JOHN DE JOHN, COMPLAINANT, v. JOHN E. POTTER,..., EEOC DOC 07A20030...

EEOC DOC 07A20030 (E.E.O.C.), 2004 WL 1084818

E.E.O.C.
JOHN DE JOHN, COMPLAINANT,
v.
JOHN E. POTTER, POSTMASTER GENERAL, UNITED
STATES POSTAL SERVICE, (EASTERN AREA) AGENCY.
Appeal No. 07A20030
Agency No. 4C-164-0011-00
Hearing No. 170-AO-8515X
May 10, 2004
DECISION
*1 Following its November 5, 2001 final order, the agency filed a timely appeal which the Commission accepts
pursuant to 29 C.F.R. 1614.405. On appeal, the agency requests that the Commission affirm its rejection of an
EEOC Administrative Judge's (AJ) finding that the agency discriminated against complainant on the basis of his
disability. The agency also rejected the AJ's finding that complainant is entitled to compensatory damages. For
the following reasons, the Commission REVERSES the agency's final order.
ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue presented herein is whether the AJ correctly found that the agency denied complainant a reasonable
accommodation and, in doing so, failed to establish that it acted in good faith.
BACKGROUND
Complainant held a bid position of carrier sequence bar code sorter (CSBCS) operator since 1996, when the
CSBCS machines were first installed at the Meadville, Pennsylvania, Post Office. Operation of this machine
requires the operator to load mail onto a conveyor belt, manipulate the mail so that it moves properly through
the machine as it is sorted, use his/her leg to push a mechanism known as a bridge, and trouble shoot operational
problems resulting from mail jams. CSBCS operation requires the operator to stand. In January 1998, complainant
was diagnosed with deep vein thrombophlebitis. This condition causes pain and inflamation in the lower legs
after prolonged standing. Complainant first requested an accommodation regarding this condition in August 1998.
Complainant requested, through his physician, that he be able to elevate his legs several times per day to alleviate
swelling. Complainant was told by the former Postmaster that he could sit when the CSBCS machine was running
and elevate his legs. Complainant continued to alleviate the swelling in this manner for more than a year until
September 1999, when the chair was removed from the machine by a different Postmaster (P1).
P1 caused the chairs to be removed from the machines and ordered all operators to work the machine without
the chairs. Complainant presented to P1 a note from his physician which stated that he needed to be able to sit
periodically during the day to relieve the swelling in his legs. Complainant also verbally requested that P1 reverse
the decision regarding the chairs at the machine due to his condition and his physician's suggestion. P1 refused
to allow complainant to use the chair. P1 told complainant that he must leave the machine and sit at a markup
table for no more than five minutes and then return to run the machine. Complainant objected to this suggestion as
unworkable, to which P1 replied that he could request light duty instead, but that he would not be guaranteed work.

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JOHN DE JOHN, COMPLAINANT, v. JOHN E. POTTER,..., EEOC DOC 07A20030...

Complainant could not afford to lose his hours, so he chose to work at the machine without a chair. Complainant
filed a formal complaint on November 1, 1999, alleging that the agency had discriminated against him on the
basis of disability when his request for an accommodation of a chair was denied.
*2 At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided a copy of the investigative report and
requested a hearing before an AJ. Following a hearing, the AJ issued a decision finding discrimination. The AJ
found that complainant proved he was an individual with a disability under the Rehabilitation Act. Specifically, the
AJ found that complainant's thrombophlebitis is a permanent impairment that substantially limits complainant's
ability to stand. The AJ also found that complainant was qualified to work on the CSBCS machine with
the reasonable accommodation of a chair that he could use intermittently to relieve swelling and pain in his
legs. The AJ further found that the agency did accommodate complainant beginning in August 1998 and then
withdrew the accommodation in September 1999. The AJ found that complainant did offer the agency sufficient
medical documentation in September 1999, including a diagnosis, a description of symptoms and a specific
accommodation, and that the agency failed to accommodate complainant. The AJ found that the agency failed
to show that it would have been an undue hardship to provide the chairs. Finally, the AJ found that the agency's
actions toward complainant did not constitute a good faith effort to reasonably accommodate him. Therefore, the
agency was not relieved of its obligation to award appropriate compensatory damages for its failure to provide
reasonable accommodation.
Based on the finding of discrimination, the AJ awarded pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages to complainant.
The AJ awarded complainant $688.58 in pecuniary damages for medical expenses. The AJ determined that
complainant suffered increased physical pain and exacerbation of his condition due to the agency's failure to
accommodate him. Specifically, the AJ found that in an effort to remain standing for four to six hours without
resting his legs complainant began to rely heavily on prescribed and over-the-counter pain pills to get him through
his shift. The AJ also found that during this period, approximately one year, complainant exhausted much of his
leave because on many mornings he was unable to work because his feet would be numb and he would be in severe
pain. The AJ further found that complainant's condition worsened and as the pain increased he increased the use
of pain medication. The AJ found that in August 2000 complainant suffered upper gastro-intestinal bleeding that
caused him to be hospitalized for five days and out of work for an additional four to five weeks. The AJ found
that complainant's upper gastro-intestinal bleeding was caused by the various painkillers that complainant was
using at the time. The AJ concluded that the agency's failure to accommodate complainant immediately following
his doctor's diagnosis was a factor contributing to the bleeding. Finally, the AJ found that after complainant's
hospitalization in September 2000, the agency continued to fail to offer complainant a reasonable accommodation.
Therefore, the AJ awarded complainant $95,000.00 in non-pecuniary damages.
*3 In addition, the AJ instructed the agency to restore all sick leave used by complainant from September 25,
1999, to the present, and all annual leave used by complainant during the same time of period. The AJ also ordered
the agency to pay complainant back pay for all leave without pay used by complainant from September 25, 1999
to the date of the AJ's decision. Finally, the AJ ordered the agency to expunge from complainant's record all the
leave without pay.
The agency's final order rejected the AJ's decision. On appeal, the agency contends, among other things, that the AJ
erred in determining that complainant was a qualified individual with a disability. In particular, the agency found
that complainant cannot perform the duties of the CSBCS operator. The agency alleged that the essential functions
are moving and using his legs to move the bridge, which is not a possibility for complainant. The agency contends
that the duties of the CSBCS position are not within complainant's doctor's recommendation and there are no
other jobs within the facility that will accommodate his restrictions. The agency also contends that complainant's
position on the CSBCS required the operator to be in constant motion. The agency argues that having a chair in
the area would present a tripping hazard to others and the walk space was no more than 36 inches wide. As such,

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JOHN DE JOHN, COMPLAINANT, v. JOHN E. POTTER,..., EEOC DOC 07A20030...

the agency contends that the requested accommodation of a chair in the CSBCS workplace would pose a safety
hazard to both complainant and other postal employees working in that area.
The agency also argues that management made a good faith effort to accommodate complainant, and that
complainant is not entitled to receive compensatory damages. Specifically, the agency contends that P1 instructed
complainant that he could sit periodically by clocking off the machine operation and clocking on a function that
would allow him to sit. P1 testified that he did not receive any documentation from September 1999 to June
2000 from complainant. P1 also testified that he received a note dated June 22, 2000, that stated complainant
should sit periodically and take occasional breaks to walk, and documents dated September 13, 2000, September
28, 2000 and October 27, 2000. The agency alleged that based on these documents complainant was sitting the
majority of his work schedule. The agency contends that once P1 was provided with documentation he made an
effort to accommodate complainant. The agency contends that nothing in the record support the assertion that
P1 intentionally ignored complainant's medical documentation, and where there is no intentional discrimination,
complainant is not due compensatory damages. The agency further contends that complainant filed an Office of
Workers' Compensation Program (OWCP) claim in relationship to his alleged condition and stated that it was
related to his employment. However, the OWCP determined that complainant had no condition that was related to
his employment. Therefore, the agency concluded that based on the above information from OWCP, because there
was no injury or exacerbation of complainant's condition from his employment, complainant was not entitled to
receive compensatory damages. The agency also alleged that complainant is not entitled to compensatory damages
because the agency did participate in the interactive process and made a good faith effort to provide complainant
reasonable accommodation.
*4 The agency further contends that no medical documents support a finding that his pre-existing condition was
worsened by decisions or actions of the agency. In fact, the agency concluded that complainant's blood clots were
attributed to the medication he was taking to treat the other medical conditions complainant suffered. The agency
alleged that from the time P1 removed the chairs from the CSBCS machine in September 1999 to September 2000,
complainant did not have an injury. The agency also alleged that the reported injury was the incident of internal
bleeding from taking Celebrex for other medical conditions. The agency concluded that complainant's condition
was exacerbated by complainant's own actions, and/or the medications he was taking for his medical conditions,
and that the injury was not related by the agency action of removing the chairs. Therefore, the agency concluded
that complainant is not entitled to $95,000.00 in non-pecuniary damages.
On appeal, complainant argues that the agency failed to timely and properly accommodate his disability.
Complainant contends that the agency's claim that it made a good faith effort is not supported by the record.
Specifically, complainant stated that he first requested an accommodation in August 1998, and used one
successfully until September of 1999, when the agency withdrew his accommodation. Complainant alleged that
the fact that he was required to stand at the machine for ten (10) months after the removal of the chairs, is clear
evidence of discriminatory intent. Complainant also contends that the agency misconstrues several facts in alleging
that work conditions and agency actions did not contribute to the disability. Complainant alleged that his other
medical conditions, Hepatitis C and gastro-intestinal bleeding, were affected by the medication taken to combat
the non-accommodated effects of the thrombophlebitis. Finally, complainant contends that the Celebrex was taken
for the thrombophlebitis, and therefore, the agency's actions are directly related to increased pain and suffering.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by an AJ will be upheld if supported by
substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,
340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory intent existed is

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JOHN DE JOHN, COMPLAINANT, v. JOHN E. POTTER,..., EEOC DOC 07A20030...

a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are
subject to a de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.
After a careful review of the record, we discern no basis to disturb the AJ's finding of discrimination. The AJ's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, and the AJ correctly applied the appropriate regulations,
policies, and laws. As the AJ found, complainant was an individual with a disability, within the meaning of
the Rehabilitation Act. An individual with a disability is one who (1) has a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities; (2) has a record of such impairment; or, (3) is regarded as
having such an impairment. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(g). Upon the review of the record, complainant presented sufficient
evidence to establish that he was substantially limited in a major life activity. The medical evidence in the record
reveals that complainant's thrombophlebitis is a permanent impairment that substantially limits his ability to stand
without raising his legs to relieve swelling and pain.
*5 Complainant must next show that he is a qualified individual with a disability. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(m). A
qualified individual with a disability is an individual who satisfies the requisite skills, experience, education, and
other job-related requirements of the employment position and who, with or without accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of such position. For the reasons set forth by the AJ, we find that complainant is a qualified
individual with a disability. In this regard, the record reveals that complainant had been performing his duties
in a satisfactory manner with the accommodation of a chair. Specifically, the record reveals that complainant
requested an accommodation for his condition in August 1998, and used the chair successfully until September
1999, when P1 removed the chair.
Under the Commission's regulations, an agency is required to make reasonable accommodation to the known
physical and mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability unless the agency can show
that accommodation would cause an undue hardship. 29 C.F.R 1630.9. Now that we have determined that
complainant is a qualified individual with disability, we turn to discussing whether or not the agency failed to
provide complainant reasonable accommodation when P1 removed the chairs from the CSBCS machine.
The agency alleged that the use of the chair at the machine constituted a safety hazard. Specifically, the
agency alleged that the workspace where the complainant would be working is very confined. P1 alleged that
complainant's position required constant movement of the CSBCS operators, and that having a chair in the area
would present a tripping hazard to others and the walk space was no more than 36 inches wide. As such, the
agency alleged that the requested accommodation of a chair in the CSBCS workplace would pose a threat to both
complainant and other postal employees. The record does not support the agency's contention. Specifically, we
find that the chair had been used since 1996, and there were no safety incidents at the machine area. We find
that the agency merely argues that the use of a chair can be a safety hazard, but, the agency offers no evidence to
support that contention and made no attempt to evaluate the risk of potential harm from the use of the chair.
The agency also alleged that the use of a chair at the machine is an undue hardship because it limits productivity.
Specifically, the agency alleged that the CSBCS machine processed more mail after the chairs were removed,
presumably because the chairs were removed. The agency alleged that after the chairs were removed, the volume
of mail processed by the machine increased eleven percent. We find that the removal of the chair was not the only
change that occurred during that year which affected processing on the CSBCS machines. The record reveals that
the agency had a new device that captured more mail to be processed by the machine. We find that the agency
failed to prove that the use of a chair at the machine area constitutes an undue hardship to the agency. Therefore,
we agree with the AJ that the agency discriminated against complainant based on his disability when management
denied him the reasonable accommodation of using a chair at his work-site.

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JOHN DE JOHN, COMPLAINANT, v. JOHN E. POTTER,..., EEOC DOC 07A20030...

*6 Finally, the record supports the AJ's finding that the agency did not make a good faith effort to provide
complainant with reasonable accommodation for his thrombophlebitis. Complainant's use of a chair was removed,
and the agency failed to provide complainant with duties consistent with his medical documentation. The record
reveals that in response to complainant's accommodation request, P1 offered him an unworkable option, which
required him to shut down his machine in order to raise his legs after moving to another part of the facility.
Complainant was also told that his other option would be to go on light duty without guaranteed work. We agree
with the AJ, that neither of the accommodations were effective. The Commission finds that this is not a case where
the agency made a good faith effort to accommodate complainant, and thus the agency is not insulated from an
obligation to award proper compensatory damages. See Teshima v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal
No. 01961997 (May 5, 1998).
Pursuant to Section 102(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a complainant who establishes his or her claim of
unlawful discrimination may receive, in addition to equitable remedies, compensatory damages for past and future
pecuniary losses (i.e., out of pocket expenses) and non-pecuniary losses (e.g., pain and suffering, mental anguish).
42 U.S. C. 1981a(b)(3). For an employer with more than 500 employees, such as the agency, the limit of liability
for future pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages is $300,000. Id.
Upon review, the Commission finds that the AJ properly determined that complainant established a nexus between
the alleged harm and discrimination. Therefore, we must review whether or not the amount of AJ's non-pecuniary
award was appropriate. The AJ determined that the agency's failure to provide a reasonable accommodation
aggravated complainant's condition. The AJ found that complainant was living with severe pain and inflammation
in his lower legs when the agency ordered him to perform his duties without the aid of a chair. The AJ also found
that complainant's pain continued for approximately one year, when he remained in his bid position working on
the CSBCS without the use of a chair. Finally, the AJ noted that the agency's action aggravated complainant's
condition, because in an effort to remain standing without resting his legs, complainant began to rely heavily on
prescribed and over-the counter pain pills to get him through his shift. The record reveals through complainant's
physician's testimony that complainant's gastro-intestinal bleeding was caused by the various painkillers that
complainant was using at the time. Complainant's doctor also testified that the agency's failure to accommodate
complainant contributed to the exacerbation of complainant's suffering. We find that the agency argues that
management's action did not cause complainant's gastro-intestinal bleeding, and that complainant's injuries were
attributed to the medication he was taking to treat other medical conditions. However, we find that the record
did not reveal that complainant's other medical conditions caused the gastro-intestinal bleeding. The record
supports complainant's claim that his condition was exacerbated by the agency's failure to provide reasonable
accommodation.
*7 We conclude that the AJ's award of $95,000.00 is consistent with prior Commission precedent and takes
into account the severity and duration of the harm suffered. The record reveals that due to the agency's failure
to accommodate complainant, he was hospitalized and his condition was aggravated. The record also reveals
through complainant's family's testimonies that the agency's actions impacted complainant's overall quality of
life. See Brinkley v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01953977 (January 23, 1998) ($110,000
in non-pecuniary damages for the injury sustained by complainant which resulted in her hospitalization, and the
various symptoms she experienced included hopelessness, loss of energy, agoraphobia, loss of interest in living,
depressed mood, impaired memory and concentration, insomnia, agitation, and loss of interest in routine activities
and personal self care) Leatherman v. Department of the Interior, EEOC Appeal 01A12222 (December 14, 2001)
($100,000.00 in non-pecuniary damages as a result of the discriminatory action of the agency, complainant was
hospitalized twice). Therefore, we find that the AJ properly concluded that complainant is entitled to $95,000.00
in non-pecuniary compensatory damages.

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JOHN DE JOHN, COMPLAINANT, v. JOHN E. POTTER,..., EEOC DOC 07A20030...

Accordingly, the Commission reverses the agency's final order. The agency is direcetd to take corrective action
consistent with the ORDER below.
ORDER
To the extent that it has not already done so, the agency is ordered to take the following remedial action within
sixty calendar (60) days, unless otherwise specified, of the date this decision becomes final:
(1) within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, the agency shall take all steps necessary
to ensure that complainant is provided with reasonable accommodation for his disability.
(2) the agency is directed to award complainant pecuniary damages in the amount of $688.58, and non-pecuniary
damages in the amount of $95,000.00;
(3) the agency shall determine the appropriate amount of backpay (with interest, if applicable) and other benefits
due for leave taken without pay, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. 1614.501, no later than ninety (90) calendar days after
the date this decision becomes final. Complainant shall cooperate in the agency's efforts to compute the amount
of back pay and benefits due, and shall provide all relevant information requested by the agency. If there is a
dispute regarding the exact amount of backpay and/or benefits, the agency shall issue a check to complainant for
the undisputed amount within ninety (90) calendar days of the date the agency determines the amount it believes to
be due. Complainant may petition for enforcement or clarification. A petition for enforcement must be filled with
the Compliance Officer, at the address referenced in the statement entitled Implementation of the Commission's
Decision.
*8 (4) the agency shall expunge all leave without pay from complainant's record and restore all sick leave and
annual leave used by complainant due to the agency's failure to accommodate him from September 1999 to the
date this decision becomes final;
(5) the agency shall provide training to all the management officials responsible for this matter in their duties and
obligations under the Rehabilitation Act.
(6) the agency shall consider taking disciplinary action against all the management officials responsible for this
matter. The agency shall report its decision. If the agency decides to take disciplinary action, it shall identify the
action taken. If the agency decided not to take disciplinary action, it shall set forth the reason(s) for its decision
not to impose discipline.
POSTING ORDER (G0900)
The agency is ordered to post at its Meadville, Pennsylvania facility copies of the attached notice. Copies of the
notice, after being signed by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted by the agency within
thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive
days, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. The agency
shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in the paragraph
entitled Implementation of the Commission's Decision, within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration of the
posting period.
ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0900)

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If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29 C.F.R. 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is
entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29 C.F.R.
1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified
statement of fees to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal
Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the
claim for attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. 1614.501.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The agency shall submit its compliance report
within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be submitted
to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the agency
must send a copy of all submissions to the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's
order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. 1614.503(a). The
complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to
or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R.
1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in
accordance with the paragraph below entitled Right to File A Civil Action. 29 C.F.R. 1614.407 and 1614.408.
A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42
U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing
of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. 1614.409.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
*9 The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the complainant or the agency
submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations
(OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt
of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity
Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and
arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to
reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable
filing period. See 29 C.F.R. 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other
party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely,
unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must
be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration
filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar
days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in

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JOHN DE JOHN, COMPLAINANT, v. JOHN E. POTTER,..., EEOC DOC 07A20030...

the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or
her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. Agency or
department means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If
you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative
processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may
request that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the action without
payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the
request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time in
which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in
the paragraph above (Right to File A Civil Action).

For the Commission:

*10 Stephen Llewellyn
Acting Executive Officer
Executive Secretariat
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
An Agency of the United States Government
This Notice is posted pursuant to an Order by the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission dated
_____________ which found that a violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation
Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 791 et seq. has occurred at the Meadville, Pennsylvania Post Office (facility).
Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any employee or applicant for employment because
of the person's RACE, COLOR, RELIGION, SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE, or DISABILITY with respect
to hiring, firing, promotion, compensation, or other terms, conditions or privileges of employment.
The United States Postal Service supports and will comply with such federal law and will not take action against
individuals because they have exercised their rights under law.
The agency was found to have discriminated against an employee on the basis of his disability when it failed to
provide reasonable accommodation. The agency has been ordered to: (1) provide the employee with reasonable
accommodation; (2) award the employee back pay and other benefits due, restore all leave taken as a result of the
denial of accommodation; (3) pay proven compensatory damages and attorney's fees; (4) provide training in the
obligations and duties imposed by Rehabilitation Act; and (5) post this notice.
The facility will not in any manner restrain, interfere, coerce, or retaliate against any individual who exercises his
or her right to oppose practices made unlawful by, or who participates in proceedings pursuant to, federal equal
employment opportunity law.
29 C.F.R. Part 1614

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EEOC DOC 07A20030 (E.E.O.C.), 2004 WL 1084818

End of Document

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