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The Relationship between Hypotheses and

Images in the Mathematical Subsection of the
Divided Line of Plato's Republic
Moon-Heum Yang
Dialogue / Volume 44 / Issue 02 / March 2005, pp 285 - 312
DOI: 10.1017/S0012217300006211, Published online: 13 April 2010

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How to cite this article:
Moon-Heum Yang (2005). The Relationship between Hypotheses and Images
in the Mathematical Subsection of the Divided Line of Plato's Republic.
Dialogue, 44, pp 285-312 doi:10.1017/S0012217300006211
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The Relationship between Hypotheses and

Images in the Mathematical Subsection
of the Divided Line of Plato's Republic

MOON-HEUM YANG

Dongguk

University,

Korea

ABSTRACT: In explaining the relationship between hypotheses and images in the

Line of Plato's Republic VI, I first focus on Plato's elucidation of the nature of
mathematics as the mathematician himself understands it. I go on to criticize traditional interpretations of the relationship above based on the doubtful assumption
that mathematics concerns Platonic Forms. To formulate my view of that relationship I exploit the notion of "structure." I show how "hypotheses" as principles of
proof can determine the structures of "images" by which the corresponding intelligible ones of mathematical objects become known.
RESUME: En expliquant la relation entre hypotheses et images dans I'analogie de
la ligne du livre Vide la Republique de Platon, je m'attarde d'abordsur I elucidation
platonicienne de la nature des mathematiques telle que la concoit le mathematicien
lui-meme. Je poursuis avec une critique des interpretations traditionnelles de cette
relation, quipartent de lassomption douteuse que les mathematiques s'occupent des
Formes platoniciennes. Pour formuler mon point de vue sur cette relation, j'exploite
la notion de structure. Je montre comment les hypotheses comme principes de
preuve peuvent determiner les structures des images par lesquelles les structures
intelligibles correspondantes des objets mathematiques en viennent a etre connues.

Dialogue XLIV (2005), 285-312

2005 Canadian Philosophical Association /Association canadienne de philosophic

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Explanation of the relationship between the two distinctive features

("hypotheses" and "images") ascribed to mathematics in the mathematical subsection of the Line of Plato's Republic VI is crucial to understanding not only the nature of the mathematical inquiry presented in it, but
also its contribution to dialectical inquiry. The central interpretative
question of this article concerns the relationship between the mathematicians' use of hypotheses and their use of images in the account of mathematics in the Line. The passage in which the question is originally raised
reads: "the soul, using as images the objects which were previously imitated, is compelled to investigate from hypotheses, proceeding not to a
first principle, but to a conclusion" (510b4-6; my emphasis).
I have found four rival interpretations of the relationship proposed
explicitly in the literature on the subject. These are the logical-connection
interpretation, the downward-movement-from-Forms interpretation, the
causal-relation interpretation, and the failure-to-use-hypothetical-method
interpretation. The time seems to have come, however, for constructing a
more reasonable interpretation of the relationship in question by providing a careful reading of the relevant passages and identifying the obvious
mistakes contained in the traditional interpretations. In the first section I
shall expose in detail some essential points of the key passages (51Oc2-d3,
510d5-511al). In the second section I shall examine the four proposals
critically. And in the third section I shall present my own two-methodological-features-of-synthetic-proof interpretation as an alternative.
1. A Preliminary Exposition of the Two Key Passages

Socrates' excessively condensed remark above on mathematical inquiry

(510b4-6) naturally does not satisfy the dialogue partner, Glaucon, who
says: "I don't fully understand what you are saying" (5lOblO). Socrates
replies, "Then, I will try again," and sets out to elucidate more clearly
what he has in mind at 510b4-6. In his new approach we find a not-wellknown but very significant fact, namely, that he separately treats hypotheses at 510c2-d3 and images at 51Od5-511al, which I shall call "the
hypothesis part" and "the image part," respectively. It is when we pursue
the implication of the separate treatment that we can grasp firmly the
nature of the relationship Plato suggests in the Line, as will be made
clearer as our discussion proceeds.
A translation of the two parts will serve to explore carefully the subject
at issue. The hypothesis part reads as follows:
1 think you know that students of geometry, calculation, and the like hypothesize (hypothemenoi) the odd and the even, the various figures, the three kinds
of angles, and other things akin to these in each of their investigations, as if they
knew them (hos eidotes). (510c2-6)

The Divided Line

287

They make these their hypotheses and don't think it necessary to give any
account (logon didonai) of them, either to themselves or to others, as if they
were clear to everyone (hos panti phanerori). (510c6-dl)
Beginning from these, they go through the remaining steps, until they reach an
agreed conclusion (teleutosin homologoumenos) on what they set out to investigate. (510dl-3)'
Now the image part reads as follows:
You know also that they [those who study geometry] use the visiblefiguresand
make their arguments about them, but they are not thinking about them but
about what they resemble (hois tauta eoike); making their arguments for the
sake of (heneka) the square itself and diagonal itself, not of that diagonal which
they draw. And similarly with the rest. These [visible] figures themselves (auta
men tauta) which they form and draw, of which there are shadows and images
in water, they use in turn as images (toutois men hos eikosin), seeking to see
those others themselves (auta ekeina), which can be seen only by thought.
(51Od5-511al)

What I would like to do at this stage is to expose in detail some essential

points of the two parts in such a way that they will both help my critical
examination of the four interpretations in the next section and also form
a basis of constructing a more acceptable interpretation of the relationship in question in the third section.
There has been a persistent controversy over whether "hypotheses" laid
down in the hypothesis part are entities or propositions. But I side with
proponents of the view that they are propositions,2 a view that much betterfitsthe mathematical passages of the Line. Approaching the hypothesis
part in this way, I should point out that here: (i) 510c2-6 concerns mathematicians' laying down of hypotheses; (ii) 510c6-dl concerns their opinion of them; and (iii) 51Odl-3 concerns their deductive procedure from
them. We see that hypotheses in (i) are revealed as principles of deduction
in (iii): the clause in (iii) ("Beginning from these [hypotheses], they go
through the remaining steps") obviously suggests that the hypotheses, as
ultimate premises in a deductive reasoning, are responsible for the stepby-step procedure of proof. This responsibility is being further strengthened by the significance of the word "from" (ek) in that clause, for, as I
read it, the word "from" can best be appreciated as being used in the same
way as it is used by Aristotle in conjunction with the words indicating
principles of proof (that is, ultimate premises in a deductive chain of reasoning).3 The question now is: what is the nature of the deductive principles of mathematics in the hypothesis part? To put it another way, the
question becomes: what is the nature of the propositions given as deductive principles of mathematics?

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Let mefirstpoint out that when the mathematicians are said to "hypothesize the odd and the even, the variousfigures,the three kinds of angles,'"
etc. (510c3-5), the "hypothesizing" can be interpretedfor example, in the
case of numbersin such a way as to embrace equally propositions such
as: (1) "every number is either odd or even"; (2) "the even is the number
that can be divided into two equal parts" and "the odd number is one that
cannot be divided into two equal parts," and (3) "there are such things as
the odd and even." The first shows a classification of numbers, the second
definitions of the odd and even, and the third the existence of the odd and
even.4 Obviously, as is the case with "the odd and the even" (510c4) in
arithmetic, the case with "the three kinds of angles" (510c4-5) in geometry
will be the same. Our question, then, is this: which kind or kinds of propositions could be the deductive principles of mathematics in the hypothesis
part? The thing we have to admit, however, is that we have no independent
criteria or sources to lead us to an obvious conclusion. Surely, in Plato's
day, definitions were typically used in proof.5 There is danger, however,
involved in identifying any one of those kinds of propositions as the
deductive principles of mathematics we seek. It is wise to leave open the
possibility that when, for example, arithmeticians hypothesize the odd and
even they might also contain in their hypotheses the classification of numbers and even the existence of the classified things.6 We are thus led, in part
by a textual indeterminacy, to conclude that Plato's setting up of hypotheses (on the mathematicians' behalf) in the hypothesis part involves various kinds of deductive principles. I do not mean by this, however, that we
have to accept fully the three kinds of propositions as the deductive principles of mathematics. For my part I am satisfied with a certain set of
deductive principles including definitions in particular.71 shall call this set
of principles "axioms" to emphasize their deductive features.
We can now go on and say that when the mathematicians in the hypothesis part do not think it necessary "to give any account of them [hypotheses]" (510c7 in [ii]), what the phrase "give an account" (logon didonai)
means should be something like "give an explanation," "give a justification," or "give a proof," rather than "give a definition." Once we take
"hypotheses" in question to indicate axioms including definitions, it seems
nonsense simply to equate "give an account" with "give a definition."8 It
is in this light that two phrases "as if they [mathematicians] knew their
hypotheses" (hos eidotes; 510c6 in [i]) and "as if they [their hypotheses]
were clear to everyone" (hos panti phaneron; 510dl in [ii]) can be properly
understood: the mathematicians think that the hypotheses of mathematics
as axioms are something "known" and "clear," and so need no explanation or proof. This is the mathematicians' response to Plato's implicit
demand that they "give an account" of their hypotheses in the sense of
deriving them from some higher or more basic principles.9 This way of
reading the hypothesis part shows, on the one hand, that their hypotheses

The Divided Line

289

as "axioms" are, in principle, underived or absolute, while it exposes, on

the other hand, their dogmatic attitude to the hypotheses, at least in Plato's
eyes.
Having discussed some essential points of the hypothesis part, I now
turn to the image part. This part concerning mathematicians' use of visible figures deserves our closest attention as it contains some definite clues
to constructing a more reasonable relationship between hypotheses and
images, clues that no traditional reading has noticed so far. How this is so
I shall show through a detailed exposition of the context or purpose of the
image part. I begin by pointing out that the question of what Plato took
to be the objects of mathematics is a central theme in understanding
Plato's philosophy of mathematics, but we must concede at the same time
that providing a correct answer is not simple.
To illustrate this, let me, in the first instance, refer to the supposed four
subsections of the Line as "the visible images subsection," "the visible
originals subsection," "the mathematical subsection," and "the dialectical
subsection."10 The basic points of controversy concerning the subsections
that may affect the character of mathematical objects are two, as can be
shown roughly in the following way. First, our question concerns whether
or not the difference between the objects of "the visible images subsection" and "the visible originals subsection" is ontological. If the difference
is ontological, we are likely, on the basis of the proportions implied at
509d4-el, to take the view that the objects of "the mathematical subsection" (the objects of mathematics) are other intelligible things than Forms
(which belong to "the dialectical subsection"), that is, mathematical
"intermediates" which Aristotle reports Plato regarded as the proper
objects of mathematics. If not, we are likely to take the view that the
objects of the two subsections (that is, the mathematical and the dialectical
subsections) are the same, implying that mathematical objects are
Forms.'' Second, our question is how to interpret the equality of the two
middle subsections of the Line (representing "the visible originals subsection" and "the mathematical subsection," respectively) that we can prove
by some laws of proportion. Is it intended or not? If the equality is
intended, we are likely to take the view that mathematical objects are the
things of "the visible originals subsection" (that is, physical things).12 If
not, we free ourselves from this rather strange position. As my discussion
suggests, there are various views on drawing the Line according to Plato's
instructions, about which I do not go into detail.13
To return to our topic, most recent commentators seem to agree that
mathematical objects are Forms: for them the two expressions in the image
part, "the square itself" and "the diagonal itself," necessitate that the
objects of mathematical inquiry are such. Remarkably, on this point proponents of the four interpretations of the relationship between the use of
hypotheses in mathematics and the use of images also do not have any

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Dialogue

doubt. Admittedly, it is beyond doubt that in many dialogues, including

the Republic,14 Plato regularly makes use of an intensive pronoun in referring to Forms. Nevertheless, we must be very cautious when we insist that
the two expressions refer to Forms in the original-image context.
As I have shown elsewhere (1999), careful reading of the image part
shows that Plato uses intensive pronouns such as "itself" and "themselves" to refer to originals as opposed to images, regardless of whether the
originals are visible or intelligible. Thus, at 510d7-8, Socrates speaks of
"the square itself" and "the diagonal itself" as representing intelligible
things, and, at 510el, of "these [visible] figures themselves" (auta men
tauta) that by implication contain in their number "the visible diagonal"
and "the visible square" geometricians draw (510el-2). It is worth noting,
in this relation, that the phrase auta men tauta ("these [visible] figures
themselves," 510el), which shows the status of the visiblefiguresas originals compared with their images (that is, "shadows and images in water,"
510e2-3), has been transformed to toutois men ("these [visible] figures,"
510e3) through dropping the intensive pronoun auta, compared now with
their original mathematical objects, auta ekeina ("those others themselves," 5l\a\).[5 As this careful reading shows, without due consideration
of the original-image context, we could never apprehend the true reason
why an intensive pronoun is freely attached also to the substantives representing visiblefiguresin the very same sentence in which "itself" or "themselves" is attached to the substantives representing intelligible mathematical objects. We observe further that in the hypothesis part, by contrast,
the pronouns "itself" or "themselves" are not attached to the substantives
representing intelligible mathematical objects, arithmetical and geometrical ("the odd and the even, the variousfigures,the three kinds of angles."
510c4-5). This is obviously consistent with the fact that in the context
where dialectical and mathematical inquiry are contrasted, Plato allows
an intensive pronoun only in relation to pure Forms with which dialectical
inquiry is concerned.16 It is thus revealed that, if we disregard the image
part (since here an intensive pronoun is attached to substantives precisely
because the things referred to by them are the originals of images, not
because the things are Forms), in Bk. VI, Plato is consistent in not allowing an intensive pronoun in relation to mathematical objects as well.
The mathematical originals in the image part can be either Forms or
mathematical intermediates.17 However, since, as we observed above, the
intensive pronouns signify only originals as opposed to their images, the
assumption that Plato is referring to Forms when he uses such phrases as
"the square itself" and "the diagonal itself" in the image part is unwarranted, and begs the question of whether there are mathematical intermediates. We are not sure that the two expressions refer to Forms. We cannot
exclude the possibility that expressions such as "square" refer to intelligible mathematical particular objects. It is perfectly natural that a visible

The Divided Line

291

particular square or an intelligible particular square can be referred to,

albeit ambiguously, as "the square." Therefore, it is definitely improper
to conclude, from the mere fact that "itself" is attached to a substantive,
that a Form is referred to by the substantive in the image part, where the
original-image relation is dominant. This does not, of course, deny that in
the original-image context the things referred to by substantives with an
intensive pronoun can be Forms, but proponents of having the two expressions in question refer to Forms have provided no independent evidence
that they must refer to Forms, other than that Plato regularly makes use
of an intensive pronoun in referring to Forms. It is therefore purely dogmatic to claim, on the basis of Plato's customary way of designating
Forms, that the two expressions refer unambiguously to Forms in the original-image context.
We need to go one step further to deepen our understanding of the
mathematicians' way of doing mathematics in the Line. In the hypothesis
part, as we have already seen, it was shown that for the mathematicians
hypotheses should be taken as "axioms" including definitions. We may
ask what the significance is of setting up such hypotheses in mathematical
activity. The significance, I take it, is that they should be considered as
those things required in providing the deductive foundation of knowledge
of mathematical objects, although this mathematical knowledge cannot
be such in the full sense in Plato's view. We may now ask what the significance is of images in that activity. A careful look at this part, freed completely from the notion that "the square itself" and "the diagonal itself"
must refer to Forms, will immediately make us see that the use of images
should be understood as a method of reaching knowledge of the intelligible objects. In this part, mathematiciansgeometricians in particular
are said to "make their arguments" about visiblefigures.l8But, as Socrates
unambiguously says, they argue so with a definite intent, that is, in order
to know intelligible objects suchfiguresresemble. This is exactly what the
little word Iwneka ("for the sake of") at 51Od8 indicates. It is in this light
that we understand why the mathematicians think about intelligible
objects when they argue about visiblefiguresof which the objects are the
originals (510d6-7). As all this clearly shows, their use of images should
be understood from the point of view of serving as a method of getting
knowledge of mathematical objects. That is, the purpose of the image part
is not to declare that mathematical objects are Forms but to bring to light
a methodological aspect of using images. We may be quite sure that for
the mathematicians the method of images constitutes an integrated part
of mathematical reasoning. It is clear, thus, why for them sensible diagrams should have resemblance to such intelligible objects as "the square
itself" and "the diagonal itself." Let me here point out that the Line
inquiry into Forms has nothing to do with the method of using images
(510b7-9, 51 lcl-2), an unmistakable contrast to, e.g,. Phaedo 74a-c, where

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Dialogue

a resemblance of sensibles to Forms is allowed. We should keep in mind

that Forms in the Line are of such a nature that they cannot be known by
the senses.
I now briefly summarize what I have tried to show in this section on the
basis of the separate treatment indicated already: (1) Plato never suggests
that mathematics concerns Platonic Forms; (2) the mathematicians use
their hypotheses (including definitions) as principles, required in providing
the ultimate foundation of knowledge of mathematical objects; (3) use of
images is for the mathematicians a method of getting knowledge of the
objects, although Plato is not willing to regard mathematical understanding of mathematical objects as knowledge in the full sense.19 But what is
the nature of the relationship between "hypotheses" and "images" which
the above two (2 and 3) contain? Let me put off full discussion of this question until 3. Now I begin reviewing the four traditional interpretations.
2. A Critical Examination of the Traditional Interpretations
2.1. The Logical-Relation Interpretation
Jackson, the author of the proposal, describes his point as follows:
The inferior method then starts from logoi, which (1) are hypothetical in the
sense that they have not been shown to be correct and complete accounts of
ideas, and (2) for that reason are still dependent upon the particulars or "many"
from which they are originally derived. (Jackson 1882, p. 145; my emphasis)2"
The phrase "for that reason" shows why the relationship which Jackson
interprets between hypotheses and images should be termed "logical."
Thus, now the mathematicians' hypothesizing of "the odd and the even,
the figures," etc. (510c4-5), according to him, means:
[T]hey start from such propositions as "There may be such a thing as length
without breadth, henceforward called a line," but do not show, or even attempt
to show, that there is such a thing. (Jackson 1882, p. 144)
So, in Jackson's view, their definition of a line as "length without breadth"
must be merely hypothetical. But, if they could prove its truth, what is now
a hypothesis would become a principle (arche). According to Jackson,
every logos is a hypothesis so long as it has not been shown to be a correct
and complete account of the appropriate Form. Insofar as mathematicians start from such logoi in their proof, appeal to sensible figures from
which they were originally derived is necessary.
The trouble with this interpretation is that it does not agree with what
Socrates actually says in the relevant passages. According to this interpretation, mathematicians' failure to grasp Platonic Forms is the source of

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293

their use of hypotheses. But this analysis seems to contain some serious
confusion. We can distinguish two meanings of "hypothesis" in the
hypothesis part. We find one meaning when, as already discussed, the
mathematicians accept their hypotheses as underived "axioms"; let us call
this Meaning (1). We find another in Plato's implicit demand that the
mathematicians "give an account" of their hypotheses in the sense of
deriving them from some higher or more basic principles (including the
Good). This demand clearly implies for Plato that the mathematicians'
hypotheses should be understood as requiring explanation; let us call this
Meaning (2). Admittedly, Meaning (2) represents Plato's criticism of the
mathematicians' view of hypothesis contained in Meaning (1). However,
the interpretation under consideration, confusing these two meanings, or,
more precisely, disregarding Meaning (1), fails to grasp what Plato intends
in the hypothesis and image parts: we must remember that the separate
treatment of hypotheses and images was arranged primarily to elucidate
more clearly the mathematical way of thinking, as Plato understands it as
practised in his time, in contrast to the dialectical way of thinking. The primary purpose of the two parts does not lie in criticism of the mathematical
inquiry. It is also important to note that it is Meaning (1) thatfitswith what
Socrates says in the image part, as I adumbrated in the previous section.
In this way, Jackson's view on the logoiwhich is intimately related to
his contention that the mathematicians' principles, including definitions,
should be seen as something falling short of knowledge, with the implication that they "do not show, or even attempt to show" the truth of logoi
turns out to be an obvious consequence of the confusion of Meaning (1)
and Meaning (2). In particular, the implication just mentioned shows how
Meaning (1) is disregarded.21 Jackson's view that the mathematicians'
starting from hypotheses originates simply from failure to grasp their
objects (Platonic Forms) does not do justice to the mathematical way of
thinking described in the Line. So, too, with the interpretation that the
mathematicians' use of sensiblefiguresis a logical consequence of starting
from hypotheses falling short of knowledge. Certainly, according to Plato,
as Jackson thinks, the ultimate objects of knowledge are Forms, and thus
on such knowledge should be founded mathematical knowledge. However, this does not require that the way the mathematicians employ their
hypotheses should be understood only from the point of view of Plato's
criticism of mathematics.
2.2. The Dowmvard-Movement-from-Forms Interpretation
Raven, the author of the interpretation, is very serious in linking the hypothetical method in the Line with that in the Phaedo. He says,
[According to the accounts in both the Phaedo and the Republic, mathematics
are by no means unique in starting from the hypothesis of Ideas and working

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Dialogue

downwards from there to particulars. Even Plato's own account in the Phaedo
of why a thing is beautiful or large does exactly the same. It starts from the
hypothesis of the Ideas of Beauty and Magnitude and then works downwards.
(Raven 1965, p. 158)
On the basis of this reading Raven then asserts,
CE [the mathematical subsection] represents the downward movement of the
Phaedo. First, it takes for granted as ultimate the plurality of uncoordinated
Ideas and so gives no account of them. And second, working by deduction from
that hypothesis, it is thereby enabled to give an account of the particulars of the
sensible world, (ibid., p. 159)
This claim is internally related to the fact that Forms in the Phaedo are
introduced in the context of inquiring into "the causes of everything, why
each thing comes into being and why it perishes and why it exists" (Phaedo
96ab). Raven says explicitly that Forms are "the causes of the particulars
of the sensible world" (ibid., p. 99). Now, for this interpretation to be
acceptable, we must commit ourselves to the view that in the Line mathematicians are concerned basically with giving an account of the mathematical properties of the sensible world by hypothesizing mathematical
Forms, just as Socrates is concerned in the Phaedo with giving an account
of why, for example, a particular thing is large by hypothesizing the Form
Largeness.
There seems to be no piece of evidence in the Line in favour of this view.
Raven, rightly pointing out Plato's separate treatment of hypotheses and
images (ibid., p. 153), goes on to insist dogmatically that the two expressions, that is, "the square itself" and "the diagonal itself," refer unambiguously to Platonic Forms (ibid., p. 156). As we now understand, failure to
see the possibility that the two expressions should properly be understood
in the original-image context is the source of his unconvincing interpretation which implies that the mathematician's way of thinking in the Line is
very similar to the philosopher's in the Phaedo. Apart from the hypothesis
of Forms dogmatically being ascribed to mathematical inquiry, however,
the interpretation under consideration also does not do justice to the use
of images by the mathematicians. Insofar as we have no right to dispose
of Socrates' explicit remark that they use diagrams in order to know intelligible objects, it is wrong to say definitely that the mathematicians are
concerned to give a deductive account of the particulars of the sensible
world by hypothesizing Forms; rather, we have to say consistently that
they are concerned to prove something holding for intelligibles by means
of sensible particulars. It is therefore obvious that Raven's interpretation
can hardly succeed in providing an adequate account of how hypotheses
and images contribute to mathematical proof of theorems.

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295

2.3. The Causal-Relation Interpretation

This interpretation finds that the mathematician's use of images causes
him to start his inquiry from hypotheses. With regard to the passage "the
soul, using as images the objects which were previously imitated, is compelled to investigate from hypotheses, proceeding not to a first principle
but to a conclusion" (510b 4-6), Ross inclines to the view that "using"
means "because it [the soul] uses" (1951, p. 52). This implies that the
mathematician's laying down hypotheses is causally dependent on his use
of images. He comments, "[T]he mathematician is so much tied to the use
of visible diagrams that he is prevented from apprehending in their purity
the real objects of his study" (ibid.). Ross's view on the nature of mathematical objects is that they should be Forms (ibid., pp. 59-60). According
to Mueller, on the other hand, Socrates' double (510b5, 511a4) mention
of mathematicians being compelled to use hypotheses (without speaking
of them as being compelled to use images) "may mean that the use of
images compels the soul to inquire hypothetically" (1992, p. 185). On the
basis of "compel" being roughly synonymous with "cause," he declares
rather ponderously,
Reasoning about sensible objects, figures, for the sake of, that is, in order to
understand, intelligible objects [is the cause of] the laying down of hypotheses,
presented as the assumption of certain objects (the odd and even, the figures,
the kinds of angle), but in fact involving assumptions about the nature of these
objects and the ways they can be manipulated, (ibid., pp. 188-89)
In this way, Mueller, like Ross, sees in the participial phrase "using images"
in 510b4-6 the role of the use of images as the cause of the use of hypotheses.
Surely, as Mueller indicates, we confirm in the image part the notion of
"reasoning about sensible objects, figures, for the sake of . . . intelligible
objects." And, as we examined, this notion is essential to understanding
the image part. But we find no evidence for the view that "reasoning about
sensible objects" is the cause of the laying down of the hypotheses, except
in the vague words "using images." That Mueller's interpretation is inconsistent is exposed when we ask what are the originals of visible diagrams,
for in Mueller's notion "reasoning about sensible objects, figures, for the
sake of . . . intelligible objects" is implied the original-image relation
between intelligible objects and visible diagrams, as we have discussed in
the previous section. Now, according to Mueller, intelligible mathematical
objects to be hypothesized are Platonic Forms, which he bases on the two
expressions "the square itself" and "the diagonal itself" (ibid., p. 184),
which argument, as I have already shown, is simply dogmatic. Furthermore, as we saw, Socrates repeatedly says that inquiry dealing with Forms
excludes sensible images (510b7-9, 51 lcl-2). So, if Mueller's interpreta-

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Dialogue

tion is right, on the one hand, intelligible objects (Platonic Forms) should
be acknowledged as the originals of visible diagrams; but, on the other
hand, the use of visible diagrams should not be acknowledged as a method
of getting knowledge of intelligible objects (Platonic Forms).
This inconsistency makes it clear that Mueller's interpretation is unable
to provide a proper answer to the question of why the mathematicians use
visible diagrams in their arguments, an answer that is required for a correct
approach to the relationship between the mathematician's use of hypotheses and his use of images in the account of mathematics in the Line. Mueller, of course, stresses the fact that the mathematicians use diagrams in
order to understand intelligible objects. This is not enough, however; the
question to consider is exactly where the ground lies for such use in their
investigation. The answer is in fact quite simple: as the image part shows,
it is because relevant visible figures resemble corresponding intelligible
objects (see 3), which means that the use of diagrams should be understood, as noted earlier, from the point of view of methodology. Now, the
reason why the significance of the resemblance has escaped Mueller's
attention is not hard to find. It is because inquiry into Platonic Forms,
which he thinks mathematics is about, excludes visible figures. But then
this much is clear: Mueller can hardly maintain his point that the mathematician uses visible figures in order to understand corresponding intelligible objects (Platonic Forms), since this exclusion would make nonsense
of the mathematician's obvious use of visible figures in an attempt to
understand corresponding intelligible objects. As all this shows, any interpretation that takes Platonic Forms to be the objects of mathematics is
very likely to fail because it can hardly provide a consistent account of how
hypotheses and images contribute to proving mathematical theorems.
2.4. The Failure-to-Use-Hypothetical-Method
Interpretation
This is the interpretation proposed by Richard Robinson. According to
him, the method the mathematicians use in their investigation should be
understood as being identical with the philosophical method in the
Phaedo dealing with Forms, which he says has nothing to do with sensible
images. He says:
If we are to show any necessary connexion between the two characteristics
ascribed to mathematics in the Line, we must do it without violating this fundamental fact that the hypothetical method has nothing to do with the senses.
A much more probable suggestion is that Plato is connecting geometry's use
of the senses not with its use of hypothetical method but with its failure to use
the hypothetical method. His view is that geometry treats its starting-points as
certainties when it ought to treat them as hypotheses, because that is what they
really are, though the geometer does not recognize the fact.... Plato felt, though
without full explicitness, that no one would be as confidently dogmatic as the

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297

mathematicians were unless he had sensible experiences to go upon, that what

made the mathematicians so convinced of their "hypotheses" was that they seemed
to be directly given in sensible intuition. (1953, pp. 155-56; emphasis in original)

Obviously, underlying Robinson's interpretation, which is supported by

Annas (1981, pp. 278-79), Cross and Woozley (1966, pp. 244-45), and
Wieland (1982, pp. 213-14), is preoccupation with linking the Line and the
Phaedo in regard to hypothetical method. However, this preoccupation is
often a sign that some essential points of the method ascribed to mathematics in the Line, including the respective roles of hypotheses and images
in mathematical proof, are being overlooked, as confirmed in Raven.
Remarkably, Robinson rightly calls our attention to Plato's separate
treatment of hypotheses and images (1953, p. 154). Nevertheless, failure
to address this treatment, as the Line invites us to do, leads him to an erroneous interpretation. It is one thing to base their "hypotheses" uncritically
upon sensible intuition, but it is quite another, and indeed a correct way
of mathematical inquiry, to attempt to know the intelligible by means of
deductive argument using the visible. Moreover, we have seen that the primary purpose of the two parts is to elucidate the mathematical inquiry
more clearly. So, since Robinson recognizes the separate treatment, the
first thing for him to do, before concluding that Plato is criticizing the
mathematicians' use of images, is to clarify how the separate treatment
shows that hypotheses and images can complement each other. Robinson,
however, is too quick to identify the mathematical method of hypothesis
with the philosophical one dealing with Platonic Forms that is independent of sensible images.22
Evidently, we must agree with Robinson and others that the mathematician does not question or give an account of his hypotheses. On this
point, surely, the mathematician's attitude is quite different from the dialectician's. And, as has been shown, the dialectician's inquiry into Forms
excludes the use of images. But it does not follow from these differences
that the relationship between hypotheses and images we are seeking should
be the relationship between two defects of mathematics itself: "[mjathematics has two defects compared with dialectic. It relies on visible diagrams, and it does not question its assumptions. Plato never indicates that,
or how, these two defects are connected, but a very plausible connection can
be made" (Annas 1981, p. 278; my emphasis). On the contrary, the mathematicians' use of both hypotheses and images should count as mathematics' two basic characteristics, upon which I shall soon expound in 3,
although Plato, dialectician that he is, has many things to criticize in their
regard. Obviously, regarding them as two defects of mathematics is quite
different from regarding the two as two basic characteristics of it. Failure
in explaining the relationship between hypotheses and images from the
point of view of mathematics is sure to lead us to misunderstanding not

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Dialogue

only the nature of mathematics described in the Line but also its contribution to dialectical inquiry Republic VI and VII are supposed to contain.
So far, I have examined the four traditional interpretations of the relationship between hypotheses and images. One common characteristic has
emerged, i.e., that they are "dialectical" in the sense that for them mathematical objects should be considered as proper objects of dialectic. We can
trace this back to their common view that mathematical inquiry is about
Platonic Forms, a view that colours their whole conception of the relationship in question. Admittedly, this tends to deny the inquiry the knowledge
of its proper objects. The consequence is a sort of paradox: to the mathematician as such, the way to know his own objects is blocked since he fails
to use the dialectical method of approaching them; but if he does use it.
he ceases to be himself, since the method is purely dialectical. But it is
hardly possible to reconcile the view in question with what Plato says in
the Republic. There is, so far as I know, no evidence in it for ascribing to
Plato the criticism that the mathematician as such has no access to his own
objects. Of course, Plato makes it explicit that mathematical knowledge
without the aid of philosophical inquiry cannot be considered as knowledge in the full sense. However, this does not necessarily mean that mathematical inquiry has neither its own objects nor its own method. It is
necessary tofinda more plausible interpretation of the two parts that does
justice to the mathematician's activity.
3. A New Approach

We come now to the "two-methodological-features-of-synthetic-proof"

interpretation. Most important in this interpretation of the relationship
between the mathematicians' use of hypotheses and their use of images is
that a formal inquiry that assigns priority to its deductive principles is
implied, a point adumbrated in the first section. Now, in what way can the
use of images properly be complementary to the formal or hypothetical
inquiry of mathematics? The way lies in the fact that the two are to be seen
as two main features of its methodology: on the one hand, hypotheses as
principles (archai, 511 c7) are those things required in providing the ultimate foundation of knowledge of mathematical objects, as shown in the
hypothesis part; on the other hand, images are those things required in
approaching the objects effectively, though indirectly, as shown in the
image part. As for the latter, we may remember that Plato wishes to present
the use of visibles as a method of reaching knowledge of intelligiblesr
which is effective because of their resemblance to corresponding intelligibles. In this context, we can rightly indicate that in the separate treatment
in question is implied synthetic proof in which fundamental (though derivable, in Plato's view) principles including definitions are presented at the
outset and their consequences are derived with the aid of visible figures,
however incomplete its actual system may have been in Plato's time.

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299

In ancient Greek mathematical terminology, we can further point out,

this method of proof that derives consequences from the first principles is
called "synthesis," in contrast to a method of discovery of solutions of
geometric problems, called "analysis." Some further discussion of analysis and synthesis is needed, insofar as my view involves the notion of synthesis. The method of analysis as a method of discovery is logically prior
to the method of synthesis as a method of proof. As is well known, however, it is synthesis that characterizes all the proofs in Euclid's Elements,
so that the only extensive, although somewhat confusing, explanation of
the two notions is due to as late a writer as Pappus, the fourth-century
Platonist mathematician-commentator.24
Interestingly, in Plato's Meno 82b-85b, where a problem of finding the
side of a square which duplicates the area of a given square is treated, we
can find some trace of deductive proof used in early Greek mathematics.
Interested in showing that the Slave-boy will discover in himself (by "recollection") the answer to the geometrical problem, Socrates begins to
interrogate him abruptly in the following way (82b9-c5). (Socrates draws
figures as he describes them; see Fig. 1.)
(1) Socrates: "Tell me now, boy, you know that a square figure is like this [ABCD]?"
Boy: "Yes."
(2) Socrates: "A square figure has all these four sides equal?"
Boy: "Yes, indeed."
(3) Socrates: "And these lines which go through the middle of it [EF and GH] are
equal too?"
Boy: "Yes."
(4) Socrates: "Such a figure may be larger or smaller?"
Boy: "To be sure."

Fig. 1

300

Dialogue

We can read some resemblance (at least, in outline) between the proof
procedure above and Euclid's proof procedure. The step (1) is reminiscent
of the "setting-out" (ekthesis) in Euclid.25 Surely, "the equality of the
sides" in the step (2) may be taken as part of a definition of the square,
although not a complete one.26 Now the steps (2)-(3) proving the relative
size of the squares in the step (4) (in the special form of Fig. 1), which is
required in the solution to the geometric problem, somehow correspond
to the "proof" (apodeixis) in the strict sense. In Euclid, "proof" in this
sense consists in the application of the principles including definitions to
drawn figures. These figures, however, may refer to "auxiliary constructions," which implies that in Euclid in many cases an auxiliary construction (kataskeue) precedes the proof.27 Observe also that Socrates in the
Meno passage above uses an auxiliary construction in the step (3).
It is crucial to note that in the proof above drawing visible diagrams is
required from the very beginning, which should be taken to indicate that
they are essential to mathematics.28 Admittedly, the proof is crude from
Euclid's point of view; something like Euclid's Postulate 1, for example,
will be required for the step (3). The point, however, is that the need of setting up some principles from the start is clearly indicated. Notice, in this
relation, that we find no justification for the (partial) definition of the
square.29 I am assuming that this way of Socrates' proof reflects early
Greek mathematicians' way of doing mathematics. We now clearly see how
the functions of the two features (both hypotheses and visible diagrams)
can be understood in mathematical inquiry and how they are complementary. Moreover, all proofs using hypotheses and visible diagrams may be
taken as "synthetic" in the sense indicated in thefirstparagraph of this section. But this does not mean that all those proofs presuppose "analytic"
discovery of them, as is shown in the case of the Meno passage (82b9-c5).30
There are still some important points that need to be discussed for a
fuller understanding of the method of synthetic proof. After this discussion, I shall return to the relationship between hypotheses and images for
a more precise formulation of it. Among the important points just mentioned must be the ontological aspect of the resemblance of visible figures
to mathematical objects. For, if the effectiveness of using visibles in proof
lies in their resemblance to corresponding intelligibles, there necessarily
arises the question regarding the nature of this resemblance. The answer
will help us understand the nature of such abstract objects. This means
that Socrates' reference to the resemblance of visibles to intelligibles in the
image part is essential in determining the characteristics of mathematical
objects. This is quite different from the approach used in the four traditional interpretations, which were necessarily very skeptical about the significance of that resemblance in mathematical inquiry. This is understandable because inquiry into Forms does not use visible figures. The
^application, however, of this metaphysical principle of Plato to math-

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301

ematical inquiry itself did serious damage to our understanding of

Socrates' remark above because the four interpretations could not fully
appreciate the mathematicians' use of visible figures in their proof for the
sake of intelligible mathematical objects. Our conclusion is that the nature
of mathematical objects must be in complete accord with the mathematicians' use of diagrams for reaching knowledge of the objects.
Let me begin with Socrates' remark on mathematicians' deductive
activity in the hypothesis part. According to him, after laying down hypotheses, they ''go through (diexiontes) the remaining steps, until they
reach an agreed conclusion (teleutosin homologoumenos) on what they set
out to investigate" (510dl-3). Here there are some controversial points of
translation.31 But, regardless of them, it is obvious that in proving theorems the mathematicians, beginning from principles of proof, proceed
step by step.12 It might seem that not much indication is given of how the
steps are systematic. Yet, if the mathematician actually possesses no idea
of such procedure, the careful steps just indicated will be almost pointless.
In this way, the passage in question (510dl-3) points to a very significant
feature of mathematical argument, i.e., that mathematical objects should
be of such a nature as to have certain definite structures that can be
approached by systematic proof. This notion of structure, although Plato
himself did not work it out in mathematical context in the Republic, will
turn out to be very useful in understanding both the nature of resemblance
and the nature of mathematical objects. (I shall soon define the concept
"structure.") So, let us turn to the important passage in the image part
(510d6-7) where the mathematicians are said to argue about visible figures
but think about intelligible objects they resemble. It is quite right to ask
what kind of resemblance Plato intends when Socrates mentions it with
the use of "about" in the two parallel constructions.33 Once we put the
question like this, we need to be explicit about the "structure" just mentioned. To this end, let me exploit Euclid's Proposition 1 in Bk. I.

Fig. 2

302

Dialogue

The enunciation (protasis) of Proposition 1 ("On a given finite straight

line to construct an equilateral triangle") is followed by the relevant "settingout" and the particular thing which is sought (diorismos). Euclid then proceeds to construct two circles BCD and ACE by means of Postulate 3 (see
Fig. 2). This principle is used in the following way: "With center A and
distance AB let the circle BCD be described." Further, by means of Postulate 1, the straight lines CA and CB are joined. Euclid now proceeds to
prove via Definition 15 that each of the straight lines CA and CB is equal
to AB, and to prove via Common Notion 1 that CA is equal to CB. From
this it follows that the three straight lines CA, AB, and BC are equal to
one another.
Euclid establishes Proposition 1 by showing the interrelation of the three
entities (that is, the straight lines CA, AB, and BC) in the special form of
Fig. 2. Clearly, each of the principles (postulates, definitions, and common
notions) determines in its own way the interrelation just mentioned: Euclid
constructs the three straight lines via Postulates 1 and 3, and proves the
equality of them via Definition 15 and Common Notion 1. We now clearly
see that the definite interrelation of the three entities in the special form of
Fig. 2 (in the case of Proposition 1) is just the geometrical "structure" of
the equilateral triangle. It is by virtue of such principles that mathematical
(especially, geometrical) entities have definite structures that can be
approached by systematic proof. We may understand the Meno passage
(82b9-c5) in much the same way. Socrates was proving the interrelation of
larger and smaller squares in the special form of Fig. 1, so what he established can be put thus: the relative size of the squares in the special form
of Fig.l is just the structure of them.34 In this way, I define "structure" in
terms of interrelation of entities in a configuration.35 I do not see any
inconsistency of this definition with the lexical meaning(s) of "structure."
When the mathematicians in the Line are said to argue about visible
figures but think about intelligible objects they resemble, what is meant
should be that the structures the mathematicians prove by using diagrams
may be most exactly applied to mathematical objects of which they want
to reach knowledge. It is assumed that the contrast between intelligibles
and sensibles, when the resemblance is allowed, manifests itself most
clearly in cases where we cannot describe the structures of sensibles
exactly as we can those of intelligibles. Yet nothing hinders the mathematician from conducting his inquiry into the mathematical structures of
intelligible mathematical objects themselves on the basis of such resemblance. Thus, according to the mathematicians the Line describes, we can
compare the interrelations between (some of) the constituents of drawn
(visible) figures with the exact relations between corresponding constituents of intelligible mathematical objects, and the structural resemblance
which this comparison reveals is the kind of resemblance which I see
implied at 510d6-7 in the image part I discussed earlier.

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303

It is now time to return to the relationship between hypotheses and

images in mathematical inquiry to formulate it more precisely. The essential point is that hypotheses (as principles of proof) including definitions
will endorse, up to a point, the step-by-step procedure in proving theorems. Now, visible figures involved in the proof of theorems are for the
mathematicians methodologically necessary to apprehending the corresponding intelligible ones. We must stress at the same time, however, that
it is the hypotheses as principles of proof that fundamentally determine
those structures of visible figures. This is an essential aspect of formal
inquiry giving its priority to its deductive principles as we read it in the
Line, an inquiry probably reflecting the then-established concept of systematization of mathematics, one completely developed system of which
(including "postulates" and "common notions") is Euclid's.36 The relationship in question can, then, be expressed thus: both being necessary to
the proof, hypotheses fundamentally determine the structures of images
by which the corresponding intelligible ones of mathematical objects
become known.37
This discussion should throw light on the much-discussed subject as to
whether or not the objects of mathematics in the Line are Platonic Forms.
Undeniably, proponents of the view that mathematics is about such
objects have put too much weight on the two expressions "the square
itself" and "the diagonal itself" in the image part. Nevertheless, despite
its straightforward appearance, the claim that the "itself" locution in the
image part commits Plato to the view above is simply dogmatic, as already
shown. The view, besides, does not fit well with the relevant mathematical
passages in the Line, in particular the deductive argument involving the
original-image relation, a relation requiring that mathematical objects
should be of such a nature that visible diagrams have a structural resemblance to them. We can further show how Socrates contrasts mathematics
and dialectic in the Line: diagrams are methodologically necessary in
mathematical inquiry, while they are definitely excluded in dialectical
inquiry dealing with Forms (510b7-9, 51 lcl-2). This contrast is not an
afterthought that is not fully integrated with the context of the Line. The
traditional interpretations we have critically examined, however, fail to
appreciate fully this obvious difference, which rather points to the conclusion that each inquiry has its own objects,38 although Plato does not spell
out his view on this in detail in such a way that doubts could never set in.
4. Conclusion

In explaining the relationship between hypotheses and images, the first

thing to note is that Plato, treating the two separately, elucidates the
nature of mathematics as the mathematician himself understands it. This
is very important, because the failure of the traditional interpretations to
distinguish it from Plato's metaphysical theory of Forms is at the very root

304

Dialogue

of the difficulty in determining the mathematical relationship in question.

The view that mathematics is about Platonic Forms prevents one from
consistently assigning proper roles to both hypotheses (as principles of
proof) and images in the discipline itself, as I have discussed in detail.
Curiously enough, the two expressions, "the square itself" and "the diagonal itself," which, as shown, refer to the originals of which some other
things are images, have greatly contributed to the failure just indicated. It
is worth noting that in ancient Greek mathematical literature wefindno
hint that mathematicians as such were concerned with those metaphysical
entities. We also find no motivation on Plato's part to establish Forms as
their objects. Any such attempt must be discouraged by Socrates' unambiguous remark that mathematics, in contrast to dialectic, aims at reaching knowledge of its objects, although it is not knowledge in the full sense
in Plato's view, by means of images, which surely implies that mathematics
deals with these images insofar as they have resemblance in structure to
mathematical objects. If my interpretation is correct, in Plato's day mathematics was moving towards searching for "first principles" in the Aristotelian axiomatic sense, that is, towards axiomatization, which was to
become dominant in later mathematics. Interestingly, the Line even goes
so far as to describe dialectic in terms of axiomatization: dialectical activity is described as a quest for "the first principle of all" (51 lb), where no
element of hypothesis is left. Undoubtedly, Plato is critical of the hypothetical method of mathematics. And he has good reason to be so. Nevertheless, this fact should not blind us to the attempt by the mathematicians
to found mathematics on fundamental principles, as Plato himself reveals
in the Line.39
Notes
1 This translation owes much to Burnyeat (2000, pp. 22-23), Grube (1974), and
Grube and Reeve (1997).
2 Lafrance (1980, pp. 58ff.) and Taylor (1967) argue persuasively that they
should be read as propositions, as they criticize the opposite view put forward
by Hare (1965).
3 As regards the things in conjunction with "from" (ek) in Aristotle's Posterior
Analytics (71b20-22), Barnes rightly indicates that they "properly characterize the principles or axioms of a demonstrative science," although he adds
some qualifications (1993, p. 93; emphasis in the original).
4 I am assuming that the notion "hypothesizing" cannot be an obstacle to including definitions among the hypotheses of mathematics. Discussing some points
raised by von Fritz (1955, pp. 38-40), and based on textual evidence, Taylor
concludes, "Plato, then, would regard it as sometimes correct to describe someone who gives a definition as hypotithemenos ti, and in default of any evidence
to the contrary it is safest to assume that in the Republic he includes definitions
among the hypotheses of mathematics" (1967, p. 199). Burnyeat, considering

The Divided Line

5
6

9
10

11

305

Euclid to be "our best guide for contextualizing" the contents of the two parts,
goes on to present some Euclidean definitions which seem to "illustrate what
Socrates says about mathematical hypotheses" (2000, p. 24).
We may recognize this, e.g., in Meno (76al-7, 82b9-c5) and in Theaetetus
(147c-148b).
See also Taylor 1967, p. 198. But some scholars, including Cornford (1965, p. 65)
and Ross (1951, p. 51), reading Aristotle's own distinction between principles, as
shown in Posterior Analytics A. 10, into those hypotheses in the hypothesis part,
think that the hypotheses of mathematics in the hypothesis part should be
regarded as indicating assumptions of existence. For a criticism of this view, see
Lafrance 1980, p. 60.
In saying this, I have two things in mind: (1) It is definitions that were most
typically used in proof in Plato's time (see notes 4 and 5 above); and (2) In relation to this, definitions can play a decisive role in describing the relationship
between hypotheses and images, as I shall expound in 3 of this article.
One may ask if I rule out the possibility that logon didonai means "give a definition" in the case, e.g., where it is required to define "parallel lines," even
when we regard Euclid's Postulate 5 as a hypothesis (or principle). Certainly,
I do not. Nor is this my point (see note 4 above).
Cf. Taylor 1967, p. 197.
I adopt this way of indicating the four subsections to avoid unnecessary exegetical problems, for a critical reader may argue: the text does not indicate that
the line is vertical; as far as the description in the text goes, it could be horizontal or on a slant; indeed, the text does not even indicate that the line is
straight.
This article opposes the view that, on the basis of the assumption that the relation between the objects of "the visible images subsection" and "the visible
originals subsection" is introduced simply and solely to illustrate the relation
between the objects of "the mathematical subsection" and "the dialectical
subsection," and proceeds to argue that, as with the former, so with the latter,
the relation between the objects in question is not ontological, a view advocated by Ferguson (1921). This view rejecting any resemblance of the objects
of "the visible originals subsection" to the objects of "the mathematical subsection" is not textually grounded. I am thus implicitly returning to the old
view that the difference between the objects of "the mathematical subsection"
and "the dialectical subsection" is ontological, though this view may also
present its own difficulties of detail. By this I do not imply that we must without reservation return to the view put forward by Adam (1963, pp. 156ff).

12 I oppose the view acknowledging the equality of the two middle subsections of
the line drawn, which denies that the objects of "the visible originals subsection" are images of those of "the mathematical subsection," a view advocated
by scholars including Bedu-Addo (1979), Fogelin (1971), Morrison (1977), and
adopted by Smith (1996). I agree with Brumbaugh (1954, pp. 98-104), Cross

306 Dialogue

13
14
15

16

17

18

19

and Woozley (1966, p. 204), Raven (1965, p. 145), Ross (1951, pp. 45-46), and
many others that the equality in question is unintended, and so irrelevant.
Balashov (1994) and Dreher (1990) deal with a new aspect of the subject.
Cf. Republic 476b-c, 479a, 480a, and 507a-b.
As I indicate elsewhere (1999, p. 33), we may discern three original-image pairs
in the image part: (i) "the square itself and "the diagonal itself""visible
figures"(51Od5-8); (ii) "these [visible] figures themselves"shadows and
images" (510el-3); (iii) "those others themselves""these [visible] figures"
(510e3-5 Hal). Two pairs, (i) and (iii), are the same. So we have just two pairs.
As I claim earlier, there are two such contexts, that is, 510b4-9 and 51 Ib3-d5.
where an intensive pronoun is allowed only in relation to Forms distinguished
from mathematical objects (see 510b8, 51 lcl-2) (Yang 1999, p. 32).
According to Aristotle's Metaphysics (A.6. 987bl4ff.), mathematical objects
are "intermediates" in the sense that they are different from sensible objects
but different also from Forms, since they are "eternal but many."
This translation of the phrase is also found in Burnyeat (2000, p. 24). Mueller
(1992, p. 184), and Robinson (1953, p. 148). We can confirm the plausibility
of the translation at 510dl-3, where expressions such as "beginning from these
[hypotheses]," "remaining steps," and "reach an agreed conclusion" make
their appearance.
So understood, one may object to my use of "know" and "knowledge" for the
postulated goal of the mathematicians. Admittedly, the mathematical level of
knowledge (dianoia) must be distinguished from the philosophical level of
knowledge (noesis) {Republic 511d8-el). Nevertheless, we are required to see
that, as my discussion thus far clearly shows, the relationship between hypotheses and images we are seeking is such that we should seek it not from Plato's
but from the mathematicians' point of view as described in the Line. And we
have seen that for the mathematicians axioms are underived and require no
fvirther proof. So, my use of "knowledge" for the mathematicians is less objectionable than at first sight.

20 When Burnet says that the special sciences "depend on hypotheses of which
they can give no account, and are therefore obliged to use sensible diagrams"
(1968, p. 187), his view seems to approximate Jackson's.
21 This implication is owing to Jackson's misinterpretation of 510c2-dl (see
Jackson 1882, p. 144), a passage I have discussed in some detail in the previous
section of this article.
22 One of Robinson's main arguments for the view that mathematics is about Platonic Forms is that the two expressions, "the square itself" and "the diagonal
itself," refer to such (see Robinson 1953, pp. 195 and 197). We have shown,
however, that this argument is dogmatic.
23 On this methodological significance attached to visible figures by mathematicians in search of the truths about mathematical objects Mueller, in relation
to Euclid, significantly remarks (emphasis mine): "So far as I know, the basic
method of proof in every historical form of mathematics in which proof has

The Divided Line

307

played an explicit role has involved the setting-out of an apparently particular

case and arguing on the basis of it" (1981, p. 13). For more details about the
elements including the "setting-out" that every problem or theorem has, see
Heath (1956, pp. 129-31). It is also significant to note that in both Meno 82b85b and Phaedo 73a7-b2, diagrams are described as very useful for discovering and proving mathematical truths. In particular, the Meno passage (82b85b) shows in detail in what way geometrical inquiry uses them. On this
Fowler comments adequately: "It [The Meno passage: 82b-85b] serves as a
lucid and straightforward example of some of the problems, styles, and techniques of early Greek mathematics" (1999, p. 8).
24 See Hultsch 1877, vii, pp. 634-36.
25 Mueller's remark on the "setting-out" (see note 23 above) is significant. See
also Heath 1956, pp. 129-131.
26 This is because "the equality of the angles" is not mentioned. For a defence
of this omission, see Vlastos 1994, p. 106, n.8.
27 For the significance of auxiliary construction see Hintikka and Remes 1974,
Introduction.
28 See note 23 above. Netz (1999) deals most extensively with the subject that in
Greek mathematics diagrams are essential to mathematical propositions.
29 The crucial role of definition in proof as we recognize here may be understood
in the context of the Meno's basic notion that nothing can be known about X
until X has been defined, the notion related to the ti-poion distinction as we
see in Socrates' insistence that the teachability of virtue (poion) cannot be
known until the definition of it (/;') has been established.
30 Certainly, we have no reasonable ground to believe that the Meno passage
(82b9-c5) presupposes "analysis." The nature of the methods of analysis and
synthesis, in particular their relationship, is very controversial insofar as Pappus's explanation is concerned (see note 24 above). We find the modern literature on the two notions extensive, including Gulley (1958), Hintikka and
Remes (1974, chap. 8), Knorr (1986, pp. 348ff.), and Robinson (1936). On
such interesting questions as "When and by whom was the method of analysis
discovered?" and "When and in what way was the method of analysis familiar
to Plato?" see Bluck (1961, pp. 75-85), Heath (1921, pp. 290-92, and 1956,
p. 134, n.l). However, we have no reliable sources, it seems to me, to lead us
to an obvious answer to the question whether Plato in the days of the Meno
or the Republic knew the method of analysis. Thus, we need to be careful in
claiming that "analysis" is implied in mathematical proofs we find in Plato's
writings.
31 For example, "With what word should the adverb 'homologoumends' be connected?" and "What meaning does it convey?" Both Burnyeat (2000, p. 23)
and Shorey (1935) think that it should be connected with "diexiontes," translating into "consistently" and "by agreement," respectively.
32 We should be careful in claiming that "analysis" is implied in the quoted passage (see note 30 above).

308 Dialogue
33 So far as the present writer is aware, no commentator has raised, or tried to
answer, this crucial question.
34 On the way Plato uses this relative size in the solution to the duplication problem, see my 2005.
35 We find the notion of "the interrelations and interdependencies of entities in
a definite configuration" in Hintikka and Remes (1974, p. 4). But I am using
it in a quite different context, and they do not define "structure" in terms of it.
36 I am not asserting that these two notions originated with Plato. In what way
these two are related to Aristotle's mathematical thoughts (see esp. Posterior
Analytics A. 10. 76a31-77a4) is controversial, elaboration of which is beyond
the scope of this article.
37 A critical reader may raise the point that, since I did not prove the independent
existence of the "intermediates," the status of the intelligible structures of
mathematical objects is left obscure. 1 should say that I did not prove the independent existence in question, and proving it was not my primary concern.
Nevertheless, my assumption is that the relationship between hypotheses and
images we seek is closely associated with that independent existence. My
assumption is to some extent justified by the fact that in the Line visible diagrams the mathematician uses in proof resemble corresponding intelligible
objects. Thus, the mathematical objects represented by "the square itself" and
"the diagonal itself" are those things that exist independently of visible diagrams of which they are the originals. The Line is supposed to have assigned
a definite ontological level to the intelligible structures in question. See also
notes 11 and 12 above.
38 I hope that my explanation of the relationship between the two distinctive features ascribed to mathematics in the Line may serve to support the same view
(i.e., that we can find in the Line the "intermediate" class of entities reported
in Aristotle's Metaphysics A.6. 987bl4ff.) shared by scholars including Adam
(1963, pp. 156-63), Burnyeat (1987 and 2000, pp. 22-42), Hardie (1936, pp. 4965), and Wedberg (1955, pp. 99-111). This view goes back to Proclus, as
Friedlein shows (1873, pp. 3ff.). Significantly, even scholars including Annas
(1981, p. 251) and Cross and Woozley (1966, pp. 233-38), though claiming
misguidedly that mathematics is about Forms, on the dogmatic basis that the
two expressions "the square itself" and "the diagonal itself" refer unambiguously to Forms, see nothing inconsistent between the idea of "intermediates"
and the mathematical passages of the Line. A detailed account of Aristotle's
view on mathematical intermediates is given by Annas (1975) and Ross (1924.
pp. liii-lvii). Robin (1963) deals with this subject most extensively.
39 I wish to thank two anonymous referees of this journal for helping me eliminate mistakes and clarify my arguments. I also wish to thank two college colleagues, Professors J. Sheridan and C. Dussere, for helpful comments on
earlier drafts. This work is supported by the Dongguk University Research
Fund.

The Divided Line

309

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