Malleable COIN Targeting

A Pentagon Plan for Flexibility in Processes

By Brandon C. Miller
Journal Article | Feb 2 2012 - 4:58am

Editor's Note: Some commenters criticizedyesterday's F3EAD article about targeting for promoting a
one-size fits all targeting solution. Does the Pentagon Plan provide a more flexible answer?
Todays planning officer faces many decisions on a daily basis, not the least of which is what process to
use to get necessary answers to the questions of battlefield commanders. Often, units plan their operations
using a plans officer, a fires officer, and an intelligence officer. Other personnel are certainly involved, but
these three officers are responsible for the decision making process leading to the design of unit
operations. D3A (Decide, detect, deliver, and assess) normally forms the blueprint for larger operations,
and F3EA (Find, fix, finish, exploit and assess sometimes disseminate is used as well, but for the
purposes of this article, disseminate is not necessary. Disseminate can be considered an additional step in
the process, but it can be assumed that the next step after complete intelligence operations is to hand out
or disseminate the results.) is used for precision operations, which are usually kinetic in nature.
Combining these two processes might seemingly form a process that is good enough to get operations
planned and across. Good enough is not enough for todays warfighter.
In the graphic below, D3A is represented by the orange diagram. F3EA is designated by the blue diagram.
The standard scientific method is designated by the green diagram. The brief MDMP process is designated
by the red diagram.

This combined diagram displays how all three processes overlap. Different processes stress different
attributes. The scientific method tends to be heavy on interpreting the results, while the MDMP process is
heavy on decision making upon decision of action. The D3A process seemingly spaces out all the steps
made in that decision making process, but also can omit a large number of aspects, while F3EA is almost
omitting the entire process of making a decision on some sort of target. The processes are overlapped in
this diagram to display how in this comparison there are four different decision making methods which all
stress different areas.
There are two processes that need to lay the groundwork for a D3A/F3EA comparison, ASCOPE
and PMES-II. ASCOPE (Area, Structure, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events) is a product of
the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and seemingly the only product of IPB (Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield) that gets used thus the importance. Noting that this is the only process that
gets used sounds very disingenuous, but while in a ground level intelligence shop, the attributes of the
society are a majority of what combatant commanders immediately need upon mission receipt. ASCOPE
covers the typical data that a standard fighting size element (platoon or squad) would be briefed on prior
to a mission. PMES-II (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information) deals
primarily with the same elements that ASCOPE addresses, but it is meant for higher echelons than a
conventional battalion PMES-II assessment is dedicated to strategic level threats. Both processes need to
be considered, and the data then needs to be implemented in whichever data inclusion process that is
decided upon. As such, the ASCOPE and PMES-II data has to be categorized and applied/updated on a
patrol or sensor collection on a targeting cycle time frame. This process usually takes one week for
conventional military ground units.
In The Targeting Process: F3EAD and D3A, Chief Jimmy Gomez, an author of a previous article

concerning the F3EA and D3EA planning processes for Small Wars Journal, describes the D3A and F3EA
processes as F3EA being a time sensitive subset of D3EA. While Chief Gomez may be correct in his
assumption - and I generally agree, there is no need to have subsets of a larger targeting process. With the
already week long process to collect information from ground units and sensors, possibly creating a few
different command-read intelligence and information products can take a small bite out of possible gains
to be achieved due to time constraints. How many changes occur in a day? A week? A month? Combatant
commanders are frequently at a thirst for information, and for an intelligence shop to give an answer of
waiting on an RFI (Request For Information) to come back is unacceptable.
Drawing inspiration from the Department of defenses largest building, but in assessing the initial diagram
displayed in the beginning of the article, it is quite clear that there are five distinctive thought steps. Most
military and scientific models start at the top with a find, detect, or form hypothesis/decide question type
of phase. Considering the large volume of data that has already been collected on counter-insurgency and
guerilla warfare, it seems disingenuous to continue to refine and use models that start at a slate scrubbed
clean while units and planning officers attempt to define a question or detect the enemy. With
resources available to an intelligence officer (Agencies, reach back sources, open networks) at least a
modicum of data should be collected on an area. Of course, Middle East theaters are well categorized and
researched. Fighting in a remote location may present itself with a problem of a lack of information for an
element on the ground, but at the very least some sort of order of battle or intelligence asset can be
leveraged in the meantime to collect even the most macro of pictures.

The preserve stage concerns itself with building on previous gains. This can be described and carried
through in lethal, non-lethal, and strategic planning methods. Starting with the lethal method, this stage is
most likely used to assess intelligence value from detainees or sensitive site exploitation through
reactionary human intelligence source information or collected signals. The goal is to preserve the current
(hopefully successful) targeting method in order to continue the cycle. A non-successful targeting method
will bring additional issues and concerns. Whether the issue is a lack of asset availability, a unit focus
which does not contain the ability to conduct direct action, or just a lack of qualified intelligence
personnel to complete the task to standard, any of these issues can be either solved or masked over with a
Pentagon Plan. Taking a risk by possibly skipping a stage, for example the preserve stage, is an option due
to a strive to complete the ultimate goal of organizing a targeting process. The theory of skipping a step
due to operational constraints should be to pick up that step on the next targeting cycle. Keeping
continuing cycles throughout hand-offs with replacing units or rotating personnel is key to keeping all the
steps of a targeting cycle intact.
A non-lethal example of the preserve stage is the game of preserving hearts and minds. Frequently, a unit
will entertain the Commanders Emergency Response Program, or CERP requests for funds and approve
projects, only to check on them once or twice and continually ask for more information on additional
processes. (Commonly the funds are used to build bridges, wells, and roads although can be used for
large scale ($500K+) projects as well.) A better approach might be to preserve the current projects
periodically and take opinions of the townspeople to get our moneys worth. Non lethal gains are the
most important to hold, as they have the longest lasting impact to the cycle as a whole. Kinetic activities,
while disruptive, create easily replaced personnel and a gain in which the best way to preserve it is though
more kinetic actions.
Making sure that those gains are preserved smartly without rapid expansion is key. A strategic planning
process will benefit the greatest from a properly executed preserve stage. No military officer likes to
rehash the wheel, right? A notification system throughout a combat area educating planning officers on
which specific tactics are sufficiently successful would be extremely beneficial. An example of non-lethal
preservation from my personal experiences in Operation Iraqi Freedom 7-9, 1/87th Infantry, 1st BCT, 10th
Mountain Division in Hawijah, Iraq (~50 miles west of Kirkuk, Iraq), was cleaning house through strict
interpretation of the F3EA philosophy. 1/87 Infantry was one of the first units to stand up the concerned
local citizens program, or sahwa/awakening in wake of extremely successful precision targeting
operations thus closing the insurgent vacuum by offering the non-lethal programs at the exact right time.
I often wondered if other units to the north in Mosul or to the south in Diyala (who, judging by activity,
were not doing as well) were receiving any specific details on our success. As the other areas situations
did not turn around until much later, I assumed not. Now, there are other contributing factors to this
independent of a targeting cycle. Whether or not the paid citizens were armed, marked properly, or even
being paid is subjective to the area but being a fly on the wall at 500 feet, as opposed to ten thousand
feet, significant activities concerning small arms attacks and Improvised Explosive Devices dwindled in
Salah al Din province, IZ, but continued in Mosul/Diyala as noticed by reading bordering reporting at the
time.
The proposal phase could be categorized as the phase at which most other targeting cycles begin. The
issue with the nature of those plans is that a military or intelligence planner is rarely going to go into a
battlefield-type situation with two things. One, some sort of previous intelligence estimate from any
source, and two, some sort of an intelligence preparation product that has been created either organically
to the unit or by some sort of echelon above/below. Chances are very good that the preparation of the
battlefield is completed and that planner is going to do some sort of battle handoff with a preceding unit.
In times of those bad chances where there is little information to gain from a preceding unit, there are

always intelligence assets available to the Intelligence Community as a whole leveraged on most dark
corners of the world. Not to speak completely in generalities, but there are the one percent situations
where a unit is flying blind. The Pentagon Plan is not recommended for standing up information
networks and collecting completely raw data about infrastructures and populations.
Typically, a battle handoff will mean that the slate is full, and the planning process is in motion so the
propose stage will build off those already in place events of the preserve stage. Planning can be difficult to
build based on extracted information, but several techniques can be used to make planning less of a hit or
miss scenario and more of an educated guess. An intelligence officer can use intelligence assets at their
disposal, either signal or human, to construct a canvas on an operating area. Planning officers should use
this information to plan either kinetic or static operations using the organic intelligence assets consulted to
perform this survey. Using organic assets carefully i.e. not burning them out, will create benefits in the
long run after networks are completed and disassembling of insurgent populations is in motion.
The position stage can be used in the general cycle method or in a current situation meaning if a unit
comes upon a situation in which the position phase is in place and the preserve stage has not been
accomplished. An example of this would be a hasty unit move upon a strongpoint seizing tactical
advantage. If a platoon size element has the chance to capture a key ridge upon ISR (Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) analysis of enemy forces, that element will move, and then the
planning process will begin a position with the weapons systems (organic weapons, wife support, etc.) or
ISR assets currently in the area. The position phase is implemented through active posturing. Examples of
active posturing can be: staging air mobile assets, confirming an ISR matrix, or preparing a foot patrol for
movement. Positioning is simple only if the appropriate enablers are either organic to the controlling unit,
are requested in advance, or not necessary due to any factor.
The proact stage is mostly about giving the elements on the ground (or air) the correct tools to be
successful. These tools should come from planning shops. Being proactive in the context of the Pentagon
Plan means making operational graphics and emplacing specific assets for either current action or afteraction collection. These operational graphics should consist of some sort of grid reference guide. This
reference guide will be an actual classified imagery shot of the location with military grid reference
identifiers. This graphic will enable linkup of the tactical element on the ground, provide extremely
advanced situational awareness for the command element, and enable air to ground interaction to an
extremely high degree. Another significant element to the proact stage is the intelligence setup of assets,
and making sure that those assets are set to receive data to continue a planning cycle. Establishing assets
to take advantage of the results of the planned operation is crucial to receive follow on intelligence. A
common way to establish this is to change the direction of intelligence assets and re-route ISR elements to
support a particular mission, even if the tasking for that asset was not included in the planning phase. Not
every mission will result in success, but those that can stir up the enemy, will provide the intelligence for
the mission that does result in success.
The provide is the most straightforward and varies between units and assets. Conducting an action on
objective well depends on the organic assets to the element. For example, an infantry battalion will often
use air assets to travel to a location, or they may use light vehicles and dismount towards the objective. A
kinetic operation may use a solely lethal force coming from an unmanned drone or manned tactical
aircraft. A planner must take into account collateral damage estimates, how the target fits into the overall
network, and the availability of non-organic assets if needed. The reason why this stage is referred to as
Provide, and not kill, or action, is that Provide can cover the non-lethal spectrum as well. Units
on a battlefield can use the provide stage to deliver a highly specialized type of food to a targeted
impoverished area or build a civic project such as a well, sewer system, or bridge. Implementing these

types of operations may be easier than a kinetic strike operation, but just as important.
The key aspect to take away from the pentagon plan is not the name or the specific instances in which it is
used; the key is that it is a malleable planning process that can involve everyone and start at any stage in
an operation. Often units may get involved in a plan of higher echelons late in the planning process, and if
those two plans from each echelon are synced then hopefully no data will be lost or catch-up on planning
needed. F3EA and D3A are great for what they do but a flexible plan across all echelons for all planners
may be a way to go, especially in a military where manpower could be severely limited in the coming
years.

About the Author

Brandon C. Miller
Brandon C. Miller is a civilian All-Source Intelligence Analyst. His past experience
includes Non-Commissioned Officer experience in the 10th Mountain Division with
deployments to Hawijah, Iraq in 2007-08, and Kunduz, Afghanistan in 2010.
Brandon currently works in the field of counter-terrorism. Special thanks to
Benjamin York, PMP and LTC Christina Bloss, for editorial review.

Available online at : http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/malleable-coin-targeting

Links:
{1} http://smallwarsjournal.com/author/brandon-c-miller
{2} http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/f3ead-opsintel-fusion-%E2%80%9Cfeeds%E2%80%9D-the-softargeting-process
{3} http://pmesii.dm2research.com/wiki/index.php/Main_Page
{4} http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-targeting-process-d3a-and-f3ead
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