Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions

ISSN: 1469-0764 (Print) 1743-9647 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftmp20

Islam and International Politics: Examining

Huntington's 'Civilizational Clash' Thesis
James G. Mellon
To cite this article: James G. Mellon (2001) Islam and International Politics: Examining
Huntington's 'Civilizational Clash' Thesis, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 2:1,
73-83, DOI: 10.1080/714005437
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714005437

Published online: 08 Sep 2010.

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Islam and International Politics:

Examining Huntingtons
Civilizational Clash Thesis

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JA M E S G . M E L LO N

In his 1993 Foreign Affairs article The Clash of Civilizations?, Samuel Huntington
suggested that the international system and future conflicts in the aftermath of the end of
the Cold War is likely to be defined by cleavages between and among distinct civilizations.
Responding to Huntingtons anticipation of a fundamental clash between a civilization
defined by Islam and the West, this essay argues that Huntington overstates the
homogeneity of the predominantly Islamic world and of the Arab world, and errs to the
extent to which he appears to suggest that so-called Islamic fundamentalism represents
the sole authentic expression of Islam.

Introduction
With the end of the Cold War, students of international politics have
had to consider which characteristics of the international system have
changed, and which have and are likely to persist. One of the most
discussed efforts in this regard has been Samuel P. Huntingtons
article The Clash of Civilizations? in the Summer 1993 issue of
Foreign Affairs.1 The article made some genuinely interesting points,
reminding fellow students of international politics that history,
culture and religion do matter. States, individuals and other
transnational actors like churches, non-governmental organisations,
international organisations and multinational corporations do seek
their own interests, or at least their own view of their interests
through the various instruments of foreign policy and international
politics like diplomacy, aid, trade, deterrence and compellence that
are familiar to students of international politics. The great strength of
Huntingtons article is his reminder that the motivations behind the
behaviour of actors in international politics are not self-evident.
Actors seek ends defined by values, and although cynicism is never
Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol.2, No.1 (Summer 2001), pp.7383
PU B L I S H E D BY F RA N K C A S S , LO N D O N

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entirely absent from international politics, the behaviour of actors

does reflect not only the structural constraints imposed by the system
but, as well, those ends valued by the actor. The behaviour of some
actors may appear superficially to be irrational by the standards of an
observer but further investigation may reveal an underlying
rationality of some sort. The virtue of Huntingtons article is its
recognition of the importance of the politics of identity. The article,
however, is marred by some fundamental shortcomings. Foremost
among these is that, in suggesting some of the complications that may
influence the characteristics of such conflicts that may arise,
Huntington leaves the impression that Western states should assume
that the forces most antipathetic to liberal democratic values will
invariably assume power in the world outside of the West, and that a
clash of civilizations is almost inevitable between the West and those
states with a predominantly Islamic population. Such a view
overstates the homogeneity of both the Islamic community and the
societies of the Middle East. While some elements within the Islamic
community and within the Middle East are radically opposed to
values identified with Western culture, it is misleading to identify
either the Islamic world or the Arab world with the most extremist
expressions of so-called Islamic fundamentalism.
The Controversy
The most controversial element in Huntingtons argument is his view
that, with the end of the Cold War and the strategic-ideological
confrontation between a liberal, democratic, market-oriented
worldview and a communist worldview, the most obvious potential
alternative worldview to the liberal democratic worldview is that put
forward by so-called Islamic fundamentalists, and that the most
politically and intellectually challenging issues in international
politics in the foreseeable future will relate to clashes between
elements of Western civilization and elements of Islamic civilization
or Islamic-Confucian civilization. In focusing on what he sees as
civilizational clash, Huntington emphasises a particular subset of
cultural differences in world politics, and on the relations between
civilizations. Huntington has been accused of overstating the
influence of civilizations as actors, and understating that of states as
actors in world politics. Hunter, for example, expresses reservations
about such an approach, cautioning that, Only a pragmatic and

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specific approach, not a general and abstract one, can answer

whether an accommodation between Islam and the West can take
place in a gradual and evolutionary manner or whether it can happen
only after conflict and confrontation.2 Fouad Ajami remarks on how
Huntington identifies the precise boundaries of civilizations where
historians find much greater complexity, and then observes that,
From one of the most influential and brilliant students of the state
and its national interest there now comes an essay that misses the
slyness of states, the unsentimental and cold-blooded nature of so
much of what they do as they pick their way through chaos.3
Huntingtons focus on cultural particularities places him within
the school criticised by Said as Orientalist that is, an approach
emphasising specifics of culture, history and religion to the neglect of
consideration of current strategic and political-economic disparities.4
Critics of Orientalism, like Said, would fault so-called Orientalists
for attempting to explain the weakness and vulnerability of the
Islamic world relative to the West in terms of limitations of the
Islamic worldview. These critics are much more inclined to seek to
explain such weakness and vulnerability in terms of colonialism and
neo-colonialism. There has tended to be a correlation between
methodological approaches and political viewpoints. Said, for
example, criticises representatives of approaches that he would
depict as Orientalist as being, in his view, lacking in appreciation of
the degree to which policies of Western states have contributed to the
problems of the Middle East. However strong this apparent
correlation has been in practice, it does not inevitably follow that
there is necessarily a logical link between methodological approaches
and political points of view.
Huntington implicitly accepts at face value assertions made by socalled Islamic fundamentalists (more aptly termed Islamists or Islamic
revivalists) that they speak on behalf of Islam itself, and that liberalism
and democracy are incompatible with Islam. Neither of these
assertions is self-evidently true; both would be challenged by many
adherents and many students of Islam. Representatives of traditional
Islam continue to exercise influence but their credibility, when
addressing the economic and technological weakness of the Islamic
world relative to the West, is constrained by their deference to, in some
cases, and co-optation by, in other cases, regimes whose incompetence
and/or corruption is seen as having contributed to the problem. Socalled Islamic fundamentalism has represented one but by no means

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the only response. Ironically the very restrictions on speech, media and
political parties have strengthened the position of advocates of Islamic
fundamentalism in that specifically Islamic organisations represented
practically the sole effective opposition voices, given the suppression
of secular opposition voices. The influence of Islamic organisations
was further enhanced by their provision of social services in societies
in which the state had limited effectiveness in this field. Nevertheless,
there have been other sorts of responses which have entailed quite
different interpretations of the Islamic tradition.

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The Diversity Within the Islamic Tradition

Proponents of the civilizational clash theory tend to assume a
certain degree of homogeneity within the community of believers in
Islam, or within the societies of states with a predominantly Islamic
population. It sometimes seems to be assumed that Islamists
(frequently referred to as Islamic fundamentalists, but the
appellation has problems given its connotations more appropriate to
certain branches of the Protestant form of Christianity) represent
Islam to the exclusion of other points of view within the community
of believers in Islam. Esposito points out that a failure to appreciate
the diversity among believers in Islam has generated
misinterpretation and mistrust.5 There is a certain irony in this in that
critics of Islamism who adopt this point of view implicitly accept the
view of Islamists that Islamism represents the sole authentic
expression of the Islamic faith. Halliday argues that proponents of
the thesis put forward by Huntington, like the proponents of radical
Islamists, mischaracterize Islamism as the sole authentic expression of
Islam.6 In fact, all ancient faiths have come to be expressed in practice
in a diversity of ways. Different believers interpret elements of
scripture and tradition in different ways. Islam does not have the sort
of formal hierarchical institutional structure that one finds in the
Catholic tradition. The Islamic community has long reflected
differences, for example, among Shia, Sunni and Sufi traditions.
Islamism reflects a reaction not only against the globalisation of
predominantly Western values but, in addition, against traditional
Islam which, it is suggested, has frequently been co-opted by the
status quo powers that be.
Modernity with its increased individualism and rationalism has
posed a challenge to all religions, as it has to all traditional

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institutions. In the case of Islam, this has been compounded by the

identification of modernity with predominantly Western values and
the disparities in economics, technology, cultural influence and
strategic capability between the predominantly Islamic world and the
West. For some, traditionalist Islam continues to be seen as the
answer. For others, traditionalist Islam is viewed as either having
failed to address the problem and/or as having acquiesced in the
exploitation of the weak by either alien rulers and/or corrupt and
incompetent indigenous dictatorships. Some have attempted to
identify some combination of Islamic and liberal values, and to
produce some sort of Islamic liberalism. From this perspective, which
has authentic roots in Islam, Islam is no more incompatible with
liberalism than other major faiths. The academic Bassam Tibi
represents an interesting case: as a student of Islam, he demonstrates
a certain sympathy with Huntingtons concern that Islamic
fundamentalism poses potential for civilizational clash with the
West, but, as a believer himself in Islam, Tibi reflects that, As a liberal
Muslim I rather believe in a cultural and political pluralism that
precludes the dominance of whatever civilization.7 Dissatisfaction
with traditionalist Islam has also inspired both moderate and radical
forms of what is sometimes referred to as Islamic fundamentalism but
which would more aptly be termed either Islamic revivalism or
Islamism. Contrary to the assumption of some that such religiosity
reflects ignorance or lack of sophistication, Islamic revivalism has
attracted many highly educated and technologically sophisticated
adherents who utilise all the means associated with modern
communications to propagate their beliefs.
In the post-World War II era, everyone in the region has been
impressed by the technology and prosperity of the West but while
some have been attracted by the openness and tolerance of the West,
others have been struck unfavourably by Western materialism and
individualism. With the spread of education and literacy has come a
questioning of traditional Islam that has given rise to both Islamic
liberalism and Islamic revivalism (or Islamism). It was exposure to the
West ironically that inspired Sayyid Qutb, for example, to turn to
Islamic revivalism, and to join the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
Islamic revivalism is not traditionalist Islam. It is much more overtly
political, determined to challenge what it sees as traditionalist Islams
acquiescence in an unjust status quo. In doing so, it is prepared to
utilise Western technology while questioning Western values.

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Few, if any, traditions are entirely homogeneous and uncontested.

Albert Hourani observes that, There was not one idea of Islam only,
but a whole spectrum of them. The word Islam did not have a
single, simple meaning, but was what Muslims made of it.8 A
number of concepts critical to an understanding of the political
implications of Islam are interpreted differently by different
adherents to Islam. These concepts include tawhid (consensus/
oneness with God) and shura (consultation). Ahmad S. Moussali
observes that moderate and radical Islamists interpret such concepts
differently.9 Spokespersons for Islamic liberalism would interpret
such concepts still differently. While some Islamists have gone so far
as to express uncertainty, at least in theoretical terms, as to whether
a capacity for legislation is necessary given the perfection of the
Sharia (Islamic law), some Islamic liberals have asserted that the
concept of shura makes Islam readily compatible with democracy.
The debate over the compatibility of Islam with democracy turns on
this issue. It should also be noted that, as the recent Algerian
experience suggests, if democracy refers to majority rule and the
reflection of popular sentiment in government, this may mean
electoral success for some form or other of either traditionalist Islam
or Islamic revivalism. Given such cases as the attempted assassination
of, and continuing threats against Egyptian Nobel Prize-winning
author Naguib Mahfuz, there is some concern about the likelihood in
the event of popularly elected governments of an Islamist persuasion
of tolerance for pluralism.
The concept of jihad, in particular, has inspired radically different
interpretations among believers in Islam and among scholars who
study the Islamic tradition. Stereotypes of fanatical followers of Islam
have depicted jihad as implying a commitment to the use of violence
and force, if necessary, as a means to the propagation of the faith.
Most contemporary followers of Islam, however, see jihad as implying
a commitment to evangelization and to the propagation of the faith
through persuasion and peaceful means. This is, after all, hardly so
strange. Medieval Christians sometimes resorted to coercion as a
means of encouraging conversions, and, in the Crusades, accepted the
notion of a holy war. Disagreements over the implications of such
concepts are not simply of academic interest; such disagreements are
reflected in differences over policy and politics.

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Diverse Sources of Identity

This religious diversity is further compounded by the intrusion of
other loyalties and allegiances that persons have. Lewis notes that
traditionally persons identified themselves as believers in a certain
faith, residents of a particular locality, and subjects of a specific lord
or monarch. With the emergence of nationality as a way of defining
identity and the development of such a notion of nationality out of
philology and linguistic studies, language became not simply one way
of defining identity but the notion of Arabs as speakers of the Arabic
language came to be extended to the notion of Arabs as members of
an Arab nation.
In some states, the notion of a shared Arab identity coexisted with
distinct identities associated with specific states, such as the notion of
an Egyptian identity, for example, that could be traced back prior to
Egypt becoming Arabic-speaking and predominantly Islamic. Even
the assumption of homogeneity at the national level is not entirely
accurate Boutros Boutros-Ghali served in the Egyptian cabinet not
only as foreign minister but also as the effective representative within
the Cabinet of Egypts Coptic community. Fouad Ajami cites Milad
Hannas analysis of Egyptian history and culture in which Hanna
analyses Egyptian culture in terms of seven pillars four historic
and three geographic. Ajami relates that, for Hanna, The historic
pillars are pharaonic, Greco-Roman, Coptic, then Islamic. The three
pillars of geography are the links to Europe through the
Mediterranean, to Africa, and to the Arab world. ... It is against this
cultural eclecticism, this old, saving ambiguity, that the Islamists hurl
themselves.10 Bernard Lewis observes that:
A Cairene Muslim may, in different situations, see himself as an
Egyptian, proud of the multi-millenial glory of his country, with
a history dating back to the Pharaohs of antiquity; as an Arab,
claiming a common identity with all those who share the Arab
language and culture, irrespective of country, race or religion;
or as a Muslim, for whom other Muslims as far away as
Bangladesh and Indonesia are brothers while his Coptic nextdoor neighbours unquestionably Egyptian by origin, and Arab
by language and culture, but Christian are not.11
While the situation in each country in the region is somewhat
different, there is, in each case, some pluralism in sources of identity.

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In much of the Arab Middle East, one finds the predominance of

both Arabic and Islam, but in Iran, for example, Islam is the
predominant religion, but the predominant language is not Arabic
but Persian (or Farsi) and Iranians historically have tended to see
themselves as a distinct nation. Irans Islamic identity is important but
so is its Persian identity which predates its Islamic one. Mackey makes
this point in the title of her recent book, The Iranians: Persia, Islam
and the Soul of a Nation.12 When the Islamic Revolution took place
in Iran, it inspired widespread concern that such a revolution would
sweep through the entire Middle East but its impact outside Iran
itself has been limited. Ajami notes that, In retrospect, it is easy to
see that the Iranian revolutionaries overestimated the centrality of
their realm to the wider world of Islam. ... For all the sound and fury
of a revolution that asserted its relevance to others, its right to guide
them, Iran remains a solitary society with a strong national and
cultural tradition.13 In the aftermath of the passing of the Ayatullah
Khomeini in Iran, there has been continuing contention between
supporters of President Muhammad Khatemi and of Ayatullah
Khamenei over whether or not to pursue a policy of gradual
liberalisation and of seeking a rapprochement with the West. Turkey
is another example of a predominantly Islamic country in which the
primary language is not Arabic and which tends to see itself as a
distinct nation. Within Turkey and northern Iraq, the Kurds see
themselves as another distinct nation.
The Iran-Iraq War highlighted a number of pertinent issues. Both
Iran and Iraq were predominantly Islamic countries, and, given the
secularist orientation of the Iraqi regime, this made it attractive for
Iran to seek support throughout the Middle East by emphasising panIslamism. This was further complicated by the fact that, while the
Shia tradition of the Islamic faith was a minority tradition in the
Middle East as a whole, it was the majority tradition within Iran. Iran,
as a result, was hopeful that the Shias who were a minority within
Iraq as a whole but a majority in parts of southern Iraq might identify
with the Iranian cause. The Iraqi regime was distrustful of both Iraqs
Kurdish minority which was concentrated in the north and Iraqs Shia
minority which was concentrated in the south. From Iraqs point of
view, given that Iraqis were Arabic-speakers and tended to see
themselves as Arabs while Iranians were neither Arabic-speakers or
Arabs, the logical way of seeking support within the Middle East was
through an invocation of pan-Arabism. The point is not to assess the

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cogency of either appeal but to illustrate, to some degree, how diverse

a political and cultural reality is actually concealed by the apparent, at
least to Westerners, homogeneity of the region.
Proponents of the civilizational clash thesis tend to focus on the
specifics of the traditional Islamic theory of international relations
which is premised on a distinction between the Islamic world (dar-ulIslam) and the non-Islamic world (dar-ul-harb). In practice, however,
with the predominance of Western notions of international relations
throughout the world over the last few hundred years, Western
notions of international law and the international political system as
one of nation-states competing in the absence of an overall authority
have come to dominate the day-to-day practice of international
politics in the Middle East as it has in other regions. This is not to
dismiss the notion that Islam has an influence on both domestic and
foreign policy within the region. Nor is to deny that some
dissatisfaction exists among some in the region with the dominance
of Western norms; some of this dissatisfaction stems from a
commitment to specifically Islamic values, and others stem from a
general Third World dissatisfaction with disparities between North
and South. Emphasis on the dualist aspect of the Islamic theory tends
to overstate the homogeneity of the Islamic world.
A sound analysis of the relations between the West and the
predominantly Islamic world cannot neglect the political, strategic
and economic influences but this should not rule out considering at
the same time the long-standing religious and cultural influences that
inspire the norms and values that move individuals, groups and
governments. Consideration of political culture need not necessarily
imply a neglect of material considerations. Nor does it necessarily
follow that, because Huntington focuses on cultural factors and
posits a theory of civilizational clash, any analysis of the
predominantly Islamic world or of the Arab world or of the Middle
East that seeks to incorporate considerations of political culture will
necessarily lead to the same conclusions. Huntingtons problem is not
that he devotes attention to cultural considerations but that he limits
his attention to broad generalisations. If Huntington is read as
suggesting that culture and values matter, then few would quarrel.
Politics and strategy do not take place in a vacuum; invariably culture
serves to frame a context. Huntington, however, is typically read as
presenting a more controversial argument that certain cultural
differences are so fundamental that clash is almost unavoidable.

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This argument suggests that differences defined by certain cultural or

civilizational boundaries preclude rapprochement. There have
tended to be two sorts of responses to such an approach, neither of
which are appropriate. One has been to accept Huntingtons
approach, and to overstate the differences between East and West and
to understate the prospects for peace; the other is to disagree with his
approach, and to conclude that consideration of cultural factors is
necessarily misguided.

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Conclusion
The most obvious way to critique Huntingtons article would be to
challenge the very notion of looking at culture and values as, in some
sense, independent, rather than dependent, variables. This is an
approach, however, as the preceding argument indicates, which will
not be adopted here. Social, economic and political forces do exercise
influence on the persistence and diffusion of ideas but ideas in
themselves and in their institutional manifestations inspire behaviour
and shape perception and interpretation. Frustration on the part of
many in the Arab world at the economic disparity between the West
and the Arab world, and at the persistence of corruption and
infighting in the Arab world contributed to the spread of both Islamic
revivalism (sometimes termed Islamic fundamentalism) and Islamic
liberalism. Adherents to Islam were more or less likely to adopt one
or the other of these positions depending on their particular
interpretations of such Islamic concepts as tawhid and shura. It would
be unrealistic to deny that Islamic revivalism has attracted substantial
support in a number of predominantly Islamic countries, and that
such developments as elections provide opportunities for the
expression of such support. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to
assume that it represents the unanimous opinion of a homogeneous
Islamic world, as it would be a mistake to assume complete unanimity
on all points among Islamists.
NOTES
1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, Foreign Affairs 72/3 (Summer
1993), pp.2249; also in The Clash of Civilizations?: The Debate (New York: Foreign
Affairs, 1996), pp.125.
2. Shireen T. Hunter, The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful
Coexistence? (Westport, CT and London: Praeger with the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Washington DC, 1998), p.29.

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3. Fouad Ajami, The Summoning: But They Said, We Will Not Hearken, Foreign
Affairs 72/4 (Sept.Oct. 1993), pp.23; also in The Clash of Civilizations?: The Debate
(note 1), p.27.
4. See Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1978).
5. See John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (revised edn.) (New York
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
6. See Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the
Middle East (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996).
7. Bassam Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World
Disorder (Berkeley, CA and London: University of California Press, 1998), p.113.
8. Albert Hourani, A History of Arab Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1991), p.457.
9. See Ahmad S. Moussali, Moderate and Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Quest for
Modernity, Legitimacy and the Islamic State (Gainesville: University Press of Florida,
1999).
10. Fouad Ajami, The Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Generations Odyssey (New York:
Vintage, 1999), p.243.
11. Bernard Lewis, The Multiple Identities of the Middle East (London: Phoenix, 1998),
pp.756.
12. Sandra Mackey, The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation (New York:
Dutton, 1996).
13. Ajami (note 10), p.149.