GR L-24670 (December 14, 1979)

Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership

vs.
Feati Bank and Trust Co.
Facts:
Ortigas & Co. is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public. It entered into
separate agreements of sale with Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles over 2 parcels of who
transferred their rights and interests over the same to Emma Chavez. Ortigas & Co. executed the
corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez upon payment of the purchase price. Both the
agreements and the deeds of sale thereafter executed contained the stipulation that the parcels of land
subject of the deeds of sale shall be used by the Buyer exclusively for residential purposes. The
restrictions were later annotated in the Transfer Certificates of Titles issued in the name of Chavez.
Eventually, Feati Bank & Trust Co. (FBTC) acquired the lots with the building restrictions also annotated in
their corresponding TCTs. FBTC started construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking
purposes. Ortigas & Co. sent a written demand to stop construction claiming that the restrictions were
imposed as part of its general building scheme designed for the beautification and development of the
Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of its big landed estate where commercial and industrial sites
are also designated or established. FBTC continued the construction contending that the building was
being constructed according to the zoning regulations as a commercial and industrial zone per Resolution
No. 27 s-1960 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal.
Issues:
Whether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations assumed by FBTC.
Held:
While non-impairment of contacts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power. Resolution No.27, S-1960 declaring the western
part of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial or commercial zone was passed by
the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong in the exercise of police power to safeguard/promote the health,
safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Judicial notice may be taken of
the conditions prevailing in the area, especially where the lots are located. EDSA supports an endless
stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution which are hardly conducive to the health,
safety or welfare of the residents in its route. The Municipality of Mandaluyong was reasonably justified
under the circumstances in passing the subject resolution.
Thus, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property,
and with business and occupations. Persons may be subjected to all kinds of restraint and burdens, in
order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state, and to this fundamental aim of the
Government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.
Dolan v. Brown, states that "Equity will not, as a rule, enforce a restriction upon the use of property by
injunction where the property has so changed in character and environment as to make it unfit or
unprofitable for use should the restriction be enforced, but will, in such a case, leave the complainant to
whatever remedy he may have at law. Applying the principle just stated to the present controversy, We
can say that since it is now unprofitable, nay a hazard to the health and comfort, to use the lots for strictly
residential purposes, defendants- appellees should be permitted, on the strength of the resolution
promulgated under the police power of the municipality, to use the same for commercial purposes.
In Burgess v. Magarian et al. it was, held that "restrictive covenants running with the land are binding on
all subsequent purchasers ... " However, Section 23 of the zoning ordinance involved therein contained
a proviso expressly declaring that the ordinance was not intended "to interfere with or abrogate or annul
any easements, covenants or other agreement between parties." In the case at bar, no such proviso is
found in the subject resolution.

G.R. No. 107671. February 26, 1997

REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:
Sps. Ochoa filed a complaint in the RTC against Remman Enterprises, Inc. (Remman) for abatement of
nuisance and damages. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of sps. Ochoa and against Remman, ordering
the latter to "stop and desist from draining their waste matter, solid and liquid, to the estate of the the
former.

Sps. Ochoa filed another complaint against Remman, this time for indirect contempt. They alleged that
a portion of their estate was still being flooded with wastes coming from the latter's hog farm, in defiance
of the final and executory order of the court directing it to stop and desist. The branch clerk of court was
authorized by the court to conduct the ocular inspection and was directed to submit a report immediately
upon termination thereof. Thereafter, said clerk of court reported his findings and on the basis of which the
court issued its order finding Remman guilty of indirect contempt.
Issues:
1. Whether Remman may be held liable for indirect contempt after a single hearing and on the basis
of an ocular inspection report. YES.
2. Whether the authorization must come from the National Pollution Control, now Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB). NO.

Held:
1. Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court specifically outlines the procedural requisites before the
accused may be punished for indirect contempt:
(1) the filing of a written charge and
(2) an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel. All that the law requires is
that there be a charge in writing duly filed in court and an opportunity given to the person charged to be
heard by himself or counsel.
In the instant case, a written charge of indirect contempt was duly filed by the sps. Ochoa. Acting on
the complaint, the trial court issued an order requiring Remman to "show cause/explain why a judgment of
contempt should not be rendered against it." Remman admits in its petition, it "vehemently denied the
accusations in the motion for contempt". We can draw no other conclusion than that a hearing was
conducted and petitioner was heard in its defenses in court.
Moreover, its vice-president and counsel were likewise present during the ocular inspection where they
actively participated, as reported by the clerk of the trial court.

2. We uphold the contention of the Solicitor General that petitioner miscomprehended the law in
applying P.D. No. 984 to this case. The original complaint antecedent to the case at bar was for
abatement of nuisance and damages. The last paragraph of Section 8 of said decree "delineates the
authority to be exercised by the (National Pollution Control) Commission and by the ordinary courts
in respect of preventing or remedying the pollution of the waters or atmospheric air of the
Philippines. The provision excludes from the authority of the Commission only the determination of
and the filing of court actions involving violations of the New Civil Code on nuissance." Hence, this
case does not fall within the exclusive authority and jurisdiction of said Commission, which has
been reorganized into the Environmental Management Bureau.

G.R. No. L-3623. November 6, 1907.

RUPERTO RELOVA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ELENA LAVAREZ, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.
Syllabus:
1. REALTY; EASEMENTS; WATER RIGHTS BY PRESCRIPTION. The enjoyment by the plaintiff landowner of
an easement for the maintenance of an irrigation aqueduct and a dam on the lands of the defendants for a
period of more than twenty years confers title thereto upon the plaintiff landowner by prescription and
burdens the lands of the defendants with a corresponding servitude.
Facts:
Relova is the owner of a tract of rice land which is cultivated with the aid of water brought from the River
through an aqueduct which passes over the land of Lavarez, et.al. On the land of Lavarez, et.al there was a
dam with a small gate or aperture in its face which was used to control the flow of the water in the
aqueduct. One of the defendants completely destroyed the dam and let all the water escape by the
drainage ditch, so that none flowed on the land of Relova. At the time when the dam was destroyed Relova
had some five cavanes of land prepared to plant rice, but because of the escape of the water resulting
from the destruction of the dam he was unable to raise his crop.
Upon the further fact that the aqueduct and dam in question had been in use by the plaintiff, as of right,
for more than 30 years, and that he had an easement in the land of the defendants for the maintenance of
the said aqueduct and dam, an injunction was granted to restrain the defendants from interfering with the
plaintiffs right to the use of the water in the aqueduct.
Lavarez, et.al. contends that the evidence of records does not establish the existence of the servitude in
the lands for the maintenance of the aqueduct and dam.
Issue:
Is the use of the aqueduct and dam an easement? YES.
Held:
The fourth assignment of error cannot be maintained in the light of the proof of record that the aqueduct
and the dam (presa) have been in existence for more than thirty years, during which period the owner of
the land in question has always exercised the right to the reasonable use of the water in the aqueduct for
irrigation purposes. (Arts. 527 and 528, Civil Code.)
Counsel for the appellants contend that under the definition of a servitude which appears in article 530 of
the Civil Code the existence of the servitude cannot be established unless it appears that from such
servitude a benefit was, or might be, derived by the Relova; and that since it appears from the testimony
of the witnesses that the aperture in the dam was used for the purpose of controlling the flow of water in
the aqueduct and for preventing damage by overflow to the lowlands over which the aqueduct runs, and
since it appears that the lands of Relova are higher than the lands of Lavarez, et.al., therefore the
aqueduct could never have been intended for the supply of water to the lands of the Relova and neither
the dam nor the aqueduct could be of any benefit to these lands.
This contention cannot be maintained in the face of the positive testimony as to the existence of the
aqueduct and its use for many years to supply water to the lands in question. It may be that the

defendants had a right to open the aperture in the face of the dam to prevent a destructive overflow of
water on their lands, but this would not give them the right to stop the flow of water altogether; nor does it
tend to establish the contention of the defendants that Relova is not entitled to the benefit of the
reasonable use of the water flowing in the aqueduct, since it does not appear that such use necessarily
involved destructive overflows from the aqueduct, provided the flow of water therein was properly
regulated by the opening of the aperture in the dam.
The judgment of the trial court authorizing the issue of the writ and awarding damages in favor of the
plaintiff for the losses entailed by the destruction of the dam is affirmed.

G.R. No. L-37409 May 23, 1988

NICOLAS VALISNO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FELIPE ADRIANO, defendant-appellee.

Syllabus:
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a
parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the
conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's land
cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person.

Facts:
Nicolas bought a parcel of land from Felipes sister, Honorata. The land which is planted with watermelon,
peanuts, corn, tobacco, and other vegetables adjoins that of Adrianos on the bank of the Pampanga River.
Both parcels of land had been inherited by Honorata and Felipe from their father Eladio. At the time of the
sale of the land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through a canal
traversing Felipes land.
Felipe levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that Nicolas was deprived of the irrigation water and
prevented from cultivating his 57-hectare land.
Nicolas filed in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications a complaint for deprivation of water rights.
A decision was rendered ordering Felipe to reconstruct the irrigation canal. Instead of restoring the
irrigation canal, the latter asked for a reinvestigation of the case, which was granted. In the meantime,
Nicolas rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense because his need for water to irrigate his
watermelon fields was urgent. Later, he filed a complaint for damages in the RTC claiming that he suffered
damages when he failed to plant his fields that year for lack of irrigation water, and when he reconstructed
the canal.
Meanwhile, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications reversed the Bureau's decision by issuing a
final resolution dismissing Nicolas's complaint. The Secretary held that Eladio Adriano's water rights which
had been granted in 1923 ceased to be enjoyed by him in 1936 or 1937, when his irrigation canal
collapsed. His non-use of the water right since then for a period of more than five years extinguished the
grant by operation of law, hence the water rights did not form part of his hereditary estate which his heirs
partitioned among themselves.
Issue:
Whether or not Nicolas has acquired the easement of water over Felipes land.
Held: Yes.

The existence of the irrigation canal on Felipes land for the passage of water from the Pampanga River to
Honorata's land prior to and at the time of the sale of Honorata's land to Nicolas was equivalent to a title
for the vendee of the land to continue using it as provided in Article 624 of the Civil Code (Doctrine of
Apparent Sign):
Article 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or
maintained by the owner of both shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in order
that he easement may continue actively and passively, unless at the time, theownership of the two estates
is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign
aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed.
The deed of sale in favor of Plaintiff included the "conveyance and transfer of the water rights and
improvements" appurtenant to Honorata's property. According to the Plaintiff, the water right was the
primary consideration for his purchase of Honorata's property, for without it the property would be
unproductive.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a
parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the
conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's land
cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person. The fact that an easement by grant
may also have qualified as an easement of necessity does detract from its permanency as property right,
which survives the determination of the necessity.
As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from
obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference, such as the appellee's act of levelling the irrigation canal
to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.