Washingtonpost.

Newsweek Interactive, LLC

The Failed States Index

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Foreign Policy, No. 149 (Jul. - Aug., 2005), pp. 56-65
Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC
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TI
mmsA
1

m
Doinia

epbi

m Veeul
-itmla44
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Ecuado

About

that

are

in

POLICY
countries

live

people

of

danger

and

the

about

countries

in

In

collapse.

States

Failed

annual

the

billion

rank

Peace

Fundfor
go

U'

FOREIGN

Index,

to

thefirst

over

the

brink.

merica is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing

ones." That was the conclusion of the
2002 U.S. National Security Strategy.
For a country whose foreign policy in the 20th century was dominated by the struggles against powerful states such as Germany, Japan, and the Soviet
Union, the U.S. assessment is striking. Nor is the
United States alone in diagnosing the problem. U.N.
Kofi Annanhaswarnedthat "ignorSecretary-General
failed
states
creates
ing
problemsthat sometimescome
back to bite us." French PresidentJacques Chirac
2005, TheFundfor Peaceandthe CarnegieEndowCopyright
ment for InternationalPeace.All rightsreserved.FOREIGN
POLICYis a registeredtrademarkowned by the Carnegie
Endowmentfor InternationalPeace.
56

FOREIGN

POLICY

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Russia
Belarus
Bona

Azerbaijan

-Uzbksa
PV

Turkey

North

Iran

um

Saudi
vArabia
GuineaNigeri
Gabi,;

46

)mllr

mEJ i
9m

Bangladesh

'W,

Korea

m1

Phlipie

Soai
Kenya
Rwand

II1

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fteI

og

Angola

Tanz ia

II;

has spoken of "thethreatthat failed statescarryfor

the world's equilibrium."World leaders once worried about who was amassing power; now they
worry about the absence of it.
Failed states have made a remarkableodyssey
from the peripheryto the very center of global politics. During the Cold War, state failure was seen
through the prism of superpowerconflict and was
rarelyaddressedas a dangerin its own right. In the
1990s, "failedstates" fell largelyinto the province
of humanitarians and human rights activists,
althoughthey did beginto consumethe attentionof
the world's sole superpower,which led interventions in Somalia,Haiti, Bosnia,and Kosovo. For socalled foreign-policyrealists, however,these states
and the problems they posed were a distraction
from weightierissues of geopolitics.

Now, it seems, everybodycares. The dangerous

exports of failed states-whether international
terrorists, drug barons, or weapons arsenals-are
the subject of endless discussion and concern. For
all the newfound attention, however, there is still
uncertainty about the definition and scope of the
problem. How do you know a failed state when
you see one? Of course, a governmentthat has lost
control of its territory or of the monopoly on the
legitimate use of force has earned the label. But
there can be more subtle attributes of failure.
Some regimes, for example, lack the authority to
make collective decisions or the capacity to deliver public services. In other countries, the populace
may rely entirely on the black market, fail to pay
taxes, or engage in large-scale civil disobedience.
Outside intervention can be both a symptom of
JULY

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

IAUGUST

2005

57

The FailedStates Index

and a trigger for state collapse. A failed state may

be subject to involuntary restrictions of its sovereignty, such as political or economic sanctions, the
presence of foreign military forces on its soil, or
other military constraints, such as a no-fly zone.
How many states are at serious risk of statefailure?The WorldBankhas identifiedabout 30 "lowincome countries under stress," whereas Britain's
Department for International Development has
named 46 "fragile"statesof concern.A reportcommissioned by the CIAhas put the number of failing
states at about 20.
To presenta moreprecisepictureof the scopeand
implicationsof the problem,the Fund for Peace,an
independent research organization, and FOREIGN
haveconducteda globalrankingof weakand
POLICY
states.
failing
Using 12 social, economic, political,
and militaryindicators,we ranked60 statesin order
of theirvulnerabilityto violent internalconflict.(For
each indicator,the Fund for Peace computed scores
using softwarethat analyzeddata from tens of thousands of internationaland local media sourcesfrom
the last half of 2004. Fora completediscussionof the
12 indicators,pleasego to www.ForeignPolicy.com
or
The
index
www.fundforpeace.org.) resulting
provides

Th
Intetbe

n
h

ou

ig
n

ihih

2pltcl

Conflictmay be concentratedin local territories

seekingautonomy or secession(as in the Philippines
and Russia).In other countries,instabilitytakes the
form of episodic fighting,drug mafias, or warlords
dominatinglargeswathsof territory(asin Afghanistan,
Colombia, and Somalia). State collapse sometimes
happenssuddenly,but often the demiseof the state is
a slow and steadydeteriorationof socialand political
institutions(Zimbabweand Guineaare good examples). Somecountriesemergingfrom conflictmay be
on the mend but in danger of backsliding (Sierra
Leone and Angola). The World Bank found that,
withinfive years,half of all countriesemergingfrom
civilunrestfall backinto conflictin a cycleof collapse
(Haitiand Liberia).
The 10 most at-riskcountriesin the index have
alreadyshown clearsignsof statefailure.IvoryCoast,
a countrycut in half by civilwar,is the most vulnerable to disintegration;it would probably collapse completely if U.N.
peacekeepingforcespulledout. It is
followed by the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo,Sudan,Iraq,Somalia, Sierra Leone, Chad, Yemen,
Liberia,andHaiti.Theindexincludes
otherswhose instabilityis less wideincluding
ly acknowledged,
Bangladesh(17th),Guatemala(31st),
a profile of the new world disorderof the 21st cen- Egypt(38th), SaudiArabia(45th),and Russia(59th).
Weak states are most prevalent in Africa, but
tury and demonstratesthat the problemof weak and
than
states
is
far
more
serious
failing
generally they also appear in Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin
thought.About2 billionpeoplelive in insecurestates, America, and the Middle East. Experts have for
with varyingdegreesof vulnerabilityto widespread years discussed an "arc of instability"-an exprescivil conflict.
sion that came into use in the 1970s to refer to a
The instabilitythat the index diagnoseshas many "MuslimCrescent"extendingfrom Afghanistanto
faces. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo or the "Stans"in the southernpart of the formerSoviSomalia, state failure has been apparent for years, et Union. Our study suggests that the concept is
manifested by armed conflict, famine, disease out- too narrow.The geographyof weak states revealsa
breaks, and refugeeflows. In other cases, however, territorialexpanse that extends from Moscow to
instabilityis more elusive.Often, corrosiveelements Mexico City,far wider than an "arc"would suggest,
have not yet triggered open hostilities, and pres- and not limited to the Muslim world.
suresmay be bubblingjust below the surface.Large
The index does not provideany easy answersfor
stretchesof lawless territoryexist in many countries thoselookingto shoreup countrieson the brink.Elecin the index, but that territoryhas not always been tions are almost universallyregardedas helpful in
in open revolt against state institutions.
reducingconflict. However, if they are rigged, con-

2 billion
oftheworld's
About
peoplelivein
of
insecure
states,withvarying
degrees
towidespread
civilconflict.
vulnerability

58

FOREIGN

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Indicators

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
17
19
20
21
21
23
24
25
26
27
28
28
30
31
31
33
34
35
36
36
38
38
40
41
42
43
43
45
46
46
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

106.0
105.3
104.1
103.2
102.3
102.1
100.9
99.7
99.5
99.2
99.0
96.5
95.7
95.0
94.9
94.7
94.3
94.3
94.2
93.7
93.5
93.5
93.4
93.2
92.7
92.0
91.7
91.5
91.5
91.1
91.0
91.0
90.9
89.4
89.0
88.9
88.9
88.8
88.8
88.1
87.6
87.5
87.3
87.3
87.1
87.0
87.0
86.7
86.1
85.7
85.6
84.9
84.6
84.3
84.1
83.9
83.8
83.7
83.5
82.4

8.0
Coast
Ivory
Dem.Rep.oftheCongo i
Sudan
8.6
8.0
Iraq
Somalia
Sierra
Leone
Chad
8.0
Yemen
7.8
Liberia
Haiti
Afghanistan
Rwanda
North
Korea
8.0
Colombia
Zimbabwe
Guinea
8.4
Bangladesh
Burundi
Dominican
Republic
Central
African
Republic
Bosnia
andHerzegovina 7.0
Venezuela
8.0
Burma
Uzbekistan
6.5
Kenya
Bhutan
8.0
Uganda
Laos
Syria
8.7
Ethiopia
Guatemala
Tanzania
Guinea
8.0
Equatorial
Pakistan
5.0
Nepal
4.0
Paraguay
Lebanon
8.0
Egypt
Ukraine
6.0
Peru
Honduras
Mozambique
7.9
Angola
Belarus
7.6
Saudi
Arabia
Ecuador
Indonesia
8.6
Tajikistan
Turkey
8.0
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
6.0
Vietnam
8.6
Cameroon
7.2
Nigeria
Eritrea
8.0
7.0
Philippines
Iran
5.0
Cuba
5.0
Russia
Gambia
7.0

-I

8.0
i
[.
8.0
8.0
8.0
7.8
8.0
8.0
7.8
6.0
8.0
8.0
6.0
7.0
7.2

8.0
5.0

Instabilit

7.7

8.8

7.7

7.0

8.0

8.0

9.0

9.1

7.8

9.1

8.5

9.2

8.7

8.0

8.3

6.3

8.2

8.8

8.9

8.2

7.4

6.3

7.5
7.1
6.4
7.3
7.7
8.0
8.0
7.2
6.9
6.4
6.1
7.6
7.1

8.9
8.3
8.2
8.1
3.4
7.4
8.6
8.1

6.0
3.8

7.1
7.3
4.5
7.4
7.8

7.1

8.5
3.0

6.8
9.0

9.6
8.0

5.7
4.5

8.5

6.0
8.2

6.9

9.2

8.0

7.5

3.0

6.0
6.3
8.0
6.0

9.1
8.9

9.4
8.4

8.0

5.0
7.4
5.0
8.4

8.0
4.0
6.7
7.3

6.5

7.9

2.5

5.0
8.5
7.7
4.5
5.1
3.3
7.1
7.8
4.7
3.8
7.3
5.0
5.4
7.8
4.4
5.4
2.2
5.0
4.0
5.3
4.2
4.1
1.7
3.4
4.2
5.8
8.8
4.7
3.3
5.7
3.8
6.7

9.0
7.9
9.5
8.2

5.0
5.5
5.0
7.8
8.0
7.5
6.0
7.0
4.3
7.3
5.5
4.4
3.0
6.7
7.2
7.0
4.3
7.5
4.0
5.0
4.8
5.0
4.0
4.3
7.5
6.9
7.0
3.8
4.8
3.8
6.7
7.0

8.7
8.7
[i

6.8

5.7
7.6

8.0

6.3

8.0

8.0
8.0
8.0
7.6

6.8
6.7
5.5
6.9

6.8
8.3
8.0
5.7

6.7

6.3

8.8

8.0
8.0
6.0
7.2
6.0
5.0
8.0
5.0
8.0
8.0
7.0
7.0
6.0
8.0

7.5
6.0
7.4
7.6
6.3
6.9
5.6
6.9
7.5
7.8
6.9
6.6
5.3
5.7
6.3
7.0
7.8
5.6
6.3
6.2
7.3
6.0
6.7
5.6
5.1
6.5
5.4
6.5
7.3
6.3
7.5
5.4

6.8
7.3
7.5
6.7
9.0
8.0
4.0
8.3
7.1
5.0
8.8
9.0
9.0
3.8
2.4
8.8
6.9
8.9
6.7
5.0
5.8
9.0
8.5
8.6
8.7
4.0
8.2
6.0
5.4
2.3
4.0

8.0
8.8
8.1
7.5

7.0

[
8.4

7.0
8.5

l(

9.1

9.5

8.3

7.7

8.0
8.0

8.0
6.3
6.0
7.0
5.0
8.0
6.0
5.0
8.0
7.0
3.0
8.0
7.0
8.0
8.0
6.0
7.0

of

7.8
7.5
8.9
[
7.5
9.4
8.1
9.5
7.9
[
9.5
7.2

6.8

8.9
8.7
9.5
8.9
9.6
8.1
7.9
8.5
9.5
9.2
8.6

7.6
6.4
8.8
9.0
9.3
9.1
7.8
9.4
8.1

9.1
9.0
9.3
8.2
8.1
5.0
4.2
8.5
7.5
8.2
9.0

8.7
9.1
6.4
8.2
8.7
7.9
8.3
9.0
8.2
7.5
8.1
8.5
8.3

9.1

8.7

8.7

8.5
8.0
8.3

8.7

UlIU

8.1
8.0
7.5

8.6
9.4
9.4
7.9
8.5
8.0
8.9
8.0
9.2
7.9
9.2
8.7
8.6

7.0

9.2

7.8

8.7
7.2

6.3
7.0

6.5
7.8
8.2
5.0
8.3
5.4

8.4
6.0
8.0

7.3
II

8.4

8.2
7.3
9.1

8.1

8.0
8.0
7.6
l I
8.2
3.0
I

6.7
7.5
6.0
i

4.0
7.0
7.5

6.7
7.6
6.3
8.7
8.6
7.8
8.1
9.1
8.3
7.3
7.7
8.5
7.1
7.2
7.4
8.3
7.3
8.6
7.9
8.6

5.0
8.5
8.4
8.4
6.6
6.7
5.7
8.2
8.8
9.0
9.0
7.9

8.1
7.9
7.0

7.6
8.0
8.1
8.5
2.0
8.0
3.8
7.0
6.8
8.0
7.6
8.0
8.0
7.0
8.0
8.0
z W
5.0
7.0
7.3
7.6
6.0

8.2
8.9
9.1
7.5
9.3
8.0
8.7
9.2
8.2
9.1
8.9
9.1
8.2
8.1
9.4
8.3
8.6
8.8
9.5
9.1
9.6
9.6
6.4
8.2
8.3
9.2
9.2
9.1
8.6
9.2
8.3

7.4
6.0
4.0
7.1
5.0
8.5
6.7
6.0
5.0
6.8
7.0
6.0
5.0
8.8
7.5
5.4
4.0
5.0
5.0
7.0
7.0
7.5
7.2
5.0
4.5
5.0
4.0
6.1
6.3
4.0
6.0

JULYI AUGUST 2005

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59

The Failed States Index

ductedduringactivefighting,or attracta low turnout,

theycanbe ineffectiveor evenharmfulto stability.Electoral democracyappearsto have had only a modest
impacton the stabilityof statessuch as Iraq,Rwanda, Kenya,Venezuela,Nigeria,andIndonesia.Ukraine
ranksas highlyvulnerablein largepartbecauseof last
year'sdisputedelection.
What are the clearest early warning signs of a
failing state?Among the 12 indicatorswe use, two
consistentlyranknearthe top. Unevendevelopment
is high in almost all the states in the index, suggesting that inequality within states-and not merely
poverty-increases instability. Criminalizationor

Go1ing

delegitimization of the state, which occurs when

state institutionsare regardedas corrupt,illegal, or
ineffective, also figured prominently. Facing this
condition, people often shift their allegiances to
other leaders-opposition parties,warlords, ethnic
nationalists, clergy, or rebel forces. Demographic
factors, especially population pressures stemming
from refugees,internallydisplacedpopulations,and
environmentaldegradation,are also found in most
at-risk countries, as are consistent human rights
violations.Identifyingthe signsof statefailureis easier than crafting solutions, but pinpointing where
state collapse is likely is a necessaryfirst step.

Critica[l1

or those near the epicenter,state failure is apartheid regime negotiated a transition to

alwaysfrightening.Statefailurewith nuclear majorityrule in 1989. The country later joined
weapons could be a nightmare for everyone. the NPT,and inspectors verified the end of its
Four countries in this ranking are particularly nuclearweapons program.
The chancesof securingwarheadsin the event
worrisome because of the nuclear capabilities
or ambitions they harbor. North Korea, with of a state's failure depend on how the failure
an insular regime and a hostile worldview, is unfolds. If the collapseis accompaniedby large13th on the list of countriesat risk of collapse. scalelootingandcivildisorder,the jobmaybe next
Pakistan,ranked34th, has a substantialarsenal. to impossible. The failure of coalition military
Iran,which the United Statesaccuses of seeking forces to securesensitivesites in Iraqis a soberweapons, is ranked57th, stillin the dangerzone. ing lesson.The presenceof radicalIslamicgroups
Russia,with its massivenucleararsenal,is 59th. in Pakistanmakesits nucleararsenala particular
If any of theseregimesbeginto teeter,a mad dash concern.It has even been reportedthat the Pento secure the nukes (or their building blocks) tagon has contingencyplans for securing Pakwill surelyfollow.
istaninukesin the case of a coup or civilstrife,but
Recenthistoryoffersa best-casescenariofor expertsadmit that huntingdown these weapons
how these weapons can be rounded up. The on shortnotice would be a long shot at best.
new states of Ukraine,
Belarus,and Kazakhstan
had nuclear weapons on
their territory when the
Soviet Union disintegratCountry IndexRanking NuclearStatus
ed in 1991. After intenNotknown
whether
nuclear
warheads
have
sive negotiations, they
sufficient
for
beendeveloped.
Fissile
material
NorthKorea
13
eventuallyagreedto cede
between
oneandfivenuclear
devices.
them and later joined the
Between
24and48nuclear
warheads.
Fissile
Nuclear Non-ProliferaPakistan
34
material
for
to
50
nuclear
devices.
up
tion Treaty (NPT).In all,
about 3,400 warheads
Nowarheads.
Uranium
enrichment
program
Iran
andpossible
weapons
program.
were returnedto Russia.
I
Likewise, South Africa
Russia
7,200nuclear
weapons.
Approximately
gave up its entire nuclear
DI
nf
o
Nuclearrialtlnill iativle;
ri
program when the I

57
59

60

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Ariespr1,0

pol

Ir
IY
lw
1`~III
Y Y1-

Z.,

'

Out

NVIien

of

S i ght

the

Mighty

Fall

IA en a largestatefalls,everyonehearsabout comparedto otherstates,was relativelysmall,

b it-and someunluckyneighborsmayeven
intheindex's
bebroughtdownwithit. Countries
dangerzoneincludeIndonesia(242millionpeople),Pakistan(162million),Russia(143million),
and Nigeria (129 million). The Democratic
Republicof the Congo(60 million)hasin many
waysalreadyfailedmorethanonce,andit is esticonflictsanddiseasehave
matedthattheresulting
taken
at
least
3
millionlives.Therecent
probably
of CongoandtheformerYugoslavia
experiences
suggestthatstatefailureon thisscalecanspinoff
smallerconflictsthatcreateregionalunrestand
crises.Congo'scollapsewas, in
humanitarian
by Rwanda'sturmoil,and it
part,precipitated
led to the militaryinvolvement
of at leastseven
firstworldwar,"the
otherstates.Termed"Africa's
of entirefailed
Congoconflictraisedthe.specter
which,when
disintegration,
regions.Yugoslavia's

sentrefugeespouringinto WesternEuropeand
countries.Only
destabilized
severalneighboring
afterthreeyearsandmorethan250,000 deaths
didtheU.S.-ledNATO
forcesrestoreorder.
to addressstatefailure
Outsideintervention
whena largestate
becomesa tougherproposition
is initsdeaththroes.Onthepositiveside,because
anddiplomatthestakesareso high,a politically
international
communityis more
icallyengaged
likely.However,the logisticalandtrooprequirementsnecessaryfor any effectivehumanitarian
mission-whether
intervention
or peacekeeping
welcomed or not-could be overwhelming.
to establishorderinIraq,whichhasa
Attempting
populationof only26 million,has stretchedthe
If the
limitsof theworld'smostcapablemilitary.
failedstatewerefourtimesaslarge,it couldmake
theslogin Iraqlooklikea cakewalk.
JULY I AUGUST 2005

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61

The Failed States Index

F ueling!Failure
discoveryof largeoil and gas reserveshas
been a boon to many national economies,
and countries often spend decades trying to
strikeit rich. But is black gold actuallygood for
stable government?
Politicalscientistshave coinedthe term "petrostate"to describea countrythatis dependenton
income from oil and gas yet plagued by weak
institutions,a poorly functioningpublic sector,
and a grossdisparityof power and wealth. Some
expertshavearguedthatlargeoil economiesoften
stuntthe developmentof stable,transparentinstitutions-a phenomenonthat has beenlabeledthe
"resourcecurse."Jose Ramos-Horta,the foreign
ministerof EastTimor,has openlyworriedthathis
small country might not be able to handle the
temptationsthatwill arisewhenit beginsto exploit
its offshoreoil andgas fieldswith Australia'shelp.
"Whileoil and gas revenuescan be a blessing,"
Ramos-Hortahas said, "we are conscious that
our publicadministration,
ourTreasury,andother
branchesof governmentare veryweak."
The index suggeststhat many stateswith oil
and gas are indeedvulnerable.Iraq,home to the
world'ssecond-largestoil reserves,is the fourth
The

Th

FOREIGN

Citcalstte

most vulnerablecountry,althoughthe causes of

its instabilityaremanifold.Chad,whichhas negotiated a majoroil pipelinedealwith privatecompanies and the World Bank, is the seventhmost
vulnerable.Oil-richVenezuela,underthe mercurialleadershipof PresidentHugo Chavez,is 21st.
Most of the energy-richstates, however,are
clusteredtoward the back of the index, indicating that they are vulnerablebut have also managed to craft and preservea semblance of stability. These states-Saudi Arabia, Indonesia,
Bahrain,and Nigeria,among others-have filled
their coffers with oil money. But those funds
may come at a steep political cost.

Continntt~aluDivid

of the 10 weakest states are in Africa.

Severalstates,includingLiberia,the DemocSeven
ratic Republic of the Congo, and SierraLeone,
havesufferedlarge-scalecivilwars.Sudanis in the
midst of what some observers have termed a
genocide.Is Africadoomed to remainthe No. 1
manufacturerof failed states?
A decade ago, there was considerablehope
that SouthAfricaand Nigeria could help fill the
continent'sgovernancegap. Today,that hope is
muchdiminished.SouthAfricanPresidentThabo
Mbeki racks up frequent flyer miles trying to
resolvemanyAfricancrises,but his interventions
haveoftenlackedfollow-up.SouthAfricahas sent
troopsto jointhe peacekeepingmissionsin Congo
and Darfur,but it lacksthe resources-including
62

soldiersfree of HIV-to imposesolutions.

The limits of South African diplomacy are
particularlyapparentin Zimbabwe,wherestrongman PresidentRobertMugabehas presidedover
his country'sdownward spiral (it now ranks as
the 15th most at-riskcountry).Mbeki has opted
for what he calls "quiet diplomacy" toward
Mugabe, but many observersbelievethat South
Africais proppingup a dictatorratherthan preventing a looming political meltdown.
Nigeria, Africa'smost populous country,is
itselfa weak state(ranking54th). Its currentgovernmentis consumedby cleaningup corruption
and mediatingserioussectariantension at home.
Evenif Nigeriacan overcomeits own challenges,
it is in no position to export stability.

POLICY

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Ivory
Coast

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ai

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JULY

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vulerabl

IAUGUST

2005

63

4 TheFailedStates Index I

Hait

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64

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POLICY

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-o

21

on
Peacekeepers

Parade

oreign interventionis not a cure-allfor

states on the edge.The Democratic Republic of the Congo, which hosts a 16,000 member U.N. peacekeeping force, ranks second in
the index. Iraq is the fourth most vulnerable
country, Haiti is 10th, Afghanistan is 11th,
and Bosnia claims the 21st spot.
Congo, Haiti, and Sudan are recipients of
what might be termed peacekeeping on the
cheap. In none of these countries is the multinational force strong enough to assert control
over the country.The small AfricanUnion force
in Sudan, for example, has failed to prevent
ongoing atrocitiesin the Darfurregion. Instead,
the internationalforces in these places have, in
some ways, become additionalfactions in environments alreadychock-full of warringcamps.
Overwhelming intervention, like that
employed in Bosnia in 1995, is at the other end

of the spectrum. There, foreign troops effectively installed an international protectorate

for the ethnically divided country. Bosnia's
standing in the index is surely better than it
would have been if peacekeepers had never
arrived. But some observers suggest that an
overweening foreign presence has stunted the
country'spolitical development.Ten years after
large-scale intervention, nobody thinks the
peacekeepers can leave anytime soon.
Iraq and Afghanistan fall in between these
two poles. In both countries, U.S.-led forces
toppled existing governments, but they have
steered away from establishing protectorates.
Relatively quick elections put in place fragile
new regimes that are now struggling to assert
control. The fate of these experimentsin nation
building will shape the menu of options for
future foreign interventions. -dH

Wantto KnowMore?]

for Peace Failed State

More informationon the methodology used in the FOREIGNPOLICY/Fund
Index is available at www.ForeignPolicy.com and on the Web site of the Fund for Peace at
www.fundforpeace.org.
For a transnationallook at responsesto failed states, see the Britishstudy on state instability,
Investingin Prevention:An InternationalStrategyto Manage Risks of Instabilityand ImproveCrisis Response (London:PrimeMinister'sStrategyUnit, 2005). The CIA'sDirectorateof Intelligence
fundeda studyon statefailure,and some of its findingscan be readin StateFailureTaskForceReport:
Phase III Findings (McLean:Science ApplicationsInternationalCorporation,2000), preparedby
Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr,and others.
Regional experts speculate about what will happen after strongmen fall in "The Day After"
(FOREIGNPOLICY,November/December2003). Severalgood case studies of countriesin conflict

are availablein Ending Civil Wars:The Implementationof PeaceAgreements(Boulder:LynneRienner,2002), edited by StephenJohn Stedman,Donald Rothchild, and ElizabethM. Cousens. Political scientistFrancisFukuyamaemphasizesbuildingbasic state institutionsin State-Building:Governanceand WorldOrderin the 21st Century(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,2004). For a detailed
look at how the United Nations has fared in recent state-buildingefforts, see You,the People: The
United Nations, TransitionalAdministration, and State-Building (New York:Oxford University
Press, 2004), by Simon Chesterman.
)For links to relevantWeb sites, access to the FP Archive,and a comprehensiveindex of related
FOREIGNPOLICYarticles, go to www.ForeignPolicy.com.
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