The Ottoman Empire in East Africa

see also this book

The Ottoman Empire began its march to dominance as a band of Turcoman nomads from
Central Asia. Several centuries later, they were the globally dominant military, political, and
economic power. Analysis of the Ottomans as a world powerespecially their diplomatic
relations with emerging European powers such as Portugal, Venice, and Franceis not new
in the historiography, but sustained monographic treatments of the Ottoman relationship with
their eastern neighbors, especially the Safavids and the Mughals, have been rare. Moreover,
Ottoman naval power has only recently given its proper place in the historiographical
analysis. Historians such as Palmira Brummett, Andrew Hess, and Salih Ozbaran detail how
the Ottomans were not only a gunpowder empire with well organized armies; they also built
and provisioned trading ships in the Mediterranean, Baltic, and Red Seas. S systemic
monographic treatment of their presence in the Indian Ocean is yet to be written.
The knowledge of Ottoman presence in the Indian Ocean was initially facilitated by
Portuguese historians, while on the Turkish side, the pioneering works of Salih Ozbaran have
been collected in The Ottoman Response to European Expansion: Studies on Ottoman
Portuguese Relations in the Indian Ocean and Ottoman administration in the Arab lands

during the Sixteenth Century.

Ozbarans work of collecting and presenting primary sources and interpretation of Ottoman
diplomatic relations and naval power is particularly valuable. He details how in the late 15th
century, having conquered Istanbul and established hegemony over Anatolia and several
Baltic and Arab provinces, the Ottomans turned to Venetian shipbuilders to challenge the
Portuguese in the Indian Ocean. At the head of the Red Sea, the Ottomans completed their
new fleet, and in 1507, Amir Husayn led the fleet to fight the Portuguese at Diu. Despite their
defeat by the Portuguese in 1509, the Ottomans remained a viable naval power in the Red
Sea, with outposts on the Horn of Africa and control over the strategic port of Aden on the
Yemeni coast.
Furthermore, the hostility of the Swahili city-states to Portuguese hegemony meant that
Ottoman incursions down the East coast of Africa were perceived as a real threat. In about
1585, a single Turkish ship promising support was sufficient to bring on a general revolt of
Swahili towns, which the Portuguese promptly quelled. A couple of years later, Amir Ali
Beywhom some sources picture as an Ottoman official, but others as a mere buccaneer
appeared with a small force. Again, several city states immediately broke away from
Portuguese control. At Pemba, the townspeople annihilated the occupying garrison, and an
attack was mounted against Malindi, Portugal's staunchest ally. Again a Portuguese fleet
from India restored control with appalling brutality. At Faza, they slaughtered the entire
population, destroyed its vessels and plantations, and sent the head of its king as a grizzly
trophy to Goa.
Ali Bey returned with a somewhat larger force two years later and took possession of
Mombasa. Another Portuguese relief force was dispatched, and sailed into the harbor to find
the Turks had come under siege by invaders they called Zimba, reportedly a savage people
who had already destroyed Kilwa. The Portuguese fleet attacked and pillaged the city, and
then, as they departed, the Zimba rushed in to complete the devastation. Advancing farther
north, the Zimba finally were defeated at Malindi by a force of warlike pastoralists whom the
Portuguese called Masseguejos. Portugese control would continue until the Omanis (invited
by Mombasa city leaders) finally wrested control of the coast from the them in 1698.
Of course there are other stories here too: the conflict between the Ottomans and the
Ethiopian emperor Minas over the coastal imperial stronghold of Debarwa, the intermittent
treaties between the two parties over the trading entrepots at Massawa and Arkiko. During
the 15th century the Ottomans had used local Muslim intermediaries to wage war against the
Ethiopian emperor, while the Portuguese backed the Ethiopians but tried to make them
submit to Papal authority in Rome. As both Ottoman and Portuguese power declined in the
17th century, these machinations died down.
The larger point in all is that the histories of these liminal spaces on the edges of the great
empires often have their own unique and compelling stories which get lost amidst the focus
on a perceived 'center'. If a historian came along who knew Kiswahili, Arabic, Portuguese,
Ottoman Turkish, French, German, and English, and perhaps Gujarati he or she could write a
comprehensive history of the Western Indian Ocean from antiquity to the present, including
some of the arcane bits of minutiae which help give life to the larger sketch. As it now stands,

learning two languages is a daunting enough task, so this herculean effort is still a future
endeavor for some aspiring genius.