4. Exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the (municipal mayor/city
mayor/governor) in cases of temporary vacancy
5. Exercise such powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or
ordinance
Powers, duties and functions of the Sangguniang (Ba