Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46930 June 10, 1988
DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR, petitioners,
vs.
HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance
of Zambales, Olongapo City, ANTHONY M. ROSSI and RALPH L. WYERS, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the petitioners were performing
their official duties when they did the acts for which they have been sued for damages by the
private respondents. Once this question is decided, the other answers will fall into place and
this petition need not detain us any longer than it already has.
Petitioner Sanders was, at the time the incident in question occurred, the special services
director of the U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City. 1 Petitioner Moreau was the
commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base, which includes the said station. 2 Private
respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence in the Philippines, 3 as so was
private respondent Wyer, who died two years ago. 4 They were both employed as gameroom
attendants in the special services department of the NAVSTA, the former having been hired in
1971 and the latter in 1969. 5
On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been
converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time, effective October 18,
1975. 6 Their reaction was to protest this conversion and to institute grievance proceedings
conformably to the pertinent rules and regulations of the U.S. Department of Defense. The result
was a recommendation from the hearing officer who conducted the proceedings for the
reinstatement of the private respondents to permanent full-time status plus backwages. The
report on the hearing contained the observation that "Special Services management practices an
autocratic form of supervision." 7
In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau on May 17, 1976 (Annex "A" of the complaint),
Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report and asked for the rejection of the
abovestated recommendation. The letter contained the statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends
to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven,
according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and c)
"even though the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case with anyone, (they)
placed the records in public places where others not involved in the case could hear."
On November 7, 1975, before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter (Annex "B" of the
complaint) purportedly corning from petitioner Moreau as the commanding general of the
U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the
change of the private respondent's employment status and requesting concurrence
therewith. The letter did not carry his signature but was signed by W.B. Moore, Jr. "by
direction," presumably of Moreau.
On the basis of these antecedent facts, the private respondent filed in the Court of First
Instance of Olongapo City a for damages against the herein petitioners on November 8,
1976. 8 The plaintiffs claimed that the letters contained libelous imputations that had exposed
them to ridicule and caused them mental anguish and that the prejudgment of the grievance
proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights.

The private respondents made it clear that the petitioners were being sued in their private or
personal capacity. However, in a motion to dismiss filed under a special appearance, the
petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of
their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the
doctrine of state immunity.
After extensive written arguments between the parties, the motion was denied in an order
dated March 8, 1977, 9on the main ground that the petitioners had not presented any evidence
that their acts were official in nature and not personal torts, moreover, the allegation in the
complaint was that the defendants had acted maliciously and in bad faith. The same order issued
a writ of preliminary attachment, conditioned upon the filing of a P10,000.00 bond by the plaintiffs,
against the properties of petitioner Moreau, who allegedly was then about to leave the
Philippines. Subsequently, to make matters worse for the defendants, petitioner Moreau was
declared in a default by the trial court in its order dated August 9, 1977. The motion to lift the
default order on the ground that Moreau's failure to appear at the pre-trial conference was the
result of some misunderstanding, and the motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to
dismiss, which was filed by the petitioner's new lawyers, were denied by the respondent court on
September 7, 1977.
This petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction was thereafter filed before
this Court, on the contention that the above-narrated acts of the respondent court are tainted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
We return now to the basic question of whether the petitioners were acting officially or only in
their private capacities when they did the acts for which the private respondents have sued
them for damages.
It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being
sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law
of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the
mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability
for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority.
These well-settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local state but also
where the person sued in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the
present case.
The respondent judge, apparently finding that the complained acts were prima facie personal
and tortious, decided to proceed to trial to determine inter alia their precise character on the
strength of the evidence to be submitted by the parties. The petitioners have objected,
arguing that no such evidence was needed to substantiate their claim of jurisdictional
immunity. Pending resolution of this question, we issued a temporary restraining order on
September 26, 1977, that has since then suspended the proceedings in this case in the
courta quo.
In past cases, this Court has held that where the character of the act complained of can be
determined from the pleadings exchanged between the parties before the trial, it is not
necessary for the court to require them to belabor the point at a trial still to be conducted.
Such a proceeding would be superfluous, not to say unfair to the defendant who is subjected
to unnecessary and avoidable inconvenience.
Thus, in Baer v. Tizon, 10 we held that a motion to dismiss a complaint against the commanding
general of the Olongapo Naval Base should not have been denied because it had been
sufficiently shown that the act for which he was being sued was done in his official capacity on
behalf of the American government. The United States had not given its consent to be sued. It
was the reverse situation in Syquia v. Almeda Lopez," where we sustained the order of the lower
court granting a where we motion to dismiss a complaint against certain officers of the U.S.
armed forces also shown to be acting officially in the name of the American government. The

United States had also not waived its immunity from suit. Only three years ago, in United States
of America v. Ruiz, 12 we set aside the denial by the lower court of a motion to dismiss a complaint
for damages filed against the United States and several of its officials, it appearing that the act
complained of was governmental rather than proprietary, and certainly not personal. In these and
several other cases 13 the Court found it redundant to prolong the other case proceedings after it
had become clear that the suit could not prosper because the acts complained of were covered
by the doctrine of state immunity.

It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being
called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders,
as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over
its personnel, including the private respondents, and had a hand in their employment, work
assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed that the letter
he had written was in fact a reply to a request from his superior, the other petitioner, for more
information regarding the case of the private respondents. 14 Moreover, even in the absence of
such request, he still was within his rights in reacting to the hearing officer's criticismin effect a
direct attack against him-that Special Services was practicing "an autocratic form of
supervision."
As for Moreau,what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval Personnel for
concurrence with the conversion of the private respondents' type of employment even before
the grievance proceedings had even commenced. Disregarding for the nonce the question of
its timeliness, this act is clearly official in nature, performed by Moreau as the immediate
superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the
special services department of NAVSTA In fact, the letter dealt with the financial and
budgetary problems of the department and contained recommendations for their solution,
including the re-designation of the private respondents. There was nothing personal or
private about it.
Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that the
petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government.
As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it is
that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts.
Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the
payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their
personal capacities but by the United States government as their principal. This will require
that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation
of the necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit
against that government without its consent.
There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the
government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to' be sued. So we have
ruled not only in Baer but in many other decisions where we upheld the doctrine of state
immunity as applicable not only to our own government but also to foreign states sought to
be subjected to the jurisdiction of our courts. 15
The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal right
against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. 16 In the case of foreign
states, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states which wisely
admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex
the peace of nations." 17 Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section
2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from our previous charters that the Philippines "adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.
All this is not to say that in no case may a public officer be sued as such without the previous
consent of the state. To be sure, there are a number of well-recognized exceptions. It is clear
that a public officer may be sued as such to compel him to do an act required by law, as

where, say, a register of deeds refuses to record a deed of sale; 18or to restrain a Cabinet
member, for example, from enforcing a law claimed to be unconstitutional; 19 or to compel the
national treasurer to pay damages from an already appropriated assurance fund; 20 or the
commissioner of internal revenue to refund tax over-payments from a fund already available for
the purpose; 21 or, in general, to secure a judgment that the officer impleaded may satisfy by
himself without the government itself having to do a positive act to assist him. We have also held
that where the government itself has violated its own laws, the aggrieved party may directly
implead the government even without first filing his claim with the Commission on Audit as
normally required, as the doctrine of state immunity "cannot be used as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice." 22
This case must also be distinguished from such decisions as Festejo v. Fernando, 23 where
the Court held that a bureau director could be sued for damages on a personal tort committed by
him when he acted without or in excess of authority in forcibly taking private property without
paying just compensation therefor although he did convert it into a public irrigation canal. It was
not necessary to secure the previous consent of the state, nor could it be validly impleaded as a
party defendant, as it was not responsible for the defendant's unauthorized act.
The case at bar, to repeat, comes under the rule and not under any of the recognized
exceptions. The government of the United States has not given its consent to be sued for the
official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy any judgment that may be rendered against
them. As it is the American government itself that will have to perform the affirmative act of
appropriating the amount that may be adjudged for the private respondents, the complaint
must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court finds that, even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are
protected by the presumption of good faith, which has not been overturned by the private
respondents. Even mistakes concededly committed by such public officers are not actionable
as long as it is not shown that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting
to bad faith. 24 This, to, is well settled . 25 Furthermore, applying now our own penal laws, the
letters come under the concept of privileged communications and are not punishable, 26 let alone
the fact that the resented remarks are not defamatory by our standards. It seems the private
respondents have overstated their case.
A final consideration is that since the questioned acts were done in the Olongapo Naval
Base by the petitioners in the performance of their official duties and the private respondents
are themselves American citizens, it would seem only proper for the courts of this country to
refrain from taking cognizance of this matter and to treat it as coming under the internal
administration of the said base.
The petitioners' counsel have submitted a memorandum replete with citations of American
cases, as if they were arguing before a court of the United States. The Court is bemused by
such attitude. While these decisions do have persuasive effect upon us, they can at best be
invoked only to support our own jurisprudence, which we have developed and enriched on
the basis of our own persuasions as a people, particularly since we became independent in
1946.
We appreciate the assistance foreign decisions offer us, and not only from the United States
but also from Spain and other countries from which we have derived some if not most of our
own laws. But we should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them
as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions
through the employment of our own endowments We live in a different ambience and must
decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our qualities and
even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept of law and justice.
The private respondents must, if they are still sominded, pursue their claim against the
petitioners in accordance with the laws of the United States, of which they are all citizens and

under whose jurisdiction the alleged offenses were committed. Even assuming that our own
laws are applicable, the United States government has not decided to give its consent to be
sued in our courts, which therefore has not acquired the competence to act on the said
claim,.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders dated March 8,1977,
August 9,1977, and September 7, 1977, are SET ASIDE. The respondent court is directed to
DISMISS Civil Case No. 2077-O. Our Temporary restraining order of September 26,1977, is
made PERMANENT. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Sanders v. Veridiano (Case Digest)

Constitutional Law. Political Law. Doctrine of State Immunity.
Sanders v. Veridano
GR No. L-46930; June 10, 1988
FACTS:
Petitioner Dale Sanders was the special services of the US Naval Station
(NAVSTA) in Olongapo city. Private respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph
Wyers are American citizens permanently residing in the Philippines and
who were employed as gameroom attendants in the special services
department of NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the respondents were
advised that their employment had been converted from permanent fulltime to permanent part-time. In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau,
Sanders disagreed with the hearing officers report of the reinstatement
of private respondents to permanent full-time status plus backwages.
Respondents allege that the letters contained libellous imputations which
caused them to be ridiculed and thus filed for damages against
petitioners.
ISSUE:

1)

Were the petitioners acting officially or only in their private

capacities when they did the acts for which the private respondents sued
them for damages?
2)

Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the
petitioner are being called to account were performed by them in the
discharge of their official duties. Given the official character of the
letters, the petioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the
United States government. As such, the complaint cannot prosper unless
the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent
to be sued. The private respondents must pursue their claim against the
petitioners in accordance with the laws of the Unites States of which they
are all citizens and under whose jurisdiction the alleged offenses were
committed for the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the case.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 84607 March 19, 1993
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. RAMON MONTANO, GEN. ALFREDO LIM, GEN.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. EDGAR DULA TORRES, COL. CEZAR NAZARENO, MAJ.
FILEMON GASMEN, PAT. NICANOR ABANDO, PFC SERAFIN CEBU, JR., GEN. BRIGIDO
PAREDES, COL. ROGELIO MONFORTE, PFC ANTONIO LUCERO, PAT. JOSE
MENDIOLA, PAT. NELSON TUASON, POLICE CORPORAL PANFILO ROGOS, POLICE LT.
JUAN B. BELTRAN, PAT. NOEL MANAGBAO, MARINE THIRD CLASS TRAINEE (3CT)
NOLITO NOGATO, 3CT ALEJANDRO B. NAGUIO, JR., EFREN ARCILLAS, 3CT AGERICO
LUNA, 3CT BASILIO BORJA, 3CT MANOLITO LUSPO, 3CT CRISTITUTO GERVACIO, 3CT
MANUEL DELA CRUZ, JR., MARINE (CDC) BN., (CIVIL DISTURBANCE CONTROL),
MOBILE DISPERSAL TEAM (MDT), LT. ROMEO PAQUINTO, LT. LAONGLAANG GOCE,
MAJ. DEMETRIO DE LA CRUZ, POLICE CAPTAIN RODOLFO NAVAL, JOHN DOE,
RICHARD DOE, ROBERTO DOE AND OTHER DOES, petitioners,
vs.

HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, ERLINDA C.
CAYLAO, ANATALIA ANGELES PEREZ, MYRNA BAUTISTA, CIPRIANA EVANGELIO,
ELMA GRAMPA, AMELIA GUTIERREZ, NEMESIO LAKINDANUM, PURITA YUMUL,
MIGUEL ARABE, TERESITA ARJONA, RONALDO CAMPOMANES AND CARMENCITA
ARDONI VDA. DE CAMPOMANES, ROGELIO DOMUNICO, in their capacity as heirs of the
deceased (ROBERTO C. CAYLAO, SONNY "BOY" PEREZ, DIONESIO BAUTISTA, DANTE
EVANGELIO, ADELFA ARIBE, DANILO ARJONA, VICENTE CAMPOMANES, RONILO
DOMUNICO) respectively; and (names of sixty-two injured victims) EDDIE AGUINALDO,
FELICISIMO ALBASIA, NAPOLEON BAUTISTA, DANILO CRUZ, EDDIE MENSOLA,
ALBERT PITALBO, VICENTE ROSEL, RUBEN CARRIEDO, JOY CRUZ, HONORIO
LABAMBA, JR., EFREN MACARAIG, SOLOMON MANALOTO, ROMEO DURAN, NILO
TAGUBAT, JUN CARSELLAR, JOEY CLEMENTE, GERARDO COYOCA, LUISITO DACO,
BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, ARTHUR FONTANILLA, WILSON GARCIA, CARLOS SIRAY,
JOSE PERRAS, TOMAS VALLOS, ARNOLD ENAJE, MARIANITA DIMAPILIS, FRANCISCO
ANGELES, MARCELO ESGUERRA, JOSE FERRER, RODEL DE GUIA, ELVIS MENDOZA,
VICTORIANO QUIJANO, JOEY ADIME, RESIENO ADUL, ALBERTO TARSONA, CARLOS
ALCANTARA, MAMERTO ALIAS, EMELITO ALMONTE, BENILDA ALONUEVO, EMMA
ABADILLO, REYNALDO CABALLES, JR., JAIME CALDETO, FABIAN CANTELEJO,
RODRIGO CARABARA, ENRIQUE DELGADO, JUN DELOS SANTOS, MARIO
DEMASACA, FRANCISCO GONZALES, ERNESTO GONZALES, RAMIRO JAMIL, JUAN
LUCENA, PERLITO SALAYSAY, JOHNNY SANTOS, MARCELO SANTOS, EMIL SAYAO,
BAYANI UMALI, REMIGIO MAHALIN, BONG MANLULO, ARMANDO MATIENZO, CARLO
MEDINA, LITO NOVENARIO, and ROSELLA ROBALE, respondents.
G.R. No. 84645 March 19, 1993
ERLINDA C. CAYLAO, ANATALIA ANGELES PEREZ, MYRNA BAUTISTA, CIPRIANA
EVANGELIO, ELMA GRAMPA, AMELIA GUTIERREZ, NEMESIO LAKINDANUM, PURITA
YUMUL, MIGUEL ARABE, TERESITA ARJONA, RONALDO CAMPOMANES AND
CARMENCITA ARDONI VDA. DE CAMPOMANES, ROGELIO DOMUNICO, in their capacity
as heirs of the deceased (ROBERTO C. CAYLAO, SONNY "BOY" PEREZ, DIONESIO
GRAMPA, ANGELITO GUTIERREZ, BERNABE LAKINDANUM, ROBERTO YUMUL,
LEOPOLDO ALONZO, ADELFA ARIBE, DANILO ARJONA, VICENTE CAMPOMANES,
RONILO DOMUNICO) respectively; and (names of sixty-two injured victims) EDDIE
AGUINALDO, FELICISIMO ALBASIA, NAPOLEON BAUTISTA, DANILO CRUZ, EDDIE
MENSOLA, ALBERT PITALBO, VICENTE ROSEL, RUBEN CARRIEDO, JOY CRUZ,
HONORIO LABAMBA, JR. EFREN MACARAIG, SOLOMON MANALOTO, ROMEO DURAN,
NILO TAGUBAT, JUN CARSELLAR, JOEY CLEMENTE, GERARDO COYOCA, LUISITO
DACO, BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, ARTHUR FONTANILLA, WILSON GARCIA, CARLOS
SIRAY, JOSE PERRAS TOMAS VALLOS, ARNOLD ENAJE, MARIANITA DIMAPILIS,
FRANCISCO ANGELES, MARCELO ESGUERRA, JOSE FERRER, RODEL DE GUIA,
ELVIS MENDOZA, VICTORINO QUIJANO, JOEY ADIME, RESIENO ADUL, ALBERTO
TARSONA, CARLOS ALCANTARA, MAMERTO ALIAS, EMELITO ALMONTE, BENILDA
ALONUEVO, EMMA ABADILLO, REYNALDO CABALLES, JR., JAIME CALDETO, FABIAN
CANTELEJO, RODRIGO CARABARA, ENRIQUE DELGADO, JUN DELOS SANTOS,
MARIO DEMASACA, FRANCISCO GONZALES, ERNESTO GONZALES, RAMIRO JAMIL,
JUAN LUCENA, PERLITO SALAYSAY, JOHNNY SANTOS, MARCELO SANTOS, EMIL
SAYAO, BAYANI UMALI, REMIGIO MAHALIN, BONG MANLULO, ARMANDO MATIENZO,
CARLO MEDINA, LITO NOVENARIO, ROSELLA ROBALE, petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HONORABLE EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, respondents.
The Solicitor General for the Republic of the Philippines.
Structural Alternative Legal Assistance for Grassroots for petitioners in 84645 & private
respondents in 84607.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

People may have already forgotten the tragedy that transpired on January 22, 1987. It is
quite ironic that then, some journalists called it a Black Thursday, as a grim reminder to the
nation of the misfortune that befell twelve (12) rallyists. But for most Filipinos now, the
Mendiola massacre may now just as well be a chapter in our history books. For those
however, who have become widows and orphans, certainly they would not settle for just that.
They seek retribution for the lives taken that will never be brought back to life again.
Hence, the heirs of the deceased, together with those injured (Caylao group), instituted this
petition, docketed as G.R. No. 84645, under Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Orders of respondent Judge Sandoval, 1 dated
May 31 and August 8, 1988, dismissing the complaint for damages of herein petitioners against
the Republic of the Philippines in Civil Case No. 88-43351.
Petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines, through a similar remedy, docketed as G.R. No.
84607, seeks to set aside the Order of respondent Judge dated May 31, 1988, in Civil Case
No. 88-43351 entitled "Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al."
The pertinent portion of the questioned Order 2 dated May 31, 1988, reads as follows:
With respect however to the other defendants, the impleaded Military
Officers, since they are being charged in their personal and official capacity,
and holding them liable, if at all, would not result in financial responsibility of
the government, the principle of immunity from suit can not conveniently and
correspondingly be applied to them.
WHEREFORE, the case as against the defendant Republic of the Philippines
is hereby dismissed. As against the rest of the defendants the motion to
dismiss is denied. They are given a period of ten (10) days from receipt of
this order within which to file their respective pleadings.
On the other hand, the Order 3, dated August 8, 1988, denied the motions filed by both parties,
for a reconsideration of the abovecited Order, respondent Judge finding no cogent reason to
disturb the said order.
The massacre was the culmination of eight days and seven nights of encampment by
members of the militant Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KMP) at the then Ministry (now
Department) of Agrarian Reform (MAR) at the Philippine Tobacco Administration Building
along Elliptical Road in Diliman, Quezon City.
The farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what they called "genuine
agrarian reform". The KMP, led by its national president, Jaime Tadeo, presented their
problems and demands, among which were: (a) giving lands for free to farmers; (b) zero
retention of lands by landlords; and (c) stop amortizations of land payments.
The dialogue between the farmers and the MAR officials began on January 15, 1987. The
two days that followed saw a marked increase in people at the encampment. It was only on
January 19, 1987 that Jaime Tadeo arrived to meet with then Minister Heherson Alvarez,
only to be informed that the Minister can only meet with him the following day. On January
20, 1987, the meeting was held at the MAR conference room. Tadeo demanded that the
minimum comprehensive land reform program be granted immediately. Minister Alvarez, for
his part, can only promise to do his best to bring the matter to the attention of then President
Aquino, during the cabinet meeting on January 21, 1987.

Tension mounted the following day. The farmers, now on their seventh day of encampment,
barricaded the MAR premises and prevented the employees from going inside their offices.
They hoisted the KMP flag together with the Philippine flag.
At around 6:30 p.m. of the same day, Minister Alvarez, in a meeting with Tadeo and his
leaders, advised the latter to instead wait for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and just
allow the government to implement its comprehensive land reform program. Tadeo, however,
countered by saying that he did not believe in the Constitution and that a genuine land
reform cannot be realized under a landlord-controlled Congress. A heated discussion ensued
between Tadeo and Minister Alvarez. This notwithstanding, Minister Alvarez suggested a
negotiating panel from each side to meet again the following day.
On January 22, 1987, Tadeo's group instead decided to march to Malacaang to air their
demands. Before the march started, Tadeo talked to the press and TV media. He uttered
fiery words, the most telling of which were:
". . . inalis namin ang barikada bilang kahilingan ng ating Presidente, pero kinakailangan
alisin din niya ang barikada sa Mendiola sapagkat bubutasin din namin iyon at dadanak ang
dugo . . . ." 4
The farmers then proceeded to march to Malacaang, from Quezon Memorial Circle, at
10:00 a.m. They were later joined by members of other sectoral organizations such as the
Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), League of Filipino
Students (LFS) and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Lungsod (KPML).
At around 1:00 p.m., the marchers reached Liwasang Bonifacio where they held a brief
program. It was at this point that some of the marchers entered the eastern side of the Post
Office Building, and removed the steel bars surrounding the garden. Thereafter, they joined
the march to Malacaang. At about 4:30 p.m., they reached C.M. Recto Avenue.
In anticipation of a civil disturbance, and acting upon reports received by the Capital
Regional Command (CAPCOM) that the rallyists would proceed to Mendiola to break
through the police lines and rush towards Malacaang, CAPCOM Commander General
Ramon E. Montao inspected the preparations and adequacy of the government forces to
quell impending attacks.
OPLAN YELLOW (Revised) was put into effect. Task Force Nazareno under the command of
Col. Cesar Nazareno was deployed at the vicinity of Malacaang. The civil disturbance
control units of the Western Police District under Police Brigadier General Alfredo S. Lim
were also activated.
Intelligence reports were also received that the KMP was heavily infiltrated by CPP/NPA
elements and that an insurrection was impending. The threat seemed grave as there were
also reports that San Beda College and Centro Escolar University would be forcibly
occupied.
In its report, the Citizens' Mendiola Commission (a body specifically tasked to investigate the
facts surrounding the incident, Commission for short) stated that the government anti-riot
forces were assembled at Mendiola in a formation of three phalanges, in the following
manner:
(1) The first line was composed of policemen from police stations Nos. 3, 4,
6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 and the Chinatown detachment of the Western Police
District. Police Colonel Edgar Dula Torres, Deputy Superintendent of the
Western Police District, was designated as ground commander of the CDC
first line of defense. The WPD CDC elements were positioned at the
intersection of Mendiola and Legarda Streets after they were ordered to
move forward from the top of Mendiola bridge. The WPD forces were in khaki

uniform and carried the standard CDC equipment aluminum shields,

truncheons and gas masks.
(2) At the second line of defense about ten (10) yards behind the WPD
policemen were the elements of the Integrated National Police (INP) Field
Force stationed at Fort Bonifacio from the 61st and 62nd INP Field Force,
who carried also the standard CDC equipment truncheons, shields and
gas masks. The INP Field Force was under the command of Police Major
Demetrio dela Cruz.
(3) Forming the third line was the Marine Civil Disturbance Control Battalion
composed of the first and second companies of the Philippine Marines
stationed at Fort Bonifacio. The marines were all equipped with shields,
truncheons and M-16 rifles (armalites) slung at their backs, under the
command of Major Felimon B. Gasmin. The Marine CDC Battalion was
positioned in line formation ten (10) yards farther behind the INP Field Force.
At the back of the marines were four (4) 6 x 6 army trucks, occupying the
entire width of Mendiola street, followed immediately by two water cannons,
one on each side of the street and eight fire trucks, four trucks on each side
of the street. The eight fire trucks from Fire District I of Manila under Fire
Superintendent Mario C. Tanchanco, were to supply water to the two water
cannons.
Stationed farther behind the CDC forces were the two Mobile Dispersal
Teams (MDT) each composed of two tear gas grenadiers, two spotters, an
assistant grenadier, a driver and the team leader.
In front of the College of the Holy Spirit near Gate 4 of Malacaang stood the
VOLVO Mobile Communications Van of the Commanding General of
CAPCOM/INP, General Ramon E. Montao. At this command post, after
General Montao had conferred with TF Nazareno Commander, Colonel
Cezar Nazareno, about the adequacy and readiness of his forces, it was
agreed that Police General Alfredo S. Lim would designate Police Colonel
Edgar Dula Torresand Police Major Conrado Francisco as negotiators with
the marchers. Police General Lim then proceeded to the WPD CDC elements
already positioned at the foot of Mendiola bridge to relay to Police Colonel
Torres and Police Major Francisco the instructions that the latter would
negotiate with the marchers. 5 (Emphasis supplied)
The marchers, at around 4:30 p.m., numbered about 10,000 to 15,000. From C.M. Recto
Avenue, they proceeded toward the police lines. No dialogue took place between the
marchers and the anti-riot squad. It was at this moment that a clash occurred and, borrowing
the words of the Commission "pandemonium broke loose". The Commission stated in its
findings, to wit:
. . . There was an explosion followed by throwing of pillboxes, stones and
bottles. Steel bars, wooden clubs and lead pipes were used against the
police. The police fought back with their shields and truncheons. The police
line was breached. Suddenly shots were heard. The demonstrators
disengaged from the government forces and retreated towards C.M. Recto
Avenue. But sporadic firing continued from the government forces.
After the firing ceased, two MDTs headed by Lt. Romeo Paquinto and Lt.
Laonglaan Gocesped towards Legarda Street and lobbed tear gas at the
remaining rallyist still grouped in the vicinity of Mendiola. After dispersing the
crowd, the two MDTs, together with the two WPD MDTs, proceeded to

Liwasang Bonifacio upon order of General Montao to disperse the rallyists

assembled thereat. Assisting the MDTs were a number of policemen from the
WPD, attired in civilian clothes with white head bands, who were armed with
long firearms. 6(Emphasis ours)
After the clash, twelve (12) marchers were officially confirmed dead, although according to
Tadeo, there were thirteen (13) dead, but he was not able to give the name and address of
said victim. Thirty-nine (39) were wounded by gunshots and twelve (12) sustained minor
injuries, all belonging to the group of the marchers.
Of the police and military personnel, three (3) sustained gunshot wounds and twenty (20)
suffered minor physical injuries such as abrasions, contusions and the like.
In the aftermath of the confrontation, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Administrative Order No. 11, 7 (A.O. 11, for brevity) dated January 22, 1987, which created the
Citizens' Mendiola Commission. The body was composed of retired Supreme Court Justice
Vicente Abad Santos as Chairman, retired Supreme Court Justice Jose Y. Feria and Mr. Antonio
U. Miranda, both as members. A.O. 11 stated that the Commission was created precisely for the
"purpose of conducting an investigation of the disorder, deaths, and casualties that took place in
the vicinity of Mendiola Bridge and Mendiola Street and Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the
afternoon of January 22, 1987". The Commission was expected to have submitted its findings not
later than February 6, 1987. But it failed to do so. Consequently, the deadline was moved to
February 16, 1987 by Administrative Order No. 13. Again, the Commission was unable to meet
this deadline. Finally, on February 27, 1987, it submitted its report, in accordance with
Administrative Order No. 17, issued on February 11, 1987.
In its report, the Commission recapitulated its findings, to wit:
(1) The march to Mendiola of the KMP led by Jaime Tadeo, together with the
other sectoral groups, was not covered by any permit as required under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985, in violation of
paragraph (a) Section 13, punishable under paragraph (a), Section 14 of said
law.
(2) The crowd dispersal control units of the police and the military were
armed with .38 and .45 caliber handguns, and M-16 armalites, which is a
prohibited act under paragraph 4(g), Section 13, and punishable under
paragraph (b), Section 14 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880.
(3) The security men assigned to protect the WPD, INP Field Force, the
Marines and supporting military units, as well as the security officers of the
police and military commanders were in civilian attire in violation of
paragraph (a), Section 10, Batas Pambansa 880.
(4) There was unnecessary firing by the police and military crowd dispersal
control units in dispersing the marchers, a prohibited act under paragraph (e),
Section 13, and punishable under paragraph (b), Section 14, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 880.
(5) The carrying and use of steel bars, pillboxes, darts, lead pipe, wooden
clubs with spikes, and guns by the marchers as offensive weapons are
prohibited acts punishable under paragraph (g), Section 13, and punishable
under paragraph (e), Section 14 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880.
(6) The KMP farmers broke off further negotiations with the MAR officials and
were determined to march to Malacaang, emboldened as they are, by the
inflammatory and incendiary utterances of their leader, Jaime Tadeo

"bubutasin namin ang barikada . . Dadanak and dugo . . . Ang nagugutom na

magsasaka ay gagawa ng sariling butas. . .
(7) There was no dialogue between the rallyists and the government forces.
Upon approaching the intersections of Legarda and Mendiola, the marchers
began pushing the police lines and penetrated and broke through the first line
of the CDC contingent.
(8) The police fought back with their truncheons and shields. They stood their
ground but the CDC line was breached. There ensued gunfire from both
sides. It is not clear who started the firing.
(9) At the onset of the disturbance and violence, the water cannons and tear
gas were not put into effective use to disperse the rioting crowd.
(10) The water cannons and fire trucks were not put into operation because
(a) there was no order to use them; (b) they were incorrectly prepositioned;
and (c) they were out of range of the marchers.
(11) Tear gas was not used at the start of the disturbance to disperse the
rioters. After the crowd had dispersed and the wounded and dead were being
carried away, the MDTs of the police and the military with their tear gas
equipment and components conducted dispersal operations in the Mendiola
area and proceeded to Liwasang Bonifacio to disperse the remnants of the
marchers.
(12) No barbed wire barricade was used in Mendiola but no official reason
was given for its absence. 8
From the results of the probe, the Commission recommended 9 the criminal prosecution of four
unidentified, uniformed individuals, shown either on tape or in pictures, firing at the direction of
the marchers. In connection with this, it was the Commission's recommendation that the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) be tasked to undertake investigations regarding the identities of
those who actually fired their guns that resulted in the death of or injury to the victims of the
incident. The Commission also suggested that all the commissioned officers of both the Western
Police District and the INP Field Force, who were armed during the incident, be prosecuted for
violation of paragraph 4(g) of Section 13, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of
1985. The Commission's recommendation also included the prosecution of the marchers, for
carrying deadly or offensive weapons, but whose identities have yet to be established. As for
Jaime Tadeo, the Commission said that he should be prosecuted both for violation of paragraph
(a), Section 13, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 for holding the rally without a permit and for violation of
Article 142, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code for inciting to sedition. As for the following
officers, namely: (1) Gen. Ramon E. Montao; (2) Police Gen. Alfredo S. Lim; (3) Police Gen.
Edgar Dula Torres; (4) Police Maj. Demetrio dela Cruz; (5) Col. Cezar Nazareno; and (5) Maj.
Felimon Gasmin, for their failure to make effective use of their skill and experience in directing the
dispersal operations in Mendiola, administrative sanctions were recommended to be imposed.
The last and the most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the deceased
and wounded victims of the Mendiola incident to be compensated by the government. It was
this portion that petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in their claim for damages from the
government.
Notwithstanding such recommendation, no concrete form of compensation was received by
the victims. Thus, on July 27, 1987, herein petitioners, (Caylao group) filed a formal letter of
demand for compensation from the Government. 10 This formal demand was indorsed by the
office of the Executive Secretary to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) on August
13, 1987. The House Committee on Human Rights, on February 10, 1988, recommended the
expeditious payment of compensation to the Mendiola victims. 11

After almost a year, on January 20, 1988, petitioners (Caylao group) were constrained to
institute an action for damages against the Republic of the Philippines, together with the
military officers, and personnel involved in the Mendiola incident, before the trial court. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 88-43351.
On February 23, 1988, the Solicitor General filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
State cannot be sued without its consent. Petitioners opposed said motion on March 16,
1988, maintaining that the State has waived its immunity from suit and that the dismissal of
the instant action is contrary to both the Constitution and the International Law on Human
Rights.
Respondent Judge Sandoval, in his first questioned Order, dismissed the complaint as
against the Republic of the Philippines on the ground that there was no waiver by the State.
Petitioners (Caylao group) filed a Motion for Reconsideration therefrom, but the same was
denied by respondent judge in his Order dated August 8, 1988. Consequently, Caylao and
her co-petitioners filed the instant petition.
On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military officers and
personnel impleaded as defendants in the court below, filed its petition for certiorari.
Having arisen from the same factual beginnings and raising practically identical issues, the
two (2) petitions were consolidated and will therefore be jointly dealt with and resolved in this
Decision.
The resolution of both petitions revolves around the main issue of whether or not the State
has waived its immunity from suit.
Petitioners (Caylao group) advance the argument that the State has impliedly waived its
sovereign immunity from suit. It is their considered view that by the recommendation made
by the Commission for the government to indemnify the heirs and victims of the Mendiola
incident and by the public addresses made by then President Aquino in the aftermath of the
killings, the State has consented to be sued.
Under our Constitution the principle of immunity of the government from suit is expressly
provided in Article XVI, Section 3. The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty,
and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends. 12 It also rests on reasons of public policy that
public service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be
subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and consequently controlled in the uses and
dispositions of the means required for the proper administration of the government. 13
This is not a suit against the State with its consent.
Firstly, the recommendation made by the Commission regarding indemnification of the heirs
of the deceased and the victims of the incident by the government does not in any way mean
that liability automatically attaches to the State. It is important to note that A.O. 11 expressly
states that the purpose of creating the Commission was to have a body that will conduct an
"investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that took place." 14 In the exercise of its
functions, A.O. 11 provides guidelines, and what is relevant to Our discussion reads:
1 Its conclusions regarding the existence of probable cause for the
commission of any offense and of the persons probably guilty of the same
shall be sufficient compliance with the rules on preliminary investigation and
the charges arising therefrom may be filed directly with the proper court. 15
In effect, whatever may be the findings of the Commission, the same shall only serve as the
cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim. Therefore, the

Commission is merely a preliminary venue. The Commission is not the end in itself.
Whatever recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State immediately, such
recommendation not having become final and, executory. This is precisely the essence of it
being a fact-finding body.
Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may have done or said,
the same are not tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from suit. The
President's act of joining the marchers, days after the incident, does not mean that there was
an admission by the State of any liability. In fact to borrow the words of petitioners (Caylao
group), "it was an act of solidarity by the government with the people". Moreover, petitioners
rely on President Aquino's speech promising that the government would address the
grievances of the rallyists. By this alone, it cannot be inferred that the State has admitted any
liability, much less can it be inferred that it has consented to the suit.
Although consent to be sued may be given impliedly, still it cannot be maintained that such
consent was given considering the circumstances obtaining in the instant case.
Thirdly, the case does not qualify as a suit against the State.
Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are:

16

(1) When the Republic is sued by name;

(2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;
(3) When the, suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that
ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government.
While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the
government. Although the military officers and personnel, then party defendants, were
discharging their official functions when the incident occurred, their functions ceased to be
official the moment they exceeded their authority. Based on the Commission findings, there
was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of firearms. 17 Moreover, the
members of the police and military crowd dispersal units committed a prohibited act under B.P.
Blg. 880 18 as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers. 19
As early as 1954, this Court has pronounced that an officer cannot shelter himself by the
plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly
without authority. 20 Until recently in 1991, 21 this doctrine still found application, this Court saying
that immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a
privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. The military and police forces
were deployed to ensure that the rally would be peaceful and orderly as well as to guarantee the
safety of the very people that they are duty-bound to protect. However, the facts as found by the
trial court showed that they fired at the unruly crowd to disperse the latter.
While it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule that a sovereign state and
its political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts except when it has given its consent, it
cannot be invoked by both the military officers to release them from any liability, and by the
heirs and victims to demand indemnification from the government. The principle of state
immunity from suit does not apply, as in this case, when the relief demanded by the suit
requires no affirmative official action on the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge of
any obligation which belongs to the State in its political capacity, even though the officers or
agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the state and
as its agents and servants. 22 This Court has made it quite clear that even a "high position in the
government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another." 23

The inescapable conclusion is that the State cannot be held civilly liable for the deaths that
followed the incident. Instead, the liability should fall on the named defendants in the lower
court. In line with the ruling of this court in Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, 24 herein public officials,
having been found to have acted beyond the scope of their authority, may be held liable for
damages.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error and no grave abuse of discretion committed by
respondent Judge in issuing the questioned orders, the instant petitions are hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic vs. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124 (Case Digest)

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine

land reform program. There was a marchers-police confrontation which

resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and scores were wounded. As a result,
then

Pres.

Aquino

issued

AO

11

creating

the

Citizens

Mendiola

Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation. The most

significant recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs of the
deceased and wounded victims to be compensated by the government.
Based on such recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre filed
an action for damages against the Republic and the military/police officers
involved

in

the

incident.

Issues:
(1)
(2)

Whether
Whether

or
or

not
not

there
the

is

State

valid
is

waiver
liable

of

immunity

for

damages

Held: The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as
claimed

by

the

petitioners.

The

recommendation

made

by

the

Commission to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the victims does
not in any way mean that liability attaches to the State. AO 11 merely
states the purpose of the creation of the Commission and, therefore,
whatever is the finding of the Commission only serves as the basis for a
cause of action in the event any party decides to litigate the same. Thus,
the recommendation of the Commission does not in any way bind the
State.
The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who
allegedly were responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the
marchers acted beyond the scope of their authority. It is a settled rule
that the State as a person can commit no wrong. The military and police
officers who were responsible for the atrocities can be held personally
liable for damages as they exceeded their authority, hence, the acts
cannot be considered official.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5156

March 11, 1954

CARMEN FESTEJO, demandante-apelante,

vs.
ISAIAS FERNANDO, Director de Obras Publicas, demandado-apelado.
D. Eloy B. Bello en representacion de la apelante.
El Procurador General Sr. Pompeyo Diaz y el Procurador Sr. Antonio A. Torres en
representacion del apelado.
DIOKNO, J.:
Carmen Festejo, duea de unos terrenos azucareros, de un total de unas 9 hectareas y
media de superfice, demando a "Isaias Fernando Director, Bureau of public Works, que
como tal Director de Obras Publicas tiene a su cargo los sistemas y proyectos de irrigacion y
es el funcionario responsable de la construccion de los sistemas de irrigacion en el pais,"
alegando que
The defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without authority obtained
first from the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, without obtaining first a right of
way, and without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff, and against her express

objection unlawfully took possession of portions of the three parcels of land

described above, and caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on the portion of
the three parcels of land on or about the month of February 1951 the aggregate area
being 24,179 square meters to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff. ----- R. on
A., p. 3.
causando a ella variados daos y perjuicios. Pidio, en su consecuencia, sentencia
condenando el demandado:
. . . to return or cause to be returned the possession of the portions of land unlawfully
occupied and appropriated in the aggregate area of 24,179 square meters and to
return the land to its former condition under the expenses of the defendant. . . .
In the remote event that the portions of land unlawfully occupied and appropriated
can not be returned to the plaintiff, then to order the defendant to pay to the plaintiff
the sum of P19,343.20 as value of the portions totalling an area of 24,179 square
meters; ---- R. on A., p. 5.
y ademas a pagar P9,756.19 de daos y P5,000 de honorarios de abogado, con las costas
R. on A., pp. 5-6.
El demandado, por medio del Procurador General, presento mocion de sobreseimiento de la
demanda por el fundamento de que el Juzgado no tiene jurisdiccion para dictar sentencia
valida contra el, toda vez que judicialmente la reclamacion es contra la Republica de
Filipinas, y esta no ha presentado su consentimiento a la demanda. El Juzgado inferior
estimo la mocion y sobreseyo la demanda sin perjuicio y sin costas.
En apelacion, la demandante sostiene que fue un error considerar la demanda como una
contra la Republica y sobreseer en su virtud la demanda.
La mocion contra "Isaias Fernando, Director de Obras Publicas, encargado y responsable
de la construccion de los sistemas de irrigacion en Filipinas" es una dirigida personalmente
contra el, por actos que asumio ejecutar en su concepto oficial. La ley no le exime de
responsabilidad por las extralimitaciones que cometa o haga cometer en el desempeo de
sus funciones oficiales. Un caso semejante es el de Nelson vs. Bobcock (1933) 18 minn.
584, NW 49, 90 ALR 1472. Alli el Comisionado de Carreteras, al mejorar un trozo de la
carretera ocupo o se apropio de terrenos contiguos al derecho de paso. El Tribunal Supremo
del Estado declaro que espersonalmente responsable al dueo de los daos causados.
Declaro ademas que la ratificacion de lo que hicieron sus subordinados era equivalente a
una orden a los mismos. He aqui lo dijo el Tribunal.
We think the evidence and conceded facts permitted the jury in finding that in the
trespass on plaintiff's land defendant committed acts outside the scope of his
authority. When he went outside the boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiff's
land and damaged it or destroyed its former condition an dusefulness, he must be
held to have designedly departed from the duties imposed on him by law. There can
be no claim that he thus invaded plaintiff's land southeasterly of the right of way
innocently. Surveys clearly marked the limits of the land appropriated for the right of
way of this trunk highway before construction began. . . .
"Ratification may be equivalent to command, and cooperation may be inferred from
acquiescence where there is power to restrain." It is unnecessary to consider other
cases cited, . . ., for as before suggested, the jury could find or infer that, in so far as
there was actual trespass by appropriation of plaintiff's land as a dumping place for
the rock to be removed from the additional appropriated right of way, defendant
planned, approved, and ratified what was done by his subordinates.
Nelson vs. Bobcock, 90 A.L.R., 1472, 1476, 1477.
La doctrina sobre la responsabilidad civil de los funcionarios en casos parecidos se resume
como sigue:

Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable therefor, and
may be sued as any other citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage
results from his tortious act. 49 Am. Jur. 289.
. . . If an officer, even while acting under color of his office, exceeds the power
conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself under the plea that he is a public
agent. 43 Am. Jur. 86.
It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial,
or otherwise who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization
of law may thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. If he
exceed the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself by the plea that
he is a public agent acting under the color of his office, and not personally. In the eye
of the law, his acts then are wholly without authority. 43 Am. Jur. 89-90.
El articulo 32 del Codigo Civil dice a su vez:
ART. 32. Any public officer or emplyee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
xxx

xxx

xxx

In any of the cases referred to this article, whether or not the defendant's acts or
omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right ot commence
an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be
instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The inmdemnity shall include moral damages Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.
Veanse tambien Lung vs. Aldanese, 45 Phil., 784; Syquia vs. Almeda, No. L-1648,
Agosto 17, 1947; Marquez vs. Nelson, No. L-2412, Septiembre 1950.
Se revoca la orden apelada y se ordena la continuacion de la tramitacion de la demanda
conforme proveen los reglamentos. Sin especial pronunciamiento en cuanto a las costas.
Asi se ordena.
Padilla, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, MM., estan conformes.

Separate Opinions
CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:
To my mind, the allegations of the complaint lead to no other conclusion than that appellee
Isaias Fernando is a party in this case, not in his personal capacity, but as an officer of the
Government. According to said pleading the defendant is "Isaias Fernando, Director, Bureau
of Public Works." Moreover, in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint, it is alleged:
4. That the defendant as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, is in charge of
irrigation projects and systems, and the official responsible for the construction of
irrigation system in the Philippines;

5. That the defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without authority
obtained first from the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, without obtaining first a
right of way, and without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff, and against her
express objection, unlawfully took possession of portions of the three parcels of land
described above, and caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on the portion of
the three parcels of land on or about the month of February 1951 the aggregate area
being 24,179 square meters to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The emphasis thus placed upon the allegation that the acts complained of were performed
by said defendant "as Director of the Bureau of Public Works," clearly shows that the
designation of his office was included in the title of the case to indicate that he was being
sued in his official capacity. This conclusion is bolstered up by the fact that, among other
things, plaintiff prays, in the complaint, for a judgment
Ordering the defendant to return or caused to be returned the possession of the
portions of land unlawfully occupied and appropriated in the aggregate area of
24,179 square meters and to return the land to its former condition under the
expense of the defendant. (Paragraph a, of the complaint).
We take judicial notice of the fact that the irrigation projects and system reffered to in the
complaint of which the defendant, Isaias Fernando, according to the same pleading, is "in
charge" and for which he is "responsible" as Director of the Bureau of Public Works are
established and operated with public funds, which pursuant to the Constitution, must be
appropriated by law. Irrespective of the manner in which the construction may have been
undertaken by the Bureau of Public Works, the system or canal is, therefore, a property of
the Government. Consequently, in praying that possession of the portions of land occupied
by the irrigation canal involved in the present case be returned to plaintiff therein, and that
said land be restored to its former condition, plaintiff seeks to divest the Government of its
possession of said irrigation canal, and, what is worse, to cause said property of the
Government to be removed or destroyed. As held in Syquia vs. Lopez (47 Off. Gaz., 665),
the Government is, accordingly, "the real party in interest as defendant" in the case at bar. In
other words, the same partakes of the nature of a suit against the state and may not be
maintained without its consent.
Hence I am constrained to dissent.

Festejo v. Fernando (Case Digest)

Constitutional Law. Political Law. Doctrine of State Immunity.
FESTEJO v. FERNANDO
GR No. L-5156; March 11, 1954
FACTS:
The defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, took
possession of the three parcels of land on February 1951
without obtaining first a right of way, without consent and
knowledge of plaintiff, and against her express objection. The
petitioner demands that the lands be restored to its former
condition and the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P19, 343.20 for the unlawful taking possession of the

defendant.
ISSUE:
Is the defendant liable for the unlawful possession of the
lands?
HELD:
The evidence and conceded facts permitted the jury in finding
that in the trespass on plaintiffs land, defendant committed
acts outside the scope of his authority. There can be no claim
that he thus invaded plaintiffs land southeasterly of the right
of way innocently for the surveys clearly marked the limits of
the land appropriated for the right of way. It is a general rule
that an officer-executive, administrative, quasi-judicial,
ministerial, or otherwise who acts outside the scope of his
jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby
render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. He
cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent
acting under the color of his office and not personally.

Festejo v. Fernando (Case Digest)

Fact:
The defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without authority obtained first
from the CFI of Ilocos Sur, without obtaining first a right of way, and without the consent
and knowledge of the plaintiff, and against her express objection unlawfully took possession
of portions of the three parcels of land and caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on
the portion of the three parcels of land on to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff.
Issue:
w/n this is a suit against the state?

Held:
No, the evidence and conceded facts in finding that in the trespass on plaintiffs land
defendant committed acts outside the scope of his authority. When he went outside the
boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiffs land and damaged it or destroyed its former
condition and usefulness, he must be held to have designedly departed from the duties
imposed on him by law.
Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable therefore, and may
be sued as any other citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage results from
his tortuous act.
It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial, or
otherwise who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may
thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. If he exceed the power
conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting
under the color of his office, and not personally. In the eye of the law, his acts then are wholly
without authority.
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
Separate Opinions
CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:
To my mind, the allegations of the complaint lead to no other conclusion than that appellee
Isaias Fernando is a party in this case, not in his personal capacity, but as an officer of the
Government. According to said pleading the defendant is Isaias Fernando, Director, Bureau
of Public Works. Moreover, in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint, it is alleged:
That the defendant as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, is in charge of irrigation
projects and systems, and the official responsible for the construction of irrigation system in
the Philippines;
We take judicial notice of the fact that the irrigation projects and system reffered to in the
complaint of which the defendant, Isaias Fernando, according to the same pleading, is in
charge and for which he is responsible as Director of the Bureau of Public Works are
established and operated with public funds, which pursuant to the Constitution, must be
appropriated by law. Irrespective of the manner in which the construction may have been
undertaken by the Bureau of Public Works, the system or canal is, therefore, a property of the
Government.

US vs. Guinto (Consti1)

En Banc
Cruz, February 26,1990
Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against the state - Failure to raise
immunity as defense
Facts:

In the 4 consolidated suits, the USA moves to dismiss the cases on the
ground that they are in effect suits against it which it has not consented
On the first suit:
On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa
Area Exchange, US Air Force, solicited bids for barber services contracts
through its contracting officer James F. Shaw
Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto
T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar
Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private
respondents who claimed that he had made a bid for 4 facilities,
including the Civil Engineering Area which was not included in the
invitation to bid
The Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX), through its representatives
petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse, upon the private
respondents' complaint, explained that the Civil Engineering concession
had not been awarded to Dizon
But Dizon was alreayd operating this concession, then known as the
NCO club concession
On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court
below to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel the award
to Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to
allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to
continue operating the concessions pending litigation
Respondent court directed the individual petitioners to maintain the
status quo
On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and
opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that
the action was in effect a suit against USA which had not waived its nonsuability
On July 22, 1986, trial court denied the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction
On Oct. 10, 1988, trial court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss
On the second suit:
Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony
Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his
dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay
Air Station in Baguio City
It had been ascertained that Genove had poured urine into the soup
stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers
His dismissal was effected on March 5, 1986 by Col. David C. Kimball,
Commander of the 3rd Combat Support Group, PACAF Clark Air Force
Base
Genove filed a complaint in the RTC of Baguio
The defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved to dismiss
the complaint, alleging that Lamachia (the manager) as an officer of the
US Air Force was immune from suit for the acts done by him in his
official capacity; they argued that the suit was in effect against USA,
which had not given its consent to be sued

Motion was denied by respondent judge: although acting intially in their

official capacities, the defendants went beyond what their functions
called for; this brought them out of the protective mantle of whatever
immunities they may have had in the beginning
On the third suit:
Luis Bautisa, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O'Donnell,
an extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust
operation conducted by the individual petitioners Tomi J. King, Darrel D.
Dye and Stephen F. Bostick, officers of the US Air Force and special
agents of the Air Force of Special Investigators (AFOSI)
Bautista was dismissed from his employment as a result of the filing of
the charge
He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners,
claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed
Defendants alleged that they had only done their duty in the enforcement
of laws of the Philippines inside the American bases, pursuant to the RPUS Military Bases Agreement
The counsel for the defense invoked that the defendants were acting in
their official capacity; that the complaint was in effect a suit against the
US without its consent
Motion was denied by respondent judge: immunity under the Military
Bases Agreement covered only criminal and not civil cases; moreover, the
defendants had come under the jurisdiction of the court when they
submitted their answer
On the fourth suit:
Complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against the
petitioners (except USA)
According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed the,
and unleashed dogs on them
Defendants deny this and claim that the plaintiffs were arrested for theft
and were bitten by dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest
USA and the defendants argued that the suit was in effect a suit against
the United States which had not given its consent to be sued; that they
were also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done
by them in the performance of their official functions
Motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court: the acts cannot be
considered Acts of State, if they were ever admitted by the defendants
Issue:
Whether or not the suits above are in effect suits against United States of
America without its consent
In relation, whether or not the defendants are also immune from suit for
acting within their official functions.
Holding and Ratio:
1st suit: No. The barbershops concessions are commercial enterprises
operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the US Armed
forces. Petitioners cannot plead immunity. Case should be remanded to
the lower court.

2nd suit: No. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state
immunity. The restaurants are commercial enterprises. By entering into
the employment contract with Genove, it impliedly divested itself of its
sovereign immunity from suit. (However, the petitioners are only suable,
not liable.)
3rd suit: Yes. It is clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of
their official functions. For discharging their duties as agents of the US,
they cannot be directly impleaded for acts attributable to their principal,
which has not given its consent to be sued.
4th suit: The contradictory factual allegations deserve a closer study.
Inquiry must first be made by the lower court. Only after can it be known
in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 91359. September 25, 1992.]
VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC., Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE CHIEF OF PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY and PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY
SUPERVISORY UNIT FOR SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION AGENCIES (PCSUSIA),Respondents.
Franciso A. Lava, Jr. and Andresito X. Fornier for Petitioner.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY CHIEF AND THE PCSUSIA MAY NOT BE SUED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE STATE. The State may not be sued
without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution). Invoking this rule, the PC
Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that, being instrumentalities of the national government exercising a
primarily governmental function of regulating the organization and operation of private detective,
watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and agency (PC-SUSIA) may not
be sued without the Governments consent, especially in this case because VMPSIs complaint seeks
not only to compel the public respondents to act in a certain way, but worse, because VMPSI seeks
actual and compensatory damages in the sum of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the same
amount, and P200,000.00 as attorneys fees from said public respondents. Even if its action
prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not be enforced because the State did not
consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that purpose.
2. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC OFFICIAL MAY BE SUED IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY IF HE ACTS, AMONG
OTHERS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF HIS AUTHORITY; CASE AT BAR. A public official may sometimes
be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction (Shauf v. Court of Appeals, supra), however, since the acts for which the PC
Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed by them as part of
their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against
them in their private capacities.
3. ID.; ID.; CONSENT TO BE SUED MUST EMANATE FROM A LEGISLATIVE ACT. Waiver of the
States immunity from suit, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred, but must
be construed strictissimi juris (Republic v. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424). The consent of the State to be
sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence, from a legislative act, not from a mere
memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the public
respondents.
4. ID.; ID.; REASONS BEHIND. The state immunity doctrine rests upon reasons of public policy
and the inconvenience and danger which would flow from a different rule. "It is obvious that public
service would be hindered, and public safety endangered, if the supreme authority could be
subjected to suits at the instance of every citizen, and, consequently, controlled in the use and
disposition of the means required for the proper administration of the government" (Siren v. U.S.
Wall, 152, 19 L. ed. 129, as cited in 78 SCRA 477).

DECISION
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated August 11, 1989, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15990, entitled "The Chief of Philippine Constabulary (PC) and Philippine
Constabulary Supervisor Unit for Security and Investigation Agencies (PC-SUSIA) v. Hon. Omar U.
Amin and Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. (VMPSI)," lifting the writ of preliminary
injunction which the Regional Trial Court had issued to the PC-SUSIA enjoining them from
committing acts that would result in the cancellation or non-renewal of the license of VMPSI to
operate as a security agency.
chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

On March 28, 1988, VMPSI filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court at Makati, Metro Manila,
praying the court to:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"A. Forthwith issue a temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo, enjoining the
defendants, or any one acting in their place or stead, to refrain from committing acts that would
result in the cancellation or non-renewal of VMPSIs license;
"B. In due time, issue a writ of preliminary injunction to the same effect;
"C. Render decision and judgment declaring null and void the amendment of Section 4 of R.A. No.
5487, by PD No. 11 exempting organizations like PADPAO from the prohibition that no person shall
organize or have an interest in more than one agency, declaring PADPAO as an illegal organization
existing in violation of said prohibition, without the illegal exemption provided in PD No. 11;
declaring null and void Section 17 of R.A. No. 5487 which provides for the issuance of rules and
regulations in consultation with PADPAO, declaring null and void the February 1, 1982 directive of
Col. Sabas V. Edadas, in the name of the then PC Chief, requiring all private security
agencies/security forces such as VMPSI to join PADPAO as a prerequisite to secure/renew their
licenses, declaring that VMPSI did not engage in cut-throat competition in its contract with MWSS,
ordering defendants PC Chief and PC-SUSIA to renew the license of VMPSI; ordering the defendants
to refrain from further harassing VMPSI and from threatening VMPSI with cancellations or nonrenewal of license, without legal and justifiable cause; ordering the defendants to pay to VMPSI the
sum of P1,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages, P1,000,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P200,000.00 as attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and granting such further
or other reliefs to VMPSI as may be deemed lawful, equitable and just." (pp. 55-56, Rollo.)
The constitutionality of the following provisions of R.A. 5487 (otherwise known as the "Private
Security Agency Law"), as amended, is questioned by VMPSI in its complaint:
chanrobles.com .ph : virtual law library

"SECTION 4. Who may Organize a Security or Watchman Agency. Any Filipino citizen or a
corporation, partnership, or association, with a minimum capital of five thousand pesos, one
hundred per cent of which is owned and controlled by Filipino citizens may organize a security or
watchman agency: Provided, That no person shall organize or have an interest in, more than one
such agency except those which are already existing at the promulgation of this Decree: . . ." (As
amended by P.D. Nos. 11 and 100.)
"SECTION 17. Rules and Regulations by Chief, Philippine Constabulary. The Chief of the Philippine
Constabulary, in consultation with the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency
Operators, Inc. and subject to the provision of existing laws, is hereby authorized to issue the rules
and regulations necessary to carry out the purpose of this Act."
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VMPSI alleges that the above provisions of R.A. No. 5487 violate the provisions of the 1987
Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade, and tend
to favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators,
Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an interest in more than one security agency.
Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3, subparagraph (g) of the Modifying
Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and Private Security Licenses and Specifying
Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO issued by then PC Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, through
Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring that "all private security agencies/company security forces must
register as members of any PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region where their main offices
are located . . ." (pp. 5-6, Complaint in Civil Case No. 88-471). As such membership requirement in
PADPAO is compulsory in nature, it allegedly violates legal and constitutional provisions against
monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade.
chanroble s.com : virtual law library

On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which
fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of security service per day at
P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila (Annex B, Petition).
On June 29, 1987, Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of
cut-throat competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered to the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said customer lower than the
standard minimum rates provided in the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986.
PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO Committee on Discipline

recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of its license to operate a
security agency (Annex D, Petition).
The PC-SUSIA made similar findings and likewise recommended the cancellation of VMPSIs license
(Annex E, Petition).
As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI when it
requested one.
VMPSI wrote the PC Chief on March 10, 1988, requesting him to set aside or disregard the findings
of PADPAO and consider VMPSIs application for renewal of its license, even without a certificate of
membership from PADPAO (Annex F, Petition).
As the PC Chief did not reply, and VMPSIs license was expiring on March 31, 1988, VMPSI filed Civil
Case No. 88-471 in the RTC-Makati, Branch 135, on March 28, 1988 against the PC Chief and PCSUSIA. On the same date, the court issued a restraining order enjoining the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA
"from committing acts that would result in the cancellation or non-renewal of VMPSIs license"
(Annex G, Petition).
The PC chief and PC-SUSIA filed a "Motion to Dismiss, Opposition to the Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, and Motion to Quash the Temporary Restraining Order," on the grounds that
the case is against the State which had not given consent thereto and that VMPSIs license already
expired on March 31, 1988, hence, the restraining order or preliminary injunction would not serve
any purpose because there was no more license to be cancelled (Annex H, Petition). Respondent
VMPSI opposed the motion.
On April 18, 1988, the lower court denied VMPSIs application for a writ of preliminary injunction for
being premature because it "has up to May 31, 1988 within which to file its application for renewal
pursuant to Section 2 (e) of Presidential Decree No. 199, . . ." (p. 140, Rollo.).
chanrobles.com : virtual law library

On May 23, 1988, VMPSI reiterated its application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
because PC-SUSIA had rejected payment of the penalty for its failure to submit its application for
renewal of its license and the requirements therefor within the prescribed period in Section 2(e) of
the Revised Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 5487, as amended by P.D. 1919 (Annex M,
Petition).
On June 10, 1998, the RTC-Makati issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a bond of
P100,000.00, restraining the defendants, or any one acting in their behalf, from cancelling or
denying renewal of VMPSIs license, until further orders from the court.
The PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above order, but it was denied
by the court in its Order of August 10, 1988 (Annex R, Petition).
On November 3, 1988, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA sought relief by a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals.
On August 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted the petition. The dispositive portion of its
decision reads:
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph

"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is hereby
GRANTED, and the RTC-Makati, Branch 135, is ordered to dismiss the complaint filed by respondent
VMPSI in Civil Case No. 88-471, insofar as petitioners PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are concerned, for
lack of jurisdiction. The writ of preliminary injunction issued on June 10, 1988, is dissolved." (pp.
295-296, Rollo.)
VMPSI came to us with this petition for review.
The primary issue in this case is whether or not VMPSIs complaint against the PC Chief and PCSUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent.
The answer is yes.
The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution).
Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that, being instrumentalities of the national
government exercising a primarily governmental function of regulating the organization and
operation of private detective, watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and
agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be sued without the Governments consent, especially in this case
because VMPSIs complaint seeks not only to compel the public respondents to act in a certain way,
but worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory damages in the sum of P1,000,000.00,
exemplary damages in the same amount, and P200,000.00 as attorneys fees from said public
respondents. Even if its action prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not be enforced
because the State did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that purpose.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Thus did we hold in Shauf v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 713:

jgc:chanrobles.com .ph

"While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also

applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in
the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the
state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the
amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against
the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded." (Emphasis supplied.)
A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad
faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction (Shauf v. Court of Appeals, supra),
however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this
case, were performed by them as part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or
bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in their private capacities.
We agree with the observation of the Court of Appeals that the Memorandum of Agreement dated
May 12, 1986 does not constitute an implied consent by the State to be sued:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"The Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 was entered into by the PC Chief in relation to
the exercise of a function sovereign in nature. The correct test for the application of state immunity
is not the conclusion of a contract by the State but the legal nature of the act. This was clearly
enunciated in the case of United States of America v. Ruiz where the Hon. Supreme Court held:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus
be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into a business contract.
It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its functions. (136 SCRA 487, 492.)
"In the instant case, the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the PC Chief and PADPAO was
intended to professionalize the industry and to standardize the salaries of security guards as well as
the current rates of security services, clearly, a governmental function. The execution of the said
agreement is incidental to the purpose of R.A. 5487, as amended, which is to regulate the
organization and operation of private detective, watchmen or security guard agencies. (Emphasis
ours.)" (pp. 258-259, Rollo.)
Waiver of the States immunity from suit, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly
inferred, but must be construed strictissimi juris (Republic v. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424). The consent
of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence, from a legislative act, not
from a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the public respondents.
The state immunity doctrine rests upon reasons of public policy and the inconvenience and danger
which would flow from a different rule. "It is obvious that public service would be hindered, and
public safety endangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected to suits at the instance of
every citizen, and, consequently, controlled in the use and disposition of the means required for the
proper administration of the government" (Siren v. U.S. Wall, 152, 19 L. ed. 129, as cited in 78
SCRA 477). In the same vein, this Court in Republic v. Purisima (78 SCRA 470, 473) rationalized:

jgc:chanrobles.com .ph

"Nonetheless, a continued adherence to the doctrine of nonsuability is not to be deplored for as

against the inconvenience that may be cause [by] private parties, the loss of governmental
efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a
fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus
restricted. With the well known propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least
provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such
a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacles, could very well be imagined." (citing
Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic, 29 SCRA 598.)
cralawnad

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED and the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED in
toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.