Southeast Asia in India’s post-Cold War Foreign Policy

By.
Mohammed Khalid
Department of Evening Studies
Panjab University, Chandigarh.
mdkhaliedchd@yahoo.com

Southeast Asia comprises of those continental margin and archipelagos of Asia

which lie to the south of China, north of Australia, and east of India. Touched by the
South Pacific Ocean on the east and the Indian Ocean to its south and west the region
includes the countries of Brunei, East Timor (Timor–Leste), Indonesia, Kampuchea,
Laos, Myanmar, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Southeast Asia
has been an integral part of Indian consciousness throughout history. Its religions
languages and culture are highly indebted to India. Trade relations between the western
parts of Southeast Asia and eastern parts of India go back to the prehistoric period which
continued in the earlier centuries. As the Colonial powers entered the Indian Ocean
seventeenth century onward, India as well as the countries of Southeast Asia fell to this
rising might. During the colonial period trade between the two regions declined as it was
more dependent on the directions of the respective colonial powers. As the process of
decolonization began post-World war II, efforts were again made to bring the two regions
close.

Southeast Asia in India’s foreign policy

After the Second World War, India and the countries of Southeast Asia gained
independence from a long and exploitative colonial rule. India felt the need to rebuild
relations with these countries. Nehru’s interest in the region was visible when he
organized Asian Relations Conference in March-April, 1947, "to bring together the
leading men and women of Asia on a common platform to study the problems of
common concern to the people of the continent, to focus attention on social, economic
and cultural problems of the different countries of Asia, and to foster mutual contact and
understanding." Nehru offered to serve as a mediator during the French-Indochina War
(1946-1954), and Korean War (June 1950 to July 1953). He expressed pride in Japan's

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victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 and opposed punishing Japan at the post-
World War II Tokyo trials.1 India vehemently opposed Dutch action in Indonesia and did
not allow the refueling of Dutch planes which were being used to quell the freedom
movement there.2 The organization of Conference on Indonesia in New Delhi in 1949,
taking interest in organizing the Bandung Conference in 1955 are only a few of many
efforts India made to redevelop economic and political relations with the region as a
whole.
However, all the efforts made by India to befriend the countries of Southeast Asia
did not bring desired results. The countries of Southeast Asia did not show keenness to
keep India on their foreign policy priority.3 They were more inclined to develop
economic ties with Japan, and Korea. The presence of a large number of Chinese
populations in many of these countries and its dominating presence also kept them
diplomatically engaged with China.4 Philippines and Thailand became part of US
sponsored military alliance called South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and
part of Western alliance system. India’s Southeast Asia policy lost further momentum
after the Sino-Indian border conflict of September 1962. Indo-Soviet Peace and
Friendship Treaty of 1971 made these countries --especially Indonesia and Malaysia--
skeptical of India’s commitment to the policy of non-alignment. The nuclear tests
conducted by India in 1974, launching of a new Joint Service Command, based in
Andaman and Nicobar Islands,5 and recognition of Vietnamese installed Kampuchean
regime of Heng Samrin made India unpopular with the countries of Southeast Asia. So,
during the Cold War period, India and Southeast Asia did not have preferential relations.

Factors responsible for a new shift towards Southeast Asia

Cold War neared its end with the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989
and subsequent German reunification. Russian support to the US-led UN alliance forces
during the Gulf War (1990-1991) marked the end of Cold War.6 The qualitative and
structural changes brought about by the end of the Cold War led to new orientations in
the foreign policy of India and the countries of Southeast Asia. The Cold War period
foreign policy preferences changed, the Western Military alliances came to an end and
India and these countries gave a fresh thought to their role and preferences in the

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changing world order. India started moving toward Southeast Asia to build strong
economic, strategic and political ties, and on the other, Southeast Asian countries, leaving
aside their past inhibitions, began moving closer to India. These moves between them can
be seen in the context of numerous politico-strategic and economic realizations brought
about by the end of the Cold War in international relations.
Change in India’s attitude can be attributed to many reasons. The open door
policy adopted by China during 1980s had given it a quantum jump making it an
emerging economic giant in Asia. In contrast; India still followed Fabian Socialist
policies of Nehru era. China regarded this region as its natural sphere of influence and
had started asserting political, economic and military influence there. Under the force of
circumstances -domestic and international- India had also to liberalize its economy to
compete with China and other international market forces in the region.7 At the time Cold
War came to an end, India was going through the worst balance of payment crises in its
independent history. In the absence of a strong political party governing the country it
was facing frequent change of governments and these governments lacked vision and will
to formulate long term policies. Rising inflation, government subsidies, high interest
rates, and a concomitant decline in overseas remittances during the latter half of the
1980s had contributed to overall decline in India’s economy. There was a substantial rise
in non-productive expenditure. For example, defence expenditure had risen from 15.9
percent in 1980-81 to 19 percent in 1990-91. Subsidies grew from 8.5 percent in 1980-81
to 11.4 percent in 1989-90.8 The percentage of trade in relation to Gross National Product
(GNP) fell from 12.4 percent in 1984-85 to 11 percent in 1988-89. The rise in oil prices
following the Gulf War of 1990-91 also caused a 21.9 percent rise in the import bill.9
These moves compelled India to open up to the world economy.
The economic ascendance of East Asia and China had made India to watch and
emulate its Southeast Asian neighbours. Manmohan Singh, who became Finance Minister
and the architect of the Indian Economic Reforms, had been Secretary General of the
South Commission of the UN in Geneva from 1987 to 1990. He had often repeated that
Korea and India had the same GDP per capita in the 1950s and that South Korean model
of economic growth could be emulated. In September 1995, he declared, “the economic
policies of India take into account the dynamism of this region (Asia-Pacific), which shall

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soon be the tiger-economy of the world. We want to be participant in this process”.10
Gautam S. Kaji, one of the Managing Directors of the World Bank had also expressed in
April 1995 that, “Certainly, the East Asian nations are still grappling with some of the
same problems as India, albeit on a lesser scale. But they have demonstrated that with the
right commitment, it is possible to move very far. With the same kind of commitment, I
am convinced that there can be an “Indian Miracle”.11 India drew inspiration from the
East Asian path of development and become more closely associated with this region in
economic terms. This desire was officially expressed by Narsimha Rao, the Prime
Minister of India in 1994 during his visit to Singapore. He said:
“The Asia Pacific could be the springboard for our leap into the global market
place…I am happy to have had this opportunity to enunciate my belief in this
vision of a new relationship between India and the Asia-Pacific from Singapore,
which I consider the geographic and symbolic centre of the Asia-Pacific. I trust
this vision will be realized… and that the next century will be a century of
partnership for us all”.12

Under the unfolding new economic order India had less economic interests in the
Middle East. Although India possesses business interests in that region and provides
labour, and professionals to the Middle East, the relationship had been more of a
dependence on the oil and remittances. Politics of Islam was exploited by Pakistan
through the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and tended to work against India’s
interests. Moreover, geo-political instability and the lately emerging threat of terrorism
also dissuaded India from undertaking worthwhile financial investments there. Southeast
Asia was politically more stable than the Middle East and had a common stand and
concern about the lethal and negative impact of growing terrorist networks, many of
which had emanated from the Middle East. The economies of Southeast Asia --due to
their rapid growth-- were an attractive and better option for India.13 It was thus natural for
India to have an alternative which Southeast Asia provided.
Strategically, also India had to devise a policy --called the Look east policy-- to
engage and create good relations with its immediate eastern neighbours. Growing
proximity between China and Myanmar and concomitant support to the insurgent groups
of India’s northeast;22 Chinese economic and military cooperation and use of some
islands of Myanmar as a strategic observatory;14 possible basis for the activities of the

4
Northeast insurgent groups in Thailand and the Philippines; underground arms market of
Cambodia which was becoming an important source of arms for the insurgent groups;
compelled India to take care of its national security which could be threatened from the
East. Chine’s gaining of economic and military foothold in Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri
Lanka was another point of concern for India.15 Therefore it was absolutely necessary to
seek the cooperation of governments of these countries in dealing with such threats.
India, being a trading nation could ill afford to tolerate unsafe Sea Lanes of
Communications (SLOCs) around its shores. With the rise in trade and commerce,
dependence on shipping overwhelmingly increased and it became essential to make
maritime trade routes safe.16 India also needed to collectively tackle human smuggling,
pollution, accidents, possible closure of choke points, territorial disputes, arms and
narcotics trade and piracy in the high seas. As a matter of fact, contraband trade of arms
and ammunitions from Cambodia and heroine from Thailand and illegal immigration
from Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka in Andaman and Nicobar have been major
concerns for India. There were also apprehensions of the ISI and LTTE infiltration in
sparsely inhabited islands of the Andaman and Nicobar for their illegal activities.17 This
underlined the need for closer naval and military ties with the countries of Indonesia,
Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. Disappointing pace of regional integration through
SAARC due to usually strained relations between India and Pakistan was another reason
for India to look East. So, these concerns became the factors behind India’s foreign
policy towards Southeast Asia after the Cold War.

Look East policy

India’s Post Cold War foreign policy towards Southeast Asia marked a strategic
shift in India’s perspective. It coincided with the beginning of economic reforms and was
seen as an opportunity to enlarge its economic engagement.18 It was also an effort to
renew and revitalize the traditional linkages with the countries of Southeast Asia.
Though, diplomatic and economic efforts were made by India to join ASEAN since 1987,
but these countries expressed reservations due to India’s support to the Heng Samrin
regime.19 Moreover, they were apprehensive that Pakistan would also follow suit and they
may bring in their bilateral tensions which will have a destabilizing effect. Nonetheless,

5
they became convinced of the veracity of Indian economic reforms of 1991 and in 1992
granted India the status of “sectoral dialogue partner” for tourism, commerce,
investments, and science and technology. The same year India formally launched the
Look East policy.20 In the second half of 1992 Foreign Secretary was made direct in
charge of Eastern region. In October 1995 Secretariat for Economic Affairs in the
Ministry of External Affairs declared that ASEAN is at the heart of our reworked
strategy. Due to continuous efforts India was given the status of a “full dialogue partner”
of ASEAN in 1995.
From 1992 onwards, successive Indian Prime Ministers visited these countries
regularly accompanied by large business delegations. In 1992 Narsimha Rao visited
Indonesia and in 1993 to Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam and South Korea.
Prime Minister again visited Singapore in 1994 and Malaysia in 1995. These visits
provided many opportunities to interact with policy makers in the countries of Southeast
Asia. India participated for the first time at the Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) of
ASEAN in Jakarta in July 1996 and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which deliberates
on the security and political concerns of the Asia Pacific.21 India tried after 1999 for a
summit level relationship with ASEAN. At the 7th ASEAN Summit, held in November,
2001, at Darussalam (Brunei), the organization decided to upgrade its relations with India
to Summit level, which culminated in the first ASEAN-India summit. Atal Bihari
Vajpayee, the Prime Minister of India, explained the scope and substance of India's
emerging relationship
The first phase of the Look East Policy focused on developing commercial
relations and institutional links with and in the second phase India aimed at political
partnership, physical connectivity through road and rail links, free trade arrangements,
and defence cooperation. During this phase India strived to build strategic partnership by
holding joint naval exercises with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and even Thailand,
Myanmar, Philippines and Vietnam through joint naval exercises. Annual naval exercise
‘Milan’ symbolizes regular interaction and cooperation between the navies of India and
Southeast Asian countries.22 India also signed MoUs on defence cooperation, provide
training to MiG-29 fighter pilots, supply spare parts and service these air crafts.

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 This new shift in foreign policy was multi dimensional. Under the policy, India
initiated measures to develop ASEAN level cooperation and individual relations with
these countries. Two other measures in this regard include the Mekong-Ganga
Cooperation Project and BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral
Technical and Economic Cooperation).

The Mekong-Ganga Cooperation

Lying between the peninsular region of India and China Mekong basin
countries include Myanmar, Thailand, Malaya Peninsula, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.
The shared histories and geographical contiguity with India accord a strategic value to
this area. For India Mekong countries provide a strategic accessibility to reach the
heartland of Asia-Pacific. These countries are relatively poor and underdeveloped than
other countries of Southeast Asia. As Indian economy was registering better growth, its
entrepreneurs had fairly good chances of profitable investment and economic cooperation
there. For the fulfillment of this objective, India announced at the ASEAN Ministerial
Meeting at Bangkok in July 2000 a new cooperative forum with five of its eastern
neighbours –Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam- called as the Mekong-
Ganga Cooperation (MGC) forum.23
The MGC aims at increasing cooperation in tourism, culture and education,
transportation and communication. The six countries also undertook to develop
transportation networks including the East-West Corridor project and the trans-Asian
highway. This is India's major cooperative venture in its Southeast Asian neighborhood
after the end of Cold war which offers immense scope to create linkages with the
Mekong countries by connecting them to the Indian Northeast. This organization also has
the potential to provide counterbalance China in the region. By exploiting the historically
driven natural connectivity, India has added powerful cultural dimension to its economic
diplomacy by encouraging business contacts between the people residing on the banks of
Mekong and Ganga. These over-land linkages have the potential to provide new
opportunity to speed up economic development of India’s northeast. One of the projects
called the Asian Highway Project under MGC is expected to link up Singapore with New
Delhi via Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia), Ho Chin Minh City (formerly Saigon), Phnom Penh

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(Cambodia), Bangkok (Thailand), Vientiane (Laos), Chiang Mai (Thailand), Yangon and
Mandalay, Kalemyo (Myanmar), Tamu, Dhaka and Calcutta (India). India has already
taken up the building of road linking Tamu (Manipur) to Kalemyo, a key communication
junction in the center of Myanmar.24 This connectivity will prove fruitful in promoting
border trade between India’s northeast with the adjoining Myanmar and the Mekong
region countries. Mekong Ganga Cooperation Initiative has therefore become a pillar of
India’s foreign policy towards Southeast Asia in recent years.

The BIST-EC to BIMSTEC, the Bay of Bengal Community

Another dimension of India’s foreign policy towards Southeast Asia was the
creation of BIMSTEC --The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation. Historically, the communities and nations around Bay of Bengal
had interacted and established multifarious strands of relationships. In tune with many
other initiatives after the Cold War came to an end, a new sub-regional grouping was
formed on June 6, 1997 in Bangkok called BIST-EC --Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, and
Thailand-Economic Cooperation. The main areas of cooperation identified included
cooperation in trade, investment, industry, transportation, infrastructure, science and
technology, human resources development, energy, fisheries, agriculture, natural
resources, and tourism.25 To be part of this upcoming regional group, Myanmar was
became its member on December 22, 1997. The name of the grouping was changed to
BIMST-EC –Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand-Economic Cooperation.
Again this name was re-christened to be BIMSTEC i.e. The Bay of Bengal Initiative for
Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation at the first Summit conference of
the group held in Bangkok in July 2004. At the conclusion of the Summit while
elaborating policy, objectives, and areas of cooperation its members, felt: 26
“Convinced, that the geographical location of our countries and our rich natural
and human resources provide a sound basis for mutually beneficial cooperation;
Recognized, that the pluralist nature of our societies, our shared cultural
heritage and the rich diversity of languages, arts, crafts and traditions provide
ample opportunity for multi-dimensional cooperation within our region;
Resolved, to foster a sense of community that will lead to the economic and
social, development of the entire region.”
Agreed, to explore the expansion of BIMSTEC cooperation into the areas of
culture, education, public health, protection of biodiversity and traditional

8
 knowledge, rural community development, small and medium scale enterprise,
construction, environment, information and communications technology,
biotechnology, weather & climate research, natural disaster mitigation &
management. Agreed, “to create a BIMSTEC free trade area, year-long Plan of
Action on tourism, establishment of BIMSTEC Chamber of Commerce…”

The BIMSTEC has indirectly met the aspirations of some of the smaller
countries of South Asia which have been clamouring for a large economic and political
space in a world of rapid global integration. This can be seen another Indian effort to link
itself with the heart of ASEAN through Myanmar and Thailand. As China and Pakistan
do not belong to the Bay of Bengal Community, India is in a more comfortable position
to play unchallenged leader of this formation. The BIMSTEC brings together 1.3 billion
people comprising 21 percent of the world population, a combined GDP of 750 billion
US dollars and has the potential of 43 to 59 billion dollar trade annually.

Relevance of new Southeast Asia policy

India’s foreign policy has undergone a sea change in the post-Cold War period.
If India wants to keep the pace of its economic development intact it has to be alive to the
changing economic world order and the process of Asian economic integration. India’s
policy to look East is relevant to develop closer cooperation with Southeast Asia as well
as the emerging Asia-Pacific economic hub. From security perspective, too the policy is
quite important and relevant as it can take care of its strategic concerns such as free and
secure sea lanes and security environment around its maritime borders. This is not
possible without the active support and involvement of the countries of Southeast Asia.
China, as an economic and military power is fast building bridges in India’s northeastern
neighbourhood. Through this policy, India can counter China in these countries.
According to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, “Look East policy was a
strategic shift in India’s vision of the world and India’s place in the evolving global
economy.” Addressing the North East Council on 12 April 2005 in New Delhi, he again
said that, “Full advantage may be taken of the Look East policy of the Government of
India. ASEAN markets provide big opportunities for NER, particularly in areas such as
promotion of horticulture, floriculture and medicinal herbs. Affinity in the cultural
background will make our products acceptable and saleable once the land connectivity is

9
improved. Air connectivity could also be considered when the need arises. Potential
Sectors in this regard are IT, tourism, mine & minerals, gas, oil, downstream industries,
education and health services, etc. The NEC is in the best position to take a holistic view
at the regional level and catalyzes the implementation of Government policies in liaison
with the concerned Ministries”.27

Constraints and limitations

India’s objective to fully integrate itself in the ASEAN community has not
brought desired results. There are certain constraints and limitations, within and beyond
India’s reach. It may be due to the non-compatibility of their economies and varying
perceptions about the unfolding post-Cold War world order. India currently has limited
economic cooperation with Southeast Asia and has yet to become a significant market for
East Asian economies. For instance, it accounted for less than 1% of Thailand’s and 2.5
percent of Singapore’s international trade in 2004.28 Countries of Southeast Asia perceive
that India has yet to go a long way in opening up its economy. The bureaucratic mindset
is slow in accepting the changing economic realities and is a hurdle of sorts to fully
exploit India’s commitment to deal with East Asia. India’s economy is not as open as that
of these countries. Insistence or expectation of Indian bureaucrats and other policy
implementers for commercial reciprocity from ASEAN member countries can not
become a reality unless India is well integrated into the global economy. For example,
despite the rhetoric of India and Japan forming an "arc of freedom and prosperity,"
bilateral engagement remains low. Japanese investment in India was approximately US$
2 billion in 2006, far less than its $57 billion in China. Sino-Japanese trade was more than
$207 billion in 2006, and Japan-India trade, was only $7 billion. India makes up only
0.67 percent of Taiwan's total trade and Taiwanese investment in India totals $116
million as compared to over $100 billion in China. Similarly, China's trade with
Southeast Asia exceeded $160 billion in 2006, while India's trade with the region is less
than $30 billion.29
India could not find a place in the currently formed six-party --or the larger ten-
party-- framework on the North Korean nuclear issue. Indian energy companies like Oil
& Natural Gas Company Videsh Ltd. and Gas Authority of India Limited have a 30

10
percent stake in Myanmar's A1 and A3 blocks in the Shwe field in the Bay of Bengal but
a proposed natural gas pipeline to India has been jeopardized by an agreement between
Rangoon and PetroChina.30
To date, foreign direct investment from Southeast Asia has not played as
significant a role in India’s economic development as it has in China. It is believed that
India’s policy on FDI has been restrictive and tends to concentrate in the service and IT
sectors, which are often less capital intensive than the manufacturing sector. India is still
considered a protected market with higher tariff rates. India is a democratic country and
has to deal with different kind of political systems prevalent in the countries of Southeast
Asia. The differences in the systems of governance sometimes create hic-ups between the
leadership of India and the countries of Southeast Asia. For Example, Continuous
military rule in Myanmar and Thailand some times puts India in a tight spot as, should it
prefer its national interest or support the pro-democracy movement there. The slow down
is also as to the East Asian economies have yet not fully recovered from the economic
crises of late 1990s and the economic recession of 2009. India’s build up of naval base in
Andaman has become a subject of considerable concern and debate among the countries
of Southeast Asia. Indonesia and Malaysia have particularly shown their concern about a
naval base at Grand Nicobar. Malaysia has questioned the rationale behind India’s
expansion, of Joint Service Command. Similarly, when India tested its nuclear weapons
at Pokhran in 1998 there were strong reactions from the countries of the region. Such
constraints have thwarted the integration process between India and these countries.

It is therefore to conclude that different measures India has taken to expand its
relations with the countries of Southeast Asia have been significant and have born fruits
but also suffer form certain constraints as well.

References:
1. India Rediscovering East Asia, 24 October 2007, See at
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=706&language_id=1
2. The Communiqué released by Press Information Bureau on 23 December said that in
view of the military action taken by the Dutch Government against the Republic of
Indonesia, the Government of India has decided to suspend the right of KLM in or across

11
India…No fuel will be issued to KLM aircrafts at Indian airports with affect from 1a.m.
(IST), 24 December 1948. Cited in Poplai, S. L: India 1947-50: External Affairs, OUP,
1959, p. 10.
3. Pattanayak, Satya R, “India as an Emerging Power”, India Quarterly, vol. LXIII, no. 1,
Jan-Mar 2007, p. 91.

4. Guihong, Zhang, “Sino-Indian Security Relations: Bilateral Issues, External Factors,

and Regional Implications”, South Asian Survey, vol. 12, no. 1, Jan-Jun 2005, p. 71.
5. Despite the strategic location of Andaman and Nicobar, India did not have adequate
forces there till India-China war in 1962 and India-Pakistan War in 1965. After 1962 it
decided to have a small naval base at Port Blair. In December 1976 it was upgraded and
in 1977, the Commodore Andaman and Nicobar was re-designated as Fortress
Commander. This post was upgraded to that of Rear Admiral in August 1981 and to Vice
Admiral in March 1987. Meanwhile, the Army had made its small presence in the Islands
in 1972 (after the 1971 Indo-Pak War) and the Air Force in 1984. In October 2001, Joint
Service Command", was launched headed by an officer from any of the three services.
For more detail see, Nanada, Prakash, “Strategic Significance of the Andamans”, Indian
Defence Review, vol. 17, no. 3, July-September 2002, pp. 12-24.

6. Sikri, Rajiv, “ India’s Foreign Policy Priorities in the Coming Decade”, Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, Working Paper No. 25, September 25, 2007. p. 1; Rusi, Alpo M:
Dangerous Peace: New Rivalry in World Politics, Westview Press, Boulder Colorado,
1997, pp. 11-34; and Vivekanadan, B: In Resrospect: Reflections on Select Issues in
World Politics, Lancer’s Books, New Delhi, 2001, pp. 160-177.

7. Gupta, Pranay, “Rhetoric of Ideology or Job Creation?, The Straits Times, 23

September 2004.

8. Nanda Prakash, op. cit., pp 67-68.

9. Economic Survey 1990-91, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, New Delhi,

1991, p. 3; Chanchreek, K. L: The Gulf War: A Global Crisis, H. K. Publishers and
Distributors, Delhi, 1991, pp. 171-186.

10. Sakhuja, Vijay, “Indian Ocean and the Safety of Sea Lines of Communication”,
Strategic Analysis, vol. XXV, no. 5, August 2001, pp. 689-702.

11. Address to a gathering of Indian Finances in Bombay, see, Kaji, G. S, “What East
Asia has Achieved, India too can Emulate”, The Times of India, April 13, 1995.

12. Cited in Rao, V. V. Bhanoji, “India and Southeast: New Partnership”, in, Prakash, S
(et. al.): India and ASEAN, Gyan Publishing House, New Delhi, 1996, p. 254

13. Kuan. Eric Koo Peng, “India's Look East Policy: Analytical Perspectives from the
Political, Economic and Military Lenses”, October 19, 2005, see at
http://www.whatsindia.com/editorials/wis20051019indiaslooksestpolicy.htm.

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14. The Chinese support to insurgents in the northeast came early in the 1960s and
continued through the 1970s. It was in Yun'an that the Naga fighters were trained in arms
and guerrilla tactics and they were also taught Maoism. With the Chinese support the
Naga insurgency became stronger and more intense with better tactics and modern
weapons. Apart from the Nagas, the Chinese also extended moral and material support to
the Mizo and Meiti insurgents by arranging for their training in guerilla warfare in
training centers of Yunan province and Lhasa. See, Sarin, V. I. K: India's North-East in
Flames, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, p. 105; Datta, Sreeradha, “Security of
India's Northeast: External linkages”, Strategic Analysis, vol. 24, no. 8, November 2000,
pp. 1495 - 1516; Nardi, Dominic J, “Cross-Border Chaos: A Critique of India’s Attempts
to Secure its Northeast Tribal Areas through Cooperation with Myanmar”, SAIS Review,
vol. XCXVIII, no.1, Winter-Spring 2008, pp. 161-171.

15. Kumar, Ashwini, “Sino-Indian Relations: Issues and Irritants”, Punjab Journal of
Politics, vol. XXVII, no. 1, January 2003, p. 103.

16. About 95 per cent of India’s trade is by sea, and sea lanes are of vital importance to
India for unimpeded flow of its merchandise trade. Presently, India’s trade interactions in
the East may be lesser relative to those with the West, but is growing at a very rapid pace.
The trade with China has increased from US$ 1 billion in 1998 to 13.6 billion in 2004
and reached about US$ 20 billion by 2007. Indo-ASEAN trade grew from US$ 7 billion
in 1997 to US$ 13 billion in 2004 and further to be about US$ 30 billion by 2007. See,
Kundu, Swati Lodh. “Asian Surge in India Trade”, Asia Times, 28 May, 2005;
Kuppuswamy, C. S, “ASEAN Economy-Dominated by China? South Asia Analysis
Group, Paper 1184, December 10, 2004.

17. Khurana, G.S, “Shaping Security in India’s Maritime East: Role of Andaman &
Nicobar”, Strategic Analysis, vol. 30, no. 1, Jan-Mar 2006, p. 171.

18. The economic reforms undertaken by India during the 1991-94 included:
Devaluation of the rupee by 30 percent against the US dollar; raising the ceiling of
foreign ownership to 51 per cent and higher in some instances, with partial repatriation of
capital at market rates on a 60:40 basis; removal of restrictive controls on the import of
most items and lowering the tariffs; abolition of internal licensing system in all but 18
industries; preparation for sale in principle of up to 49 per cent of the government’s share
in state enterprises; floating of the rupee on trade account in 1993; reduction of excise
duty; reform of the financial sectors; a substantial reduction in the rate company taxation
in 1994. See, Gordon, Sandy: India’s Rise to Power in the Twentieth Century and
Beyond, St. Martin Press, New York, 1995, p. 121; Mukherji, Rahul: India’s Economic
Transition: The Politics of Reforms, OUP, New Delhi, 2007.

19. Grare, Frederic, “India and the ASEAN Regional Forum”, in Grare, Frederic and
Matoo, Amitabh (eds.): India and ASEAN: The Politics of India’s Look East Policy, op.
cit., p. 125.

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20. Grare and Mattoo, op. cit., p. 11; Ram, A. N, “India’s Look East Policy: A
Perspective”, in, Kesavan, K.V (ed.): Building A Global Partnership: Fifty Years of Indo-
Japanese Relations, Lancer Books, New Delhi, 2002, p. 8.
21. Thomas, A. M, op. cit., p. 301

22. MILAN is an institutionalized biennial event to engage the navies of the Southeast
and South Asia in mutual cooperation at sea and in harbour. See Annual report 2006-07,
Ministry of Defence, Government of India, New Delhi, 2006, p. 32; Jayant, V, “Indian
Navy Planning Strategic Command for Far East”, The Hindu, December 26, 2000

23. Jayant, V, “The Mekong Ganga Initiative”, The Hindu, October 28, 2000; also see,
Baruah, Amit, “Looking East”, Frontline, vol.17, Issue 24, Nov. 25-December 8, 2000,
pp. 49-50.

24. India had upgraded the 160 km long Tamu-Kalewa-Kalemyo highway in 2001 and
indented to maintain it for the next six years. There is an ongoing project for construction
of a trilateral highway from Moreh in India to Mae Sot in Thailand to Bagan in
Myanmar, the progress of which is being reviewed regularly by the foreign ministers of
the three nations. See, Kuppuswamy, C. S, “India’s Look-East Policy: More Aggressive,
Better Dividends”, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 1663, 3 January, 2006.

25. Suryanarayan, V, “India’s Look East Policy”, World Focus, vol. 20, no. 10-11-12,
Oct.-Dec. 1999, pp. 55-57; Rao, P.V, “India and Regional Cooperation: Multiple
Strategies in an Elusive Region”, in Rao, P.V (ed.): Indian and Indian Ocean: In The
Twilight of the Millennium, pp. 122-151.

26. “BIMST-EC Summit Declaration”, World Focus, vol. 25, no. 9, September 2004, p.
23; Bhasin, Avtar Singh (ed.): India’s Foreign Relations–Documents 2004, Geetika
Publishers, New Delhi, 2005, p. 916; Morris, Peter, “Grouping to Check China’s
Influence”, Asia Times Online, 11 February, 2004.

27. Prime Minister Manmohan singh’s Address to the North Eastern Council, New Delhi,
12th April, 2005. See at, http://pmindia.nic.in/speeches.htm.

28. Asian Development Bank Indicators 2005. See at

http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Key_Indicators/2005.

29. The Shanghai Times, 28 October, 2007.

30. Lundholam, Gideon, “Pipeline Politics: India and Myanmar, Power and Interest”,
News Report, 10 September 2007, see at http://www.pinr.com/reportt?ac=view_report
&report_id=679.

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