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Abstract
This paper uses Jean Comoroffs argument in Body of Power, Spirit of
Resistance to reflect on the changing nature of religious practice in the contemporary world. It draws on Comaroffs method, which situates religion
in a complex social, economic, and political field that is itself in the process
of unfolding. Using Hindu practices among Indian IT workers in the diaspora as a case in point, the paper suggests that the forms of techo-scientific
labor that IT workers are involved in demands certain types of religious
practice that discipline mind and body. At the same time, engaging in those
practices opens up challenges to dominant tropes around religious belief
and worker disposition, since it creates critical spaces for reflection in the
Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 3, pp. 519550, ISSN 0003-549. 2010 by the Institute for Ethnographic
Research (IFER) a part of the George Washington University. All rights reserved.
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Neeladri Bhattacharya reminds us to think through the mutual articulation of the religious and the political (2008:65), so too does it seem necessary to unpack mutual formation of the scientific and the religious without collapsing one into the other. The terms by which these young
computer programmers collectively are named (Indian ITers, Indian IT
workers) in discussions about new technologies and the changing nature
of work is itself a token of this process, demarcating an uneven fit
between the shape of new kinds of economies and subjects and the persons called on to work them. I take and reuse this lumpy name as a symptom of a peculiar dynamism in the current moment, a moment when the
form that the relationship of Hinduism, new technologies, and economic
formations is in the process of congealing.
Chris Fuller and Haripriya Narasimhan described the transnational
spaces of labor that Indian IT workers occupy. What they described for
workers in Chennai applies to the conditions of work in Germany, with the
telling exception that instead of working five days, most Indian IT workers I knew worked six, and worked between 50 and 60 hours a week
instead of the 40 to 50 described by Fuller and Narasimhan (2007:126):
Pressure to meet deadlines is also common and extra hours are then
expected, from men and women alike. Most work is done by teams
of software engineers, together with a few domain specialists, who
are supervised by project managers a teams size can vary from a
handful to a hundred or so, and some team members may be working abroad on-site, while others stay in India. Almost all staff work in
modern, open-plan offices and team members, male and female,
work closely together. [] Very importantly, major IT firms are universally understood to be part of a global industry, not just an Indian
one [] on-site overseas project assignments, lasting several months
or even a year or two, are a normal part of working life.
Aneesh Aneesh furthers the argument about the global nature of work
in Indian IT by suggesting that outsourcing and onsite work need to be
considered part of the same mechanisms of creating mobility and flexibility in technology-driven companies (2006). While working abroad, Indian
IT workers, as those I interviewed often told me, become part of other circuits of Indian belonging, especially for those that are part of ongoing
conversations around the status of the Indian state, Hindu religious prac523
Living and Praying in the Code: The Flexibility and Discipline of Indian
Information Technology Workers (ITers) in a Global Economy
tices, and the nature of the privileges and costs of working abroad. This
makes Indian ITers diasporic;that is, they rely on the link between
Hinduism and work established through the discursive practices of IT. At
the same time, diasporic imaginaries can be marshaled to criticize this
link and part of state and capital based hegemonies.
To anticipate my later argument, I suggest that ITers, rather than adhering to a strict definition of Hinduness or abandoning religion completely,
are involved in calibrating practices and beliefs in a manner that affords a
critique of the conditions of their labor. These acts of calibration are often
understood according to the idea of appropriateness. Ritual calibration for
practicing Hindus has long been thought of as both a form of intervention
into life and world and as a deontic imperative to produce symmetry
between a person and her surroundings (Eck 1996, Babb 1986). Doubtless
established connections between correct personhood and appropriate
action are at work here, but so too are supplementary practices of appropriateness informed by conditions of migration and work. Hinduism allows
a relationship to the work of programming that is twofold. On the one
hand, practices of prayer and meditation produce in the IT worker the kind
of concentration that their work requires; on the other, ritual practices can
transform the work that they do into the spiritual supports of family,
nation, and belonging. Here, Comaroffs arguments about the relationship
between leisure, prayer, and work are particularly salient, as she shows how
the elaborations on dress and performance practiced by the Tshidi both prepare them for industrialized work and function as a source of opposition to
that very co-option. Beyond showing how Hinduism helps tie terrains of
global capital and knowledge such as Information Technology together to
workers from South Asia and how it is used in everyday life to protect working subjects from being overrun by the demands of work and life abroad, I
also show towards the end of this essay how Hinduism and public life in an
Indian diaspora are being reformulated by subjects who are working and
living in between the demands and pleasures of high technology and of kinship, nationality, and personal devotion. To make these interrelated arguments, I first weave together the history of coding and computers in India
and the recent development of Hindu nationalism to demonstrate how,
while they have different origins, they are under particular historical circumstances made to be commensurable.
In the study of Hinduism, it is often difficult to identify what the standard religious practices could be in general, as Hindu practice varies
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widely by region, time period, class, and caste. In the case of Hindu
Indian IT workers, there is no identifiable sect or church that all who can
be classified as this type of worker belong to; it is more accurate to say
that they have a series of practices that have similar form and a series of
ritual events that mark public sites of belief (Novetzke 2008). What is
more, and among the group of ITers I observed, they all participate in
these events together, forming a shifting public helping shape belief. As
Comaroff points out, the task for the writer is to pay attention to the distinctive confluence of local and global factors, how its iconic forms and
practical implications are to be understood in terms of a particular peoples journey, bearing in mind that, while that journey might be similar
to expeditions elsewhere in the first and third worlds, neither the point of
departure nor the route taken are ever identical (1985: 254). I examine
the emergence of physical and discursive spaces as site where religious
practice can be linked to work in ways that move beyond the overdetermined tropes of Orientalism in the service of production. Modifying this
sentiment slightly, public shapings of Hindu practice mark them as events
pitched at once at different ethical scales (see Shipley, this volume).
Here, I consider how to account for peripheralization itself, and how to
account for a kind of globalism that incorporates into its workings the
very religious practices that, in her analysis, formed a backbone of resistance to neocolonial market penetration. I ask not whether the practices
of Hindu Indian ITers are or are not a form of resistance, but what exactly might they be making themselves resistant to? Rather than question
whether or not they occupy a space on the periphery, I ask, how can they
be both so needed and so marginal at the same time? Finally, this essay
takes on the prickly question of the role of religion in an age of technology, arguing neither for its demise nor for its resurrection, but showing
how internet technology workcoding, programming, making information flowbecomes interwoven with a reconstructed form of Hinduism
for Hindu IT workers from India.
Living and Praying in the Code: The Flexibility and Discipline of Indian
Information Technology Workers (ITers) in a Global Economy
The first computer scientists emerging from India were graduates of the
Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs), a family of state-funded math and
science colleges created in the early 1950s. These institutes were part of a
larger plan for the newly independent nation in which scientific study and
educational advancement were supports for Indias economic, social, and
political stability. Over the course of the next three decades the focus in IIT
engineering classes began to shift away from mechanical and civil projects
and towards computing, in keeping with trends at other similar institutes
in the United States and Europe (Saxenian 2002, Heitzman 2004, Nilekani
2008). At the same time, and in response to Cold War politics that made
India reliant on US and Soviet expertise, Indian government scientists
began developing mainframe computers while IIT graduates were
employed in increasing numbers to develop software and applications for
computers used in military and business within India. During the decades
following Independence (1950s through the 1980s), Indian schools of higher education developed significant levels of expertise in software development because of the government ban on importing small electronics (such
as refrigerators and computers), which led to a home-grown industry of
software applications designed to run on domestically produced machines.
When in the early 1990s India removed restrictions on imports for
small-scale electronics and loosened regulations governing foreign ownership of firms operating within the country, Indian computer scientists
were poised to enter the emergent international IT (information technology) market in strength, and in two ways that would become increasingly important as time went onas software experts employable in the
burgeoning competitive zones of Silicon Valley and Route 128 (Boston),
and as members first of research and development teams and then of
service units for US firms located in Bangalore and Pune. Both of these
areas benefited from the kinds of skills that engineers within India had
developed within the protected environment provided by government
import substitution policiesprogramming and coding skills, as opposed
to hardware design for example, could be transferred and adapted to
meet the needs of multinational software and services firms (Patibandla,
Kapur, and Peterson 2000).
As Indian ITers made their way into chains of migration through the
United States and then increasingly England, Western Europe and
Australia, they became a second or even third waveafter the doctors,
engineers, and research scientists that preceded themof Indian profes526
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sional, upper class and high caste immigrants. And, as trained computer
programmers formed pools of qualified labor in Indian cities, they became
a reliable source of coding and expertise in the third world that would
later develop into the global trade in computer-related services done on
contract basis called outsourcing (Aneesh 2006, Xiang 2007).
Over the same span of time, Hindutva, or Hinduness was emerging as a
cornerstone of popular politics. Voters began to mobilize around the imaginary of a Hindu nation and Hindus as the rightful heirs to the economic
value of India, now under threat from internal or external Muslim enemies. Reasons for the popularity of Hindutva were manifold, and included among them increasing alienation of a middle and lower-middle class
Hindi speaking (and other vernaculars including Marathi and Gujarati)
population from the English reading upper class public, the ability of
Hindu nationalist groups to provide goods and services on a neighborhood level for underprivileged classes, and the savvy use by the BJP and
other Hindutva parties of mass mediated technologies, especially television (see Rajagopal 2001, Hansen 2001, Nandy 1998). What voters found
appealing in these parties was a new combination of social programs and
moral pronouncements emphasizing traditional and exclusionary
Hindu moralities, themselves painstakingly constructed; coupled with an
aggressive pursuit of new forms of wealth, money and prosperity for the
parties loyal followers.
The rise of Indian IT and the rise of Hindutva can be read as local manifestations of the janus-faced nature of neoliberal globalizationat the
same moment that middle class Hindu Indian subjects began to imagine
their futures as expanding because of increased access to world markets
and the flow of investment moving towards India through IT, the suspicion, often correct, that these capital flows may be difficult to manage
and contain began to be displaced onto a population long considered
alien. In this context, Hinduism became both the vehicle to protect
India and one to help Indians solidifythrough both practices and ideologies equating Hinduism with particular sets of skillstheir place in the
multinational world of (IT) labor.
This combination of spiritual fervor and economic gain characterizes
the emergent attitude of many religious institutions towards new economic formations. It also goes a long way, in my opinion, in explaining
their intuitive appeal. If there is new money to be had, then that new
money seems more elusive than ever because it circulates more widely,
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quickly and loosely than before. Divine means may, indeed, be the best
suited to catch these uncanny forms of materiality. Yet, as Indian programmers discovered, there is a different catch in marshalling religiously
derived characteristics in work abroad. The stories of ITers were peppered
with accounts of glass ceilings and culturo-religious assumptions, where
the personal ambition of a worker was constrained by the purported
inborn characteristics that accompanied Hindu programmerswhat
Povinelli called being caught in a genealogical, community-bound grid
(Povinelli 2006). Conversations among IT workers discussed how to
respond to questions like Why do Hindus worship monkeys? or Whats
the significance of the color red? All agreed that providing convincing
answers to these questions shored up the authenticity and therefore the
brand of Indian programmers. Recognition of the limiting affects of a
homogeneous definition of Hinduism, as I discuss below, contributed to
the reworking of Hindu practice and rhetoric in the IT diaspora.
Over the course of the 1990s and into the new millennium, programmers also were swept up in new transnational migrations as they responded to temporary contract work and some long-term employment opportunities in the technology industries of the United States, Europe, and
Australia. During the same period, the politics of religion in India brought
about the rise of the Hindu fundamentalist BJP party, which came into
power in 1998. For the underclasses, this meant party-sponsored access
to basic goods and services such as health care and sanitation (Hansen
2001). For the middle classes, it meant increased representation in national politics especially through languages and the symbolics of Hindu
mythology (Rajagopal 2001), and for that section of the middle classes
that was upwardly mobile, it meant opening the national market to multinational companies and making India modern in an age when modernity
was best expressed through, not against, culture. This last impulse, as will
become evident, was not due to an internal or eternal need to maintain
an Indian identityalthough it was often voiced in those terms (Das
2002)but rather was itself a condition of the newly globalizing market
because value on this market was and continues to be assigned according
to constructed notions of gender, race, age, and ethnicity. In all of this, as
many thoughtful commentators have written, Muslim Indians became the
remainder and the reason for Indias lack of success; they were blamed as
competitors for limited goods, as backward persons needing remedy,
and as internal threats to the nation with outside funding (Appadurai
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2006). All of this heated rhetoric led to the now infamous mass killings
and riots that preceded the fall of the BJP from power in 2004.
The BJP was ousted from power in the 2004 elections that ushered in
Manmohan Singh as prime minister after Sonia Gandhi stepped aside as
leader of the winning Congress Party. This result was widely seen as a surprise and the reasons for the BJP loss are still being debated. The Congress
Party continued to be successful in the recent 2009 elections. These
changes in the Indian political scene all count towards the backdrop
against which Indian IT workers engage with the practices and discourses
of Hinduism. One of the legacies of the Hindutva movements for these
programmers is to undo the binary between secular, scientific and development discourses and the discourses of religious right and duty. Of
course, this binary never really existed as starkly opposed in action, but
Hindu practices have moved squarely within the domain of public and
political culture. The next section turns to the relationship between
transnational IT migration and changing definitions of India.
Living and Praying in the Code: The Flexibility and Discipline of Indian
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software companies) on the other (Saxenian 2004). Complicating the relationship between nation, technology, and economy still further was the
change traceable to the same decades in the definition of the Indian citizenry. As the national economy began to spread outside the political
boundaries of India, the idea of belonging that bound a citizen to her
place began to shift, and the Indian citizen received its supplement
through the figure of the diasporic and the non-resident Indian.
Serious out-migration from India began with the shipment of indentured servants as replacements for the emancipated slaves of the
Caribbean, South Africa and Indian Ocean islands from Calcutta, Bombay,
and Madras (Lal 1983, Tinker 1974). Closer to the current moment, the
first wave of Indian professionals and working class migrants entered the
United States and Britain in large numbers after the Second World War.
Yet the term diaspora as applied to South Asian populations is definitively of more recent provenance. It may be said of Indian IT professionals
that they were the first wave to migrate from India having the term diaspora firmly affixed to their passports, rather than, like those who came
before them, having to be retrospectively baptized with the term.
Diaspora, a term of address (Edwards 2006), has for South Asia a
simultaneous double-birth. It names both a complex poetics of postnationalist belonging and a claim of ownership by the Indian nation-state
on its ostensibly most productive membersIT and other professional
workers. And, just as this double-birth is both a mode of national hegemony and an escape from the container of the nation, so too its religious referent (Gilroy 1991). Sikhs and Tamils, two groups defined by ethnicity and
religion, were the first groups to be baptized diasporas according to the
principle of extra-national belonging, and their battles against the Indian
and Sri Lankan national regimes respectively were carried out from abroad
as well as from within these two countries (Axel 2001, Jeganathan and
Ismail 1995). Yet, the idea of a diasporic identity, in the sense of transcending a single national boundary, and opposed to national identity in its very
articulation, was quickly adapted to the needs of a developing nation in a
multinational economic environment. The Indian (or more broadly,
depending on context, South Asian) diaspora became then a bifurcated,
contradictory placeholder, at once the rallying cry for a post-national form
of belonging, and a descriptor binding out-migrants through moral compunction and an imaginary of continuity sans location to the national community of India (Ho 2006). Without going into detail about the contortions
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An Economy of Techno-Signs
In the years after 1947, a relationship was established between technoscience and the nation-state in India that in many ways underwent a similar construction to the relationship between religion and the Indian
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nation state. Both religion and science became touchstones for refiguring institutions of government as cleansed of the negative associations of
the colonial era. Techno-science and religion gained purchase as universal sources of ethics and morality by being oriented towards the democratic goals of an independent nation-state. As an episteme belonging
squarely to the European Enlightenment, science and technology was a
standard bearer of British, then Indian governmentality, as Gyan
Prakashs seminal work has shown. In the post-independence, post-colonial formation of science and technology, scientific methods were meant
to purify institutions of governance of their colonial taints (Prakash
1999, Gupta 1998). At issue was whether techno-science could exist free
of the structures of colonial science: could a more scientific mode of
governance be a more just one? This continued and ongoing ambivalence
in the inheritance of science and technology has, in Abrahams terms,
made a fetish of national sciences and their corresponding technological, military, and now economic applications, both covering up and
revealing the underlying contradictions of state power. In post-independence India, governance was supported by continual interaction with
what had been relegated, at the level of ideology, to the pure, cultural
substrate of the nation, defined as religious tradition and as the undifferentiated populace. This separation was marked deeply by caste and
class differences, and it fell to upper caste, educated elites to become
patrons of the nation and its people (Hansen 1999).
This suggests that science and religion in the first few decades after
Indian independence were part of a parallel construction of state power,
rather than being opposed to one another. Both served to remake a state
distanced from the politics of colonial control. Religion created spaces for
the expression of cultural nationalisms, while techno-science did so by
demonstrating how the state could be in the service of, rather than in the
business of oppressing, the people. Science and national interest were
never fully separated in India but were linked through a discourse of ethical purity, as was national interest and religion. Of course, both these
unstable constructions yielded results much different than their stated
intents. The exercise of demonstrations of technological and scientific
prowess, especially when linked to demonstrating the force of state
power, and of piety, especially in the illustration of individual charisma,
enabled and masked the oppression of marginalized and minority communities (Abraham 1999, Gupta 1998).
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cism of Hinduism were resuscitated and altered to fit the strictures of the
IT workplace, consigning Indian ITers to the back office and making international mobility a condition of employment.
The association of religious institutions with particular forms of affect
and interiority is not new. At the end of the 19th century, Max Weber
penned a treatise on the qualities of Hindu-Buddhist thought he believed
to be at heart inimical to the rise of capitalism. Otherworldy, ascetic and
caste-bound, the Eastern subject would not be the bearer of a spirit
directed towards the rational ordering of persons and things. At the end
of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century, those otherworldly qualities quicken the fantasy of the perfect Information Technology worker. In
the dreams of many a business manager, the Indian software engineer
springs fully formed from an IIT or other Indian bastion of math and science, his spirituality intact. He, although the IT worker may be increasingly imagined as she, works for long hours in a perfect symbiosis
between human and machine, producing profitable abstractions and caring little about paychecks. The ascetic spirituality of the programmer is
meant to fill the coffers of the West with the spoils of digital labor. And
importantly, unlike the truculent, unionized factory worker, the engineer does not have to be forced to work hard for little pay. Because of
her nonmaterial, non-selfish and math-oriented spirituality, she is naturally inclined to do so.
How are we to understand this particular reemergence of an old
abstraction? One way is to pronounce the Protestant ethic ailing and to
diagnose a Hindu-Buddhist-Muslim-Sikh-Taoist-Confucian Ethic as the new
heart of contemporary capitalism. This line has been taken up over the
past three decades with enthusiasm, until an economic crash coupled
with the feint of corruption and mismanagement seems to remind everybody, if only temporarily, of the interconnectedness and unevenness of
things. It might then be a good time then to think in general about
realignments of religion and science happening in many parts of the
world, among them the United States and South Asia. As I have alluded to
above, the alignment of Hindu math and science with success in programming does not animate capitalism per se, but a particular internationally
distributed division of labor within it. Islamic science, as much as it is
enunciated, does not do the same work because it marks the limits of toleration and because it is not hooked into a particular diasporic subject of
science, like the high class, high caste Hindu programmer.
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need to carve out a space for themselves within the daily press of their jobs.
Following the teachings of Sri Sri Ravi Shankar is a way to establish spacetimes during the day unsaturated with the economic logic of short-term
work contractsa logic which allows the holder of such a contract to harbor
no illusions of advancement in the company that employs her. The globalized sphere of religious practice forms through mutual modes of dependencies, as gurus need followers abroad, and in this particular kind of diaspora guru-shishya (teacher-student) relationships seem to be gaining in
popularity. As previously mentioned, the mediation that goes on before
work, and celebrating festivals on the weekends nevertheless makes ITers
more ready than ever to work long hours in front of computer screens doing
the repetitive duties that other programmers would rather not do.
In fact, although I cannot elaborate fully here, there is a great deal of
overlap between the logic of the code that ITers write during the weekday
and the religion that they practice outside of work. Both have an asymptotic aspectboth prayer and coding are potentially infinitely expandable, the supplicant or coder having a greater deal of control or precision
over the end product the closer she gets to infinity itself, defined as a perfect match between code and process on the one hand and transcendental wisdom (pragyaa, gyaanodhya) on the other. So, when ITers pray, they
are also transmuting the logic of coding onto the logic of prayer (and vice
versa), making for a world in which the horizons of their aspirations are
always just after the next big project and just beyond what is graspable by
human intellect.
Cutting across the increasingly tight interweaving of personal devotion
and time spent in front of a personal computer are practices that open up
a gurus teachings to a wider set of morals and articulations. It is at the
intersection of practices of devotion and talk about devotion, emblematically represented by the threshold between kitchen and sitting room, where
practices that challenge the Hindu orthodoxy emerge. On Indian
Independence day, in August 2004, I observed one such conversation,
where the sitting room became the coffeehouse, and talk emerged that
made Indian ITers Hinduism into a kind of critique of Hindu orthodoxy,
marked for these programmers by strict adherence to Vedic texts and codes.
Over the course of the day, I had accompanied a group of 12 programmers as they celebrated independence, first at the Indian Embassy, and
then at a small Hindu temple in the city. After these two stops, the group
visited with one another in the sitting room of one of the programmers, a
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Research for this paper was supported by the Social Science Research Council and the
Fulbright Foundation. I would like to thank Jesse Shipley, who kindly invited me to
contribute to this volume, Bent Hayes Edwards and Michael Warner for reviewing early
versions of this paper, and the anonymous reviewers of Anthropology Quarterly, who
helped me refine my ideas through their careful and considered comments.
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