Review: [untitled]

Author(s): George C. Homans, Guy E. Swanson, Bennett M. Berger

Source: The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 78, No. 3 (Nov., 1972), pp. 696-708
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2776320
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Review Symposium
Beyond Freedomand Dignity.By B. F. Skinner.New York: AlfredA.
Knopf,Inc., 1971. Pp. 225. $6.95.
GeorgeC. Homans
HarvardUniversity
One sometimewonderswhatall thefussoverB. F. Skinneris about. Take
his behavioralpsychologyitself.Many personsdo not realize that they
have been talkingprose,that is, behavioralpsychology,
fora verylong
time,indeedforendlessages. It did not requireSkinnerto teach people
that if theywantedsomeoneto do something,
it helped to offerhim an
inducement,
or thata man who had performed
an actionwhichwas successfulin particularcircumstances
was apt to repeat that action when
similar circumstancesrecurred.This sort of commonsense embodies
perfectly
soundbehavioralprinciples.What modernbehavioralpsychology
has done is state the principlesexplicitly,free them fromunnecessary
assumptions,
test themrigorously
in experiments
largelycarriedout on
animals,and beginto establishthe crucialquantitativerelationships.
All
thishas been a verygreatachievement,
and Skinnerhas been the leader
in it, but it is an achievement
in systematizing
whatmenand womenhave
longknownintuitively
and unsystematically.
They could not have helped
knowingit. Their own behaviorand that of otherswerewhat theywere
mostfamiliarwith,and successin social life requiredthat theyuse behavioral principlesin some haphazard fashion,even if they did not
formulate
them.
I myselfam fullypersuadedof the truthof the principlesof behavioral
psychologyas so far formulated,
thoughI thinktheremay be principles
we have yet to formulate
clearly.To this extent,I am a Skinnerianand
have longbeen knownas one. But the issue raisedby his presentbook is
less the intellectualtruthof behavioralpsychologythanits applicationin
a systematictechnology
forcontrolling
humanbehavior.Skinner'scentral
is that the viewsput forwardby the ideologistsof humanfreeargument
dom and dignitymay preventmen fromadoptinga technologywhich
mightbe morepowerfulin changinghumanbehaviorand changingit for
thebetterthananything
we use now.On thisissue,I believebothSkinner
and his opponentsare muchmoretouchythan the realitywarrants,and
that the most seriousimpediment
to the adoptionof a behavioraltechnologyis one that Skinnerfailsto recognize.NeitherSkinnernor his opponentswill make as muchpracticaldifference
as eitherpartyseems to
think.
Let me turnfirstto thefamousproblemof "the freedom
of thewill."Its
practicalimportis limited,whateverits philosophical
interestmaybe. As a
I mustbelieve that my actionsare whollydetermined,
behaviorist,
that
the choiceI make betweenalternatives
is predestined-butwhat earthly
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SkinnerSymposium
difference
does it make? My intellectualconvictiondoes not,as I wishit
would, relieveme of the necessityof makinga decision; and in this
thoroughly
operationalsense I remaina free,autonomousman. Not until
a machineis inventedthat will always and correctlypredictmy action
in advance,even whenI knowthat it is designedto predictmy action,
shall I lose my de factofreedomand autonomy.I shall thenalso become
superfluous.
But even if at some timein the futuremachifies
of this sort
can be produced,theirproduction
is alwaysgoingto be muchmorecostly
thantheproductionof ordinarymenlike myselfby whatI shall call conventionalmethods,and therefore
men are nevergoingto loose theirloophole to freedomand autonomy.No one need fear that behavioralpsychologyis goingto rob himof his freewill,so whatis all the fussabout?
Freedomis reallya moraldemand,not an intellectualissue. Though
thephilosophicfreedom
of man'swillmaybe preservedby cost considerations-to provethat the behaviorof everyman is utterlydetermined
will
always cost more than the proofwill be worth-nevertheless,
men will
alwaysin fact attemptto determine,
that is, to control,the behaviorof
others,and theirattemptswill oftenbe successful.The demandthatmen
have made for themselvesand for othersthat theyshould be freehas
usuallybeen a demandnot thattheyshouldbe sparedattemptsto control
theirbehavior,but only that theyshouldbe spared certainkindsof attempts-adversivecontrol,as Skinnercalls it-controlby threats,deprivation,and force.In this demandSkinnerhimselfconcurs.Few men have
argued,on the otherhand, that men shouldbe freefromcontrolin the
sense of being spared the temptationof receivingpositiverewardsfor
theiractions,unlesstheactionsthemselves
werebelievedto have adversive
consequencesin the long run,like Adam's eatingthe apple.
True, some silly thingshave been said, and some personshave argued
thatmenshouldbe freedfromall control,but thearguments
soon get into
hopelessdifficulties.
First, for one man to refrainfromattemptingto
controlthebehaviorof anotherdoes not mean thattheother'sbehavioris
leftuncontrolled:
it onlymeansthatit comesunderthecontrolof different
variables.Second,and moreinteresting,
it is alwayspossible,indeedit is
easy to show,thatthe verypersonswho declaimagainstefforts
to control
others-"manipulate"is the word often used-do in fact attemptto
controlothers.Accordingly,
they are hypocrites,thoughno doubt unconsciousones, if that is not a contradiction
in terms.Rememberwhat
Mr. JusticeHolmes had to say about the philosophicalobjectionsto
"treatingman as a thing,and thelike.... If a man livesin society,he is
liable to findhimselfso treated."He mighthave added "and so to treat
others"(0. W. Holmes,The CommonLaw, ed. M. DeW. Howe [Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity
Press, 1963], p. 38).
Take the case of ArthurKoestler,who oughtto knowbetter.Skinner
quoteshim(p. 165) as referring
to behaviorism
as "a monstrous
triviality."
It represents,
he says, "question-begging
on an heroicscale." It has spun
psychology
into"a modernversionof theDark Ages." Trivialitythoughit
is, one could quite easilyshow that it has been exceedingly
importantto
697

AmericanJournalof Sociology
ArthurKoestler,forhe uses it everyday of his life,forinstancewhenhe
asks anyoneelse to do anything
forhim-forpay or not forpay. "Manipulation" always seems to referto someoneelse's attemptto controlthe
behaviorof others,not one's own.
Skinnerargues that the literatureof freedomtends,in fact and contraryto its intent,towardperpetuating
adversecontrol.Thus, if a man is
freein the sense thathis behavioris not determined
by externalcircumstances,thenhe may personallybe held responsibleforhis behavior,and
if he is responsible,
thenhe may fairlybe punishedif he does ill.
I wouldnothold theliterature
For myself,
of freedom
so muchto blame
forperpetuating
eitheraversiveor otherrelativelyineffective
methodsof
control.(Incidentally,Skinnernever makes clear what his alternative
"strong"or "effective"
methodswould be.) The fact the verymen who
most decry behavioralpsychologyas a threatto freedomwill use its
principles
to controlotherswhentheyare able to offer
theseotherspositive
rewards,suggeststhatsomething
else is at stake.It is easy, forinstance,
to say that the juvenile delinquentshould not be punishedbut rather
that the environment
thatproduceshimshouldbe changed.That, indeed,
is a reasonableconclusionfrombehavioralpsychology.
But we maynot be
able to changetheenvironment,
or thecost of doingso maybe morethan
we are willingto pay. We may,on the otherhand,be able to punishthe
delinquent.Our action at least satisfiesour emotional,
need forvicarious
revenge,and it may have some littleeffectfor the good on his future
behaviorand that of others.So we punishhim,and we cite his freedom
in orderto rationalizeour action.That is, it may not be the literatureof
freedomthat perpetuatesaversiveand otherweak formsof controlbut,
rather,our aversiveand otherweak formsof controlthatperpetuatethe
literature
of freedom.
And,as I shalltryto showlater,thefactthatcontrol
is carriedout accordingto theprinciplesof behavioralpsychology
neednot
exemptit froma crucialkindof weakness.
I feeleven moreoversoldin what Skinnersays about dignitythan in
whathe says about freedom.I thinkboth he and thosewho oppose him
exaggeratethe dangerseach presentsto the other.What Skinnermeans
by dignityis the creditmengive to others(and take forthemselves)for
thegood deedstheyhave performed.
Skinnerarguescogentlythatmenare
apt to giveotherscreditforactionsthathave the following
twoproperties:
theyrewardthe creditgivers,and the conditionsthatdetermine
themare
noteasilyrecognizable.
(Thus, we wouldnotgivea mancreditforbravery
in jumpingfroma highplace if we could see that he had been pushed.)
I myselfwould state in a somewhatdifferent
fashionthe characteristic
that makes an action praiseworthy:the action must be rare, in short
supplyrelativeto the demandforit. But I suspectthat this amountsto
saying the same thing,for the actions whose determinants
are readily
recognizable
are just the ones thatare easilyproduced,thatmanypeople
can and do perform.
Accordingly,
the moreclearlyone can demonstrate
the conditionsand
laws thatdetermine
theactionsof men,theless excuseone has forpraising
698

SkinnerSymposium
themfortheiractions.Yet Skinnersays (p. 58), "What we may call the
literature
of dignityis concerned
withpreserving
due credit.It may oppose
advancesin technology,
includinga technology
of behavior,because they
destroychancesto be admiredand a basic analysisbecause it offersan
alternativeexplanationof behaviorforwhichthe individualhimselfhas
previously
been givencredit."
It is an interesting
point,like all of Skinner's,yet I remainskeptical.
First,Skinneroffersverylittleevidencethat "the literatureof dignity"
has in factopposedadvancesin behavioraltechnology,
thoughlogicallyit
oughtto have done so. Second,it is not as easy as he thinksto destroy
reasons for admiringothersor being admiredoneself.Presumably,for
instance,peoplehave alwaysknownthatthebeautyof a beautifulwoman
is not her fault.Accordingly,
she shouldget no creditforbeingbeautiful.
But we all knowthatshe does damn well get that credit,and usuallyis
readyto acceptit too. Or take an examplecloserto home.As I have said,
I believefirmly
thateverysinglebit of mybehaviorhas been predestined
fromages eternal,and therefore
I giveintellectual
assentto theproposition
that,not beingan autonomousindividual,I shouldbe givenno creditfor
anythingI do. Yet I observethatin factI muchenjoy beingpraisedfor
articlesand books thatI write,and I believethat the praise (whenI get
it) makesit morelikelythat I shall writefurtherarticlesand books. I
believe that the same is true of Skinnerhimself.That is to say, being
given creditis, paradoxically,part of the very determinism
whichdiscreditsgivingcredit.In the wordsof Emerson'spoem,"When me ye fly,
I am thewings."
On thisissue, it is curiousthat a behavioralpsychologist
like Skinner
shouldrelyso heavilyon a purelyintellectualand logicalargumentand so
littleon observation
of actual humanbehavior.
Let Skinnerbe very carefulin arguingthat the literatureof human
dignitystandsin theway of further
humanachievement.
His own typeof
literaturemightbe morelikelyto have that effect.If it reallypersuaded
people-which it will not-that they ought not to praise others,since
theseothersare not autonomousindividualsand so deserveno praise,he
wouldrobmankindof one of themostpowerful
of positivereinforcers.
But
to getachievement,
we musthave reinforcers,
and theyare not so plentiful
that we can affordto forgoany of them.To quote Mr. JusticeHolmes
once more,this timehis elegantstatementof the paradoxof behavioral
determinisms,
"The way in whichtheinevitablecomesto pass is through
effort"(The Holmes-Einstein
Letters,ed. J. B. Peabody [New York: St.
MartinsPress,1964], p. 5). But if effort
is to be sustained,it requires,by
Skinner'sown argument,reinforcement.
For the reasonsgiven,I doubtthat the freedomand dignitywill much
impedethe systematicapplicationof behavioralprinciples.What is much
morelikelyto impedeit is something
Skinnergiveslittlethoughtto. Again
and again he arguesthatbehavioris underthe controlof contingencies
set
by its environment.
He is quite rightto do so, forthatinsightis theheart
of behaviorism.Accordingly,if the environment
can be appropriately
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AmericanJournalof Sociology
arranged,thebehaviorwillbe forthcoming.
As he says (p. 149), "The outlinesof a technology
are alreadyclear.An assignment
is statedas behavior
to be producedor modified,
and relevantcontingencies
are thenarranged."
Are thenarranged!I like thatuse of thepassive! Who does thearranging,and is he able to do it? Skinnerknowsbetter,but he sometimestalks
as if "the environment"
werealwaysreadilymanipulable.Usuallyby far
themostimportant
partof the environment
of behavioris thebehaviorof
othermen,so thatwhenwe tryto manipulatethe environment
to change
thebehavior,we findthatwhatmustbe manipulated
is stillmorebehavior,
and we are rightback wherewe started.That is, we mustmanipulatethe
environment
of a social relationship
betweentwo or morepersons,and so
on in an infinite
regress.The taskmay easilybecomeexpensive.
Skinnerhardlygivesa thoughtto the crucialquestionof cost. He does
not appear to realizethat one may have developeda technologythat is
capableof securingparticularresultsbut stillnotapplyit, becausethecost
of applyingit is too high-cost in the sense of alternativeand rewarding
resultsthatmustbe forgone
if it is applied.For instance,he speaks (p. 6)
of "makingit possibleforeveryoneto be gainfullyemployedand, as a
result,to enjoya higherstandardof living."He impliesthat thisresultis
not now feasible.I suggestthatit is whollyfeasibleto employeveryone,
but thatits costs,in inflationforone thing,may be higherthan the government
and citizensare willingto bear. Again,it may well be feasibleto
plan an economicsystemin detail, but the costs of planningmay be
greaterthantheresultsare worth.In thesameway,thecostof a systematic
behavioraltechnology
mayprovidethechiefobstacleto its application.
As Skinnerhimselfsays (p. 150), "The technology
has been mostsuccessfulwherebehaviorcan be fairlyeasilyspecifiedand whereappropriate
contingencies
can be constructedfor example,in child care, schools,
and the management
of retardatesand institutionalized
psychotics."But
notethattheseare all situationsin whichthepersonswhoare to applythe
technology
alreadyhave so much controlover othersthat arrangingappropriatecontingencies
is relativelyinexpensive.The personsto be controlledare so littlein a positionto exercisecountercontrol
that theyneed
not, so to speak, be boughtoff.Outsideof such situations,the costs of
applyinga sophisticated
behavioralpsychology
in detailare apt to become
prohibitively
expensive,especiallyif the numberof highlytrainedbehavioralpsychologists,
neededto apply the technology
but otherwiseunproductive,
mustbe highin proportion
to therestof thepopulation.Then
it mightbe thatour old, hit-or-miss,
but relativelycheap methodsof controlling
one anothermight,on analysis,proveto getus moreforour money
than the best of behavioraltechnologies.
At any rate, it is a question
thatSkinnernowhereraises.
Much morelikelywill be the gradualextensionof the kind of control
and envisagesgrossand only stathat makesuse of existinginstitutions
tisticallysignificant
results,achievedthroughalteringin some degreethe
payoffsof a largenumberof persons.The kind of controlthatproduced
the recentdevaluationof the dollaris an example.Such controlsare just
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SkinnerSymposium
as much based on the principlesof behavioralpsychologyas any that
Skinnerproposes,thoughthepersonswhoemploythemmay not be aware
of the fact.They come quite cheap forthe resultsobtained.And no one
seemsto raiseagainstthemthemoralissue thatall controlis wrong.
Skinnerregularly
himby seeming
helpsto createthefussthatsurrounds
to claim too muchforbehavioralpsychology.
He writes(p. 19), "A technologyof operantbehavioris, as we shall see, alreadywell advanced,and
it mayproveto be commensurate
withourproblems."The technology
may
indeedbe on hand,but that does not mean it can easily be applied.At
times,Skinnertalks too gliblyabout "the designof a culture,"yet he
always keeps returning
to sobriety(p. 156): "Perhaps we cannotnow
designa successfulcultureas a whole,but we can designbetterpractices
in a piecemealfashion."What nervousconservativeever claimed less?
It is even patheticto findhim writing(p. 158), "We have the physical,
biological,and behavioraltechnologies
needed'to save ourselves';theproblem is how to get people to use them."What reformer
forthe last 5,000
yearshas everutteredany othercomplaint?What is so powerfulabout a
behavioraltechnology
thatis not powerfulenoughto get peopleto use it?
If Skinneris right,theywoulduse it if appropriatecontingencies
in the
environment
could be arranged.But whereis he to place the fulcrumfrom
whichtheworldis to be moved?
Finally, Skinnermust ask the inevitablequestion (p. 103): "If a
scientific
analysiscan tell us how to changebehavior,can it tell us what
changesto make?" Many peoplewouldagreeon thechangesthatoughtto
be made,if possible,in the behaviorof a retardedchild-and thatis one
reasonwhya behavioraltechnology
can be appliedin thiscase at relatively
low cost.But it is nota scientific
analysisthatbringsabout theagreement,
and thereare manycases in whichno agreement
of any sortis in sight.
In effect,
Skinnerproposesthat"the survivalof a culture"(p. 129) be
the criterion
accordingto whichchangesin behaviorshouldbe evaluated:
those changesshould be made whichhelp a cultureto survive.Such a
criterion
appearsto makegood sense,if onlyforthe reasonthatmenhold
manyof theirvaluesjust becausethesevalueshelpedmankindas a species
to survive.These values had survivalvalue.
it is notas unambiguous
Unhappilyforthecriterion,
as it looks.Skinner
to thecontrary(p. 129), a culturedoes not reallycorrespond
to a species.
Many specieshave failedto survive,but veryfewcultures.They are not
killedoffbut are absorbedby, and meltedinto,othercultures,changing
and developingovertime.The RomanEmpirefailedto survive,but much
of its culturestill formspart of our culturetoday. The survivalof a
cultureis a rubbercriterion.
Suppose,forthe sake of argument,
thatwe knowwhat"the survivalof
a culture"means.Skinnerthenspecifiesthebehaviorthatcontributes
most
to thesurvivalof a culture,and therefore
thebehaviormostto be promoted
by a behavioraltechnology(p. 136): "The simplefact is that a culture
whichfor any reason inducesits membersto workforits survival,or the
survivalofsomeof its practices,is morelikelyto survive."
701

AmericanJournalof Sociology
one. For it is
This may be a necessarycondition;it is not a sufficient
not just a questionof whetherthe membersworkforthe survivalof their
culture,but whattheyworkat. Supposetheydecidedthatthebest way to
all othercultures
ensurethe survivalof theirculturewas by destroying
and workedhard to that end. They mightindeedensurethe survivalof
theirculture,but thenagaintheymightnot,and I doubtthatanyscientific
they were eithercorrector inanalysisnow existingcould demonstrate
correctin advanceof theevent.The factis thatwe do not knowjust what
practiceswill ensurethe survivalof a culture-except a returnof all
band. We knowthatcultures
culturesto thelevelof thehunting-gathering
can surviveat that level, fortheydid so forhundredsof thousandsof
years.If we do not returnto the huntingband, it will not be because a
scientific
analysistoldus not to.
Skinnereven says (p. 135), "Practiceswhichinducethe individualto
thesurvivalof othersand
further
workforthegood of otherspresumably
hence the survivalof the culturethe otherscarry."But do theyfurther
thesurvivalof theculturethattheindividualin questioncarries?I wishI
that theydid, but I findthat
couldbelieve,as a universalgeneralization,
I can thinkof cases in whichthe
I cannotand thatI mustdiscriminate.
statement
holdsgood,but unhappilyI can thinkof othersin whichit does
marinersadriftin an open
not. One of themis the case of shipwrecked
boat,shortof food.If each worksforthe good of the others,all will soon
starve.If someworkagainstthe good of othersand kill them,a fewmay
surviveand theirculturewiththem.With the presentincreasein world
population,the culturesof the world increasinglyresemblethe shipwreckedmariners.If some refrainfromkillingthe others,it will not be
it. Considerwhatelse mightdo
analysishas forbidden
becausea scientific
so!
In short.Skinner'sprocedurefor decidingwhat changesin behavior
oughtto be made turnsout to be facile.It fails to take accountof the
Yet he has thoughtto somepurposeabout theproblems
actual difficulties.
of applyinga behavioralpsychologywhen most of the opponentsof its
He has asked the rightquestions
applicationhave been quite thoughtless.
betteranswersthan
and has providedan immensestimulustowardfinding
thosehe proposeshimself.

Guy E. Swanson
University
of California,Berkeley
As Skinnerhimselfhas said, "No one goes to the circusto see the average
oftenerthan untraineddogs"
dog jump througha hoop significantly
(AmericanPsyckologist11 [May 1956]: 228). If you want a dog to do
you trainhimuntilhe does it on call. That's whatthe paying
something,
customers
demand.
In this new book,he asks whywe shouldsettle formuchless in our
702

SkinnerSymposium
demandson the methodsof social management.
We face terrifying
problemsin theworldtoday.We must,he says,containa populationexplosion,
stave offworldfamine,preventa nuclearholocaust,providehousingand
transportation,
eliminateghettos,cure disease, and stop.pollution."In
short,we need to makevast changesin humanbehavior"(p. 4). What we
need is a technology
of behavior."We could solve our problemsquickly
enoughif we could adjust the growthof the world'spopulationas preciselyas we adjust the courseof a spaceship,or improveagriculture
and
industrywith some of the confidencewith which we acceleratehighenergyparticles"(p. 5).
The readerwho believeswithSkinnerthat we are moving"inexorably"
toward"catastrophe"(p. 5) willnotgainheartfromthepages thatfollow.
We are far-very far-fromthe technology
required.It takes long,hard
workto traina singledog. How muchmoredifficult
will it be to train
mankind-especiallysincewe are not certainof whichbehaviorwe really
wantto produce!Nonetheless,in thatway lies our hope. Perhapswitha
largeenoughprogramof federalgrants-in-aid....
But, even if it could be accomplished,
would not such trainingbe intolerable-an ultimatetotalitarianism?
Not at all, says Skinner.We are
fullyprotectedby our geneticendowment.This protectionoperatesin
two ways.First,we are so constructed
thatwe act to freeourselvesfrom
harmfulcontactsand consequences-from
whathe calls negativeor aversivestimulior reinforcers.
Second,the newbehaviorthatour crisesrequire
can be attainedonly throughthe use of positivereinforcement.
To overcomeour crises,menmustcometo do the rightthingsand not merelyto
avoid doingthe wrongthings.It so happensthat animals,men included,
can be trainedto do the rightthingsonlyif theyare givenpositivereinforcement,
only,that is, if theyare so trainedthat the desiredbehavior
leads to positiveconsequences.When a bit of behavioris followedby a
positiveconsequence,thatbehavioris morelikelyto occuragain.
To summarize,
we are innatelyso equippedthatwe tryto freeourselves
fromwhat is harmfuland we can learn to behave only in ways that we
will,by innatelygivenstandards,"want" to repeat.We cannotbe other
than true to our geneticendowment.It guaranteesthat we cannot be
trainedto behavein ways thatare harmful(pp. 103-26, 128-29).
We need,so Skinnerurges,to distinguish
between(a) thecomprehensive
controlof behaviorand (b) totalitarianism.
There is nothingwrongwith
controlitself.It is the means,and the onlyone, by whichwe acquireour
mostvaluedpatternsof behavior.The problemwithtotalitarianism
is not
thatit entailscontroland is comprehensive,
but thatthe controlexercised
is aversive.
What about human freedomand dignity,you ask? What about responsibility
and goodness?No problem,Skinneranswers,providingyou
will use these wordsin the way that makes sense. Unfortunately,
such
usage is not commonamongscientists,scholars,or ordinarymen. When
theytalk about man's freedom,
theymean that his behavioris uncaused
(p. 19). That meaningis patentlyuntrue.The tenablemeaningof freedom
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AmericanJournalof Sociology
is successin freeingoneselffromnegativereinforcement
(pp. 26, 44). By
the same token,dignityis the ability to attain positive reinforcement
(pp. 44-59). Both are maximizedin the new worldSkinnerdesigns.By
his definition
of thatworld,it cannotbe otherwise.
As for responsibility
and goodness-as commonlydefined-no one in
the new worldwouldwantor need them.They referto a man's behaving
well despitethe absenceof positivereinforcement
that is obviouslysufficientto explainit. Wheresuch reinforcement
exists,"no one needs goodness" (p. 67).
Skinnerinsiststhat man's very effortto believe that his behavioris
free-in the meaningof "uncaused"behavior-has helpedto bringus to
the precipice.It has workedagainstour developingthe technology
of behaviorthat we so desperatelyneed. To place a high value on our being
responsible
and goodis also to workagainstourselves,becausethesewords
are meaningful
only if we live withoutsufficient
positivereinforcements.
To value thesewordsis to preservea social orderthatdependsprimarily
uponpunishment,
thatis, upon the applicationof aversivereinforcements
or, whatis also, if differently,
aversive,the removalof positivereinforcements,this in an effortto removeundesiredbehaviors.One learns from
howto avoid it-not how to behavewell.When,Skinnerasks,
punishment
will we stop tryingto do the impossible-leavingit up to each personto
learnhow to behavewithoutpositivereinforcement?
I have liftedout what seems centraland distinctivein Skinner'snew
presentation.
I do thisbecauseit needsto be examinedforits ownqualities
and,to theextentone can,apartfromhispositionon thestudyof behavior.
That positionhas frequently
been evaluated.It embodies,I think,great
powersoveran important
if narrowdomain.
One can judge whatseemsnewestin thepresentbook even apart from
the restof his work.I take whatis new to be his extendedelaborationand applicationto the endsof social action-of a thesishe has enunciated
before:thethesisthatwhatis positivelyreinforcing
is rightfortheanimal
whosebehavioris controlledby that reinforcement.
He suggeststhat this
thesiswas forcedupon him (1956, p. 233):
In myearlyexperimental
days[theoneideain mylife]wasa frenzied,
selfishdesireto dominate.
I remember
the rageI used to feelwhena
prediction
wentawry.I couldhaveshoutedat thesubjectsof myexperiments,"Behave,damnyou,behaveas youought!"Eventually
I realized
thatthesubjectswerealwaysright.Theyalwaysbehavedas theyought.
... Whata strange
fora would-be
thattheonlyeffective
discovery
tyrant,
of control
technique
is unselfish.
We neednottroubleourselvesaboutpossibleconfusions
herein Skinner's
use of "is" and "ought"or the limitations
of his philosophical
positionor
theadequacyof his sociology.He himselftellsus thathis recommendations
turnon a simplerpoint. For those recommendations
to be workable,it
must be the case that people will findpositivelyreinforcing
that which
will save them.And he agreesthat thismay not proveto be true.What
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SkinnerSymposium
peoplefindreinforcing
is a joint productof theirbiologicalcapacitiesand
the optionsthat theirenvironment
provides.That environment
may rewardindolenceratherthaneffort,
deceit ratherthanhonesty,withdrawal
ratherthancourage,mindlessconsumption
ratherthanthe wise conservationof resources,
aggressionratherthanaffection,
and so on. Skinnerhimselfwillnotcall suchpositivereinforcements
rightor good or,at theleast,
will not say thattheyare as rightor good as he wants (nor does he draw
the inescapableconclusionthatour geneticendowment
is not sufficient
in
itselfto produceor protectthe good). He agrees that everylivingman
may be hopelesslyincapacitatedto be reinforced
by whathe should:
The problem
is to designa worldwhichwillbe likednotby peopleas
theynowarebutby thosewholivein it. "I wouldn't
likeit" is thecomplaintof theindividualist
whoputsforthhis ownsusceptibilities
to reinforcement
as established
values. A worldthat wouldbe liked by
contemporary
peoplewouldperpetuate
thestatusquo. It wouldbe liked
becausepeoplehavebeentaughtto likeit,and forreasonswhichdo not
A betterworldwillbe likedby thosewholivein it
alwaysbearscrutiny.
becauseit has beendesigned
withan eye to whatis, or can be, mostreinforcing.
[P. 164]
Skinnerdoes not suggestwhowouldbe competentto decidewhat"is,
or can be . . . right,"or the meansby whichthatdecisionwouldbe made
or validated,or the meansby whichrecalcitrant
peoplewouldbe brought
to the way theysurelyoughtto go. That beingso, the payingcustomers
will behaveas theyoughtto and will keep theirmoneyin theirpockets.

BennettM. Berger
University
of California,
Davis
Like any good social scientist,B. F. Skinnerknows that feelingand
behaviorare shaped by conditionsexternalto the organism,and he has
spentmuchof his professional
lifeattempting
to discoverthe precisesets
of conditions("contingencies
of reinforcement")
sufficient
to producethe
behaviorsocietyregardsas desirable,and theby-products
of thatbehavior
-feelings and othersubjectivestates.He is now at the point wherehe
thinkshe knowshow to accomplishthis.Althoughhe is uncharacteristically
reticentabout exactlywhattheyare, the technologies
of behaviorcontrol
are available,he says,to createthekindof social environment
(and hence
thekindofpeople) we want.Standingin thewayof theeffective
utilization
of these technologies
are a couple of widelysharedpositivesentiments:
"freedom"and "dignity,"a pair of wordswithwhichsocietyrewardsand
to
honors(i.e., positivelyreinforces)thosepeople who seem successfully
resistor transcendthe conspicuousconstraintswhichattemptto control
behavior.
Skinneris irritatedand impatientwith this situation.Rather like a
Mad Scientistfromsome old low-budgetmovie,preventedby the ethics
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AmericanJournalof Sociology
and conventions
of his profession
fromcarrying
on his WeirdExperiments
to save mankindfromitself,he is drivento attackits mostsacredcows.
"Autonomous
man,"then,is thevillainof thisbook and "the literature
of
freedom
and dignity"whichsupportshimin his delusionthatit is he alone,
the "innerman" (and not environmental
contingencies),
who deservesthe
creditand theblameforhis good or bad behavior.
Given Skinner'sdisdain of freedomand dignityand his belief that
persuasion("the attemptto changeminds") is merelya weak positive
reinforcer,
themostobviouslogicalquestionthatoccursis whyhe bothered
to writethe book at all-a questionraisedby at least a few earlierreviewers.Thereis an answer,althoughit is a disquietingone: Skinnersays
thatpersuasionis effective
only if thereis alreadysomepredisposition
to
behaveand that"we persuadesomeoneby makinga situationmorefavorable foraction." By givinghis explicitexpertsanctionforprogramsof
behaviorcontrolto those in high places (the president,the attorney
general),the book supportsthosewho are alreadyfavorablypredisposed
towardbehaviorcontrol.The book is obviouslyaddressedto thoseEstablishedenoughto be able to makeauthoritative
decisions(the royalist"we"
is the book's mostpervasiverhetorical
device,as in, "What we need is a
of behavior,"etc.), and Mr. Nixon is exactlythe man who,
technology
with his lust for perfectclarity-if not for logical consistency-could
affirm
freedomwhileactingto institutebehaviorcontrol.
Why would Skinnerbe interestedin persuadingmen in highplaces to
initiateeffective
programsof behaviorcontrol?Underhis system,he says,
it would be environmental
contingencies
(not the innerman) whichgot
the creditforthe good behaviorof individuals.But in a humansociety,
this could mean only that the designersof the systemof environmental
controls(i.e., Skinnerians)wouldget thecredit;and the factthatSkinner
doesnotmakepublicin thisbookhowbehavioris to be controlled
suggests
bothwhythe book is addressedto an eliteand whythereis reasonto be
apprehensive
about it.
These, of course,are politicalapprehensions,
and it is remarkablethat
in a book about redesigning
a culturein waysthatwouldcontrolbehavior
morebenevolently-a projectwhich,as Skinnersays, involves"altering
the conditionsunder which men live"-there is hardly a word about
poweror politicalstruggle.It is not likelythatthisis an accidentalomission. Strugglesover the alterationof the conditionsunderwhichpeople
live is exactlywhat politicsis about, and powerfulpeople do not often
yield to othersthe rightto alter the conditionsof theirlives. Powerless
people are not so fortunate,
and in Skinner'ssystem,in which status
wouldbe explicitlya function
of the speciallyadvantageousenvironments
to whichone had been exposed(it does not seem to occurto him thatin
would apfact,if not in ideology,it alreadyis), the underadvantaged
parentlybe denied even the small compensationof the mythof their
dignityand autonomy.
Whenquestionedor interviewed,
Skinnertypicallypooh-poohsthe felt
about the totalitarian,
of his programs
apprehensions
1984-ishimplications
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SkinnerSymposium
phraseslike,"It is not thebenevolence
forbehaviorcontrolwithreassuring
of a controller
but the conditionsunder whichhe controlsbenevolently
whichmustbe examined."But he mentionsonly two contingencies:(1)
himselfmustbe
thatall controlis reciprocaland (2) that the controller
controlledby his systemof controls.Neitheris in fact very reassuring.
are seldom
Social controlis no doubt reciprocal,but the reciprocities
Moreover,democequitable,or therewouldbe no problemof exploitation.
racy (a systemin whichlegislatorslive undertheirown laws) has never
been any insuranceagainstinjustice.
Skinner'sbookbegs someimportant
If, as an essayin persuasion,
logical
questionsand is frightening
with its answersto others,are thereother
groundson which"we" (ordinarypeople,thatis) mightfindhimpersuathe
sive? Skinner,of course,is a utopian,and if his plans forredesigning
culturecontainedsomemorallyennoblingvisionof the future,"we" might
But Skinneris a utopian
be persuadedin spite of "our" apprehensions.
withouta moralvision,and thereinlies a problem.Listen to him: "Our
inner
task is not to encouragemoralstruggleor to build or demonstrate
virtues.It is to make life less punishing."Life is made less punishingin
Skinner'sfaithby movingaway fromrelianceon primitivenegativereinforcements
(in whichpeopleaccede to controlsforfearof theconsequences
of not acceding: "Do it or I'll kill you") to greaterrelianceon positive
reinforcements
(whichmovepeople to behavein ways thatare rewarded:
"Try it, you'll like it"). Now thereis no questionthat seductionis less
punishing
thanrape,but as an ennoblingvision,it sortof lacks something.
Skinnersaysnota wordaboutlove.
caused pain,
Skinneris not merelyforthe reductionof environmentally
in the designof a culturein whichbehavior
he is also forgreaterefficiency
likelyto be punishedseldomor neveroccurs."We" have alreadydesigned
sucha worldfor"babies,retardates,
or psychotics,
and if it couldbe done
husforeveryone,muchtimeand energywould be saved." The efficient
bandingof timeand energyis a qualitymuchadmiredin managersand
administrators,
but forwhat is a questionthat groupshave been killing
each otheroverfora verylong time,and if the best answerthat Skinner
can come up withis to renderthe rest of us as painlessas babies, retardates,and psychotics,
the answeris again less than ennobling;in any
case, I shouldpreferopium.
Skinnerhas troublewith "for what?" questionsbecause he does not
believein the possibilityof moralchoice. For him,statementsof value
"Thou shalt not
preferences
are all reducibleto "if, then" propositions.
kill" meansif you do not want to go to jail, do not kill anybody.The
of a kind
closesthe comesto any statementof faithis in his affirmation
of Darwinianevolutionism
in which"survivalis the onlyvalue according
to whicha cultureis eventuallyto be judged." But even thisis far from
persuasivebecause Skinnerhas nothingto say about whichspecificpractices do or do not have survivalvalue, and fromthe perspectiveof deliberate behaviorcontrol,a survivalethic is less than useless because
and intentionalsurvivalbehavior
adaptivebehavioris oftenunintentional
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AmericanJournalof Sociology
oftenhas the oppositeconsequences.At a timeof ecologicalcrisis,it is
of thosefacts.
thatwe evenneedto be reminded
surprising
Moreover,culturesdo notinducetheirmembersto workfortheculture's
survival,as Skinnersuggests;theyinducethemto maintainspecificpracits
tices and to changeothers(whichis not the same thing),to affirm
sacredsymbolsand to resisttheirdesecration.But in a complexsociety,
and desecration,are
the objects of maintenanceand change,affirmation
and if,as Skinnersays, a cultureis a
mattersof controversy;
themselves
all peopleare alwaysworkingforthe
of reinforcement,
set of contingencies
of others,and the adaptiveor
of some and the destruction
preservation
maladaptivecharacterof the consequencesis as mucha matterof politics
(in which"historyis theonlyjudge") as it is of science.It is, indeed,one
to make the separation.
of thoseareas of publiclifein whichit is difficult
BeyondFreedomand Dignity,then,is a book thatis persuasiveneither
at the level of logic nor as a visionaryappeal for a morallyennobling
warrantattentionif forno otherreason
future.Still,Skinner'sarguments
than that theyare not apparentlydesignedto win him popularacclaim.
arguingagainst freedomand dignity! Unlike
Imagine the effrontery:
on televisiontalk
announcing
thoseunemployed
agingactressesrighteously
showsthat ratherthan worknude theywouldprefernot to workat all,
It reminds
But thebookis disappointing.
Skinneractuallyriskssomething.
me of a remarkmade in WrightMorris'sLove amongthe Cannibals,a
downon theirluck and tryingto
novelabout two Hollywoodsongwriters
writea hit. "It doesn'thave to be a good song,"one of themsays, "just
one thatremindsyou of a good song." BeyondFreedomand Dignityremindsyou of a good book.

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