Second Years de novo Intra-Moot Court Competition, 2015

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TC-06 A

In the Honble Supreme Court of India

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No.-______ of 2015

Appeal filed seeking relief under Article 132 of

The Constitution of India

In the matter of:

State of Mithila... .... Appellant
Versus
Sparta India Pvt. Ltd. . Respondent

Most Respectfully Submitted before the Honble Chief Justice of India

and His Companion Judges of the Supreme Court of India

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT DRAWN

AND FILED BY THE COUNSELS FOR THE APPELLANT

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA EXERCISES JURISDICTION

TO HEAR AND ADJUDICATE OVER THE MATTER UNDER
ARTICLE 132 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950.
THE PROVISION UNDER WHICH THE PETITIONER HAS APPROACHED THIS
HONBLE COURT AND TO WHICH THE PETITIONER HUMBLY SUBMITS IS READ
HEREINUNDER:

132. Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in appeals from High Courts in certain
cases:
( 1 ) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order of a
High Court in the territory of India, whether in a civil, criminal or other proceeding, if
the High Court certifies under Article 134A that the case involves a substantial question
of law as t the interpretation of this Constitution
(2) Omitted
(3) Where such a certificate is given, any party in the case may appeal to the Supreme Court
on the ground that any such question as aforesaid has been wrongly decided.

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QUESTIONS OF LAW

1. Whether the Bangur Land Rehabilitation and Development Act, 2013 is violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India?
2. Whether the absence of Social Impact Assessment clause renders the Bangur Land
Rehabilitation and Development Act, 2013 repugnant to the Central Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013?
3. Whether the consent of the President of India was essential for the Bangur Land
Rehabilitation and Development Bill, 2013?
4. Whether the acquisition of land under the Bangur Land Rehabilitation and
Development Act, 2013 fulfills the criteria of public purpose as mentioned in the
Central Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013?
5. Whether the refund clause mentioned in the Bangur Land Rehabilitation and
Development Act, 2013 is legally valid?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. That the Bangur Land Rehabilitation and Development Act, 2013 is not violative
of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
The counsel humbly submits that the Bangur Land Rehabilitation and Development
Act, 2013 is not violative of Constitution of India because it reasonably classifies and
does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution.
2. That the absence of Social Impact Assessment clause does not render the Bangur
Land Rehabilitation and Development Act, 2013 repugnant to the Central Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.
The counsel humbly submits that there is no repugnancy between the Central Act and
the State Act. The State Act is enacted under Entry 18 of list II.
3. That the consent of the President of India was not essential for the Bangur Land
Rehabilitation and Development Bill, 2013.
The counsel submits that the Act has been enacted under Entry 18 of List II so does
not require Presidential Assent.
4. That the acquisition of land under the Bangur Land Rehabilitation and
Development Act, 2013 fulfills the criteria of public purpose as mentioned in
the Central Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.
The counsel submits that part of land is to be returned to unwilling farmers and rest to
be utilized for public benefit.
5. That the refund clause mentioned in the Bangur Land Rehabilitation and
Development Act, 2013 is legally valid.
The counsel submits that the refund clause is valid and reasonable as it authorises a
district judge, on an application by Sparta Group, to determine the compensation.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. That the Bangur Land Rehabilitation and Development Act, 2013 is not violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

We are a country governed by the Rule of Law. Our constitution confers certain rights
on every human-being and certain other rights on every citizen. Every person is entitled
to Equality before the Law.1
It is most respectfully submitted before this Honble Court that the instant appeal is filed
against the judgment of the Honble High Court of Mithila. With due respect, it is stated that
the said Honble High Court has erred in not upholding the Act in question on an important
aspect of law. It is submitted, against the ruling and judgment of the Honble High Court of
Mithila, that the said Act is valid and passes the test of Reasonable Classification under
Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Article 14 runs as follows:
The state shall not deny any person equality before law or equal protection
of law within the territory if India.
What it postulates is the application of same law alike and without discrimination to all
persons similarly situated. But the fact remains that all persons are not equal by nature and
therefore a mechanical equality before the law may result in injustice. 2 The varying needs of
different classes or sections of people require differential treatment. This leads to
classification among different groups of people and differentiation between such classes.
Accordingly to apply the principle of equality in practical manner the courts have evolved the
principle that if the law in question is based on rational classification it is not regarded as
discriminatory.3

1 Faridabad C.T. Scan Centre v. DG, Health Services, (1997) 7 SCC 752
2 Chiranjeet Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41

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In the present case before this Honble Court, the state legislature has enacted the Bangur
Land rehabilitation and development Act, 2013 to obtain back the land acquired on behalf of
Sparta India Ltd. and return 400 acres land to the unwilling farmers and utilize the rest for
some purpose beneficial to the people. The classification for the purpose of the Act is made
on the basis of satisfaction of the criteria of Public Purpose. The State Legislature
considered the issue when the strikes by the unwilling farmers continued for a considerable
amount of time. Therefore, the basis of classification for the purpose of this Act is totally
reasonable and justifiable. The state legislature has power to enact laws for the benefit of the
people of the State.
To attract Article 14, it is necessary to show that the selection or differentiation is
unreasonable or arbitrary, that it does not rest on any rational basis having regard to the object
which the legislature has in view in making of law in question. 4 The differentia which is the
basis of classification and the Act are distinct things and what is necessary is that there must
be nexus between them5 as in the present case.
As this Honble Court has observed in Thimmappa6:
When a law is challenged to be discriminatory essentially on the ground
that it denies equal treatment or protection, the question for determination by
the Court is not whether it has resulted in inequality but whether there is some
difference which bears a just and reasonable relation to the object of legislation.
Mere differentiation does not per se amount to discrimination within the
inhibition of the equal protection clause. To attract the operation of the clause it
is necessary to show that the selection or differentiation is unreasonable or
arbitrary, that it does not rest on any rational basis having regard to the object
which the legislature has in view.

3 Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, (2002) 4 SCC 34

4 Jaila Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1976) 1 SCC 602
5 In re Special Courts Bill, 1978, (1979) 1 SCC 380
6 K. Thimmappa v. Chairman, Central Board of Directors, (2001) 2 SCC 259

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Further, a mere plea that a party has been treated differently is not enough. The initial
presumption is in favour of validity of the law, and if the person fails to adduce sufficient
evidence in support of his challenge, which in this instant case is nothing, his plea of
provision being violative of Article 14 cannot be entertained. The state can lean on
presumption of validity of law7. The presumption of constitutionality stems from the wide
power classification which the legislature must, of necessity possess in making laws
operating differently as regards different groups of persons in order to give effect to policies.
It must be presumed and understood that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates
the need of its own people. 8 The state Legislature has understanding of the people of the state
and their need and aspirations.
It is further submitted with utmost respect that a statute based on a reasonable
classification does not become invalid merely because the class to which it applies consists of
only one person. A single body or institution may form a class. A legislation specifically
directed to one person or body would be valid if, on account of some special circumstances,
or reasons applicable to that person and not to others, a single person may be treated as a
class in itself.9
For example, a special law passed for Shri Jaggannath Temple was held valid for the
temple had a unique position among Hindu Temples and so it could be given a special
treatment.10
Similarly, special provisions can be made for each university as each University is a class
in itself. Article 14 does not require that provisions for every university be same.11
The provisions of the Act cannot be struck down on the fanciful theory that power would
be exercised in such an unrealistic fashion.12 The fact that the legislature considered ordinary
procedure inefficient or ineffective in evicting unauthorised occupant of government property
7 G.K. Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 375
8 Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan (2002) 4 SCC 41
9 Charanjit Lal v. Union of India, (1950) SCR 869
10 Bira Kishore Deb v. State of Orissa, (1964) 7 SCR 32
11 Azeez Basha v. Union of India (1968) 1 SCR 833

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and, therefore, provided a special procedure for it is a clear guidance for the authorities
charged with the duty of evicting unauthorised occupants and such Act being specific and
clear cannot be rendered unreasonable and arbitrary and any allegations describing the act as
being such is baseless and frivolous.

2. That the absence of Social Impact Assessment clause does not render the Bangur
Land Rehabilitation and Development Act, 2013 repugnant to the Central Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013?

It is submitted before this Honble court that the Act in question has been enacted under the
power of State Legislature under Entry 18 of List II which reads hereinunder:
Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation
of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of
agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization.
State Legislature can extinguish or restrict subsisting rights in the land or provide for
statutory purchase of land by tenants in occupation, or modify or curtail the rights of landlords
in the land and expand rights of the tenants, or provide for transfer and alienation of
agricultural land.13
If a State makes a law with respect to matters in state list, then there is no question of
repugnancy between it and a Central Law pertaining to a matter in the Central or Concurrent
12 Pandia Nadar v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 2 SCC 539
13 Sri Ram Ram Narain v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 459

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List. The view is based on the rule Pith and Substance. If a state law is enacted with respect
to a matter in List I, it is void, but if it falls within the State List then its incidental
encroachment into the concurrent List will no render it invalid 14. Repugnancy between the
two statutes- Central and State arises if there is a direct conflict i.e. these laws are fully
inconsistent and have absolutely irreconcilable provisions and if laws made by the
Parliament and State occupy the same field.15
Since there is no conflict between the provisions of the two Acts; hence there is no
repugnancy between the two under Article 254. The first thing to examine is whether it is the
subject matter and to determine the rule of Pith and Substance, so as to find the dominant
intention of two Acts. Both Acts must be substantially on the same subject to attract Article
254(1)16.
The intention of the State Legislature and the purpose for which the Act was enacted, as
mentioned in the Preamble of the Act, is very clear. The Preamble of the Act reads as under:
An act to provide for taking over of the land covered by the lease granted to
Sparta India Limited for the sole purpose of Small Car Manufacturing project and
letters of allotment issued to the Vendors as recommended by the Sparta Group in
view of non-commissioning and abandoning Small Car Project and ancillary
factories with a view to returning such portion of the land to the unwilling owner
thereof, who have not accepted compensation and to utitlize the balance portion
in public interest and for the benefit of the State
The Act is question does not cover the topic of land acquisition as mentioned in the Entry 42
of the Concurrent List. The subject of the Act is covered under Entry 6 read as: Transfer of
property other than agricultural land; registration of deeds and documents
The purpose of the Act is to break the lease and retake the land. The land was
acquired on behalf of Sparta Group by the State, so State has every right to break the lease, or
shorten the period of lease for the benefit of public and the State. As long as the Legislation is
14 A. S. Krishna v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 297
15 Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1959 SC 648
16 Vijay Kumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka (1990) 2 SCC 562

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within Pith and Substance, objection would not be entertained merely on ground that while
enacting Legislation, provision has been made for a matter which though germane for the
purpose for which competent legislation is made, it covers aspects beyond it. An enactment
cannot be held void merely because it incidentally encroaches on matters assigned to another
legislature17.
To ascertain the true character of Law, it must be looked into as organic whole. It would be
wrong approach to view the statute as a mere collection of sections, to disintegrate it into parts
and then to examine under which entry each part would fall and then to determine which part
of it is valid and which invalid. Instead the Act should be taken in one place and then its
character determined.18
To determine whether or not the legislature has transgressed the spheres assigned to it, what is
material is Pith and Substance, the true nature and character of the legislation in question
and not its outward or formal presence.19
Ultimately, the issue boils down to the question whether the legislature had competence and
enact the legislation because if the impugned legislation falls within the competence of the
legislature, the question of doing something indirectly which cannot be done does not arise.20
In the instant case, the two laws do not relate to one common entry in one List but the two
laws dealt with different matters of legislation and therefore Article 254(1) would not apply in
such a situation. The subject of both the statutes and object of two sets of provisions being
different both statutes can stand together.21

17 Premchand Jain v. R.K. Chabra (1984) 2 SCC 302

18 Jain, M.P., Indian Constitutional Law, 2006 Reprint Edition
19 Ashok Kumar v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 498
20 Naga Peoples Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India (1998) 2 SCC 109
21 Vijay Kumar Sharma (1990) 2 SCC 562

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3. That the consent of the President of India was not essential for the Bangur Land
Rehabilitation and Development Bill, 2013.

It is most respectfully submitted before this Honble Court that the act in question does
not require Presidential Assent under Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India.The Act in
question has been enacted under the power of State Legislature under Entry 18 of List II
which reads hereinunder:
Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation
of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of
agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization.

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As pointed out earlier, the purpose of the Act and the intention of the State Legislature
mentioned in the Preamble of the Act is very clear. The Preamble of the Act reads as under:
An act to provide for taking over of the land covered by the lease granted to
Sparta India Limited for the sole purpose of Small Car Manufacturing project and
letters of allotment issued to the Vendors as recommended by the Sparta Group in
view of non-commissioning and abandoning Small Car Project and ancillary
factories with a view to returning such portion of the land to the unwilling owner
thereof, who have not accepted compensation and to utilize the balance portion in
public interest and for the benefit of the State
The purpose for which the Act was enacted is not acquisition of land under Entry 42 of List
III but Breaking of lease between the Sparta group and the State covered under Entry 18 of
the State list. Since there is no conflict between the provisions of the two Acts; hence there is
no repugnancy between the two under Article 254. The first thing to examine is whether it is
the subject matter and to determine the rule of Pith and Substance, so as to find the
dominant intention of two Acts. Both Acts must be substantially on the same subject to attract
Article 254(1)22. The State Legislature is competent to enact a law for entries under State List
and the Act comes to life when the Governor of the State gives assent to the Act. This entry
confers plenary power on the State Legislature to enact legislation to extinguish, restrict,
transfer or convey the rights in lands, or concerning land tenures including the relation of
landlords and tenants, or concerning transfer and alienation of agricultural land. State
Legislature can extinguish or restrict subsisting rights in the land or provide for statutory
purchase of land by tenants in occupation, or modify or curtail the rights of landlords in the
land and expand rights of the tenants, or provide for transfer and alienation of agricultural
land.23
It is pertinent to mention here that leases in respect of non-agricultural land are dealt with
Transfer of property Act and would appropriately fall within the scope of Entry 6 of the List
III. It is categorically denied that the Act in question comes under purview of the Central Act.

22 Vijay Kumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka (1990) 2 SCC 562

23 Sri Ram Ram Narain v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 459

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4. That the acquisition of the land under Bangur Land Rehabilitation and Development
Act, 2013 fulfills the criteria of public purpose as mentioned in the Central Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.

We hereby submit before this Honble Court that the acquisition of the land under
Bangur Land Rehabilitation and Development Act, 2013 fulfills the criteria of public
purpose as mentioned in the Central Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013.

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It is contended that the need of a section of a society can be termed as public purpose.
In this scenario, this section of society was the unwilling owners. Even if people benefitting
from it are very less, it has to be termed as public purpose24
It is also argued before this Honble Court, that the land owners who accepted
compensation cannot be treated as unwilling owners who have not accepted compensation.
Therefore, classification made by legislature is reasonable.
The definition of the term public purpose is elastic and takes its colour from the
statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with the time and state of society and its
needs.25 It is further submitted that the restoration of land or payment of compensation in lieu
of land is a measure of rehabilitation and is a public purpose.26
Since the Bangur Act is not a Legislation for acquisition, the dominant purpose of the
Bangur Act is to utilize land for socio-economic development of the state. To give effect to
such public purpose the State has exercised its right for reversion by way of Legislative Act. It
is further submitted that the principal purpose of socio-economic development of the State by
utilization of the Bangur land would be possible, if the legislative act takes care of the
discontent of farmers/unwilling owners and would act as a catalyst for the purpose of socioeconomic development and ensure safety and security of the area. It is further contended
before this Honble Court that safety and security is also a public purpose. It is ancillary to the
public purpose of socio-economic development referring to statement of objects and reasons
of the said Act.
It is for the State Government to decide whether the land is needed or is likely to be
needed for a public purpose and whether it is suitable or adaptable for the purpose for which
the acquisition was sought to be made.27It is contended that State is a primarily the best judge
to decide what would be the public purpose. 28 The current legislation in this behalf is

24 Ratilal Shakarabhai & Ors. vs. The State of Gujarat & Ors. AIR 1970 SC 984
25 State of Bihar vs. Kameshwar Singh AIR 1952 SC 252
26 State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Narmada Bachao Andolan 2011 (7) SCC 639
27 Laxman Rao Bapurao Jadhav vs. State of Maharashtra AIR 1997 SC 334

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compendiously described as "pooling legislation" and is based on the fundamental idea that
the collectivist economy is superior to individualistic economy.29
The relationship between the individual's right to compensation upon land being used
for Public Use and the sovereign's power to condemn is discussed in Thayer's cases on
Constitutional Law:30
it is now generally considered that the power of eminent domain is not a
property right, or an exercise by the state of an ultimate ownership in the soil, but
that it is based upon the sovereignty of the state. As the sovereign power of the
state is broad enough to cover the enactment of any law affecting persons or
property within its jurisdiction which is not prohibited by some clause of the
Constitution of the United States, and as the taking of property within the
jurisdiction of a state for the public use upon payment of compensation is not
prohibited by the Constitution of the United States, it necessarily follows that it is
within the sovereign power of a state, and it needs no additional justification.
More accurately, it is the rightful authority which must rest in every sovereignty to
control and regulate those rights of a public nature which pertain to its citizens in common
and to appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the public safety,
convenience or necessity may demand.31 It is a right inherent in every sovereign to take and
appropriate private property belonging to individual citizens for public use. This right, which
is described as eminent domain in American law, is like the power of taxation, and offspring
of political necessity, and it is supposed to be based upon an implied reservation by
Government that private property acquired by its citizens under its protection may be taken or
its use controlled for public benefit irrespective of the wishes of the owner.32
28 Daulat Singh Surana vs. First Land Acquisition Collector, (2007) 1 SCC 641.
29 Coffee Board, Karnataka, Bangalore v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Karnataka,
(1988) 3 SCC263
30 Thayer, James Bradley, Cases on Constitutional Law,1831-1902
31 Cooley, Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations - Chapter XV
32 Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India and Ors., (1950) 1SCR869

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5. That the refund clause mentioned in the Bangur Land Rehabilitation

and Development Act, 2013 is legally valid.

A bare reading of the Act in question shows that rehabilitation and resettlement clause
was provided in the said act. The state act states that:
Section 5: Payment of amount
(1) For the transfer to and vesting in the State Government the land under section
3 and right, title and interest in relation thereto, the amounts of premium paid
respectively by the vendors shall be refunded after deducting the amount of
arrears of rent left unpaid by them upon an application being made by them
respectively mentioning the amount of premium paid and rent kept in arrears.
(2) For the transfer to and vesting of the land leased to the Sparta India Limited,
the amount of compensation would be adjudged and determined by the District
Judge, Hooghly on an application being made by the Tata Motors Limited in due
compliance with the principles of natural justice and by reasoned order.
(3) The amount so determined in accordance with the provisions hereto, shall
carry simple interest at the rate of six per centum per annum from the period
commencing on the date of application made by the claimant and ending on the
date of tender of the amount as may be, determined and payable by the State
Government.
The aforementioned section provides for compensation. It enacts that compensation
would be given by the State as determined by the district judge.
Blacks Law Dictionary defines compensation in the following terms: Payment of
damages or any other act that a Court orders to be done by a person who has caused injury to
another and must make the other whole.

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Therefore, compensation is the concept of indemnification. Compensation, more fully

and completely indemnifies a person against any loss, than damages 33. When the State
exercises the power of eminent domain the deprived land owner had a natural right to be
compensated for the loss.34 Compensation is a just equivalent of the loss suffered or full
indemnification for it.35
As observed by this Honble Court in Kameshwar Singhs36 and Bella Banerjees37 case:
the concept of acquisition and that of compensation are two different
notions having their origin in different sources. One is founded on the sovereign
power of the State to take; the other is based on the natural right of the person
who is deprived of property to be compensated for his loss.
The relationship between the individual's right to compensation and the sovereign's
power to condemn is discussed in Thayer's cases on Constitutional Law38:
it is now generally considered that the power of eminent domain is not a
property right, or an exercise by the state of an ultimate ownership in the soil, but
that it is based upon the sovereignty of the state. As the sovereign power of the
state is broad enough to cover the enactment of any law affecting persons or
property within its jurisdiction which is not prohibited by some clause of the
Constitution of the United States, and as the taking of property within the
jurisdiction of a state for the public use upon payment of compensation is not
prohibited by the Constitution of the United States, it necessarily follows that it is
within the sovereign power of a state, and it needs no additional justification.
33 Yadava Kumar v. Divisional Manager, National Insurance Company Ltd. and anr., (2010)
10 SCC 341
34 Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar, 1952 SCR 889
35 The State Of West Bengal v. Mrs. Bela Banerjee 1954 AIR 170
36 Supra, at 33
37 Supra, at 34
38 Supra, at 30

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In the instant case, the compensation is payable to the Sparta Group and Vendors
associated with the project. Therefore, there is the necessary intention to pay compensation 39
as envisaged in the Act. There is also a mechanism provided in the Act for determining this
compensation, namely by the District Judge Srirampur on an application made by the Sparta
Group, so with the aforesaid reasons it is emphasized that this mechanism or procedure is not
arbitrary or illusory or could result in such kind of a determination.
A statute carried the presumption of constitutionality. It was only to be struck down
when it was not possible to sustain it by any means. 40 The constitutionality of an Act is to be
presumed, as it represents the will of the people or at least the majority of the people
expressed through the legislature.41 When all attempts to uphold the Act fail, then the Court
should strike it down. 42 The Court should not pick holes in it and try to interpret the Act so as
to support it.43
As observed by this honorable court in State of Bihar and ors. v. Bihar Distillery Ltd44.:
The approach of the Court, while examining the challenge to the
constitutionality of an enactment, is to start with the presumption of
constitutionality. The Court should try to sustain its' validity to the extent
possible. It should strike down the enactment only when it is not possible to
sustain it. The Court should not approach the enactment with a view to pick holes
or to search for defects of drafting, much less inexactitude of language employed.
Indeed, any such defects of drafting should be ironed out as part of the attempt to
sustain the validity/constitutionality of the enactment. After all, an Act made by
the Legislature represents the will of the people and that cannot be lightly
39 Rajiv Sarin v. State of Uttarkhand, (2011)8 SCC 708
40 State of Bihar and ors. v. Bihar Distillery Ltd., (1997)2 SCC 453
41 Tata Power Co. Ltd. v. Reliance Energy Ltd. and Ors., (2009) 16 SCC 659
42 Government of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Laxmi Devi, (2008)4 SCC 720
43 Seaford Court Estates vs. Asher, 1949(2) all ER 1955
44 Supra, at 38

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interfered with. The unconstitutionally must be plainly and clearly established

before an enactment is declared as void. The same approach holds good while
ascertaining the intent and purpose of an enactment or its scope and
application.
In 1955 by the Fourth Amendment the Constitution was amended. The amendment
added a rider that the adequacy of the compensation could not be gone into by the Court. The
amount of compensation could not be challenged45.
Words used by the legislature must be construed according to their plain natural
meaning, and in order to ascertain the true intention of the legislature, the Court must not only
look at the words used by the legislature but should also have regard to the context and the
setting in which they occur. The word "context" has to be construed in a wide sense to mean
all the provisions of the Act which bear upon the same subject matter and these provisions
have to be read as a whole and in their entirety each throwing light and illumining the
meaning of the other.46
In the case of Kesavananda Bharati47 this Honble Court held that the word
compensation had been replaced by the word amount and the adequacy of compensation
could not be challenged until and unless it arbitrary or illusionary.
Therefore, there is no reason for striking down this Act because it does not
provide the amount of compensation or the principles for calculation of this amount.
For the above reasons, it is emphasized that the legislature by using the word
compensation meant compensation based on the principles mentioned in sections 23 and
24 of the Land Acquisition Act, 2013, as applicable.

45 R.C. Cooper vs. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564

46 Delhi Transport Corporation Vs. DTC Mazdoor Congress & Ors. (1991) Supp.(1) SCC
600
47 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerela, AIR 1973 SC 1461

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PRAYER

In light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and cases cited it is most humbly
prayed before this Honble CourtI.

That the Bangur Land Rehabilitation and Development Act 2013 be upheld as

II.

Constitutional and not violative of Article 14.

That the Judgement dated xx.xx.xxxx of the Mithila High Court against

III.
IV.
V.
VI.

Appellant be quashed.
That the Act in question be declared non-repugnant to Central Act.
That the non-requirement of Presidential Assent be upheld.
That the Act fulfils the criteria of Public Purpose be upheld.
That the refund clause mentioned in the Act is legally valid be upheld.

Or grant such other relief as the court may deem fit in the light of justice, equity and
good conscience.

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AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS THE PETITIONERS SHALL DUTY BOUND
EVER PRAY.

Sd/(Counsel for the Appellant)