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otherwise would be to encourage corporate litigants to use their shareholders

as fronts to circumvent the stringent rules against forum shopping.



McGee v Int'l Ins. Co

The Due Process Clause did not preclude the California court from entering a
judgment binding on respondent, since the suit was based on a contract which
had a substantial connection with California.
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, the Court decided that
"due process requires only that, in order to subject a defendant to a judgment
in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
RATIONALE: In part, this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of
our national economy over the years. Today, many commercial transactions
touch two or more States, and may involve parties separated by the full
continent. With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great
increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines. At the
same time, modern transportation and communication have made it much less
burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in
economic activity.
The contract was delivered in California, the premiums were mailed from
there, and the insured was a resident of that State when he died. It cannot be
denied that California has a manifest interest in providing effective means of
redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims. These
residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to follow the
insurance company to a distant State in order to hold it legally accountable
the CA committed a reversible error when it dismissed the petition for failure
to strictly follow the verification requirements. Stated otherwise, we do not
consider the variance between the dates as fatal to the petitioners case because
the variance did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that no verification was
made, or that the verification was false. More importantly, the variance totally
lost significance after the petitioners sent from the US and submitted to the
CA the required Verification/Certification in compliance with their previously
manifested intent. As this Court noted in a case where compliance with a
certificate of non-forum shopping was at issue, the fact that the Rules require
strict compliance merely underscores its mandatory nature; it cannot be
dispensed with or its requirements altogether disregarded, but it does not
thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable
circumstances, as we find in this case.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) v. Arabian
American Oil Co.
Title VII does not apply extraterritorially to regulate the employment practices
of United States firms that employ American citizens abroad.
It is a longstanding principle of American law "that legislation of Congress,
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States. This canon of construction is a valid
approach whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained. It
serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of
other nations which could result in international discord.
Absent clearer evidence of congressional intent, this Court is unwilling to
ascribe to Congress a policy which would raise difficult international law
issues by imposing this country's employment discrimination regime upon
foreign corporations operating in foreign commerce. This conclusion is
fortified by other factors suggesting a purely domestic focus, including Title
VII's failure even to mention foreign nations or proceedings, despite a number
of provisions indicating a concern that the sovereignty and laws of States not
be unduly interfered with, and the Act's failure to provide any mechanisms for
its overseas enforcement. It is also reasonable to conclude that, had Congress
intended Title VII to apply overseas, it would have addressed the subject of
conflicts with foreign laws and procedures, as it did in amending the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) to apply abroad.


The objective of the law was to subject the foreign corporation to the
jurisdiction of our courts. The Corporation Law must be given a reasonable,
not an unduly harsh, interpretation which does not hamper the development of
trade relations and which fosters friendly commercial intercourse among
countries.The Corporation Law is silent on whether or not the contract
executed by a foreign corporation with no capacity to sue is null and void ab
A Michigan statute provides: No foreign corporation subject to the provisions
of this Act, shall maintain any action in this state upon any contract made by it
in this state after the taking effect of this Act, until it shall have fully complied
with the requirement of this Act, and procured a certificate to that effect from
the Secretary of State. It was held that the above statute does not render
contracts of a foreign corporation that fails to comply with the statute void,
but they may be enforced only after compliance therewith.
There is no question that the contracts are enforceable. The requirement of
registration affects only the remedy.
Significantly, Batas PambansaBlg. 68, the Corporation Code of the
Philippines has corrected the ambiguity caused by the wording of Section 69
of the old Corporation Law. Section 133 of the present Corporation Code
provides: SEC. 133. Doing business without a license.-No foreign corporation
transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or
assigns, shag be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or
proceeding in any court or administrative agency in the Philippines; but such
corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or
administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under
Philippine laws.
Our ruling that the lack of capacity at the time of the execution of the
contracts was cured by the subsequent registration is also strengthened by the
procedural aspects of these cases.
Bank of the Philippines) and MERCURIO RIVERA vs. COURT OF
Black's Law Dictionary says that forum shopping "occurs when a party
attempts to have his action tried in a particular court or jurisdiction where he
feels he will receive the most favorable judgment or verdict." Hence,
according to Words and Phrases, "a litigant is open to the charge of "forum
shopping" whenever he chooses a forum with slight connection to factual
circumstances surrounding his suit, and litigants should be encouraged to
attempt to settle their differences without imposing undue expenses and
vexatious situations on the courts".
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one
forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts
but also in connection with litigations commenced in the courts while an
administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat
administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative
ruling and a favorable court ruling.
TEST: Buan vs. Lopez , also by Chief Justice Narvasa, and that is, forum
shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.
Corporate veil cannot be used to shield an otherwise blatant violation of the
prohibition against forum-shopping. Shareholders, whether suing as the
majority in direct actions or as the minority in a derivative suit, cannot be
allowed to trifle with court processes, particularly where, as in this case, the
corporation itself has not been remiss in vigorously prosecuting or defending
corporate causes and in using and applying remedies available to it. To rule

under this title with a distinct purpose: lawfully made suggests an effort to
distinguish copies that were made lawfully from those that were not, and
under this title sets forth the standard of lawful[ness] (i.e., the U. S.
Copyright Act). This simple reading promotes the traditional copyright
objective of combatting piracy and makes word-by-word linguistic sense. In
contrast, the geographical interpretation bristles with linguistic difficulties.
Wiley first reads under to mean in conformance with the Copyright Act
where the Copyright Act is applicable. Wiley then argues that the Act is
applicable only in the United States. However, neither under nor any other
word in lawfully made under this title means where. Nor can a
geographical limitation be read into the word applicable. The fact that the
Act does not instantly protect an American copyright holder from
unauthorized piracy taking place abroad does not mean the Act is inapplicable
to copies made abroad.
BMW of North America Inc vs. Gore Jr.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a substantive
limit on the size of punitive damages.Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens,
with whom Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyerjoined, began his
analysis by focusing on the relationship between Alabama's interests in
punishment and deterrence and the size of the punitive-damages award.
Justice Stevens noted that under the federal system Alabama, like the other
states, has "considerable flexibility in determining the level of punitive
damages that [it] will allow in [various cases]." However, while Alabama
could compel BMW NA to comply with a particular disclosure policy in that
state, Alabama could not punish BMW NA for out-of-state conduct that was
neither unlawful nor detrimental to Alabama's residentswith the intent of
changing the tortfeasors' lawful conduct in other States." 77 Applying this
state-interest analysis, the Court concluded that the $2 million punitive award
was "grossly excessive" in relation to Alabama's legitimate objectives.
The Court developed three "guideposts" for determining whether adequate
notice has been given: (1) the "degree of reprehensibility" of defendant's
conduct; (2) the ratio between the actual or potential harm and the punitive
damages; and (3) the authorized civil or criminal sanctions for comparable
misconduct.80 Using the guideposts, the Court made three key findings. First,
because BMW NA's conduct "evinced no indifference to or reckless disregard
for the health and safety of others," and because the harm that Gore suffered
was "purely economic in nature," BMW NA's conduct was not "sufficiently
reprehensible" to justify the $2 million award.
Second, the punitive damages were 500 times the actual damages as
determined by the jury, and there was no reasonable relationship between
these two types of awards.8 2 Third, the $2 million award was dramatically
greater than the maximum $2000 civil penalty authorized by Alabama for a
violation of its Deceptive Trade Practices Act.8 3 Furthermore, there was no
judicial precedent in which similarly large punitive damages were awarded for
comparable misconduct when BMW NA's nondisclosure policy was first
The Relationship Between Reasonableness and Substantive Due Process The
BMW Court declared that when a punitive-damages award is unreasonably
large in relation to a state's legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence,
the award "enter[s] the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
119 (2005)
Title III of the ADA applies to foreign-flagged cruise ships doing business in
the United States.
Unless Specifically Exempted by the Statute in Question, Foreign-Flag Cruise
Ships Doing Business Within the Internal Waters and Ports of the United
States Must Comply with All Generally Applicable Laws. It is axiomatic that
activities taking place on United States waters are generally governed by
United States law.
The fact that a cruise ship sails under a foreign flag or is registered in a
foreign country does not exempt it from generally applicable laws of the
countries in which it does business. As this Court has recognized, [i]t is well

Small vs United states

Section 922(g)(1)s phrase convicted in any court encompasses only
domestic, not foreign, convictions.
In considering the scope of the phrase convicted in any court it is
appropriate to assume that Congress had domestic concerns in mind. This
assumption is similar to the legal presumption that Congress ordinarily
intends its statutes to have domestic, not extraterritorial, application.
foreign convictions may include convictions for conduct that domestic laws
would permit. In addition, it is difficult to read the statute as asking judges or
prosecutors to refine its definitional distinctions where foreign convictions are
at issue. To somehow weed out inappropriate foreign convictions that meet the
statutory definition is not consistent with the statutes language; it is not easy
for those not versed in foreign laws to accomplish; and it would leave those
previously convicted in a foreign court (say of economic crimes) uncertain
about their legal obligations. These considerations provide a convincing basis
for applying the ordinary assumption about the reach of domestically oriented
statutes here.
LA has extra-territorial jurisdiction.
Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,18 provides: SECTION 10. Money Claims.
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days
after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employeremployee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral,
exemplary and other forms of damages.
Also, Section 62 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A.
No. 804219 provides that the Labor Arbiters of the NLRC shall have the
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all claims arising out of
employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving
Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral,
exemplary and other forms of damages, subject to the rules and procedures of
the NLRC.
Under these provisions, it is clear that labor arbiters have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-employee relations,
including termination disputes involving all workers, among whom are
overseas Filipino workers.
Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the
protective mantle of Philippine labor and social legislation, contract
stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding. This pronouncement is in keeping
with the basic public policy of the State to afford protection to labor, promote
full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or
creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. For the
State assures the basic rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work
[Article 3 of the Labor Code of the Philippines; See also Section 18, Article II
and Section 3, Article XIII, 1987 Constitution]. This ruling is likewise
rendered imperative by Article 17 of the Civil Code which states that laws
"which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determination or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country."
Kirtsaeng vs. John Wiley & Sons Inc
First sale doctrine - the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully
made under this title . . . is entitled, without the authority of the copyright
owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or
phonorecord, Sec109(a). Importing a copy made abroad without the
copyright owners permission is an infringement of sec106(3).
Section 109(a) of the copyright act says nothing about geography. A nongeographical interpretation provides each word in the phrase lawfully made

In an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident who does not

voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of
summons within the state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over her
person. This method of service is possible if such defendant is physically
present in the country. If he is not found therein, the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the
case against him. An exception was wherein a non-resident was served with
summons through his wife, who was a resident of the Philippines and who
was his representatives and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case filed by him;
moreover, the second case was a mere offshoot of the first case.
Since HERAS was not a resident of Hong Kong and the action against him
was, indisputably, one in personam, summons should have been personally
served on him in Hong Kong. The extraterritorial service in the Philippines
was therefore invalid and did not confer on the Hong Kong court jurisdiction
over his person. It follows that the Hong Kong court judgment cannot be
given force and effect here in the Philippines for having been rendered
without jurisdiction.
When the defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the country,
summons may be served extraterritorially in accordance with Rule 14, Section
17 of the Rules of Court. Under this provision, there are only four (4)
instances when extraterritorial service of summons is proper, namely: "(1)
when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs; (2) when the
action relates to, or the subject of which is property, within the Philippines, in
which the defendant claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when
the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and (4)
when the defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the
Philippines." In these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a)
personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also
with leave of court; or (c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Clear from the foregoing, extrajudicial service of summons apply only where
the action is in rem, an action against the thing itself instead of against the
person, or in an action quasi in rem, where an individual is named as
defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to
the obligation or loan burdening the property. This is so inasmuch as, in in
rem and quasi in rem actions, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court
acquires jurisdiction over the res.
However, where the action is in personam, one brought against a person on
the basis of his personal liability, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. When the
defendant is a non-resident, personal service of summons within the state is
essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person.
This cannot be done, however, if the defendant is not physically present in the
country, and thus, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and
therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him.
It must be stressed that any relief granted in rem or quasi in rem actions must
be confined to the res, and the court cannot lawfully render a personal
judgment against the defendant. Clearly, the publication of summons effected
by private respondent is invalid and ineffective for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner, since by seeking to recover damages
from petitioner for the alleged commission of an injury to his person or
property caused by petitioner's being a nuisance defendant, private
respondent's action became in personam. Bearing in mind the in personam
nature of the action, personal or, if not possible, substituted service of
summons on petitioner, and not extraterritorial service, is necessary to confer
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and validly hold it liable to private
respondent for damages.
There are generally two types of actions: actions in rem and actions in
personam. An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of
his personal liability, while an action in rem is an action against the thing
itself, instead of against the person.

settled that when a foreign-flag shipping line chooses to engage in foreign

commerce and use American ports it is amenable to the jurisdiction of the
United States and subject to the laws thereof.The jurisdiction of the country
whose territorial limits a ship voluntarily enters attaches in virtue of her
presence, just as with other objects within those limits. During her stay she is
entitled to the protection of the laws of that place and correlatively is bound to
yield obedience to them.
No. A court may enter a judgment against a non-resident only if the party: 1)
is personally served with process while within the state, or 2) has property
within the state, and that property is attached before litigation begins (i.e.
quasi in rem jurisdiction).
If, without personal service, judgments in personam, obtained ex parte
against non-residents and absent parties, upon mere publication of process,
which, in the great majority of cases, would never be seen by the parties
interested, could be upheld and enforced, they would be the constant
instruments of fraud and oppression.
In this case the property was moved against to satisfy a personal judgment
against a non-resident. Pre-trial seizure of the land would have satisfied
notification of a property judgment (in rem), because it is assumed that
property is attached to the person
Neff was not personally notified nor was his land attached at the time of
adjudication. Judgments in rem for non-residents must be given due process,
which involves a personal appearance by the Defendant or personal service of
notification or attachment of land.
The substituted service of process by publication in actions brought against
non-residents is valid only where property in the state is brought under the
control of the court, and subjected to its disposition by process adapted to that
purpose, or where the judgment is sought as a means of reaching such
property or affecting some interest therein; in other words, where the action is
in the nature of a proceeding in rem.
The Oregon court did not have personal jurisdiction over Neff because he was
not served in Oregon. The courts judgment would have been valid if Mitchell
had attached Neffs land at the beginning of the suit. Mitchell could not have
done this because Neff did not own the land at the time Mitchell initiated the
Asiavest Limited v. CA
Under paragraph (b) of Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which was
the governing law at the time this case was decided by the trial court and
respondent Court of Appeals, a foreign judgment against a person rendered by
a court having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by the
subsequent title. However, the judgment may be repelled by evidence of want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.
Also, Section 3(n) of Rule 131 of the New Rules of Evidence provides that in
the absence of proof to the contrary, a court, or judge acting as such, whether
in the Philippines or elsewhere, is presumed to have acted in the lawful
exercise of jurisdiction.
Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign judgment is proved, the burden to
repel it on grounds provided for in paragraph (b) of Section 50, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court is on the party challenging the foreign judgment.
The testimony of an expert witness may be allowed to prove a foreign lawn
There is, however, nothing in the testimony of Mr. Lousich that touched on
the specific law of Hong Kong in respect of service of summons either in
actions in rem or in personam, and where the defendant is either a resident or
nonresident of Hong Kong. In view of the absence of proof of the Hong Kong
law on this particular issue, the presumption of identity or similarity or the socalled processual presumption shall come into play. It will thus be presumed
that the Hong Kong law on the matter is similar to the Philippine law.

When the case instituted is an action in rem or quasi in rem, Philippine courts
already have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because, in actions in
rem and quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court
acquires jurisdiction over the res. Thus, in such instance, extraterritorial
service of summons can be made upon the defendant. The said extraterritorial
service of summons is not for the purpose of vesting the court with
jurisdiction, but for complying with the requirements of fair play or due
process, so that the defendant will be informed of the pendency of the action
against him and the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to
him or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff, and he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so
minded. On the other hand, when the defendant or respondent does not reside
and is not found in the Philippines, and the action involved is in personam,
Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility
of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in
International shoe co. vs Washington
The activities in behalf of the corporation render it amenable to suit in courts
of the State to recover payments due to the state unemployment compensation
fund. The activities in question established between the State and the
corporation sufficient contacts or ties to make it reasonable and just, and in
conformity to the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, for
the State to enforce against the corporation an obligation arising out of such

In such a suit to recover payments due to the unemployment compensation

fund, service of process upon one of the corporation's salesmen within the
State, and notice sent by registered mail to the corporation at its home office,
satisfies the requirements of due process. The tax imposed by the state
unemployment compensation statute -- construed by the state court, in its
application to the corporation, as a tax on the privilege of employing salesmen
within the State -- does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth

"Presence" in the state in this sense has never been doubted when the
activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and
systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on, even though no consent
to be sued or authorization to an agent to accept service of process has been
given. Conversely, it has been generally recognized that the casual presence
of the corporate agent, or even his conduct of single or isolated items of
activities in a state in the corporation's behalf, are not enough to subject it to
suit on causes of action unconnected with the activities there. To require the
corporation in such circumstances to defend the suit away from its home or
other jurisdiction where it carries on more substantial activities has been
thought to lay too great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to
comport with due process.
Appellant having rendered itself amenable to suit upon obligations arising out
of the activities of its salesmen in Washington, the state may maintain the
present suit in personam to collect the tax laid upon the exercise of the
privilege of employing appellant's salesmen within the state.

Kulko v. Superior Court of California

The exercise of in personam jurisdiction by the California courts over
appellant, a New York domiciliary, would violate the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The mere act of sending a child to California to
live with her mother connotes no intent to obtain nor expectancy of receiving
a corresponding benefit in that State that would make fair the assertion of that
State's judicial jurisdiction over appellant.
A defendant to be bound by a judgment against him must "have certain
minimum contacts with [the forum State] such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"
The acquiescence of appellant in his daughter's desire to live with her mother
in California was not enough to confer jurisdiction over appellant in the

The certificate, subject of the donation, is a personal property. The action filed
by Victoria is therefore a personal action. So in order for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the respondents, summons must be served upon them.
Further, the certificate is indivisible, Cynthias and Teresas interests thereto
can only be determined if both are summoned in court.
In personal actions, if the respondents are residents of the Philippines, they
may be served summons in the following order:

Personal Service;
If (1) is not possible, Substituted Service;
If respondent cant be found because he is abroad but still a
resident of the Philippines, by publication with leave of court.
In personal actions still, if the respondents are non-residents,
they may be served summons in the following manner:

Personal service through the Philippine embassy; By publication in a

newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court
may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should
be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or In
any other manner which the court may deem sufficient. The above must be
with leave of court.
NM Rothshild& Sons (Australia)
Consolidated Mining Company




Rothschild, by seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, is deemed to

have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of said court. A party cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction.
Section 12, Rule 14 of said rules provides:
Sec. 12.Service upon foreign private juridical entity. When the defendant is a
foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business in the
Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent designated in
accordance with law for that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the
government official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers
or agents within the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 15 of the same rule which provides:
Sec. 15.Extraterritorial service. When the defendant does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is property within the
Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or
contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in
excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the
defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of
court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under section 6;
or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for
such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and
order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of
the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any
order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be
less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must answer.
Breaking down Section 15, Rule 14, it is apparent that there are only four
instances wherein a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the
country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service, to wit: (1)
when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs; (2) when the
action relates to, or the subject of which is property, within the Philippines, in
which the defendant claims a lien or an interest, actual or contingent; (3) when
the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and (4)
when the defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the
Philippines. In these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a)
personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also
with leave of court; or (c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Undoubtedly, extraterritorial service of summons applies only where the
action is in rem or quasi in rem, but not if an action is in personam.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a
state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident
defendant. A judgment rendered in violation of due process is void in the
rendering State and is not entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere.
A state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
only so long as there exist "minimum contacts" between the defendant and the
forum State. . It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a
distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States through
their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their
status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.
Thus, the Due Process Clause "does not contemplate that a state may make
binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant
with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations." The defendant's
contacts with the forum State must be such that maintenance of the suit does
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, and the
relationship between the defendant and the forum must be such that it is
"reasonable . . . to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is
brought there."

California courts. Exercise of in personam jurisdiction over appellant was not

warranted by the financial benefit appellant derived from his daughter's
presence in California for nine months of the year, since any diminution in
appellant's household costs resulted not from the child's presence in
California, but from her absence from appellant's home, and from appellee's
failure to seek an increase in support payments in New York.
The "effects" rule that the California courts applied is intended to reach
wrongful activity outside of the forum State causing injury within the State
where such application would not be "unreasonable," but here, where there is
no claim that appellant visited physical injury on either property or persons in
California; where the cause of action arises from appellant's personal,
domestic relations; and where the controversy arises from a separation that
occurred in New York, and modification is sought of a contract negotiated and
signed in New York that had virtually no connection with the forum State, it is
"unreasonable" for California to assert personal jurisdiction over appellant.
Since appellant remained in the State of marital domicile and did no more
than acquiesce in the stated preference of his daughter to live with her mother
in California, basic considerations of fairness point decisively to appellant's
State of domicile as the proper forum for adjudicating this case, whatever be
the merits of appellee's underlying claim.

Here, there is a total absence in the record of those affiliating circumstances

that are a necessary predicate to any exercise of state-court jurisdiction.
Petitioners carry on no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma; they close no sales
and perform no services there, avail themselves of none of the benefits of
Oklahoma law, and solicit no business there either through salespersons or
through advertising reasonably calculated to reach that State. Nor does the
record show that they regularly sell cars to Oklahoma residents or that they
indirectly, through others, serve or seek to serve the Oklahoma market.

California's legitimate interest in ensuring the support of children residing in

California without unduly disrupting the children's lives is already being
served by the State's participation in the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act of 1968, which permits a California resident claiming support
from a nonresident to file a petition in California and have its merits
adjudicated in the State of the alleged obligor's residence, without either
party's having to leave his or her own State. New York is a signatory to a
similar statute. Those statutes appear to provide appellee with means to
vindicate her claimed right to additional child support from appellant and
collection of any support payments found to be owed to her by appellant

Asahi Metal Industry Co. Vs Superior Court

Burnham vs. Superior court

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a
state court to exert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. "[T]he
constitutional touchstone" of the determination whether an exercise of
personal jurisdiction comports with due process "remains whether the
defendant purposefully established minimum contacts' in the forum State."

Jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process because

it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due
process standard. That standard was developed by analogy to physical
presence. Justice BRENNAN, joined by Justice MARSHALL, Justice
BLACKMUN, and Justice O'CONNOR, although agreeing that the traditional
"transient jurisdiction" rule is generally valid, concluded that historical
pedigree, although important, is not the only factor to be taken into account in
establishing whether a jurisdictional rule satisfies due process, and that an
independent inquiry into the fairness of the prevailing in-State service rule
must be undertaken. The transient jurisdiction rule will generally satisfy due
process requirements.

Jurisdiction is proper . . . where the contacts proximately result from actions

by the defendant himself that create a 'substantial connection' with the forum
RATIONALE: 1) to allow an exercise of personal jurisdiction to be based on
no more than the defendant's act of placing the product in the stream of
commerce 2)to have jurisdiction it is required that the action of the defendant
to be more purposefully directed at the forum State than the mere act of
placing a product in the stream of commerce)
Because the stream of commerce eventually brought some valves Asahi sold
Cheng Shin into California, Asahi's awareness that its valves would be sold in
California was sufficient to permit California to exercise jurisdiction over
Asahi consistent with the requirements of the Due Process Clause.
(1) Hague Evidence Convention applied to request for information from
foreign national which was a party to the litigation; (2) Hague Evidence
Convention did not provide exclusive and mandatory procedure for obtaining
documents and information located within territorial foreign signatory; (3)
first resort to Hague Convention was not required; and (4) Hague Convention
did not deprive district court of jurisdiction it otherwise possessed to order
foreign national party before it to produce evidence physically located within
a foreign signatory nation.
The Convention does not provide exclusive or mandatory procedures for
obtaining documents and information located in a foreign signatory's territory.
The Convention's plain language, as well as the history of its proposal and

Among the most firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in

American tradition is that the courts of a State have jurisdiction over nonresidents who are physically present in the State. The view developed early
that each State had the power to hale before its courts any individual who
could be found within its borders, and that, once having acquired jurisdiction
over such a person by properly serving him with process, the State could
retain jurisdiction to enter udgment against him, no matter how fleeting his
visit. That view had antecedents in English common law practice, which
sometimes allowed "transitory" actions, arising out of events outside the
country, to be maintained against seemingly non-resident defendants who
were present in England.
The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the California Superior Court. Among
the most firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in American
tradition is that the courts of a State have jurisdiction over nonresidents who
are physically present in the State. The view developed early that each State
had the power to hale before its courts any individual who could be found
within its borders, and that once having acquired jurisdiction over such a
person by properly serving him with process, the State could retain
jurisdiction to enter judgment against him, no matter how fleeting his visit. A
state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction satisfies the Due Process Clause
if it does not violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
World-wide Volkswagen corp. vs. Woodson

At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in civil
cases under Batas PambansaBlg. 129, as amended by RA 7691, In all other
cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in
controversy exceed P100K or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the
demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds P200K. It is clear
that the claim for damages is the main cause of action and that the total
amount sought in the complaints is approximately P2.7 million for each of the
plaintiff claimants. The RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction over the cases
filed in General Santos City and Davao City.

Del Monte Fresh Produce, petitioner vs DOW Chemical

Company, etc., respondents
There are two requisites for a court to allow an omitted counterclaim or crossclaim by amendment: (1) there was oversight, inadvertence, or excusable
neglect, or when justice requires; and (2) the amendment is made before
The CA correctly held that there is basis for allowing the cross-claims of the
Dole, Del Monte and Chiquita defendants against the Dow/Occidental
defendants as they complied with the rules. It is undisputed that the Dole, Del
Monte and Chiquita defendants sought to amend their answers to include their
cross-claims before judgment. More importantly, justice requires that they be
allowed to do so in consonance with the policy against multiplicity of suits.
Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert
Gilbert himself is not a resident of New York, nor did any event connected
with the case take place there, nor does any witness with the possible
exception of experts live there. No one connected with that side of the case
save counsel for the plaintiff resides there.
It is a strange argument on behalf of a Virginia plaintiff that the community
which gave him patronage to make his business valuable is not capable of
furnishing jurors who know the value of the goods they store, the building
they are stored in, or the business their patronage creates. And there is no
specification of any local influence, other than accurate knowledge of local
conditions, that would make a fair trial improbable. The net of this is that the
Court cannot say the District Court was bound to entertain a provincial fear of
the provincialism of a Virginia jury. That leaves the Virginia plaintiff without
even a suggested reason for transporting this suit to New York.
The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist
imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the
letter of a general venue statute. These statutes are drawn with a necessary
generality, and usually give a plaintiff a choice of courts, so that he may be
quite sure of some place in which to pursue his remedy.
An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the
private interest of the litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease of
access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance
of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses;
possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action,
and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and
inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforceability of a
judgment if one is obtained. The court will weigh relative advantages and
obstacles to fair trial. It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an
inconvenient forum, "vex," "harass," or "oppress" the defendant by inflicting
upon him expense or trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his
remedy. But, unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the
plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed. Factors of public
interest also have place in applying the doctrine.
Piper aircraft co. vs Reyno
The possibility of a change of law should not be given substantial weight in a
forum non conveniens analysis. Plaintiffs can choose among many forums,
and generally choose the most favorable one. If they do not choose the most
favorable but the action can be dismissed anyway, it would not be proper. In

ratification by the United States, unambiguously supports the conclusion that

it was intended to establish optional procedures for obtaining evidence abroad.
Its preamble speaks in non-mandatory terms, specifying its purpose to
"facilitate" discovery and to "improve mutual judicial cooperation." Similarly,
its text uses permissive language, and does not expressly modify the law of
contracting states or require them to use the specified procedures or change
their own procedures. The Convention does not deprive the District Court of
its jurisdiction to order, under the Federal Rules, a foreign national party to
produce evidence physically located within a signatory nation.
The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the Convention "does not
apply" to discovery sought from a foreign litigant that is subject to an
American court's jurisdiction. Although they are not mandatory, the
Convention's procedures are available whenever they will facilitate the
gathering of evidence, and "apply" in the sense that they are one method of
seeking evidence that a court may elect to employ.
The concept of comity requires, in this context, a more particularized analysis
of the respective interests of the foreign and requesting nations than a blanket
"first resort" rule would generate. Thus, the determination whether to resort to
the Convention requires prior scrutiny in each case of the particular facts,
sovereign interests, and likelihood that such resort will prove effective.


While the letters rogatory issued by the trial court specifically directed the
Clerk of Court of Boston to take the depositions needed in the case, it became
impossible to follow the directive since the Clerk of Court of Boston merely
brushed it aside and refused to cooperate. Respondent cannot be faulted for
the resultant delay brought about by this circumstance. Neither can the trial
court be faulted for allowing the admission of the depositions taken not in
strict adherence to its original directive, nor for directing the petitioner to have
the depositions authenticated. Obviously, it was not within the trial court's
power, much less the respondent's to force the Clerk of Court of Boston to
have the deposition taken before it. After all, while a court had the authority to
entertain a discovery request, it is not required to provide judicial assistance
thereto. This reality was recognized by the trial court when it ordered
respondent to have the questioned depositions authenticated by the Philippine
More importantly, the Court finds that respondent substantially complied with
the requirements for depositions taken in foreign countries. In our jurisdiction,
depositions in foreign countries may be taken: (a) on notice before a secretary
of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent
of the Republic of the Philippines; (b) before such person or officer as may be
appointed by commission or under letters rogatory; or (c) before any person
authorized to administer oaths as stipulated in writing by the parties. While
letters rogatory are requests to foreign tribunals, commissions are directives to
officials of the issuing jurisdiction.
In the instant case, the authentication made by the consul was a ratification of
the authority of the notary public who took the questioned depositions. The
deposition was, in effect, obtained through a commission, and no longer
through letters rogatory.
Besides, the allowance of the deposition cannot be said to have caused any
prejudice to the adverse party. They were given the opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses through their cross-interrogatories, which were in turn
answered by the deponents. Save for the complaint of delay in the
proceedings, petitioners were unable to point out any injury they suffered as a
result of the trial court's action.
Navida v Dizon
The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled
to all or some of the claims asserted therein. Once vested by law, on a
particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of
the action cannot be dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature
through the enactment of a law.

The NLRC was not in a position to determine whether the Tiannamen Square
incident truly adversely affected operations of the Palace Hotel as to justify
respondent Santos' retrenchment.
Principle of effectiveness, no power to execute decision. Even assuming
that a proper decision could be reached by the NLRC, such would not have
any binding effect against the employer, the Palace Hotel. The Palace Hotel is
a corporation incorporated under the laws of China and was not even served
with summons. Jurisdiction over its person was not acquired. If Santos were
an "overseas contract worker", a Philippine forum, specifically the POEA, not
the NLRC, would protect him.



The doctrine of forum non-conveniens, literally meaning 'the forum is

inconvenient', emerged in private international law to deter the practice of
global forum shopping, that is to prevent non-resident litigants from choosing
the forum or place wherein to bring their suit for malicious reasons, such as to
secure procedural advantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid
overcrowded dockets, or to select a more friendly venue. Under this doctrine,
a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction
where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are
not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
However, though this case satisfies all the requisites for the application the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, this principle should not be used as a
ground for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court

This Court has also further ruled that while it is within the discretion of the
trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do
so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances require the court's desistance; and that the propriety of
dismissing a case based on this principle of forum non conveniens requires a
factual determination, hence it is more properly considered a matter of

In a suit to establish and enforce a maritime lien for supplies furnished to a

vessel in a foreign port, whether such lien exists, or whether the court has or
will exercise jurisdiction, depends on the law of the country where the
supplies were furnished, which must be pleaded and proved.

The multiple-contact test to determine, in the absence of a specific

Congressional directive as to the statutes reach, which jurisdictions law
should be applied. The following factors were considered: (1) place of the
wrongful act; (2) law of the flag; (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4)
allegiance of the defendant shipowner; (5) place of contract; (6) inaccessibility
of foreign forum; and (7) law of the forum. This is applicable not only to
personal injury claims arising under the Jones Act but to all matters arising
under maritime law in general.

Out of the seven basic factors listed in the case of Lauritzen, Philippine law
only falls under one the law of the forum. All other elements are foreign
Canada is the place of the wrongful act, of the allegiance or domicile of the

addition, courts would have to interpret the law of foreign districts, which
would pose a lot of problems and inconsistencies. This is why there is a
doctrine of forum non conveniens, to get rid of this kind of confusion.
Giving the plaintiffs interests less weight is justified when the plaintiffs are
foreign. Under this circumstance, the choice of forum is not necessarily
convenient. The connections with Scotland were not necessarily
overwhelming, but the District Court correctly found that there would be
fewer evidentiary problems. If Defendants had to prove exactly what persons
it would be difficult to identify and bring as witnesses, Defendants required
expenditures would defeat the purpose of their motion. Even if Scottish law
would not apply, the other public interest factors would be sufficient to
support dismissal. There is a local interest. The American interest is not
The Court ruled 9-0 that "a court need not resolve whether it has personal
jurisdiction over the defendant if it determines that a foreign tribunal is plainly
the more suitable arbiter of the merits of the case." The opinion by Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that while the first step of a court is normally to
determine whether it has jurisdiction, a court can dismiss a case for forum non
conveniens without establishing subject-matter or personal jurisdiction. The
Court held that determination of jurisdiction is only important when there is a
chance that the court will rule on the merits of the case. When it is clear that
the case would be more conveniently tried in a foreign court, a court should
immediately dismiss for forum non conveniens rather than undergo a
burdensome and unnecessary determination of jurisdiction before dismissing
the case anyway.
Philsec Investment Corp. vs. CA
The trial courts refusal to take cognizance of the case is not justifiable under
the principle of forum non conveniens.
First, a motion to dismiss is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, 1, which
does not include forum non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case
based on this principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is more
properly considered a matter of defense. Second, while it is within the
discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this
ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine
whether special circumstances require the courts desistance.
In this case, the trial court abstained from taking jurisdiction solely on the
basis of the pleadings filed by private respondents in connection with the
motion to dismiss. It failed to consider that one of the plaintiffs (PHILSEC) is
a domestic corporation and one of the defendants (Ventura Ducat) is a
Filipino, and that it was the extinguishment of the latters debt which was the
object of the transaction under litigation.
Manila Hotel Corporation vs. NLRC, Marcelo Santos

The main aspects of the case transpired in two foreign jurisdictions and the
case involves purely foreign elements. The only link that the Philippines has
with the case is that respondent Santos is a Filipino citizen. The Palace Hotel
and MHICL are foreign corporations. Not all cases involving our citizens can
be tried here.

Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may
assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided: (1) that the
Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2)
that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to
the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have
power to enforce its decision. The conditions are unavailing in the case at bar.

the court should determine which state has the most substantial connection to
the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should
consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed,
and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties.
This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates them according to
their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.

Before determining which law should apply, first there should exist a conflict
of laws situation requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules. Also,
when the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for
the solution of a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded and proved.
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element,
is brought before a court or administrative agency, there are three alternatives
open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack
of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume
jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3)
assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or apply the law of
some other State or States. The courts power to hear cases and controversies
is derived from the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to
recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign
law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding
rights provided by foreign sovereigns.



The "Employment Agreement" between Norse and the late Abordo states that
compensation shall be paid under Philippine Law or the law of registry of
petitioners' vessel, whichever is greater. Since RestitutaAbordo was offered
P30k only by the petitioners, Singapore law was properly applied in this case.

The "Employment Agreement" is attached to the Supplemental Complaint of

Restituta and, therefore, it forms part thereof. As it is familiar with Singapore
Law, the National Seamen Board is justified in taking judicial notice of and in
applying that law.

Article 20, Labor Code of the Philippines, provides that the National Seamen
Board has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases
including money claims, involving er-ee relations, arising out of or by virtue
of any law or contracts involving Filipino seamen for overseas employment.
Thus, it is safe to assume that the Board is familiar with pertinent Singapore
maritime laws relative to workmen's compensation. Moreover, the Board may
apply the rule on judicial notice and, "in administrative proceedings, the
technical rules of procedure particularly of evidence applied in judicial
trials, do not strictly apply."

Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this code, including its
implementing rules and resolved in favor of labor.
EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc. vs National Labor Relations
In cases involving OFWs, the rights and obligations among and between the
OFW, the local recruiter/agent, and the foreign employer/principal are
governed by the employment contract. A contract freely entered into is
considered law between the parties; and hence, should be respected. In
formulating the contract, the parties may establish such stipulations, clauses,

injured and the place of contract; India is the law of the flag and the allegiance
of the defendant shipowner. Balancing these basic interests, it is inconceivable
that the Philippine court has any interest in the case that outweighs the
interests of Canada or India for that matter

Applying P.D. No. 1521,a maritime lien exists would not promote the public
policy behind the enactment of the law to develop the domestic shipping
industry. Opening up our courts to foreign suppliers by granting them a
maritime lien under our laws even if they are not entitled to a maritime lien
under their laws will encourage forum shopping.

It is clear that Canada has the most significant interest in this dispute. The
injured party is a Canadian corporation, the sub-charterer which placed the
orders for the supplies is also Canadian, the entity which physically delivered
the bunker fuels is in Canada, the place of contracting and negotiation is in
Canada, and the supplies were delivered in Canada.


Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers
whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks
the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will
determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise
jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to
apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lexfori will often
coincide, the "minimum contacts" for one do not always provide the necessary
"significant contacts" for the other. The question of whether the law of a state
can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the
courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the

sovereign authority which establishes and organizes the court. It is given only
by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further determined by the
allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to
all or some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its motion for the
dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the
matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the
claims. In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do not claim
that the trial court is not properly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear the
subject controversy for, indeed, the case for specific performance and
damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation and is properly cognizable
by the RTC of Lipa City. What they rather raise as grounds to question subject
matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and
lexcontractus, and the "state of the most significant relationship rule."

Lex loci celebrationis relates to the "law of the place of the ceremony" or the
law of the place where a contract is made.,The doctrine of lexcontractus or lex
loci contractus means the "law of the place where a contract is executed or to
be performed." It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract
and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law
intended by them either expressly or implicitly. Under the "state of the most
significant relationship rule," to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute,

Section 25, Rule 132, to wit: Proof of public or official record An official
record or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a
foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
It cannot be overemphasized that the required certification of an officer in the
foreign service under Section 24 refers only to the documents enumerated in
Section 19(a), to wit: written official acts or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of the
Philippines or of a foreign country. The SC agrees w/ the CA that had the
Court intended to include notarial documents as one of the public documents
contemplated by the provisions of Section 24, it should not have specified
only the documents referred to under paragraph (a) of Section 19.
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction
and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any
other fact, they must be alleged and proved.

A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and an

unwritten law. The former falls under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, the entire provision of which is quoted hereunder. Where
the foreign law sought to be proved is "unwritten," the oral testimony of
expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published books of reports
of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly
admitted in such courts.

The two Venezuelan Laws were not duly proven as fact before the court. Only
mere photocopies of the laws were presented as evidence. For a copy of a
foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are
(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by
his deputy; and
(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign
service officer, and with the seal of his office.

And in case of unwritten foreign laws, the oral testimony of expert witnesses
is admissible, as are printed and published books of reports of decisions of the
courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such

ANNE NICOLAY, Petitioners, vs CA

The principle of state immunity from suit, whether a local state or a foreign
state, is reflected in Section 9, Article XVI of the Constitution, which states

terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically
states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the
contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.).
Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the
contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the
termination of the employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is
treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or
labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to
know only domestic or forum law.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the
matter; thus, the International Law doctrine ofpresumed-identity
approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is
not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign
law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining
the issues presented before us.
Heirs of the Deceased Spouses Vicente Arcilla v. Teodoro

Section 5, Rule 7, of the Rules of Court provides: Certification against

forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in
the complaint /other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief/in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he
has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of
his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is
such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or
claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint/initiatory pleading has
been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by
mere amendment of the complaint/other initiatory pleading but shall be cause
for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided,
upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or noncompliance w/ any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, w/o prejudice to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute
willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt as well as a cause
for administrative sanctions.
Circular No. 28-91, w/c originally required the certification of non-forum
shopping for petitions filed with the SC and the CA; and SC Administrative
Circular No. 04-94, w/c extended the certification requirement for civil
complaints and other initiatory pleadings filed in all courts and other agencies.
However, it is equally settled that litigation is not merely a game of
technicalities. Rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Moreover, the emerging trend
in our jurisprudence is to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just determination of his cause free from the constraints of
In the instant case, the Court finds that the lower courts did not commit any
error in proceeding to decide the case on the merits, as herein respondent was
able to submit a certification of non-forum shopping. More importantly, the
apparent merit of the substantive aspect of the petition for land registration
filed by respondent with the MTC coupled with the showing that she had no
intention to violate the Rules with impunity, as she was the one who invited
the attention of the court to the inadvertence committed by her counsel, should
be deemed as special circumstances/compelling reasons to decide the case on
the merits.

The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and BRII

themselves, provided that the laws of the host country became applicable to
said contracts if they offer terms and conditions more favorable than those
stipulated therein.

Adopting the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel
thereof. The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be
governed. In such a case, the foreign law is adopted as a system to regulate
the relations of the parties, including questions of their capacity to enter into
the contract, the formalities to be observed by them, matters of performance,
and so forth. Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties
may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed
incorporated into their contract as a set of terms. By such reference to the
provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not become a foreign contract
to be governed by the foreign law. The said law does not operate as a statute
but as a set of contractual terms deemed written in the contract. A basic policy
of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties. Such party expectation
is protected by giving effect to the parties own choice of the applicable law.
The choice of law must, however, bear some relationship the parties or their
transaction. There is no question that the contracts sought to be enforced by
claimants have a direct connection with the Bahrain law because the services
were rendered in that country.

As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum
(local court), Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of
actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the
laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign
substantive law. A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of
Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive,
depending on the characterization given such a law.

However the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law

becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum (local Court) has a
borrowing statute. Said statute has the practical effect of treating the
foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A borrowing statute directs
the state of the forum (local Court) to apply the foreign statute of limitations
to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While there are several kinds of
borrowing statutes, one form provides that an action barred by the laws of
the place where it accrued will not be enforced in the forum even though the
local statute was not run against it.

The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce any foreign claim
obnoxious to the forums public policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive
period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question
would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.

In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution

emphasized that:The state shall promote social justice in all phases of
national development (Sec. 10).

The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare (Sec. 18).

that "the State may not be sued without its consent." If the instant suit had
been brought directly against the Federal Republic of Germany, there would
be no doubt that it is a suit brought against a State, and the only necessary
inquiry is whether said State had consented to be sued. However, the present
suit was brought against GTZ. It is necessary for us to understand what
precisely are the parameters of the legal personality of GTZ.

Where suit is filed not against the government itself or its officials but against
one of its entities, it must be ascertained whether or not the State, as the
principal that may ultimately be held liable, has given its consent to be sued.
This ascertainment will depend in the first instance on whether the
government agency impleaded is incorporated or unincorporated.

If the agency is incorporated, the test of its suability is found in its charter.
The simple rule is that it is suable if its charter says so, and this is true
regardless of the functions it is performing. Municipal corporations, for
example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are
engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign
immunity from suit.

A corporation organized under the Corporation Code but owned by the

Philippine government, or a government-owned or controlled corporation
without original charter. And it bears notice that Section 36 of the Corporate
Code states that "[e]very corporation incorporated under this Code has the
power and capacity x xx to sue and be sued in its corporate name."
GTZ has failed to establish that under German law, it has not consented to be
sued despite it being owned by the Federal Republic of Germany. We adhere
to the rule that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a
particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines, and
following the most intelligent assumption we can gather, GTZ is akin to a
governmental owned or controlled corporation without original charter which,
by virtue of the Corporation Code, has expressly consented to be sued.

Had GTZ obtained such certification from the DFA, it would have provided
factual basis for its claim of immunity that would, at the very least, establish a
disputable evidentiary presumption that the foreign party is indeed immune
which the opposing party will have to overcome with its own factual

Cadalin vs. POEA

NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater
benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts of the
claimants. It was of the belief that where the laws of the host country are more
favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host country shall
form part of the overseas employment contract. It approved the observation of
the POEA Administrator that in labor proceedings, all doubts in the
implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing
regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.

Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts

Although some of the class members were non-residents who had no contacts
with the forum state, the class members were plaintiffs, and therefore the
traditional minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction was not applicable.
The Shutts Court also concluded that due process considerations were
afforded to absent class members because each class member was provided
with notice of the action, an opportunity to appear in person or through
counsel, an opportunity to opt out, and adequate legal representation. The
Supreme Court's analysis centered on distinguishing among the different
burdens of litigation placed upon class action plaintiffs as opposed to those
placed upon a defendant in a non-class suit.

state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the claims of nonresident
class members constituted a vital step in the process of ensuring the full and
fair litigation of multistate class actions. A decision otherwise would have
denied judicial access to multistate class action plaintiffs with small monetary
claims, thus contradicting the explicit purpose of class action adjudications.
Although precedent supports the Court's conclusion, the Court's analysis in
reaching this conclusion was inadequate. Generally, restrictions are placed
upon a state court's exercise of personal jurisdiction for two reasons: first, to
guarantee protection of the personal liberty interests of the parties to the
litigation;second, to protect state sovereignty concerns. The Shutts Court,
however, based its decision primarily on matters of convenience,'" rather than
conducting a complete analysis of the controversial aspects of personal

The minimum contacts test is premised on the theory that due process permits
state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who
have certain contacts with the forum state. Thus, the minimum contacts
requirement ensures that the maintenance of the action in a forum does not
offend the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Included in these notions of fair play and substantial justice is the principle of
interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution." Accordingly, the
minimum contacts requirement limits a state court's jurisdictional powers in
order to protect the personal liberty interests of nonresident parties in
obtaining a fair adjudication of their claims. In addition, the minimum
contacts requirement guarantees the concept of state sovereignty"


Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what

category a certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as
characterization, or the doctrine of qualification. It is the process of deciding
whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts
rule. The purpose of characterization is to enable the forum to select the
proper law.

Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual
situation, event, or operative fact. An essential element of conflict rules is the
indication of a test or connecting factor or point of contact. Choice-of-law
rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right,
contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of
the res, the place of celebration, the place of performance, or the place of

Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible

In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution
provides: Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all.


Doubtless a state may prohibit the enjoyment by persons within its borders of
rights acquired elsewhere which violate its laws or public policy, and, under
some circumstances, it may refuse to aid in the enforcement of such rights.
But the Mexican corporation never was in Texas, and neither it nor the
garnishees invoked the aid of the Texas courts or the Texas laws.
And, in the absence of a contractual provision, the local statute of limitation
may be applied to a right created in another jurisdiction even where the
remedy in the latter is barred. In such cases, the rights and obligations of the
parties are not varied. When, however, the parties have expressly agreed upon
a time limit on their obligation, a statute which invalidates the agreement and
directs enforcement of the contract after the time has expired increases their
obligation and imposes a burden not contracted for.
The Texas statute as here construed and applied deprives the garnishees of
property without due process of law. A state may prohibit and declare invalid
the making of certain contracts within its borders. It may prohibit performance
within its borders. Even of contracts validly made elsewhere, if they are
required to be performed within the state and their performance would violate
its laws. But, in the case at bar, nothing in any way relating to the policy sued
on, or to the contracts of reinsurance, was ever done or required to be done in
Texas. All acts relating to the making of the policy and contracts of
reinsurance were done in Mexico or in New York.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague
The decedent was a member of Minnesota's workforce. The State of
employment has police power responsibilities towards non-resident
employees that are analogous to those it has towards residents; as such
employees use state services and amenities and may call upon state facilities
in appropriate circumstances. Also, the State's interest in its commuting nonresident employees, such as respondent's decedent, reflects a state concern for
the safety and wellbeing of its workforce and the concomitant effect on
Minnesota employers. That the decedent was not killed while commuting to
work or while in Minnesota does not dictate a different result, since
vindication of the rights of the estate of a Minnesota employee is an important
state concern. Nor does the decedent's residence in Wisconsin constitutionally
mandate application of Wisconsin law to the exclusion of forum law.
Employment status is not a sufficiently less important status than residence,
when combined with the decedent's daily commute across state lines and the
other Minnesota contacts present, to prohibit the choice of law result in this
case on constitutional grounds.
Petitioner was at all times present and doing business in Minnesota. By virtue
of such presence, petitioner can hardly claim unfamiliarity with the laws of
the host jurisdiction and surprise that the state courts might apply forum law
to litigation in which the company is involved. Moreover, such presence gave
Minnesota an interest in regulating the company's insurance obligations
insofar as they affected both a Minnesota resident and court-appointed
representative (respondent) and a longstanding member of Minnesota's
workforce (respondent's decedent).
In addition to the other contacts, respondent became a Minnesota resident
prior to institution of the instant litigation. She subsequently moved to Savage,
Minn., after marrying a Minnesota resident who operated an automobile
service station in Bloomington, Minn.

aliens. Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto
make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to depart
from the country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien.
Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not mandatory for the
CID to admit any alien who applies for a visitor's visa. Once admitted into the
country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay. Under Section 13 of the
law, an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and
"may be admitted" as a permanent resident. Among those considered qualified
to apply for permanent residency if the wife or husband of a Philippine citizen
(Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 13[a]). The entry of aliens into the country and
their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are legally
married to Filipino citizens. Indonesian wife can be deported.

TuanAnhNguyen vs. INS

When the citizen parent of the child born abroad and out of wedlock is the
childs mother, the requirements for the transmittal of citizenship are
described in 1409(c):
c. Notwithstanding the provision of subsection (a) of this section, a
person born, after December 23, 1952, outside the United States and out
wedlock shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality status of his
mother, if the mother had the nationality of the United States at the time of
such persons birth, and if the mother had previously been physically present
in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuos period
of one year.

Specifically, the imposition of the requirement for a paternal relationship, but

not a maternal one, is justified by two important governmental objectives.
The first governmental interest to be served is the importance of assuring that
a biological parent - child relationship exists. In the case of the mother, the
relation is verifiable from the birth itself.

test for the determination of the applicable law. These test factors or points of
contact or connecting factors could be any of the following:
(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of
sojourn, or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be
situated. In particular, the lexsitus is decisive when real rights are involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place
where a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort
committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts and torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of
performance of contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to
be exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern
their agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or
done. The lexforithe law of the forumis particularly important because, as we
have seen earlier, matters of procedure not going to the substance of the claim
involved are governed by it; and because the lexfori applies whenever the
content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application
in a given case for the reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the
applications of foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal
relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also covers
contractual relationships particularly contracts of affreightment.

Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the
connecting factor or point of contact could be the place or places where the
tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in
a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort
(the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is
in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a
Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly
believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the
performance of its duties, act with justice, give her her due and observe
honesty and good faith.

The second important governmental interest furthered in a substantial manner

by 1409(a)(4) is the determination to ensure that the child and the citizen
parent have some demonstrated opportunity, or potential to develop not just a
relationship that is recognzed by the law but one that consist of the real
everyday ties that provide a certain connection between child and citizen
parent and in turn the United States. In the case of citizen mother and a child
born oversees, the opportunity for a meaningful relationship between citizen
parent and child inheres in the very event of birth, an event so often critical to
our constitutional and statutory understandings of citizenship.

Considering that it was the petitioner who was invoking the applicability of
the law of Saudi Arabia, thus the burden was on it [petitioner] to plead and to
establish what the law of Saudi Arabia is.

Section 1409(a) thus imposes a set of requirements on the children of citizen

fathers born abroad and out of wedlock to a noncitizen mother that are not
imposed under like circumstances when the citizen parent is the mother. All
concede the requirements of 1409(a)(3) and (a)(4), relating to a citizen
fathers acknowledgement of a child while he is under 18, were not satisfied
in this case. As an individual seeking citizenship under 1409(a) must meet all
of its preconditions, the failure to satisfy 1409(a)(4) renders Nguyen ineligible
for citizenship.

Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration

authorities in her applications for temporary visitor's visa and for permanent
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence
is deemed inimical to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the
right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country, this right is based on
the fact that since the aliens are not part of the nation, their admission into the
territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which creates no
obligation on the part of the government to permit them to stay.

Before considering the important governmental interests advanced by the

statute, two observations concerning the operation of the provision are in
order. First, a citizen mother expecting a child and living abroad has the right
to reenter the United States so the child can be born here and be a 14th
amendment citizen. From one perspective the statute simply ensures

There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be

admitted, much less to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines. The
fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the
operation of the immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of


Djumantan vs. Domingo

While the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid
discrimination that is so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process. A
native-born citizen is free to reside abroad indefinitely without suffering loss
of citizenship. The discrimination aimed at naturalized citizens drastically
limits their rights to live and work abroad in a way that other citizens may. It
creates indeed a second-class citizenship. Living abroad, whether the citizen
be naturalized or native born, is no badge of lack of allegiance, and in no way
evidences a voluntary renunciation of nationality and allegiance. It may
indeed be compelled by family, business, or other legitimate reasons

Trop vs Dulles
Section 401(g), the statute that decrees the forfeiture of this petitioner's
citizenship, is based directly on a Civil War statute, which provided that a
deserter would lose his "rights of citizenship." The meaning of this phrase was
not clear. Citizenship is not subject to the general powers of the National
Government, and therefore cannot be divested in the exercise of those powers.
The right may be voluntarily relinquished or abandoned either by express
language or by language and conduct that show a renunciation of citizenship.
Under these principles, this petitioner has not lost his citizenship. Desertion in
wartime, though it may merit the ultimate penalty, does not necessarily signify
allegiance to a foreign state. Section 401(g) is not limited to cases of desertion
to the enemy, and there is no such element in this case. This soldier committed
a crime for which he should be and was punished, but he did not involve
himself in any way with a foreign state. There was no dilution of his
allegiance to this country.

Use of denationalization as a punishment is barred by the Eighth Amendment.

There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture. There
is, instead, the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society.
It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the
individual the political existence that was centuries in the development. The
punishment strips the citizen of his status in the national and international
political community. His very existence is at the sufferance of the country in
which he happens to find himself. While any one country may accord him
some rights and, presumably, as long as he remained in this country, he would
enjoy the limited rights of an alien, no country need do so, because he is
stateless. Furthermore, his enjoyment of even the limited rights of an alien
might be subject to termination at any time by reason of deportation. In short,
the expatriate has lost the right to have rights.

equivalence between two expectant mothers who are citizens abroad if one
chooses to reenter for the childs birth and the other chooses not to return, or
does not have the means to do so. This equivalence is not a factor if the single
citizen parent living abroad is the father. For, unlike the unmarried mother, the
unmarried father as a general rule cannot control where the child will be born.

Second, although 1409(a)(4) requires certain conduct to occur before the child
of a citizen father born out of wedlock and abroad reaches 18 years of age, it
imposes no limitation on when an individual who qualifies under the statute
can claim citizenship. The statutory treatment of citizenship is identical in this
respect wether the citizen parent is the mother of the father. A person born to a
citizen parent of either gender may assert citizenship, assuming compliance
with statutory preconditions regardless of his or her age. And while the
conditions necessary for a citizen mother to transmit citizenship under 1409(c)
exist at birth, citizen father and/or their children have 18 years to satisfy the
requirements of 1409(a)(4).

Statutory distinction relevant in this case, is that 1409(a)(4) requires one of

three affirmative steps to be taken if the citizen parent is the father, but not if
the citizen parent is the mother: legitimation, a declaration of paternity under
oath by the father, or a court order of paternity. Congress decision to impose
requirements on unmarried fathers that differ from those on unmarried
mothers is based on the significant difference between the respective
relationships to the potential citizen at the time of birth.

Specifically, the imposition of the requirement for a paternal relationship, but

not a maternal one, is justified by two important governmental objectives.The
first governmental interest to be served is the importance of assuring that a
biological parent - child relationship exists. In the case of the mother, the
relation is verifiable from the birth itself.The second important governmental
interest furthered in a substantial manner by 1409(a)(4) is the determination to
ensure that the child and the citizen parent have some demonstrated
opportunity, or potential to develop not just a relationship that is recognzed by
the law but one that consist of the real everyday ties that provide a certain
connection between child and citizen parent and in turn the United States. In
the case of citizen mother and a child born oversees, the opportunity for a
meaningful relationship between citizen parent and child inheres in the very
event of birth, an event so often critical to our constitutional and statutory
understandings of citizenship.


This punishment is offensive to cardinal principles for which the Constitution
stands. The civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that
statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime. It is true that
several countries prescribe expatriation in the event that their nationals engage
in conduct in derogation of native allegiance.


It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting RA 9225 is to do away
with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine
citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of

352(a)(1) is discriminatory, and therefore violative of due process under the

Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, since no restriction against the length of
foreign residence applies to native-born citizens, though some members of
that majority believe that Congress lacks constitutional power to effect
involuntary divestiture of citizenship.
Section 352(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality' Act of 1952, provides:
(a) A person who has become a national by naturalization shall lose his
nationality by --"(1) having a continuous residence for three years in the
territory of a foreign state of which he was formerly a national or in which the
place of his birth is situated, except as provided in section 353 of this title,
whether such residence commenced before or after the effective date of this
Act. . . ."

It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2

immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of
necessary implication in statutory construction, which may be applied in
construing constitutional provisions, the strategic location of Section 2
indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the
actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos
abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos
who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not
satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

other countries. What RA 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born

Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not
recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly,
from Sec. 3, RA 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and
shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual
allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other
citizenship was not made a concern of RA 9225.

Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only to the votes of the President
and Vice-President, and not to the votes of the Senators and party-list
representatives, is violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.

Pursuant to Sec. 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, dual allegiance shall

be dealt with by law. Thus, until a law on dual allegiance is enacted by
Congress, the Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to entertain issues
regarding dual allegiance. To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the
Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing
provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In
Sections 2 and 3 of RA 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual
citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain
their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.
Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific
parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it
would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule
on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.

Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may vote
for president, vice-president, senators, and party-list representatives.
Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:
Sec. 18.On-Site Counting and Canvassing.



18.5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a
winning candidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by the
results thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is empowered
to order the proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the
scheduled election has not taken place in a particular country or countries, if
the holding of elections therein has been rendered impossible by events,
factors and circumstances peculiar to such country or countries, in which
events, factors and circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the
Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189
empowering the COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning candidates
for President and Vice-President is unconstitutional and violative of the
following provisions of Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution:

Sec. 4.



The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified
by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the
Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the
certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty
days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of
the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in
the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected,
but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one
of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members
of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

BONCODIN, respondents




Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is not violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the
Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, entitled An Act Providing for a System of
Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad,
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes, provides:
Sec. 5. Disqualifications.The following shall be disqualified from voting
under this Act: xxxxxxxxx

d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host

country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the
purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from
approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state
that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return
shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent
resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.

It was clearly shown from the said discussions that the Constitutional
Commission intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens
abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin, which is in the
Philippines. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who
reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the
Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.

essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save

for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary
conditions, are qualified to vote.

Constitutional Commission that [it] intended to enfranchise as much as

possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of
origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach
voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and
consider them qualified as voters for the first time. It is in pursuance of that
intention that the Commission provided for Section 2 [Article V] immediately
after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary
implication in statutory construction, , the strategic location of Section 2
indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the
actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos
abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos
who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not
satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

COMELEC itself admits that the Citizenship Retention and ReAcquisition Act
expanded the coverage of overseas absentee voting. According to the poll
body with the passage of RA 9225 the scope of overseas absentee voting has
been consequently expanded so as to include Filipinos who are also citizens of
other countries, subject, however, to the strict prerequisites indicated in the
pertinent provisions of RA 9225.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on
the power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President
and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions.

Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only to the second sentence in its
second paragraph allowing Congress to exercise the power to review, revise,
amend, and approve the IRR that the COMELEC shall promulgate, is
violative of Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 created the Joint Congressional Oversight

Committee (JCOC), as follows:
Sec. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee is hereby created, composed of the Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and
Laws, and seven (7) other Senators designated by the Senate President, and
the Chairman of the House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms,
and seven (7) other Members of the House of Representatives designated by
the Speaker of the House of Representatives: Provided, that of the seven (7)
members to be designated by each House of Congress, four (4) should come
from the majority and the remaining three (3) from the minority.

Lopez vs Comelec

While respondent was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the
Dual Citizenship Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice
Consul of the Philippine Consulate Generals Office in Los Angeles,
California, the same is not enough to allow him to run for a public office. The
above-quoted provision of law mandates that a candidate with dual citizenship
must make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. There is
no evidence presented that will show that respondent complied with the
provision of R.A. No. 9225. Absent such proof we cannot allow respondent to
run for Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay.

For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly

executed before an officer of law who is authorized to administer an oath. The
affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all
foreign citizenship for it to be effective. In the instant case, respondent Lopezs
failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the absence of an
affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe that he
failed to comply with the positive mandate of law. For failure of respondent to
prove that he abandoned his allegiance to the United States, this Commission
holds him disqualified from running for an elective position in the Philippines.


P. PAGADUAN, Respondents

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to

monitor and evaluate the implementation of this Act. It shall review, revise,
amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by
the Commission.
All the parties, petitioner and respondents alike, are unanimous in claiming
that Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 is unconstitutional
The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is
circumscribed by other constitutional provisions, one of which is the
aforementioned provision on the independence of constitutional commissions.
The Court has held that whatever may be the nature of the functions of the
Commission on Elections, the fact is that the framers of the Constitution
wanted it to be independent from the other departments of the Government.
The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an
independent body except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that
is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct
to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact
election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC
by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority. In line with
this, this Court holds that Section 25 of R.A. 9189 is unconstitutional and
must therefore be stricken off from the said law.
Loida Nicolas- Lewis, v. COMELEC

There is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring

"duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines
first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in
implicit acknowledgment that duals are most likely non-residents, grants
under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee
voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in



The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a

positive and voluntary act of representation as to ones nationality and
citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but
it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an
elective position.

Such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino
citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing
himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to
his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took
place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using
his US passport. This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing ones
foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnados bid for public office, as it effectively
imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position. In
effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period
of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he
first used his American passport after renouncing his American citizenship.

American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code calls for application in the case before us, given
the fact that at the time Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he was not
only a Filipino citizen but, by his own declaration, also an American citizen. It
is the application of this law and not of any foreign law that serves as the basis
for Arnados disqualification to run for any local elective position. This
requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read
together with Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code which disqualifies
those with dual citizenship from running for any elective local position,
indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to run for public office must be
solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who
reacquires Philippine citizenship to continue using a foreign passport which
indicates the recognition of a foreign state of the individual as its national
even after the Filipino has renounced his foreign citizenship, is to allow a
complete disregard of this policy.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete and unequivocal.

The requirement that the renunciation must be made through an oath
emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath of renunciation to
remain true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign
passport because it is convenient for the person to do so is rendering the oath a
hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere
ceremonial formality.

REYES v. COMELEC and TAN G.R. No. 207264, 22 October

2013, EN BANC

xxx for Reyes to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for
public office the law requires that she must have accomplished the following
acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before

R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship
for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking
an oath of allegiance to the Republic. The oath is an abbreviated repatriation
process that restores ones Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights
and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed
in Section 5.

Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who
have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or
retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public
offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public
officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to
qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.

To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one

citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.

Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other
fact, they must be alleged and proven. To prove a foreign law, the
party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:

Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to
in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a
foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice- consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
(Emphasis ours)

Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a

document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the
official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

The Court has admitted certain exceptions to the above rules and held that the
existence of a foreign law may also be established through: (1) a testimony
under oath of an expert witness such as an attorney-at-law in the country
where the foreign law operates wherein he quotes verbatim a section of the
law and states that the same was in force at the time material to the facts at
hand; and (2) likewise, in several naturalization cases, it was held by the Court
that evidence of the law of a foreign country on reciprocity regarding the
acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice,
may be allowed and used as basis for favorable action, if, in the light of all the
circumstances, the Court is "satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof

the Consul-General of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a
personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath." In the case at bar, there is no
showing that Reyes complied with the aforesaid requirements.