Sie sind auf Seite 1von 312

m

BnV.J;,

S.g, Srxttrlrer Sibr arg


Gift of

SaMUJEIL

HuBBAMD)

SCUIMJIE]

June 22,1903

^^y\n

,f.

Kohler Collection

K^

iJ^\%^OG -1^^^

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE,

IN THEIR CONNEXION

WITH THE LAJFS OF MATTER AND FORCE:

A SERIES OF SCIENTIFIC ESSAYS.

BY

JOSEPH JOHN MURPHY.

IN TWO VOLUMES.
VOL.

II.

^'onbou:

MACMILLAN AND

CO.

1869.

\Tlic llKjhl

tif

Tnnis/nliiiii ninl

Riprivhicdnn

is

reserved.]

LOHDtIN
R.

CliAV, SOSS,

AND TAYLOR,

BREAD STREET

HILL.

PRINTERS,

CONTENTS OF VOL.

II.

CHAPTER XXVII.
INTELLIGENCE.

Formative, motor, and mental functions,


intelligence of the bee the
is

all guided by intelligence


Instinctive
same in kind with formative intelligence Instinct

not more wonderful than formative intelligence

Purpose in

the formation

and action of the iris Gradation from unconscious to conscious and rational
motor actions in the eye, and in the digestive orgtins Actions determined by
sensation All motor actions are intelligent, whether conscious or not Intelligence, unconscious and conscious, formative and mental, is fundamentally
the same This view includes instinct We cannot point out the beginning of
sensation, or of consciousness
Most thought, perhaps all, is partly unconscious
Identity of formative, instinctive, and mental intelligence A special act of
creation is not necessary for every new adaptation Moral difliculties lessened
by this view Parasitic worms Unnatural or immoral instincts All matter
is endowed with forces, and vitalized matter is endowed with intelligence

Intelligence tends to guide all vital actions in the direction that

health of the organism

Disease

is

no exception

only to the individual, but to the race


Social afiections

is

Vital actions

best for the

minister not

Reproductive and maternal functions

Development of unconscious

action into conscious

Love of

life.

Note

Instinct

Instincts

of social insects cannot be inherited

planation by natural selection

some

think them due

Darwin's ex Instincts of

to Intelligence

Pp.

fishes

CHAPTER

11

XXVIII.

MIND.

Mind
Consciousness

Definition impossible
plicable

is

developed out of sensation Consciousness inexsensation Sensation without consciousness

is

of

Acquired

Sleep

Mental development Consciousness distinct from

taste

due to a change not in the sensation, but in the consciousness of

sensation

it

CONTENTS OF VOL.

VI

II.

Analogous impressions from different senses Consciousness is indivisible


Biological ground of this in nervous centralization Sensation is divisible
Consciousness not hereditary Instance how birds acqiiire
consciousness not

Pp. 12

man

a dread of

17

CHAPTER XXIX.
THE PHY.SIOLOGY OF MIND.
Differentiation into organs of vegetative

fundamental character of the latter


cular

Its

and of animal

Nervous

life

Contractility

the

system developed out of mus-

primary function is to transmit stimuli to the muscles Nervous


Ganglia Pieflex action Nervous function differentiated

system never simple

Sensation does not exist at begins probably


Sentient and insentient nerves histologically alike Parallel

from muscular function


with special sense

first

It

development of organs and of functions Corpora striata their relation to the


sensory ganglia Consensual action its similarity to merely reflex action
Sensation at first is only the guide to action Insects have only this, with some
:

Sensory ganglia developed out of spinal cord, and cerebrum


the organ of consciousness Largest
out of sensory ganglia The cerebrum
in the highest animals Cerebrum not in direct connexion with the organs of
external
structure The functions of parts can be ascertained only by
One nervous current proanalogy Phrenological theory disproved by
thus produced Nerves and nerve-currents
ducing another Consciousness

possible exceptions

is

life

Its

its

facts

is

of consciousness

cereljrum

thought

Is

consciousness produced in the sensoi-y ganglia or the

Consciousness of thought

is

Recollection without apparent

distinct

cause

from thought

Nerves

Unconscious
The sen-

of thought

Consciousness of thought how


Memory rudimentary form a consciousness of sensation outlasting the sensation Recollection due to the reproduction of a current of consciousness Consensual action produced by remembered consciousness Voluntary action The same action may be at one time
sory ganglia are the seat of consciousness

produced

Scat

of

consciousness

Its

is

consensual, at another voluntaiy, according to the nature of the stimulus

Thought

acts

on the motor ganglia through the nerves of will

the nerves of will

musician

This

Voluntary actions may become

may become

consensual

Position

Instance of

of

hereditary in animals, as in birds, and in dogs

consensual actions Instance of the bee


This explanation will not apply to
Voluntary action has been developed out of consensual, and consensual out
of insentient Summary Enumeration of mental actions Mutual relation of
the nervous organs of mind Sensation Consensual action Consciousness of
Reverie
sensation Thought Consciousness produced by thought
Sleep Dreaming Somnambidism Grounds of theory stated Functions of
sensory and motor nerves and ganglia are known Those of the cerebral nerves
may be inferred by analogy Cerebral nerves of consciousness, of thought, and of
will Three primary mental functions probably corresponding thereto Nerves
of consciousness distinct from those of thought and will Nerves of consciousness:
how identifiedThought
in
unconscious Nerves of thought Nerves
all

"Will

is

itself

CONTENTS OP VOL.
of will

Ideo-mutor

and voluntary

action.s

Vll

II.

how

distinguished

The

theory

incomplete.

Note

Nervous Currents

telegraph currents

Consciousness

is

always a secondary phenomenon

Compared to
Nerve-fibres are more than merely conductors. Pp. 18 41

The secondary current

is

not a continuation of the

electric

first

CHAPTER XXX.
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THOUGHT.
Physiology

useless as a guide in

is

mind depends on nervous action


sciousness

Feelings of

consciousness

any but elementary psychology, though all


this
Feeling is wider than con-

Proofs of

Gradations of
explicable
relation of sensations to each otherAttention to

sensation and feelings of consciousness

Emotions Feeling

becins with the sense of the

is

inexplicable

Thought

It

is

one particular sensation, or to one particular relation between sensations


Instance in geometrical study We have no real consciousness of relations,
only of related things But we have knowledge of relations Unconscious

conscious
when
of relations
ceases
to
be

Thought
explained
thus
thought
"What
only, to the exclusion of the feelings between which the relations are
it is

is

taken for consciousness of thought

is

often really consciousness of mental effort.

4247

Pp.

CHAPTER XXXI.
MENTAL

HABIT.

All actions tend to become habitual Motor habits Voluntary actions becoming
habitual and consensual Mental habit, or association of ideas Impressions on

consciousness are either sensory or ideal

Law of association

stated

Instance

of a man's face and his voice Groups of sensations Association by contiguity


and by resemblance, both cases of the same principle Explanation of associa-

it is a case of association by contiguity The power


tion by resemblance
and difference is an ultimate fact All association
resemblance
of cognising
a case of loss of habits by disuse Reappearance
Forgetting,
habit
on
depends
:

memories supposed to be lost Association enters into all mental acts


Accurate knowledge Error Reverie
of knowledge
Invention Reasoning The mind cannot create, but can only combine Are all
of

Memory Acquisition

mental facts referable to the law of mental habit alone ? Parallel question in
biology I believe in intelligence, in addition to the laws of Kabit The question stated

Is intelligence

tion so brieflv

an ultimate

fact

?Why

have treated of associaPP'

*8-5^

CONTENTS OF VOL.

Viii

CHAPTER
THE

GROtrxp.S OF

Moral means emotional

Definition

root of the moral nature

is

XXXII.

THE MORAL NATVRE.

Moral

Organic intelligence guides

Sentient organisms
Keason

it

may

and pain

how they

he possible to teU

organisms to do what

all

The
Pleasure and

contrasted with intellectual

is

in the sense of pleasure

pain are inexplicable in themselves, hut


arise

II.

their welfare

is for

by sensation Exceptions
Desire and fear Love of
Great
in the organic
their

are guided to their welfare

thinking the law must be general

for

Sexual, domestic, and social affections

life

life

i-oots

changes are injurious, slight ones beneficial

gi'eat

changes are painful, slight

Application of this principle to beautyRoots of emotions in


Emotions generated by association Association of feelings
the organic
Love of money not a primary feeling may have become hereditary Emotions
ones agreeable

life

of holiness The sense of holiness


a case of intelligence.

have their seat in the nerves of consciousness Germ of the moral nature in
of unselsensation Prudence
Unselfishness Holiness Origin of jjrudence

fishness

is

5664

Pp.

CHAPTER

XXXIII.

MENTAL DEVELOPMENT.
Is sensation

mental

The question

is

only verbal

Mind begins with sensation

Feelings of sensation and of consciousness, or bodily and mental feelings

their

no fundamental distinction Sensation Consciousness


Thought "Will Relation of thought and will to the insentient life Analogy
of mental to organic development
Inter-action of functions in mind Development of thought, feeling, aud will Consensual and voluntary actions
Intermediate class Sensation aud consciousness both inexplicable Development of memory, from consciousness outlasting sensation Necessity of this to
thought Hearing words and sentences Memory is developed by the law of
anatomical grounds

Reverie Recollection,

voluntary memory Children have


power of recollection Only what has been attended to can
be recollected Imagination Continuance of impressions Memory Recollection
Imagination Development of reasoning out of cognition of relations
Elementary relations Likeness Succession Space-relation Causation Reassociation

memory with

little

or

Perception Perception may have seat


in the sensory ganglia Man's superiority in reasoning Power of directing

thought at will Language Abstraction "VThately's view on language Use of

lations presupposed in association

words in thought, due to the power of directing thought at will

developed

jSIora]

nature

whence

also

Instance in arithmetic Voluntary action always


than involuntarj' Simple inference and abstract reasoning
dcncloped out of the sense of pleasure and pain Care

the power of 'abstraction


later

its

is

for

CONTENTS OF
the

future

Emotions

VOL.

IX

II.

due to association Sympathy Love of beauty, of


Summary Tabular statement Second tabular

knowledge, and of holiness

statement.

Note

There

are unconscious sensation

and thought

believe there

unconscious feeling

Pp.

is

no

6582

CHAPTER XXXIV.
MENTAL GROWTH.
Analogy between the organism and the mind in development by differentiation
Organic and mental integration Analogy of organic and mental growth The
organism is constructed out of the food by the organic intelligence so mind
^Assimiis constructed out of impressions of sense by the mental intelligence
forgetting
Parallel
in
receiving
and
in
youth
most
rapid
lation and waste both
mental impressions Organic and mental growth both consist in excess of what
Waste is a condition of organic life so is foris received over what is lost
getting of mental life If we remembered everything, we could not think
Coalescence of residua by forgetting What constitutes familiarity Words
must not only suggest their meaning they must suggest nothing else The
Summary
first of these is secured by remembering, the second by forgetting
Formation of habits of action by the same law Moral benefit of forgetting

Forgetting

is a

Pp. 83

case of the laws of habit

91

CHAPTEE XXXV.
THE SENSES.
External senses

That of heat

when mixed, combine

their constituents
bine, but

may

The muscular sense belongs


and heat

so of

to touch

as are also the nerves of

sensations do not combine with each other

smells,

distinct

is

are nerves of both touch

The skin-nerves
taste
and these

but two tastes or

into a resultant of character intermediate between

Orange White Sounds do not so com Reason of this in the constitution of the nerves

mixed colours

be discriminated

and hearing transmit no other sensation


The nerves of smell,
kinds being transmitted by the same
different
sensations
of
Probable cause of
sight give perception of space
touch
and
Only
combining

without
nerve
and hearing Reproduction in memory of
touch,
Intellectual senses
impressions of sight and hearing Pleasure due to this Its moral importanceCause of this in hereditary habit Senses of touch and heat These sensations
resistance Muscular sense Taste
do not combine What touch cognises
of hearing

sight,

sight,

is

Smell

its

resemblance to taste Sight, or the sense of colour Only some

luminous undulations produce the sense of

sations of colour

light,

and these excite various sen-

Sight gives cognition of space

Characters

hearing Semicircular canals give a sense of the direction of


is

of sight
Of
sounds Hearing

unlike the other senses in the power of discriminating simultaneous sounds

CONTENTS OF VOL.

II

smell, and sight,


sensitive
Distribution of the nerves of touch,
surfaces Distribution of the nerves of hearing different Laws of sonorous
the same string Pitch of note
vibrations Period of vibration constant
the same string One string may set another vibrating Action of
constant
sound on the nerves of the ear Tone of sound how produced Why do the
to

taste,

for

for

secondary vibrations, or overtones, combine with the fundamental into a


sultant sound

The

practice overtones
intellectual,

combination or distinction maj' be due to habit

may

be distinguished

and the only

re-

With

Sight and hearing are the most


Music produces a more intense

senses

sesthetic

feeHng than visual beauty, because the

ear

loses

no

time in combining

impressions.

Note

Nerves of Special Sensation

colours

Reasons

against this

No

Opinion

of distinct nerves for distinct

special nerves of taste, nor of heat

The

kind of sensation depends not on the nerves, nor on the ganglia, but on the
organ of sense Sensations of light due to pressure, and to an electric current.
Note B Colours and the Laws of their Combination
Difference between sensations of sight and of the other senses
Meaning of ligJit and of radiance
Heating and chemical effects of radiance Eadiance consists of undulations

Rays of different wave-lengths are mixed together in the sunbeam Their sepaby the prism The places of brightest light, of greatest heating power,
and of greatest chemical power, do not coincide Different rays have different
colours
Succession of colours Difference of colour is a physiological fact, and
analogous not to tone but to pitch in sound The octave in sound and in colour
The series of colours in the spectrum is circular, and the opposite colours are
complementaries How to combine colours Whites produced by the comliina-

ration

All colours
Black Grey BroAvn Result of combining

tion of different pairs of complementaries are optically different

except white are in the spectrum

two colours not complementary


ones, but optically different
sense,

apart on the circle

and secondaries

in

but there

We might expect

crepancy of observation and theory


equally bright to our eyes
tific

form compound colours visibly like simple

distinction of primaries

may be in a physiological sense Further matheconsiderations Wave frequency A colour and its octave are 360"

any physical
matical

is to

No

complementaries to be 180 apart

How accounted

for

All

Dis-

the rays are not

Possibility of giving a formula for any tint ScienPp. 92 116

principles of harmonious colouring

CHAPTER XXXVL
PERCEPTION.

The problem, how


cognition

sensations give rise to perceptions

Perception

is

more than

the referring of sensations to their sources, the sources being


present in time
perfectly accurate definition is impossible
Perception is an
:

it is

The same act may be the one or the other, according to circumstances The subject has been complicated by extraneous questions Perception
and the cognition of space are
but have been confounded We cognise
inference

distinct,

space before

we perceive

objects in

it

Cognition of two sensations as separated

CONTENTS OF VOL.
iu space

Cognition of space by

tlie

XI

II.

motion of a sensation

In these ways only

can be cognised Cognitions of space and of time originate

superficial extension

ways Perception of objects external to tlie body is acquired by the


motor sense Summary Sight, like touch, originally cognises only superficial
extension Perception by sight is an acquired power Facts confirming these
views Answer to objection Perceptions due to both touch and sight Special
connexion of these two senses Cognition of space in three dimensions is due
to touch Additional proof of this Touch cognises linear magnitudes
sight
cognises angular ones
and we think more easily of the former than of the
latter
Words denoting the former are common words denoting the latter are
technical A being with sight only would cognise only angular magnitude
Impressions of the two senses are identified iu the mind as the result of habit
Account of the process Berkeley Quotation from M'Cosh Difficulty about
instinctive actions, as a duck running to the water when it leaves the egg
in parallel

Explanation

Presumption that perception


from the midtiplicity of senses Difficulty of the subject
from their multiplicity and their combination Elements involved in perception
enumerated Assigameut of a sensation to its source Cognition of space-relais

these are cases of hereditary habit

not a simple

tions

Perception

and sight^What

of objects in space
Combination of impressions of touch
is " the external world " external to ?
It may be extra-

mental, or only extra-organic

Note

act,

No organ of sense can perceive

itself.

Case of a being having

knowledge of space from sight only It would


cognise only sm-face, and that the surface of a sphere
It would see straight
lines as arcs of great circles
Plane geometry would seem true to it only on
:

infinitely small surfaces

The eye cannot see a plane surface or a straight line

Straight lines are seen as arcs of great circles, which intersect


Eeid's " Geometry of Visibles "
A Barrister's puzzle

when produced
Pp.117 132

CHAPTEK XXXVII.
THE RELATION OF THE MIND TO SPACE AND TIME.
Our knowledge of time
that space

necessary

number

is

I believe

is

Is

is

we

cognise time in cognising our

cognised in a parallel

more naturally expressed

expressed in time

separate origin

way Opinion
Similarity of space and time Both are

space

cognised by motion only

Magnitude

is

a primary cognition

is

sensations as successive

Conclusion

in space than in time,

Reason thinking that


Reason advanced thinking
motion Time
more inseparable from

the argument relevant

for

it is

Larval and mature forms of these cognitions


that the cognition of space

our thoughts than space


dental to the

human mind

is

from

for

is

believe this

Our

is

not essential to

all

mind, but

Possibility of consciousness being developed in


as
Touch,
and hearing minister to mind Of these only the
sjiace

sight,

give cognition of space

because

we think

iu

Hearing

is

well as
first

two

the most closely connected with thought,

words Sensations

of time, but only those of the

acci-

consciousness begins with the succession of

sensations

time

though

that the cognitions of the two have

of different senses

same sense can give

it

may

of sjiace

give cognition

Case of a

mind

CONTENTS OF VOL.

Xll
develoijed out of

tlie

seuse of sight only

in both time and space

its

Illustration What

Possibility of a consciousness

II.

consciousuess would be developed


is

meant by thinking in space

independent of time

Instance

believed in

of this being

133142

Pp.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.
TIME,
I

SPACE,

AXD CAUSATION.

hold the experience theory of our knowledge of space and time in preference to
that of forms of thought

But the experience

is

inherited

so that the results

of the experience of the race become fonns of thought for the individual

The problem stated: How have space and time become


the fact ultimate, or a result of experience The experience theory The ideal theory The ideal theoiy was consistent with the
psychology of Kant's time Further conclusion, that space and time are unreal,
Herbert Spencer

forms of thought

adjnitted

Is

by Kant

The

experience theoiy

consistent with our psychology

is

Kant was kept


from scepticism by his faith, in spite of his philosophy The experience theoiy
makes our knowledge to be true, though limited, and is a possible basis of belief
Causation, like space and time, is cognised directly, by coming within the
JS^otion that idealism is favourable to faith

think the reverse

Causation is cognised in becoming conscious of mental


no direct cognition of the will as the cause of muscular action
How we learn to identify physical and mental causation as cases of the same
law Imaginary case of a being with thought, but no motor powers Where
I agree with MUl, and where I differ
Summary Belief in the infinity of
space and time Difference between our belief of an eternal past and of an
sphere of consciousness
action

There

is

eternal future.

Note: The

Philosophy of Kant:

The

idealism, identical with scepticism

system of Kant's "Pure Reason"

that of

liis

"Practical Reason"

is

is faith.

Pp. 14.3151

CHAPTER XXXIX.

MENTAL

IN T E

1. 1

GENC

E.

The most important

question of biology is whether intelligence is a primary fact


have argued the affirmative of organizing intelligence, and have now to

argue

it

of

Thought
which

is

mental Difficulty

of the latter

question There are no innate ideas

Element of intelligence in thought


result of experience Association will account
conceptions,
Belief in the constancy of the order of things How

begins from experience

not a

all

for

but not for beliefs


this acquii-ed

Belief

is

? Some

is

say by habit

only I think

this is

no explanation-

subject to the laws of habit, but habit cannot produce belief Phy-

analogy

Objection from the inconstancy of the weather answered The


constancy of the order of things is not certain, but only probable but it is certain
to be constant unless interruiited In what sense the law of causation is selfsical

evident- This confidence

is

presupposed in action, and in desire and fear The

CONTENTS OF VOL.
only principles which enter into

known by

reasoning are those of logic

all

intelligence without habit

xiii

II.

They are

These are
The

involved in perception

The idea of substance Axioms of metaphysics


not the results of thought, but implied in thought Belief in the
veracity of memory is an ultimate fact, and belongs to intelligence
Resemlogical principle of identity

Beliefs

blance of

my

theory to idealism, and

its

diflerence

thought are so because they are laws of nature

believe the laws of

The question, should we expect


were not so, is irrational Intelligence is co-extensive with life, and not always conscious
Summary Belief implies intelligence,
as nutrition and gi-owth imply organizing power
Intelligence dominates most
in the highest life, both organic and mental Peculiarities of the mind of man
to find natui-e constant if

it

Sense of holiness Power of directing thouglit will Consciousness of


Use of the personal pronouns Intelligence needed
Note A Bain's Theory of Belief: Quotation from BainHis theory of belief
no explanation Belief in substance Mill on Bain Bain on the belief in the
veracity of memory Mill on the same.
Note B MilVs Inductive Logic Inductive and deductive reasoning Reasoning from particulars to particulars Quotation from Mill Question of the
at

self

for this.

is

origin of the belief in the constancy of nature

CHAPTER

Pp. 152

168

XL.

HABIT AND VAKIATION IN HISTORY.

The

and mind has been fully systematized, as have also been logic,
but the sciences of the results of man's
mental activity have not yet been systematized, including those of language,
art, and society
The laws of these subjects depend on the laws of mind, but
science of

life

mathematics, physics, and chemistry

the converse

is

not trae

In language are an intelligent and

Comparative gi-ammar
syntax

is

hoped

to be

is

for

a habitual element
only comparative etymology, but comparative
Language is an organism As life constructs the

as yet

organism, so thought eonstnicts language Variability of language, both in the

forms of words and their meanings, comparable to variations in the forms of


organs, and in their functions Rudimentary organs comparable to silent letters
Morphological correlations, independent of function, comparable to inflections

without meaning
tive sciences,
is

yet

Morphology and the science of language are both comparaand sciences of progressive change The embryology of language

unknown

Historical

ciples as organic

changes

morphology and language

English

Love of novelty

science of the fine arts, involving the

is

Morphology of
art

same prin-

Its progressive

architecture Roman, Gothic, and Oriental architecture

Habit the reason


Rapid changes in art Substitution in
Norman This probably paralleled in the de-

the moving power in the progress of art

is

of continuity in the history of art

England of Early Pointed for


is
velopment of species Intelligence in art modifying the materials given to it liy
unintelligent habit, without \'iolating the consistency of a style
Instance in

the modification of Gothic architecture for the display of stained glass

Continuity of history

and gradnaluess of

political

Politics

growth are consequences

CONTENTS OF VOL.

XIV
of the law of habit

and history

II.

Gradual variability of habit in morphology, language,


progress to mental education Both consist
art,

Analogy of

jiolitical

in the formation of habits

Necessity of permanence in habitsPolitical bores

Conscious functions are


Government LawHabit

later developed,

both in the individual and in society

ought to be controlled by inteUigcuce

vatism and Liberalism Institutions outlive their usefulness

CHAPTER

IN HISTORY.

Production of new types of character in colonization

by climate

selection

This process

world
flicts

effect of

of a race suited thereto,

jourely physical

is

History

Direct

183

XLI.

NATURAL SELECTION

emigrants from the parent stock

Conser-

Pp. 169

Natvu'al

Average

difference of

new circumstances

and having a

selection

is

Natural

distinct character

also tnie of the

moral

determined by man's mental nature Victory in human condepends on moral causes^It does not depend chiefly on courage Supeis

power in a primitive state due to the domestic virtues The political


virtues
The civic virtues Virtue confers power At first vanquished races
were destroyed afterwards they were subjugated Political progress due to
conquest Ultimately, war ceases to be an agency of jn'ogress Peaceful progress due to competition and natural selection Justification of freedom.
riority of

Pp.

184191

CHAPTER XLI I.
INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL OllGANIZATION.
Division of labour in the organism and in society

Nutritive and nervo-rauscular organs

development,

Social, like organic

liighly organized are the largest

material

Groimd of the

Industrial

Society
and

is

an organism

political organization

from the simple to the comjilex The most


and tlie longest lived Constant change of

is

resemblance

Life

is

in both a

mode

of activity

Intelligence Three differences between individual and social organizathe whole exists
tion Social organization does not depend on structure In
Habit

it

for the parts

Argument
Note

It

has no reproductive function

Are societies necessarily mortal

Hcrhcrt SiKiicer on the Social Organism

ject to

for the negative.

H. Spencer

My

objections on this sub-

Hobbes on the same subject


CHAPTER

Pp. 192

197

XLIII.

THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.

The present subject naturally comes at the end of the work Any such classification must be imperfect Subjects belonging to more than one science
Spectrum analysis polarizing crj'stals electro-chemistry One science giving
:

CONTENTS OF VOL.
suggestions to

or furnishing materials to another, or supplying instru-

aiiotliev,

The
matics with dynamics The

ments

to another

telesco])e

This kind of relation


series

Such

is

and the microscope

laws of dynamics imply

First

other sciences,

reasoning

is

Logic

Mathematics

Connexion

division into logic,

and

its

The

of mathe-

of mathematics

tliose

to be the basis of the classification,

a series is only approximately possible

simple and general to the complex and special


in nature

XV

II.

which

order

is

is

to he a

from the

Summary No single
Logic, unlike

series

applications

the

Logical notation not an instrument of


science Mathematical and physical sciences
physics Algebra, arithmetic, and geometry
Those of matter come Dynamical and

not an organon

is

the initial

is

comes

before

Sciences of matter and of

life

first

General and secondary dynamical sciencesThe dynamical


come before the chemical Molecular physics, chemistry, and crystallography
Molecular physics defined Crystallography Two groups of the sciences of
First, those of the properties of organisms Morphology and physiology
Psychology Second group not yet systematized Tabular statement Posichemical sciences

life

tion of astronomy,

meteorology, and geology in another series of sciences,

whereof the subjects are not laws, but phenomena

Parallelism

propose to call them the

cosmic sciences Its


Gradation of phenomena from the vastest to the smallest Astronomy
Terrestrial magnetism Meteorology Oceanography Geography Geology
Mineralogy Palajontology and the distribution of species Corresj)ondences
Tabular enumeration of the cosmic sciences Imagibetween the two

cosmic sciences

of

the abstract and the

ground

series

nary case of a being coming near the universe the order in which he would
Chain of laws, each link presupposing that which comes
see its phenomena
Parallel to this in the arrangement of things
before it
Living beings are
:

small in proportion to matter

Matter

is

The
The only

small in proportion to space

widest laws are the simplest, and act through the longest time
certainly unalterable truths are those of logic Time

and space were before


Life and mind are
least in quantity, and the

Gravitation the only constantly acting


j)roducts The highest products are the
in time Harmony of the mind of man with

matter

is

the latest
last

force

Artistic rule of
Not
chapter believe in

nature

highest beauty in least quantity, and, in poetry and music, at the end

all

knowledge is included in the sciences enumerated in this


I
metaphysics and theology Opposition of liter'ature and history to science
Nature of historical science.
Note Comte and Humboldt on the Classification of the Sciences : My obligations
His series of the sciences Where my series differs from his Posito Comte

tion of

dynamics

obligations to

of

astronomy

Science of language

My
198 220

omitted by Comte

Humboldt

Pp.

CHAPTER XIAY.
REM.\nK.S ON

Agreement of the

historical

THE HISTORY OF

SCIENt'E.

order of the evolution of the sciences with their

Illustration from painting a picture The truth stated above


only approximate The progress of science
twofold, deductive and inductive

logical order

is

is

CONTENTS OF VOL.

XVI

Mathematics
both The

is

II.

deductive, chemistry mostly inductive

the science of heat

logical relations of a science are not always obvious at first

is

and usually has done so What the early


Mathematics Geometry and algebra Clieorigin of a science depends on
mistiy Sciences of observation are easier than those of experiment Morphology Science began at the point most remote fi-om human life, and was conseand still its moving power is not usefulness, but
quently deemed useless
All inorganic science depends on measuretelegraph
interest
The
intellectual
science

may

originate independently,

ments of space.
Note: Measurement of linear spaces:

.sistauce

of velocity:

of time: of force: of re-

Pp.

of energy

221227

CHAPTER XLV.
EEMARKS ON THE LOGIC OF THE SCIENCES.
and complex is the subject of a science, the less is mathematics
In connexion with this, the facts of life are in some degi-ee
not imply any uncertainty The same is true of morals
This
does
indefinite
Certainty without precision Four fallacies and their origin that logic is an
organon of discovery that mathematics is the type of science that clearness

The more

special

applicable to

it

and

intelligibleness are tests of truth

that precision

is

the criterion of cer-

Extension of the use of the word science Double method in science


Theory and observation Failure of
method
the
each alone Paracelsus Meteorology Historical science
science Free trade In what sense mathematics needs
same as that of
tainty

Induction and deduction must co-operate

its

is

jihysical

verification

Conclusion

Pp. 228

2-34

APPENDIX.
Three questions

Is life

in the affii-mative

an ultimate

fact

Are

organizing and mental intelli-

answer
Moral sense Intelligence Life Quotation from Huxley

gence ultimate facts

Is

the moral sense

an ultimate fact

My reply to it

Pp.

ERRATUM.
p. 50, note, Sot Leilie renrf Liebe.

all

235240

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.


CHAPTEE XXVII.
INTELLIGENCE.

WE

have seen in a previous chapter that vital functions Formaare to be classed as formative, motor, and sensory,
^^^l'^^

Sensory functions develop into mental ones; and for the and mental
^""^
purpose of the present chapter I shall speak of functions "^'^

and mental.

as formative, motor,

Formative, motor, and mental actions are


intelligence.

In the

last

two chapters

guided by all guided


have endeavoured ^^ ii^teiiiall

to prove that formative or organizing intelligence is

an

ultimate, inexplicable fact, not capable of being resolved

any other; and in what follows I shall take this as


proved. Those who agree with me that the complexities
of such organs as the eye and the ear are due to unconscious intelligence, will probably feel no difficulty in
believing the same of such wonderful motor instincts as
the cell-building powers of the bee and the wasp.
These

into

insects, in building their

hexagonal

cells,

guided by intelligence of some kind; but


conscious intelligence, for

we cannot

Instinctive

are manifestly ^J^^^'^^

it cannot be
think that they have

the bee,

any conscious knowledge of those properties of the hexagon


which make that form the most suitable to their purposes.
The unconscious intelligence that guides the cell-buildins ^'^'^ ^^^^
1" kind

,
,
,
1
actions of the bee is exactly the same m kind with the with
B
VOL. II.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

2
formative
gence!'

[chap.

unconscious intelligence that determines the formation of


The only reason why we think
i^s mouth and its eyes.^

wonSl

anything exceptionally wonderful in such instincts


as those of the bee and the wasp, is that they are comInstances of motor instincts, so
paratively uncommon.
definitely adapted to a very special purpose, are found in

than

]but

intSL^^

every animal that has well-developed eyes presents an

there

Instinctis

S'"^''-

is

a few out of the vast

number

of animal species

while

means to purpose by unconscious formative intelligence, which is quite as definite


as that shown in any motor instinct, and far more delicate
and subtle. Considered in itself, and without reference to
least
its being exceptional or common, the bee's eye is at
instance of the adaptation of

as wonderful as the bee's cell.

These instincts of bees and wasps are the most remarkable and the most extreme case of motor actions directed
by a definite, intelligent purpose, which purpose is yet

But they are

totally unconscious.

distinctly exceptional

so that, in order to understand the relations

between the

different intelligent functions, we must take a different class


of instances, which show a direct, and not merely an inferred connexion between formative and motor intelligence.
There is no more clear and definite instance of the
adaptation of means to purpose in the whole organic
Purpose in creation
tion and^'
action of

the ins.

than in the structure of the

iris,

enabling

it

to

order to

involuntarily and
The formation
retina against too much light.
the
protect
^^ ^^^ ^.^ ^^ ^ ^^gg ^^ unconscious formative intelligence,
and its action in closing against the light is a case of

spontaneously,

Contract,

in

unconscious motor intelligence. The action of the iris,


though a motor action, is as purely unconscious as the

cannot be controlled by the will, it is


not accompanied by consciousness, nor does it always even
depend on sensation for there is a kind of blindness in
formative actions

it

which the optic nerve does not transmit the sensation of


light to the brain, and yet the iris opens and closes as in a
healthy eye.^
1

From

this there is a perfect gradation to

See Note at end of chapter.


Carpenter's Human Physiology, p. 533.

'

INTELLIGENCE.

XXVII.]

those motor actions which are accompanied

by consciousand are under the control of the will. The action


of the eyelids in closing is sometimes voluntary, but is
ness,

p.

r.

oltener performed spontaneously, without consciousness or


will.

The motion

of the eyeballs

And, to
between the

voluntary.
J

is

''

complete the evidence of a perfect gi-adation

>

Gradation
conToious
to conscious and
rational
!^oi"
.

actions, lu
tlie eye,

unconscious or involuntary actions, and the conscious or

voluntary ones,
is

asserted that in

it is

some few men the

capable of being opened and closed at

We

will.^

iris

find

the same gradation between involuntary unconscious action

and voluntary conscious action in the digestive system


The actions of the stomach, muscular as well as
chemical, are quite involuntary, and in a state of health
are unaccompanied by sensation. The action of the throat
also.

swallowing

and iu the
!!,lf^^!r''

though accompanied by
sensation.
The action of the mouth in chewing and swallowing is mostly performed in obedience to sensation,
with little direction from the conscious will, though it is
in

is

involuntary,

capable of being controlled by the will.


of the hands in conveying food to the

Finally, the action

mouth

is

altogether

voluntary.

In these cases of the motor actions of the eye and of the

own

separate

motor

actions.

digestive organs, each distinct action has its


set of muscles.

But

this is not true of all

Coughing and sneezing,


a definite purpose

for instance, are actions that

namely, the removal


but have no

from the air-passages


their performance.

have

of obstructions

special muscles for

These, like the winking of the eyes, are Actions

performed in obedience to sensation, and are only in part


under the control of the will.

"We thus see that there is a perfect gradation from those


motor actions which, like the action of the iris in opening

and

closing, are neither conscious

nor voluntary, but are

determined by vital intelligence, through those which are


determined by sensation with little control from the will,
to the purely conscious
^

Lewes's Physiology, vol.

and voluntary
ii.

p. 222.

He

heen ahle to stop the action of the heart at will


^

ones."

also states that


for a

men have

moment.

See the tabular statement of the organic functions, vol.

b2

At one end

i.

p. 163.

'^^}^'^'

sensation.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

[chap.

scale is perfect unconsciousness;

at the other is

4
of

tlie

perfect consciousness.

The muscular

actions at the uncon-

scious end of the scale are manifestly determined


intelligence that

same organizing
its special work

fits

by the

the muscles each for

determined to contract, not by


any conscious intelligence, but by the same unconscious
The muscular
intelligence that formed it for contracting.
;

the

iris is

actions at the other end of the scale, on the contrary

motions of the artist's hand, for instance


But though there
conscious mental intelligence.
sciousness at only one end of the scale, there

throughout.

All motor

that
iutelS^enT ligencc
whether

'

or"not!"^^

is

All motor actions are directed


adapts means to ends

but

the

are directed

con-

is

intelligence

by an

it is

by

intel-

only in the

case of the voluntary muscles that the intelligence is con-

The unconscious closing of the iris and of the


eyelids against light, and the unconscious motions of the
throat and the stomach, are as truly adapted to a special
purpose, and therefore (according to any possible definition of intelligence) as truly intelligent, as the most consciously determined motions of the artist's hand and, as
I have already insisted, the formative principle to which
scions.

the structure of the eye

is

due

is

as

truly intelligent

as either.
Intelli-

^"^nscious"

For these reasons I conclude that vital intelligence is


I believe the unconscious intel^^^ same throughout.

and con-

ligence that directs the formation of the bodily structures

foiToative
^"'^

is

the same intelligence that becomes conscious in the

believed to be fundamentally
mind. The two are generally

,
t-.tt
t
conscious mental mtelugence is believed to be

mental, is
distmct
fundamentally
j^^-m^^^n,'
the same.

This view
includes

-tt

is believed to be Divine.
and formative intelligence

This view, making the two to be totally unlike, leaves no


room for the middle region of instinct and hence the
marvellous character with which instinct is generally
But if we admit that aU the intelligence
invested.
;

fundamentally the
same, it wiU. appear natural, and what might be expected,
that there should be such a gradation as we actually
manifested in the organic creation

find

from perfectly unconscious

telligence

the intermediate

is

to perfectly conscious in-

region

being

occupied

by

INTELLIGENCE.

XXVII.]

though unconscious motor actions

intelligent

by

in a word,

instinct.

what point in the ascending "We cannot


scale of organization the mutual action of ganglia and nervethe'bednfibres begins to be accompanied by sensation
and it is ^ing of
equally impossible to say at what point sensation begins or of
But what I wish to insist consciousto develop into consciousness.
ucss
on here is, that intelligence is not the same thing with the
consciousness of intelligence. Intelligence
a power tranthe
ordinary
properties
of
matter,
and adapting
scending
means to pui-poses, intelligence, I say, presides over all
It is impossible to say at

vital actions,

whether formative, motor, or mental, directing

each action to

its

only in mental actions

and

that

but

it

becomes conscious

is to say,

only in thought

becomes perfectly conscious only in mature

it

thought.

berate

end

specific

All other thought, including

deli-

all

the Most

mental operations of animals and young children, and by


far the greater portion of the

mental operations of even

tlie

most thoughtful men, is in a great degree unconscious,


We cannot tell at what point consciousness becomes perperhaps,
fect, any more than we can tell where it begins
perfect
perhaps
we
have
no
thoughts
indeed, it is never

pg{Jfpf'
all. is

conscious."

which we are able to give a complete account, even to


ourselves. It is however certain, that so far from consciousof

ness being necessary to intelligence, unconscious intelli-

gence

is

the rule, and conscious intelligence the exception.

If these views

which

the intelligence that


functions

is

have stated are true

and

if

adapts organic structures to their

fundamentally identical

with the

mental

man;

it follows from the mere statement,


which
forms the lenses of the eye is
that the intelligence
the same intelligence which, in the mind of man, nnder-

intelligence of

stands the theory of the lens

the intelligence that hollows

identity of

[i^g7'
tive,

and

out the bones and the wing-feathers of the bird in order to nVence!'
combine lightness with strength, and places the feathery
fringes

where they are needed,^

is

the same intelligence

1 See the explanation of the mechanism of flight, in the Duke of Argyll's


" Eeign of Law." The hollowing out of the bones of birds is probably the
most wonderful adaptation in the motor system of any animal.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

[cHAP.

which, in the mind of the engineer, has devised the construction of iron pillars hollowed out like those bones and
feathers
its

and the same

intelligence that guides the bee in

unconscious shaping of hexagonal ceUs

that

also

is

which, in our minds, understands the properties of the

hexagon.
This view of the essential identity of orgaiuc intelligence

and mental intelligence is, I believe, generally received


among the Germans but it will be new to most Enghsh
readers, who have been accustomed to refer all organic
adaptations to creative wisdom directly. Such an hypothesis
;

was inevitable

for believers in a Personal Creator, at least

so long as the world

and

contains was supposed


But now that we know
be almost immeasurable and

that

all

it

to have been created in a few days.

the antiquity of the world to

now

that arguments,

which

been brought forward


is

special

creation

is

notneces-

I believe to

be conclusive, have

to prove that every organized

the result, not of a simple

form

creative act, but of slow

development it appears more reasonable to believe that


^^^^ ^^^^ development has taken place, not in virtue of
a fresh exercise of Creative Power at every one of the
;

every new almost infinitely numerous stages,


adaptaprinciple of intelligence, which guides all

but in virtue of a

tion

and

all

motor

instincts,

and

finally

organic forma-

becomes conscious

in the brains of the higher animals, and conscious of itseK


in

man.
This view, as I have already remarked, has the great

advantage of including instinctive intelligence as a case


of the same general principle with all other intelligence.
It leaves instinct mysterious indeed,

rious than all

life,

but not more myste-

and not anomalous, as

it

was under

the old view.


difficulties

by

this

^*^'
.

worms.

have stated has also the advantage of rej^Qying certain very serious difficulties connected with the
Divine Purpose of Creation. I refer especially to the existence of such animals as parasitic worms, which are as

The view

Moral

well adapted as any others for their

mode

of

life,

but have

probably no sensation and certainly no consciousness, and


inflict

pain, disease,

and death on animals that possess

INTELLIGENCE.

XXVII.]

On

both sensation and consciousness.

the theory of the

independent creation of every separate species, these can


only be regarded as instruments of torture devised by

But if we believe that they are descended


which were not parasitic, and have become

Creative Wisdom.

from species

self-adapted to

new

habitats, their existence ceases to be

anything more than a particrdar case of the question,


pain and disease are permitted at

The same remark

applies

to

why

all.

what have been

called Unnatural

unnatural, but would be better called immoral instincts

such as the working bees slaughtering the drones, after


they have fertilized the queen; the female spider endeavouring to devour the male as soon as she

is fertilized ;i

the habit of some species of ants, of carrying off ants of


other species

them

when

in the

pupa

state,

and making slaves of

the habit of the cuckoo of laying

nests of other birds

its

eggs in the

and of the young cuckoo, of throwing

the original tenants out of the nest to perish.

It is surely

easier to believe these instincts to be very peculiar

and

than to believe each


of them to be a special providential endowment.
It will probably be said that this identification of
formative, instinctive, and mental intelligence is Panthe-

abnormal results of

This word

istic.

is

vital intelligence,

sometimes used very

indefinitely,

but

the proper meaning of Pantheism is the identification of


the Divine power and intelligence with the powers and
intelligences that work in the world of matter and mind.
on the contrary, I believe in a
I am not a Pantheist
Divine Power and Wisdom infinitely transcending all
manifestations of power and intelligence that are or can
be known to us in our present state of being. The rela:

between the Creator and the creation is a mystery


not from want of information, but from want of
to us
a faculty for understanding it; and it must remain so until
tion

we have begun to

"

know even

as

we

are known."

On this

question of intelligence, however, the following remarks


will

be

sufficient

to

show that

my

position

consistent with Theism.


*

Carpenter's Comparative Physiolog}',

p. 427.

is

quite

instinctT.''

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

We

All matter
with*^"^^*^

know

endowed with
and chemical, which

that matter h as been

of different kinds, gravitative

We

are capable of producing motion.

forces,

[chap.

by the action

in being set in motion

know

forces

forces

that matter,

of these forces, is

on the contrary, matter is


When, for instance, a mass
acting as well as acted on.
moves, as in the fall of a stone, or when a fire burns
and produces heat, which is atomic motion, the energy

not acted on from without

the motion

of

neither

is

from without

brought

created at

Energy or force

created.

is

the

only becomes

it

moment nor
from

actual

Energy, like matter, has been

being potential or latent.

but there

is

an

effect of

Divine power

not a fresh exercise of Divine power when-

So with intelligence.
All intelligence is a result of Divine wisdom, but there
is not a fresh determination of Divine thought needed
ever a stone

every

for

falls or

new

fire

burns.

adaptation in

structure, or

organic

for

every new thought in the brain of man.


wiU admit that there is not a fresh act of creation
when a new living individual is born. I go a little

Every Theist

further,

and

vital-

irelidowed
with In-

and say that

creation for a
^^^^

^^

endowed

igouce.

do not believe in a fresh act of


I

species.

separately

believe

that the Creator

every structure, but has

organized

matter with intelligence, under the

vitalized

which it organizes itself; and I think there


no more Pantheism in this than in believing that

gyj^g^jj^jg
is

new

Qf

the Creator does not separately cause every stone to

fall

and every fire to burn, but has endowed matter with


energy, and given to energy the power of transforming
itself.

We

have next

intelligence acts.

to consider the

of being very indefinitely stated.

common
Intelli-

law under which

to formative, motor,

Tlie only

actions in

law which

and mental actions

is

alike is

that their guiding intelligence tends to determine

them in
the life and

P'PllCG

tends to
guide all

vital

This, so far as I can see, is only capable

whatever direction

is

health of the organism.


is

any exception

to

most favourable to
I do not think that even disease

this

law.

Many

diseases,

as for

INTELLIGENCE.

XXVII.]

instance probably all eruptive ones, are due to the un- the

conscious instinctive action of the vital forces in endea-

-g^^pg^

growths, like cancer, probably consist of portions of the

orcfanism.

organism that have got away from the control of the


the

and lead a

life,

and ministering

rest,

of their own, parasitic

life

own

to their

^^^^

And morbid the health

vouring to get rid of poisonous matter.

general

direc-

life,

on

disease is
no excep-

though to

the injury of the entire organism.^

The law that the actions of every organism are such as


to minister to its own life and health is to be understood

Vital

minister

with this very important extension, that under certain ^^ ^^y


tothein.
circumstances it mmisters not to its own private advan- dividual,

tage

only, but also to that

.,

Here

of the race.

"^

is

the ^^*

**^

*^

race.

ground of the reproductive and maternal functions and,


where vital actions are accompanied by sensation and
consciousness, here is the ground
also of the sexual, the

domestic, and the social affections.


;

Where
agreeable,

sensation

is

and what

developed,

is

what

destructive

healthful

is

is felt

tive

functions.
Social
^ff<=*i"-

is felt

as painful

as

and

where conscious intelligence is developed, pleasure is consciously sought and pain is consciously avoided as such
and for their own sakes. But the instinctive unconscious tendency to seek what is needful for life and to avoid what is
injurious

developed far lower

is

down

than any sense of pleasure and pain

l*evelop-

unconaction into
conscious,

in the organic scale

a daisy, for instance,

opens to the light and closes at sunset, and a sea-anemone,


which has no nerves and consequently no sensation, opens
to the water and closes when the tide leaves it.
The vital
impulse to self-preservation is also the ground of the love
All organisms are constantly
of life and the fear of death.
and instinctively employed in the work of self-preservation
and hence when consciousness aiises, the preservation of
life is thought of as desirable, and the destruction of it as
fearful.
But in every case love of life, love of pleasure, life.

See Carpenter's

that cancer

is

open one, and


text

is

Human

He

Physiology, p. 371.

due to a morbid poison in the blood

leans to the belief

but the question

is

an

think the opinion of the nature of cancer expressed in the

favoured by the fact that,

cured by extirpation.

See also

when not

vol.

i.

p.

too far advanced,

167, note.

and

^natemal

it

may be

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

10

[chap.

and social affection the conscious feeling


and the rational determination are developed later than
the instinctive impulse, and are developed out of it.
Eeason differs from instinct only in being conscious.
Instinct is unconscious reason, and reason is conscious
sexual, domestic,

instinct.

NOTE.
INSTINCT.
Darwin endeavours

to account for instinct, as for all other facts

by the law of natural

Concerning the instincts

Instincts
of social
insects

of

cannot be

difficulty,

inherited.

because the working insects have their reproductive organs un-

Darwin's

developed, and cannot propagate.

life,

of social insects

selection.

bees, wasps,

and ants

explanation by
natural

families as well as to individuals.

selection.

budding

culty,

there

is

this peculiar

that characters cannot be inherited in the direct line,

and rephes

to

it

Darwin points out

that natural selection

He

may be

this

dififi-

applied to

believes that the cell-

instinct of the bee, for instance, has

been perfected by

the survival of those swarms which constructed the most perfect

hexagons, and consequently used their was the most economically.

This explanation postulates, what


the same variation will affect
I

think

them due
to Intelligence.

all,

is

certainly probable, that

or the great majority, of the

But I cannot think it a satisfactory


and those who agree with me on the subject
of Organizing Intelligence will have no difficulty in believing

bees of the same swarm.

explanation;

that instinct also

is

really a case

of intelligence, though rm-

conscious.

The

instincts of the social insects are the

the animal creation, but there are

many

most wonderful in

others, the origin of

which is equally hard to guess at. The nest-building instinct


which is general among birds may perhaps be prompted by a
kind of half-conscious intelligence. But we can scarcely attribute
this to fishes ; and yet there are at least two species of fishes
the Stickleback and the Gobius niger that make nests. ^ And
1

Carpenter's Comparative Physiology, p. 96i.

how

11

INSTINCT.

XXVII.]
are

we

to account for the origin of so strange

that of the Arius,' and of some other fishes,'

an instinct as
the male of which

mouth ? ^ Questions of this sort, howmore nor less difficult to answer than questions

hatches the eggs in his


ever, are neither

concerning the origin of special structures, as for instance the


electric organs of

some

fishes

a case which

Darwin mentions

as one of special difficulty.

Professor Turner, in British .Association Keport, 1866.

Instincts
o'

some

nsnes.

CHAPTER

XXVIIT.

MIND.

writing such a work as


IN proceeding
to begin the
Pctiiiiiiou

life,

sible.''"

^^^^

by a

mind

-^^

chapters on mind, or mental

definition of mind.

^^^ possible.

as conscious life

It
;

would be an obvious

this, it

So far as I

would be plausible

but, as

we

mind

however,
to

define

shall see, there are

mental actions which are not conscious.


plausible also to define

see,

It

as intelligence

would be
but, if the

conclusions of the last few chapters are correct, intelligence

does not belong to mental


ever.

The want

of

life alone,

any exact

but to

definition,

all life

what-

however, need not

embarrass us much.^
Mind

is

^^*^

ourof
sensation.

mere statement of a fact to say, that mind


begins with sensation, and is developed out of sensation,
But it is equally true, that sensation does not constitute
mind.
Something more is needed
and I believe the
common view is perfectly accurate, that this something
It is the

Conscious- is consciousness.
Jiess

What, then,

is

consciousness

I believe that conscious-

ness, like sensation, is in itself utterly incapable of being


inexiili-

cable.

explained

all

that

we can do

is

to define the relations of

sensation and consciousness to each other, and to ascertain

the biological conditions under which they


1

H. Spencer

(see his Principles of

of external relation, in so far ad this

think, however, this

is

arise.

Psychology) regards mind as the


is

life

from the nutritive life. I


would include, as a mental

distinct

doubly inaccurate.

It

phenomenon, the act of a climbing plant in swinging its tendrils in order


to catch something (vol. i. pp. 167, 178)
and, so far as I can see, it would
exclude those thoughts and emotions which have no tendency to lead to
;

action.

MIND.

CHAP. xxviii.J

13

Sensation and consciousness are both feelings.


logical language, feeling

and consciousness are


sciousness

the genus of which sensation

is

All consciousness

species.

of feeling.

It

is

without being conscious of

In order to simplify the subject,


speak of sensation, which

and that out of which

all

Consciousness, then,

Sensation

sation.

is

is

is

con-

possible to have a feeling

but

it,

become conscious without having


to

To use

it

is

not possible to

feeling to be conscious of

it is

better instead of feeling

the simplest kind of feeling,

other kinds are developed.

primarily consciousness of sen-

comes

before

consciousness

it

is

Conscioussensation

possible to have a sensation without being conscious of sensation

it

'"'ittiout
a truth within every one's experience,
though
^
o consciousnot a very familiar truth, because the absence of ness.

This

it.

is

is

'

*'

must often,
however, have occurred to every one suddenly to become
conscious of a sight that had been before his eyes, or of a
sound that had been in his ears for some time and to
remark, "I saw (or heard) this, but was not conscious of it."
But, what is still more conclusive than this, it is impossible to doubt that in sound sleep there is no consciousness
of sensation; and yet when any one has become accustomed
to sleep in a loud monotonous noise, as for instance that
of a mill, it is well known that a sudden cessation of the
noise will put an end to sleep, just as its sudden commencement would do. This proves that the sound must
have reached the sleeper's sensorium, or in other words
must have been heard, though his consciousness was, in
the most literal sense of the word, asleep to it. This is a
consciousness

is

not likely to be noticed.

It

sleep.

conclusive instance of the possibility of sensation without

the consciousness of

We

it.

thus see that there

sciousness
sensation.

may

be sensation without con-

but there can be no consciousness without


Consciousness

is first

awakened by

sensation,

were not so awakened it would sleep for ever, or


in other words would never come into existence.
We con-

and

if it

sequently say that consciousness


tion

the conscioiis or mental

merely sentient

life,

is

developed out of sensa- Mental

life is

developed out of the

as the sentient life is developed out

j^J^^.*^^"

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

14

I shall

of the insentient.

more
are some more remarks

have to go into

detail in the next chapter

Conscioustiifct

this subject in

but before I do

so,

there

be made concerning the relation

between sensation and consciousness.


The distinction between a sensation and the conscious-

from ^^^^

sensation,

to

[chap.

*^ sensation

'^^

though

one,

it

opinion a very important

The truth

appears to be often overlooked.^

may

that they are distinct


that a sensation

fact,

my

in

is

be further illustrated by the

which

is felt

as disagreeable at

sometimes becomes agreeable when

become

Hence

it

first,

repeated often

is

common

Acquired

enough

taste,

yet really very remarkable fact of "acquired tastes."

to

familiar.

is

the very

am

now speaking

not

by music,

by

or

poetry,

from mere sensations, and are much


tastes in the primary sense of the

mean

which

there are flavours, the taste of

which a liking

for

the feelings they produce

word, as belonging to the sense of

and

by

of the feelings produced

visual beauty

are very different

more complex

is

taste.
is

We

know

disagreeable at

that
first,

nevertheless soon acquired. It can

scarcely be maintained that the flavour comes

by

repetition

to produce a different sensible impression on the nerves of

can scarcely be maintained that


comes to taste differently from what it did at first. I

taste

due to a

it

in other words,

think

much more

it

it

likely that the sensation itself con-

tinues to be the same, but the impression produced by the


in th.e^^
sensation, sensation on the consciousness becomes different.
If it is
consciousness of It.

Said that this


jjjay

is

no explanation

be acquired, I admit

it

I advance explains nothing

make

the fact

advance

it

what

admit that the hypothesis

or,

in other words, does not


intelligible

only

I believe to be a true statement

far as the fact of acquired tastes is capable of

being explained at aU,


it to

at all of the fact that tastes

we have to do with more

as being

So

of fact.

the law of habit

it

can be explained only by referring

among

sentient beings, that

what

is

habitual tends to become agreeable.^

Had

been recognised, no one could have fallen into the


think it) of maintaining that insects have no
sensation, because they have nothing homologous with the cerebrum or
Vertebrata, which is the organ of conscioiisness.
1

this distinction

monstrous absurdity

See vol.

i,

p. 188.

(as I

MIND.

15

Another remarkable fact which has a kindred bearing


to that last mentioned is, that consciousness perceives

Analogous

XXVIII.]

various analogies bet^yeen the sensations of different senses,

gi^ng'^from
different
S6I1S6S

without the slightest approach to identity.


sensation of touch, yet
is

Softness

is

we speak of soft colour. Sweetness


we speak of sweet sound. The

a sensation of taste, yet

propriety of these expressions

they are
analogy

by every

felt

one, yet

be inexplicable a real yet inexplicable


between impressions received from different

felt to

is felt

I believe that although the impressions of

sensations.

senses

different

is

objects of touch

soft

sweet taste and sweet sound

are

and

soft colour,

totally unlike in so

merely impressions of sense, yet the impressions they produce on the consciousness are in some
far as they are

degree similar.

Another

fact concerning consciousness

is,

that so soon Conscious-

as consciousness, from being


conscious of sensations

other feelings, becomes conscious of

itself,

it

and

j?? }f-}^'
divisible.

recognises

being simple and indivisible.

Unlike the relaand consciousness of which I have


spoken in the last two paragraphs, this is so obvious and
indisputable that no sane person could possibly doubt it,
and no proof or elucidation could make it more certain.

itself as

tions between sensation

shown the physical ground of this


metaphysical tru.th. The ground of the unity

Biology, however, has

Biological

mental or

ground of

and

indivisibility of consciousness, or the

centralization of the nervous system

mind,

which in

that nervous

is

^^'
all classes

of animals appears to be a necessary condition of mind.

Mind, or any approach

to a

mental nature, appears to exist

only in the Vertebrata, the higher Articulata (such as insects

and spiders), and perhaps the Cephalopodous Mollusca;


and in all these classes the nervous system is not only
complex but centralized all those parts of the nervous
system which control and dominate the rest being centralized in the head.
The ganglia thus centralized in the
head are in the Vertebrata called the brain. This is really
a very complex organ, or rather a congeries of organs but

the unity of
itself to

be,

its

action

is

and

really

is,

so perfect that the

mind

feels

not a mere congeries of func-

H^^-^]

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

16
tions,

but a living unity.

This

[cHAP.

primarily a metaphysical

is

dictum of consciousness but


We have seen
it is re-affirmed by biological observation.
that many of the lower animals are not killed by being
cut into pieces, but each separated part will continue to

truth, or, in other words, a

and

live,

Some

will develop into a perfect animal.

may be

animals which have this property

sentient,

of the

we

but

If they are sentient.

Sensation

cannot think they are conscious.^


there is no difficulty in supposing that each of the separated

siUe^"

P^^"^^

continues to feel the same sensations that

division (provided, of course, that


Consciousness not.

nervous centre)

but

it is

such a division of consciousness


inconceivable

by the mind

is

of

highly of that kind of reasoning.


the

human

before

it

impossible to conceive of conI do not say that

gciousness being divided in this way.

is

it felt

contains a sensory

consciousness affirms

its

impossible, because

it

I do not think

man.

What
own

I say

is,

that

and

indivisibility,

anatomy and physiology


the law of all consciousness

that the facts of comparative

tend to prove that such

is

whatever.

In speaking in a former chapter of the laws of habit, I


said that all characteristics tend to become hereditary, subThe limitation I spoke
ject to one important limitation.
that consciousness

Conscious- of is this,

h^^^dir-

^^^^ consciousness

is

is

never inherited.

not transmissible,

may

This

fact,

perhaps stand

on in the
Mental
last paragraph, that consciousness is not divisible.
transmissible,
and
often
characters, like bodily ones, are
become hereditary, but the transmission is never accompanied with consciousness. Habits which have been formed
by the conscious acts of the parents may be inherited by the
offspring but the habit is inherited without any consciousThe offspring have no consciousness,
ness of its origin.
thing, no memory, of the conscious
the
same
or, what is
Hereacts by which the habit was formed in the parent.
ditary habit is so much more conspicuous among animals

some

in

close connexion with the fact insisted

my

meaning,

it is

"We cannot say that such animals have any true individuality.

See

than in man,

Note

to Chapter

that, in order to illustrate

XVI.

MIND.

XXVTIT.]

17

best to take an instance from among animals.


Biras on Instance
^^ ^'^^'^^
uninhabited islands show no dread of man, but after thev
J acquire
a

nave become a mark

for

the

sportsman for some time

they acquire a dread of him, and this instinct becomes


hereditary.^
We cannot suppose that the birds which

man have any conscious memory of


may be, their ancestors having been

inherit this fear of


their parents

frightened

or, it

by man.

consciousness of

They
cause.

its

crease this tendency,

But the main cause

by the

is

inherit the fear,

Selection will,
less

but not the


no doubt, in-

timid birds being killed.

evidently hereditary habit.

This illustration has been suggested to me by a passage in H. Spencer's


Review of Bain's Psychology, republished in H. Spencer's collected Essays.
1

VOL.

II.

dread of
^'^'

CHAPTEE XXIX.
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF MIND.

IN

^-

--

organs of
vegetative

the chapter on the Direction of

Development

animal

life.

what

It is necessary for

me

to state over again part of

have already stated in that chapter, though I now


approach the subject from a different point of view. The
organs of vegetative life essentially consist of an apparatus
I

for transforming matter; those of

animal

life

essentially

an apparatus for transforming energy.


fundamental attribute of the apparatus of animal

consist of
Contrac-

mental
of

the**^'

latter.

has

been stated that the fundamental differentiation in


animal development is that into the systems of organs
-^Jiich belong respectively to the vegetative and the animal

^^^^'

tihty, tlie

it

contractility

that

is

to say, the characteristic

The
life

is

power of

muscular tissue to contract under the influence of a stimulus, and in contracting to transform energy from the vital
jnto the motor form ^ in other words, to do work by contracting. In those simple animals which have muscles but
no nerves, as especially the Hydrozoa, the stimulus under
:

which the muscles contract consists in the contact of food


and such a stimulus,
or of some other foreign substance
if it is applied to one part of the animal's muscular
;

tissue, will

slowly propagate

itself; so that, if

one tentacle

But in
those more highly organized animals which have a complex nervous system, the stimulus rmder which the muscles
contract usually consists in a flow of nervous energy.
The
is iiTitated, the other tentacles will also contract.

between the action of muscles that usually conunder a stimulus applied to themselves, and muscles

difference
tract

See the chapter on the Dynamics of

Life.

THE PHYSIOLOGY OF

CH. XXIX.]

19

MIJSTD.

that usuallv contract under a stimulus transmitted through

the nerves,

however, a fvindamental diflerence. The


nature of the stimulus is the same in both cases
it
is not,

same way, and


Between the case

originates in the

affects the

the same way.

of a

muscles in

muscle that contracts from the stimulus of a foreign body coming into
contact with the muscle itself, and one that contracts
from the stimulus which the nerves transmit to it when

body comes into contact with the extremity of a


nerve in some other part of the organism, there is probably
not much more difference than there is between the act of
ringing a bell in the hand and the act of ringing it at
the end of a bell-wire or, what is a better comparison,
between decomposing water by the action of sulphuric
acid on zinc while the acid and zinc are in the same
vessel with the water, and effecting the same decomposi*tion by arranging the acid and zinc in a voltaic battery,
and sending the liberated energy, in the form of a voltaic
a similar

current, along a wire to a separated vessel


is to

where the water

be decomposed.

The nervous system

developed by differentiation out Nervous


of the muscular system, and in its first and lowest deve- system developed
,
.
lopment appears to have no vestige of sensation and no out of
is

other function than that of transmitting stimuli to the


muscles.
The muscular tissue of the Hydrozoa, as stated

pi-imaiy

above, transmits a stimulus but slowly.

to'traus'^

the contrary, transmits

it

^^

ISTervous tissue,

with a rapidity which

on

is practi- ^}^

and this, of course, makes the motions


and the whole life more energetic, in those
animals which have a nervous system than in those which
cally instantaneous

more

'j'^^'^^'^^'"-

rapid,

to the
^^^''^'*"

are without one.

however, a very remarkable, and at present an


inexplicable fact, that the nervous system is not, in any
Nervous
animal whatever, so simple as might be thought from the system
1

It

is,

toregomg account of its functions. The nerve-fibres are


in no case directly laid on, as it were, like telegraph wires,
1 All the facts and opinions respecting
the anatomy and physiology of
the nervous system stated in this chapter are taken from Carpenter's
Human Physiology, except where I advance any opinion as my own.

C 2

simple,

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

20

[chap.

purpose of transmitting stimuli directly from the


skin, or any other part which is more exposed to stimuli
than the rest, to the muscles that have to make the
response to the stimuh. In the simplest nervous system

for the

Ganglia.

that appears to be possible under the laws of life, there


must be at least two fibres, meeting in a ganglion, and

acting one on the other through

the

conducts

stimulus

outer extremity

The other

ganglion.

fibre

action.

action

;"

it

This

is

the stimulus being, as

it

the muscle to contract.

its

inner extremity at the

conducts the stimulus from the

ganglion to the muscle in which


Eeflex

of the fibres

from the skin, or wherever

situated, to its

is

One

it.

terminates,

what

is

and causes

called "reflex

were, reflected from the

ganglion.

As

already mentioned, nervous structure

is

a develop-

ment and outgrowth of muscular structure, being developed by differentiation from it. This is observed, both in
watching the successive stages of the development of the
highest animals, and in comparing the various members of
the animal kingdom, from the simplest to the most complex
Nervous
function
differenti-

ated from
muscular
function.

development of a nervous system. And it will be obvious


from what has been stated above, that nervous function
also is a development and outgrowth of muscular function,
In the
being developed by differentiation from it.
Hydrozoa, there are no separate organs for the purpose of
transmitting stimuli, nor any organs at all which transmit
them,

except

nervous system
stimuli

Sensation
does not
exist at
first.

is

muscles

the
is

themselves.

But when a

developed, the function of transmitting

separated from the ordinary muscular function,

and assigned to the nerves.


In the simplest and lowest development of a nervous
system, the action of the nerv^e-fibres on their gangUa is
probably unattended by any sensation and this continues
to be true of large parts of the nervous systems even of
man and the higher animals. Higher up in the animal
;

scale, sensation

appears

the nerve-fibres on

the action of

some

not of
all

their ganglia produces sensation.

We

where it begins. I think it most likely, that


sensation begins where organs of special sense come into

cannot

tell

21

THE PHYSIOLOGY OF MIND.

XXIX.J

most generally distributed It begins


of these in the animal creation, I think it most likely that P'^^j^^ ^
sensation is nearly co-extensive with the possession of special
SGllSG
But this is incapable of proof we have no criterion
eyes.
existence

and

as eyes are the

whatever of
itself,

Sensation

presence or absence.

its

It is utterly

of course, perfectly inscrutable.

possible that

we can

ever

know how

or

why

it is

in

is

im-

that the

flow of a current of a peculiar kind of energy along a


nerve to its ganglion should be accompanied by sensation.

But we might have expected to find sensation the peculiar


function of some particular kind of tissue, so that the presence of sensation might be inferred with certainty from
its presence, and the absence of sensation from its absence.
Such, however, is not the case. Some nerves and ganglia
and the microscope, so far
are sensory, others are not so
as we yet know, shows no difference whatever between
;

the structure oi the two.

We thus

see that the sensory function is not a primary

or fundamental

been added to
lopment.

endowment

its

gentimt
nerves
histologically alike.

[.

Sentient

Parallel

of the nervous system, but has m^e^t'of

original functions in the course of deve- organs

The history

of the development of the nervous

functions.

organs is parallel with the history of the development of


The spinal cord, which is the
the nervous functions.
principal nervous organ of the insentient
first

life, is

developed

in the embryo, and the sensory ganglia grow out of

The sensory ganglia ^


distinct

it.

are situated within the skull, but are

from the cerebrum, or true brain.

Besides the

among them

a pair of

ganglia of the special senses, there

is

ganglia called the thalami

which (notwithstanding

optici,

name) are believed to be the nervous centre for the


In close proximity to the sensory ganglia
sense of touch.
is another pair of ganglia called the corpora striata, which
are believed (though the subject is an obscure one) to be
their

the ganglionic centres for the nerves of motion, in so far as


In order to guard against a probable misconception, it ought to be
we know, the ganglia are not the seats of sensation
Sensation is produced when certain
any more than the nerve-fibres.
their
nerve-fibres
but the ganglion is
from
ganglia receive a stimulus
way
except through its
any
other
pricking
or
in
on
by
acted
insentient if
^

stated that, so far as

fibres,

and the

fibres are insentient if

they are cut

off

from their ganglia.

Corpora
^^^^^^
'

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

22
motion
their relation to the

sensory
ganglia.

and

is

will.

[chap.

not merely reflex, but determined by sensation

The

relation of these to the nerves

of sense is as follows

An impression

and ganglia

of sense

is

trans-

mitted by some of the nerve-fibres of that sense to its


ganglia, and the reception of the impression by the ganglia

produces the sensation which

appropriate to that im-

is

pression: the sensory ganglia, in their turn, act on the

which are motor ganglia; and the latter


send down the motor nerves whatever motor impulse is

corpora

striata,

necessary in order to
Consensual
action

sensation.
retina,

make

!For instance

the appropriate response to the

and the impression


where

is

to the optic ganglia,

a flash of light

falls

on the

telegraphed by the optic nerve

produces the sensation of

it

light; the optic ganglia act

on the corpora

striata,

and

cause them to send a motor impulse to the muscles of the


eyelids, which closes the eyes, and thus makes the appropriate response to the impression of the flash of light.

what Dr. Carpenter calls consensual action. The


chain of cause and effect is exactly the same in consensual

This
its simi-

larity to

merely
reflex
action.

is

action as in merely reflex, except that in consensual action

and the motor


Both
action will not be produced unless sensation is felt.
in,
first,
an
simply
consist
action
reflex and consensual
impression sent from the exterior extremity of a nerve to
and, second, a motor impidse sent
the nervous centre
one of the links of the chain

is

sentient,

outwards from the nervous centre in response

to

the

impression.
Sensation
at

first is

only the
guide to

It will be observed that in the foregoing account of

consensual action, sensation


itself,

is

described as existing, not

by

but only as the intermediate link between impres-

action.

sions received

by the organism from without, and the mus-

cular actions that constitute the appropriate response to

those impressions.

Sensation existing by

itself,

and not

necessarily leading to action, appears to belong to a liigher

and to be the preparation for Mind.


An insect may no doubt have sensations without making
any motion in response to them if such sensations exist,
we can have no evidence of their existence. But we know
that the first and lowest functions of the nervous system
development of

life,

THE PHYSIOLOGY OF MIND.

XXIX.]

appear to be purely reflex and insentient


indistinguishable gradations,
that, at its

into

23
;

these pass,

consensual action

commencement in the animal

by
so

scale, sensation

appears not to exist alone, but solely as the guide to muscular action.

The nervous mechanism described above is all that


insects, or any other invertebrate animals, are known to
Their highest nervous

possess.

organs consist

of

insects

^ ^
thil*'

the

nerves and ganglia of sense and motion, and their highest

nervous functions consist in sensation, and the direction of

motor actions by sensation.


This at least is generally
true, but it appears difficult to believe that ants and
spiders have not some dawnings of conscious intelKgence,
like that of the higher animals.
For the most part, howwonderful as they

ever, the instincts of insects,

in consensual, or sense-directed, actions, guided

are, consist

by uncon-

scious vital intelligence,^ kindred rather to the organizing


intelligence

which adapts the bodily structures

functions, than

man.

Especially

is

of the bee and the

for their

conscious mental intelligence of

to the

this true of the cell-building instinct

wasp

it

cannot be supposed that those

insects understand the geometry of the hexagon, and the

unvarying perfection of their work

is

alone enough to ex-

clude the idea of an intelligence which works in any degree


like that of

man.

some insects have a vestige of conscious intelligence,


This would inits seat must be in the sensory ganglia.
volve no great anomaly, for motor, sensory, and mental
functions, including those of instinct, are much more
variable between species and species than are the functions
If

belonging to the inorganic

life.

Besides,

the sensory

ganglia of all insects appear to be the seat of perception


I

mean

the perception of external objects, as external

which, as I shall have to show farther on, I believe to be a


rational
itself.

function,

though the reason

is

unconscious of

Leaving the problematical subject

sciousness of insects and spiders,

of the con-

we now go on

to

consciousness of the Vertebrata, and especially of man.


1

See the chapter on Intelligence (Chap. XXVII.).

the

with some

excep^^^^-

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

24

The

spinal cord

sentient

Sensory
ganglia

developed
out of
spinal
cord,

life

it is

is

the

[chap.

the chief nervous centre of the infirst

part of the nervous system that

makes its appearance in the development of the embryo.


Out of it are developed, by a process like budding, the
nervous centres of the sentient

life,

consisting of the sen-

sory ganglia, and the pair of motor ganglia called the

corpora

striata,

which, as already intimated, are in the

connexion with the sensory ganglia. The


nervous system of insects contains no parts of higher
closest nervous

and
cerebrum
out of
sensory

But in the Vertebrata a distinct


organ appears, which is developed by budding out of the
sensory ganglia, as they are developed by budding out of

grade

than

these.

ganglia.

This

the spinal cord.

is

the cerebrum, or true brain

also called the cerebral hemispheres, for

is

organ, though in

man and

it

is

it

a double

the rest of the highest animals

We

the two hemispheres are in close contact.

have every

The

reason to believe that the cerebrum

is

the organ of con-

cerebrum

sciousness and mind, as distinguished

from unconscious

tbe
organ of
consciousis

ness.

Largest in
the highest
animals.

instinct.

In

classes, it is

ganglia, but

fishes,

which are the lowest

of the vertebrate

very small in comparison with the sensory


it

increases in size as intelligence increases in

ascending the animal scale, until in

man and

the rest of

the most highly organized animals the cerebrum

times larger than

all

is

many

the rest of the nervous centres put

together.

The

cerebral hemispheres are often called ganglia, but

an accurate expression. Like the spinal


cord, they contain masses both of ganglionic cells and of

this is not quite

unlike

either the

spinal cord or

Cerebrum

nerve-fibres

not in

sensory ganglia, their nerve -fibres are not in direct con-

but,

direct

connexion
with the
oi'gans of

external

nexion with any of the organs of external


the muscles or the organs of sense.

life

The

with

the

either

cerebral hemi-

spheres consist of masses of fibres radiating upwards from

life.

the sensory ganglia, and terminating in masses of gan-

which are continuously spread out under the


bones of the skull and these ganglionic masses, both those,
of the two hemispheres and the various parts of the same
glionic cells

Its

structure.

Including the medulla oblongata, which, though within the skull,

really part of the spinal cord.

is

THE PHYSIOLOGY OF MIND.

XXIX.]

hemispliere,

masses of

connected with

are

each

25

by other

other

fibres.

Concerning the functions of these various parts, we have The

no

We

have no guide but ontsTarts


the help of analogy, however, I believe can be

evidence whatever.

direct

With

analogy.

tiscGr-

that a tolerably complete and satisfactory theory can be tained


formed. I ought
first to mention, that the theory of the so- ^^y '^^
"
''

called phrenologists

by

analogy.

not only unproved, but disproved,

is

According to that theory, the cerebral hemi-

facts.^

spheres consist of a congeries of organs, in each of which a


distinct

mental function

is

localized

tion, firmness, love of children,

comparison, imaginaWere

&c.

Phreno-

^^^y
disproved

this true, in-

would injure the mind in definite ways,


the locality of the injury. But this is not the

juries to the brain

according to

injuries to the brain,

when

the patient recovers at

case

all,

appear generally to leave the mind unaffected, even

when

a part of the substance of the brain has been lost

and they certainly do not


can be predicted
nitude, are

same

when

affect the

mind

any way that


its mag-

in

the seat of the injury, and

Experiments on animals yield the

known.

result.

We have

seen that

it is

in accordance with the analogies One

of the nervous system, that a current along one nerve-fibre current


should determine a current to be sent along another fibre. ^ producing

Thus, for instance,

if

the impression of a flash of light

is

telegraphed along the optic nerve to the sensory ganglia, a

motor impulse

is

telegraphed along another nerve, causing


I think

the eyelids to close.

it

most probable that the

nervous mechanism of consciousness resembles


certain that sensation is

this.

It is

produced by the flow of a current

energy along a nerve-fibre of sense to its


the sensation of light, for instance, is produced

of nervous

ganglion

by a current flowing along the


ganglia.

Now,
1

if

optic nerve to the optic

Let us call this the nerve-current of sensation.


consciousness

think there

is verj'

is

a feeling, which

probably, however, this

it

much

certainly is

truth in phreno-

between the form of the


brain (which determines the form of the skull) and the mental character.

logy, that there is a tolerably close correlation

See Note at end of chapter,

HABIT AND INTELIJGENCE.

26

[chap.

and if the consciousness of a sensation is a distinct thing


from the sensation itself, as I think I have shown in the
preceding chapter
Conscious-

it,

as probable as analogy can

it is

that the consciousness of the sensation

is

also

make

due to a

nerve-current, like that of the sensation, but in a different

thus produced.

fibre

Nerves

conclusion,

and

if so, all

that

the

the evidence

we have

nerve-currents

leads

to the

are

of consciousness

connect the sensory ganglia with


currenT7^' forced in the fibres that
of conthe ganglionic substance of the cerebrum. I consequently
ScioUSneSS.

n^

Z.^

regard these fibres

-C

j.1

t-

as the nerves of consciousness, just as

the nerves which connect the organs of sense with the


sensory ganglia are the nerves of sensation.

A sensation

is

due to a current entering the sensory ganglia from a nerve


of sensation and I believe that the consciousness of the
sensation is due to a secondary current being set in motion
;

and flowing out of the sensory ganglia along


Sensation is due to the action
of the nerves of sense on the sensory ganglia, and I believe
that consciousness is due to the action of the sensory
ganglia on the nerves of consciousness, which are cerebral

by the

first,

the nerves of consciousness.

nerves.

Sensation and, as I have no

question arises here.

doubt, consciousness also are due to the mutual action of

a nerve-fibre and a ganglion.


ganglia at only one end

with the organs of sense


&c.

ends
Is con-

^^*di^"eT
in the
^In^aiil

The nerves

of sensation

have

their other ends are in connexion

with the

eye, the ear, the skin,

But the nerves of consciousness have ganglia at both


at one end are the sensoiy ganglia, at the other is

the ganglionic substance of the cerebrum.

Is

the con-

sciousness of sensation due to the action of the sensory

ganglia in sending out the current of consciousness along


tlie

cerebral nerve-fibres

or is

it

due

to the action of the

or the

ganglionic substance of the brain, at the other end of the

cerebrum? '^
,
l n
k
An
answer to this question
fibres, receiving the current ?
.

might appear impossible, and of course there is no direct


nevertheless, I believe the same analogical
evidence
reasoning which has guided us so far, will enable us to
give at least a probable answer to this question also.
I have as yet spoken only of the consciousness of
;

THE PHYSIOLOGY OF MIND.

XXIX.]

27

sensation, which, after sensation itself, is the simplest

and

most elementary of mental functions. Beyond and above


and the consciousness of thought. I say
thought and the consciousness of thought, because, as the

this are thought,

consciousness of sensation

is,

from the sensation

and there may be a sensation

itself,

as I believe, a distinct thing Conscious-

without the consciousness of

thought

it,

so the consciousness of

^i^oi

^t

jg

distinct

a distinct thing from the thought

itself, and thouo'lit.


be thought without the consciousness of it.
Of the existence of unconscious thought there is ample Uncon-

there

is

may

evidence, and

it

is

now

by those who

generally admitted

tbousht

have studied psychology. To mention a single instance


of this
probably the commonest, but by no means the
most remarkable it is only by admitting that trains of

thought, or suggestion,

we can

may

go on in unconsciousness, that

account for the mental phenomenon, which must


come within every one's experience, of thoughts

often have

and memories coming suddenly

into consciousness without

anything whatever to suggest them, either in external circumstances, or in the thoughts that were consciously

occupying the mind.

night,

am

my mind

Sometimes when
sciously occupied

myself very

sometimes soon

and when consciousness

is

my

of incidents,

consciousness.

of

wakening in the
perfectly awake but not

lines

after

I find recollections

of poetry, coming into

The things thus

recalled

are

often

uninteresting and trivial, and they often, I feel certain,

have not been in


have frequently,

my

conscious

memory

for years.

on their occurrence, sought

for

any

by wdiich to account
them, and made myself certain that there was none.
But there is no effect witliout a cause, and if these

possible link of conscious suggestion


for

have not been suggested by any conscious


process they must have been suggested by an unconscious
one.
It is scarcely possible to doubt that unconscious
recollections

thought, as well as consciousness,

must be a function

some part of the nervous system; every


sentient or insentient, appears to have

of

vital function,

its

own

'^^J^X

to this, apparent

appears to be fully and con-

occupied with any train of thought


of places,

liable

Eeoollec-

peculiar

^^"'*^"

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE,

28
nerves

and

[cHAP.

I think it is in the highest degree probable,

which connect the various parts of


the ganglionic substance of the cerebrum with each other
The sensory ganglia are, as I
are the nerves of thought.
that those nerve-fibres

Nerves of
thoug it.

i^qIIq^q ^i^g seat of consciousness

The

the cerebral hemispheres

and I think we

may

consequently

sensory
ganglia are

are the seat of thought

conscious-

due to nerve-currents flowing between various parts of


the cerebral hemispheres, without entering the sensory
ganglia and that consciousness of thought is due to other

^'^^^'

conjecture, with great probability, that unconscious thought


is

motion by

currents, set in

these,

and flowing from the

cerebral hemispheres along the nerves of consciousness to

Owing

the sensory ganglia.

have

nerve-currents

to the remarkable

of setting

power that

one another in motion,

currents in the nerves of thought generally start currents


in the nerves of consciousness,

but this is
and thought are, I believe, in their own nature unconscious
^^^ t^6 nerve -currents of sensation and thought give rise
to consciousness, not always, and not directly, but only by
scious

Conscious-

thought,

how

pro-

and thought becomes conBoth sensation

not always the case.

causing secondary nervous

currents

to

flow

along the

nerves of consciousness.

My

to the question I

answer

sequently this

have asked above

that consciousness of sensation

is

is

con-

due

to

currents flowing along the nerves of the brain, upwards,

from the sensory ganglia to the ganglionic substance of


the cerebrum; and consciousness of thought is due to
currents flowing in the opposite direction, or downwards,
along the same nerves, from the ganglionic substance of
In both cases, not
the cerebrum to the sensory ganglia.
the cerebrum, but the sensory gangha, are the seat of
Seat of
consciousness.

consciousness
to the
fibres

or,

in other words, consciousness

is

due

mutual action of the sensory ganglia and the nervewhich connect them with the ganglionic substance

of the cerebrum.

The foregoing theory


Memory,

of consciousness affords a complete

account of the physical conditions of Memory.

admitted that the consciousness of a sensation

same thing with the sensation

itself, it

If
is

it

is

not the

will necessarily

THE PHYSIOLOGY OF

XXIX.]

memory

follow that the

of a sensation is a continuation or

reproduction not of the sensation


sciousness of
of

memory

but of the con-

itself,

The simplest and most rudimentary form

it.

when

is

continues for some

the conscious ness of a sensation

time after the sensation

little

This

has disappeared.

show

29

MITn^D.

how

necessary

have to
some of the most elementary and important mental
it

is

^^^^^

itself conscious-

usually the case, and I shall

is

in a future chapter,

its rudi-

to

sensation
outlasting
the sensation.

operations, that the consciousness of a sensation should

thus outlast the sensation

whatever in understanding

There

itself.
it

is

no

difficulty

produce them thus,


most decided instance, we continue to see a
after the eyes have been closed against it.

intense, outlast the impressions that

to take the

bright light

This

is

when

Sensations,

as a fact.

evidently due to the current of nervous energy

that flows along the optic nerve, and produces the sensation of light in the optic ganglia, continuing to fl.ow after
its

exciting cause has ceased to act

and the nerves of

consciousness, as I suppose, possess, in a higher degree

than those of sensation, this property of continuing to


transmit their currents after the exciting cause of those
currents has ceased.

This property may, perhaps, be a

may

be comparable to the fact

when

struck, vibrate longer than

purely physical one, and


that some
others.

elastic bodies,

It is to

not currents of
currents.

be remembered that nervous currents are


fluid,

but currents of energy, like electric

That higher kind of memory which consists not

in the continuation, but in the revival of the consciousness EecoUecof sensation

as,

heard or saw yesterday

manner.

or,

The

when we

for instance,

is

recall

^^^^'

be explained in a parallel

to

revival of the consciousness

in a word, recollection

what we

is

due

of sensation

to the reproduction due to

tlie

reproducof a current in the nerves of consciousness,' exactly similar


-^

(except generally in intensity) to the current to which the


original consciousness of that

sensation was

must be an exciting cause


consciousness,

or

for the currents of

recollection,

as

But

due.

currents cannot produce or reproduce themselves

tion of a
current of
conscious^gg_*

there

reproduced

well as for those of

original consciousness, or consciousness

of sensation.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

so

[chap.

believe that all currents of consciousness are secondary-

currents

those of original consciousness are excited

by

currents of sensation (though, as we have seen, they

sometimes outlast their exciting cause)

those of repro-

duced consciousness are excited by currents of thought.


Currents of thought, both in exciting one another and in
exciting currents of consciousness,

law of mental

habit, or, as

the association of ideas

it is

according to the

usually called, the law of

which

of

act

I shall

have to speak

in a future chapter.
Consensual action

produced
bered"cou-"
sciousness.

j^ many
cases, remembered consciousness acts on the
^
motor nerves, and on the whole organism, exactly as the
>

oi"igiii^l

The

sensation, or the consciousness of

it,

would

do.

thought of a disgusting object, for instance, sometimes

produces nausea.
sea-sickness

Dr. Carpenter mentions an instance of

being brought on by the sight of a ship

tossing on a stormy sea.

Such

as cases of consensual action

cases are to be regarded

due, however,

to reproduced

consciousness, not to sensation or the original consciousness

Dr. Carpenter proposes to call these ideo-

of sensation.

motor actions
going, not

by

indicating

by

a sensation, but

word that they

this

are set

by the revived consciousness,

or idea, of a sensation.

In

order, so far as it is possible, to

logical theory of the

mind which

complete the physio-

am

here attempting,

it

now only remains to speak of voluntary action.


Voluntary action is related to consensual action, in the
Voluntary
action.
same way that recollection, or reproduced consciousness, is
related to original consciousness.

my

belief

on the

As

have already stated

subject, the consciousness of a sensation

due to a nerve-current of consciousness being excited


by the nerve-current of sensation and the recollection,
or revived consciousness, of the same sensation is due
is

to a similar nerve-current of consciousness being excited

by a nerve-current of thought.

Thus,

when

remember

speech I heard yesterday, the revived consciousness of the sounds is just like the original consciousness I had of them when I heard them, only fainter;
to-day the

but the currents of consciousness were then excited by

THE PHYSIOLOGY OF MIND.

XXIX.]

currents

now they

sensation, while

of

31
are

by

excited

currents of thought.

may be at The same


one time consensual and at another time voluntary. All action may
muscular action is produced by nerve-currents in the motor time conIn an exactly similar way, the same action

nerves

^^"sual

the action of the motor nerves and of the muscles

which they

direct

sensual action

just the

is

it

is

same in voluntary

at another

as in con- voluntary,

only the stimulus, or exciting cause

of the motor currents, that differs

according
* !:^^

in consensual action

nature

the motor nerve

is

by a current of sensation of the


*"^'^^"
excited to act by a current of

excited to act

in voluntary action

it

is

Thus, for instance, the sensation of a flash of


light flowing in from the optic nerve may determine a
thought.

motor current which will cause the eyelids to close, without the action of will, or even the production of consciousThis

ness.

is

consensual action

but the eyelids

may

also

be stimulated to close by a determination of will in this


case the exciting ciirrent is not a current of sensation, but
a current of thought. I do not, however, suppose that the Thought
nerves of thought act directly on the motor ganglia I
thf
;

believe the

nerves of thought, in

producing voluntary

on the motor ganglia, not directly but through


the nerves of will. There are anatomical reasons for this
I have endeavoured to show how there are two
belief
action, act

distinct sets of cerebral nerves,

inotor
ganglia

the nerves
^ ^^^'

which may be respectively


and the nerves of

identified as the nerves of consciousness

thought; and I believe the nerves of will

As

identified.^

already stated,

it is

now

may

also

be

believed that the

pair of ganglia called the corpora striata really constitute

the nervous centre for consensual and voluntary motion.

They are connected with the ganglionic substance of the


cerebrum by thick strands of nerve-fibres, and all analogy
in favour of the belief that these are the nerves of will

is

just as the fibres that connect the sensory ganglia with the
The whole

of what I have said on the physiological theory of voluntary


taken in substance from Carpenter's Human Physiolot^y.
I
think, though I cannot be certain, that Dr. Carpenter would agree with
1

action

is

what I have advanced concerning the physiological theory


and thought.

of consciousness

Position of
^^ "7^*^^
of will.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

32

[chap.

ganglionic substance of the cerebrum are the nerves of


I suppose, consequently, that

consciousness.
is

purely voluntary, the process

is

this

when

action

current in the

nerves of thought (which, as stated above, are not in direct

connexion with either the sensory or the motor ganglia)


a current in the nerves of thought, I say, determines a
current in the nerves of will

and

on the motor

this acts

ganglia, so as to determine muscular action, exactly as a

current of sensation would do.


It is

Voluntary
actions

a very important fact, that actions wliich were

may

voluntary at

become

The best instance


any manual art,

consensual.

Instance
of a
musician.

is

may

hereditary
in animals,
as in birds,

of this

is

consensual through habit.

afforded

especially music.

by the

act of learning

In learning to play

and voluntary determination; but by long practice the


intermediate links of consciousness and will may be
gradually left out, and the motions of the fingers may be
consensually directed by the sight of the printed notes.
In man, the greater part of what have become consensual
have become so by such a process.

of walking

become

may become

from printed notes, every movement of the fingers must at


first be made to correspond with the notes by a conscious

actions,

This

first

is

Even the

not originally consensual, but has to be learned.

many

act

not instinctive in chDdren, or in other words

animals, actions that were voluntary at

Among

first

have

not only become consensual in the individual, but,


hereditary transmission, have become so in the race.

by
One

is the tendency to fly from man which, as


mentioned in the preceding chapter, has become hereditary
among many races of birds to which it was not originally

instance of this

and in

apply to

But the acquired instincts of the domestic races


Young pointers often
of dogs are yet more remarkable.
point the first time they are taken out and Darwin states
that the tendency to rim round a flock of sheep instead of
at them has become hereditary in the sheep-dog.
But are all consensual and instinctive actions to be
thus accounted for? in other words, were all consensual
actions voluntary at first, and have they only become con^

all consensual

sensual through habit

actions.

could scarcely avoid the conclusion that such

dogs.

natural.

This explanation
will not

Were we

to study

man
is

only,

we

the case

THE PHYSIOLOGY OF MIND,

XXIX.]

33

but our conclusion would be wrong.


The comparative
absence of instinctive powers, and the vast development of

makes the study of human psychology in


some respects misleading, if it is not corrected by comparison with that of the lower animals.
But a study of
animal instinct shows that there are many consensual
actions which never can have been voluntary.
The cell- Instance
thought, in man,

building instinct of the bee, for instance, certainly cannot

be the result of consciousness and


itself or in

any of

its

ancestors

unconscious vital intelligence.

will, either in

I believe

it

to

be due to

All analogy leads to the Voluntary

and not the converse and consensual action has


certainly been developed out of insentient or purely reflex
;

action.!

It is

^^''*

the bee

belief that voluntary action is developed out of consensual


action,

*^^

a general law, that the higher

makes

i,een^de

^^

l"ped out

sensual
"its ^^'^
SGllStl3.l

appearance later than the lower, and

is

developed out of

and in this particular case we know that, both


in the development of the individual and in the ascending
scale of organic forms, the cerebrum
which is the organ
of consciousness, thought, and will makes its appearance
later than the sensory and motor ganglia, which are
the organs of consensual action
and the sensory and
motor ganglia make their aj)pearance later than the
the lower

nervous organs of the insentient


that have a nervous system at

all,

life,

which, in animals

are the organs of reflex

action.

The

and theories concerning the nervoiis organs of


mental life, and their functions, which I have stated in
this chapter, may now be briefly summarized leaving out
facts

of account the nervous organs of the insentient life; and


also leaving out the cerebellum, a

nervous centre probably

belonging to the motor and instinctive

life,

though

its

functions are not yet clearly ascertained.

think that Professor Bain's theoiy of the will is vitiated by not


He represents the will as originally set in action

attending to this truth.

by pleasurable and painful

sensation.

believe the will has its root in

reflex action, anterior to the origin of sensation.

VOL.

II.

out of in^^^^i^nt.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

34
Summary.

The various uervous


mental

life

Enumera-

[chap.

and

actions belonging to sentient

may be enumerated

as

Sensation,

tion of

mental

Motor

actions.

Consciousness (including Memory),

action,

Will, and

Thought.

Each

of these has

its

own

and

nerve-fibres,

special

is

caused by the mutual action of the fibres and the ganglia

with which they are connected

or,

in other words,

by

nerve-currents flowing from the fibres into the ganglia, or

the converse.

current of one kind can determine the

production of a current of another kind,

according to

definite laws.

Mutual
relation
of the

The

may

position of the ganglia

and

nerve-fibres of

mind

be represented in the following diagramatic form

nervous
organs of
mind.

Ganglionic substance of the cerel)rum.

Nerves of thought.

^
Motor

Sensory ganglia.

ganglia, or

corpora striata.

'S'

Organs of

Sensation.

Voluntary muscles.

sense.

All mind begins with sensation


consists

in currents flowing

the

first fact

of

mind

upwards from the external

THE PHYSIOLOGY OF MIND.

XXIX.]

35

organs of sense, and producing sensation as tliey enter the


sensory ganglia.

Sensation sometimes determines the flow of a downward Consencurrent from the motor ganglia along their nerves to the ^^^^'^^^^'^
muscles, causing muscular motions.

This

is

what

is

called

consensual action.

Sensation sometimes determines the flow of an upward


current from the sensory ganglia along the nerves that

Conscioussensation.

connect them with the ganglionic substance of the cerebrum, producing consciousness. This is original consciousness, or consciousness of sensation.

Consciousness generally determines the flow of currents ThougM.


along the nerves that connect the different parts of the
ganglionic substance of the cerebrum with each other,

producing thought.

Thought

not

conscious but it generally, though


not always, becomes so by producing currents in the nerves
is

itself

of consciousness.

Consciousness thus produced by thought


sometimes takes the form of the revival of the consciousness of a sensation, in which case

it

Conscious-

jucecrb
thought.

constitutes the recol-

lection of the sensation.

Thought is capable of acting on the motor ganglia by wui.


means of currents sent down the nerves of will. The
motor ganglia respond to the stimulus exactly as if it
were a stimulus to consensual action coming from the
sensory ganglia

they send the proper current down the


motor nerves to the muscles, causing voluntary muscular
motion.

Even

as a very brief outline, the foregoing list of the

of mental interactions

various kinds

is

incomplete.

It

what may be called the primary classes


When we come to the laws of association,

leaves out all but


of interactions.

we

have

speak of secondary classes of interactions,


which are governed by those laws.
shall

to

The phenomena of

sleep,

depend on the partial or

dreaming, and somnambulism

total suspension of the activity

of various nervous centres of the

D 2

mental

life,

and on the

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

36

partial or total suspension of

by

communication between them

tbeir nerve-fibres.

This last expression

[cHAP.

may need

Independ-

explanation.

ently of that lowering of the activity of the nervous centres

which sleep

in

consists,

the

fibres

that

connect them

appear, in particular cases, to cease to transmit any messages,


Reverie,

or to keep

up the communication.

Thus, in the

and thought

state of reverie, the nerves of consciousness

may

memory, reasoning, or
invention while the sensory and motor nerves, with their
ganglia, may be engaged with some consensual action, such
but
as the practice of some easy mechanical occupation
the mind may have no consciousness of what the eye is
seeing, or what the hand is doing
in physiological lanbe

intently

occupied with

guage, the currents of sensation that reach the sensory

ganglia excite no currents in the nerves of consciousness.


Sleep.

In sound

sleep,

the whole

activity of the

cerebrum

appears to be suspended, including the nerves of consciousness and will, as well as those of thought.
activity of the sensory

and motor ganglia

lowered, though consensual actions are


as turning

round during

still

is

very

possible,

The

much
such

sleep.

Dreaming appears to be an intermediate state between


sound sleep and reverie.
SomnamThe peculiarity of somnambulism appears to be that
Dreaming.

^'

the action of the nerves of consciousness

while

all

suspended,

work as in
somnambulists show that

the rest of the nerves of

mind

is

are at

The actions of
must be awake, and capable of guiding consensual action. Thought and wiU are also active, and yet
Somnambulism appears to be
there is no consciousness.
the only mental state in which determinations of the will
the waking

state.

their senses

made

It has been well remarked, that


and
somnambulism
are the opposites of each
dreaming
other.
In dreaming, the consciousness is partly awake,
though it is not in communication with the organs of
sense, and the other mental powers are asleep
in somnambulism, the consciousness is asleep, and the other mental
powers are awake.

are

unconsciously.

THE PHYSIOLOGY OF MIND.

XXIX.]

As

the theory stated

iii

tliis

37

chapter concerning the Grounds

functions of the three different sets of cerebral nerves

is

gtated"'^^

avowedly propounded as only a hypothesis, I shall conclude by stating, more distinctly than I have yet done,
the evidence on which

it rests.

we had no
analogy would make it
Even

if

direct

evidence on the subject,

impossible to doubt that every

every ganglion must have

nerve and

But we have

function.

own

its

direct evidence

separate

anatomy, and

Functions

the results of experiments on living animals, combine to and motor


show, with tolerable distinctness, which are the nerves and nerves and
ganglia of sensation, and which are those of motion

the theory of reflex and consensual action


established.

But these methods

fail

is

and

are

known.

perfectly well

us in the inquiry Those

about the functions of the cerebral nerves. We cannot


doubt that nerves in connexion with the organs of sense

and that nerves in connexion with


the muscles are motor nerves but when we come to the
cerebrum we have no such facts to guide us, and the
are nerves of sensation,

of

gg^g^jj^j^j

nerves
i^fJn-ed

by

analogy,

method

of experiment cannot be applied.

It

is,

impossible to doubt that in the cerebrum, as in

however,
all

organs, different nerve-fibres have different functions

analogy

may

other
;

and

guide us, as I think, to a tolerable degree of

what the functions are.


Anatomy has shown that there are three

certainty as to

distinct sets of

These are

cerebral nerves, having distinct connexions.

to Cerebral

be thus enumerated
1. The fibres connecting the sensory ganglia with the
:

ganglionic substance of the cerebrum.

I regard these as of consciousness,

the nerves of Consciousness.


2.

The

fibres

connecting

the

different

parts

of

ganglionic substance of the cerebrum with each other.

regard these as the nerves of Thought.


3.

The

fibres

the
I

And

of thought,

connecting the ganglionic substance of the

cerebrum with the corpora striata, which are the nervous


I regard these as the nerves of and
centres for motor action.
"'^-

Will.

As

a parallel to

psychological (or

these

what

is

anatomical

facts,

the purely

usually called the metaphysical)

of

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

38

Mind

analysis of the facts of

three primary mental functions

Three
primary
*^^

[chap.

has shown that there are


:

that

to say

is

Consciousness, or Feeling

functions,

Thought

and

Will.
It is at least a probable hypothesis, that the three sets

probably

^^ Cerebral nerves correspond to the three primary mental

spondino-

But how are the respective functions of the


Here it is important
?
to remember, that although thought and will are usually
accompanied by consciousness, they are not always so
there may be unconscious thought, and the facts of
somnambulism appear to show that there may be un-

thereto.

functions.

three sets of nerves to be identified

conscious voluntary determinations.


Nerves of

j^ggg^

Now,

^^ least, are distinct

liow are

we

from those of thought and

will.

to identify the nerves of consciousness

be seen that of the three sets of cerebral nerves,


r^g
enumerated above, only one is in connexion with the
sensory ganglia, leading up from them to the ganglionic
It will

thought

and

facts greatly

strengthen the probability that the nerves of conscious-

conscioustiuct from

These

will,

substance of the cerebrum.

Nerves of
conscious-

Tlie functions of these nerves

must have something to do with the functions of the


sensory ganglia. But they are not nerves of sensation.
The nerves of sensation are those which are in connexion
with the external organs of sense. They may be, however.
and I believe are, the nerves of consciousness whether
:

consciousness of sensation, or the secondary


primary
r
j
j
ness, how
identified, consciousness of memory and thought.
^YiQ

'

The same kind

of reasoning applies to

what

I believe to

The mass of the ganglionic


substance of the cerebrum, and of the fibres connecting
its different parts, varies as between different species of
animals and between different individuals among men, in
some kind of approximate proportion to their intellectual
powers and it is doubted by none that the cerebrum is
be the nerves of thought.

Thought
unco^uscious,

is

the organ of thought.


necessarily conscious.
scious,

though

it is

Thought, as we have seen,

That

is to

say,

it is in itself

is

not

uncon-

usually accompanied by consciousness.

THE PHYSIOLOGY OP MIND,

XXIX.J

Being

itself

unconscious,

of consciousness

seat cannot

its

and I think

39
be in the nerves

analogy

all

is

in favour of

the hypothesis that the currents of thought are formed in Nerves


the nerve-fibres that connect the different parts of the*
ganglionic substance of the cerebrum with each other

in other words, that thought

is

the ganglionic substance of

tlie

of
ougit.

or,

mutual action of
and

'due to the

cerebral hemispheres,

the nerve-fibres that connect the different parts thereof


It is a very significant fact, that "it is

on the very large

proportion which the commissural fibres [or those which I


regard as the nerves of thought] bear to the

bulk of the cerebriim of


appears chiefly to depend

man and
;

and

that the

rest,

of the higher animals

it is

easy to conceive that

an important relation with the operations


of the mind, whatever be our view of the relative functions
this condition has

of different parts of the cerebrum."^


If

my

reasoning

little difiiculty in

is

assented to thus

there can be

far,

identifying the nerves of will.

a set of nerve-fibres which

by

"VVe find Nerves of

their position serve to con-

nect the ganglionic matter of the cerebrum with the corpora

which are the motor ganglia for consensual motions.


Analogy points to these fibres as the probable channel by
which determinations of will, formed in thought, are
conveyed to the motor organs.
striata,

"What

I will here anticipate a possible difficulty.

is

the

physiological distinction between ideo-motor actions (to

use Dr. Carpenter's expression) and voluntary ones

Sup-

on deliberation, to draw
back from a position of danger, and do so this is voluntary
pose, for instance, that I decide,

action.

Suppose, on the contrary, that I do not wait to

deliberate,

but itivoluntarLly shrink back from the thought

of danger, perhaps contrary to


is

an ideo-motor action, and

differs

only in the feeling that prompts


consciousness of thought.
actions,

my
it

better

judgment

this

from a consensual one

being not sensation but

The stimulus

to ideo-motor

and the stimulus to voluntary actions, both proceed


from thought, and consequently from the nerves

originally

But the stimulus

of thought.
*

Cai'penter's

Human

to voluntary action

Pliysiology, p. 577.

comes

Ideo^i^,[{^ar

actions
tiu^Iuished.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

40

[CHAP.

from the gangliouic substance of the cerebrum to the


motor ganglia directly, through the nerves of will; the
stimulus to ideo-motor action, on the contrary, comes
through the nerves of consciousness and they do not act
;

on the motor ganglia

directly,

medium

but through the

the sensory ganglia, which, as I have shown

of

reason to

believe, are the ganglia of consciousness.

I admit that the physiological theory of mind, of

The theory
plet^'

have in this chapter drawn the


which may probably never be
I

outline, is
filled up.

but an

which

outline,

Among

other

no account of one of the most remarkable and yet common of mental facts, namely the act of
which may be defined as the direction of conattention
In any but the most
sciousness by a voluntary act.
deficiencies, it gives

elementary psychological inquiries, physiology

of little

is

or no use as a guide.

NOTE.
NERVOUS CURRENTS,
Conscious- If

T^^

^s

secondary

^^'

my

theory of consciousness

^ secondary

is correct,

consciousness

The consciousness

phenomenon.

is

always

of a sensation

is

due to a current in the nerves of consciousness, produced by a


current in those of sensation
of a thought

is

and, similarly, the consciousness

due to a current in the nerves of consciousness,

produced by a current in those of thought.

One

current of

consciousness may, however, produce another, according to a

law to be stated in the next chapter.


The
cuiTwit is
not a conof^the^^"^
fiist.

It is to

order to illustrate

first,

my

but

meaning,

from the working of the

may make

is

not a mere

is

in every sense distinct.

it

will

In

be best to take instances

electric telegraph.

ments may be so arranged that an

Compared London
to d6ctric

be observed that the second current

continuation of the

Telegraphic instru-

electric current sent

from

a signal by deflecting a magnetic needle at

teleffi-aph

York, and then go on and make a signal at Edinburgh.

currents,

nothing like this takes place among nervous ciurents.

But
The

NEEVOUS CURRENTS.

XXIX.]

41

only analogy in telegraphy to the production of secondary


;
nervous currents is the action of a " relay battery " that is to

which is so placed that on the arrival of one


current it sends on another.
The second current here is not a
contkiuation of the first, but has been produced by a distract

say, a battery

battery.

Just

so,

a secondary nervous current

tion of the primary one, but


nerve-fibres

may

is

and ganglia on each

other.

here state, that I think Mr. Lewes

main taining that


graphic wires.

not a continua-

is

produced by a distinct action of

is

quite right in Nerve-

nerve-fibres are not merely analogous to tele- 1^(1^


th^^Ti
They are, no doubt, conductors of nervous merely

energy, but they are also necessary to its production.

mutual action of a nerve-fibre and a ganglion

is

The ^^gL

necessary to the

production of a nervous current, just as the mutual chemical


action of

two substances

voltaic current.

is

necessary to the production of a

CHAPTEE XXX.
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THOUGHT.

"N the foregoing

chapter, I have attempted

an analysis of

the different mental functions, only so far as such an

and

analysis illustrates,

is

anatomy and
That anatomy and

illustrated by, the

physiology of the organs of mind.

most valuable guides for the first


few steps in the analysis of mental functions, but beyond
the first few steps they fail us altogether. I have no doubt
that Mind, in its very highest functions as truly as in mere
sensation, is dependent on nervous action
but, beyond
physiology

are, I believe,

broadly discriminating between the nerves of consciousness, of thought,

tifying the
Physio-

though

all

depemis on
nervous

will,

we have no means

nervous actions to which

af iden-

particular mental

actions are due.

All psychology, therefore, except in

^* elementary

parts,

usflessas
a guide in science,

elementary psychology,

and of

without

howevex,

is

must be studied

further

as a

help from physiology.

its

distinct

This,

not because bodily and mental functions are

really distinct, but only because

we

are unable to trace the

''

But though it is impossible to trace the deon nervous action in particular cases,
that dependence is proved as a general truth by all analogy,
and by much direct evidence such as the fact that great
mental power is never found without a well-developed
connexion.

P^iidence of mental

Proofs of
this.

cerebrum
true)

(though the converse does not appear to be


that mental exertion, like bodily exertion, exhausts
^

do not say a large cerebrum.

met with

Great intellectual power

in brains not above the average size.

But there

is

is

sometimes

certainly

no

instance of great intellectual power in an abnormally small brain, or in a

malformed

one.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND THOUGHT.

CH. XXX.]

nervous energy,

wliicli requires to

43

be renewed in sleep

and that, as muscular exertion causes decomposition of the


substance of the muscles, so mental exertion causes de-

composition of the

substance of the brain,

phosphorus, which

fouud in the excreta.

We

is

separating

have seen reason to believe that there are separate

and
we have seen that these correspond with the three primary
mental functions of Feeling, Thought, and Will.
In speaking of the results of psychological analysis, I
say feeling, thought, and will, rather than consciousness,
thought, and will.
Feeling includes consciousness, but it
cerebral nerves for consciousness, thought,

will

All action of the sensory ganglia

also includes sensation.

produces feeling

and

those feelings which originate in im-

Feeling

is

^'

^"

'^^

consciousness.

pressions coming
of sense, or from Feelings of
from the external organs
o
sensation
the external termination of any of the nerves of the body, and feel'

*-

belong to sensation
the brain

those feelings which originate within

belong to consciousness.

itself

and the primary form of consciousness,


.

ness of a sensation

...
while
it

is

present

is
;

other forms of consciousness are developed.


of consciousness

sensation which

is
is

memory,
no longer

The

simplest,

cousc*iousness.

.of

the conscious- Gradations

out of

conthis, all sciousness.

The next form

or the consciousness of a
present.

Beyond

this

are

that large class of feelings or emotions, which, to use H. Emotions.


"

Spencer's felicitous expression, are

generated indepen-

dently in consciousness," and have no prototype in mere


bodily sensation.
of the pleasures,

The most elementary of these are desire


and fear of the pains, of sensation but
;

beyond these elementary emotions are that higher class of


feelings which attach themselves not to sensations but to
higher objects, including the sense of beauty and the social
and moral feelings.
Thus we can classify
nervous

organs

of

We

feelings.

sensation

and

consciousness,

ascertain the physical conditions under

sensation and consciousness arise

can identify the

which

and

feelings of

and we can trace the


by develop-

origin of one class of feelings out of another

ment within the mind


of sensation,

and

desire

itself (as, for instance,

and

memory

out

fear out of the consciousness

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

44

[chap.

But when all this has been done,


that whole class of facts which are variously called feeling, sensation, consciousness, and emotion, remains unexWe can compare
plained, and incapable of explanation.
one feeling with another, and to a great extent we are
able to ascertain where, when, and how, feelings arise.
But it is in the nature of things impossible to teU what a
of pleasure and pain).

Feeling

is

cable^^"

feeling

A man born blind may be

is.

when

that the colour of green arises


to grass or leaves

and

made

to understand

the eyes are directed

knowledge, so

this is real

far as it

but no possible explanation could make him underTo use a mathestand what the sensation of green is.
goes

matical

mode

and consciousness can-

of speech, sensation

not be described in terms of anything but themselves.

But with

Thought is
explicable,

thought

^mconscious thought

may

elements, and
It

ness.

is,

Thought

otherwise.

is

it

even

always derived from conscious

is

be described in terms of conscious-

thought begins with

admitted, that

universally

believe,

sensation

all

but sensation, and the

consciousness of sensation, are not themselves thought.


It begins

The

first

elementary act of thought

the

is

conscious-

^J^L*^/
S61IS6
01

ness, not of sensations, but of the relation of sensations

the rela-

to

sensations
to each
other.

each other

the

consciousness,

for

Hkeness or unlikeness between two


qj,

Qf

their

co-existence

there are two


at

once, the

more than

or

more

separation in space.

or

more

sensations,

time,

or

of

Now, when

feelings present to the consciousness

consciousness

to the rest

instance, of the

succession in

co-existence or

their

or

or,

in

is

generally

common

directed to one

language, the

mind

For instance,

Attention

attends to one rather than to the

particular
sensation,

music and talk are both going on at once, the attention will
probably be directed either to the music or to the talk, but
not to both.

*'''

^.

?j,

relation

if

This sometimes takes place involuntarily,

sometimes by a voluntary determination. In such a case


as this, the cousciousness is directed to one sensation, or set

sen^tions. of scnsations, rather


x

rest.

ness

is also

than

to the other.

But the conscious-

capable of being directed, not to a particular

in geo-

sensation or set of sensations, but to a particular relation or

study!^

set of relations

between sensations.

The best instance

of

CONSCIOUSNESS AND THOUGHT.

XXX.]

45

by the use of a
The
lines
of
the
diagram
may be either
geometrical diagram.
drawn in white chalk on a black board, or in black ink on
white paper; but it makes no difference whatever to the
this that I can think of, is that afforded

geometrical student whether the lines are black or white,

nor would

it

make any

they were red or green.

if

It is

necessary that the lines should be of some colour, in order


to

make an impression on

his sight

were there no

differ-

the lines and the

ence of colour or of shade between

ground they are drawn on, there would be no sensations


with which to begin the consciousness of relations between

But one colour

the lines.

cause his consciousness

is

will do as well as another, be-

not occupied with the colours of

the lines and of their ground, or with the relation between

them considered

as a relation

between

colours,

but with a

particular kind

of relations, namely relations in space,


which are the same for lines of any possible colour, and
which constitute the subject-matter of geometrical science.
I ought to say, that I do not mean to prejudge any

metaphysical question as to the nature of

Whatever may be the nature

truth.

geometrical

of the

of

tru.ths

geometry in themselves, or in relation to all possible intelligence, it is an unquestionable fact that we begin our knowledge of geometry, and indeed of everything, by cognition
of sensations and of the relations between sensations.

Neither sensation, nor the consciousness of sensation,

thought

the

first

rudimentary act of thought

sciousness of the relation between sensations.


lieve, will

that

it is

relation

be admitted by

But

all.

am

the con-

is

This, I be-

inclined to think

not strictly accurate to speak of consciousness of

though

it

is

accurate not to be

sufficiently

misleading up to the present point of the discussion.


of the relation

we

when we

am

we are conscious We have


^.
between two sensations, we reallv
mean ^
conscions-

inclined to think that

that

is

say that

'

are conscious, not of the relations, but of the

sensations

which

are related.

are too abstract to be of

much

The

relations of

geometry

use for illustration here


T

we

^^ij ^^
related
things.

must take an example from among what is nearer


sensation.
If I look at a half-open moss rose, I

ness of
't'pJftfl.fi'i'iQ
'

to

mere

see red

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

46

Here

petals in contact with a green calyx.

sensations of red and

related to

green,

unlike, and as in contact.

unlike sensations in contact

am

but I

[chap.

are the

two

each other as

then conscious of two

am

not,

nor can I be,

conscious of the abstract relations denoted by the words


" unhkeness " and " contact."
I am not conscious of abstract unlikeness,

am

but I

conscious of unlike sensations

But we

not conscious of abstract contact, but I am conscious


Eelations, in themselves, cannot
of sensations in contact.
But they are objects of
be objects of consciousness.

knowledge

knowledge

of rela

am

this is a fact of experience, explain

or metaphysically as

tions.

that

we

relations

There

we may.

are conscious of sensations,

nothing

is

new

my readers

thought
thus explained.

and cognizant of the


I expect that the

in all this.

will say that

and the other half that


any meaning behind it.
Uncon-

logically

between them.

one half of

scious

it

I consequently prefer to say

it

is

it

is

a mere truism,

a verbal distinction without

I have no objection to its being


called a truism, but 1 believe that, so far from being
without meaning, it shows us where to seek for the explanation, in so far as it is exphcable, of the fact of uncon-

Consciousness has to do with feelings.

scious thought.

do with the relations between the feelings,


or with relations between these relations, or with a third
set of relations between the second set of relations, and

Thought has

to

so on, in almost indefinitely increasing degrees of abstract-

ness

that

sensations on
based.

(I

to say, of remoteness

is

which

do not

ceases to

arises.)

scious

clusicm'of
feel-

and the relations between the relations, after we have


ceased to be conscious of the feelings which were the
of

the

relations.

are.

And

this,

believe, is

the

rationale of the fact of unconscious thought,


jt

may

be said in reply to

ill2fS

between
which the

nevertheless ultinaately

tions,

of^rda^*^^
tions only, subjects

the

it

is

complete account of the


but only as an account of how thought
is possible to go on thinking of the rela-

Thought

Now,

thought

offer this as a

objects of thought,

be con-

all

from the feelings or

mathematical and

all

this, that, if it

were

true,

highly abstract reasonings would be

performed unconsciously.

I reply to the objection, that I

believe such reasonings are in a great degree performed

XXX.]

CONSCIOUSNESS AND THOUGHT.

47

and that what we are conscious of while What is


engaged in them is not so much the object under attention, consciousas the effort of will which is needed in order to keep the ess of
thought at work ; for in the normal state of the mind the ofteiT
exercise of will appears to be always accompanied by con- ^^^^^^ ^'^'
sciousness
sciousness.
But when thought is mdependent of will, it is of mental
also frequently unaccompanied by consciousness.
Men of ^^^*"
inventive minds say that their happiest thoughts have
often come to them involuntarily, almost unconsciously,

tmconsciously

unsought, they

know

not

how

that

is to say,

of unconscious or half-conscious thinking.

as the result

CHAPTEE XXXI.
MENTAL
All actions

tend to

become
habitual.

the chapter on the

IN

HABIT.

Law

of Habit I believe I have

shown that all vital actions whatever tend to repeat


We
themselves, and consequently to become habitual.
have seen that every vital action may be classed under one
of the three denominations of formative, motor, and mental.
It is not a usual

habits,

and

to

form of expression to speak of formative

but I think I have shown that it is strictly accurate


speak of motor and mental habits that is to say,

habits of action and habits of thought


accurate,

tifically

When
Motor
habits.

becoming

and in accordance with general usage.

habits are spoken of without any qualifying word,

motor habits that are generally meant and, indeed,


the whole organic creation contains no better illustration
;

the formation of

Voluntary habit

habitual
and consensuaL

at once scien-

is

it is

of
actions

than

mechanical

habit

the power of
arts,

that

not

individual,

human

beings

which

actions

at

so

first

hereditary
to

learn

were per-

formed by a conscious effort of the will, at last become


so that (to return to a
consensual and unconscious
;

may

former instance) a musician's fingers


as to be guided almost, if not quite

be so trained

unconsciously,

by

the sight of the printed notes.


Mental
habit, or
association of

The law of mental habit is usually called the law of


The association of ideas is a
the association of ideas.
subject that

has been very

ideas.

purpose

much

and to good
more thoroughly exBut the isolated manner in
studied,

indeed, few subjects are

plored or better vmderstood.

which psychology has been cultivated


its

till

now, has caused

nature to be misconceived in one important respect.

MENTAL

CHAP. XXXI.]

The law
as if

it

HABIT.

of the association of ideas

is

49
generally mentioned

Now,

were an ultimate law.

no doubt an

is

it

ultimate law, so far as psychology only

is

concerned.

true of all mental phenomena, and

is

not resolvable

is

it

It

But the phenomena of mind


are only a part of the phenomena of life, and the law of
the association of ideas is only a particular case, though a
very important one, of a law which is true of all the
phenomena of life namely, the law of habit. In order to
keep this truth before the reader's mind, I intend to speak
into

any other mental law.

of mental habit in preference to the association of ideas,

though I admit that the association of ideas


accurate expression, and I shall use
best serve to express

Ideas

may

my

it

is

a perfectly

wherever

it

will

meaning.

be defined as

all

those impressions on con- impres-

sciousness and thought


which are not due to immediate
o
impressions of sense. All impressions on the mind, con-

which

sequently,

the word idea

by common

is

are not sensory are ideal.

perhaps rather wider than

usage, but

it

is

intelligible

This use of
is

sanctioned

and, I

^^"^ P'^
consciousness are

sensory or
^'^^'^l-

think,

necessary for the purposes of science.

The elementary law of association may be thus stated


When two feelings have been experienced together, or
immediate succession, the recurrence of either of the
ings separately tends to recall to

ness

of the other feeling

or,

memory

Law
in

of as""^

stated

feel-

the conscious-

and less
have been experienced
Let us call two sensa-

in fewer words

technical language, feelings that

together tend to recall each other.

A and B

and let us caU the


consciousness of the two respectively a and h. If A and B
have often occurred togetlaer, or in immediate succession,
a and h also will have occurred together, or in immediate
tions, or

groups of sensations,

succession

and, in virtue of the law that all the actions of

become habitual, a and b will acquire


the habit of occurring together, and whatever produces the
one will recall the other also. Or, to use an illustration

living beings tend to

of a man's instance
statement the sight
instead of an algebraic
<J
o
face and the sound of his voice may become so associated '^^^^ ^^^
:

J?

together in the mind, that the consciousness, or memory, of Ws

VOL. IL

voice.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

50
the two

may

[cHAP.

acquire a habit of always accompanying each

other, so that the sight of the face will recall the voice into

conscious memory, and the sound of the voice will simiI


larly recall the sight of the face.
Groups of u
sensations, or groups of sensations."
is

a single sensation

sense of sight

is

of sensations has

have spoken ahove of


The sound of a voice

the impression of a man's face on the

a group of sensations

become

but once a group

familiar, it is capable of

becoming

the subject of associations, just like a simple sensation.


In the case of association just mentioned, the ideas of

two things become associated in our consciousness, because


the things themselves have been associated in our expeAssoeiati"'^.^y.

by contiguity

time

and association produced in

ciation

con iui

to each other, either in space or in

rience

by

^^^^

Association

contiguity.

y,

^yiiici^^

though

this
is

way

is

called asso-

produced in another

quite as familiar, is not quite so easy

to analyse into its elements, so as to prove it to be a case


and by
cp Tin

il

fl

reTl

fP
'

as, for instance,

mind the

face

when
it

mean

^^^ jg^^ ^f habit.

association

the sight of a

resembles.

by resemblance

good portrait recalls to

Association by resemblance

and association by contiguity are sometimes spoken of as


but
if they were both ultimate facts of the mental nature
I think it can be shown that they are both to be referred
to the same principle of association, though under different
;

both cases
of ^^^^
.

same prm

^-^^^^g^^j^^^gg^ ^^(j ^j^at

law of

In order

habit.

they are both alike cases of the

to explain the fact of association

by

resemblance as a case of mental habit, it is better to speak,


not of objects having the kind of likeness that a face and
its portrait have to each other, but of objects so nearly
alike

as

to

be indistinguishable

uncut copies of the same book.

Explana-

as,

for

instance,

two

book

at a

If I see a

and this recalls to my memory that I have


seen the same book that is to say, a precisely similar
]30ok in a bookseller's shop, by what mechanism of assoIt is to be thus
ciation is the recollection effected?
explained mv first view and my second view of the book

friend's house,

tion of as-

by resem- are two distinct incidents, partly alike and partly unlike^
blance:
^-^.^^ -^ ^^^^^ y^^ ^^^ copies of the book were exactly
similar, unlike in that the places

and other circumstances

MENTAL HABIT.

XXXI.]

61

were differeut and consequently the impressions produced


on my consciousness by the two incidents are compound
;

impressions, partly similar and partly different.

But when
the second impression on my consciousness is made by
seeing the book for the second time, the idea of the book
is

already habitually associated with

the

idea

of the

and recalls it.


what takes place in all cases of remembrance
by similarity. ISTo two incidents are similar in all their
details
and when they are said to be precisely similar, it
is only meant that, of the compound impressions which all
bookseller's shop,

This

is

incidents

make on

the consciousness, the parts that attract

the attention are the similar parts.

When

one incident, recalls another by

its

similarity, the one,

may

always be resolved

when compared with

the other,

one thing, or

and a dissimilar part. Let us call the


two things, or of two incidents. A, and the
dissimilar parts
and Y ; the things themselves wiU coninto a similar part

similar parts of

sequently be respectively indicated hy

A X and A

T.

In

the act by which the

mind has acquired its memory of


A X, A has already become associated with X as a case
of association by contiguity.
So that when we say the
impression of

A X

on the consciousness recalls that of


A Y, what really happens is, that the impression of A,
which is the element common to the two, recalls that of Y. it
Thus, association by resemblance
elation

by

is

really a case of asso-

contiguity.

is

a case

tk,nT^^'
contiguity.

In order to prevent

my

meaning from being miscon- The power


.^ ^'"
add that I regard
the power of cosnisine
c
o
o smg reresemblance and difference in a word, the power of com- semblance
parison as an ultimate and original power of the mind, en?ets an
not dependent on habit, association, or memory. I have ultimate
indicated this view in the last chapter.
It is, for instance,
ceived, I ought to

X-

mind should compare two sensations,


such as two spots of colour, simultaneously present to the
consciousness, without any element derived from habit
conceivable that the

entering into the process.

Most readers who

will take the trouble to follow

my

reasonings on the subject of association by contiguity and

E 2

HABIT

52

by resemblance,

AND

INTELLIGENCE.

[cHAP.

will probably be of opinion that I have

what

elaborately explained
itself

may

when

formally stated,

is

self-evident

that the subject

be understood without the slightest difficulty,


while there is some difficulty in following my explanation
I reply, that, obvious as may be the whole subject
of it.

is it

not self-evident, nor, I believe,

it is

yet generally recognised, that

are formed

by

by resemblance is
by contiguity. But I beKeve

that association
tion

that these two

all

simple associations

contiguity, either in place or in time

so

really a case of associait is

generally admitted

contiguity and resemblance

include

all

cases whatever of simple association.

must here reply

to a possible objection to

my mode

regarding all association as a case of the law of habit.

of
It

beyond question that many associations, and those the


most durable, are habitual for instance, that vast network
of associations between the sounds of words and their
meanings which constitutes the knowledge of one's own
language, has evidently been acquired by the habit of
hearing and speaking the language, from a time before the
But when we form
earliest time that one can remember.
meaning, not by
association
between
word
and
its
the
a
often hearing them conjoined but by a single mental act,

is

as

we

constantly do in learning a foreign language,

be argued that this

it

may

is not a case of habit, but of a totally

mental law.
I believe, however, that this difference, important as it is, may be shown to be merely one
of degree.
The law of habit is, that actions tend to repeat

different

All assode^*euds

on

habit,

themselves.
tition

but

All habits no doubt strengthen with repeif

an action tends to repeat itseK without

having been repeated more than once, this

no less truly
became habitual after countless
repetitions.
If, indeed, we knew the meaning of any
words without having learned them, this would no doubt
be a case of association wliich could not be traced to habit.
But it is safe to assert that no case of the kind exists.
In the chapter on the Laws of Habit,^ we have seen that
a case of habit than

if it

Chapter XV.

is

MENTAL HABIT.

XXXI.]

habits are liable to be lost


true,

and

it

is

by

disuse.

This

is

universally

perhaps more conspicuously true of mental

habits than of any other kind.


is

"53

Memory,

as

we have

altogether due to mental habit, or association,

sists

in the liability of

seen,

and con-

associations to be recalled into

In virtue of the law of the loss of habits


by disuse, any association which remains for a sufficiently
long time without being recalled into consciousness, ultimately loses the power of being so recalled in common
consciousness.

Forget^

]^'gg

habits

^f^

by

language,

it is

But we have

forgotten.

also seen that the Reappear-

tenacity of a habit does not always depend on

nence, or present strength


revive after appearing to

its

^^^^

promi-

and that a tenacious habit may


be lost. To this class of facts

supposed
* ^^ ^*'

belongs the very remarkable yet not uncommon fact of


the recollection in illness or in delirium, of long-forgotten

memories of childhood.
r

As

the law of habit

is

a law of all

life,

so the

law of Associa-

mental habit, or the law of association, is a law of all


J^ ^J^""^
mind.
It enters into aU mental processes.
Memory, as mental
we have seen, consists in the power of recalling associations !! ^'
that have been once formed.

The

acquisition of knowledge

consists in the formation of associations

the learnincf of a

language, for instance, consists in the formation of associa-

Accuisi^'
tion of

ledgl'

between the words and their meanings, so that either


will recall the other.
The acquisition of knowledge contions

cerning things consists in the formation of associations

between the various properties of the things, and the


acquisition of the power of recalling those associations to

memory when they

are wanted.

Accuracy of knowledge Accurate


consists in the associations which are formed in the mind
f^^^'
between things, and between their properties, accurately
corresponding to the combinations that exist in the real
world.
Errors of knowledge consist in failures in the
correspondence.
Reverie chiefly consists in associations
successively recalling each other to

Error.

Kcverie.

memory without any

effort of will.
Imagination, or invention, consists in the
formation within the mind of ideal associations, which the
inventor may afterwards construct as actual combinations

Invention,

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

54

in the real world

as

when

written out, or a machine


Eeasoning.

imagined in the mind.

poem

[chap

or a piece of music

is constructed, after

being

is

first

Eeasoning consists in forming, or

attempting to form, associations within the mind which


will correspond to the actual combinations of things in the
real world

as,

for instance,

when

Sir E. Murchison,

from

the scanty data before him, predicted the discovery of that


physical configuration which Dr. Livingstone afterwards

discovered in South Africa.


It

may

my

appear to some of

readers an inaccurate and

unjustifiable extension of the use of the word, to describe

imagination and reasoning as cases of association.

I reply,

that they are unquestionably cases of the formation of

mental, or ideal, combinations


tion

must be the

and

all

mental combina-

association of ideas already in the

mind

The mind because all knowledge has its beginning in experience


f^^^^ot

mirid, strictly speaking, has"

can only

only combine the materials furnished to

com me.

j^ ^^^ present
is

originality

in

its

is

mode

But

it

impossible.
of

the

no creative power, and can


it

by experience,

state of psychological science, I

unquestionable.

thiak this

does not follow that true mental

The mind may be

truly origiaal

combining the data of experience, just as

an architect may be truly original though he cannot create


the stone with which he buUds, but must obtain it from
the quarry.
I have said that the law of mental habit, or the association of ideas, enters into every mental process except the

Are all
mental

-able to the

*^^

most elementary. I think this does not admit of question.


But it is a question, whether the action of the mind
^^ ^j^g ^^^g^ given to it by experience, in virtue of the
law of mental habit alone, is capable of accounting for
^^^

-inTntal

^^^ facts of mind.

This, in fact, is another aspect of

hahit

the question which I have discussed in the chapter on the

Parallel

Origin of species.

I there considered the question,

whether

question
^-^q facts of
in biology.

adaptation
can be due to the actions,
Organic
^

direct and indirect, of the surrounding world of multiform

\^liev0
mtelligence, in
I

on the organism through the laws of liabit


Q^^ variation alone and I came to the conclusion that
-,.
t
such IS not the case that, in addition to the unintelligent

forces, acting

MENTAL HABIT.

XXXI.]

laws of habit and variation, there


izing intelligence,

which

is

an ultimate

science of mind.

a principle of organ-

is

not a resultant from any unin-

addition to

j^abit^^^

put together out of any unintelligent

telligent forces, or

elements, but

is

55

the

Ju.st so in

fact of nature.

In the present state of psychology as of The


all questions is whether
g^atf,!*!^

physiology, the most important of


intelligence is

an ultimate, primary

resolved into any other

or whether

out of unintelligent elements.


in organization, intelligence

is

incapable of being

fact,
it

has been put together

I believe that in mind, as

an ultimate

for Avhich the

it is

keep

I shall

something

is

But

laws of habit do not account.

yet too soon to discuss this question.

ultimate
^^.ct

I believe

fact.

that in all thought, as in all organization, there

Is intelli-

as
for

it

the concluding psychological chapter.

In the next chapter I shall have

to speak of habit

and

intelligence as acting in the moral nature.

It will

be perceived by any one

who

is

in

any degree

familiar with psychological studies, that I have in this

chapter treated the vast subject of the laws of the association

of ideas

very slightly.

have only glanced by

allusion at the formation of ideas of groups of sensations,

and other yet more complex ideas


all

our ideas

of external

things

to
as

which

class

belong

distinguished from

ideas or memories of simple sensations.

And

have

dis-

missed in a single paragraph the action of mental associa-

and invention though


would take whole chapters, and perhaps a whole volume,

tion in the processes of reasoning


it

to do justice to those subjects.

My

reason for doing so

is.

Why

that I do not design, as part of this work, to write a

^^^J^^^a

complete treatise on psychology, any more than a complete

association

treatise

on biology

and

a complete treatise on the laws

of association, in all their cases

and

applications,

would be
The

nothing less than a complete treatise on psychology.

purpose of the present work

on

this or

any other

subject,

is

not to enter into full detail

but to point out what I believe

be the true position of the laws of habit in biology


and in psychology, and the relation of the principle of

to

intelligence to that of habit in both.

"'^

^"

CHAPTER XXXII.
THE GROUNDS OF THE MORAL NATURE.

Definition.

Moral

JN Speaking of the moral nature, I do


X expression in the usual sense, in which

^Zllnal. to those powers of the

mind

not use the


it is

restricted

that take cognizance of right

and wrong. I intend to speak of the moral nature as coextensive, and indeed identical, with the emotional nature.
Moral

The word moral

is

contrasted

j/o?-aZ

is

not properly contrasted with mental.

is

contrasted with intellectual

and the moral and

both branches of the mental nature.


"We have seen that the intellectual nature begins from
sensation, and that the first rudiment of intellect consists
intellectual natures are

ledual.

sense of
pleasure

power of cognising the relations between different


It is no less true that the moral nature begins
sensations.
The first rudiment of the moral nature
f^.^^^^ sensation.
consists in cognising the difference between agreeable and
digagreeable sensations, and in desiring
vAj.ociQi.y^v.i*
o the one and

and

disliking the other.

in the
If^the*

moral
?nthe^^^

pain,

Pleasure
and pain
are luexjilicable in

serfs'

may

Pleasure and pain

or,

in other words, the agreeable

and

are facts which, like


of sensations
qualities
(jiggfTjeeable
-i
"^"^o
,
^
sensation itself, cannot be explained or resolved into any
But, as we have seen it to be with sensation, so it
others.

ni-

be with pleasure and pain. Though it is impossible to


it may be possible to
to tdl how explain what they are in themselves,
they arise.
In speaking of organic
^^^ y^Y^en and how they arise.

but

it

jj^^y

law
p
that it directs all the actions, whether
intelligence,
o
organisms
whatever
to do what formative, motor, or mental, of an orgamsm,
the
health
of
organism.^
life
and
the
is best for
welfL-l!^^^'^ direction

te'n^^nc^ intelligence I stated

it

to be, as I believe, the general

guides all

'^'-

'

m
_

See

p. 8.

am

57

GROUNDS OF THE MORAL NATURE.

CH. xxxil.]

inclined to think that intelligence

lutely unerring,

and that when

actions of the organism aright,

it
it

is

in itself abso-

does not guide


is

the

because the action

of intelligence has been interfered with and counteracted


by other and unintelligent forces just as gravitation is a
and when bodies do not
universal and unceasing force
:

fall

towards each other,

But

this, as

it is

because they are prevented.

regards intelligence, does not admit of proof.

All organisms, as I believe, are intelligent, but only

some organisms are sentient. All organisms, as a general


rule, seek what is good for their life and health and
avoid what is bad for them. Insentient organisms, as I
believe, are guided in so doing by their imconscious
organic intelligence

but when sensation

is

developed, Sentient

and with it the power of discriminating between pleasure yf^^lij^d


and pain, the sense of pleasure and pain becomes a guide to their
what is healthful is felt as agreeable, and as such is sensation,
sought
what is destructive or injurious is felt as disagreeable, and as such is avoided.
Not that intelligence
abdicates its functions.
The connexion between the
animal's welfare and the sense of pleasure, and the converse connexion between injury and the sense of pain,
is, I have no doubt, in some way determined by intelliThe law that what is beneficial is agreeable, and
gence.
what is injurious is disagreeable, is no doubt subject to
very puzzling exceptions, of which the most remarkable, ^^<=^P"
and indeed the typical, instances are the sweet tastes of
some poisonous substances. These, in the present state of
our knowledge, must stand over as inexplicable anomalies.
But I am convinced that they are only exceptions for,
:

when organisms
at least as

committed
j,ble

to the choice of food, appears to


to the sense of

in taste

indications
right,

are sentient, the guidance of their lives. Reason

and

as to

if

what

this

is

be entirely

for

the^iaw^

agreeable and disagree- must be

sense habitually gave such

guide the organism wrong instead of

the whole race of such organisms would speedily

perish.

The sense

of actually felt pleasure

of the desire of pleasure

and pain

the root

is

and of the fear of pain

so that,

Desire and

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

5S
organisms

once

acquire

and

desires

[cHAP,

fears,

the law

of

and pain stated above causes them to desire


what is favourable to their life and health, and to fear
what is injurious.
This is the ground of the love of
life and fear of death.
These feelings would be scarcely
explicable if they had their roots in thought, or even in
sensation but their roots are deeper than either thought
pleasure

life"^

or sensation,

with

all

down

is

life.

we have

in

common

organisms whatever, vegetable as well as animal,

which prompts
their

in the nature that

alike to seek whatever ministers to

all

In other words, the impulse to self-preservation

universal

among

organisms, sentient

conscious and unconscious.

We

and

insentient,

have become conscious,

and the impulse to self-preservation has become conscious


in us, and is called the love of life, or the fear of
death.

In speaking in a former chapter of organic intelligence,


I stated that organisms are guided

by that

intelligence to

perform not only such actions as are salutary for the individual, but also such as are needed for the perpetuation

and the prosperity

of the

The simplest and the only

race.''-

the reproductive function.

universal instance of this

is

When

sentient "and

organisms

become

which minister
as those which minister
actions

to the

life

of

conscious,

the

the race, as well

to the life of the individual, are

attended with a sense of pleasure and become objects


Sexual,

and

social
affections :

of desire.

These feehngs constitute the root of the sexual,

Thus the

domestic, and social affections.


bird, for instance, causes her to

instinct of a

tend her young

bably has a sense of pleasure in doing so

she pro-

and,

if

she

shows manifest signs of mental pain. This


an instance of the general fact that the healthful performance of every vital function, in so far as it is
loses them, she
is

attended with sensation or consciousness at

all,

gives rise

and any interference with its performance gives rise to a sense of pain.
The affection
of a bird or other animal for her young has thus
to a sense of pleasure,

See

p. 9.

THE GKOUNDS OF THE MORAL NATURE.

XXXII.]

root deeper than consciousness

its

instinctive

which

intelligence

59

sensation, in the

or

prompts

organisms,

all

conscious and unconscious, animal and vegetable alike, to


minister to the

life

of the race as well as to their

own; and

the same

is true of the attachment, outlasting mere desire,


which some animals, at least among birds, feel for their
mates.
The pleasures and pains, the hopes and fears of their roots
sympathy, all the unselfish emotions, and all that makes "^ *''.
organic
of man a social being, grow, I believe, out of this root.^ So life.
far as I see, the origin and nature of the sympathetic and
social character of man neither need nor admit of any
other explanation than that which is here suggested.
.

In speaking of the laws of habit, I hinted at another


and totally different way in which the sense of pleasure
and pain is to be directly referred to the elementary and
universal laws of

We

life.

then saw that ereat changes of

the circumstances in which any organism has to live are

Great
are 'in-^

and destructive, while slight changes are bene- jurious,


ficial.^
We have subsequently seen that when organisms beneficial:
become sentient what is beneficial is felt as agreeable,
and S'*^^*
o
changes
what is injurious is felt as painful. From these two laws, are
it follows by mere syllogistic inference that great changes
gjjg'ijt
injurious

...

'

'

are felt as painful, but slight changes are felt as agreeable

and

this is affirmed

our mental nature.

ways, and yet

by

experience as a general fact of

all

We

we weary

like familiar things

of

monotony and

This sounds contradictory, yet

The

full

form,

is

we know

we

like

what

is

like novelty.

its

it

is

true.

paradoxical

but we like

familiar,

be diversified with slight novelty.

and familiar

that

statement of the truth, divested of


that

it

to

It does not in the

least degree interfere with the truth of this statement as a

law, or rather a pair of laws, of the mind, that the love of


familiar things is relatively strong in

" Die Leidenschaft

flieht,

Die Leibe muss bleiben

Die Bhime

some persons, and

verbllilit,

Die Frucht muss treiben. "


"

Vol.

i,

p. 188.

Schiller.

ones

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

60

the love of novelty in others

and

[chap.

same

also that the

persons love novelty in some things, while in other things

they cannot endure

Many

it.

persons, for instance, are

and

fond of novelty in such matters as dress

whom

music", to

the pain of reconsidering a religious or political

opinion would be unbearable.

commence a

I should

were to endeavour

if

of this law, that

novelty
the

whole

of

subject

is

that

law

human
human

the

all

novelty

for

trace

to

slight

disagreeable

results of the action of


art,

perfectly inexhaustible subject

applications

pleasing,

but great

connected with

is

character,

and

all

the

character in history, in

I shall here only speak of

and even in language.

the importance of this principle in constituting the sense


of beauty.
Applica-

The sense

of

beauty

a very complex

is

fact,

and

tion of

believe that no definition of beauty has yet been proposed

ciple to
eauty.

which

eluding
that

by

in-

and excluding

all

really answers the purpose of a definition


all

it is

that

meant

it

is

meant

to include,

For the present purpose let


much as possible by excluding

to exclude.

us narrow the subject as


moral beauty, such as that of a thoroughly amiable character, and intellectual beauty, such as that of the theories

and heat so that we shall have to do with the


beauty of sight and of sound alone. And let us also further
narrow the subject, by excluding all elements that properly
belong, not to the beautiful, but to the sublime and the
picturesqixe, which, though they are constantly mingled
with beauty, are perhaps radically distinct. Having thus
narrowed the subject to beauty of sight and of sound, leaving
out all elements of the sublime and of the picturesque, we
shall find that it is tolerably manageable for purposes of
of gravitation

analysis.

I do not say, for I do not believe, that the

fact of the sense of

any

beauty

is

complex

capable of being referred to

single principle of our nature.

But

say that one

element of beauty, and that of the greatest importance,


directly traceable to the

law already

changes are agreeable, but great

is

stated, that slight

changes

are

painful.

Great changes or abrupt transitions are disagreeable to the

THE GROUNDS OF THE MORAL NATURE.

XXXII.]

61

Violent contrasts of light and shade, or of colour, are

eye.

not beautiful, or at least are less beautiful than gradation.

The same is true of form as of colour a mixture of Greek


and Gothic details, for instance, would be condemned by
:

who

those

are best qualified to appreciate the beauty of

and gradual transitions, on


demanded by the eye. A vast expanse

Slight changes

either alone.

the contrary, are

of a single colour, or the endless repetition of a single

form,

may be

order

beautiful, but its

beauty will be of a low

a mucli higher kind of beauty

due to variety

is

of colour where the masses are not too large, as in the


case of flowers

among

beauty of colour

is

foliage

that which

is

and the highest of

all

due to the almost imper-

ceptibly graduated combinations of tints ih sunset skies.

The soundness

An

of these principles is generally admitted.

design in which they are observed cannot

artistic

fail

have many of the elements of beauty, though it may be


commonplace and Unmeaning; while a design in which
they are violated can scarcely be beautiful at all. I think
it will be generally admitted that these artistic principles
to

are based

on our

natiiral

and

instinctive liking for slight

changes and dislike of great ones

shown how these


laws of

feelings

and

I believe I have
have their roots in the deepest
;

life.

have now endeavovired to give an account of the


origin of some of those feeKngs which are independently
generated in consciousness, and transcend mere sensation.
I have successively considered the love of life, the sympaI

thetic

and

social feelings,

and

so

much

of the sense of

beauty as consists of the love of gradual variety, or


variety in unity
and I have endeavoured to trace them
;

which we have in
living beings, whether sentient or insen-

directly to their roots in the nature

common
tient.

with

all

I do not believe that their origiii

is

in

traceable to the laws of the association of ideas

any way
though

I have no doubt that the laws of association have very

much

do with their development, as indeed they have


with every mental process whatever. I am, of coiirse, aware
to

Roots of
?ti^3
organic
^^^*

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

62
that

my

view of the subject

the view held by what

is

some degree opposed

in

may now be

[chap.

to

regarded as the reigning

school of British philosophy.

But there

Emotions

are feelings or capacities for pleasurable

and

doubt generated by

by^associa-

Painful emotion which are beyond

tion-

the action of the laws of association or mental habit.

Associa-

law of what be called the association of feelings, as distinguished from and parallel to the association of ideas, is

feeUngs

this,

that whatever

all

has become associated in experience

with pleasurable or painful feelings,

becomes the
Thus the sight

itself

occasion of pleasurable or painful feelings.


of a place where

The

we have endured sorrow may become the


The

cause of a feeling of mental pain, or the converse.


Love

of

most remarkable instance of

Money

this is the love of

not a desirable thing in itself;

is

money.

desirable

it is

only on account of the desirable things that can be had


not a

by

fedTng^

of

its

It is consequently impossible that the love

means.

money can be

some forms of beauty,


association with

in

any

The love

life.

desirable things

formed,

it is

men spend

may have

are primary feelings, not du^e to

others,

but having their roots directly

by

which

able to purchase.

it is

exactly like a primary emotion

own

a secondary

association with the thought of the

up

it

as if

But once it
and many
it were de;

sake, without a thought of its doing

good either to themselves or to any one

else.

It

money has become an

l^^reditary characteristic in at least

some classes of society


and if so, though it is

among the

civilized races of

men

a secondary emotion for the race,

one
Emotions

is

quite probable that the love of

is

hereditarv

real

of kindred,

their lives in storing

sirable for its

any

life,

of money, on the contrary,

emotion, produced

is

The love of food and,


and of at least

a primary feeling.

as I believe, the love of

it is

practically a primary

for the individual.

The

seat of the emotions

is,

of course, not in the nerves of

scnsation, but in those of consciousness.

se^aTin the
nerves of

of the secondary emotions,

ness.

ciation,

and of those which

This

is

true alike

which are generated by


I believe to

other words, directly traceable to


beings, such as the love of kindred.

be primary,

assoor,

in

our nature as living

THE GKOUNDS OF THE MORAL NATURE.

XXXII.]

63

and pain, with the desire of plea- Germ of


fear of pain, constitute the germ out of which nature^in
the whole of our moral and emotional nature is developed, sensation.
But though they are emotional, these elements cannot be
themselves regarded as moral. There are three things in
which morality or moral excellence consists. These are

The sense
sure and the

of pleasure

or prudence.

1.

Preferring the future to the present

2.

Preferring the interest of another to one's

own

Prudence.

the

Preferring a higher aim to a lower one

3.

stance,

as, for in-

the performance of a duty which

preferring

Uuselfish'^*'^^-

social virtues, or unselfishness.

certain to be unrewarded, to pleasure

any word that properly distinguishes


from the other two, except holiness.

is

I cannot think of

this class of virtues


Holiness.

In morality, as in all life, the higher is developed out of


the lower, and presupposes the lower. Prudence, unselfish-

and holiness are all developed out of the preference of


pleasure to pain.
Out of the sense of pleasure and pain
ness,

in the

present arises prudence,

pleasure,

to provide for

care

or

and against pain, in the future

and the

Origin of
P^i^deuce

readi-

ness to forego a smaller present pleasure, or to endure a

smaller present pain, in order to provide for greater future


pleasure,

or

against greater future

sense of one's

own

Out

of the

pleasure and pain arises unselfishness,

And

or care for the welfare of others.

and

pain.

pains, the desires

and

fears, of

love

of beau.ty, love of truth,

and love of

arise of

virtue.

Concerning the origin of prudence, there is


for

no room

doubt, and not much, so far as I see, even for dis-

cussion

it

necessarily arises

when thought and

will

have

obtained the ascendency over mere sensation and consensual action.

The

origin of the unselfish virtues

has been very

much

debated.

is

a subject which

have stated

my

reasons

have their roots in those instincts


organisms, sentient and insentient alike,

for believing that they

which prompt

all

to perform such actions as are needful for the preservation

of the race.

out of the pleasures

mere sensation,

those feelings which belong to a higher order than sensation

of unsel"s'^'^''^

l^oli'^ess.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

64

[CH. XXXII.

But how have we acquired the idea of holiness ? how


have we learned that some pleasures, quite irrespectively of
their intensity, are higher than others, and worthier to be
sought

that the pleasure of hearing music,

higher than that of eating and drinking

the affections higher than those of music

for instance, is

the pleasures of

and the pleasure

yielded by the approbation of a good conscience higher

The

sense

a case^^^
of intelligence.
is

And how

have we learned to conceive


of aims of duty so high, that not even the highest pleasure,
present or future, ought to be weighed against them ?
I believe this moral sense, or sense of holiness,^ is in-

than

all

the rest

capable of being referred to any principle belonging to


either matter,

life,

or sensation,

and can only be explained

as a case, not of vital but of spiritual intelligence.


I

have only glanced

at this

most important

subject.

It

would be impossible to do it justice without introducing


arguments drawn from another world than that external
world which we know of the senses and to do so would
be to enter on a totally new class of subjects. It is not
from indifference to them, but rather from the sense of
their transcendent importance, that I at present pass them
by with this allusion, and restrict myself in this work to
the sciences of matter and life.
;

Mr. MiU, in his work on Utilitarianism, maintains, with the whole of

the philosophical school which he so ably represents, that the moral sense
is

what

have called a secondary

feeling,

the pleasures and pains of sensation.


or rather,

ought to

say,

and produced by association with


is, however, obliged to admit

He

he places in the front of his theory

differing in quantity (which, I suppose,

means

that besides

intensity multiplied into

duration), pleasures differ from each other as higher

and lower

little

of

a higher pleasure being worth as much as a great deal of a lower one. Of


course I agree with this but I think it destroys the whole of the theory.
I think it introduces an ethical element into the subject without saying
;

whence

it is

derived,

and thereby virtually confesses that

it is

underived.

CHAPTEE

XXXIII.

MENTAL DEVELOPMENT.
T)EFOPiE

endeavouring to trace the subject of mental


development in detail, it will be well to recapitulate,

so as to bring into one brief

view the various statements

of the last few chapters concerning the elementary prin-

mind.

ciples of

Mind

developed out of sensation, as out of a germ.


the purpose of this chapter to trace the process of

It is

is

development.

But does sensation


qiiestion,

itself

belong to mind

any answer, but

as

one which

embarrass the reader's thoughts


the question

my

my

not as one which from

is

may

and

I state this

I reply to

a purely verbal one.

it,

of fact,

Consciousness belongs to

that

have stated

my Jjfh"^

reasons for believing that the seat of both kinds of feelings


in the sensory ganglia, though produced

by the

heart,

which may be produced

mental

either

by bodily

or

feelings.

See the Chapter on the Physiology of

VOL. IL

seusation.

action Feelings

and feelings of sensation and


of consciousness, especially disagreeable ones, often act on
the organs of unconscious life in the same way, as for
instance in the cases of nausea and of palpitation of the
of different sets of nerves

i^s^onlv'^

mind begins with sensation. verbaL


mind
there are feelings of Mind

sensation and feelings of consciousness

is

I have confessed The

inability to frame a satisfactory definition of mind,

But, as a matter

Is sensa-

point of view needs Cental


naturally arise and

Mind (Chapter XXIX.).

by

tion and
of consoioiisiiGss '

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

66
I

or bodily

fe'din^sf ^

have just

mental

common

usecl the

feelings," to signify

feelings of sensation

common

expression

understand what

it

and

expression of "bodily and

what

have previously called

The

feelings of consciousness.

perfectly accurate,

is

[chap.

really means,

we

if

and do not

accurately

let ourselves

be hampered by preconceived notions about the mutual


Bodily feelings are
relation of the body and the mind.
those whicli originate in impressions on the body
feelings are those

anatomical

grounds

which originate within the mind

To speak in anatomical language

their

which

Qf sensation, are those

jjjo.g

mental

itself.^

bodily feelings, or feelare

due

to the action

-^i

j^t

of the nerves that connect the sensory gangba with the

various parts of the body

mental

feelings, or feelings of

are due to the action of the nerves that

consciousness,

connect the sensory ganglia with the ganglionic substance

But our own consciousness


of our mental states unites with reasoning based on
physiological anatomy, in testifying that there is no fundamental difference between the feelings of sensation and
of the cerebral hemispheres.^

no fundat^ction'^^^

those of consciousness.

Sensation.

Besides sensation,

heads
Conscious'^^^^^

1.

aU

are

tions

to

we have

seen that the mental func-

be classed under

the three following

Consciousness

to

which belong the

feelings of con-

sciousness, also called the mental feelings, or the emotions.^

Consciousness has
2.

Thought.

Thought

its

root in sensation.

which, as I believe, has

its

root in the

unconscious vital intelligence that belongs to


beings.
Will.

living

And
which has

3.

Will

It

may be

its

root in involuntary motor action.

said that I have here contradicted

saying in one breath that sensation

all

is

myseK, by

the germ out of

See the chapter on the Laws of Mind, in Mill's Logic,

vol.

ii.

ought not to put forward an hypothesis, of which part of tlie details


have been, so far as I am aware, first thought out by myself, as if it were
See the
a proved theory, though I am myself convinced of its truth.

chapter on the Physiology of Mind.


2

See Note at end of chapter.

MENTAL DEVELOPMENT.

XXXIII.]

which

all

mind

sciousness has

is

its

developed

67

and in the next, that con-

separate root in sensation, thought in

vital intelligence, and will in motor action.


I reply that
no such expression can be anything more than a metaphor,
and that the truths indicated by the metaphors do not

contradict each other, but supplement each other.

Had

they been indicated by inconsistent metaphors it would


not have mattered, but it may be shown, if it is worth
showing, that the metaphors are really consistent with

each other.

We may

say that consciousness, thought, and

will are all developed out of the single

germ

of sensation,

but thought and will send down each its own root into the
insentient life thought into unconscious vital intelligence,
will into the motor function.

Relation
iji^^if^^
to the
jj^^P^'^ti'''^*

I have a few

more remarks

to

trace the details of the process

make

before going on to

by which mind

loped out of the germ of sensation.


All development, mental as well as bodily,
tion

and in describing any process of

difl&cult, if

which

to

subject,

oiit.

which
it

is differentia-

differentiation, it is

imply that

Especially

is this

differentiation signifies

true

when

differentiations are stated in a tabular form.

form

deve-

not impossible, to avoid the use of language

will appear to

hranching

is

I intend to reduce the

the successive

In the tabular

summary

of this

will necessarily appear as if the various mental

functions branched out of sensation, as the branches of


a tree out of its root. But this, though of course only
metaphorical, would be a most inaccurate metaphor.
The
true analogy to the differentiations that constitute mental

development does not consist in the separation of the


branches of a

which are all alike in functions and


in organization. The true analogy is in that differentiation
of unlike parts from each other which takes place in the
'^
]

tree,

development

Analogy of
^^'^^^^} *"

organic

and most completely in the develophighest. The differentiated organs and tissues of organisms ^^^^^'
do not branch out and separate on the contrary, the more
complete is their differentiation, the more complete also is
intertheir integration
that is to say, the more unlike they ^^tion of
become, the more perfectly their functions are combined, m?nT
of all organisms,

r 2

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

68

[CHAF.

and the more necessary they are to each other's life. As


stated in the chapter on the Direction of Development,^ the

more complete is the physiological division of labour, the


more complete is also the physiological centralization. It
Consciousness,
is the same with the mental functions.
but
they
are
all necessary
distinct,
thought, and will are all
Thought derives all its
to each other's development.
materials from consciousness, and furnishes consciousness
Will is
with the materials of aU the higher emotions.
directed by thought, and is nearly always accompanied by
WiU has also the power of directing
consciousness.
thought this power is what makes possible that process
of thought called abstraction, on which the immeasurable
superiority of the reasoning power of man to that of all
;

These various relations of


interaction between the various mental functions are not
less real, and for a complete psychology not less necessary
animals appears to depend.

to understand, than their relations of


is

development

only the relations of development that I shall

but

it

make any

attempt to state in tabular form.

now proceed

to state in

some

detail

various mental functions to be derived

how

I conceive the

by development the

one from the other.

We

have seen that the germ of all mind is sensation.


Tliose mental functions which do not necessarily determine
any other actions, but have their end in themselves, that
to say the functions of

thought and

feeling,

have their

Develop-

is

ment

germ in sensation determining consciousness. The voluntary powers, on the contrary, have their germ in sensation

of

thought,
feeling,

and

\vill.

determining motor action; that


action.

Or we may

tradictory metaphor,

is

to say, in consensual

say, using a different

and

but not a con-

another aspect of the

stating

subject, that thought and feeling have their roots in the

sensory functions of the organism


tary powers, in
It is

its

and

will, or

motor functions.

impossible to draw the line where consensual action

Consensual and

the volun-

ends and voluntary action begins.


1

Chapter XII.

I shall

use the word

MENTAL DEVELOPMENT.

XXXIII.]

69

voluntary in a sense nearly synonymous with

mentally voluntary

determined, and I shall class as voluntary all actions the

^ ^^^"

impulse to which comes, as I believe, along the nerves of


will
although they may not be voluntary in the highest
;

sense, of being at our choice to

do or not to

do.

mean

such actions as yielding to fear against one's better judgment,


or attending to something that one

would rather not listen


Such actions are of intermediate character between
consensual actions and those which are in the highest

to.

'

inter-

^J^diate
class.

sense voluntary.

The development of merely consensual or sense-determined nervous action into will is, perhaps, the greatest of
the mysteries in the whole of the mysterious realm of life.
I am unable to throw any further light upon it and as the

'

question of the freedom of the will does not

fall

within the

province of the present work, I shall at once go on to the


subject of the development of thought and feeling out of
sensation.

As

I have already stated, I regard the consciousness of

a sensation as a distinct thing from the sensation itself

and I believe that consciousness is equally inexplicable


with sensation. Without consciousness, no higher mental
function than mere sensation could be developed though
thought and will are not forms of consciousness, and though
they sometimes, as we have seen, act unconsciously, yet
consciousness appears to be a necessary condition of their
development. But the mere consciousness of sensation

Sensation
g^iousTess
^'o.th i'lex-

^^

could not give origin to thought or emotion.


first

of the

I shall

speak

development of thought, or the intellectual

nature.

The consciousness of a sensation usually indeed, I think


always in some slight degree outlasts the sensation itself
This is memory in its simplest and most rudimentary
form and, as remarked before, it is no doubt due to some

peculiar property iu the nerves of consciousness.^

This

is

primary property of consciousness, and is not in any way due


to thought or association.
It is obvious tliat this much of
1

See

p. 29,

Develop-

omory,
f'o'n con-

outlasting
sensation.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

70

memory is

necessary, in order that a

[chap.

number

of impressions

by sensation should combine to make


The sound of
^ word, for instance, if it is a word of more than one letter,
consists of a number of different sounds reachino- the ear
successively and in order that the successive impressions

successively received
Necessity

thought

Hearing
words

a single total impression on consciousness.

on the sensation may make one practically simultaneous


impression on the consciousness,

obvious that while

it is

the mind is receiving any one of the successive impressions,


it must not have lost the consciousness of those already
The same is true of the words of any short
received.
iatelligible sentence

and
sentences,

sively,

though the words are heard succes-

the total meaning of the sentence

The

flashed on the consciousness at once.

power

is

thinking

much more than merely


if we did not thus retain

Sensation after the


another,

sensation

effect of this

economize time in

the consciousness of a

itself

would be impossible

it

to

practically

is

to

has given place to


the relation

cognise

between two successive impressions, and thought at least


all thought which, like ours, is developed under the conditions of time,

thought,

I say,

would

be,

not slow, but

impossible.

This power of retaining impressions in the consciousness


for

Memory

is

of

some short time is, however, only the rudimentary form


memory. The developed form of memory consists not

byThe^Taw ^^ retaining impressions in the consciousness, but in the


of associa- liability of the impressions to be recalled into consciousness.

This takes place under the law of mental habit, or the


association of ideas
recalls to

an impression on the consciousness

memory another

impression which has become

habitually associated with the

first

as, for instance,

when

the sound of a friend's voice recalls the imas;e of his face.


This, of course,

is

true not only of feelings of sensation, but

equally so of those classes of impressions on consciousness

which have

their source within the

words, the law of

memory by

mind

itself.

association

is

of sensations, of emotions, and of thoughts.

blishment of such associations,

it

In other

equally true

By

the esta-

becomes possible

for

one

sensation or thought to produce not only the consciousness

MENTAL DEVELOPMENT.

XXXlli.]

71

but also the revived consciousness or memory


Without this process, so far as I can see,
of another.
thought would have no materials. And not only may
of

itself,

up the remembrance
of another, but that remembrance may call up another
remembrance and this may go on for a great number
one impression on consciousness

call

of times.
in

the

Reverie

may

remembered images thus

of

succession

perhaps be defined as consisting

Reverie,

calling

one another into consciousness, without the guidance of


thought or will. It is impossible to doubt that in a great

number

of cases the intermediate links of association are

manner can
we account for the strange way in which absent and longThis
forgotten things will often come back to memory.
unaccompanied by consciousness

unconscious suggestion

is

of unconscious thinking.

in no other

the rudimentary and lowest form

But

have not yet come

to the

consideration of the thinking process.

memory

stage in the development of

The next

collection, or the recalling of

involuntary process of mere

is

remembrances, not by the yXntary

suggestion, but

by a voluntary

act; as, for instance, when, in answer to a request,


relate

what we have heard.

re- EecoUec-

memory.

we

within every one's ex-

It is

perience, that a very considerable effort of will is often

order to recall

needed, in
Recollection

is

what we wish

recollect.

This

to every one

remember.

a higher development than mere memory,

and, like all higher developments,

Children often

to

it

later

is

remember tenaciously before


is

the reason of a fact that

who has had much

is

acquired.

they can

well

known

intercourse with young

Children

namely, that they enjoy hearmg a story told [jfj^^^j.^


over and over again, even when they know it so well that with little
power of
-i
mi
the lecollecihey remember xi
it.
they can correct any mistake
children;

story without being able to recollect

7.

Somethmg

it.

of the

t'o"-

same is to be observed among uneducated adults indeed,


the power of recollection is probably in no case equal to
the power of remembrance.
;

Attention

is

a voluntary act

voluntary direction

of

a fact which every one

it

may

consciousness.

may

verify,

be defined as the Only what


It

is,

think,

that objects which

^.^ttg,jj^>^i

to

can be

HABIT AJSD INTELLIGENCE.

72

[chap.

have passed before the sight without being consciously

recol-

lected.

attended to

may

be recognised

when they

are seen again

but only those which have been consciously and voluntarily


attended to can be recollected.

We have

now

memory, from
impressions on the consciousness, up

traced the development of

the mere retaining of

to the voluntary recollection of them.


Imaginanation.

what

is

A higher

stage of

really the same development consists in imagina-

new

formation of

tion, or the

combinations, by the action of

mind itself, out of tlie materials furnished by memory.


The mind cannot create it can only recombine. Memory
must furnish the materials for imagination to work on.
The Greeks, in the language of allegorical fable, or rather
allegorical truth, called the Muses the daughters of
Mnemosyne.
the

There are thus four stages of the development of the

powers of memory and imagination


Continuance of im
pressions.

1.

it

Continuance of an impression in consciousness after

has vanished from sensation.

Memory.

2.

Memory by

Eecollec-

3.

Voluntary memor}^, or recollection.

4.

Imagination, or recombination of remembered im-

tion.

Imagina-

pressions

tion.

association.

by the action

of the mind, sometimes voluntary,

sometimes involuntary and spontaneous.


Develop-

ment

of

reasoning
out of cognition of
relations.

Side by side with the development of the powers of

memory and

imagination proceeds the development of the

reasoning power.

As

the

germ

of

memory

is

the power of

the consciousness to retain the impression of a sensation,


after the sensation itself

has vanished

so the

germ

of

the reasoning power consists in the power of cognising

the relation of different sensations one to another.


Elementary relations.

There

are,

simple elementary relations


these are
1.

The

and only three, kinds of


between differerit sensations;

believe, three,

relation of likeness or uulikeness

as

when two

spots of colour are perceived to be like or unlike.


Likeness.

brevity, let
2.

The

For

us call this the relation of likeness.

relation of co-existence or succession in time.

If

MENTAL DEVELOPMENT.

xxxiil.]

1 hear the twofold note of a cuckoo, its

73

two notes are an

instance of the succession of two sensations in time.


see the cuckoo while I hear

two sensations

it,

If I

the sound and the sight are

For brevity,

co-existent in time.

let

us

call
Succes-

this the relation of succession.

sion.

3.

The

If I feel

relation of co-existence or separation in space.

two

objects,

one with each hand, this

the sepmrition of two sensations in space.

hand on a

slab of marble,

and

find

this is a case of the co-existence of

For brevity,

let

it

is

a case of

If I press one

both cold and hard,

two sensations in

space.
Space-

us call this the space-relation.

Likeness, succession, and the space-relation are, I believe,

the only simple and elementary relations that are possible

between sensations. But I believe there is a fourth relation


between feelings which is also a perfectly simple one
namely, that of cause and effect. This relation cannot
exist between two feelings of mere sensation; one impression

sensation

of

impression of sensation

cannot cause another.

may

cause an emotion, as

the sight of food causes a desire to eat


of

mind

in emotion, thought, or will,

For brevity,

of another.

But

let

it

an

when

and one action

may

be the cause

us caU this the relation of

causation.

Causatiou.

All these four kinds of relation


cognised by the

mind

are, I believe, directly

and these cognitions constitute the


ground of thought. It is not, I believe, disputed by any
that the cognition of simple relations is the ground and the
germ of thought but it is under discussion what relations
are really simple, primary, and incapable of being resolved
into others. JVIill and Bain regard the relations of likeness
and of succession as the only ones which are really
;

simple

the

space-relation

and causation

to them, ultimately resolvable into

are,

according

the relation of suc-

In the following chapters I shall have to state


reasons for differing from them
but in this I prefer

cession.

my

only to state
are,

and

of the

to

my

belief as to

what the primary

relations

go on with the subject of the development

power of thought out of the cognition of simple

relations.

HABIT AKD INTELLIGENCE.

74

As

[chap.

the power of retaining the consciousness of a sen-

sation after the sensation itself

has ceased

is

the germ

cognising simple relations

of memory, so the power


between sensations is the germ of thought.

of

It is

observed that the cognition of simple relations

be

to

pre-

is

Asso-

supposed in the formation of associations of ideas.

by contiguity presupposes that the mind cognises


the relation of contiguity, whether in space or in time
and association by likeness, in the same way, presupposes
ciation

EelatioDS
presup-

posed in

that the

association.

true,

mind

whether

by

ciation

the

cognises

am

This

likeness.

is

equally

right or not in believing that asso-

likeness

resolvable

is

by

association

into

contiguity.

The

first

stage in the development of thought is thus the

cognition of relations

Perception.

things.

I think that

the second

is

the perception

of

Berkeley has clearly proved the act of

perceiving things to be, not an immediate and simple act


of the mind, but an inference from data

tlie

data being

and the relations between sensations. It may be


advanced as an argument against this, that insects appear
to perceive, and yet they are without the cerebral hemispheres, which in the Vertebrata are the organs of thought.
I reply that perception, though an inference, and as such
an act of thought, is not due to conscious thought, but to
The
unconscious, though sentient, organic intelligence.
thought which I believe to have its seat in the cerebral
sensations,

hemispheres
unconscious,

the sensory

Perception

may

have

its

seat in

sensory
ganglia.

is
it

conscious

has had

ganglia are

sensation, but of the

thought,

its

or,

if

it

has become

But

origin in consciousness.

perhaps the

seat,

power of cognising

not only of
likeness,

the cession, and the space-relation between sensations

suc-

and
and possibly even in the Vertebrata, they
In a future chapter I
are the seat of perception also.
shall have to treat the subject of perception with greater
in

insects,

fulness.

In the development of thought, the next stage above


perception is that lower form of the reasoning power which
we have in common with animals. This may be defined
as merely reasoning from one object of sense to another, or

MENTiVL DEVELOPMENT.

xxxrii.]

simple inference

it

consists in the

inferences as this, that a


his hat

is

on

its

man must

75

power of making

siicli

be in the house because

peg.

The next stage

of the

development of thought consists in

human power of reasoning. I am not Man's


any way of referring all the superiorities of in^eason-'*^

the distinctively
able to see

man to any single principle.


of man to the highest of
believe

it is

But

so far as the superiority

the animals

traceable to the fact, that

is

man

intellectual, I

has the power, Power

which they have not, of directing his thoughts


this power depends the power of abstraction

it

On

at will.

and with

the power of using words and other arbitrary signs

is

?*

'*^i'^-

*^^'

was a favourite doctrine with Archbishop Whately,

that " language

thouo-ht

m Abstrac-

speaking and in thinking.


It

of

Language.

i^S-

not only the expression of thought, but

VP^hately's

I'angua^e.

and he maintained that it


is impossible to carry on any reasoning process except
by the aid of words or other arbitrary signs of essentially the same kind, such as the figures of arithmetic
the instrument of thought

or the letters of algebra.

"

And

believe he maintained

in connexion with this, and as part of the same theory,


that the power of using such

ments of thought
is

at

arbitrary signs as instru-

the distinctively

is

human

power, and

the root of man's intellectual superiority to the

lower animals.

There can be no doubt that this


It is

possible to

make such an

must be in the house

is correct as to

the facts.

inference as that a

man

on the peg, without the


use of words in the process
and there are many dogs
which are perfectly able to draw such an inference as this.
But no one who examines any reasoning process of a much
higher kind than this, as it goes on in his own thoughts,
if his

hat

is

will doubt that

we

think in words

and that

if

we were

debarred from the use of words in thinking, no elaborate Use

would be possible to us. But I cannot


power of making use of words or other arbi-

process of thought
believe the

trary signs for the purpose of thinking, to be an inde-

pendent and primary power.


something simpler and deeper.

think

I
I

it

is

the result of

should think

so,

even

if

of

though"

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

76

[chap.

any further. But


I believe it is a result of another power, which constitutes
the really primary and fundamental difference between the
intellect of man and that of the animals which most nearly
approach him namely, the power of directing thought at
will.
Thought is impossible without the formation of
associations
indeed all thought which is higher than the
I were myself unable to carry the analysis

due to the
power of
directing

thought

at will

cognition of the simplest relations consists in forming

In forming associations the mind

associations.

is

new

at first

but it soon becomes active, and one of the


most important results of its activity is the formation of
language
which consists in the formation of arbitrary
associations between the words and their meanings, by a
voluntary, though probably only haK-conscious, act of the
mind. A second result of the power of directing thought
Without abstraction
at will is the power of abstraction.
none but the most rudimentary process of thought would
be possible. An example may best serve to make this
subject clear, and the best example I can think of is that
The multiplication
contained in elementary arithmetic.
purely passive

whence
also the
power of

abstraction.

Instance
in aritli-

metic.

table

that

the statement of a set of abstract truths

is

say,

is to

truths,

which can only be arrived at by abstracting,


number from the ideas of all

in thought, the relations of

In saying that
instance, we have

the things that are or can be numbered.


eight times eight are

sixty-four,

for

nothing to do with any things that

number
houses,

of sixty-four
it

matters not

they

may

may

count up to the

be books, or

we only make an

cattle, or

assertion con-

cerning the abstract numbers eight and sixty-four. Thus in

thought and in language to abstract a particular set of the


relations, or of the properties, of things from the things
themselves,

is

what mere suggestion, working by the laws

of association, could never do

mind can do
is

always

only a voluntary act of the

it.

In reasoning as well as in memory, the voluntary action

Voluntary
action

of the

mind

is

a later and a higher development than

Voluntary recollection

its

higher than

later deve-

spontaneous action.

loped than
involun-

spontaneous remembrance, and voluntarily directed thought

tary.

is

higher than spontaneou.^ thought.

is

The same

is

also true

MENTAL DEVELOPMENT.

xxxiii.l

of motor action

77

voluntary motor action

is

a later and

higher development than consensual action.

The lower kind of reasoning, which we have in common


with animals, and which merely consists in reasoning from
one object of sense to another,
ence.

The higher and

may

be called simple infer-

cUstuictively

human kind may be

Simple
^^if^renoe

abstract

'"^^^s-

called abstract reasoning.


I

have now completed

development

this outline of the

and concerning the development


moral
of the
and emotional nature it is only necessary to
of the intellectual nature;

we have

state again, in a slightly different form, the results

arrived at on this subject in the preceding chapter.

The germ

of the whole moral

and emotional nature

the sense of pleasure and pain in mere sensation.

Out

is Moral

of

the sense of pleasure and pain as actually

and

felt,

JJ^ture

developed

arise desire out of the

fear
and out of the desire and fear of present things, !,i!f!!,l
such as desire for food or fear of a wild beast, arise care and pain,
for the unseen and distant future
and hence the virtue care for
:

(for it is

At

a virtue) of prudence.

the same time

new ^^^

future,

emotions are produced by the action of association, which Emotions


attach themselves, not to the immediate pleasures and ^^^ *-
-

pains of sensation, but to

objects

habitually associated with these.

the best instance of this

by the

association in the

money can

it

associa-

which have become


The love of money is

has evidently been produced

mind

of

money with

the desirable

money

is

not desirable except on account of the desirable things

it

things that

will obtain.

mark and

obtain for

its

owner

Selfish as this passion usually

attribute of a

nature than that which

because

able of the class

for

is,

it

is

the

more highly developed mental


cares

enjoyments of mere sensation.


love of money,

tion.-

it

is

only

or

chiefly

for

the

have mentioned the


by far the most remarkI

but these feelings of association

may

attach themselves to almost anything, and sometimes do


attach themselves very closely to places and to objects

which may have no beauty, and no value except as


mementoes.
Next in the scale of moral development are sympathy
and the social affections. Out of the desire of good and

Sympathy.

HABIT AXD INTELLIGEXCE.

78
the fear of

the fear of

harm for oneself, arise the desire of good and


harm for others. This among animals appears

to be confined to the care for offspring,

of gregarious animals of the


in

man

it

[cHAP.

and the sympathy

flock for each other

same

but

becomes the root of patriotism, philanthropy,

and all the unselfish ^irtues.


The last and highest kind of moral development consists,
in its rudimentary form, of those affections which are not
to

be referred, either directly or (as I believe) indirectly,

mere sensation the most


important of these are the love of beauty and the love
Higher than these, but on the same line
of knowledge.
the love of holiness,
is the moral sense
Qf development,
^
j
and the fear and hatred oi sm.
and pains

to the pleasures
Love of

rkMwledge,
ana of
holiness,

of

<?

I have now, in conclusion, to enumerate in tabular

form the various kinds, or rather the various directions, of


mental development, with the successive stages of each.
I do not think it at all likely that my enumeration can be
nearly perfect I have no doubt it will be found to admit

of great improvements in detail

the substantial correctness of

those

its

am cominced of
The main divisions

but I

plan.

marked with Arabic figures are, I


They differ from each other not in
believe, entirely right.
degree but in kind, and may be compared to use an
illustration which is quite accurate for the present purpose
The subdi^-isions those
to the branches of a tree.
which are marked with Greek letters may, no doubt, be
which

are

greatly improved in detail, especially those of the emotional


of the

The successive subdivisions

part.

differ in

degree rather than in kind

they

same

division

are, at least in

several instances, successively developed out of each other,

and may be compared, not


to the

to distinct branches, but rather

same branch. It will be


table is the same as that in

successive parts of the

seen that the principle of this


the chapter on Organic Functions^

may

of which, indeed,

be regarded as a continuation

two tables

of the subjects in the


1

Vol.

i.

p. 163.

it

The arrangements

are not quite consistent

MENTAL DEVELOPMENT,

XXXIII.J

witli each other

but this

have endeavoured

its

own
As the

to

79

not any proof of inaccuracy

is

make each

separately accurate from

point of view.

use of a tabular statement like this

communicate information
to give a concluding

Sensation

or ideas in the first instance, but

summary

to state its substance in

of them,

it

may

be well

may produce no

effect

it

beyond

may

itself,

produce

or

it

The

may
Con-

action.

either intellectual or emotional.

is

first

an ordinary paragi'aph.

produce consciousness, or
sciousness

not to

is

intel-

two distinct developments one in the


direction of memory and imagination, the other in the
direction of the reasoning power.
The germ of memory is

lectual nature has

the continuance of the consciousness of sensation after the


sensation itself has ceased

memory by

The germ

nation.

this successively develops into

suggestion, voluntary recollection,


of the reasoning

power

is

and imagi-

the cognition

and the

of such simple relations as likeness, succession,

space-relation

this successively develops into perception

power of simple inference, and the power of


abstract reasoning.
The germ of the emotional nature is
the sense of pleasure and pain in mere sensation this
develops into desire and fear; the emotions due to assoof things, the

such as the love of money

ciation,

emotions

moral sense, or sense of holiness.


duces

action,

action
tion

of

thought.

it

the sympathetic

the love of beauty and of knowledge

this

in

its

simplest

and the
"When sensation proform

is

consensual

successively develops into the voluntary direc-

muscular

action,

and the voluntary direction of

Summarj'.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

80
Tabular

1.

By

[chap.
Sensation.

itself.

statement.
^

a.

Continuance of
consciousness

1.

Mnemonic.

)3.

when

sensa-

tion

past.

is

Memory

by

suggestion.
7. Voluntary

re-

collection.
,

5.

Imagination.

a.

of
Cognition
simple rela-

l.Tntellectual.

tions.

2.
2.

(8.

Perception of

7.

Simple

things.

Rational.

Deter-

mining
Sensation.

infer-

ence.
S.

conscious-

Abstract

rea-

soning.

ness.
a.

Sense of pleasure

and pain.

;8.Desire and fear.


7.
2.

Emotions of association.

Emotional.

Sympathy.
. Love of beauty
and of
f Knowledge.
^7). Moral sense.
S.

a.

Consensual action.

3.

mining

/S.Voluntaiy muscular action.

action.

7.

Deter-

Voluntary
rection

di-

of

thought.

table represents the development of the

The foregoing

mental functions alone from the germ of sensation. The


following one is an extension of the tabular statement of
the organic functions in the chapter on that subject.^ As
given there,

all

the functions which are developed out of

sensation were included under the single head of


I

now

state

them

separately,

and

classified

of view of development.
1

Chapter XV.

Mind:

from the point

MENTAL DEVELOPMENT.

XXXIII.]
"3

O
-^

CO

7i

bo

or

tissu

C>

no

motic

orga

notion

tn

4-5
'S
^ M

otion.

n.

c^_, c*_i

o
a 3 a a

.2

"o "s

l>,

0)

fl
to

m
rmatio

rmatio

rmatio

ontane

nsensu

c?

P,
pj

taoo
j3
CO

81

P4

tab <o

s
s O
CS
9
CD tw i)

54-1

O)
^H

7^

-t-

>->

ctf

c:

C0.2 S
^
-M
S
-r-*

luntar

p ft

!-(

-*-

ft_2

ca

o o

compo

flex

o o

f^

|i(fe

o,

!D

::;

go

O O

xPi8>

5
s
CO W

B 01 ^<o

05.

S.::^
0^

03.

O 3 o

K- HH

t^o

o
B
a

t^

(P

^^

cB

-^ '^ 'S

'S
's!
cS O P
O
O ft. a
S ph a
S

a
CB

?S

OJJ CD

cD.ii

:;<

'-3
c^

-2
A
pH tZ2 -q CO

01

i>ra

8'

Oi c^5

a
c3

C3

_o

o
a

Second
tabular
statement.

60
.g

a en
o S
cS

>-,

CO

a a
u n

OS
cm'

CQ

>'.

C3

fl^
r/l
C/J

O)

bc
't>,

f>;=l

rn

'5

i!

Sh

*+->

=2
CD

>

rr" -3

^
fc.

cH bOfl
O)

d)
,13

-M c^
t

a
a
3 g, o
< o

C3

I^H

rH

VOL.

II.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

82

[CII.

XXXIII.

NOTE.

In the past chapter, wherever I have spoken of emotions that


of consciousness (or, to use Herbert Spencer's

is to say, feelings

which

expression, feelings

are independently generated in con-

distinguished from mere sensations)

sciousness, as

where

have spoken of emotions, I say, I have always implied that the


emotion
There are
unconscious
seusatiou

and

and the consciousness of the emotion

itself

the same thing.

and

are one

I have, nevertheless, insisted that the con-

is a distinct thing from the sensation


and that the consciousness of a thought is a distinct thing

sciousness of a sensation
itself,

from the thought

I refer to this, as

itself.

it

thought.

may probably be

thought that I have fallen into an inconsistency out of mere

though

inadvertence.
I beUeve, however,
I believe
there is no subject to reconsideration,
that I

unconscious
feeling.

sensation and thought may,

and

am

I hold the opinion

right

I believe that

any consciousness of them, but that there can be no emotion, or mental


feeling,

do, exist without

without the consciousness of

it.

It

may be urged

that,

as a matter of experience, there are unconscious emotions as well

and unconscious thoughts.


make of those we have loved and

as unconscious sensations

common remark to
we did not know the
Avas gone.

strength of our

own

It is a
lost,

that

affection till its object

I think, however, that in such cases

what we were
we had at

formerly unconscious of was not any feelings which


the time,

but the feelings which we should have under changed

circumstances

and though

of actual feelings, there


of possible feelings,

become

actual.

is

I believe

we cannot be

unconscious

no doubt we may be unconscious

which may under changed circumstances

CHAPTEK XXXIV.
MENTAL GKOWTH.
TISr the last chapter, I have given an account in outline, Analogy
-- of the process by which the mind, like an oroanism, ]>.^^^'^^^^

developed by diftereutiation out of a simple germ,


The organism is a mass of vitalized matter, having very
complex structvire, and is developed out of a minute
structureless mass of gelatinous substance.
The mind is
a complex aggregate of conscious and intellectual functions,
IS

and

ism and
in d^eloij-

"i^"* ''^
tiatiou^'

developed out of the germ of sensation. The resemblance is one of analogy, according to the received
is

definition of

analogy,

namely resemblance of

relations.

The mind does not resemble a bodily organism, but the


relation of the

the relation to
of the
or

mental functions to each other resembles


each other of the bodily functions and

bodily tissues

and

organs.

And

resemblance of relations, between

the mind, and the organs of the body,

the
is

this

analogy,

functions

of

They

twofold.

not only agree in the vast complexity of both being developed by differentiation out of a simple germ
they
;

further agree in this, that as in organic development the Organic

more complete is the differentiation, or mutual separaand nnlikeness, between the various organs, the more

tion

complete also

and dependence
complete

mutual co-operation
in mental development
the more

their integration, or

is
;

so

the differentiation of mental functions from


each other, the more complete also is their integration.

As an

is

instance of this mutual dependence, or integration,

of mental functions,

may

be mentioned the fact that pure

g2

?^^^g"^*^^

tionr

HABIT a:^d intelligence.

S-i

perfectly

tliouglit,

scientific

needs the action of will to


Analogy of
organic

^oT^k

[chap.

from

differentiated

make

it

feeling,

work.

The analogy here traced is between the mental functions


I do not lay claim to any ori^^^ q^q bodily Organs.
But there is a further analogy,
ginality in pointing it out.
between organic growth and mental gTOwth, and between
the formation of organic tissue and of w'hat by a bold
metaphor may be called mental tissue which, so far as
I am aware, has not yet been traced by any one in all its
;

closeness.

well-known

It is a

The
organism

truth, that every

and

is

built

perfectly

is

is

equally certain of

is less visible,

consisting chiefly

familiar with respect to animals,

structed

organism
This

^^^^ ^f ^j^g substance of its food.

foodty the plants,

though their food

organic inigence

carbon contained in the carbonic acid of the

^f

^j-^g

^^^

.^

^^^^

nutrition.

evidently not a full account of the process of

must be not only

Tliere

thing that builds with the materials


is

the principle of

I have

so

mind

is

con-

out of

ini-

reasons

though unconscious.^
The growth of mind

come

to

materials, but some;

and

something

this

or the organizing power, which, as

life,

my

stated

materials

air.

is

for

believing,

analogous with

is

intelligent,

As

this.

the organism from without,

materials of knowledge come

to the

mind from

so

all

the

without,

shape of impressions on the senses. All knowledge


bv ^^ ^^^
the mental begins with sensatiou
we have no " innate ideas " pre'^r^ nse

genceV

vious to sensatiou

we have

neither ideas, nor knowdedge,

nor any actual mental existence whatever, but only the

speak more accurately the potentiality, of


a mental existence. This is admitted by all. To quote
the old scholastic axiom, " There is nothing in the mind
possibility, or to

but what

it

evidently not

growth.

has derived from sensation."

But

this is

of

mental

a full account of the process

There must be not only materials, but something

that builds with the materials.

As

Leibnitz expressed

it,

we must modify the scholastic axiom, and say " There is


nothing in the mind but what it has derived from sensaFrom the point of view to
tio]i, except the mind itself."
:

See the chapters on Natural Selection and on Intelligence.

iMENTAL GROWTH.

XXXIV.]

which we have uow attamed,


amplified

"

There

is

85

axiom may be thus

this

nothing in the organism but what

it

has received in the food, except the organizing principle of

which builds up the organism

vital intelligence

nothing in the mind but what

is

and there

has received from

it

sensation, except the organizing principle of

mental intelwhich evolves knowledge out of the materials


received from sensation."
It is my belief that the

ligence,

organizing intelligence of the vital organism, and the intelligence of the mind, are one and the same principle,
though acting unconsciously in the organism and consciously in the mind and further, that this intelligence,
:

under both of these


incapable

manifestations,

its

is

an ultimate

fact,

of being resolved into anything simpler than

itself.

have not

however, fully stated the closeness of the

yet,

analogy between organic growth and laental growth.


living organism, while it is constantly acquiring

The
and

new

assimilating

material, is as constantly parting with AssimilaThese two processes respectively consti- ^g J^*^
tute nutrition and waste and the excess of nutrition over

old material.

'

waste constitutes growth.

Waste

most rapid in the

is

early youth of an organism, but at that period nutrition both most

more rapid

in early youth.

and consequently growth is most rapid


The process of mental growth is an exact

parallel to this.

The mind

is

sions

still,

is

from the external senses, and as constantly losing

the impressions by forgetting


the

memory
is

away and

fade

them

are lost,

Parallel in
^''^'^emng

old impressions on getting

and new ones supply

^/essionT"

and mental growth consists in the excess of


remembered over what is forgotten mental growth Organic

their place

what

constantly receiving impres-

youth.^'^

new

goes on so long as the

impressions which are re-

'^r^^^+h"*^^^

tained exceed in number, force, and' variety those which both


are

lost.

As

organic growth

acquiring more substance than


.

growth consists
impressions than
This,

is

it

in

the

organism

parts with, so mental

-^

the

imnd acquirmg more and

stronger

closer

distinctly stated, is
still.

excess of
'*^'^*^t

i'"*,

received
over what
^ ^**-

it loses.

when once

the parallel

consists

con-

Waste, no

self-evident

less

but

than nutrition,

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

86
Waste
of

a is

is

otSc

life

a necessary condition of organic

life

[chap.

The

and growth.

organism is not like a crystal, which simply acquires substance, and, when it has done growing, remains in a state
Both during growth and after
of molecular immobility.

growth has ceased, the organism is constantly losing subEvery one is


stance and replacing it with new substance.
aware that this is true of the organism. Every one knows
not an imperfection of the organism, as
wearing-out is of machinery, but a necessary condition
But it appears to be the general belief, that the
of life.

that waste

is

corresponding fact in mental

life

impressions by forgetting them

weakness of mind, as
machinery.
so is for*^

am

liability

*o *^^^ l^f^

life.

less

every-

could not
think.

wear and tear


an error

is

This

may

is

is

life

of

am

necessary

so forgetting,

necessary to the

is

no

and growth

appear a strange paradox, but I

think that on consideration

bered"

to

convinced that this

than remembering,

lose

an imperfection and a

is

^^^ growth of the organism,

of the mind.

we

liability to

convinced that as waste, no less than nutrition,

g'^^^Y^^

If

the

it

will

become

evident.

we had
^'^'^^ received since the beginning of our mental life, we
should be distracted by their multitude, we should be
If

we remembered

the mental impressions

all

If the sound of every


overwhelmed by their weight.
word of our own language, or of any other language with
which we have become familiar, were to recall to memory
every time we had ever heard it pronounced; or if the
sight of every familiar face were to recall every time

we

the most insignificant as

had ever seen it


well as the most important, the least interesting as well as
the most interesting, were to come crowding unbidden into
memory whenever we desired to think of any object or of
any event, the mind would, as it were, have no room to
move, and thought would be impossible. But such a result
is prevented by that constitution of the memory in virtue
of which we retain, generally and on the average, the important and interesting particulars of any object or of any
event, and forget the rest so that, on the whole, we retain
what we need to retain, and forget what we do best to
;

if all details,

forget.

MENTAL GROWTH.

xxxiv.]

Further

87

the gi'eater part of our mental acquisitions does

not consist of mental pictures of single objects, or mental

Such pictures and

representations of particular events.

memory develops

such representations are not formed until


into the

power of

recollection,

and

it

is

not probable that

animals or young children form them at

The most

all.

important mental acquisitions, and those the accumulation


of

which

constitutes the rapid mental

growth of young

children, do not consist of the residua^ of single impres- Coalessions,

An

many impressions.
_''

but of the coalesced residua of

impression leaves

when

it

is

its

residuum

in the

memory

and

^^^9^: ^,

residua by
forgettiug.

often repeated, the residua of the several im-

become inseparable and indistinguishable, and


coalesce into one.
It is in this way that we become
familiar with the words of our own language, and with

pressions

everything else that

is

familiar

definition of familiarity, that

anything until
witnessed

we have

The

it.

we

indeed,
are

forgotten

earliest,

it is

part of

tlie

not familiar with what con.

how

often

we have

the most durable, and the most

^.*^''"*5^

arity.

important of our mental acquisitions are of this kind.

The best instance

of this

is,

perhaps, our knowledge of our

own language. We have become familiar with words in


common use, not by hearing them once, but by hearing
them oftener than we can remember our knowledge of any
common word is not a single residuum from the impression
made by hearing it once, but a coalesced residuum, con;

sisting of the indistinguishably united residua that

been

left at

each time

we have heard

it.

Familiarity with

a word consists of two elements, familiarity with

and

familiarity with

its

meaning.

The sound

only an impression on the sense of hearing,


ledge of the meaning

sound

word is
but the know-

law of habit, between the sound


In order that language Words
signifies.
"*

function of communicating thought, |Jy


necessary that every word shall suggest its meaning ; suggest

should rightly
it is

it

its

of a

consists of a mental association,

effected in virtue of the

and the thing which

have

fulfil its

borrow the word "residuum" from " Morell's Mental Philosophy."


He has borrowed it from the Gorman writers on psychology. I make no
apology for the use of a most courenieut though new word.
1

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

88

but luore than this

tbeir

is

needed

word shall suggest nothing


a word shall suggest its meaning

they^must ^^ery
suggest

The

memory

of

else.
first

.secured

by the not

power of

by negative,

The

else.

it

shall suggest nothing

though purely

less necessary,

forgetting.

requisite that

secured by the power

is

the requisite that

gjgg jg secured

further necessary that

is

it

[chap.

The sound

of a

word may

the second

have been heard a thousand times, imder circumstances


which were never exactly alike the speaker, the words

getting.

before

beriuo'"

in the sentence, the words after

it

it,

and

other

all

circumstances, have been constantly varied, excepting only

the only important cu'cumstance (using the word circumstance with

its literal signification),

the circumstance of

its

In virtue of the law that strong or often-repeated

meaning.

impressions on the

consciousness leave residua in the

memory, the word itself and

its

meaning are remembered

in virtue of the law that feeble or seldom-repeated impressions

on the consciousness fade altogether away, the vary-

ing and unimportant cii'cumstances under which the word

has been heard are forgotten.

Of

all

the complex impres-

which have been produced on the mind by the word,


been heard a thousand times under as many
partly dissimilar circumstances, the varying and unlike
sions

as it has

elements are forgotten, wliile the constant elements


to say, the

is

sound of the word and

its

that
are

meaning

and the residua of the thousand impressions,


having become alike by the loss of their unlike elements,
By this proare indistinguishable, and coalesce into one.
cess, the word comes to remain in the memory, separate,
detached, suggesting its meaning, and suggesting nothing
else.
But if the residua of all the thousand impressions
did not lose their unlike elements, they would still be
retained

The word
would indeed remain in the memory, but not as a single
coalesced residuum it would not be separate and detached
from irrelevant objects it would no doubt suggest its
meaning, but it would suggest so much else that it would
not serve the purpose which language is meant to ser\^e.^
distinguishable, and could not coalesce into one.

'

It

may

be objected to

this, that, in

habitually remerabcr a word and

its

learning a foreign language,

meaning

after

meeting with

it

we

only

89

MENTAL GKOWTH.

XXXIV.]

nuw

up the whole of the parallel I have Summary,


been endeavouring to draw between organic and mental
life and growth.
The organism grows by means of new material brought
from without in the food. So the mind grows by means
But
of impressions brought from without by the senses.
Tlie orfood could not of itself build up an organism.
ganism is built up out of the materials of the food, by
I will

Slim

the action of the intelligent organizing principle of

life.

So the impressions received by the mind from the senses


could not of themselves form a mind. They are organized

and become part of the mental structure


by the action of the intelligent principle of mental life.
It is necessary to organic Hfe and growth not only to be

into knowledge,

constantly acquiring

new

material, but also to

stantly parting with old material

mental

life

and growth

So

be con-

necessary to

is

it

be not only always acquiring

to

and retaining new impressions, but always also forgetting.


Organic growth is due to the excess of material acquired
So mental growth is due to
over material parted with.
the excess of what is remembered over what is forgotten.
In infancy, when the body is growing most rapidly, it
is also most rapidly undergoing waste and parting with
So in childhood, when the mind

material.

knowledge the most rapidly,

The same law

it is

of forgetting,

getting, are true of a different

of

mental phenomena.

doing
this

it."

The process

with conscious

and the necessity of

for- Forma-

though closely related

first
;

set

by which
do a thing by

the process

We learn

to

of learning a mechanical art

that actions are at

attention

"

acquiring

also forgetting the most.

mean

habits of action are formed.

is

is

performed vohmtarily and

but, in virtue of the

law of

Partly through mere habit, partly


this is an acquired power.
of a language acquires a power of
student
the
voluntary
exertion,
through
once.

But

forming the association between a word and its meaning with peculiar
I think that children begin to acquire this power while they are
facility.
But it is not likely that a trace of it exists at the time
learning to speak.

when language
knowledge

is

nothing to the child but sound


from that point.

of language has to begin

and yet every one's

il^[^ of

action

by

tllG SclTTlB

law.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

90

[chap.

habit, the oftener they are repeated the easier they become,

until at last, in

many

cases,

they cease to need any co-

They
but when set

operation of the will or of the conscious attention.

have of course to be voluntarily set going,


going they are continued consensually the stimulus and
guide to each successive action of the muscles being some;

times the action next before

sometimes the sight of the

it,

work

or the instrument before the

cians

become able

workman.

to perform in this

sense being given either

Some musi-

way, the stimulus of

by the sound

of the successive

by the sight of the printed music. I have stated


what I wish to point out now is the
perfect similarity between this process and the process
by which we learn our own language or, in more general
terms, between the process of acquiring motor habits, and
the process of acquiring purely mental associations. I
have shown that, in order to have the association between
words and their meanings in an available form in the
mind, the residua of the impressions of all the times
we have heard any word must coalesce in the mind into
a practically single residuum
and this is done by forgetting the merely accidental circumstances under which
we have heard each word. Just so in learning an art.
notes, or

before, but

this

can be consensually performed the memory of


each separate time that it has been practised must be
Before

it

and the residua of them all must coalesce into one,


which single residuum constitutes the acquired habitual

lost,

power.

The

Moral
fo^rgetting.

^^^'

^^

necessity under which

another way.
and

we

are of forgetting

Our Kfe and

oui-

is

good

duties are in the

would be bad

for us were our thoughts to


be too much in the past but this is for the most part forbidden by the law of the certain though slow and gradual
fading away of all impressions which are not renewed.
It

present,

it

is

in virtue of this law that time mitigates grief, even

when no

nobler cause
1

is

at work.^

" "We forget because we must,

And

not because we will."

SIattiiew Arnold.

91

MENTAL GROWTH.

XXXIV.]

be observed that the law of the fading away


.,
of mental impressions is not an independent primary
It

to

is

law.

which

,,.

It

is

all

vital

case

of that

tendencies,

gradually disappear

1J.-

law
whether organic or
of habit

when nothing

in

occurs to

See the chapter on the

Laws

^j^g j,^^g

virtue ofofliabit.

mental,

call

into exercise.^
1

Forgetting
a case of

is

of HalDit (Chapter XV.).

them

CHAPTEE XXXV.
THE SENSES.

the foregoing chapters


IN speak
of sensations and

has not been necessary to

it

the consciousness of

them

there has been no occasion


kinds of sensations.
various
the
between
for discriminating
But before entering oil the consideration of the complex
facts of perception, and of our conceptions of time and
further than as general facts

space,

will be necessary to consider the peculiarities of

it

which they
For the analysis of the more

the various senses, and of the various


are related to the mind.

general facts of mind,

it

ways

in

only necessary to take into

is

account the general fact of sensation


of the more special facts of mind,

but for the analysis

we must

also take

into account the special facts of the various senses.


It is not necessary in the present chapter to

make any

further mention of the visceral sensations, such as hunger


and thirst, and the sensations of being weU or ill. For

the present purpose


senses

we

that

we have

to

do only with the external

to say, those senses

is

by means of which

obtain information concerning things external to the

sentient organism.

The

External
senses.

heat

is

distinct.

The
muscular
sense

of
its

taste, smell, sight,

" muscular sense," or sense of

by many

as a distinct sense

muscular

for regarding

it

action, is classed

but I shall state

belongs to
touch.

as five

and hearing. The sense


heat, however, is really a distinct sense, though it has
The
seat in the same nerves with the sense of touch.

namely, touch,

That of

senses are usually enumerated

external

as not really separable

my

reasons

from the sense of

THE SENSES.

CHAP. XXXV.]

Perhaps, however, this

touch.

93

is little else

than a merely

verbal question.

There are several different ways in which the various


senses differ very remarkably from one another.

now proceed

differences I shall

The nerves

1.

mouth

and of

heat,

and the nerves of the inside

^'^j.^gg

are nerves at once of touch, of the sense of ueives

of

.^^.^

These, though combined in the same and heat


and when the same nerve is ^ ^^'^ ^^^

taste.

nerves, are distinct senses


.

to enumerate.

of the skin are both nerves of touch and The

nerves of the sense of heat


of the

These

the nerves

transmitting sensations or distinct senses to the sensory


ganglia, they are cognised

we

by the consciousness

of taste

as distinct

which is and these


hard enough to press against the inside of the mouth, ''^^'^''atioiis
which is hot, and has a flavour, the pressure, the heat, and combine
T^
the flavour form, not one combined sensation, but three other
But when two or more sensations of
distinct sensations.
the same sense are transmitted by the same nerve, the
sensations, instead of being cognised as distinct, combine
into a resultant sensation, which makes a single impresThus, if two tastes, or two hut two
sion on the consciousness.
smells, are mixed together, the mixture is perceived as a smeifs'^
Thus,

sensations.

if

are eating something

having a character intermediate 'wlien


between those of its constituents but it is impossible to combine
direct the attention to one of the two constituents sepa- "1* f
single

taste

smell,

or

In drinking tea with sugar in

rately.

resultant

it,

for instance, the of charac-

is a mixed sensation, and not two sensations


^^ediate^'
would be impossible, by any effort of attention, to i^etween
taste the tea and not the sugar, or to taste the sugar and stituents.'
not the tea. The same is true of mixed colours. If two So of
rays of light of different colour are made to combine their ^^^^^
colours by falling on the same spot of white paper, what
is seen is not two colours, but a resultant colour.
If red
and yellow, for instance, are thus combined, the resultant
colour is orange and it would be impossible, by any effort Orange,

sensation

and

it

of attention, to see either the red or the yellow separately.

In some
resultant

those

of

cases, of

colour
its

is

which that just mentioned


of a

constituents

is

one, the

character intermediate between


;

but when

all

the

prismatic

94
White.

Sounds do
not so
combine,

but may
be discriminated.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

[chap.

which is
totally unlike any of them, and could not possibly have
been predicted from them.^
The sense of hearing is the
only one among the senses which has any power of cognising, as distinct, sensations of the same order which come
mixed together. We have a power of distinguishing simultaneous sounds, and even of directing the consciousness, by
a voluntary act of attention, to one sound among many
thus, any one can, by a little effort of attention, hear
what a particular person is saying amidst a buzz of conversation and some persons acquire the power of listening
to a single instrument in a whole orchestra.
This is no
doubt an acquired power that is to say, it is not likely
that infants are born with it but it is a power which is
not the less characteristic of the sense of hearing no
amount of practice would give to the eye the slightest
vestige of any power analogous to this
no practice could
confer the power of seeing any of the separate prismatic
colours in white light.
There is reason, however, to
believe that the sense of hearing is no exception to the
law that sensations of the same sense, when transmitted by
the same nerve, combine into a single sensation.
There is
colours

are

combined, the resultant

is

white,

Reason of
this in the
constitu-

reason to believe that distinct sounds are not transmitted

tion of the to

the auditory ganglia

by the same

nerve, but that on the

nerves of
hearing.

contrary sounds of different pitch excite each a different

have to return to this subject.


I think there are no cases of sensations of different

nerve.

I shall

senses being transmitted

hj the same

nerves, except those

already mentioned, of the nerv^es of the sldn being at once

nerves of touch and of heat, and those of the mouth bein"


at once nerves of touch, of heat, aud of taste.
The nerves

The
nerves of
smell,
sight,

of smell, of sight,

and of hearing appear


which are peculiar

and sensations except those

hearing
transmit
no other
sensation.

to transmit
to

no

them.

As stated above, I believe it is a law that when the


same nerve transmits two or more sensations of the same
sense, they combine into a single sensation
but when the
sensations transmitted by the same nerve belong to distinct
;

senses, they are cognised as distinct.


1

On

tlie

I think

we may with

laws of the combination of colours, see Note at end of chapter.

THE SENSES.

XXXV.]

'9,5

some degree of probability assign a physical ground

for this

We

have seen in a former chapter,^ that in nervous


action something flows along the nerve-fibre with a mea-

law.

surable velocity

along a wire.

much

less

than that of the electric current

It is scarcely possible to doubt that

what

Probable
sensations
of differeut

being

*'"?'?\^",
thus flows along
the nerve, as well as what flows along
* the mitted by
electric wire, is not a fluid, or matter in any form, but the same
'

energy, in the form probably of a vibratory or wave-like

^"it^o^t

motion of the molecules of the conductiu" fibre.


Now combining,
when waves are formed in the same medium and of the
same order of magnitude, they combine into resultant
waves but if the waves formed in the same medium are
;

of different orders of magnitude,

they do not combine,

but remain visibly

if

the same

distinct.

Thus,

two stones of nearly

thrown into water at a little distance from each other, the waves raised by the two
will, where they meet, be seen to coalesce together, though
they afterwards separate but if the waves from a stone
are met by the waves proceeding from heavy drops of
rain, the two sets of waves, being of different orders of
magnitude, will remain visibly distinct, though intersecting
are

size

each other.

If

transmission of
ganglia,

it

it

is

true that sensation

vibrations

is

due to the

along the nerve-fibres to the

appears a probable conjecture that sensations of

the same sense are due to vibrations of the same order of

magnitude, and sensations of different senses to vibrations

magnitude and that vibrations of the


same order, when coming into the sensory ganglia together,
combine and produce resultant sensations while those of
different orders do not so combine.
But I only offer this as
a conjecture, wMch I see no possible means of verifying.
2. The perception of space is due to the senses of touch Only
and sight exclusively no otlier sense is capable of giving g-'.'i^^^^ve
it.
I shall have to examine this subject in detail in the perception
next chapter, where I shall state reasons for believing
of different orders of

that our

first

cognition of space

is

due

to touch, including

the muscular sense, though our habitual thoughts of space

have become associated rather with


'

sight.

See the chapter on the Direction of Development (Chapter XII.).

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

96
Intellec-

tual senses;
touch,
sight,

There are only three of the senses which can be regarded as in any way intellectual senses I mean, as
3.

and ministering to the intellect

hearing.

[chap.

By hearing we
men, and by sight we
touch.

knowledge of external

we make

the intellect,

these are hearing, sight, and

learn the thoughts of our fellow-

part

greater

obtain the

our

In the developed state of

things.

by means of

progress in knowledge

these two senses exclusively

of

but at the beginning of in-

most impornext
show

tellectual development, touch is probalily the

tant of all;
chapter,

for,

to

means of touch that we


space, and with it our first

in all probability liy

it is

acquire our

have

as I shall

in the

first

cognition of

knowledge of the existence of an external world.


4. In connexion with the intellectual character of sight

and hearing

is

the fact that they are the only senses the

which are capable of being reproduced in


It is often easy to recaU in
memory of recollection with any vividness.
impresthought what we have seen or heard, to recall an absent
Eeproduc- impressions of

tion in

sions of
sight and
hearing.

Pleasure

due to
this.
-Its

moral

import-

face or scene before the mind's eye, or to repeat in thought

a conversation or a poem.

This power

is

often a source of

very great enjoyment, especially to intellectual persons who


and its usefulness needs no proof but
lead a lonely life
:

what

is

not quite so obvious

These

this fact.

the moral importance of

is

" i^leasures

of

pure, and of a kind that are good

were

possible

senses in the
tion

if it

to

recall

pleasures

same way, and

were

memory"
for the

of

to enjoy

are perfectly

mind.

the

them

But

if it

unintellectual
in the recollec-

same kind
the meat we

possible, for instance, to feel the

of reproduced pleasure in the

memory

of

have eaten and the wine we have drunk that we can feel
in the memory of the music we have heard and the
pictures we have seen, it needs no proof how bad this

would be

for

human

character.

And

further

many

of the

pains produced by disease or accident are very intense, and

would embitter

life if

they remained in the

like the pleasures of eating

memory

and drinking, and

all

but,

other

unintellectual impressions on the consciousness, these pains

cannot be reproduced in consciousness, and are comparatively forgotten.

THE SENSES.

XXXV.]
Till',

sound

the impressions of sight and

of recalling

facility

1J7

the basis of the imaginative power, which, in so

is

works with the materials of sense, works exclusively with those of sight and sound, and produces the
results which we enjoy in music, in painting, and in the

far as

it

rest of the arts.

The cause of the facility of recalling the impressions of Canso of


sight and sound is, I have no doubt, hereditary habit, {jg'i'gj^^j^j.
Ever since the first dawn of the human intellect, men have habit,
been endeavouring to recall the words they have heard from
other men, in order to consider their meaning and what

and they have been endeavouring to recall


what they have seen, in order to decide where to go and
what to do. The power of reproducing sights and sounds
in memory has thus been cultivated by practice, and has
But no power could be developed
become hereditary.
by habitual exercise, unless its germ existed previously.
The germ of memory, as shown in the chapter on Mental
they indicated

Development, consists in the consciousness of a sensation


outlasting the sensation itself; and the next stage of its

development consists in the power of remembering a past


sensation when it is recalled by anything that has become
In connexion with the visceral sensaassociated with it.

and the unintellectual

tions

memory
it

stops here

senses, the

development of

in connexion with sight and hearing,

goes on into recollection, or the power of recalling im-

pressions at will for the purposes of use and enjoyment,

And

this, again,

At the

becomes the germ of imagination,

risk of

some

repetition, I shall

now enumerate

the different senses, with the priucix:)al characteristics

of

each.
1.

The nerves of touch are

also nerves of heat, but, the Seuses of

senses being distinct, an impression of touch

and one

of

]^"j_

heat occurring together are cognised in consciousness as


distinct: for instance, if I press

my

hand on a

slab of These
sp]i

marble and

feel it

hard and cold, the hardness and the

coldness are cognised os distinct sensations.

The sense
VOL.

ir.

of touch consists in the sense of pressure

and

sfi i"i

Oil ^

jo not
combine.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

98
resistance

"What
l^l^X..

;.

resistance,

all

[chap.

the properties of things that

we

by

cognise

means of touch, such as the differences of hard and soft,


and of rough and smooth, are due to various modes and
I regard the "musdegrees of resistance to the touch.
cular sense " as a part of the sense of touch, for all that

and resistance it
appears uncertain whether there woidd be any sense of
muscular motion whatever that is to say, it is uncertain
whether muscular action would give rise to sensation if it
cognises

Muscular
sense.

it

is

also resolvable into pressure

Our

were absolutely unresisted.^

and

first

due

of things existing in space, are

touch, which so far

is

to the sense of

an intellectual sense

of the intellect

developed state

cognitions of space,

we

though in a

obtain information

concerning external things chiefly through sight; but in


blind persons the sense of touch, in virtue of its giving a
cognition of space and of the form and position of things
in space,

is

capable, in a great degree, of supplying the

place of the sense of sight, in a

could conceivably do.

being reproduced in
2.

Taste.

The nerves of

way

that no other sense

Sensations of touch do not admit of

memory with any

vivicbiess.

taste are also nerves of touch

and of

heat,

and when these sensations are experienced together, they


But when two tastes are mixed
are cognised as distinct.
together, a single taste is cognised intermediate in character

between

its

constituents.

intellectual one

it

memory.
"

of taste

gives no cognition of space

impressions are scarcely


in

The sense

at all

is
;

not an

and

its

capable of being reproduced

Sensations of taste are due to the substances

Of the voluntary motion of our limbs we know

originally nothing.

"We do not perceive the motion of our muscles by their own sensations,
but attain a kuowledge of them only when perceived by another sense.

The muscles most under our control are those of the eye and the voice,
which perform motions microscopically small yet we have no conscious:

ness of the motion.


of the liver, &c.,

We

move

yet with as

the diajihragm against the heavy pressure


little

consciousness of the motion.

It

must be observed by sight or touch


in order to learn that they move, and in what direction." (Weber, quoted
in M'Cosh's Examination of Mill's Philosophy, p. 128.)
Dr. M'Cosh
quotes this in opposition to the theory of Mill and Bain, to be referred to
iu the next two chapters, that we acquire the cognition of space through
follows that the motions of our limbs

the muscular sense alone.

THE SENSES.

XXXV.]

which

09

are tasted being dissolved in the moisture of tlie

mouth.
3.

The nerves of smell

any other

are not nerves of

sense. Smell.
resemDlance to

Sensations of smell bear a greater resemblance to sensa-

}\^

tions of taste than do the sensations of

senses to each other

this

is,

which

In other respects,

nostrils.

intellectual sense

it

also,

memory.
4. The nerves of

all

is

white

for

not an

is

its

capable of being reproduced

sight are not nerves of

All the sensations of sight


called colours

the senses of taste and of

Smell, like taste,

gives no cognition of space, and

impressions are scarcely at

black

of their pro-

due to the vapours

are smelled being dissolved in the moisture of the

smell resemble each other.

in

conditions

for sensations of smell are

tasto.

no doubt, a consequence of

the similarity in the physical

duction

any other two

any other

sense. Sight, or

may with perfect accuracy be ^Y


may be regarded as a coloiir,

the absence of any colour, and lustre

orr"

only a

is

way in which light falls. According to the


now generally received, and I think on demon-

particular

theory

strative evidence, radiance consists of undulations in

ethereal

The undulations

medium.

we

but, so far as

an

are of various lengths,

are able to ascertain, they do not differ

one from the other in any essential property, except that


those rays whereof the undulations are between certain Only some
'^"'""""^
ascertained limits of length
have the ^power of excitins

the
unilula-

sensation of light

or rather (for the property is a purely tions pro-

physiological one), the nerves of the eye have the power of

perceiving the sensation of light

by

those rays

appear to

and,

what

is

excite sensations of colour

are acted on

^^p^j!g*^)!'

I'g^t,

most remarkable, rays which

only in the length of their undulations

differ

but in kind

when they

which

not in intensity and these


siich as red, green, and blue.
This is an ^^'^'}^^

ultimate fact of sensation, and


quite inscrutable.^

The subject

binations being a very


consideration of

it

to

its

differ

reason

of colours

See Note

consequently

and

special one, I defer

Note

at the

end of

The sense of sight gives a cognition


1

is

at

my

com-

further

this chapter.

of space,

end of chapter.

h2

their

though I

various
sensations
^^"^""'-

HABIT AND INTELLICxENCE.

100

demonstrable that

Sight gives

think

of^pac'r

o'btained, not

Characters
of sight,

it is

Sight

is

by

sight,

tlie first

[chap.

cognition of space

is

but by touch.

a highly intellectual sense

^-^.i^ ^jj-g ^g ^i^g ^g^^ ^YiQ^

and in connexion

impressions of sight are capable

of being not only remembered, but reproduced in

memory,

or recollected, with great vividness.


Of

5.

hearing.

Tlie nerves of hearing are not nerves of

Hearing, like sight,

any other

a highly intellectual sense

is

sense.

and

impressions of sound, such as those of voices or of music,


are capable of beiiig reproduced in

sense of extension, but

Semicircular

canals give
a sense
S ^^f.
direction
of sounds,

all

great

Hearing gives no cognition of space in the

\T.vidness.

tion

memory with

it

does give a cognition of direc-

the higher animals, at least, appear to have some

power of judging from what direction a sound comes. " It


semicircular canals have
jg commonly supposed that the
,.
for their peculiar function to receive the impressions by
the direction of sounds and it is
which we distinguish

'

'

-,

argument in support of this view that


in almost every instance in which these parts exist at all,
they hold the same relative positions as in man, their three
certainly a powerful

planes being nearly at right angles to one another."

power of judging

of the direction of sound, however, is

in precision

very deficient
of other senses

it

This

and without the assistance

would probably be quite

insufficient to

any cognition of space, at least unless it was


incomparably more accurate than it is in man.
That ill which hearing differs from all the other senses
i'^ ^^^ ^'^^^> ^^^^^ distinct sounds falling on the ear together
^q not neccssarily combine into a resultant sensation, as
tastes, smells, and colours do when they are mixed. Unlike

give rise to

Heiiringis
^^^
nt'ii''^

R"iises, in

ofdiscri-

minating
SllllUl-

Ta

neons

those Other sensations, simidtaneous sounds are capable


^
.

of being recognised as distinct,

soiinrs.

There

separately.

is

and of being attended

good reason to believe that

to

this

remarkable property of the sense of hearing depends on


the peculiar manner in which the nerves of hearing terminate in the ear.
T^. .

.,

Distnbutijii

of the

The nerves

of the other organs of sense

branch out and form a network at their terminations thus


the nerves of touch, of taste, and of smell form extended
:

Carjientei's

Human

Physiology,

j).

669.

XXXV.]

101

SEKSES.

Tilt:

networks, the purpose of which appears to he to obtain the


necessary extent of sensitive surface

and the optic nerve

nerves of
'

^^J^^^

branches out into a network through the retina (which

organ derives

its

name from

this fact), for the

providing a surface sensitive to light,


of the object looked at

is

to be formed.

aud

purpose of sensitive

on wliich the image

hearing terminate in a totally different

'^^'''^'Ces.

But the nerves of


way from any of

No

image has to be formed in the ear analogous to


the retinal image in the eye, and consequently no sentient
surface is needed like the retina, nor is an extended
Consesentient surface needed for any other purpose.
these.^

smelJ,

Distribu]/erves of^*^

^f?^""g

quently the nerves of hearing are not spread out at their


terminations, but

concentrated togetlier in " Corti's

are

There are about three thousand of these nervefibres


and we have good reason to believe that each one
of these is sensitive, not to all sounds, but only to sounds
of a pitch altogether or nearly identical with that to which
organ."
;

it is itself

strung.

So

the same time, are heard by different

each

its

own

impression on the

colours, or smells, or tastes, which,

the same nerves, and

make

when heard at
nerves, and make

sounds,

tliat different

consciousness

when mixed,

unlike

are felt

by

a combined impression on the

consciousness.

In order to explain how sounds act each on


appropriate nerve,

we must

its

own

refer to the general laws of

Every stretched string has a period


of vibration belonging to itself, which is not affected by
the manner in which it is caused to vibrate, but is constant
so long as its length and its tightness are unchanged in

Laws

of

suikmous

acoustic vibrations.

other words, the

number

which a string makes


the same string. The pitch of a

of vibrations

in a second is constant for

vibration
constant
s;e
^^t'l'ig-

sound depends on the number in a second of the sonorous


vibrations, which, when transmitted thiough the air to the
so that the same string,
sound of the same pitch
a single vibration of the string, of course, producing a

ear, excite

by

its

the sensation of sound

single sonorous vibration,


1

l'"<;r

vibrations, always produces

or sound-A^'ave.

the fullowiiig details, see the review of

Soiuid, in

lliB

Ediiiliurgh

Ueview of January

lSfi8v

The

TyndaUV
^

lav/s

teetures

of
oji

^otu con""**"''
^f

string.

HABIT AND INTELLIOENCE.

102

same in

vibratiou are the

bodies whatever

all

[chaf.

but vibrat-

ing strings exemplify those laws in their greatest simplicity


is

it

Olio string

another
vibrating,

and in the most manageable form,

best, in treating of

of strings only.

If

two

elementary
strings

for

which reason

acoustics,

to speak

have the same period of

and one of these is set vibrating, the sonorous


vibrations produced by it will set the other string vibrating
in unison from the analogy of the case, and from the wonderful way in which the auditory nerve-fibres in " Corti's
vibration,

organ" are stretched like the strings of a violin across a


Action of
the'uerTes
of the ear.

bridge,

we have

^^'^ ^^^^'^

every reason to believe that those nerves

Sympathetically vibrating strings.

Every sound

vvMch enters the cavity of the ear sets in vibration that


nerve which

strung to

is

own

its

pitch,

and

its

vibrations

produce in the auditory ganglia the sensation of sound.


ought to be stated that this theory is not offered as a
demonstrated truth, but only as' having a very high degree
It

It is not easy to see any way


which it could be experimentally verified.
I have next to speak of the tone of sounds, which is
a more complex fact than their pitch. The physical theory
The tone of a
of tone may thus be stated in outline
sound is produced by the union of secondary sonorous

of analogical probability.
in
Tone of
'^"""'^

how
produced,

-^^^ygg^

qj,

with the primary sonorous wave, or

overtones,

fundamental.

When

the fundamental

is

not accompanied

by any overtones, its soimd is soft and dull, as that of


But such sounds are very unusual there
a timing-fork.^
:

Consequently, neaii}^

are overtones in nearly all sounds.


all

sounds are not simple but complex sounds.

tones are of higher pitch than the


pitch of the fundamental

complex sound.

many

is

what

fundamental

The over-

fundamental.

may be accompanied by

In a word, the tone of a sound

overtones.

Tlie

defines the pitch of the

is

due

to the combination of secondary sonorous vibrations with

The secondary sonorous vibrations are

the fundamental.

of course due to the production of secondary vibrations


in the musical string or other sonorous body.

But now a question


^

arises.

How

Tj'udall's Lectures

is

any such thing pos-

ou Sound.

sible as

103

THE SENSES.

XXXV.]

a complex sound

Why

do we not hear the Why

overtones as distinct sonnds from the fundamental, instead

a complex

of hearing

sound unlike either

Why

do

do

se)iKlarv
vibrations,

sounds ever combine into a resultant sound, instead of tones,


being each transmitted along

its

own

nerve-fibre separately

'"^^f^^l?

to the auditory ganglia, so as to be distinct in the con- funda-

sciousness?

inclined to think the answer

when heard

All sounds,
into

am

this

is

simultaneously, tend to combine

J!"*^

,.

sultant

complex sounds, and the power of distinguishing

them, like the rest of man's voluntary powers, has to be


acquired by habit.

In consequence of the laws which

regulate the vibration of strings

and other
and

sounds are accompanied by overtones

mental and

most

bodies,

as the funda-

overtones are habitually heard together, the The comear in most persons never acquires the habit or the power ^I'^^tiou
its
-^

-"^

-^

them

while

or distinc-

power tion may


^
of distinguishing sounds which are heard together only by
i^abit
accident, such as two different voices.
In distinguishing
two voices which are heard at the same time, the ear is
also, no doubt, very much guided by the fact that the
different voices rise and fall separately, while a fundamental note and its overtones rise and fall together. But with prac'^^'''
it is stated by Helmholtz ^ that it is possible to acquire by ^^^^
tones may
,...,.
practice the power of distmguishing the overtones of a be distinof distinguishing

it

easily acquires the

"^

guished.

single vibrating string.

The senses

of sight and

hearing are the only senses

sight and

^^^'^""g
Avhich minister to the intellect in any
high
'
state of intel- are the
lectual development
and, no doubt for this reason, they most intel;

are the only aisthetic senses

through which
unusual to
music, but

we

that

derive any

call that heauty


it

say, the only senses anVthe


ideas of beauty.
It may be ^^J
is to

which we admire and enjoy in

certainly impresses the

mind

senses.

exactly as visual

beauty does, making allowance only for the unlikeness of


one sense to another. The objects of visual beauty are in
general much more permanent than sounds can be, and
they consequently give a more durable pleasure but the Music propleasure due to music, on the other hand, is, while it lasts, duces a
;

more

more intense than that due


1

to visual beauty.

Quoted in Tyudall's Lectures on Sound.

The reason

tense

in-

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

104
fecliiig

than
visual

beauty,
because
the ear
loses 110
time in
conibiiiii

impressions.

of this pi'obal)ly

that the beauty, or

is,

au expression which

what

is

called

by

scarcely a metaphor, the harmony,

is

and colour

[chap.

due to the combination of several


distinct impressions on the sense of sight, which cannot
be properly combined without a motion of the eye and

of form

is

time while the harmony

sound
this occupies some little
i.s
due to the combination of distinct impressions on the
sense of hearino- which combine in the consciousness of
;

themselves, without any time being


that no time whatever

is lost

lost.

To

of

this

fact,

in combining simultaneous

impressions of sound, while some

little

time

lost in

is

combining simultaneous impressions of sight, I attribute


the ]:)eculiarly \ivid and intense effect of music on the
consciousness.

XOTE

A.

NERVES OF SPECIAL SENSATION,


Opinion of

The

distinct

been sanctioned by the high authority of Helmholtz,^ that there


must be three distinct sets of nerve-fibres in the retina and the

nerves for
distinct
colours.

ojjiniou

was

advanced by Dr. Youug, and has

first

On

optic nerve, one for each of the three primary coloui'S.

subject

to see

it is difficidt

conclusive evidence

for,

how

lately

this

there can ever be any absolutely

supposing the three sets of nerves to

be distinctly visible under the microscope, how


could the distinct function of each be ascertained 1 But there

and

exist,

are

to

what appear

to

me

the strongest analogical reasons for reject-

ing such an hypothesis.

The hypothesis in question rests on the belief that each sensory nerve must transmit a single kind of sensation, and cannot
any

other.

Now

this belief appears to

be contrary to

Reasons

trausniit

aj^ciiust

Dr. Carpenter says of the


such evidence as we can obtahi.
" There is no special nerve of taste for the
sense of taste

this.

No

special

nerves of
taste.

gustative impressions
(to

upon the

front of

t)ie

tongue are conveyed

the sensory ganglia) by the Lingual branch of the fifth pair,

while those

made upon the back

of the organ are conveyed by

the Glosso-pharyngeal, both of which nerves also minister to

common
1

sensibility (or the sense of touch)

and pressure on the

Physiological Theory of Musie, French fvanslatiou, p. 185.

1"5

NERVES OF SPECIAL SENSATIUX.

XXXV.]

trunk of either of these nerves gives

which

rise to pain,

is

nut the

case with either the olfactory, the optic, or the auditory nerves.

Moreover, the papUlary apparatus, through which the gustative

made upon

impressions are
essentially the

jMoreover,

the extremities of these nerves,

same in structure with that of the skin."


there

if

each primary colour,

a distinct set of visual nerve-fibres for

is

would appear

it

is

must

to follow that there

be a distinct set of nerve-fibres of taste for each distinct kind


of taste

saline, bitter, sweet, &<:.;

and a

distinct set of olfactory

nerve-fibres for each distinct kind of smell

The

an almost iucretUble conclusion.

we have

hearing, as

from

sense

of the

case

seen in the preceding chapter,

is

of

different

these.

Each

sound

distinct

probably transmitted to the auditory

is

ganglia by a distinct set of nei'ves.


is

which would be

Eut, as a result of

possible to distinguish, as distinct, sounds

in the consciousness together


2)riniary colours

which

are received

and if the impressions of

this, it

different

were transmitted to the optic ganglia by different

nerve-fibres,

we should be

colours in a

compound

able to distinguish the constituent

colour

we

should be able to see the

three primaries in white.


If

were true that any one nerve- fibre can transmit sensations

it

of only one kind,


tion of heat

it

must follow that the nerves of the

must be

distinct

ing to Dr. Carpenter, there

is

from those of touch

no evidence whatever

sensa- nor of

but, accordin favour of

this conclusion.^

The truth appears

which any

to be, that the sensations

transmits depend neither on the constitution of the nerve

nor on that of

its

ganglion (for

as the microscope has

all ner\-es

and

all ganglia,

shown, are histologically

alike),

gether on the constitution of the organ in which the


.

nei've
itself,

Thekiud

so lar "f

seiisa-

but

alto- pends nut


nerve has ^'^ ^^
nerves uor

Thus a nerve which terminates in the outhegaueve transmits the sensation of light,
and a nerve which termi- S^^\ ^^^'^^

external termination.

its
'

nates in the ear transmits the sensation of sound.

The

ences in kind between the sensations of different colours

doubt

left

plicable

the

uuexplaiued by this liypothesis, but they are inex-

by any hypothesis whatever, and the


of sugar

tastes

sensation,

is

and of

salt,

difierence

between

or any other simple fact of

equally inexplicable.

The conclusion
'

.,

stated in the foregoing paragraph

lluiuaii riiysinldgy,

]i.

(il7.

"

Ibid.

may appear
|i.

tjlT).

on the

difier- organ of
are no sense.

HABIT AND INTELjuIGENCE.

106
to

[chap.

be contradicted by the well-known fact that presMu-e on the

retina produces the sensation, not of pressure, but of light.

when

But

the retina and the optic nerve have been habitually trans-

Sensations mitting sensations of light ever since their first formation, it is


of light

due to
pressure,

what might have been expected that

I think

should take the form of sensations of

disease,

It is stated, that

and to an
electiic

current.

all their sensations,

even when excited, not by radiance, but by pressure or by

an

light.

shock sent in opposite directions

electric

along the optic nerve will produce,

if in

the one direction the

sensation of red, and if in the other direction the sensation of

This

blue.^

is

a strong argument against the hypothesis of

distinct nerves for each of the three


difficult to believe that

primary colours

for it is

the set of nerves which produces the

sensation of blue will produce their sensation in response to an


electric current in

one direction, that the

set

which produces

the sensation of red will respond to a current in the opposite

and that the

direction,

which produces the sensation of


It is far more likely that the

set

green will respond to neither.

opposite electric currents, or shocks, produce different sensations

in the same nerves.

NOTE

B.

COLOURS AND THE LAWS OF THEIR COMBINATION.


Difference

There

between

taste,

are a great

many

primary kinds of sensation of

distinct

of smell, and of sound.

The same might appear

to be

sensations
true of the sensations of colour; but such is not the fact j all
of sight
and of the the sensations of colour
which are possible, at least to the human
other

eye, are capable of being

produced by the combination of three

primary elements.

In what

Meaning
of light
and of
radiance.

of a sensation.
radiance.

Eadiance, however, has other properties than that of


producing the sensation of light when it falls on the retina.
It
is

Heating
and
chemical

word light as only the name


That which produces the sensation I shall call

follows, I shall use the

a form of energy, and, like

of being transformed into heat

heat the body on which they

and

little

forms of energy,

all
:

tliis

fall.

understood chemical

radiance.

graphy
1

is
I

It has

effects

effects of

it is

capable

when sunbeams
also many peculiar

takes place

the whole art of photo-

based on some of these.

regret that I cannot find

my

authority for this statement.

OOLOUES AND THEIR COMBINATION.

XXXV.]

There

is

what I regard

107

as demonstrative evidence for believing Radiance

that radiance consists of undulations

in a universal ethereal consists of


imdula-

medium. The radiance of the siin, and of all other sources tions.
with which we are famdiar, consists of a variety of rays, which, ^.^^^ ^
difterent
SO far as we know, differ from each other in no physical character wavelengths
of the undulations of which they are composed,
except the length

^
'

"'

are

The velocity of all the rays is the same, and consequently the
number of undulations, or waves, to the second in any ray is

mixed

together
"^

^}'"^

sunbeam,

inversely proportional to the length of the waves that compose

that ray.

All the rays are capable of being refracted

where the wave-length

refrangibility is the greatest

so that rays

from the same source,

is

the

the least

as for instance the rays that

may be separated by refraction through a Their


rays of unequal refrangibility being refracted at separaliou

constitute a sunbeam,

prism

the

unequal angles, and consequently proceeding in different

The unequally

tions.

refracted rays,

when

direc- prism.

received on a screen,

constitute the prismatic spectrum.

As

radiance

is

a form of energy,

and

as all energy is capable

of transformation into heat,

it

heating-power of any ray

a measure of the quantity of energy

due

to

it.

When we

is

can scarcely be doubted that the

apply this

test,

we

find that the visible

brightness of a ray has nothing to do with the c[uantity of

energy which

it

contains

heating-power are scarcely

for the rays

which have the

if at all visible.

not a physical but a physiological fact

or,

greatest

This, of course,
in other words,

is

depends not on the nature of radiance, but on the constitution


of our visual faculty.

What

is

even more remarkable

is

The

it places of

that

jjogt of
gi'eatest

the greatest chemical, or actinic, or photographic power coincides po^-er^


neither with the greatest heating power nor with the brightest ^^'^ of
light

almost

the rays of greatest chemical power, on the contrary, are Chemical


if not quite invisible, and are at the opposite end of the power,

spectrum from the heating

The

rays.^

coincide

rays of different wave-lengths, and consequently of dif-

ferent refrangibilities, produce different sensations of colour in

Beginning at the rays of the greatest wave-length and


refrangibility, and going on to those of opposite character,

the eye.
least

the succession

is as

follows

1 For the probable reason of the last mentioned fact,


see a paper
Professor Tyndall in the Fortnightly Eeview for February 1869.
2

by

take this enumeration from Professor Grassmann's paper on the


of Compound Colours, in the Philosophical Magazine for April 1854.

Theory

raj-s

have

cUfferent

HABIT AND INTELLKJENGE.

108
KeJ,

Succession
ot colours.

Tiie rays of greatest heating-power are

greatest cbeniical

accurate enumeration of tints

of different wave-lengths,

is

logical
'

and analogous not


to pitch in

sound.

physiological
It

possible.

which

tone

its

of colour,

colour of light

its

i^itch

for,

a purely

is

to the tone of sound.^

on the Avave-length of the sonorous

depends on the combination of secondary

In the manner of

waves with the fundamental.


^j^g

lengths,

altogether a quantitative

is

any true sense analogous

pitch of sound depends

fact that rays

however, to be remarked, that the colour of

is,

undulation, and

The

and one of which no explanation appears

fact,

light is not in

The

impossible.

is

^vodLXX.ceqiialitative differences

difterence,

beyond the brightest

power nearly coincide with


The colours graduate into each other, so that any

and those of

the purple.

"^"^j^^"-

green,

a2ure, indigo, violet, purple.

red,

Difference

green, bluish

yellow, yellowish green,

orange,

[cHAP.

its

production,

analogous, not to the tone of sound, but to

is

which have different wavewe know, no other difference

as just stated, rays

and have, so

as

far

whatever, excite totally different sensations of colour.

There

strong reason for believing that the colour of light

is

corresponds to the

markable way.
faculty, for

pitch of sound

law of sound

It is a

it is

re-

(or rather of the hearing

a physiological fact and not a physical one)

a law of the hearing faculty, I

is

another and very

in

it

that any two notes whereof

saj^,

the sonorous waves producing the one are exactly twice as

numerous
TliB
octave in
in colour

in a second as those producing the other, are in a

manner recognised
^^^ other.
colours.

There

as the
is

same

note, the one being the octave of

reason to think that the same

What makes

the subject obscure

a purely physiological one, that the

is

the

is

fact,

true of

which

is

power of perceiving sound

extends over more than eleven octaves," while the power of

It

is,

I tlunk, to

be regretted that the Germans, and Dr. Tyndall in

imitation of tliem, have introduced the term sound-colour iu the sense of


tune.

The word

is

not needed, for

not express quite as well, both in


as

shown iu the

text, the

analogy

it exjiresses

German and
suggests

it

is

nothing that "tone " does

in English

and moreover,

untrue.

^ According to M. Dcspretz, " the number of vibrations required to produce an api)reciable musical sound, in persons endowed with an acute
sense of hearing, may vary from 16 [in a second] for the lowest, to 73,000

for the highest note."

(Carpenter's

Human

range of rather more than eleven octaves


ol'

Physiology, p. 660.)

This

for the eleventh octave of a

is

lo honorous vibrations to the second contains 65, .536 to the secwud

Uuit

is lo

2i
say, 16 x

+ " =5,536.

note
:

COLOURS AND THEIR COMBINATION.

XXXV.]

perceiving light extends over but one.^

109

The number of luminous

undulations to the second of the faint purple-red rays beyond the


violet

is

about twice that of the extreme red rays at the opposite

extremity of the spectrum, and their wave-length consequently

about one-half.
difficult,

Satisfactory observations on

the subject are

in consequence of the faintness of the purple rays,

which makes them often


difficult to identify

from violet

to red

even to

difficult

with the red.

through purple

and

see,

more

still

!N"eYertheless, the transition


is

stated to be perfectly visible

with good light and a good instrument

so that the colours of

the spectrum really occur in the following recurrent order, ^ like


that of the notes of music

Eed, orange, yellow, yellowish green, green, bluish green,


azure, indigo, violet, purple, red again.

If there

is

any doubt of the actual recurrence of the same


though I believe there is none,

tint of colour in the spectrum,

this theory of

an octave in the spectrum would

highest degree probable

still

be in the

not only from the analogy of sound,

but also from the visible fact that violet and purple are intermediate colours of tint between blue and red, just as orange

is

between red and yellow.


It is obvious that this fact of an octave in the spectrum is an
ultimate fact of sensation, not to be accounted for by any law

visibly intermediate

of habit, or accounted for at

all.

If the series of colours in the spectrum

recurrent,

it

is

using only another word for the same fact to say that

it

colours
is ?f

circular.

circidar

is

The

series

arrangement of the colours of the spectrum spectrum


is circular,

According to Sir John Herschel (Good Wonls, August 1S05), the

luminoTis vibrations of the extreme red

number 399,401,000,000,000

the second, and those of the exti-eme violet 831,479,000,000,000

to

so that

little more than twice as numerous as the former, and the


power of vision extends through a little more than an octave. No such
determinations, however, can be anythiug more than approximative. The
measurement of the lengths of the waves, and of their luimber to the
second, is not subject to any great error, but it is a matter of great uncertainty where the extreme red and the extreme violet are for the illuminated part of the spectrum graduates into darkness, and its extreme limits

the latter are a

will be talcen as at different points, according to the goodness of the light

and of the in.stvument, and perhaps

also according to the peculiarity of tlio

observer's eyes.
~

For the

fact

already leferred

to.

of this veeurrencp,

see

Professor

Gras.smann's paper

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

110
is

[CHAF.

necessary, in order to give any riglit conception of the laws

of the composition of colours,

and

It is possible to arrange the colours of the spectrum in such

tlie

oiiposite

colours are

compleTiientaries.

pair of colours in
^ circular order, that every opposite
i x
'

be complementary to each other; that


^j^j^e

^y^gQ combined.

Grassmann,

is

This order,

is

to

say,

it

in
shall

according to

shall

make
i

Professor

that of the following diagram.

PUEPLB.

GREEN,

1 See the paper already referred to.


Professor Grassmann does not give
the circular form, but his tabular statement of the pairs of complementaries
comes to the same thing. The law that every colour in the spectrum has

complementary in the spectrum was deduced by Professor Grassmann


from theoretical considerations and it has been to a great extent confirmed by the experiments of Helmholtz, who " found that the colours from
red to green- yellow were complementary to colours ranging from green-blue
to violet, and that the colours between green-yellow and green-blue have no
its

homogeneous complementaries, but must be neutralized by mixtui-es of red


and violet. " (Professor Clark Maxwell on the Theory of Compound Colours,
Philosophical Transactions for 1860.)

think there can be

little

doubt

COLOURS AND THEIR COMBINATION.

XXXV.]

So that auy one of the following


combined, will make white

pairs of

Ill

colours,

when

Eed and

bluish green.

Orange and azure.


Yellow and indigo.
Yellowish green and

violet.

Green and purple.


It is to be observed that, in such experiments as these,

what

we must do is to combine the colours themselves ; and this is to How to


be done by letting rays of the two colours which we wish to combine
,

p 1,

combine

fall

colours.

on the same spot of white paper.

Mixture of

colouring stuffs will not give the same results.^


It is also to be observed, that the white

produced by the Whites

combination of any one pair of complementaries, though the

same in appearance

as that

produced by the combination of any combina-

is not really the same.


The difference is shown by
decomposing any white ray with the prism, which will separate

other pair,

into its differently-coloured constituents

it

"'

'

iust as the

''

com-

mon

decomposed by the prism into all


Thus, the white which is comthe colours of the spectrum.
^
pounded of red and bluish green may be separated by the prism
back into red and bluish green and the white which is comwhite light of day

is

and indigo may be in like manner separated


back into yellow and indigo. Thus, two whites may be, to use

pounded

of yellow

Professor Clark Maxwell's expression, optically different though

chromatically alike.

The white

light of

day

of course

is

mixture of the whites which are compounded of

all

the pairs of

complementaries in the spectrum.


that the failure to find homogeneous complementaries (that

is

to say,

com-

plementaries in the spectrum) for the colours from gi-een-yellow to greejiblue

due merely to the faintness of the purple

is

tints,

among which by

the theory their complementaries shoiild be found.


^

If

we mix two

mixture
rials

or

more colouring materials

together, the colour of the

due to those rays which are not absorbed by any of the matethat the more ingi'edients we put into our mixture the more rays

is

so

and the nearer we come to the total suppression of light,


Hence the necessity, in water-colour painting, of
obtaining brilliancy, if possible, by a single wash of colour. If on the

are absorbed,

which

is

contrary

F'oj;l^^ced

blackness.

we mix the colours themselves in the way described in the text,


we add the more light we get. It is thus obvious that

the more colours

the two methods of mixing will not give the same results.

For the remark


about water-colours, see Sir John Herschel, in Good Words, August 1865.

^}?^

pairs of

comple-

mentanes
are
^I'^^'^^^'y

dineveiit.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

112
Except white,

All colours

Black

in the

or lowered white.^

is

possible colours are colours of the spectrum.

all

e.xeept

[chap.

merely the negation of

Brown

and grey

Light,

which

tints,

only a subdued

is

to the eye appear unlike

colours of the spectrum, are " merely red, orange, or

Black"'

^^y ^

Grey.

yellow, of feeble intensity,

Brown.

^^^ colours of the spectrum not complementary to each other


are mixed in the way already described (the brightness of the two

*'^

more

or less diluted

with white."

j^^

colours being of equal intensity), the colour produced by their


combining
to the colour situated
combination will be similar in appearance
^ '
two
p
1
colours not half-way between the two constituents on the circumference ot
comple^-j^g
and the compound will not
circle of ^prismatic colours
Eesult of

mentary,

be similar

necessarily

in

appearance

to

either

constituent.

But such a compound


to form Thus, red and green form yellow.
compound colour, though it may be chromatically similar to a simple one,
is of course optically different, and may be decomposed back
vLsiblv

i.9

like simple

j^g

jjj^Q

constituents

by

The compound

the prism.

colours,

o])tical]y

however, though of the same tint with the simple ones, are in

different,

many

cases less saturated, presenting the appearance of being

diluted with white.

No

dis-

from

It follows

tinction of j^^^j

this,

that there

is

no distinction of primary

secondary colours,^ for every colour

may be

either primary

'

primary, because

and

or secondary

secondaries in

secondary, because
/'
other colours.

any
.sical

pliy-

sense,

it

may
''

it is

found in the spectrum

and

be formed by the combination of


''

by mathematical consequence from the facts


verified by experiment, that if any

j^ ^Iso follows

stated here, and has been


three colours whatever are

so taken

from the circumference of

the circle of prismatic colours, that the centre of the circle falls

within the triangle whereof they are at the angles, either white

Most of

wlwt are

callcil

grey tints,

however,

probably contain

bine.
2

Professor Clark Maxwell's paper, referred to in a former note.

David Brewster thought he had shown that the colours of the


spectrum are not primary, but capable of further decomposition by passing
them through coloured media. By this kind of decomposition he thought
3

Sir

he proved that there are but three primary colours, namely red, yellow,
Helmholtz however has, 1 think, shown satisfactorily that
aiid blue.
Brewster's results were due to an imperfect method of observing, and that

no ray of

tlie

spectrum

coloured medium.
ened, but

it

preserves

is

capable of decomposition by passing through any

ray under such circum.stances


its tint

uuchauged.

Philosophical Magazine for December 18r>2.)

may

be

gi-eatly

weak-

(See Helmholtz's paper in the

COLOURS AND THEIR COMBINATION.

XXXV.]
or any

other colour

suitable

proportions. ^

We

may

be formed by combining them in

thus find that, as a physical

equally primary.

113

fact,

rays of

all

But Professor Clark Maxwell

colours are

has found

reason, from observations on colour-blind persons, to think that,

Ijut

as a physiological fact, sensations of all colours are not equally

^7

primary; but that

^ T'hysiological
sense.

other sensations of colour are

all

compounded

of the three primaries, red, green, and blue.

there
^'^'"

I shall conclude this note with some remarks on the mathe- Further
theory of chromatic octaves and complementaries. ^a*"^-

matical

Logically they ought to have come earlier, but I think

it

to leave the statement of the elementary laws of colour

better considera-

unen-

*'^"

cumbered by even the simplest mathematics.


In what follows let us, as in musical science, speak not of the
wave-lengths, but of the frequency of the waves ; that is to say, Wave frethe number of waves in a given time.
The frequency is ofV^eiicy.
course inversely as the length.

Having ascertained the wave-frequency


sound or a colour

is

due,

we

find the

octave by multiplying by two, or of

its

which

to

either a

wave- frequency of

its

lower octave by dividing

by the same.
and on

by an
have

tlie

Extreme purple is the octave of extreme red, A colour


chromatic circle drawn above these are separated ^^^ ^^^

arc of 360.
laid

Now,

them down,

the pairs of complementaries, as I 360 apart

are

separated,

complementary, by an arc of 180.

ment

each colour

from

its ." V*''

If this circular arrange-

of colours represents any truth of nature,

it

might conse-

quently be supposed that, having ascertained the wave-frequency

any

of

colour,

we should be

able to find that of

its complemenby multiplying or dividing, as the case may be, by the


square root of two.
That is to say, if we arrange the colours,
from red to its octave where purple turns red again, round the
360 degrees of a circle, in such a way that any two colours separated by equal arcs shall have their wave-frequencies in. equal

tary

ratios

then, as the wave-frequencies of the

two reds which are

See Professor Clark Maxwell's paper, already referred to.


See the same paper.
According to Professor Clark Maxwell, most
colour-blind persons (so called) are insensible to any difference between
^

red, yellow,

blue or

and green, but sensible

violet.

But there

is

to the difference

another less

between these and

common kind

of colourblindness, which consists in insensibility to the difference between green

and bine.

VOL.

II.

HA KIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

114

arc of 360 stand to each other in the ratio of

We might

separated

expect

J ^Q 2^ the wave-frequencies of

mentaries
to be 180

by an

[cHAP.

any pair of colours which are

opposite to each other in the circle must he in ratio of 1 to the

be expected, that such pairs

It might, I say,

soTjare root of 2.

of opposites should he pairs of complementanes.


But this does not appear to be the case. According to Pro-

Clark Maxwell, the wave-frequencies of some of the

fessor

pairs of

here given with

them

of that opposite to

Eed

it

; ^

in the other column.

36-40

Bluish green

Orange,

39'80

Blue

41-40

Indigo.

If the wave- frequencies

column were

of the

to those of their

the square root of 2 to

tion and
theory.

numbers

each colour being the complementary

Yellow.

Diserepancy of

ratios of the

complementary colours are in the

1,

54-70

colours

51-80

4765

in

the

right-hand

complementaries in the ratio of

they would be

Bluish green

51-47

Blue

56-28

Indigo

58-54

It will be noticed that the observed wave-frequencies of these

colours are

i]xTee

considerably smaller than those calculated

by the hypothesis from the wave-frequencies of their compleand the differences, besides being all on the same
side, are too great to be accounted for by any accident or error.
Thus in such a circle as I have imagined (in which equal dismentaries

tances along the circumference correspond to equal ratios of


frequency), any two complementaries are not precisely opposite,

but approach each other on the green side of the circle.


Prom a mathematico-physical point of view this may appear

How

anomalous, but

acconntecl

ij^ite

is

it is

easily explained

from a physiological one.

not a mathematical expression

it is

for,

to the colour- sensation

rays of which the

produced by sunshine.

sunbeam

is

the

name we

We

give

say that the

composed are of very unequal

The determinations Tvere made by


by an application of the principle of Newton's rings, and the numbers given are the numbers of waveThe determinations are for the positions of
lengths in tlip retnrdations.
certain of Fi ounhofer's lines. In the cases of bluish-green, blue, and indigo,
I have taken the mean of the determinations for two or three lines in the
1

See the paper already referred

means

same

to.

of an interference-spectrum, obtained

colour.

COLOURS AND THEIR COMBINATION.

XXXV.]
brightness

purple.

its

much

that

its

But

this is not strictly accurate

of vision which

is

green, for instance,

so constituted as to be

is

more

115

brighter than All the

it is

our faculty ^^^^

forcibly impressed eciunlly

by the green rays than by the purple ones. This is a purely


physiological fact, and it is quite possible that there may be
animals which have eyes that are more forcibly impressed by
the purple than by the green.^
If all parts of the spectrum
were of equal brightness to our

then equal arcs of

eyes,

tlie

would contain equal quantities of colour, and equal and


opposite arcs would neutralize each other, forming white.
The

circle

we have

circle, as

pairs of

seen, is divisible into arcs of the following

complementary colours

Eed and

bluish green

Orange and azure


Yellow and indigo
Yellowish green and violet

Green and purple

Were

White.

=:

"White.

White.
White.

White.

a pair of complementaries always of equal brightness,

obvious that, in order to

it is

=
=
=

make white without

leaving any

residual colour, they ought to occupy equal arcs of the circle.

But

this is not the case

circle are

much

the colours on the green side of the

brighter than those on the purple side

the combination of equal arcs

(or,

in other words,

so that

of equal

quantities) of the two would not produce pure white, but would
have a residual green tinge. The neutralization, or conversion
into white, of all the colours, without residual tinge from any

of them,

is

attained

by the

brightest colour of any pair of com-

plementaries occupying the smallest arc

and, as the colours are

brighter on the green side of the circle than on the purple side,
this involves as a geometrical consequence that the colours

we might have expected


a

little

As

to find separated

nearer to each other

by the green

tints,

by an

which

arc of 180, are

side of the circle.

stated above (see p. 112), all possible colours are contained

in the spectrum, except white, black,


especially the various tints of

It has

and grey; though many


brown, are so inferior to

been suggested that cats and owls, and other animals which see
may have eyes unusnally sensitive to the very refrangible

well in twilight,
rays,

the

which

violet

and purple, and the photographic rays invisible to us,


more abundant in twilight than the less refrangible

are relatively

ones,
I

^'"'^

'^'''S"t

to

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

116
those of

spectrum in intensity and in

tlie

[cii.

XXXV.

degi'ee of saturation

that the eye does not identify them.

There are three, and only three, ways in which any two
These are
of colour can possibly differ from each other.

tints

1.

In the order of the colour

or,

in other words, the posi-

tion of the colour in the chromatic circle.


2.
3.

In the intensity of the colour. And


In the intensity of the white with which the colours of

substances are diluted.

all

Professor Clark

Maxwell has made the important remark,

Possibility that, as these three elements aU admit of numerical statement,

of giviug a
-J.

for

any

*^*"

jg

possible to give an arithmetical formula for

The

tint.

any possible

intensity, or brightness, of the colour itself

may

the intermixed white

and of

of course be numerically valued,

taking as unity for each colour the brightest tint that can be

The order of the colour may


the chromatic circle, which for such a

obtained by means of pigments.

be stated in degrees of

purpose ought probably to be so arranged that each colour


should be exactly 180 from its complementary.
Scientific

am

convinced that the principles of harmonious colouring

principles
of harino-

^j.g

nious

in this note.

colouring,

saying that no rules for harmonious colouring are worth any-

^q

Ijq

found in the laws of the combination of colours stated


^r
t
I do not know how lar Mr. Kuskin is right in
r-

thing, but if he

is

been yet laid down,


taining

it

to

no such rules of any value have


does not follow that he is right in main-

right that
it

be in the nature of things impossible for sucli

rules ever to be discovered.

for

-r~,

If

harmonious colouring, this

is

we have no

rules of

any value

only because the true laws of

the combination of colours have not been long known.

We

know what

and

science has done for the kindred art of music,

with this analogy

be unable
colouring.

it

is

to

to discover valid

me

incredible that science should

and valuable rules

for the art of

CHAPTER XXXVI.
PERCEPTION.

IT
all,

an axiom concerning which there

no dispute, The
It is also agreed by
that mind begins with sensation.
^Jj^
that sensation is inexplicable.
But the most debated sensations
is

question of psychology

is,

how

is

sensations give

rise

to to^pe"cep-

perceptions.

^^^^-

"When I speak of perception, I mean more than the


mere cognition of a sensation. Any sensation whatever
may be the object of cognition any sensation becomes the

Perception
^j^^n eoo--

'"tion

object of cognition in the act of directing attention to

it.

But a sensation may be cognised without its giving rise


Nothing, for instance, is perceived in
to any perception.
cognising the general sensation of being well or

That which we

or weary.

ill,

perceive, according to

regard as the accurate use of the word,

is

what

not the sensation

but that to which we refer the sensation.

itseK,

vigorous

And

propose to define perception, as that act hy %vhich the

mind

I must, however, in

some

refers sensations to their sources.

that

perception

space

we

thus,

if

is

to say,

assign the sensation

may

I receive a ray of light

be remote in
from a star on my

and thereby perceive the star, that which I perceive


But the perceived
is at an almost immeasiirable distance.
source of a sensation cannot be remote in time it must be
present in time if the source to which the mind refers
eyes,

the sensation belongs to past time, the act of referring


the sensation to
inference.

Thus,

perceive that

my

its
if I

source

is

not called perception, but

cognise the sensation of thirst, I

throat

the

^^ gg^g^?
tions to

The perceived source of a sources


the source to which in the act of

degree qualify this definition.


sensation

it is

is

dry,

and may

may

infer that this is

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

118

my

caused by

having eateu

[chap.

meat an hour

salt

must consequently modify the


above, and call it that act hy

the sources offered


presfut
ill

time,

sources present

sensations to

accurate

it

This
it

mind

refers

the most

is

not perfectly

is

includes as perceptions some acts which are

really inferences.

from

but

definition I can offer,

accurate

ivJiich the

in time.

We

ago.

of perception

definition

and

disease,

may cognise a local pain arising


may know with perfect certainty the

Thus, I
I

state of the diseased part

which causes the pain

yet the

knowledge by which I assign the painful sensation to its


source may be a case, not of perception, but of very
circuitous inference.
1

per-

aecurate

believe, however, that it is in the nature of things

impossible to frame a definition which shall be such as


^^ include all that are really acts of perception,

defiuitiou

exclude

sible.

reason of

this,

inference

graduate into each other.

is

as,

my

in

an inference

of inference.
'

it

is

opinion,

ceptiou

when we

inference,

regard

simple

to

the

and

Perception indeed

first

and simplest case


to

refer light to

as

that perception

refer a sensation

in so doing perceive the star


Percep-

is

only the

When we

instance,

for

And

that are really acts of inference.

all

and

its

source

star,

and

I do not regard the per-

inexplicable

act

of the

mind

bethc^oue

an inference, instantaneously and spontaneously made.


This view is supported by the fact that
the same act may appear to be a perception or an infeience, according as it is performed at once and spon-

or the

taneously,

cording to
circum-

thought.

The same

stances.

as

it

or

with hesitation and with some

by the

of

effort

dog will
smell a dead animal and perceive at once where it is
Thus, uogs perccive

wlien a

man may

sidering

for

some

ascertain
little

its

smell.

presence only by con-

time what the

unpleasant smell can be, and even then

source of the

may remain

in

some degree of doubt. It is, I think, quite impossible to


point out any difference between the dog's unhesitating
perception and the man's hesitating inference, except the
mere circumstance that the one is instantaneous, while the
other occupies an appreciable time.
perception

is

It

may be

said that

an unconscious process, while inference

is

This

conscious oue.
just supposed
is

119

PERCEPTION.

XXXVI.]

is

true

at least it is true iu the case

but the unconsciousness of a mental process

a result of

being habitually performed.

its

We

can

by sound, as accurately as the dog can percei^'e


by smell, and we can perceive the presence of our friends
by their voices but this is altogether an acquired perception, depending on habitual association when we are
learning to know a man by his voice, the power of idenperceive

him graduates from hesitating inference to unhesiand when it has become perception,
tating perception
it is accompanied by no more conscious thought than the
And when inspontaneous perceptions of an animal.
tifying

ferences

that

what

is,

are indisputably inferences

are

effort, we
them as perceptions. David perceived
was dead, when he saw the servants whisper.

performed at once, spontaneously, and without


habitually speak of
that his child

I believe this account of perception in itself presents The

no

difficulties.

the question

is

which
generally surrounded do not arise from
believe

the

difficulties

with

any metaphysical perplexity in the nature of the subject itself, but from its being complicated with other
questions which come before us in connexion with it.
These questions concern the relation of the mind to space,

and the relation of the two senses of sight and touch


each other in the act of j)erception

to

so that in the treat-

of the theory of perception various questions have

ment
got mixed up together, concerning the nature of that act
by which the mind refers sensations to their sources, the
nature and origin of the cognition of space, and the mode
in which the sensations of sight and touch are combined
in the perception of bodies. To these three distinct
inquiries some writers add a fourth, namely, the nature
of the idea of material substances as distinguished from
their properties.

It is

no wonder

appear inextricably perplexed

up

together,

and yet may prove

if

four such questions

when they
to

mixed
be manageable enough
are all

if they are taken separately.

I have stated

my

belief that perception

is

to be defined

^ggi^f^^t"
plicated

by

questions.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

120
Perception,

aud

the cognition of
space, are
distinct,

but have
been confounded.

[CHAF-

The next question to conan instantaneous inference.


and origin of our cognition of space.
These two questions how we perceive, and how we become
and
cognizant of space are nearly always confounded
this confusion has its expression in the use of the term
"the external world," as synonymous with "the world
existmg in space." The two may be identical in fact, but
as

sider is the nature

they are not necessarily identical in thought.

may

"VVe

conceive a being with consciousness and thought like -our

Such a

own, but with no sense except that of hearing.

being could not possibly acquire any idea of space, yet

might pterceive that


of a world external to

to say,

is

might

On

itself

infer

space, without perceiving

and not only

the existence

the other hand, I believe

and of

possible to be cognizant of space,

it is

relations in

an external world

as

but I believe we

We

in space

cognise

cognise the existence of sensations as related

space
before we
perceive
objects
in it.

before

we

sations

before

so,

existing

necessarily

in

space,

we refer the senwe must have cognised space

perceive the objects to which


in other words, that

it

we can

begin to perceive objects as existing in space.

more

I go

on

to state

believe,

we

cognise space.

way

fully the

When

must be understood

in which, as I

speak of two or more

meaning sensations of
the same sense. Let us imagine what may take place
when consciousness is being first awakened by sensation.
sensations, I

A ray

as

of heat falls on a spot of skin

this is cognised as

simply a sensation, and nothing more.


second ray of
equal intensity falls on the same spot of skin this is not
;

cognised as a distinct sensation, only the

now
Cognition
of two
sensations
as separated in
space.

cognised as having increased in intensity.

the second ray

fall

on a

different spot of skin

cognised as a distinct sensation, in


the

sensation

first

first,

but separated from

it

all

in space.

let

this will

be

respects similar to
This, I believe, is

the elementary form of the cognition of space.

my

But

is

It

is,

opinion, a case of pure primary cognition, without

in

any

element of inference; just like the cognition of unlikeness


that would be produced

if

the two sensations were different.

some distance
warm spot is moved

Or, instead of supposing a second sensation at

from the

first,

let

us sunno'^e that the

121

PERCEPTION.

XXXVI.J

over the skin

this will

be cognised as a change, not in the

character of the sensation, but in

its locality

will give rise to a cognition of space.

and

I do not say that of a sensa-

such experiences as these will give a fully developed cognition of space.


They can only give the cognition of space
of

two dimensions

of surface only, not of solidity.

they can, and do, give the

I believe

first

But

rudimentary

j^^ ^-^^^^

ways, only
extension

can be
cognised.

Coguitiou

this also "he motion

cognition 01 space.
I do not suppose that the cognition of space could be Cognitions

produced by a uniform sensation spread over a sensitive


surface, such as the sensation of heat over the whole skin

^
"[j^^^^gf

time

body when in a warm bath just as the cognition "n^parallel


by the unchanging con- '*^*y'*tinuance of the same sensation. The cognition of time
is produced by the commencement, the cessation, or the
change of sensations
and the cognition of space, as I
believe, is produced in an exactly parallel way, by the
existence of sensations at the same time in different parts
of the

of time could not be produced

of a sensitive surface.

By

these

cognition

we acquire the
between our own sensations

merely passive sensations,

of

space-relation

and that, I think, in space of only two dunensions.


The cognition of a third dimension in space is, I think,
due not to any merely passive sensation, but to our motor
activity, and the sensation of it
and to the same " mus-

only

cular sense

" is

due the perception of objects in external

space^external, that

to the body.

is,

Our perceptions

Pereepo\"(.g

of e.xtemal to

external objects, in so far as they are derived from touch

is^acqnired

and not from sight, consist of combined impressions of^y***


^
motor

Torm and resistance (this analysis is admitted by all sense.


writers on the subject)
and I believe that these perceptions are inferences from our sensations of motion and of
,

'

1..

resistance to motion.

who

This will be intelligible to any one

man examining a new


He moves them round it in order

will watch, or imagine, a blind

object with his hands.


to ascertain its form,

and

feels its resisting

power in order

to ascertain its hardness or softness.

There are thus three possible ways in which impressions Summary.

on the senses

may produce

a cognition of space

and

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

122

[cHAP.

have no doubt the three actually co-operate in producing


it.
These are
1. The existence of two or more sensations in different
places at the

Sight, like

miSiiill
cognises
superficial

'^^

3.

Our own motions.

sensation changing

its place.

AVe coguise space, or extension, by the sense of sight


^^^ ^^ ^y ^^^^ ^^ touch and in sight, as in touch, we
;

are

cognizant

originally

What we
we

-what

Percep-

sensations

bihtl^ an
acquh-ed
power.

that

superficial

of

Originally see is

extension only,

only coloured surface

and

of in seeing is

are originally cognizant

only

and the mutual relations of those


The power of perceiving
seusations in superficial space.
of colour,

sav,

to

is
1

objects

by

the
1-1
by touch,
a

of inferring

sight, as

jt ig

is,

of external

existence

later acquired power.

is

This view, that the cognition of space


superficial space,

these
views.

time.

2.

extension,

Facts con-

same

at

is

of

first

of course, not capable of proof.

But

very strongly supported by a fact of which every

him

one's consciousness will inform

easier to think

of extension as

as linear or as solid.

we imagine

we

If

namely, that

it

is

than either

superficial

desire to think of a line,


it.
If we
we imagine

a surface and draw the line on

desire to think of space of three dimensions,

a surface, and then, I think with some

add the thuxl dimension.

Such a

little

fact as this

difi&culty,

may be com-

pared to those facts of organization which have no bearing

on the functions of the


process of

its

adult,

development.

It

but are records of the

may

be said that on

my

theory of the acquisition of the cognition of space by the


co-existence of similar sensations in different parts of the
sentient surface of the body, there
first

Answer

to

o yec on.

is

no reason

why

our

thoughts of extension should be superficial rather

we become cognizant
by the co-existence of two separated sensations, but by the co-existence of an indefinite number
of sensations, some of them similar and some unlike,
spread over the surface of the body and thus our first
than Knear.

I reply, that in practice

^^ extension, not

perceptions of extension are not linear, bu.t superficial.


I

have as yet spoken only of perceptions by a single

But in the most important

sensation.

that

123

PEECEPTION.

XXXVI.]

is to say,

in those of sight

class of perceptions Percep-

elements from the two

and touch are combined. The peculiarly


f
^
between those two senses is due to the
connexion
intimate
fact, that they alone of all the senses give any cognition
Space has become more associated in our
of space.^
but the
habitual thoughts with sight than with touch
senses of sight
.

-,

-I

u_T

to^both"*^

touch and
sight.
g^g^jg^i

connexion

^^q

seij^jjey_

origin of our cognition of space in its three dimensions

must be due, not

to

sight,

but to touch (including the

muscular sense as belonging to the

which is the principal organ of


moving in all three dimensions, and thus
to

the cognition of three

whether

dimensions

at rest or in motion, has

dimension.

of giving origin touch,

while the eye,

no way of cognising a

power of

It is true that the eye acquires a

estimating distance, not only by the effects of perspective,

but by means of the varying optical adjustments which


are spontaneously

power

is later

made

acquired,

for varying distances

and

is far inferior

but this

in accuracy, as

well as totally different in kind, from the power of the eyes


to appreciate the space-relations of surface.

It has

been

shown by observations made on persons born bhnd who


afterwards received sight by the removal of the congenital
cataract, that

knew simple superficial forms, such as a


when presented to their sight, but had no

they

circle or a square,

Cognition

for the hand, ^^


;
l^^^^
touch, is capable of dimensions

latter)

perception whatever of the distances of objects from the eye.^


1 See the chapter on the Physiology of the Senses, in Dr.
Examination of Mill's Philosophy.

M 'Cosh's

2 See Dr.
Berkeley said that a
'Cosh's chapter, already referred to.
person born blind, and acquiring sight suddenly, would not know a circle
from a square. In his time, no observations on the subject had been

made. It has been subsequently stated, that his purely theoretical views
have been confirmed by observations on persons cured of congenital
cataract but a very carefully observed case reported by Dr. Franz of Leipzig
(quoted by Dr. M'Cosh from the Philosophical Transactions of 1841) appears
;

conclusive as to the cognition of superficial extension.

With

respect to

the inability of the eye to perceive the distance of objects from itself,
until it has learned to do so by practice, Mr. Abbot, in his work " Sight

and Touch," argues that no observation of the kind is in the least degree
conclusive because in all such cases as yet recorded there has been but
one eye, so that the patient has been without those means of perceiving
and in that
distance which arc given by the simultaneous use of two eyes
;

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

124

Our habitual mode

Additional
j)roof of

[chap.

of thiuking of space is sucli as to

afford additional proof that

we have our

first

cognition of

The magnitudes
which the hand cognises and measures are linear magthe magnitudes which the eye cognises and
nitudes
space from touch rather than from sight.

this.

Touch
cognises
linear

magni-

sight
cognises

space

derived from touch,

is

we ought

to think of linear

magnitudes more easily than of angular ones.

angular
ones and contrary,
we think

our conception of space

more

If our conception of

measures are angular magnitudes.

tudes ;

is

If,

on the

derived from sight,

we

ought to think of angular magnitudes more easily than of

easHy of
linear ones.
the former
than of the with us ; we
latter.

Now, the former of these two is the case


think more easily of linear than of angular
magnitudes. This is the more remarkable, because, once

angular magnitudes are understood, they are as easy to


reason about as linear ones, and

much

easier to

measure

but no one clearly conceives what angular magnitudes


are until he has received his first lesson in mathematics
AVords
denoting
and words denoting linear magnitudes and directions are
the former
are

common
words
denoting
the latter
are technical.

abundant in colloquial language, while words denoting


angular magnitudes and positions are all in some degxee
Such words as above, below, before, behind,
technical.

and
such words as

right, left, mile,


Avliile

inch, belong to
altitude, azimuth,

To speak
neous thoughts of space, whether

to scientific language.

common

language;

and degree, belong

technically, our spontasuperficial or solid, are

always in terms of rectilinear co-ordinates, never in terms


of polar co-ordinates.

A being
with sight
only

would
cognise

only
angular

magni-

Were

a being with mental faculties like ours to haA^e no

power of moving about, and no sense except sight, it could,


and would, form an idea of angular magnitude, but not
It would see all things, as we see
of linear magnitude.
the stars, on the surface of a hollow sphere, of which the

tude.

one eye the

ojitical

apparatus for adjusting the lenses of the eye to varying

distances has inevitably been destroyed in the operation for cataract

so

by the mere physical conditions of the case, there could be no power


perceiving distance by the eye, until the effects of perspective were

that,

of

learned.

This

is

cognition of space

perfectly tnie as to the fact.


is

My

originally derived from touch,

not grounded on any such observations, but chiefly

next two paragraphs, which, so far as

know,

conviction that the

and not from sight, is


on the reasoning in the

is original.

125

PERCEPTION.

XXXVI.]

would be its own eye but it would be totally unconscious of any distance between its eye and the objects.
Not, however, that they would seem close to its eye the
question whether they were near or far would for it have
no meaning.^ If in the course of its development it were
to acquire a hand or a tentacle, by means of the motions
of that organ it would acquire the sense of distance, and
then its knowledge of the properties of space would be as
complete as ours but, as its ideas of angular magnitude
centre

were more early acquired than its ideas of distance or


linear magnitude, it would always think more easily of

would spontaneously think of space in


But if, on the contrary, the
terras of polar co-ordinates.
organ of touch were developed first and the eye afterwards, it would acquire its ideas of distance or linear
magnitude first, and of angular magnitude later; and it

the former

and

it

would consequently always think of space


linear co-ordinates.

In

all

Now

in terms of recti-

this last is practically our case.

perceptions and ideas of bodies as existing in

space, impressions of sight are

combined and practically

identified with impressions of touch.

know

Thus,

if I

perceive

impres-

^he'two

what size it will senses are


seem to the hand or if I first perceive its size by the hand, ^^ t^e
In common ^^^'^'
I know of what size it will seem to the eye.
laneuase it would be said that it seems of the same size to
But how can it be possible to identify an angidar
both.
magnitude and a linear one with each other ? The identi- as the
lip
'
fication is the result solely of habitual experience. If we had ^^^^}^^
no means of ever touching what we saw, and no means of
ever seeing what we touched, we should have no notion of
identifying the two, nor would it be possible for us to do
for there is no common measure
so, even in imagination
nor is there any resemmagnitudes
for linear and angular
blance between the sensations of light and colour felt by
the eye, and the impressions of contact and resistance felt
Without experience there would be no
by the touch.
more connexion in perception or thought between the
objects of sight and of touch, than there is between colours

the size of a book by the eye, I

of

'

See Nnte at rnrl of chapter.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

126

and

But experience has taught us

soiinclp.

general rule, wherever there

sensation of touch there


Account
of the
process.

is

That

is

to say, if I raise

is

my

as a

that,

a sensation of sight there

a possible sensation of touch

is

[chap.

and wherever there

is

a possible sensation of sight.


eyes and see, for instance,

know

my

my

hand

that on
meet
with a corresponding sensation of
I
touch or if I stretch forth my hand and feel it, I know
that on raising my eyes I am certain to meet with a corresponding sensation of sight. The two sensations are met
paper-cutter, I

am

stretching forth

certain to

with together

and

this is our only,

reason for referring them to

the same

but quite

sufficient,

object.^

This truth, that the identification of visual and tangible


objects is solely due to experience, was first seen by

B erkeley.

Berkeley, and

He

of vision.

the essential point of

is

deduced

it

celebrated theory

liis

from purely theoretical

data,

and
on

has been subsequently confirmed by


persons cured of congenital blindness by the removal of a
observations

it

It is

cataract.

stances have to

walk

found that persons under such circumlearn to see, just as children have to learn

to quote Dr. M'Cosh's expression, they " re-

Quotation

to

from
M'Cosh.

quire observation and thought to reconcile the information

or,

they had got from touch, with that which they are now
receiving from sight; just as persons who have learned

two languages, say German and French, require practice


enable
^

them

readily to translate the one into the other."

A very remarkable

instance of the facility with which

called habits of perception are foi-med is afforded

the axes of whose eyes are far from parallel


squint

hare

by the

that

is

to
2

what may be

fact that persons

to say, persons

who

the visual images necessarily formed on parts of the two

and yet they see single. When the two


operation, so that the two images come
parallel
by
an
set
been
axes have

retinas whioli do not correspond,

to be formed on corresponding parts of the retinas, the patient sees double


at

first,

but soon learns to see single.

(Carpenter's

Human

Physiology,

In this case, however, there must be some organic change in the


nervous connexion between the two eyes and the optic ganglia.
2 See the chapter referred to in a former note.
It may not be a familiar
fact that translation is an art which has to be learned by practice, even
p. 705.)

when

familiarity with

two languages

exists already

in other words, that

facility in translating with accuracy from one language into another

a matter of course,
is true.

even to those who know both languages well

is

not

but

it

PERCEPTION.

XXXVI.]

127

Berkeley, however, left imsolved, and I believe unat-

tempted, the real difficulty of his theory.


cernin<j[

mean

that con-

Young
swim
them able

the instinctive motor actions of animals.

ducks, for instance, run to the water and begin to


as soon as they leave the egg; so that

we

see

to perform, without

Difficulty
i'^'^^?*

lllStlllC-

tive
^'*

aTuck'

having learned, actions of the same ranning to


character as those which a child performs in consequence when It"
of having learned, such as walking or feeding itself. ISTow, ^^^^^ ^^^
the actions of young ducks, and of most young animals,
evidently involve perception, and are a result of it.
What

then becomes of Berkeley's theory, that the perception of


objects has to be learned?
To state the argument more

The young duck knows not consciously, but in


an unconscious way that serves
guidance that the
clearly

it

water which

for

which it can swim. It


leaves the egg, not only witli the same power of sensation
which man possesses at birth, but also with that power of
it

sees is water in

perception which,

is

man

only acquires gradually and by experience.


no explanation to say that animals are instinctive,

correct,

It is

but

Berkeley's analysis of perception

if

man

is

that there

is

We

have no ground for thinking


any fundamental difference between instinct

rational.

and reason or, since the words instinct and reason have
acquired misleading associations, I will say rather between
;

mind and

the animal powers of

the lower

human

ones.

In this state the question was left by Berkeley and


on the subject, which was first published
more than twenty years ago, after stating with his usual
;

Mill, in a review

grounds for believing that we have no possible


means, except experience, for identifying the objects of
sight with the objects of touch, concluded by admitting the
ability the

instinctive actions of animals as

an unsolved

When my

difficulty in

the

way

first

directed to the subject, this difficulty appeared to

of Berkeley's theory.

attention

was

me

not a merely residual difficulty, like those planetary perturbations which the theory of gravitation failed to account
for in

Newton's time

it

appeared to amount to a refuta-

But recent speculations on the


nature of instinct and of mind, especially the speculations

tion of the entire theory.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

128

shown

of H. Spencer, have

[cHAP.

that Berkeley's theory

is

consistent with all the facts, and that the difficulty

The question

apparent.

how

is,

out having learned to

only

the duck able to recog-

is

and

nise water without having seen water,


Explana-

really

is

swim ? And

swim with-

to

the answ^er

is,

that these

which have become hereditary and consequently


instuictive.
The race has learned them, and they are conThe individual
sequently instinctive in the individual.
But
has learned them, not in itself but in its ancestors.
power
which
is
the power of perceiving by means of sight,
obviously implied in the duck running to the water when
it sees it, is, in the duck as well as in man, purely the
^^^ habits

tlie^e are

cases of
habit,

result of experience

man

only that in

of the individual, in the

duck

it is

the experience

that of the race.

it is

deny that the explanation is in some degree


is no possible test for deciding what
are the results of habit, and what of unconscious organic
intelligence, acting independently, or as it were in anticiBut the explanation I have offered, in
pation of habit.
which, I believe, every authority would now agree, has the
only proof of which the nature of the case admits that is
to say, the cause alleged is known to exist, and is adequate
I do not

hypothetical, for there

to produce the effect.

As

have stated at the beginning of this chapter, I

believe that perception

neither

is

simple act nor an

inexplicable one, but merely the simplest of all cases of

The

inference.

Presump-

fact that

we

perceive not by one but

by

several distinct senses is enough to raise a very strong


perception
is not a
presumption that perception is not a simple inexpKcfrom the
multiphClty of
senses.

'

^^^^^

^^^'

tamty,
loss

^^^ one that admits of analysis and explana-

And what

tion.

IS

r.

raises the probability, I think, to


-1

the familiar fact that in

whether we ought

o/the"

organic system.

many

to refer the

external, or to account for


^

it

cases

we

are at a

sensation to anything

by the disordered

The multiplicity

a cer-

of the senses

state of the
is,

however,

subject,

a cause of difficulty in the understanding of the subject

multipli-

^iid it is still further

city,

and

binatioii.

complicated by the combination, in

h^q most important class of perceptions, of impressions

derived from the two senses of touch and sight.

It is

PERCEPTION.

XXXVI.]

129

quite conceivable that in a different world from

mental

natiu-e as highly

tliis, a
developed as ours might he evolved

out of the germ of a single sense, at least

were sight

and

that sense

if

to such a being the nature of perception

would probably present no difficulty whatever.


I think I have shown in this chapter that what Ave
perception, and naturally regard as a single mental
T

enumerated

we

The

referring of a sensation to its source

perceive the friend by

means

as

true

in other words,
sensation

or,

This has not

of his voice.

we know

that every sound

2.

of space-relations

hearing,

between our sensa-

and

The cognition

of a third

dimension

Cognition
of space-

mi
3.

^'^^"

It

not by means of the sense of hearing that

it is

The cognition
:

to its

must come from some

we have learned this. Had we no sense except


we should have no cognition of sjDace at all.
tions

tio" enumerated.

when Assign-

necessarily anything to do with the cognition of space.


is

iu^perce^j-

recognise a voice as that of a friend,

place, but

act,

which may be thus

really consists of distinct elements,

1.

call Elements

m space by means

relations.

of the motor or muscular sense.


4.

Having learned

to refer a sensation to

a source, and

having acquired the cognition of space in three diniensions,

we become

in external

able to perceive the source of a sensation

space

that

is

to

say,

to

perceive

Percepobjects in
space.

objects

external to the body.


5. Lastly, we learn to combine the impressions of sight Combina^^ ^
with those of touch, and thus to acquire
the very
^
J comiolex

impres-

ideas that

we have

of external objects.

sions of

by thus separating the complex subject of


its elements, we remove the difficulties
which have hung round it, and make it as explicable as
any mental function can be.
One cause of difficulty concerning the present subject is
I believe that

g,^^j^^.

perception into

the ambiguity of the expression

What

is this

mind, or only

"

the external world."

understood to be external to
to the

body ?

part of the external world

be only a verbal one


VOL II.

it

is

the body

may

appear to

In other words,
This question

and we may appear

to the ^'^lat

Is

is

" the
external
"'

to dispose of it

"^^^''^"^

to

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

130
It

may

be

extra-

mental, or
only extraorganic.

which
includes the body, and of the extra-organic world, which
But I think the question redoes not include the body.^
If I am right
presents a real though a soluble difficulty.
in agreeing with those who think that perception is an

by speaking,

inference,

of

of the extra-mental world,

instead,

we may define the internal world as consisting


and tlie
is known by direct consciousness
world, as including all that is known only by

aU that

external

In so

inference therefrom.

far as the

sensations, it is part of the internal

an object of perception,

No

organ

of sense

can
perceive
itself.

[chap.

It is here to

it is

itself,

is

the seat of

in so far as

it is

a part of the external world.

be observed, that

when one

sense becomes an object of perception,

by

body

world

of our organs of

it is

but by another organ of sense.^

are the only organs by which we perceive

perceived, not

Sight and touch


objects, because

they are the only organs of sense that give any idea of
space.

The eye cannot

see

one hand, or at least one

hand can

itself,

finger,

but the hand can

cannot

feel itself,

feel it

but the

and the eye can see both the hands.


Had we but one sense, and were the organ of that one
sense incapable of becoming an object of perception to
itself, and consequently incapable of becoming an object of
other

perception at

feel

all, it

it,

would not occur

to us to regard

it

as a

part of the external world.


1

"

have endeavoured to show that the

difficulties

connected with the

apparent deception of the senses can be removed by attending to three

1. That between our original and ac(iuired percejitions


That between sensation and perception 3. That between the objects
all of them being extra-mental, but some of them
intuitively perceived
also extra-organic."
(M'Cosh's Examination of Mill's Philosophy, p. 171,

distinctions

2.

note.)
I

" Objects intuitively perceived which are not extra-organic," must,

suppose, be states of the organism, such as dryness of the throat.

^ This remark has been made by Professor

Ferrier.

perception.

xxxvlJ

131

NOTE.
As

an intelligent being, which


should derive its knowledge of space from sight alone, could
have no idea of more than two dimensions in space. The eye
stated in the foregoing chapter,

sees surface only

through the eye,

And

further

and if knowledge of space came exclusively


it would be of superficial extension alone,

as

it

for, as

knowfecl"e
^ P^^
sio-ht only.

the superficial extension thus cognised would not

be that of a plane surface, but that of the interior surface of a


sphere

Case"of a

j^emg

previously stated, the eye really sees

sees the stars, projected

all

cognise

things, "ly

on the interior surface of a sphere, and

that

would consequently be impossible for such a being to have *^^'' snrface


any knowledge of the properties of a plane surface, or of any
surface except a spherical one ; and as a straight line cannot be
drawn on a sphere, it could have no idea of a straight liae.
All plane surfaces would appear to it as portions of the surface it wonkl
of the sphere, and all straight lines would appear as arcs of ^^
great circles drawn on the sphere.
The propositions of solid lin'es'as
geometry would be unmeaning to such a being the propositions ^^''^^ ^
f FGilt
of plane geometry would appear to be true only on an infinitely circles.
small scale ; and a race of such beings would perhaps make the
-plane
first great improvement in their methods of studying geometry, geometry
by introducing the conception of infinitely small portions of ggem^rue
It

surface, in order thereon to study the properties

%--

of lines and to

only

it

n^ly

.
.

There

is

nothing hypothetical in

matical truth.

all this

it is

simple mathe- small

It is mathematically impossible for the eye to see

a plane surface or a straight line.

Plane surfaces, and indeed

'

'^^^

^'

^J^

CtlUllOt SG6

all

surfaces whatever, are


lere

straight lines are

see^i

see7i

as portions

of the surface of a a plane

as arcs of great circles

on the

Every one who understands enough of geometry to


perceive the absurdity of asking whether the moon appears
sphere.

bigger or less than a cheese,

is

aware that this

is

tive

knows

K 2

"'"

line,

straight

true of the lines are

and every one who has studied the theory of perspecthat it is true of what we see on the earth.
When
we 2^<'rceive plane surfaces and straight lines by sight, we do not
see them ; we infer them from what we see.
Perception is only

heavens

'*"i"'^'^.''

^,.^!! ^^
great

''"

'^^'

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

132

The

a rapid inference.
lines, or rather

through

sight,

must

when ^T)ro-

^^I'i'^i^^ lines

cluced.

Reid's
o/v'isibles

meet

but

parallel great

great circles

two points (thus the

necessarily intersect each other in

on a globe intersect

two

Any two

sjahere.

at the

two

by

straight lines are represented to the eye


it

straight

but through touch.

cannot be drawn on the

which

and

conce^dion of plane surfaces

the possibility of those conceptions, comes not

Parallel straight lines never


circles

xxxvi.

[ch.

Now,

poles).

arcs of great

as

circles,

which

follows that straight lines as seen by the eye are lines

would meet and intersect if they were produced.


All this was stated long ago by Eeid, in his " Geometry of
^i^i^^^s," and has often been stated since.
But it has been stated
in that form of needless jjaradox, which tends to obscure truth
at once to those who are urging it and to those whom they
address.
It has been said that if we had no geometrical conceptions except what came to us through the sense of sight, it
would appear to us that parallel straight lines could, and if

Now, the

produced must, enclose a space.

making

this statement

tions except

is,

that if

accurate

way

of

we had no geometrical concep-

what we acquired through the sense of

should have no concejDtion of straight lines at

all,

sight,

we

but of great

circles instead.

These remarks will show us what


puzzle
rister

Bar-

nsters

"

for

space.

no better

really

" Essays

by

a Bar-

would also be possible to put the case of a world in


two lines would be universally supposed to include a
Imagine a man who had never had any experience ot

straight lines through the

denly

think of the following

to

from

"

It

-yvhich

is

it

placed

ujDon a

straight line to

an

medium

of any sense whatever, sud-

railway stretching out on a perfectly

indefinite distance in each direction.

He

would see the rails, which would be the first straight lines he
had ever seen, apparently meeting, or at least tending to meet,
at each horizon ; and he would thus infer, in the absence of all
other experience, that they actually did enclose a space

produced

far

enough."

The answer
two

to this

straight lines,

being nearly,

when

if

is,

that

what he would

but arcs of two great

not quite, a semicii'cle

have no reason to infer anything

else.

circles,

see

would not be

each of the arcs

and, I supjiose, he would

CHAPTER XXXVII.
THE RELATION OF THE MIXD TO SPACE AND TIME.

TN
--

the last chapter^ I have endeavoured to show that

rudimeutary knowledge of space consists in


the cognition of sensations as being situated in different
our

first

and consequently related to each other


seems inconceivable that the existence, at

parts of the body,

in space.

It

the same time, of sensations in different parts of the sentient

organism should not give


of space;

rise to a

rudimentary cognition

whether these are sensations of pressure or of

heat in different parts of the skin, or sensations of colour


in different parts of the retina.

And

besides, as I

have

shown, this theory of the origin of the cognition of space


accounts for the fact, that our spontaneous thoughts of
space or extension are more apt to be of a surface than of
either a line or a solid.
It is not disputed

by any, that our knowledge

an immediate and primary cognition


of time in

become cognizant

the

act

that

One

is

of time
to say,

of cognising

is

we

great

diversity

school,

'

with that of time

in other words, that

as

time by the succession of sensations in time,


"'

we cognise
so we origi-

by the separation of sensations in


This is a statement, though too brief to be comspace.
plete, of the theory on the subject which I have endeavoured to prove in the last chapter. Another school,
nally cognise space

we'cocm^se

of time

which 1 believe is the prevalent


one in Germany, and with which I agree, maintains that
the cognition of space is equally immediate and primary
opinion.

Our kuowl?'^o*^.of

our primary

But concern-

feelings as succeeding each other in time.

ing our cognition of space there

is

in

our sens^tions as
successive.

i believe

^P^^*: '^

cognised
in a

"^^^^

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

134

[chap.

which ]\Iill, Bain, and H. Spencer belong, think that the


of space is obtained solely by moving in it
i^ cUuisMl knowledge
by motion and as all motion takes place in time, they infer that our
" ^'
knowledge of space is not a primary cognition at all, but
derived from that of time. As I have said, I am opposed
Opinion

to

have stated my reasons


for thinking that the cognition of space is primary. Nevertheless there are real arguments on the other side, which
to this view.

In the

last chapter I

fully stated before they can be refuted.

must be

In approaching the question whether our knowledge of


space is really a primary cognition like that of time, we
first meet with this fact, that whether time and space are
Similarity

considered in themselves or as objects of thought, they are

aucUime

i^

many important

anything

Considered in themselves, they are both

else.

infinitely extended,

tude

is

and unlike

respects like each other,

and both

Magni-

infinitely divisible.

expressible in terms either of time or of space.

Both have being, though neither has existence all things


Considered
exist in space, and all events occur in time.
;

Both

are

both necessary; that

as obiects of thought, they are

is

to

''

necessary.

say,

,t

conceive them as

we cannot

not

tut

We

bemg.

can

voluntarily form

a mental conception of the absence of all

existing things,

but empty space will remain

we can

similarly conceive the absence of all events, but time will

remain.

We

cannot conceive, by any

effort of

the miiid,

we cannot conceive of a boundary in


space, nor can we conceive of a beginning

of a limit to either

any direction to
or an end to time.^

In one way, indeed, the idea of space

appears to cling closer to the mind than that of time ; for


Magnitude althoueh magnitude may be expressed in time as well

IS more
i
i
p
i
naturally
as in space, we habitually think of magnitude rather as

1 Mr.
ill says it is credible to him that there may be a limit to si^ce
(though of course he admits that it is inconceivable), and I suppose he
would say the same of time. I do not agi-ee with him but I mention
;

and credible are words and ideas


though it is one of the most imiior-

this in order to point out that conceivable

which ought never

to be

confounded

tant of all metaphysical problems, to determine how far conceivableness is


a test of possibility and credibility. I do not mean to charge Mr. Mill with

any such confusion


\vi-iter

who

is so free

on the contrary,
from

it.

do not think

could

name any

RELATION OF MIND TO SPACE AND TIME.

XXXVII.]

On

we speak of a expresseJ
we never speak of
^^

Thus,

expressed in space than in time.

space of time, but not of the converse

a time of space.

135

the other hand,

[j^ia^u

we speak

numbers

of

when the numbers indicate ratios


between spaces thus we say that the sun is many times as
From these facts, as well as from
far off as the moon.
in terms of time, even
'

time

tlwugh

number

is

expressed
"^ ^""'

those dwelt on in the last chapter concerning our cognition


[i^."|.'^|.^j^g'^

knowledge of space and our cognitions


^
knowledge of time are distinct in their origin, and parallel, ^^^^
separate
though closely connected, in their development.
of space, I conclude that our

It

may

be said that

all

this is irrelevant.

It

may

be

mere examination of our habitual thoughts


throws but little light on their origin, just as the anatomy
and physiology of a mature organism may throw but
little light on its larval form and on the mode of its
development. I formerly thought this argument was valid,
but I have in a great degree been compelled to modify my
said that the

opinion^ in consequence chiefly of

have shown, we spontaneously think of space in terms


of linear magnitude, which are given by the hand, and
not in terms of angular magnitude, which are given by
as I

the eye.

This

is

a very decided remnant and record of

the origin of our cognition of space by touch, and not by


sight.

If

it

were true that the cognition of space were

developed out of the cognition of time,

some such evidence


we find none such. Time

find

our cognition of

if

and

we should

surely

development

as this of its

but

and
space were developed by means of
is linear,

so is

motion

;^

motion out of our cognition of time, we surely should


think more easily and more spontaneously of a line
1

It

may

be said that rotatory motion

rotatory motion

may

is

arcniment
relevant?

the very remarkable Reason

manner in which our thoughts of space actually do, as I


have shown in the last chapter, retain traces of their
mode of development, and of what, by a bold but perfectly
The
accurate metaphor, I may call their larval form.
larval form of our cognition of space is derived from touch
and from the motions of the hand only in its developed
-,1
f
n
-NT
JSIow,
form it IS derived from these conjointly with sight.
,

"

not linear, but angular.

always bo resolved into linear

nintiiius.

Hut

fo

!{^"J^1"

Larval an
f(Jpn]^s^of

these
cognitions.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

136

than of a surface

as

but,

we have

[chap.

seen, the reverse

is

the case.

The reason usually advanced in favour

Eeasou
adviiDCoil

for think-

ing that
the cognition of

space

is

from
motion.

that the cognition of space

of the theory

not primary, but derived

is

from that of time through the means of motion, is, that


motion is capable of producing it, and that no cognition
ought to be regarded as primary if it can possibly have
been derived from any other. I have stated my reason
for thinking, in opposition to this theory, that our

thinking of space

from what

is different

it

would be

my

But in

had been produced in that way.

mode

of

if it

opinion the

really strong reason for thinking that the cognition of space


is

somehow

is

the fact, of which every one must be aware w?io has

less of a

primary cognition than that of time,

read or thought on the questions of modern metaphysical


controversy, that there
it

may

something perplexing, something,

is

be said, unmanageable, in the relation of the mind

which there is not in its relation to time. And,


argue as we may, we cannot get rid of the fact, that time
is much more inseparable from our thoughts than space.

to space,

Time
more

is

in-

separable

It is true, as already remarked, that we cannot conceive of


thoughts
But it is also true that we
than space, a universe without them both.

from our

think in time, and do not think in space

and we cannot

by any process of reasoning get rid of the notion that


"the external world "does exist in space, in a sense in
which the same is not true of " the internal world " or,
:

in

other words,

mind.
first

These

that space

facts

directed to this class of subjects, that the cognition of

mind

space was formed in the

must be formed

at least,

and

somehow external to the


when my attention was

is

convinced me,

am

than that of time,

or,

way

think that these facts are what

inclined to

really determine

later

in a fundamentally different

such thinkers as Mr. Mill, though

it

may

be in some degree unconsciously to themselves, in favour


of the theory of our knowledge of space being altogether
acquired
that,

l^y

in the

means

of motion.

way

have just

consciousness to space

is

It is

unquestionably true

stated, the relation of

unlike

this fact will, I think, lose its force if it

our

But
can be shown to

its relation to

time.

RELATION OF MIND TO SPACE AND TIME.

XXXVII.]

belong, not to consciousness as such, but, as


dentally, to the

human

it

137

were acci-

consciousness, as a consequence of

which the human consciousness is developed out of its original germ of sensation. I believe j hcn^yg
I think it can be shown how the tliis is not
this can be shown.
6SSGHtitll
human mind has been developed under circumstances to all
which have caused its relations to space to be unlike its "?*^}' ^\
aceidental
relations to time and it can be further shown with great to the
probability, how a mind might be developed, qu.ite consis- nihili.^
tently with what we know of the laws of mental development, imder circumstances which should cause its relations
to space to be the same as its relations to time; or, in
other words, how a mind might be developed which
the

manner

in

'-

should think, not only in time, but also in space.


All consciousness

is

primarily consciousness of differ-

This, I believe, is admitted

ence.

by every

one.

That

is

mind were to be always feeling the same


would never be conscious at all but conawakened when sensations begin, or cease, or Our

to say, if the
sensation, it

sciousness

is

As

succeed each other.


certain,

sciousness

much

a matter of

and will be disputed by no


is

T
developed
T

implied in

is

this.

i_i

ence between two sensations


time,

that

is to

the

first

to cognise the differ- iions.

succeeding each other in

necessary to remember the

is

it

how

this way.

In order

say, it

should

loped in time.

o^ir

sensation itseK.^

memory

necessary to the

consciousness

But

laws of mind that

of the two

outlast the

development of consciousness in time.


admitted that

first

necessary that the consciousness of

is

sensation

Consequently, a rudimentary

time

con^^lousness
fact,' I think it is
begins
one, that our con- with the
succession
-Dili.
Bnt let us see 1
^f gensa-

all

is

it

is

is

'Now, I have just

unquestionably deve-

a necessary consequence of the

consciousness must be developed in

we may assert with some tolerable degree


that a mind might be developed, under the

think

of certainty

same laws as ours but under other circumstances, from


the thoughts of which space and time should be alike
inseparable, which should think in space as well as in
For, why do wc think in time and not in space ?
time.
1

See pp. 70, 71.

Possibility

sciousness

heing degpae
)Y^^

y<,"'

^^

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

138

The

fact that

ness,

we do

so,

I thiuk, not

is,

though

is

a fact of couscious-

fact,

but one that admits

it

an ultimate

In order

of being accounted for.

must go beyond the general

[chap.

account for

to

it

consciousness

fact that

we
is

developed out of sensation, and examine the constitution


of the separate sensory faculties.
Touch,
and

siglit,

hearing
minister
tu mind.

Of

tliese,

only the
first

two

give cognition of
space.

The sensory
Qjjiy
'

faculties

which we have

three intellectual senses

j.|jg

that

'

examiue are

to

to say, touch,

is

and hearing
man at least, have any appreciable effect in producing
mental development.^ Now, it needs no proof that it is
only touch atad sight which give rise to any cognition
of space (including the mnscular sense as belonging to
Hearing alone could not give it. But, in comtouch).
sight,

for these are the only senses which, iu

pensation for being unable to cognise space, the sense of


the remarkable power, in which

hearing has

from

all

it

differs

the other senses, of cognising different simulta-

neous sounds without their combining into one


to say, of cognising sensations as distinct

same

that

is

which are sensa-

and are not separated either in


and not only of cognising them as
but of either attending to one of them in pre-

tions of the

time or in space
distinct,

sense,

ference to the others, or else of attending to several at


once, so as to cognise their

Time

is

cognised by

all

This fact

sight.

relation.

the senses, because

succeed each other in time

touch and

mutual

but space

that

is

time

cognised by

is,

all

I think,

we thiuk in time, and


But this is not all. That intellectual sense
which givcs no cognition orc space namely, the sense ofc
hearing is of all the senses the most closely associated

enough

to account for the fact that

Hearing is not in space.


the most
^
^

-j

connected

sensations

cognised only by
is

the senses, and space by only some of them

closely

all

thought,
because we

with thought.

words.

lopment of thought.

j.i

This is probably a consequence of the habit

q thinking in words,

which

is

necessary to any high deve-

It is also to

be observed that sensa-

Sensatious tions of different senses are cognised either as simultaneous


ot ddierent qj,
^g
senses
give
sliot,
may

successive.

we

If,

for instance,

we

see a flash

and hear a
what

are conscious of hearing the shot either at


'^

See the Chapiter on the Senses (Chai). XXXV.).

RELATION OF MIND TO SPACE AND TIME.

XXXVII.]

appears

be the same time

to

sensibly

moment,

later

senses

give a cognition of time

of the

same

sense,

witli

flash,

tlie

sensations

that

so

139

or

at

a cognition

of different

while only sensations

whether of sight or of touch, are able


There is thus

primarily to give any cognition of space.^

"mJ'on'l'

tliose of

sense^can
of

S^^'^ '*

qnite enough in the constitution of the sensory faculties

man

of

to account for the fact that

we

do not think in space, and that time

human

the

inseparable from

consciousness, while space can only be thought

of as something external to

There

it.

is

enough, I say,

constitution of our sensory faculties to account

the

in

think in time and

is

any such hypothesis as

for these facts, without the aid of

that of the conception of space being derived from the con-

ception of time

But

by means

though

these,

of the experience of motion.


of our consciousness, are not

facts

necessarily facts of all consciousness.


that

we may

conceive of a being having

have said above


its

consciousness

developed in space as well as in time, and consequently

Such would proa mental nature as complex and

thinking in space as well as in time.

bably be the result

if

were developed, as

lofty as ours

conceivably might be,

it

out of the germ of the sense of sight alone.

We

must

suppose such a being to have no sensations whatever except


those of light and colour
or organic sensations at

had no visceral
had any, that they

so that either it

all,

or,

if it

took the form of sensations of colour, as jaundice

is

said

(though, I believe, erroneously) sometimes to give a yellow

colour to everything that

looked

is

at.

not conceive of a sensation without


in space

It

may

having position

must of necessity
The consequence of

be said that a sensation of sight and one of touch are cognised

as related to each other in space

paper on which
sensations.

its

for every colour that is seen

be seen in some position in space.


1

Such a being could

This

am
is

writing,

true

for instance, I botli see

and cognise

its

and

feel the

by means of both
chapter, we have every

position

but, as stated in the last

reason to believe that the power of identifying a visual object with a


tangible one is an acquired power.
If we had never seen anything that

we

felt, and had never felt anything that we had seen, the idea of identifying the objects of sight and of touch would not occur to us as a possible

or conceivable idea.

Case of a
^JioTied
out of the
g,viit

only:

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

140
consciousness
its

this

would

be, that its consciousness

and time, just

[chap.

would be developed

would be

in both space

developed
in both
time and

All oiir sensations have position in


some of them have position in space. The
sensations of hearing which, as we have seen, is the sense
which is the most intimately connected with thought are
not primarily in any way related to space and consequently
o^ir consciousness is developed in time, and we think in
time, but we do not think in space, and space appears to
our consciousness to be somehow outside of it. But in
the supposed case of a being which is u.nable to have, and
consequently unable to conceive of, any sensations except
such as have position in space, the mind would be developed in space as well as in time. It would think both in
time and in space. Space would be as inseparable from its
thouglits as time is from ours, and would not appear to be
in any way outside of its consciousness. The relation of its
consciousness to space would be no more perplexing to it

space.

as our consciousness is deve-

loped in time only.


time, but only

than the relation of our consciousness to time is to us.


Indeed, the development of its consciousness in space

would be a simpler

than the development of

fact

consciousness, or of our consciousness, in time


as

we have

seen, consciousness cannot

its

because,

be developed in

time without at least a rudimentary memory, so as to

between present sensations and


past ones but nothing simUar to this is needed in order
to cognise either the relations of likeness and unlikecognise

the

difference

Illustra-

or the

ness,

tion.

called

space-relation.

Our consciousness may be

a series of feelings strung together on a thread

of time

^
;

but the consciousness of such a being

are supposing

inseparably as
feelings

If
1

as

series of

it is

is

space.

asked what I mean by thinkiag in space

But, as Mill has remarked,

series

we

woven, as a pattern, into a web whereof the warp

time and the woof

is

as'

a consciousness into which space enters


time might rather be called a

which

is

aware of

if

itself as

the

is

how

is

a series of feelings, it is a

with Dr. M'Cosh that


doubt whether Mill means it as an

a series.

this is an inadequate statement, but I

exhaustive one.

mind

I agree

it

141

RELATION OF MIND TO SPACE AND TIME.

XXXVII.]

conceivably possible to do so

I reply, that

we think

in What

is

time by means of words whicli succeed each other in time. tMnkin^/


If we were naturally, spontaneously, and unavoidably to in space,
think by means of diagrams drawn in space, I should call
this thinking in space.

of a subject which,

This, of coiirse,

by the terms

is

not a

of the case, lies in a great

degree outside of our possibilities of thought


it

I only offer

as a suggestion or indication.
It

may

be

at the most,

answer

said, in

to this reasoning, that I have,

proved the possibility of consciousness being-

developed in space and in time at once

would complete

my

argument

ness being only, as


consciousness,

may

it

but

that, if I

as to the difference

the relation of time and of space to the

it

account

full

human

between

conscious-

were, accidental, and not a law of all

in order

to complete this argument, I say,

be urged that I ought to show the possibility of

Possibility

"'
consciousness beinsf
and not in time, sciousiiess
developed in space
^
as a parallel and an oj)posite to the development of the indepen.

human

consciousness in time and not in space.

however,

is

This, time."

demand which cannot be complied

with.

The very fact of our consciousness being developed in time


makes it impossible for us to conceive the possibility of a
consciousness which is not developed in time. But though
it is not imaginable by us, I do not see any impossibility
in a consciousness being developed in space and not in
time that is to say, I do not see any impossibility in
the consciousness of some totally different order of beingbecoming awakened into life not, like ours, by the suc:

cession of different sensations, each occupying a distinct

portion of time, but by the co-existence of different sensations,

each occupying a distinct portion of space.

I say,

that I see nothing absurd or incredible in a consciousness

being in this

way developed

in space

while the sensations,

being perfectly unchangeable,

do not give rise to the


development of consciousness ni time. Indeed, the one
essential condition of the origin of consciousness, as

appears to me,

is

it

neither the cognition of the succession of

sensations in time, nor the cognition of their separation in


space, but

simply the cognition of difference

whether

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

142

[cii.

XXXVJI.

difference of opposition in space, or difi'erence of position

in time,

or

difference in the sense of uniikeness.

consciousness which

thougli the notion of a

is

But

not de-

veloped in time, and which remains unchanged through


time,

is

not capable of being imagined by us, whose con-

sciousness has been

developed in so totally different a

manner, yet the possibility of


Instance
of this
lieing
lielievcJ
in.

capable of being be-

it is

been a favourite notion with some Christian


mystics, that the happiness of a future state may be a

lieved.

It has

perfectly unchangeable state of bliss, so as to exclude all

sense of the succession of feelings, and consequently all

This notion has been thus ex-

consciousness of time.

pressed in the well-known lines


" Nothing there

is to

But one eternal

come, and nothing past,

now

doth ahvay last."

I quote these, not as having myself

the feeling they express, but merely

any sympathy with

in.

order to show that

the notion of a consciousness which does not exist in time

has proved

itself before

now

to be believable.

CHAPTER XXXV

IT.

AND CAUSATION.

TIME, SPACE,

IT

by any one who

will be perceived

lias

followed

my

reasonino's
the relation of the
thus far, that, as regards

mind

and time,

iioki

the

f,^P''iience

theory of

I assent to the theory

which is our kuowassociated with the name of Locke, namely, that our knowgp Jg and
ledge of them is derived from experience, in preference to ti^, in
the theory which is associated with the name of Kant, of to that of
their being d priori forms of thought existing in the mind fo'"s of
thought.
,
previously to experience, though it is only by means of
experience that the mind becomes conscious of them.
I
see no reason whatever for thinking that the conceptions
of space and time exist in the mind in any form at all,
to space

consciously or unconsciously, previously to experience.

a word, I think with Locke, that experience


duces those conceptions

In

is

what pro-

in opposition to Kant,

who main-

tained that experience does not produce them, but only

them forth from unconsciousness into consciousness.


But the doctrine of Locke, which T adopt, must be But the
understood with a very important modification. The con- ^^psi'ience
ceptions of space and time are indeed results of expe- herited
rience
but it is, for the most part, not individual but
calls

a word, they are results of the results of


experience of the race, tvhich have become fm'?ns of thought \'^^^^
the race
for the individual.
inherited experience

Thus Locke, who derived our conceptions of space and


time from experience, and Kant, who regarded them as

foraof
t'lo"^'''*

for tliG

forms of thought, are seen to be both right


seen by Locke

and includes

it.

is

but the truth

a wider truth than that seen by Kant,

The

reconciliation

and union of the two.

individual.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

144

mental habit,
is due to Herbert Spencer, in whose work on Psychology
I believe that his doctrine
tlie subject is wrought out.
will, in another generation or two, be universally accepted, and that the age-long controversy on this subject

by introducing the conception

^I^^'T!

[cuap.

of hereditary

will cease.

be denied that space and time are forms of


'
thought the question is, how space and time have become
Tuted
How have forms of thought. Kant repHed to this question by simply
spce and
g^^^^.- ^^g ^Yxq fact, and stating it as an ultimate and inexplicbecome
Locke and Spencer, like Kant, admit the fact
^ble One.
It is not to

The

thought?

ultimat^*

but, unlike Kant, they do not regard

inexplicable

or a result it

is

it

as ultimate

and

they believe, and I agree with them, that

result of experience

actmg through the law

of

encer"

hereditary mental habit.

The

The doctrine that the conceptions of space and time are


j.gg^its of experience is often, and conveniently, called the
experience theory. The doctrine that they are ultimate
and inexplicable laws, or forms, of thought, is often, and
conveniently, called the ideal theory and it forms a chayacteristic part of those metaphysical systems which are

experience

The

ideal

theory.

as the various forms of Idealism or Transcenden-

known
talism

them

The

ideal

cousilteuT
with the

logy of"
Kaut's

if I

understand

mind as the fundamental


knowledge from the constitntion

aright, consists in regarding

reality,

of the

the essential character of which,

and in deriving

mind

all

itself

Kant's ideal doctrine, that space and time are not only

forms of thought but a priori forms

inexplicable

facts of

by experience, or accounted
this doctrine, I say, was quite consistent with
at all,
psychology of Kant's time, which regarded mind as

Blind not to be accounted for


for
^]^g

something totally distinct in nature from the matter and


the organic life with which it is always associated. When
space and time were found to be forms of thought, and
when thought was supposed to be something apart from the
external world,

it

was a

logical inference that these forms

of thought belonged to the mind only, and could not be

traced to any origin in the external world.


further inference, not very obvious, but logical

And

it

was a

and perhaps

TIME, SPACE,

XXXVIII.J

AND CAUSATION.

145

necessary, that space

and time are notliiug but forms ofFurtlier


thought, to which there is no corresponding reality in the
sion^that
world outside of the mind that though we are compelled space and
by the constitution of our faculties to perceive, and to unreal,
;

think

and events in time, yet space


in no way functions of the objects and of the
events, but solely of the mind which cognises them. Kant admitted
saw this inference, and admitted it. But now that we ^^ ^^"^
of,

objects in space

and time are

have learned to regard thought, not as something apart The


from the external universe, but as the highest manifestation of its highest forces

namely, those of

life

it is

an

throry'ir"
consistent

equally logical inference, and is the inference which I psVclw"


draw, that space and time are forms of thought Secawse ^8y-

they are facts of the universe

that they were facts of the


universe before they became forms of thought and that,
in a word, they are facts of the universe which have
;

become conscious of themselves in the brain of man.


It appears to be a prevalent notion
though it was the Notion
notion rather of the schools of Kant and of Coleridge than
ije^ii^jj^ is
of those which have succeeded to them
that idealism, or favoural.le
the theory which makes time and space, and other con- *'' ^'^
ceptions that belong to the groundwork of our thoughts,
to be d priori forms having no root except in the mind
itself, and consequently derives all knowledge from the
constitution of the mind
it appears, 1 say, to be a pre-

'

valent notion that idealism

is

somehow more favourable

to

than the rival experience-theory. I think this is not


only wrong, but the exact reverse of the truth.
If space
.and time, and other fundamental conceptions, are nothing
but forms of thought, to which nothing in the universe
around us necessarily corresponds, then they are, or may
faith

be, totally unreal

which

is

and absolute truth

think

!^1,.,

that say, truth


unattainable by
is to

true for all natures whatever

is

and perhaps has no existence. Kant did not draw this Kant was
kept from
T- n
^
conclusion his faith kept him from it but his philosophy scepticism
us,

did not constitute a basis for his faith

was

his faith that kept

on the contrary,

him from what he saw and

it

ad-

mitted to be the logical consequence of his philosophy. ^


'

VOL.

11.

See Note at end of cliapter.

foith'^in

spite of

sophy.'"'

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

146

But

[chap.

that these couceptions were

if it is true, as I believe,

they became forms of thought, and


are forms of thought because they are facts of nature, then
with the
it follows that the forms of thought correspond

facts of nature before

The

experience f^cts of

raakel our

knowledge

thongh

Sfa

external nature

we know

things as they are

often despised as being

paratively unpretending, and

belief"

materialistic, is at least a possible basis for belief.

is

cognised

HOW come

I believe that

^^ acquire the knowledge of causation in exactly the same


way in which we acquire the knowledge of space and time,
namely by

within the

sphere of consciousness.

^^^-

is

to the subject of causation.

b'^^connntr

conscTous-

our

knowledge of the universe, though very limited, is real so


So that idealism, with all its vast pre^^^ ^g ^^ extends.
tensions, leads by a direct and logical path to absolute
scepticism while the experience-theory, though it is com-

possible

Causation,
like space

direct cognition

I liave already stated

by

my

their

coming within the

belief that

we

acquire our

cognition of space from the co-existence of sensations


in different places in the body and that we acquire our
In
first cognition of time by the succession of sensations.
first

mind

the act whereby the

cognises the separation of sensa-

comes within the sphere of consciousin the act whereby it cognises the succession of
ness
sensations in time, time comes within the sphere of con-

tions in space, space


;

sciousness.

I believe that

we

causation in an exactly parallel

acquire the cognition of

way

to these

namely, by

the relation of cause and effect entering into the sphere of


Consequently, our first knowledge of
our consciousness.
causation

is

not merely inferential knowledge

it is

matter

of direct cognition, as much as our knowledge of likeness


and uulikeness, of succession, and of the space-relation.

But there is this peculiarity about the cognition of causaThe other three simple relations which I have
tion.
enumerated obtain between sensations and in cognising
But with
them the mind may be perfectly passive.
;

causation the case

is different.

cognised as the cause of another


1

One
:

sensation cannot be

when we

are cognizant

In the Chapter on Mental Development (Chap. XXXIII.).

AND CAUSATION.

TIME, SPACE,

XXXVIII.]

witbm

of causation taking place


sciousness, the effect

is

]47

the sphere of our con-

not a sensation, but either a thought,

a mental feeling, or a voluntary determination

production of any of which the

in the

mind must be

in

some

In a word, we become cognizant of causabecoming


conscious of our own mental action.
I
*^

degree active.
tion in

how this fact of a direct cognition of causation


within the mind itself can be doubted. I was coiiscious,
do not see

instance,

for

of a

Abyssinian war.

of joy at

feeling
I

the result

of the

was conscious of assenting

to

Causation
'^

'jog'^ised

in be-

coming
of mentTi
^<^^^o^-

the

reasoning by which, as stated above, H. Spencer has explained the origin of our conceptions of space and time as

And

results of hereditary habit.

since the

commencement

of this work, I have often been conscious of voluntary

my will, to think and


on its subjects these determinations are not mere
feelings, but feelings followed by action and I am directly
cognizant of the connexion between the determination as
the cause and the action as its effect.
determinations, or determinations of

to write

must here guard against a probable misconception.


are directly cognizant of the relation of cause and
effect only when both the effect and the cause are within
I

We

the sphere of consciousness.

Thus,

when

think out a particular subject, and do


cognizant of the causation

that

is

I determine to

am
am

so, I

to say, I

cognizant of the fact that the determination of


the cause of the direction of
Avrite, I

am

my

not directly cognizant of

of the motion of

my fingers, because

the will and the muscular actions


ness.
if

he

It
is

thoughts.

my wiU

directly
directlj^

my

will is

But when

I There

as the cause

the connexion between

is

not within conscious-

was maintained by AVolf, the expositor

not misrepresented, that the determinations of the

and the motions of the muscles are not related as


cause and effect, but that the mind and the body are so
constructed as to act together without any such connexion

the

is

such a theory,

it

does not actually give

to consciousness.
So far as I can perceive, our
though quite sufficient, reason for believing that our
muscular actions, such as the motions of the fingers in
lie

only,

l2

cocnit'"^*
i^f tiie

will

cause of

of Leibnitz, muscular

will

and, absurd as

is

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

14S

by our voluntary determinations,

writing, are caused

that

we always

[chap.
is

find that the voluntary determinations are

by the motions. But if any one were to tell me


that hearing good news is not the cause of joy, or that my
followed

reading a sound demonstration


assenting to

this

it,

would contradict a

much

cognition, just as

as

if

my

not the cause of

is

fact of direct

he were to

assvxre

me

that

sugar was bitter or toothache pleasant.

We

How we
identify

physical

and mental
cansation
as cases of
the same
law.

^jqjj

fire

causes heat, and that good news causes

^ire causing heat

joj-

but

say that

and

Qf causc

is

a fact of matter

effect is
r>

is,

-i

as I believe, inferred

jjg^g causing
J
& Jiov

is

and

this rela-

not within our consciousness,

a fact

-iptacts.

/>

by us Irom the
and
of mind
;
'

/-it
Grood

this relation

of cause and
I

effect is witliin

self-evidently

think,

no mere

inference,

is,

but a fact

But mankind naturally and spon-

cognition.

of direct

our consciousness, and

taneously regard these as both alike cases of causation

and I believe that

many

here, as in so

spontaneous belief of mankind

is

other cases, the

But how do we

right.

come mentally thus to ascribe the same law of causation


two sets of actions, the physical and the mental,
between which there is so little intelligible resemblance ?
T think, though the subject is most difficult to analyse,
that the connecting link by which we learn to identify
to these

causation as cognised within the

mind with causation

inferred in the world of matter outside of

we have the power,


making our own will an

it,

as

consists in the

fact that

inexplicable as that power

of

acting cause in the world of

Thus,

matter.
desired

tlesired

if

I will to think,

my

is,

thoughts act as

my fingers and my pen act as


though
the
causal connexion, as already
and

if I

pointed out,

will to write,

is

within the sphere of consciousness in the

one case and not in the other, yet the effect follows the
cause in both cases with equal certainty, and we learn to
identify the nature of the causal action in the

In a word,

we

identify the

two

facts of

two

cases.

mental causation

and physical causation in consequence of the fact that a


mental determination
cause

as

when

is

capable of becoming a physical

the determination of

my

will causes the

TIMK, SPACE,

xxxviii.]

AND CAUSATION.

If a being

iiiutiou of iny pen.

were to

exist,

141

having powers Imaginary

and thought like our own, but without any


power whatever of acting on the world around it, I think
it is certain that its ideas of causation would be very unlike
ours.
It would have exactly the same idea of causation
that we have, in the sense in which causation is resolvable
into mere " invariable and unconditional sequence " but it
would have no idea of causation in the sense of force and
of perception

w^th
thought

ijeing

motor
po^^^i-s.

appears to me,

force, as it

is

the essential thing in our idea

of causation.

be seen that in this account of our original

It W'ill

cognition of the relation of cause and


to experience, although I differ

those

who
it

to experience

we

it

I agree with

but they ascribe

it

" fire is

in where

them

to experience

which we observe I
which
;

When we

the cause of heat,"

we

say,

for instance,

state a fact

have learned purely from external observation.

when we say

Mill maintains that

that "

fire is

which we
But Mr.

the cause of

meaning is, that " fire always emits heat,


and nothing more than the fire itself is needed in order to
have heat." I think, on the contrary, that more is meant
heat," our only

than

this.

think

we apply

the

analogy of our

own

mental experience to the external world, and infer that


causes heat in the same sense in which good news

fire

causes joy, or evidence causes belief.

analogy

men

is

It

may

be said this

plausible only to that intellectual state in

try to explain the facts of the external world

fancies of their

own

minds.

the rejection of this

I think,

which

by the

on the contrary, that

analogy belongs to that exploded

system of psychology in which mind and matter were regarded as distinct and totally unlike substances.
Tlie
progress of science has gradually brought us back to the

spontaneous conclusion of the earliest conscious thought,


before metaphysics were invented
of

man

is

" u-iii^f[i^j^jj"^

to experience of the facts of the mind, of

are directly cognizant.

that

it

from Mill and the rest of Where

of the facts of the external world


ascribe

ascribe

regard causation as nothing more than

form and unconditional sequence."


ascribing

effect, I

namely, that the mind

not distinct from the matei'ial world in the

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

150
midst of which

it

is

placed, hut

is

[cHAr.

the highest product of

and what we have discovered


concerning the dynamics, both of inorganic matter and of

the forces of that world

life,

makes

highly probable,

it

that in every physical

Smiiinary.

if

not indeed quite certain,

and every mental change there

is

some transformation of energy.


To sum Up in the fewest words possible the results of
Time, space, and causation are facts of the
this chapter
universe which have become forms of thought in consequence of coming within the spliere of our consciousness.
Our conceptions of time, space, and causation are results
of the experience of the race which have become forms of
:

thought for the individual.

But though
true so far as
Belief in
finit\"of
spacG anil

Any

tion.
if

it

matter to be

I believe this account of the

goes, I do not think

account of

ovu-

it

exhausts the ques-

conceptions of time and space,

complete, ought to explain

why we

believe in the infinity

Those who regard these conceptions as mere


results of experience, say that we have never found any
limit to space, and are therefore iinable to conceive of any
of both.

and that we have never found an end of time, and are


therefore unable to conceive of any.

think this satisfactory.

We

I cannot, however,

believe that time

without end and without beginning

is

alike

and any theory of

the subject ought to account for this twofold

Now

belief.

the pure and simple experience-theory does not account


for

tliis.

It

accounts for the belief that time

an end, by the

Difference

ourTe'uef
of an
past,

of

fact that

and

future.

is

without

experience of

any portion of time without another portion of time


coming after it. But this will not apply to our belief that
^^^^

^^

without a beginning

one's consciousness

a-n

we have never had

for the first

was awakened, he had

time that any


at that

moment

experience of a portion of time without having experience

any other portion of time coming before it


anything that mere experience can witness
of

so that, for
to,

nothing inconceivable in a beginning of time.^


1

This difference has been pointed out to

me

friend the Rev. Dr. Reichel, Vicar of Mullingar.

there

is

I think

in conversation

by

my

TLME, SPACE,

xxxviii.]

AND CAUSATION.

this is conclusive proof that, although

we

knowledge of time by

and

direct cognition,'

151

obtain our
it

first

has become

a form of our thought by hereditary habit, yet there

is

something in our knowledge of its properties for which


mere habit will not account, and which can be referred
only to that mental intelligence which

is

not a result of

If this is true of the conception of time,

habit.

it is

no

doubt equally true of the conceptions of space and of


causation.

This mental intelligence

is

to

form the subject of the

next chapter.

NOTE.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT.
I

SHALL probably be told that I have misunderstood Kant's

who

philosophy; and I admit that, like most of those

write

about him, I have not any knowledge of his works at

But I

believe I

am right. The

first hand.
system unfolded in his " Critique The

of the Pure Eeason "


principles of
is,

is one of absolute idealism, deriving all the


knowledge from the constitution of the mind this
:

and Kant perceived

it

to be, logically identical

with pure

really

which denies the possibility of our


knowing anything except that which passes within the

mind.

It is true that, in his " Critique of Practical Eeason," he

scepticism, or that system

arrived at a different conclusion,

But I beHeve I am
in no way a basis for

sible.
is

and showed how

budding

itself

up in

was pos-

^^

i^g^ii's'^

identical

scepticism-

Pi-actieal
"

right in saying that his " Pure Eeason " Reason


his " Practical

Eeason

;" that,

contrary, his " Practical Eeason," though of course

philosophical language,

faith

of ''lia^t's

" Pure

is

it

on the

speaks in a

in reality nothing else than faith,

spite of the sceptical conclusions of the

reason, or faculty of speculative philosophy.

pure

CHAPTER XXXIX.
MENTAL INTELLIOENCE.
The most
important
question of
biology

is

whether
intelli-

gence is a
primary
fact.

IN

my

opinion, the most important question

discussion

think I

in the sciences of life

may add

now under

and mind, and I

the most important question that ever

can be debated in those sciences,

is

this

Is

intelligence

an ultimate primary fact, witliout physical cause, and without any cause except Creative Power or only a resultant,
;

put together out of unintelligent elements by the action of


the laws of habit ? In the chapter on Natural Selection
I

have

argiied the
alfinnative

of organizing intelligence,

and have

now

have argued, in opposition to the theories of Darwin


and H. Spencer, that the organizing intelligence which

adapts one part of the organism to another


fact,

not to be accounted

endeavour to account for

as those

for,
it,

is

an ultimate

most able writers

by the principles of habitual

to

and natural selection. In this chapterj[ shall


have to argue the same of mental intelligence, namely,
that it is an ultimate fact, not to be accounted for by the

self-adaptation
argue it
of mental.

laws of habitual association.

In the chapter on Intelligence,^

have given my reasons for believing that organizing intelligence and mental intelligence are only different maniI

festations of one principle.

me in
with me

readers will agree with

Possibly, not

many

of

my

most probable
that all who think
as to the primary and independent nature of intelligence in either of these two cases
will agree with

me

this

but

it is

in the other case also.

It

is,

however,

necessary to argue the question of the nature of organizing

and of mental intelligence, on totally different


The argument as to the latter is, at least to me,

intelligence,

grounds.
Difficulty
of the

the most difficult

but this
1

is

not because 1 think

Chapter XXVII.

it less

MENTAL INTELLIGENCE.

CH. XXXIX.]

certain

is

it

.153

only on account of that peculiar difficulty

which arises when thought becomes


and which makes metaphysics so difficult and,
of most men, so unsatisfactor}- a study.

the object of thought,

latter

^^^^ '""

in the eyes

None of the materials of om- thoughts are innate in the


mind they are all either the direct results of experience,
or
as when we remember what we have seen and heard
;

There are
j^eas.

else

they are the results uf the mind's activity in working

with the results of experience, as when we infer and

mind

For, as I have already pointed out, the

imagine.

possesses no

power it can only combine


have shown in the last chapter,

really creative

and recombine.

And,

as I

I believe not only the materials of thought,

but also such

forms of thought as time, space, and causation, to be results


of experience.
Thus all thought begins from data of ex- Thought

But we have the power

perience.

of reasoning, and reason- f/o^^gx-

ing truly, from these data to conclusions that

Thus, for

experience.

the whole

instance,

geology, as distinguished from

its

mere

lie

beyond

perience.

of

science

facts, consists in

mass of inferences, from the data that are visible in the


rocks, concerning the state of the earth before
to witness

it

many

of

man

lived

which inferences admit of no more

reasonable doubt than do the events of the history of last


year.

Now, what

makes these

is

the nature of the intelligence which

inferences

Is

laws of habitual association

it

only a resultant from the

or are

its

principles (to use, I

believe, Coleridge's expression), not the result of experience

but implied in experience

am

of Coleridge's opinion.

1 believe that in the simplest inference

an element of

which is not a result of experience or,


other words, not to be referred to the laws of habitual

ligence is needed,
in

intel- Element of
;

association.

The laws

of association will account for much.

In

thought
which is
the "* f^ .

chapter on IMental Growth I have endeavoured to show

how, as I believe, the laws of memoiy, acting by association,

^^^^^J'
in all

result of
experi^^^^'

account for such a mental process as that of learning

own

the laws

Associa-

of association are quite sufficient to account for the origin

*gp^,j\''

our

or another language

of our con rc2'>f ions

and

I believe that

but that they utterly

fail

to account

for con-

154

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

ceptions,

our

for

but not for

merely as thoughts

of things.

The

laws of association

but not for the belief that a thought

corresponds to an external
Belief in
the constancy of
the order

account for the origin of our thoughts, considered

will

beliefs.

In other words

heliefs.

[CHAF.

One

of the

reality.-^

most important of

all

our beliefs

the belief

is

in the constancy of the course of external things

or, as it

usually expressed, the belief in the uniformity of nature.

is

We

instinctively believe that fire will always be hot, ice

always

cold,

and food always nourishing

we

terms instead of instances,

or, to

use general

believe that the

same or

same properties,
and the same or similar causes will continue to have the
same effects.
All reasoning from known things to unknown is based on this expectation not only reasoning
from the past to the future, but all reasoning from known
things to unknown, whether the imknown things are
future, as when we endeavour to foresee the weather
presimilar tilings will continue to ha\'e the

sent, as

when we

tion of the earth

reason concerning the internal constitu-

axiom implied in

all

these three cases alike

no doubt this axiom

acquired

Some say
by habit
only.

think
is

no

explanation.

is,

is

this

this

is

that the

is,

and will be constant there is


implied, and there is no doubt that

order of nature has been,

How

The

or past, as in geological questions.

it

is

in

it.^

true

the question

is,

how we

acquire

our belief

The most obvious answer to this question, and one


which has moreover satisfied many philosophers, is that
this belief is a mere consequence of experience, producing
mental habit. We have always found the order of things
constant, and we therefore expect to find it so.^
I do not wish to speak dogmatically on so controverted
a point, but this appears to

what comes
1

to the

See Note

at the

See Note

at the

same

me no

thing, it is

explanation at

all

or,

an explanation which

end of this chapter.

end of this chapter.


3 Experience is what produces mental habit.
Consequently, the theory
referred to in the text is sometimes called the experience theory, some-

times the association theory,


theory.

The expressions

or,

as I prefer to call

habit are only the opposite sides

it,

the mental habit

synonymous for experience and


of the same fact
experience being the

are practically

external or objective side, and habit the internal or subjective.

MENTAL INTELLIGENCE.

xxxix.]

The
known
to
from
the
question is, how are we able to reason
the unknown ?
why we believe, and truly believe, that it
takes for granted that

wliicli

be explained.

to

is

is

practicable to apply data of experience to things of

which we have no experience

we

And

the answer

is,

that

believe in the accustomed order of nature obtaining

among
with

the things

among

it

we do

we

not know, because

are familiar

we do know.

the things that

Surely this

no explanation at all. It is worth while, however, to


look more closely into the question.
To say that the
is

belief in the constancy of the order of things is

same thing

habit, is the

tion; for association

as to say that

it is

simply mental habit.

is

due to

due to associa-

can the mere association between two ideas, of

Now, how
itself,

pro-

duce a belief in the association between the corresponding


things
is

No

doubt

appears to do

it

so,

but

this, I think,

only because the axiom of the constancy of the order

of things is habitually

what

is

and unconsciously assumed.

the law of association

chapter,

is

it

merely this

As

if

For

stated in a former

any two

things, such as

lightning and thunder, have been habitually united in our


experience, the ideas of

thoughts, so that

thunder, and

if

if

we

we

them

will

become united in our

see lightning

hear thunder

we

we

shall think of

shall think of light-

But the thoughts of lightning and of thunder are


mere impressions on the consciousness and how can the
association between two mere impressions, however inning.

separable

it

may

be,

engender the belief that the things

in the external world to

which those impressions on the

consciousness correspond will be found in corresponding


association

There

is

a step from thoughts to things,

from the association of ideas to a beKef in the association


of the things corresponding to the ideas, for which, I think,

no mere laws of habitual association will account.


It

may

be said in reply to

many

this, that, as

a matter of

fact,

by habit,
and by no other cause whatever. Most men have beliefs,
especially on religious and political subjects, which have
belief is in

cases obviously determined

no ground wliatever except

haljit,

originating usually in

156
Belief is
subject to
the laws
of habit,
but habit

cannot
produce

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCK.

[cHAr.

but

belief,

This

education.

true

is

it

only sliows that

mental function,

like every other

subject to the laws

is

and consequently that particular beliefs may be


it does not show that the laws of

of habit,

determined by habit
habitual

general fact that the

may

This distinction

capable of accounting for the

are

association

belief.

Physical
analogy.

mind

capable of forming beliefs.

is

appear strained, but

it is

capable of

being illustrated by an analogy drawn from the simplest of


the physical sciences.

The

action of

governed

all forces is

by the laws of motion, and yet the laws of motion


not account for the origin of force
of beliefs, like

just so, the formation

other mental actions whatever, takes

all

place subject to the laws of association, and yet

not follow

association

tliat

will

is

of

itself able

to

it

does

produce

belief.

It

in

may

be asked whether

we should have

the constancy of the order of things,

things were not constant

To

this

this confidence
if

the order of

1 reply that I regard

imaginary but impossible

this supposition as not only

the same kind of impossibility, I mean, as

if it

a mathematical absurdity.

to

grounds of
But,
is

it

tliis

shall

have

of

involved

show the

opinion fuither on.

may be

not perfect

said, the
is

it

constancy of

tlie

order of things

perfect in the motions of the heavens,

Objection
from the
inconstancy
of the
weather

but imperfect in the changes of the weather.

answered.

motions, only less traceable.

This

is

true

and it would not be altogether


what is nevertheless true, that the bond
cause and effect is, beyond all reasonable doubt, as real

in a very obvious sense

relevant to reply,
of

and as rigid in atmospheric changes as in the

which

speak

of

celestial

I reply, that in the sense in

the constancy of nature, irregularly

much an instance of it as
From the fact that the changes
irregular, we have learned to expect

succeeding phenomena are as


regularly succeeding ones.
of the weather are

and this is a case of expecting that


what has been found true in the past will continue to be

that they will be so

found true in the future.


The

constancy of
the order

It

may

stancy

of

be said that

my

argument assumes the con-

the course of things to be as certain as the

MENTAL INTELLIGENCE.

xxxrx.]

axioms of mathematics; whereas


only highly

sun

will

probable.

It

to-morrow

rise

m acting

it

is

157
not certain, but

highly probable that the

is

we

so probable that

it is

are

of thin f^s
certain
^^"t

only

t>ut

it is

were an absolute certainty but it


is not so certain that the suu will rise to-morrow as it is
that he rose to-day and it cannot be regarded as even
right

as if it

highly probable that the course of nature will continue to

go on
that

thousand millions of years longer.^

for a

true

all this is

nevertheless,

it

is

I reply,

as certain as the

axioms of mathematics, that the course of nature will go

on until

The law

tron.

of

i-i

the uniformity of the oixler of things,^

same antecedents
consequents

it

but

finite,

Our knowledge

while our ignorance

be cut

is

infinite

of things

and we must

known lines of causation


through by unknown ones.

consequently regard
liable to

by the same

cannot guarantee that the antecedents

will continue to be the same.


is

only that the

is

will continue to be followed

but

^o be

by some cause not now in opera- constaiit


unless nio
causation, which is a part of the law of temiptwl.

interrupted

it is

all

Of course the truth that

all

as being

causes in the natural world

act regularly, so that their action is in its nature capable of

being predicted,^
contrary,

is

it

is

not by any means self-evident

on the

a discovery due to the progress of science.

must have a cause is, I


think, universal among men, and among animals which
But the

belief that every effect

I believe

hilitj'

'

that the attempt to find a numerical value for the proba-

of the sun rising to-morrow

At the

best, it is

is

one of the idlest of

all

amusements.

an attenqjt to arrive at a conclusion for which there are

But I am inclined to agree with Mr. Venn, the author


of Chance," that in such a case the expression " numerical

DO possible data.
of "

The Logic

value of the probability " has no meaning at

all.

The uniformity of the order of things includes uniformities both of


co-existence and of succession it is only those of succession that belong
By uniformities of co-existence I mean, that the same subto causation.
stance wDl always have the same properties as, that ice, at a temperature
below freezing, will always be hard and brittle. By uniformities of succession I mean, that the same causes will always have the same effects
as,
These two classes of uniformities run into each
that heat will melt ice.
^

mentioned show. I doubt whether there is


fundamental distinction between them.
This truth is what Mill, in his I-ogic, means by the law of universal

other, as the instances just

any
'

really

iMusatioii.

^" '^^^^
sense tlio
law of

158
causation

HABIT AND IXTELLIGEKCE.


manifest any germ of conscious intelligence

is self-

evident.

[chap.

in their universal expectation that

being implied

what has been

foimcl

true in the past will continue to be found true in the


future.

From

conclude, that our instinctive confidence

all this I

in the constancy of the order of things

but

an ultimate

is

If this is so,

action,

and iu
desire

and

fear.

fact,

not due to habit,

belonging to mental intelligence.

follows that in every determination to

an element which is not a result of habit


for all actions whatever, and all feelings that have reference
to action, such as desire and fear, presuppose the belief in

action there

This confidence is
presupposed La

it

is

is

The

the constancy of the order of things.

desire of a

hungry man or animal for food, and the proverbial dread of


a burned child for the fire, presuppose the belief that food

wiU continue
to

burn

and that fire will continue


have stated my reasons for

to satisfy hunger,

and such

belief, as I

thinking, belongs to intellicfpnce.

The

how-

principle of confidence in the order of nature,

ever, does not enter into all

our thoughts

it

does not, for

instance, so far as I can see, enter into mathematical reaTlie only

principles
whicli
enter into
all reasoning are
those of
loi^ic.

soning.

The only

principles which, so far as I see, enter

into all reasoning without

any exception whatever,

are

and when I speak of reasoning, I include


not only abstract reasoning, but simple inference, including

those of logic

perception, which, as I have argued in the chapter


subject, is

an inference.

In

elementary axiom of logic

all

on that

reasoning whatever, the

assumed namely, the axiom


that a contradiction cannot be true
or what is called, in
is

the technical language of logic, the principle of identity

and contradiction. All beings that are capable of inferring


and of perceiving know that this is true, though they may
be unable to express

it

there

is

universality of the beUef or of

been acquired

no question either of the


its

how has

truth; but

it

have argued that mental habit or experience cannot alone and of itself produce belief in the
?

constancy of the order of


if

my

reasoning

is

vaKd

the order of things,

it is

natiu-e, or

any belief

for the belief in the

at all

and

constancy of

equally valid for the belief in the

MENTAL INTELLIGENCE.

XXXIX.]

159

and necessary truth of this


Indeed, the argument is stronger for the

universal

logical principle. These are

belief in the iui\^^^^


possibility of a contradiction being independent of expe- gence

rience and antecedent to

than

it,

for the belief in the order habit.

of nature being independent of experience


in the order of nature

merely that

is

^^'

it

is

for our belief

and

will be

constant, so long as no cause occurs to disturb

it

but

our belief in the impossibility of a contradiction is without

any such qualification under no circumstances, and in


no world, can it ever be possible for a contradiction to be
;

This

true.

Further

cannot be the result of habit,

belief, I think,

and can only belong

to intelligence.

I maintain that the perception of things ex-

an inference from our sensations. It


once the idea of an external world has

ternal to ourselves is
is

obvious that,

been suggested to

us,

the belief in

the idea of an external world

may

involved in perception
^
^

*'

sensation has not


fore

have

-^
.

source within

me

source outside of me."

its

existence receives

be thus expressed :=-" This


.

its

its

But what first suggested


The process of inference They

confirmation at every moment.

it

This

must

there-

would be a contradiction
once within and without.

source were at

But
do

we

at all

for it

this is not a full account of the subject

or,

This

what

substance?

why do we

in other words,

their objects

is

for,

of identity,

the

why

is

only a particular

refer sensations to

way

of asking the

the nature and meaning of our idea of The

Mr. Mill defines matter as a

possibility of sensation

"

which

think, inadequate as a definition

is
;

"permanent
^

obviously true, but, I

just as

it

would be an

inadequate definition of the mind, or the conscious

ings.^

if

take for granted that sensations must have a source

question,

call it

tion.

obviously The logical

is

a particular application of the law that a contradiction

cannot be true

are
iii^olved
lu percep-

self,

to

a permanent liability to sensations and other feel-

In becoming conscious of our own

feelings,

we

1 Mr. Mill (Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy) defines


matter as " a permanent possibility of sensation ;" but he goes on to pay

(though not in these words) that

it

would not be an adequate

definition of

^'^^^"^
substance.

HABIT AND JNTELLIGENCE.

160

[cHAP.

which has the feelings, and yet


is not merely the sum-total thereof ^ and in inferring the
existence of an external world we infer, as I think, the
existence not only of "permanent possibilities of sensation," but of objects to which we refer the sensations.
1. That
I regard the following as axiomatic truths

become conscious of a

self

Axioms
physics'

where there are properties there must be


2. where there is relation, there must be things related
and I am
3. where there is action, there must be an agent
same
category,
inclined to add, as a truth belonging to the
substance

that where there

4.

is

an

there

effect

must be a

cause.

The question whether we have any idea of substance as


distinct from mere permanence is a parallel one to the
question whether we have any idea of causation as disIn the last chapter I have
tinct from mere succession.
stated

my belief that

our idea of causation

is

not resolvable

mere succession. I regard the four metaphysical


axioms stated above, like the logical axiom that a contrainto

diction cannot be true, as necessary truths of intelligence


Beliefs not

of \hoht

but

ini-

thmight

and tte

belief in

them

is

^^^ ^ inference from data of experience


it is

implied in

all

thought and

all

neither thought nor experience

it

a result neither of mental habit,


;

on the contrary,
and without

experience,

would be

possible.^

we have a belief in the veracity of memory


that is to say, we believe that as perception gives us^ true
^"radtv
of memory information of present reality, so memory gives us true
Further

Belief

information of past reality.

It is to be observed that the

belief in a past reality as corresponding to

memory

of

mind
but
>

to call

it

is

not implied in the mere presence of the

a permanent liability to feeling.

think this inconsistent

not the result of any oversight ou Mr. Mill's part.


" Cogito, ergo sum," said Descartes not meaning by this celebrated

it is

saying to prove his


of it

but to

state

conscious of our
2

an impression

It is

own

which neither needs proof nor admits


the truth that it is in the act of thinking we become

own

existence,

existence.

scarcely necessary to remark, that the belief, or knowledge, of

is not necessarily conscious knowledge, and does not imply


Men were not conscious of knowing
the power of stating them in words.
them till they had begun to think about thinking.

these truths

MENTAL INTELLIGENCE.

xxxix.]

161

memory for a doubt often arises whetlier


such an impression is really due to memory or only to
involuntary imagination. It is generally admitted, and is
impression of

I think indisputable, that this confidence in the veracity


of

memory

an ultimate

is

fact,

not to be accounted for by

is

an

any other, or in any way explained. Its root and origin is fac^**'
no doubt in the cognition of feelings as they follow each
other in the mind but this is no more an explanation of
the fact, than it would be an explanation of the life of a
plant to trace it back to its seed.
Now, a belief which,
;

like the belief in the veracity of

mind and not

fact of

to

memory,

be accounted

habit, is to be classed as a case of

for

mental

an ultimate aud

is

by the laws

of f^tell?

gence.

intelligence.

In thus expressing the opinion that the belief in the


laws of
nature,

the belief in the constancy of the order of

logic,

and the

belief in the veracity of

results of experience,

memory,

but d priori conditions of

all

are not

thought,

without which impressions on the consciousness would be


nothing higher than sensations, and could not give rise to

knowledge

in

thought that I

expressing this opinion, I say,

am

it

may be

bringiug back, under a slightly different

form, that doctrine of idealism which I have disavowed

in the last chapter.

blance of
Idealism

my

I do not

deny the apparent resem-

theory to idealism, but

at least the idealism of

it

Kant

is

only apparent.

maintains

Resem^f^J^y

that theory ta
'

such forms of thought as time, space, and causation belong

and not

to the miad,

to the external world.

I believe,

on and

the contrary, that such forms of thought as time, space,

and causation
laws of

logic,

are laws

of

its

^rence.

and such natural beliefs as the belief in the


and in the constancy of the order of nature
;

mind because they

are laws of the external

which have i believe


become conscious of themselves in the brain of man. In ^}^^ ^^y'^ *
thought
the last chapter I have endeavoured to explain by what are so
means time, space, and causation have come within the tw^are
sphere of consciousness, and consequently, from being laws laws of
of the external world, have become habitual forms of
world

thought.
VOL.

II.

I believe they are laws of nature,

If the reasoning of this chapter be sound, the

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

162

same explanation

will

[chap.

not apply without modification

to the belief in the laws of logic, in the constancy of


nature, and in the veracity of
results of habit,

for these are not

but of intelligence, antecedent to any pos-

sible formation of

There

mental habits whatever.

To repeat the

no contradiction.

ever,

memory

howwhich

is,

distinction

made at the beginning of this chapter, our conceptions,


among which I class those of time, space, and causation,
I

But in

are due to habit; but belief implies intelligence.

the formation of both concej)tions and beliefs the

mind

is

developed in accordance with the laws of nature, and the


laws of nature become conscious of themselves in mind.

In other words, mind is a part of nature, and consequently


its consciousness is developed in accordance with the laws
of nature.
The
should
expect

from

follows

It

this,

question whether

that the

we

expect to find the order of nature constant if


we should
were not really constant, is an irrational question for

nature
constant

the Order of nature were not constant,


if

p^rt of the order of nature,

oui'

it

if

minds, being

would have received a

totally

it WCl'6

not

so, is

irrational.

Intelli-

gence

with

and another

from

set of intuitions,

^j^Qgg ^iiich they actually have received.

my

To

is

co-extensive
Ufe,

different development,

fact,

conclusion that mental intelligence

is

an ultimate

not to be accounted for by the law of habit, or ac-

no objection that animals manifest


I have in many places endeait
voured to show, intelligence is co-extensive with life and
the organizing intelligence which adapts each part of the
organism to the rest, and the entire organism to its mode of
the instinctive intelligence which constructs the cells
life
coimted for at

all, it is

in some degree;

for, as

of the bee
not
always
anil

conscious.

and the mental intelligence of man

fundamentally the same.

Intelligence

and even when conscious

scious,

it is

is

are all

not always con-

not always conscious

of itself; indeed, I believe there is something unconscious

about
Summary.

U thought,

To sum up the

except that which

is

result of the foregoing

formally logical.

remarks

I believe

that all mental determinations which go beyond the mere

MENTAL INTELLIGENCE.

XXXIX.]

163

remembrance, association, and recombination of

ideas,

and

involve belief in things external, in things past, or in things

Belief
"elfigence

imply intelligence as an ultimate irresolvable fact.


The rudimentary form of belief in things external is
perception.
The rudimentary form of belief in things past
future,

memory.

is

Belief in things future is expectation.

I con-

sequently conclude, that in the simplest act of perception,

memory, or expectation, an

intelligence

not the result of experience, but

is

of the acquisition of experience

is

is

implied which

a necessary condition

just as in every act of

organic nutrition and growth an organizing power

work, which

is

as nutri-

at ^^^ ^?
chemical imply

not a result of the physical and

is

properties of the food that supplies the materials for build- po^eiT^"^
ing up the organism, but which is a necessary condition of
all

nutrition and growth.

But

it

must be remembered that

intelligence is not necessarily conscious


it

admits of

all

on the contrary,

degrees from perfect unconsciousness to

perfect consciousness.

In the biological chapters of this work, I have several


times dwelt on the fact that the evidence of organizing

where the organization is the


instance, " in insect's wing or eagle's

intelligence is the strongest

highest

stronger, for

eye," than in
is

any part

of a tree or of a zoophyte.

needed for the parallel

fact

in psychology

No

inteiH-

loinfnates
most in

^fe ^Sth

proof organic

the

fact, mental.

namely, that the higher the mental nature, the greater


is

the influence of intelligence, and the more decided

its

domination.

In conclusion, I have
peculiarities of the

minds

mind

to

of

make some remarks on

any

Peculiari-

man, as distinguished from the ^i^^

of the highest animals.

perceive, there is not

the

So far as I

single principle to

am

^f

able to man.

which the

whole of man's manifold superiorities are to be traced. I


have already expressed my opinion that what is most
characteristic of the moral nature, namely, the sense of

and of

due to a peculiar
spiritual intelligence in man, distinct in kind from any
principle of organic or animal intelligence, and having no
holiness

its

opposite, sin,

is

Sense of
^ '"^ss.,

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

164

But the

root therein.^

[chap.

intellectual superiority of

Power

of

thou^hT
at will

power
power

is

namely, the
on which depends the

due, as I think, to quite a distinct cause,


of directing thought at will

man

and thence the power of


abstract reasoning, wliich is the distinctive power of the
human intellect for animals are capable of the mental
of forming

ahstractions,

process which I have elsewhere called simple inference.


There is, however, another distinctive character of the

man, which is not identical with the powers just


mentioned, though probably closely connected with them

mind

of

Conscious- 1
^

^^^

mean

The higher

the faculty of self-consciousness.

animals are conscious, but only man is conscious of seK


the higher animals think, but only man is conscious that

Use of the he thinks, or can


personal
^|^^
consciousness
pronouns.

think about thinking.


of self

is

The symbol of

the use of the personal pro1

nouns and in their use is displayed, I think, a higher


kind of intelligence than any animal ever attains to, and
an intelligence, moreover, which is demonstrably not a
A child learns to call itself / and
result of mere habit.
imitatiag
other persons who call themme, no doubt, by
;

and once begun, the use of those words, as of


But the personal
any other words, becomes habitual.

selves so

pronouns, at least those of the

first

person, differ from all

other words in this, that the child applies all other words
to the

others

same objects
;

but

namely,

it

itself

by

others

of

/ and me

which

to which

so that

in the same

to

it

has heard them applied by

applies the words

to

it

it

/ and me

to

an object

has never heard them applied

appears impossible for the meaning

be learned by mere habitual association,

way

that the meaning

of other words

is

The meaning of the words dog and cat, for


learned by their association with the objects
dog and cat and the names of persons are learned in the
But the meaning of the words / and 771c
same way.

learned.

instance,

is

cannot be learned in this way, because the child never


hears

them

associated with

other persons' selves.

by

imitation; but

how

its

It learns

does
1

See

it
p.

64.

own

self;

always with

to use them,

know what

no doubt,

to

imitate?

MENTAL INTELLIGENCE.

XXXIX.]

165

The power of perceiving the peculiar relations expressed


by the words / and me can only, I think, be ascribed to
an unconscious exercise of that intelligence which is not a
result of habit

and, though unconscious,

subsequent development of

that

leads to the

it

consciousness

of

IntelH-

needed for
this,

self

whereof those pronouns are the symbol.^


I have

now completed
laws of

treats of the

]\Iy

been to write in any way a complete

and
show the primary and

trace the laws of Habit,

and

to

work which

the part of this

and mind.

life

purpose has not

treatise,

but only to

their relation to Intelligence

irresolvable nature of the

latter.

NOTE

A.

bain's theory of belief.

On

the subject of our belief in the constancy of the order of

nature, Professor Bain says

"

intuitive tendencies involved in

The foremost rank among the


behef

is

to be assigned to the

natural trust that we have in the continuance of the present

state

o/Qnotation

we have once begun. This ^^ Bain,


is a sort of law of perseverance in the human mind, like the
first law of motion in mechanics.
Our first experiences are
and we go on under them to all lengths, being
to us decisive
things, or the disposition to

go on as

arrested only

by some

failure or contradiction."

The

italics are

Professor Bain's.

This

is

very like an admission that the belief in the constancy

of the order of nature

is

an ultimate

any law of habitual association.


is

that belief

is

truth, that belief,

Now,

His theory of

I think

and every other

mind, involves the exercise of

its

it is true,

different

however,

intelligent function of the

and

is

not to be

and forcilily stated, though from a point of view somefrom mine, in Professor Terrier's Introduction to the

Philosophy of Consciousness.
2

belief,

and an important

active powers,

Tills is clearly

what

not to be resolved into


jjig theory-

a result of habitual association, with the addition of belief

of an active element.

fact,

The Emotions and the Will, 2d

edit. p. 537.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

166

accounted for by any modification of

Bat

feelings.

this is not

[chap.

passive capacity for

its

Stripped

what Professor Bain means.

of its verbiage, his theory of the subject seems to me to come to


nothing more than this the germ of belief in anything consists in
:

IS

no es-

plauation.

and

readiness to act on that belief ;

no explanation

this is

at

all.

I do not even admit that readiness to act on a belief has necessarily

anything to do with the

first

rudimentary formation of

with the origin of the power of believing. The belief


that wherever there are properties there must be substance, for
instance, appears to me to contain no active element whatever

Belief in
belief, or
substance.

This argument, however,

in Professor Bain's sense.

is

of

no

weight in the estimation of Professor Bain and the school to

Mill on
Bain.

which he belongs, as they reduce the idea of substance to that of


mere permanence.
Mr. MlU, in liis review of Professor Bain's work on the
Emotions and the Will,^ truly remarks that belief is the great
the (exclusive) association theory

difficulty of

the theory which would account for

all

that

is

to say,

the facts of mind, other

than mere sensations, by the laws of association alone.

He

does

not express any decided opinion as to Professor Baiu's success in


I think belief is not the difficulty of the
solving the difficulty.
association theory, regarded as a complete

but

its

I think,

refutation.

as

and exclusive theory,

I have already stated, that

habitual association will account for the origin of our conceptions,

but not of our beliefs

or, to

use what

perhaps more

is

accurate language, that the laws of habitual association will

account for the power of conceiving, but not for the power of
believing.

Bain on

If I understand Professor Bain,

he goes so far as to argue that


is not an ultimate fact, but

the belief
in the

the belief in the veracity of

veracity of

produced in the same way in which (according

memory.

memory

memory

germ, readiness

in

is,

its

that

are as we remember them.


that

it is

is

to

him) any other

to say, that belief in the veracity of

belief is produced

to act

I think this

an exi^lanation which takes

on

is

the belief that things

open to the objection

for granted the thing to

Of course the truth of a belief in the veracity of


be explained.
memory, or in anything whatever that is past, or future, or
But
external, can be tested only by its agreement with facts.
this does not account for its original formation

and

I think

the only possible germ, or root, of the belief in the veracity of


'

Mni's Dissertations and Discussions,

vol.

iii.

memory
mind.

167

mill's inductive logic.

XXXIX.]
is

the perception of

succession of feelings in

tlie

I do not say the succession of feelings,

tlie

but the perception

of their succession.

Mr. Mill, in his " Examination of Sir


Philosophy," says that "the
If this

evidently idtimate."

be ultimate as well

WiUiam

Hamilton's

belief in the veracity of


is

why may

so,

memory

Mill on

is the

same,

not other behefs

NOTE

B.

mill's inductive logic.

in his "

System of Logic, Eatioci native and Inductive," accepts the usual doctrine, that there are two kinds of
reasoning the one, inductive or analytic, ascending from parti-

Mb. Mill,
:

Inductive

the other, deductive or synthetic, descending


culars to generals
+
from generals to particulars. But he maintains also that the reasoning.
original and elementary form of reasoning is neither from particulars to generals, nor from generals to particulars, but from Eeasoning
;

particulars to particulars

the

fire

as

which has burned

it

^"

when

a child, or a dog, infers that (.^1.^


^o

once

may be

expected to burn

it particulars,

again.

As a mere statement of fact, this is perfectly true.


men reason, and reason correctly, from one fact

that

It is true

to another,

before they learn either to infer one general truth from a


of special facts

by induction,

number

or to apply one general truth so as

to prove other less general ones

by deduction.

rationale of the process.

Mill

!Mr.

is

But

this is not a

well aware, and pointed

work was thought of, that all reasoning concerning things involves the axiom that the course of
out long before the present

nature

is

uniform

scientific language,

or, as

that

I have purposely expressed

what

probably be found true again.

it

in less

has been found true once will


I quote his

own words

" If Quotation

we throw the whole course of any inductive argument into a


series of syllogisms, we shall arrive, by more or fewer steps,
at

an ultimate syllogism which will have for

its

major premiss

the principle, or axiom, of the uniformity of the course of


Having reached this point, we have the whole field of
nature.
induction laid out in syllogisms, and every instance of inference

'

HABIT AND IXTELLIGENCE.

168

[CH.

XXXIX.

exhibited as the conclusion of a ratiocination, except one


that one, unhappily, includes all the rest.

universal major

What

Whence came

proves to us that nature

is

hut
the

governed

hy general laws ? Where are the premises of the syllogism of


which this is the conclusion 1"^
Question

It is perfectly true that the constancy of the order of things

of the
origin of

cannot be proved by any deductive

or' syllogistic

the belief
in the
constancy
of nature.

Mill thinks that oux belief in

due to

habit.

it is

association, or

I have stated, in the foregoing chapter,

thinking that

it is

an ultimate
1

Logic, vol.

reasoning.

my

fact of intelligence.

i.

p. 373, note.

Mr.

mental

reasons for

CHAPTER

XL.

HABIT AND VARIATION IN HISTORY.

HAVE in the foregoing chapters traced the outline of the The


sciences, or rather the single science, of life

and mind,

i^^fg^'and"

regarded as consisting of various and manifold applications mind has


of the two principles of Habit and Intelligence.

though

science,
is

at present in a state of

systematized

fully

a vast

That

very rapid advance,

number

of

its

systema^^'^'^'^'

problems

be solved, but a fundamental revolution in the


mode of conceiving of the problems appears as totally
impossible in the science of life and mind as in dynamics

remain

to

or in astronomy.

and physical
that there

The same

sciences.

is

is

hope

true of
to

all

the mathematical

show in a future chapter

a perfect series of sciences, from abstract

as

have
''*'

through mathematics, physics, and chemistry, to ^^^^^


the sciences of life and mind. The ground-plan of this matheseries has been so well laid, as regards both the principles physics,
logic,

of the

sciences

themselves and

their

relation

to

each

^^"-^
.

chemistry

other, that the work can never by any possibility have


The outline has been drawn, and
to be done over again.
what remains to be done consists exclusively in fiUing
it

up.

But there

is

another group of sciences which have not

yet been thus systematized.

No

doubt they admit of

systematization, but the time for doing this work is, but the
The sciences I speak of are those the "esuits
perhaps, not yet come.

whereof the subject-matter consists of the results of the


activity of the human mind, and the laws by which the
mind acts under particular conditions. I cannot attempt

of man's

even a complete enumeration of this group of sciences

systema-

activity

have not

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCK.

170

but the most important, or at least those which have been

tized,

including
those of
language,
art,

[chap.

and

most nearly reduced


language

to systematic form, are the science of

the science of the fine

and

to

say,

arts, or sesthetics

the science of society, or politics.

society.

The

subjects of these three

language,

art,

sciences

are

and human society

that

all

is

products of the

mind of man and, consequently, their elementary laws


must depend on the laws of mind, while the laws of mind

The laws

of these
subjects

depend on do not in
the laws
of mind,
but the

converse
not true.

In language are
an intelligent

and an
habitual
element.

any degree depend on them.


So that these
depend on psychology in somewhat the same way
that biology depends on chemistry, or dynamics on mathematics.
The manner in which the principles of language,
art, and society depend on the laws of mind can be best
shown by taking those three sciences separately.
First, as to language.
In all mental action whatever,
as I have endeavoured to show in the last chapter, there
is an habitu.al element and an intelligent element, which,
though they may be separated in thought, are always
combined in fact. Language, being a product of mental
activity, may be expected to show manifest traces of these
two factors and such is the case. It would be superfluous
sciences

is

to argue for the obvious truth that all language involves

an habitual principle
and by habit alone.

we

learn to use language

But

it

is

also

by

habit,

obvious that

all

when it is used as the means of the


most elementary reasoning, involves a logical principle
and if the conclusions of the preceding chapter are true, the

language, at least

logical principles that all thought involves belong to intel-

But without going back on


that metaphysical question, it is obvious that the power of
learning words by memory, and the power of combining
them into sentences that have a meaning, are two totally

ligence,

and not

to habit.

distinct

powers

and even those who do not agree with


and fundamental difference between

me

as to the absolute

Habit and Intelligence, will agree that the distinction


between the two in the use of language is real, and of
great importance.
"We may briefly say though, perhaps,
not with perfect logical accuracy that memory supplies
the words, and intelligence combines them.
A person

171

HABIT AND VARIATION IN HISTORY.

XL.]

might know the names of things,


but he could not combine the words into sentences having
a meaning and this, I believe, is the case with some
A person without memory, on the contrary, might
idiots.
without

intelligence

conceivably think, but for want of knowing the necessary

words he could not express his thoughts in words. Memory


and intelligence are thus both necessary to the use of

and
that habit and
language

as

memory

is

a case of habit,

follows

it

intelligence co-operate in the use and in

the formation of language just as they do in organization

and in mind. I think this cannot be disputed, whatever


may be our conclusion as to the ultimate nature of intelligence; but in the present state of the science of language

science of comparative

The
will be at some future time.
grammar has not as yet got beyond

comparative etymology

it is

not so evident as

it

Conipa-

the students of the science are at gi-ammar


present concentrating their whole attention on the habitual is as yet

element in language, namely the words

this is needful parative

and may probably continue to be so for a long etymology,


But it may not always be so a science of com- parative
time.
^^
parative syntax will surely be possible, so soon as mate- ^^^\^^
rials enough have been accumulated.
By the formation of lioped for.
at present,

such a science the logical element in language will be


brought

come

the same prominence, and may,

into

perhaps,

be as well understood as the habitual, or verbal,


element is now. I do not think it is too much to hope
to

some fellow-countryman of Bopp and Grimm, or


perhaps of Sir "\V. Hamilton or of Professor Boole, may
that

yet so trace the connexion between the laws of language

and the laws

of logic as to

throw light on both.

am

make a beginning at that subject. I go on


show how very close is the resemblance between the

not able to
to

action of the habitual principle in organization

and

in

language.

Language is an organism. This is no mere metaphor.


The definition of an organism
is that it consists of parts
o
r
which are all in functional relation to each other; and
the words of a sentence are thus functionally related.

Organization

is

not the cause of

life,

but

life

is

the

Language
^^f;," :,,
organism.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

172
As

life

theM-tJanism, so

cause

High organization

organization.

of

necessary to any high development of

the organism to be at once

consS-ucts its action.


language.

^ highly

Jvist so,

[cHAP.

its

language

development of thought

life

constructs

dwelling and the means of

is

developed language

life

however,

is,

the result of thought, but


is

necessary to any high

thought

has

constructed the

organism of language in order to use it as an instrument.


Considering the unlikeness between the subjects of the
analogy, the analogy itself

the action of

life

is

in building

wonderfully close between

up the organism, and the

action of thought in constructing language

an oroanism

both in
of words
aud their

be

its

each forms

instrument.

All habits are gradually variable

Variability

gua^r

to

particular words are peculiarly so

and habits of using


that

is

to

say, the

words themselves are variable. Words vary both in their


forms and in their meanings. I have argued in the earlier

Y)?^Tt of this
meanings, ^

work, that the characters of organic species

t
p
i
no umit as to amount oi change,
allowed and that all organisms

are variable, with little or

only time enough

if

is

which are morphologically similar, are so by reason of


being descended from the same ancestors.

If this is true,

between parts which are morphologically


between the leg of the dog and
the same
are due to variation in the course of
that of the horse
and such
their descent from their common ancestor

any

difference

as, for instance,

comparf'l^ ^?
in the
oro-ans''

variation

is

a parallel fact to the variation that takes place

in the form of words

the same
fo^"

is

when

word which

found in different languages.

instance, that the

German word

hcide

is

fundamentally

ISTo

one doubts,

and the English

heath are forms of the same word, and that the similarity

due to their common Gothic original. I


believe that the modifications, both in the organisms and
in the words, are due to modification in the course of
and that both, consequently, are
descent or derivation
of the two

is

alike cases of the variation of habit.

We

usually speak of

the descent of living races, and of the derivation of words

but

it

is

not a violent metaphor to speak of the deriva-

and of the descent of the latter.


change their meanings, even within the

tion of the former

Words

also

HABIT AND VARIATION IN HISTORY.

XL.]

same language, while

limits of the

and this has its parallel in the


assume new functions, while
undergoes but

173

their forms

remain

fact that organs frequently

their

form and structure and

change, as in the case of those fishes

little

whereof the swim-bladder, without differing

much

that of other fishes, assumes the function of limgs.


analogy, or a similar one,

might have expected

is

to find

carried

much

We

it.

in

functions

fi'om

This

further than

we

have seen that some

animals have rudimentary and totally useless organs, such Eudi-

some serpents and the wing-bones of the


wingless birds, the only intelligible explanation of which
consists in the supposition that they are inherited from
ancestors which had the corresponding organs in a developed and working state. ^
These rudimentary organs have
been compared to the silent letters used in spelling many
words, especially in French and in English.
This analogy
is not merely fanciful, but real.
The silent letters were
once sounded so the rudimentary organs were once, as I
believe, developed and at work.
The silent letters mark
the origin of the word; so, as I believe, do the rudimentary organs mark the descent of the species and, as
as the leg-bones of

all naturalists

admit, they

Further, there

is

mark

its

true affinities.^

another very curious parallel between

the laws of organic morphology, and the laws of what


As the

strangest instance of this

the word implicit.

Implicit

plied as opposed to expressed

mean

to

is
:

will mention
and means imand obedience have come

can think

but implicit faith

blind faith and obedience.

meaning of the word

tlitit I

properly opposed to

The history

of, I

explicit,

of the change in the

is this,

that implicit faith became a theological ex-

pression, signifying the faith

which a man was credited with having in a

doctrine to which he was too ignorant to attach any meaning, provided he

believed in the authority of the Church, on the authority of which the


doctrine

stupid to
tion,

was

to be believed.

know what

Thus, a

man who was

too ignorant or too

the Church taught on the subject of transubstantia-

would nevertheless be credited withiimplicit or implied faith in that


Church which taught it coxild

doctrine, provided he only believed that the

not
^

err.

See the chapter on Comparative Morphology (Chap.

XX. ).

come before very long, when it will be generally


admitted that the descent of a species is what constitutes its affinities ;
and that affinity iu classification has no meaning except community of
2

believe the time will

descent.

oJ-^anT'^

compargijeut"
letters.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

174
may, by a very
Morphological
correla-

tions

independent of
function,

sliglat

[chap.

metaphor, be called the morphology

We

have seen that there are some morphowhich are due to laws of
correlation merely, and appear to have nothing to do with
Such are the
the adaptation of structure to function.
of language.

logical characters in organisms

same deeply
the leaves and in the

facts that in umbelliferous plants there is the

cloven or branched

structure in

and that in man there are five toes on each


It is as imfoot as well as five fingers on each hand.
possible to assign any purpose for these correlations as it
wovdd be to assign a purpose for the laws of crystalline
inflorescence

formation

comparable to
inflections

without
meaning.

they are not adaptations, they are nothing but

There are in some languages correlations


correlations.^
which may be compared to these the best instance is that
of the inflections of Greek and Latin adjectives, which
contribute nothing to the meaning, and are only added
from a principle of correlation with their substantives.
The analogy, I think, is perfect. The logical principle
:

in

language

corresponds

to

the

adaptive

principle

in

and we find that there are correlations in


organization which are not adaptations
and correlations
in language which have nothing to do with meaning,
and consequently nothing to do with the logical principle; they both consist in a kind of symmetry, which
appears as if it were sought for, not as a means but as
an end.
Since the study of organic morphology and the study of
]\Iorphology and
language
have both become tndy scientific, the analogy
the science
of lanbetween them is really very remarkable. Both have beguage are
the decisive step which first
both com- come comparative studies
parative
made the study of language really a science was taken
sciences,
when the study of comparative grammar, or comparative
philology, was commenced
a science of language was
impossible, so long as its data were obtained from only
one or two languages. In exactly the same way, the only
scientific morphology is that which is based on the comparison of forms which are widely different, but not so
And
different as to exclude a fundamental resemblance.
organization

See the chapter on Morphology (Chap. XIX.).

175

HABIT AND VARIATION IN HISTORY.

XL.]

the more profoundly both comparative morphology and

comparative grammar are understood, the more fundamental resemblances do their students discover xinder the

The science of and


external appearance of total unlikeness.
sciences of
language also resembles morphology in being a science of
progressive change.

embryology, because

development or of

I do not say of

we know nothing

aware, about language in

its

am

yet, as far as I

embryonic

state

sive
'^

^^^^'

though the The em-

embryology of language, that is to say the history of


origin and earliest development, would be a subject

its of lan-

ofS'^'^S^^

and a most interesting one, if the facts could be known,


ascertained.
But as morphology traces not only the
graduated resemblances and differences between different
species and different classes, but also the progressive
science,

changes during the

life

of the individual; so the science

of language traces not only the graduated resemblances

between the same or allied words in


different languages, but also the progressive changes in
the same language from century to century, amounting
sometimes to total apparent transformation such as,
to mention one of the most remarkable of all perfectly well-known cases, the transformation of Latin into

and

differences

French.

The same remarks apply, without more modification


than the difference of the subjects renders necessary, to
the science of the Fine Arts. I speak of the scientific
study of their history

wliich

is

the'e^e"
arts,

their theory is a different subject.

Concerning the theory of the Fine Arts not


established, with the

Historical

much

is

yet

exception of the theory of music,

well understood, at least in a technical sense

but

though there must be a profound connexion between the


laws both of visual beauty and of music with the laws of
mind, yet the laws of this connexion have not yet be-

come a subject

of science,

yet any science of beauty

and conseq^uently we have not


nor have

sense, a science of those arts

we

as yet, in the truest

namely,

the Fine Arts

which consist in the embodiment of man's ideas of beauty


,
,^
.1
p 1
IT
through the action of nis intelligence. But a scientific
T

-I-,

involving
tne same
principles

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

176
as organic
inorplio-

logy and
language.

Morphology of

art.

treatment of the history of art

is

possible

[CHAF.

and

it is

found

principles that obtain alike in organic

same
morphology and in the science of language. In art, we
have to do with comparative morphology, and with deIt is no
velopment and progressive gradual change.
metaphor to speak of morphology in art; the word is

to involve the

applicable with the most perfect literalness to those arts


architecture is perhaps the
of which the object is form
:

best

architecture,

any historical account of a style of


in any comparative account of styles

In

instance.

or

which are not too unlike for comparison, especially if they


have a common origin, it would be almost impossible to
Its progressive

changes.

English
architecture.

avoid the use of language which sounds as if it were borrowed from organic morphology. Thus, in describing the
progressive changes of the architecture of England,

bold,

and ornaments more

descent

Roman,

ture.

with

modification

Or in tracing the
the word descent is

elaborate.

(and in

implied an analogy with living beings), in tracing the


process of descent, I say, by which the Eoman architec-

Gothic,aud i^ufg
architec

we

say that from the time of the introduction of the pointed


arch, by which the Gothic style was constituted as a distinct style, arches gradually became flatter, mouldings less

was modified

into the Gothic

on the one

into the Oriental or Saracenic on the other,

we

side,

and

find that

the arch, which was semicircular in the Eoman style,


became pointed in the Gothic, and in the Oriental acquired
the " horse-shoe " form, or, in other words, became a some-

what greater arc than a semicircle. We use exactly the


same language when we describe how the leg of the
quadruped is so modified as to be changed into the wing
of the bat or into the paddle of the whale and all these
changes, those of organic morphology and the morphology
of art alike, as well as the changes of language, come
under the one law of the gradual variability of habit.
;

This, I think, is self-evident, if once the origin of species

by descent with modification


no doubt
morphology are due
There

is

is.

admitted.

this difference, that changes in organic

to the action of totally unconscious

forces, and changes in language are due to mental forces

HABIT AND VARIATION IN HISTORY.

XL.l

acting witli very


of art are

consciousness

little

Ml

made with

is

not fundamental,

have elsewhere argued,^ that organizing

is true,

as I

ligence

and mental

The love

but changes in styles

consciousness on the part of the

This difference, however,

artist.

:I77

if it

intel-

intelligence are essentially the same.

unintelligent principle,

is

own

sake, though an Love of


probably the moving or impelling !>o^elty

of slight nr velty for

its

power, though not the controlling one, in the XJ^gress of moving

improvement and deterioration


without this, I mean, art would be either quite stationarv,
or subject to very few and slight changes and this love
of slight novelty, as I have already remarked, is probably
very closely connected with the law of the gradual variaart,

in the direction both of

t]e\?ro-^

S'ess of

bility of habit.is

On

the other hand, the continuity which

so remarkable in the history of

art,

without

indeed, art could not be said to have a history at

which,

all,

this

due to the constancy of habit, and to


the mental law that o
great or sudden changes
are disagreeo
&
continuity, I say,

It

able.

is

may be

said that in point of fact the history

art is less continuous

than

have stated

it

to be.

Habit

is

reason
01f conof tinuity in

do

"''^

of lit''

not deny that the history of art presents some very re-

markable instances of rapid,

Some

not quite abrupt change. Rapid


of these, however, are cases merely of the introduc- phanges
if

which has superseded the native


one, as when the pointed Gothic architecture was introduced from France into Western Germany, and rapidly and
tion of a foreign style

completely superseded the old round-arched


are due to the introduction of
necessities

I shall

new

style.

Others

materials or of

new

have to mention a very remarkable

kind further on. But the total change in Suli.stituEnglish architecture from the roiind-arched Norman of w?"/"
Glastonburv to the Early Pointed of Salisbury is not to be of Early
thus accounted for. It appears to be a case of almost total Nonnan.
instance of this

transformation, effected without any extraneous cause, and

in a very short time.^

But

this does not violate

See the chapter on Intelligence (Chap.


^

2
3

See the chapter on the


I

of the

Laws

on

the

XXVIL).

of Variation (Chap. XVI.).

believe this change nearly coincides in date witli the transformation

Norman kingdom

VOL.

II.

of

England into an English one.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

178
This is
probably
paralleled
in the de-

velopinent
of species.

contrary,

it

completes

the

[chap.

between

parallel

tlie

history of

and that of the morphological

the morphology of art

changes in the development of species, if it is true, as I


have maintained in a previous chapter, that organic
changes must have taken place at particular periods with
exceptional rapidity.^
I

have stated that although there

intelligent, or logical,

principle in

beyond doubt an

is

language, yet in the

present state of the science of language we know very


It is otherwise in the
little of the mode of its action.
history of art
Intelli-

gence in
art modifying the

in the

morphology of

art,

as well as in

organic morphology, the action of intelligence is clearly


traceable in modifying the results of unintelligent habit.
I

have shown in a previous chapter how the organizing


with the materials given to it by
as to modify for new purposes what

materials
intelligence works
given to it
by unin- hereditary habit, so
telligent
habit,

without
violating
the consistency of

style.

homologically the same organ, and yet so as to retain a


much closer resemblance to the original model than is
is

needed for the new purposes as is seen, for instance, in


comparing the wing of the bat with the leg of the quad;

ruped.2

This action has

where the
Instance
in the
modifica-

artist's

its

parallel in the history of art,

purpose, which

is

the intelligent principle,

modifies the action of the habitual principle of traditional


The best, or at least the most curious instance of
style.
this that I

know

is

of,

the

way

in

which the Gothic

was modified, without losing

its

style

distinctive

tion of

of architecture

Gothic

characters, in consequence of the introduction of stained

architecture for

the display
of stained
glass.

Politics,

the display of which, without injury to the other


beauties of the style, became the object of the Gothic

glass

architects.^

The principles of the science


more remarkably applicable to

human
It

of life

and mind are

politics,

or the science of

society.

has become a commonplace, that " constitutions are


;

not made, but grow " the same

is

true of language, of

See the chapter on the Eate of Variation (Chap. XXVI.).


See the chapter on Comparative Morphology (Chap. XX.).

See Fergusson's Illustrated Handbook of Architecture, vol.

still

ii.

art,

HABIT AND VARIATION IN HISTORY.

XL.]

179

and of every product of human activity continued through successive generations though it is not
of society,

necessarily true of the product of the activity of a solitary

worker or thinker. This truth is a result of the fundamental truth, that habit is variable, but only gradually so.
All the historical researches of the last half-century tend

show, more and more clearly, the continuity of

to

^^'
is and"''
be gradual-

and the impossibility of any progTess which

history,

not

all Continuity

changes, no

Destructive

gradual.

may

sudden, and so

death

may

doubt,

but constructive changes must

take place under the laws of

and must be gradual,


n

life,

'

because they mvolve, or consist

changes of habit.

in,

has been said, with a basis of truth, though with

political
g^^'tli'

are conse-

It quences of

much

"*
Ijab/t^^^

exaggeration, that
"

A thousand years scarce serve to


A day may lay it in tlie dust."

form a

state,

Constructive changes cannot be at once profound and

sudden

when they

are unquestionably sudden

and appear

which we have lately


witnessed in Italy and in Germany, their profundity can
only be tested by the durability of the result and if it stands
this test, we may be sure that such a revolution, however
sudden it may seem, has been prej^ared for by a gradual
change in the minds of men. It is indeed a commonplace
that all political change, if it is to be durable and safe,
must be gradual that constitutions must develop themselves, and must take time to do so.
This is a consequence
of the law of the gradual variability of habit
and in
speaking of political or constitutional growth or development, men almost unconsciously use a metaphor taken
from the science of life.
We thus see that the law of the gradual variability of Gradual
habit is that which underlies the analogous facts of organic
of
morphology, of language, of the history of art, and of in morto be profound, as in the revolutions

])'!|['|['*'^

political history.

fangufge,

These analogies are very wide and general.


I

now

go
-1

on to the subject of a remarkable special analogy, also


1

Byron.

^"^
fl"*'

history.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

180

[chap.

law of habit, between the process of mental


gj^j^ation and that of social and political progress.
nil*
All education consists in tlie formation of habits, and

Analogy of based on the


political
T)rO?l

to

cSS

mental

education.

of

acquisition

^^^^

any new power

as

the

of

result

education consists in the exercise of that power becoming


habitual, and in a great degree independent of conscious-

Thus, the process of learning one's

ness and will.

own

or

and their meanings coining to suggest each other without any effort of
thought, so that the reasoning process which is needed in
order to understand or to form a sentence is in a great
any other language consists

in the words

not altogether, performed in unconsciousness.


By thus learning to perform as a result of unconscious
habit what at first needed a conscious effort of will and
degree, if

thought, the immediate work to be

a sentence, or practising an

art,

or

done-whether forming
whatever it may be is

done much more rapidly, wliile the attention is set free for
Learning an art, or a language, occupies
other purposes.
the whole attentionthat is to say, according to what I
think

is

the correct definition of the word attention,

it

absorbs the whole consciousness in so far as the consciousness is under the control of the will; but when the art

has been thoroughly learned,


a large share,

if

it

may

be practised while

not the whole, of the attention

liberty to direct itself to other objects.

tent artisan
it

is

in

it

difficult.

And

for the

I believe, comparatively useless to most

it is,

read books of information or of reasoning in

to

a language with
to read,

at

Thus, a compe-

able to converse wliile at his work, unless

any way exceptionally

same reason
persons

is

is left

which they are not

without

effort

of the attention to leave

sufficiently familiar

the language absorbs too

enough of

it

much

fiee for the subject

of the book.
Both confornlatinn
of habits,

Necessity
of per-

manence
in habits,

It is a parallel truth

to this, that social

and

political

mainly consists in the formation of social and


political habits, of which laws are in a great degree the
expression and this progress is possible only on condition
^f actions becomiu" habitual after they are once decided

pTog^ess

on.

It

is,

ior instance,

very important to have a good par-

HABIT AND VARIATION IN HISTOKY.

XL.]

liameutary constitutiou,

181

quite as important that

biit it is

merits should not be constantly under discussion.


legislation

would be impossible

engaged in discussing projects

Other

Parliament were always


reform of

for the

itself,

just

exchange of ideas would be scarcely possible if we


l)e always thinking of the grammatical construction

as tlie

had

if

its

to

In a word, as education

of our sentences.

is

possible oidy

by actions becoming habitual, so political progress is possible only on condition of institutions becoming in some
degi'ee permanent.
They are the greatest of political hores

who think every opportunity


discussion

a right one for opening a

any

on the merits of

institution

Political
^'^^^-

whatever,

though the instinctive conservatism of mankind generally


prevents them from being dangerous.
All this is obvious enough. There is another parallelism,

between the mental development of the individual and the


progress of society, which is equally real though not so
obvious.
It is a truth on which I have insisted in the
biological part of this work, that

the conscious functions

are in all cases later developed than the unconscious ones,

and are developed out of them


phor to say that this is true of
sciously.

it is

political

unconsciously before

Society acts
T

and

it

,,,.,.
at nrst springs

^
Government

scarcely a meta-

development

Consciou.s

a kT"!-^
develoiied

also, the imiivi-

learns to act con-

up spontaneously

^'^^^

'^"'^

in society.

nations at a later period learn to appoint their governments

by a conscious and deliberate act but the appointment of


a government by a conscious national act would never Govemhave become possible, and indeed could not have been '*'^*"
thought of, if governments had not first grown into existence as a natural development of paternal authority.^ The
same is true of the origin of law.
It is a truth which Law.
must be understood in order to make primitive history
;

intelligible,

custom

that

is

older

than lajislation

laws

custom before they can be conby legislation and legislation would be


had not a basis in customary law. This

originate unconsciously in

sciously modified

impossible

if it

who live under the


common law has, or at

ought to be easily intelligible to those


English system of law, in which
'

See Maine

oil

Ancient Law,

clia])ter v.

HABIT AND INrELLIGENCE,

182
least is

supposed to have,

older than

any

its

origin in

[chap.

immemorial custom,

statute.^

Moralists constantly warn us against the dominance of

and

habit,
Habit
ought to
be controlled

They

politicians

warn us against blind conservatism.


is an unintelligent force, and ought

Habit

are right.

be kept as far as possible under the control of

to

by gence

and

will

and mere blind conservatism

is

intelli-

nothing

intelli-

gence.

else

than the action of unintelligent habit in

it is

But

politics.

only the law of habit that makes the formation of

character possible, whether in an individual or in a com-

munity

and therefore what we

habitual forces

is

have to do with the

not to destroy them (for

this,

were

it

would be mental suicide), but to keep them


under control, so as to be capable of modification at the
possible,

command

This

of intelligence.

vidual and of society.

Politicians

since political progress began,


until

it

is

and

true alike of the indi-

have been divided ever


will continue

to

be so

has ceased, into two parties, or schools, which have

borne various names at various times and places, but are


Conservatism and
Liberalism.

known
is felt

Conservatism and Liberalism.

to us as those of

by

all

that these

names

profound distinction, and

indicate an important

it is felt

more than mere partisans that

by

all

who

It

and

are anything

this distinction does not

coincide with the distinction of truth and falsehood, or with


that of good

and

permanence of habit
possibility

of

The

evil.
:

basis of Conservatism is in the

the basis of Liberalism

is

in the

being controlled and modified by

habit

intelligence.

The dominance

of intelligence over unintelligent habit

is

probably imperfect in even the wisest individual men, and

among

nations

it is

well

if it exists at all.

Entire races,

The relation of written to un\yritten law api)ears to have been somewhat different in the ancient republics from what it is in England. The
Twelve Tables of early Rome, and other ancient codes, according to Mr.
Maine (Ancient Law, chap, i.), were not ac?(^i<o?is to the customary laws

already in force, but only written expositions of them.


consisted in their publicity

Their usefulness

for there is reason to believe that, previous

to their publication, the ruling aristocracies were the exclusive guardians

of the legal traditions, and abused the power due to that function.

HABIT AND VARIATION IN HISTORY.

XL.]

183

as for instance those of India, appear to regard the change

of a custom or a law as impossible.

vatism

is

due the

fact,

which

of history, that institutions


their usefulness.

is

To

this blind conser-

illustrated in every page

have a tendency

The best instance

of this

is

to outlive institu-

probably the

Papacy, which in the early Middle Ages was no doubt a


beneficial institution,

but has been a noxious one ever since

the time of Innocent III.

l-ve^their

usefulness.

CHAPTER

XLI.

NATUKAL SELECTION

HISTORY.

!>[

1
preceding chapter I have spoken of the applicaIN tion of
the laws of habit and vaiiation to the facts of
tlie

In this chapter I shall speak of the application

history.

of the law of Natural Selection to the same.


Proibiction of

new

I shall first

speak of the physical action of natural selec-

new

tion, in producing

types of mankind by the process of

t)'pes

of character in
colonization.

colonizing

new

countries.

mean

colonization as

is

by the voluntary emigration of individuals


and of families not, as it took place in prehistoric and early
historic times, by the migration of whole tribes together.
Tn the first place, it is the most restless, ambitious, and

effected now,

Average
(litference

of emi-

energetic that emigrate

this characteristic, lilce all otliers,

and

grants
friini the
parent

tends to become hereditary

stock.

emigrant population and the parent stock.

a difference of average character

certain that this cause has

much

in the character of our North

kinsmen which
Direct
elfect of

now

it

cir-

cumstances.

is

to

from the very

first,

established between the


I think it is

do with that peculiarity

American and Australian

sometimes called energy and sometimes

is

In the second place, the different physical

restlessness.

and

thus,

social circumstances of the

new country from

those of

the old will tend in various ways to modify character, and


these modifications

wUl

also tend to

be inherited.

Lastly,

Natural
selection

by

clin ''^''*^

of a r.ice
suited
thereto,

there will be

some individuals and

emigrating population to

country

is

whom

congenial, and others to

tively unhealthy

families

whom

it is

the

new

compara-

the former will have the greatest chance

of surviving and of leaving descendants,


die or

among

the climate of their

abandon the country,

whQe

the latter

in either case leaving few or

NATUKAL SELECTION

CHAP. XLi.j

no children

IN HISTOKY.

185

so that, even without taking into account

any

direct action of the climate in adapting the people to itself,

the action of natural selection will, in the course of generations, cause the

colonial poptdation to consist exclusively

who

are suited to the climate in virtue of their

of persons

physical constitution.
that with

Noav,

it is

any such peculiarity

scarcely possible to doubt and having


of physical constitution

ch^i!["ter

some peculiarity of mental constitution will be correlated,


though we know nothing of the laws of such correlations.

And

thus will a

new

national character be formed.^

true that in this process there


certainty,

is

It is

no moral element, and no

even preponderant probability, of the new

or

type of character being on the whole better than that of


the parent race.
But variety is ensured and variety
;

for its

own

sake appears to be a part of the purpose of

nature.
"

God

fulfils

Himself in many ways,

Lest one good custom should corrupt the world."

The process which I have now described is a purely


physical one, and in no way peculiar to human history
indeed, there can be no doubt that new races of animals
and of plants originate in this way, and have so originated
;

in countless instances during


time.
the course of geological
o
o
1 now go on to speak of natural selection as a law of the

moral world and a cause of historical progress.


The laws of habit and variation, as we have seen, are
true of both the bodily and the mental functions
and, as

This
P'f'^s* i^

physical,

Natural
?'^l'*ction
IS

also

true of the

world

have endeavoured in the preceding chapter to show,


those laws are applicable to the facts of human history.
I

human

History

is

determined almost exclusively, not mined by


by the bodily but by the mental nature of man not by uiaii's
JSTow,

history

is

ii

that nature which he has in


1

p.

other animals,

166), acclimatization is

new climate, and


by natural, or in the case of cultivated plants by artificial, selecand he avows himself unable to separate the respective effects of the

tion

two

causes.

common with

According to Darwin (Origin of Species,

effected partly

partly

by the

self-adajitation of the race to the

Tennyson's " Morte d'Arthur.''^

I have no doubt that Tennyson is


modern character of this sentiment, and
in the mouth of a king of the heroic age.

perfectly aware of the thoroughly

of the anachronism of 2ilaciug

it

mental
nature.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

186

[chap.

but by that which is peculiar to himself. The reason of


this is, that the mental nature, which distinguishes man

from the lower animals, is also that in which consists the


superiority of one man, and of one race of men, to another.
This is a case of the law which I have mentioned in several
places, that mental characters are more variable than

But though it is a case of a biological law,


none the less the ground of the truth that history

bodily ones.

it

is

is

almost entirely not a physical but a mental process or, as


we say in more famUiar language, that history is associated
It is
not with the physical but with the moral sciences.
true that such physical causes as those which belong to

geography and climate have had a most powerful intiueuce

on the course

of history

physical science

but this does not

make

history a

just as the facts of organic life cannot be

understood without reference to the external conditions of


life in the earth, the waters, and the air, and yet the laws
of life are distinct from those of matter.

The law

of natural selection implies that the life of

every species

is

an incessant struggle for existence

and

what causes advance in organization is, that victory in the


This is
struggle falls, on the whole, to the superior races.
as true of man as of any other species the whole history
of man is a tale of struggle and conflict ^ but what con;

Vii;tory in
liiitnan

stitutes

CO iflicts
lU^pends

among

on

moml

the

of

peculiarity

human

man

exclusively pliysical, while with


clusively moral.
life,

is

this,

that

the lower races the conditions of success are almost

causes.

of

history

Among

they are almost ex-

animals, victory, the preservation

and the chance of leaving

offspring,

depend on such

qualities as fleetness, strength, keenness of sight or of scent,


or,

at the highest,

on sagacity and cunning.

The same

may have been true of man in his earliest prehistoric condition, when as yet he was but little removed above the
But in any state of man which history
higher animals.
records,

and doubtless

for long ages before

the

dawn

of

history, victory has been determined, on the whole, by


1

What

follows has been in a gieat

article, entitled

Rccicir of

"The Natural History

December 1867.

rlfgi-ee

suj,'geteil

by a most able

of Morals," in the Xoiih

British

NATURAL SELECTION

XLI.]

quite a different set of qualities

187

IN HISTORY.

uot

by physical but by

moral superiority.
This will probably be assented to as self-evident

never-

theless, I think the conditions on which depend the


success and predominance of races and nations are geneIt is the most
rally and systematically misunderstood.
notion,
that victory
commonest
obvious, and, I suppose, the
belongs as a matter of course to the most courageous. Other
But it is very
things being equal, this no doubt is true.
seldom that all other things are equal; and of all moral
endowments, there is probably none in which men are
more nearly ecjual than in what is significantly called
" mere animal courage."
The Duke of "Wellington, a very

competent judge, used to say that as a general rule all men


are brave
and there is no doubt of the fierce valour of
;

many

Asiatic tribes

with some partial exceptions in

yet,

Mahomedan

the history of the

the time of Miltiades

till

conquests, Asiatics, from

now, have always given

The causes

way

must reside, not It does not


in that lowest moral quality with respect to which men
chFeflif on
are comparatively on a level, but in those higher moral courage,
qualities with respect to which they differ indetinitely.
The most obvious and commonplace of all the conditions
on which victory depends is the relative number on each
In our times, this in no way depends on any moral
side.
superiority of the more numerous army, or of the nation
that sends it forth.
But it was not so at the beginning of

before Europeans.

We know

civH society.

of victory

that primitive

tribes tend to
break up into fragments, as in the case of the separation of

the families of

We

Esau.i

Abraham and

have

not,

evidence on the subject

nature

we may

and those of Jacob and


am aware, any direct
but from what we know of human
Lot,

so far as I
;

safely infer that the tendency to split

will be greater

among a people

temper, while

those

in

of selfish

whom

more highly developed, and the


1

I believe

historical

the

Book

of Genesis, from

ut whether

it is

up

and contentious

oritrof
powei- in a

staV^ue

the domestic virtues are

\ ^^^^,.

coming

virtues.

civic virtues are

Abraham

forwards, to be mainly

so or not, the incidents referred to in the text

are not the less characteristic of the period.

domestic-

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

188

[cHAP.

will be more likely to stay together,


under the same government, and consequently to
form a united and powerful tribe, able to overcome and
conquer those tribes which are kept in a divided state by
their deficiency in the domestic and civic virtues.
This cause of superiority can exist only so long as there
It will come
is room for tribes to split up and separate.

into

existence,

to live

an end when the increase of population is sufficiently


great to prevent them from spreading at will when agrito

culture succeeds to a pastoral

life,

and

tribes consolidate

But when political communities are larger,


and wars are waged on a larger scale, the conditions of
The first of these
success are even more distinctly moral.
conditions are fidelity, and, what is intimately connected
into nations.

The
vTitueT^

with

this,

the

capacity for obedience.

This

subject

is

systematically misunderstood by Western Europeans, who


often appear to think that self-assertion and untameable-

ness of disposition
It

virtues.

may

are the best

basis for the political

be true that the greater

of taming a race of

men

is

the difficulty

into civilization, the nobler is

when they have been so tamed.


may be true, though I very much doubt it.

their character

This,

But
uutameableness is simply the character of the savage, and
freedom and the love of freedom are of no moral worth
whatever unless they are based on loyalty and the capacity
Fidelity, loyalty, and the capacity for
for obedience.
I

say,

obedience are moral qualities of a very high order.


is

It

these more than any others which make political and

military

combinations possible, and give political

and

military power.

Thus the domestic virtues which keep a tribe together


are those which conduce to power and to victory at the
first dawning of civil life in the nomadic and patriarchal
and the political virtues are those which conduce to
state
power and to victory in a more advanced state of society.
We may perhaps say with some approximation to accuracy
that the former are characteristic of pastoral life, and the
But there is a third kind of virtues
latter of agricultural
which are characteristic of civic life, and are called from
;

NATURAL SELECTION

XLI.]

189

IN HISTORY.

them the civic virtues. It is not very easy to define in The civic
what civic virtue consists, bnt it is happily so well known ^'"*"*^^'

among us
meaning

':hat

no definition

is

needed in order to make my


perhaps be defined as the

may

Tt

intelligible.

transference of loyalty from a superior to the community.

shown in

It is

all

history

how

the civic virtues form the

best and surest bases of political and military power.

The

republics of Greece and Eorae are the most conspicuous

and the most familiar instances of this truth, though by


Holland and England in the
modern world are equally good instances.
Thus virtue gives political and military power. In the "Virtue
strife of tribes, of races, and of nations in the political aSpo^e^^
no means the only ones.

in the physical

on, of

world

a process of natural

which the tendency

is

selection goes

to give the victory to the best.'

In the

earliest periods it is probable that wars were At first


always wars of extermination; and under those circum- ^'"^"^'j^g^^j

the effect of natural selection must have been races


simply that the inferior races perished and the superior
ones survived.
This process takes place even at the
stances

were

present day, where the inferior races are unaljle to adopt the

ways

life, though not now by means of massacre.


on before our eyes in Australia and New Zealand,

of civilized

It is going

and the comparatively benevolent disposition which civimen have now acquired appears unable to arrest it.

lized

This

is

exactly the

way

in

which natural

selection acts as

between contending races of animals namely, by the


destruction of the weakest.
But at a later period, when
men had become less brutal and savage, wars ceased to
lie wars of extermination, and became wars of conquest,

And when one

race

being destroyed, a
there

men

is

as

nothing at

among

is

thus subjugated by another without

new
all

which

set of conditions arises, to

similar in the animal world.

Among

animals, the progress of the entire species

ensured by the destruction of the inferior races.

is

when
'

the inferior races are not destroyed, but only sub-

Oil the subject of the

tendency of virtue to confer political power, see

a rema.rkahle passage in Butler's Analogy of Religion, Part


(pp. 71

i3ut

and 72 in Bishop Fitzgerald's

edition).

I.

chapter

iii.

afterwards
g^J^^^^l^^'^

gated.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

190

[chap.

the effect of this on the entire species?

jugated,

what

This

not a question for merely historic or prehistoric

is

is

research, but one

importance.

of

the

deepest political interest and

The answer to

it

is,

on the whole
dominant, whether

T think,

Eaces which become

Political

satisfactory.

progress

through innate force of character or through favouring


circumstances promoting their advancement in civilization,

due to conquest.

appear to have a power of raising the conquered races


The best instance of this probably
to their own level.
is

of

to

be found in the results of

Western Europe.
But when nations,

the

Eoman

conquest

from mere empires,

as distinguished

ceases to be possible for conquest to be

Ulti-

are consolidated,

mately,

any longer an agency of improvement and thenceforward


historical progress must be almost exclusively due to the
arts of peace, industrial as well as political. But progress is

war

ceases

an
agency of
to be

progress.

it

due to a process of natural selection, though natural


selection is now applied, not to races of men, but to instistill

and

to ideas.

In the peaceful

strife of

our modern

Peaceful
progress
due to

tutions

competi-

principle to

tion and
natural

namely, free competition and the victory and preservation


It is only on this principle that freedom can
of the best.

selection.
Justifica-

tion of

freedom.

times, however, as in the warlike strife of the ancient, the

which progress

is

due

is

still

the same

The ever-repeated argument against freedom


is, that the mass of mankind, when they have attained it,
do not knoAV what to do with it. This may be true but,
even if it were proved to be true, freedom would be none
the less a means of good. It is a law of the organic world
that many more seeds must be produced than can possibly
be

justified.

and it is a law of the human


mature their products
large proportion of effort shall
immensely
an
world that
be wasted. But it is only by permitting freedom of effort
;

in all directions, with

its

unavoidable concomitant of

waste, that any valuable results can be achieved.

Where

many men will struggle into positions for


which they are unfit. Where industry and commerce are
uncontrolled, many disastrous blunders will be made by
men in the exercise of their freedom. Where the expression of thought is free, much will be published that is
careers are open,

NATURAL SELECTION

XLI.]

191

IX HISTORY.

and miscliievous. Hence it will always be possible


arguments against freedom, which so far as they go
are perfectly valid. The reason that modern political society
is right in disregarding them is not that they are false,
for they are not false
but that they are outweighed by
immeasurably stronger arguments on the other side.
Open careers may tempt men to waste their lives, but
careers must, nevertheless, be open in order that the
best men may be selected.
Commercial freedom may
tempt men into disastrous speculations, but commerce
and industry must be free in order that it may be
ascertained, by actual competition, in what way the
industry of each district and each nation may be most
profitably directed, and how commerce may be most
foolish

to find

that
may

And freedom of thought


freedom of discussion and publication

successfully transacted.
is

to

say,

lead to the dissemination of pernicious error, yet freedom


of publication

and

free

and

is

necessary to the progress of knowledge,

fair discussion is

error can ever be killed.

in the world of

dom

human

the only means

In a word,

it

is

by which

necessary that

society there should be full free-

(within the limits of morality and public safety) for

the spontaneous variation of character, action, and thought,


in order that the competition

may

select

and preserve

the best results, while the worthless ones perish.

In

this chapter, as in the preceding, I

have treated

the questions under consideration in the barest outline.


I have not endeavoured to exhaust the subject, but only
to point out its existence.

CHAPTER

XLTI.

INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION.

have shown how the prinof habit, variation, and natural selection apply

the last
IN ciples

two chapters

to the historical sciences, as well as to the sciences of life

and mind.
Division of to

In addition to these, I purpose in this chapter

speak of a special and very remarkable set of resem-

^^^i^ces between the bodily life of an organism and the life


theor"anism and in of a society.
The fundamental law of vital and of social

organization
Society
IS

an

orffanism.

definition

is

the same

namely, division of labour.

of organization is functional relation

The

between

where labour is
divided or, to speak more accurately, a society where
employments are distributed is not metaphorically but
literally an organism. The expression, " physiological division of labour," has been borrowed by biology from political
parts

and, under this definition, a society

science, to signify

guage, the

what

is called,

in less suggestive lan-

But

" specialization of functions."

to

speak of

the division of labour, whether in the individual or in the


social organism, expresses only half the truth.

The more

unlike are the members one to another, the completer

is

the division of labour between them, and the completer

mutual dependence and the greater is the


power of the entire organism, by means of the combined
action of its various unlike members, to achieve results
which coidd not be achieved by any union of like parts.
is

also their

To use technical language

tlie

greater

is

tion, the completer is also the integration.

the differentiaThis,

which

is

CH. XLII.]

INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL OUGANIZATION.

true of organic

life, is

equally true of social

193
It is too

life.

need insisting on, that the power, or


efficiency, of a society depends on division of labour, and
on ability to combine the several actions of the various
faniiliax a truth to

members among

whicli the labour

equally obvious to any one

who

is

divided

and

it

is

has the slightest know-

ledge of comparative biology, that the eflticiency of the


nutritive, or motor, or sensory apparatus of

depends on the same conditions

an organism

namely on the

distri-

bution of functions between the several parts, and the

consequent ability to combine the different

actions of

those parts.

The

between the individual and the social


organism is, however, a much closer one than the foregoing remarks imply.
In the higher organisms that is to say, in all animals
except the Protozoa there are two totally distinct sets
of organs, namely the nutritive and the nervo-muscular.
parallel

Nutritive

Similarlv, the organization of society is twofold, industrial ^^'^ nervo.'


muscular
,
-1
p
and political the industrial organization of society is com- organs.

1.1

parable to the nutritive organization of the animal, and


the political organization of society

is

comparable to the

of the animal.
nervo-muscular organization
&

There

is also this

Industrial
political

organization.

resemblance, that the development of


gggjjj

the commvinity, like that of the individual organism,

^^^.^

is organic de-

In the simplest forms mentis


no division of labour, except from the
simple
p
what IS determined by the differences oi age and sex. to the
With social and political advance, the division of labour ^"'"Pl-'^Moreover, the more highly The most
goes on constantly increasing.
'^'Shly
organized
among
grow
to the largest
size, and
o organisms
o
o
t>
b
from the simple

human

1.1

of

to the complex.^

society there

is

-iiii-Pf.

>

live the longest

those of lowest organization are mostly

microscopic, and live for only a few days


contrast with the whale, the elephant,

same

in remarkable

and man.

It is the

in societies; the communities of savages are very

and last for but a few generations unlike the kingdoms and republics of civilized men. I further believe
small,

See the chapter on Organic Development (Chap. XI.).

VOL. XL

organized

are the

th?longest
li^'^^.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

194
that

tlie

highest organisms have been derived by descent,

with modification, from the lowest


highly

[chap.

civilized

and that the most

have been developed

societies

out

of

savage ones by gradi;al advance.

Further

of the organism

the material

Constant

ceasin" to live, and

matefial!

matter

is

cast off

by

is

constantly

excretion, while

new

brought in and vitalized; so that the same

is

organism, at successive periods, does not consist of the

same matter.

Just

members

so,

of the

constantly dying, while others are born

community,

periods,

successive

at

community are
so that the same
of

consists

different

individuals.

The
of

blancr*^"^'

which

have drawn between the organic

and that of society is much too close


must be due to some common ground

of the individual

life

Ground

parallel

to be accidental

it

consists in these three truths


Life

is

^*^ ^

1. Life,

ia
r

activity,

Habit.
lutelli-

gence.

is

mode

common

This

i^ ^^^ nature of both.

ground, as I think,

in both the individual organism and in society,


Perfectly stagnant

of activity.

life

would be a

contradiction.

and

2.

The laws

3.

Habit and the other unintelligent forces are in both

controlled

by

of habit are operative in both

intelligence

to

the action of wliich. all

advance in organization, whether individual or

due

mental intelligence in

which

social, is

organizing intelligence in the individual organism,


society.

social organization

and

The mental

intelligence to

social progress are due, acts

for the most part with very little consciousness of the

process which
rp,

differences

individual

and

social

tion.

Social

till does

not depend
ture.

it

effects

but organizing intelligence has

no consciousness whatever.
I have to remark, in conclusion, that there are three
differences between individual and social organization,
-^hich ought to be clearly stated.
In the individual organism, organization depends on
in other words, the relation of parts with
structure
respect to function depends on their relations of position
and form. In societies this is not the case,
;

In the higher animals, the sentient

life is

concentrated

195

HERBERT SPENCER ON THE SOCIAL ORGANISM.

XLU.]

in the

brain

zation

of

life,

In

whole.

and from

this concentration or centrali- In

follows

it

societies,

the parts

that

exist

on the contrary, the whole

for

the

exists for

it

the

exists for
tlie parts.

the parts.

have no reproThe resemblance, in some shape, of the

Societies, unlike individual organisms,

ductive function.
social

organism to the individual

and

has been often inferred therefrom that societies, like

it

is

a very old speculation

'

must be subject

individuals,

that, so far as the

other way.; for

if

analogy
death

is

to

decay and death.

good

for anything,

1ms no

ductive
function,
^^^.

^.

societies

I think necessarily

it tells

a law of individual

is

It

life,

the Ar<nimeut

so is

for the

and births, in a normal state of things, compensate, and more than compensate, for deaths.
But if
death is a law of social life, there is no law of birth to
birth

compensate.

KOTE.
HERBERT SPENCER ON THE SOCIAL ORGANISM.
It will be perceived that the ideas of the foregoing chapter are

borrowed from Herbert Spencer's very ingenious and able essay

on the same

subject.^

I think his leading idea

is

true

and most My

objec-

but, not satisfied with pointing out the general resem- tv^^.^u
blance between the principles of organization in the individual ject to H.

valuable

and the

social organisms,

parallel

he has attempted to draw a detailed

between particular organs and functions

way which

I think utterly untenable.

stating the various parallelisms

This will be shown by

which he

discovers, in a double

need scarcely say that Herbert Spencer has not

tabular form.

made them out

in tabular form himself.

The working class.


The trading class.

The
The

Commodities.

Blood.

in the two, in a

nutritive system.

circulating system.

Eepublished in the second volume of his collected Essays.

O 2

^pencer-

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

196

[chap.

Money. ^

Eed

Koads, canals, and railways.

Blood-vessels.

Double

Double set of vessels


and veins).

lines of rail.

blood-corpuscles.

(arteries

The uervo-muscular system.

The governing class.


Local and executive govern-

Ganglia, including the

spinal

cord.

ments.

Telegraph wires.

The cerebral
Nerve fibres.

Telegraph wires used in work-

Nerve

Parliament.

ing railway

ganglia.

fibres

controlling

the

arteries.

traffic.

I cannot see that I have done any injustice to Mr. Spencer in

summary of some of his special conclusions. I do


however, mean to imply that they are nothing more than a

the foregoing
not,

mass of incongruities. His general parallel between the processes


of development in the individual and in the social organism is
most valuable. Mr. Spencer has laid himself the more open to
Hobbes on such a criticism as mine by quoting a passage from Hobbes, in
the same
^"^ '

'^

'

show its incongruities, which, as it appears to me, are of


I subjoin part of it, quoting
exactly the same kind as his own.
Hobbes, I
the words exactly, but putting it into tabular form.
"
commoncalled
a
great
leviathan
the
regards
mention,
must
order to

wealth

" as

an

artificial

production, not a natural growth.

(An artificial soul,


and motion

as giving life

to

the

whole

body.

The

magistrates

officers

of

and

judicature

other

and

execution

Artificml joints.

" Silver and gold have to perform, in the organization of the state,
the same function as the blood-corpuscles in the human organization.
As these round discs, without themselves taking an immediate share in
1

the nutritive process, are the medium, the essential condition of the
change of matter, of the production of the heat and of the force by wliich

the temperature of the body is kept up and the motions of the blood and
all the juices are determined, so has gold become the medium of all activity
in the

The

life

of the state." (Liebig,

quoted by Spencer.)

theory referred to in the above passage

corpuscles are carriers of

oxygen

to the tissues,

is,

that the red blood-

and of carbonic acid away

from them; so that they are used in the process of nutrition without
Carpenter, however (Human Physiology, p. 198), refers

being consumed.

to this theory as only a probable one.

HERBERT SPENCER ON THE SOCIAL ORGANISM,

XLII.J

Reward and punishment, by


which, fastened to the seat

and member

Joint

to perform

The

ivealth

liis

and

particular

is

The

every

sovereignty,

the

of

riches of all the

are

The

by whom

needful for

it

suggested unto
Eqxiity

and laws

Concord
Sedition
Civil

The

war

to
it,

all

Its business.

things

know
are

strength.

Salus 2}opuli, the pcoiJle's safety


Counsellors,

do the same in

moved

duty, are

members

nerves, that

the body natural.

The memory.

are
J

An

artificial

reason and

Health.
Sickness.

Death.

incongruities of this speak for themselves.

^vill.

197

CHAPTER

XLIII.

THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIEXCES.


The

rpHE

])reseut

J-

naturally

comes at
the eiid ot
the work,

appropriate place for a treatise on the classifica-

^[qj^

^^j h^q mutual

relation of the sciences is not at

the beginning, but at the end of a work like the present,


A

classification of the sciences is

programme

of

work

be done, but only a r^sumS of work

to

that has been done

not and cannot be a

in otlier words,

it

is

impossible to

classify the sciences until the sciences exist.

It

would

for Aristotle, or Bacon, or any other


man, to lay down a chart of the course which scientific
research and scientific thought would take when as yet
Such intellectual
science had scarcely begun its work.
power as woitld have been needed in onier to do so does

have been impossible

To understand history

not belong to man.


the highest

attainments of man's

not belong to unassisted

In this chapter

it

man

intellect,

is

one of

biit it

does

to utter prophecy.

will be impossible for

me

to avoid

must

repeating part of what has been said in the chapter on


Organic Subordination.^
It is to be observed at the outset that a paper classifi(.r^j^joji Qf
classifications of
f^e sciences, like the paper
^ ^

be imper-

zoology and botany, can be at the best only approximately

Any such
rlassifica-

tion

^'^

'

'

The divisions in both are in a great degree arbiand the tabular form does not represent the real
I think, however,
order of things with perfect accuracy.
that a much more complete and regular classification of
the sciences is practicable than we could have expected.
correct.

trary,

Chapter XIII.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.

CH.XLIII.]

When we

199

seek for points of connexion between the

sciences to serve as a basis for their classification,

on

this rather embarrassing fact, tliat there

whicli belong to more than one science.

we come

are subjects Subjects

do not mean

which occur in organic classification, where


it is sometimes doubtful on which side of a boundary-line
we ought to place some particular form. I mean cases
where there is no doubt whatever that they belong equally
to two sciences.
Whether, for instance, does spectrum
cases like those

^^ niore"^
tl\an ouo

Spectrum

Whether do

^"%.i.^

the polarizing properties of crystals belong to optics or to

crystals

analysis belong to optics or to chemistry

crystallography

Whether do the

facts of electro-chemical

'^

cheniis'try.

decomposition and the theory of the voltaic battery belong


to chemistry or to electricity
is,

The only

possible answer

that they belong equally to both.


This, then,

is

one kind of connexion between the sciences

namely, that one

and the same subject may belong to


more than one science. Another kind is when one science One
gives suggestions to another
such as, to mention the best science
instance that occurs to me, the instructive and valuable suggesidea of the physiological division of labour which the another

science of

human

society has furnished to biology.

kind of connexion

when one

is

A third

science furnishes materials

another, as in the case of biology furnishing to che-

to

mistry a variety of

new

substances,

which constitute the

or furnishrifis^to'*^"

another,

subject of the branch of the latter science called organic

chemistry.

fourth

way

is

when one

science becomes, in

or sujiply-

mean, when

2i|it"\^'

the literal sense, instrumental to another

one

science

it

supplies another with instruments.

optics has supplied astronomy

enabling

Thus,

another.

with the telescope, thereby The


heavens and has ^''l^scope

to explore the depths of the

supplied biology with the microscope, thereby enabling

it microscope.

examine the minutest structure of the tissues.


may perhaps be mentally added by the reader that
mathematics has become instrumental to dynamics and
astronomy, by supplying them with methods and formulte.
but it is one
This is true, and a most important truth
The conof a different kind from the last mentioned.
through
with
biology,
nexion of optics with astronomy and
to

It

Connexion
^^'

^a.cs
^^itli
..

200

HABIT

AJS'D

INTELLIGENCE.

[chap-

the means of the telescope and the microscope,

is

only,

it were, accidental
that is to say, it does not depend
on the nature of the sciences themselves. If this is not
quite evident, it will become so on reflecting that it is
conceivably quite possible, though unlikely, for a man to

as

understand astronomy wdthout understanding the theory


of the telescope, or to be an accomplished physiologist

without understanding the theory of the microscope.

But

the connexion of mathematics with dynamics and astro-

nomy

is

of a different kind from this

impossible

for it

would be

impossible, mean, in the sense of involving


understand dynamics and astronomy
I

a contradiction

to

The connexion of

without understanding mathematics.

mathematics with dynamics and with astronomy (which


but a particular application of dynamics)
sense accidental, but
The laws
of dyna-

micsinjply
those of

mathematics.

mics.

It

is

grounded in the nature of dyna-

would be impossible

so

much

to state the

as

laws of dynamics without taking some of the truths of

mathematics as known. Thus, to mention an elementary


instance, it would be impossible to prove or to state the

theorem of the parallelogram of forces without


This kind
of relation
is to be
the basis
of the
classifica-

tion,

which

is

to be a
series.

Such a
series is

only
approxi-

is

not in any

is

first

ing the geometrical properties of the parallelogi'am.

knowNow,

kind of relation between sciences namely, that in


which the truths of one presuppose those of another is
the most fundamental of all relations, and is that whereon
any rational classification or co-ordination of the sciences
must be based.^ That is to say, we have to arrange the
sciences in such an order that the truths of each science
presuppose and depend on the truths of that science
which comes before it in the series, and are independent
Thus dynamics depends
of all those which follow it.
mathematics,
and
mathematics
does not depend on
on
dynamics or any other physical science.
In classifying all the sciences, however, we cannot perwe can only
fectly attain to such an arrangement as this
approximate to it. There is no possibility of so framing
this

mately
possible.

speak of this subject more briefly than

consequence of having gone into

it

Organic Subordination (Chap. XIII.).

in

some

should otherwise do, in

detail in the chapter

on

201

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.

XLIII.]

an encyclopaedia of the sciences that each separate science


can be fully treated of without any anticipatory reference to
The chemical
those which are to follow it. For instance
:

group of sciences, as I shall have to show, conies after the


dynamical group, and is dependent thereon: electricity
belongs on the whole to the dynamical group, yet the facts
of electro-chemistry, as already remarked, belong as much
to chemical as to electrical science, so that they cannot be

explained or even stated without taking some of the facts


The best arrangement of the
of chemistry as known.

which the smallest number


and we can
of such anticipatory references is needed
than could
arrangement
approach much nearer to such an

sciences, however, is that in

have been thought

The value

possible.

by

of this aiTangement is greatly increased

The order

and most general s-Jpie\,,|


general
subjects first, and the more complex and special ones
for the more complex and special subjects complex
after these
depend on the simpler and more general ones, but the ^JJ^^.^j_
simple and general do not depend on the complex and
Thus the facts of biology are more complex
special.
than those of chemistry and they are also more special
for all substances have chemical properties, but only some

the fact that

it

places the

simplest

It is
substances are vitalized, or capable of vitalization.
simplicity
of
the
speaking
necessary to observe that, in

and generality of any

set of scientific facts, I

speak of the

subject-matter of the science only, and not of

its

pro-

The processes of mathematics are more intricate


cesses.
than those of chemistry but the subject-matter of mathe;

and absolutely general, consisting


while the subjectin the properties of space and time
matters of chemistry are neither general nor simple on
the contrary, they are special, for every substance has
and they are so complex and
its own peculiar properties

matics

is

perfectly simple

varied

that no

complete enumeration

is

yet possible of

the properties of any substance whatever.

have said on the subject of the classification Summary,


of the sciences may be summed up in this formula

What

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

202

[chap.

The arrangement we are to aim at is that in which the


more simple and general subjects come before the more
complex and special, and in which each science depends
on those which come before it in the series, but is independent of those which come after it. I think no intelligent

man

will

an arrangement

question that,

whether the sciences will

No

single

series in

nature.

if

the right one.

is

fit

into

is

it

practicable, such

The question will be


such an arrangement

and this is not a question for reasoning, but for trial.


The only way of proving that such a classification can be
made, is to make it.
I admit that there is no such thing, either in the classification of the sciences or anywhere else in nature,
All classification whatever is
as a single linear series.
I think I shall show that
But
in groups of groups.
the

sciences

do arrange themselves in a series of large


the simpler and more general
more complex and special ones,
this series depends on those which
independent of those which come

groups, in which series

come
and each member

before the

subjects

go before
after

First
division,

into logic

and

its

but

is

it.

Proceeding on these principles, the

first

logic

on the

Every possible science comes under

other.

one of these two heads

every science other than abstract

logic consists in the application of logic to


class of subjects.
Logic,

unlike
the other
sciences,
is not an
organou.

and most funda-

mental division of the sciences is, as it appears to me, that


into abstract logic on the one side, and the applications of

applications.

it,

of

In another way

with the other sciences.

some

particular

also logic is contrasted

All the other sciences are orgaua

make

whereby
we come to know what we did not know before. But
logic is not an organon of discovery. It has no discoveries
"When we master the science of logic, we do
to make.
not learn anything that we were ignorant of before; we
only become conscious of knowing what we previously
knew unconsciously. The axioms that a contradiction
cannot be true, that what is true of every one of a class
is true of each one of the class, and that things which
of discovery

that

is

to say, they

discoveries

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.

XLiii.]

same thing

co-exist with the

203

co-exist with each other,^

these have not been discovered by logicians

logicians

have not taught lis these truths, but have only made us
aware that we know them, and have always known them.
Logic is exclusively occupied with determining the foundations of knowledge,

and leaves the other sciences

the superstructure

or, to

works backward

to build

use a difterent metaphor, logic

to the fiindamental

and

principles

as-

sumptions of knowledge, and leaves the other sciences to


work forward to inferences.^

namely, because
not an
that no o notation can be

It is for this reason

organon
of knowledge

logic is

looical

any use except

for the

of logic itself.

The notations

of

of arithmetic

and algebra

of logic can be of the slightest use as an instrument of

Boole's

though

be and, I think, in Professor


of great use in showing the

may

it

hands ^ has been

laws of reasoning.*
Logic

is,

on every ground, to be regarded as the

mean the

I do not

the sciences.

Tlie first of these three

axioms

is

first

that which

is called,

on which the syllogism

the dictum de

is

that which Mr. Mill places at the foundation of his logic.


2

Questions however arise in many, perhaps in

like those of logic,


settling its basis.

have to

No

do,

of

in the language

is

et nulla,

first

in the sense of the

of technical logic, the principle of identity and contradiction

omni

is

all

the second

based

the third

sciences, which,

not with extending knowledge, but with

one will question the great service done to science

by Euclid in stating the postulates and axioms as he has done and yet
this work did not extend our knowledge
but it is always desirable, not
;

only to extend knowledge as


tions

not only

to infer as

much as
much as

number of primary
Laws of Thought.

smallest possible
^

See Boole's

possible,

but to

settle its founda-

possible, but to infer it

from the

principles.

In the chapter on Mental Intelligence (Chap. XXXIX.), and in the


present, I have throughout spoken of the laws of logic as being laws of the
universe, and being laws of thought only because they are laws of the
*

universe.

Consequently,

altogether difler with those

who would

class

branch of psychology I think it would be as rational to call


mathematics a branch of psychology because space and time are forms of

logic as a

thought, as to
of thought.

call logic

2iot

an

111-

purpose of illustrating the truths strument

are instruments of vast utility and power, but no notation

reasoning

Logical
'^^'^*''^" '^

a branch thereof because the laws of logic are laws

jug'^'^^"'^'

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

204

[chap.

I only mean that logic is the initial


most important
Its subjectthat which commences the series.
science
matter is perfectly simple, and it is absolutely universal in
for no inference can be made on any subits generality
;

whatever without involving the principles of logic


and the principles of logic do not depend on those of
any other science, but the principles of all the other

ject

sciences

We

depend on those of

now

logic.

leave the subject of abstract logic, and proceed

which consist in applications of logic.


Here the first and most important division of subjectmatter is into the abstractions of space and time on the
one side, and on the other all those things which exist in
space and act in time that is to say, all existing things
The science of the
whatever which are known to us.
properties of space and time is mathematics
the sciences
the

to

sciences

Matliematical

aud

physical
sciences.

Mathematics

comes
before
physii/s.

existing things

of the properties of

may

be called the

must be understood that


these include psychology and those sciences which depend
on psychology, such as the sciences of language and of
history.
On every ground, mathematics comes in our
The subject-matter
series before the physical sciences.
science
is
the
of mathematical
properties of time and
space, and time and space are perfectly simple and absolutely universal; while matter, which is the primary
physical

sciences

though

it

suliject of physical science, is

for
is

not simple in

its properties,

they are so various that no one knows them


it

universal in

occupied by matter.

its

all

nor

extent, for only part of space is

And,

as already remarked, the truths

of a large part of the physical sciences, including especially


all

branches of abstract and applied dynamics, presuppose

those of mathematics, while the truths of mathematics do

not presuppose any physical truths.


Algebra,
arithmetic,

aud

geometry.
Logic
is the
initial

science.

The three mathematical


science of abstract quantity
of

number

sciences
;

are

algebra,

or the

arithmetic, or the science

and geometry,

or the science of extension

go on to

physical sciences,

and form.

We now

the

or

those

205

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.

XLiii.J

involving real existence

and here the first


and those of life

into the sciences of matter

distinction is Sciences of

speak

or, to

of

lifg.

with more precision, into the sciences of the properties of


unvitalized matter and the sciences whereof the subjects
involve
series

It is

life.

come

of life are

obvious that the sciences of

after those of matter,

more complex and

The

matter.

in our Those

both because the facts

less general

matter, and because the laws of

life

life

of

^^g'^gj-gt

than those of

presuppose those of

sciences of matter, again, are divided into Dynamical

the dynamical group and the chemical

dynamics

being

the science of force and energy, and chemistry being the


science of the transformations of matter.

At the head

gj^gmigj^i

sciences.

of

the dynamical group stands abstract or general dynamics, General

which

and energy in so
and after this
cases whatever

consists of the theory of force

far as it is applicable to all

gecondaiy
dynamical

the secondary dynamical sciences (to use Dr. Whewell's


expression) of sound, radiance, heat, electricity, and

mag-

netism, each of which consists in a special set of applications of dynamical theory.

The dynamical
chemical.

Energy

This

sciences

is

come

in our series before the The

partly because their subject

is

simpler. conie'^

though capable of appearing under various


forms, of which the principal are motion, heat, electricity,
and radiance. Matter is also capable of assuming various
is one,

forms, solid, liquid,


one, like energy,

and gaseous

but consists of

and moreover

many

it

one

is

aware who

not

distinct elements,

which are not capable of mutual transformation.


besides, though matter and energy are functions one
other, yet, as every

is

before the

is at all

And
of the

conversant

with this class of subjects, there are far more dynamical


facts

presupposed in chemical science than chemical facts

presupposed in the dynamical sciences.

The chemical group of

sciences

may

be enumerated as

Molecular

The

chJmistW

molecular physics, chemistry, and crystallography.

need no explanation. Molecular and


physics has till now been usually regarded as a part of giaphy.
chemistry, and has been treated of in the introductory
chapters of works on that subject but I think it is now
time to raise it to the rank of a distinct science. It may

names

of the

two

latter

206

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

Molecular

be defined as the science of the various states of molecular

defined!

aggregation

includes

it

[chap.

the theory of the gaseous

or

vaporous, the liquid, and the solid states of substances,

and consequently of evaporation and freezing of cohesion


and capillarity, of solution, of gaseous and liquid diffusion, of osmose, and of various other kindred subjects.
In strictuess of definition, crystallography is a branch of
;

Crystallo-

molecular physics, but the facts of crystallography are so

and

distinct
it

so peculiar that

as a separate science.

It

it
is

is

much

better to treat

sufficiently obvious that

molecular physics comes before chemistry in the

series,

because the simplest facts of chemistry would be unintelligible without some knowledge of molecular physics
enough, at

least, to

understand what

because every crystalline species

having

own

its

chemistry

"
;

meant by

solution

and

a distinct substance

is

peculiar chemical constitution, which

equally characteristic

elements

is

Crystallography comes after chemistry,

or evaporation.

of

with

it

this, of course,

while

it

is

is

" crystallographic

its

can be learned only from

possible to understand chemistry

and decompositions without


of crystallization, which indeed are

as the science of combinations

reference to the facts

referred to in chemical writings only occasionally.

We

Two
frthe^
sciences
YiYst^'

those'of

now come

to the sciences of

merely as such

^^"

fall into

these properties belong partly to morpho-

or the science of organic forms, of

logy,

which science

and partly to physioThese two, no


cloubt, are both parts of biology, and they run into each
other but they do not, I think, run into each other more
than do chemistry and crystallography indeed, crystal-

pertieTof
organisms, logy,

physio-

These

two very well-marked groups. The subject of the first


group consists in the properties of organisms considered

Systematic natural history

Morpho-

life.

is

a part

or the science of vital functions.

lography

is

a morphological science,

and

its

relation to

may

be compared with the relation of organic


morphology to physiology. Physiology and morphology
chemistry

are so distinct that systematic natural history,

in

fact comparative

morphology,

is

which

is

not necessarily nor

generally cultivated by the same persons

who

cultivate

207

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.

XLIII.]

have defined physiology as the science of


functions.
But the conscious or mental functions

physiology.
vital

are so different from the unconscious or bodily ones, that


it

convenient, and

is

former apart

indeed necessary, to treat of the

in other words, to treat psychology as

or,

a distinct science.

The second group

of the sciences that involve life has Psycho-

for subiect-matter the results of the activity of the


''

'

man

mind of Second

and society and the aesthetic, moral,


and economical laws under which that activity is necesin language,

art,

This group of sciences is much less


advanced than the mathematical, physical, and mental

group

sarily carried on.

not yet

and has not yet been systematized.^


feed.^'
In the foregoing brief review I have not aimed at anything more than an enumeration of the sciences in their
sciences,

order,
is

with a statement of the subject-matter of each.

now

time to state the same in tabular form.


1

See the preceding chapter.

It

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

208

[chap.

.,-1

y;

Si

sis
8
s

5r>

r^

'e

-^

-w

L>^ "^i

.>

1^5;

t.

a,

P
O

ft

3 o
ft

o
.3

o
C3

6C

Idhular
statement

en

s
o

-g

CO

ft

ft

ft

<D

0)

^
H

EH

'

i
o

.<u

'^

to
_a

>

*'"'

>

-M

^
^

_g
>"
sp

OJ

-M bD

<D

-^

g
-4-

+-

ft
ft

o
Mao
i-

S C

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.

XLIII.]

209

On

reading over this enumeration, the most natural and


probably the first remark of the reader will be that it

must be very incomplete,


important of the sciences.
meteorology, or geology.

It has

This

no place

true

is

not a complete enumeration

is

some

for it omits

of the

for

most

astronomy.

the foregoing series

needs to be supple-

it

Position of
'^^*'""

meteoro-

mented by another series, containing astronomy, meteoro- a^\o^


logy, geology, and a few others.
It is in the nature of ^"otlier
S6riGS of

things impossible to place all the sciences in a single series,

sciences.

Every one of the sciences enumerated in the foregoing


tabular form has for its subject-matter a particular set of
natural laws
and the tabular eniimeration is an attempt
;

at a classification of natural laws

classification

which

probably will be found to admit of improvements in

detail,

though

it

I think,

is,

But such a

beyond doubt correct in

principle.

science as astronomy or geology has for its

subject-matter, not a particular set of laws, but a particular set of

Now,

is

it

phenomena

found in nature.

as actually

evident that a science whereof the subject- whereof

a particular set of laws, and one whereof the ^^% ^^^'


subject-matter is a particular set of phenomena, cannot not Jaws

matter

is

properly be placed in the same

series.

This distinction nomena'

would not be of any importance if each set of phenomena


as occurring in nature were due to only a single set of
laws
if,
for instance, astronomy were exclusively an
application of dynamical laws, meteorology of the laws
of heat, and geology of the laws of chemistry and crystallization.
But such is not the case it is only approximately true of astronomy and meteorology, and is not true
of geology at all. Astronomy is no doubt chiefly dynamical
but if we admit as I think we must the nebular theory
:

as a legitimate branch of astronomy,

it

has to do also with

the laws of heat and of the physical constitution of gases and


vapours.^ The most important facts of meteorology depend

on the laws of heat, but some of them are

some
1

It

are optical.

may

And

the facts

be said that the study of the sun's atmosphere also belongs


and yet it does not depend on dynamics. But it is better

to astronomy,

to regard this as a part of meteorology.

VOL.

II.

and
of geology do not depend
electrical

j^

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

210

on any one
vital

for

of natural laws, but on a vast compli-

set

cation of tlieni

[chap.

dynamical,

we know

thermal, chemical, and even

that limestone and coal are organic

products.
I

propose

to call

them the
cosmic
sciences.

I propose to call the sciences

now under

consideration

enumerated
The subject-matter of an
above, which are abstract ones.
abstract science is a particular group of laws, under whatthe cosmic sciences, in opposition

to those

may

ever conditions or on whatever scale they

the motions of a

star,

act

thus

the swinging of a pendulum, and

the rotations of a gyroscope, all belong equally to dynamics.

The subject-matter of a cosmic science, on the contrary, is


a particular group of phenomena which may have no connexion except that they are found together
the theory

includes alike

opinion at
best

least,

and

and

heat,

I believe I

am

thus geology

which

(in

my

on the side of the

entirely to be referred to

authorities) is

of force

of volcanoes,

the

laws

and the theory of the formation of

coral islands, Avliich is a vital process, thoiigh controlled

by physical
ParaUelism of the
abstract
and the

agencies.

But, though the

series

of

the abstract sciences

that of the cosmic sciences are not coincident, there


a kind of approximate parallelism between them.

cosmic
sciences.

and

have seen that the

is

We

series of the abstract sciences begins

with the simplest and most general laws, and goes on to


the more complex and special ones.

The

series

of the

cosmic sciences, in like manner, begins with the simplest

Its ground.

and vastest phenomena, and goes on to the more complex


and less vast ones. The parallelism between the two series
rests on the fact
^which, as now expressed, is almost an
identical proposition
that the most general laws, which

which act on the widest


scale; so that there is a series of phenomena from the
widest to the minutest, parallel to the series of laws from
the most general to the most special.
The simplest and
most general of the laivs of nature are those of dynamics
the simplest and vastest of the ijlicnomcna of nature are
tliose of the celestial motions, Avhicla altogether depend on

are also the simplest, are those

Gradation
of pheno-

mena from
the vastest
to the
smallest.

dynamical laws.

All other phenomena are almost infinitely

211

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.

XLIII.]

smaller than these; for the subject-matters of the twin


sciences of meteorology and geology are not only special

each planet, but are confined to the surface of the

to

planet: the domain of meteorology

is

confined to a few-

miles of height above the surface, and that of geology to

about as

many

of depth below.

the distribution of

life,

And

parably smaller than these

phenomena

the

again, are for the

the largest trees are of insig-

comparison with the mountain

nificant size in

are the only products of

of

most part incomcoral-reefs

that attain to geographical

life

importance, and they are small in comparison with conti-

The laws

nents.

on the

of the distribution of living species

surface of the earth are united with palfeontology, or the


life.

The

subject of the distribution of living species

may be
may be

called

geographical biology, and palaeontology

called

science of the fossil remains of extinct forms of

geological biology

science

but these form the subject of a single

laws which

the

determine the distribution of

species in the present cannot be separated from those

which have determined the distribution and the succession


of species in the past.

have seen

"VVe

that, in the

order of the vastness and

the simplicity of the phenomena, astronomy comes

among

treat of

Next to astronomy are those


phenomena whereof the magnitude is such

embrace an entire planet.

phenomena

treat of

W'hich
First,

'

tical

There are three sciences

of this order of magnitude.

the theory of the force of terrestrial magnetism.

distribution,

its

first

the cosmic sciences.

which
as to

Astro^^^y-

and

its

fluctuations

'

this

with the abstract laws of magnetism, but

cation thereof, just as astronomy


abstract laws of dynamics.

is

not iden-

is
is

science

this

chiefly

an application of the

Second, meteorology, or the Meteoro-

consists

of

applications

^'
;

the
laws of heat and electricity to a great variety of circumstances, though it has a branch which stands in the same
relation

optical

to

the

laws of

phenomena

ism.

an appli-

theory of atmospheric changes and of the laws of climate

Terrestrial
^^S*^*^*"

radiance,

as rainbows

p2

and

and
halos.

treats

of

of

such

Third, oceano-

HABIT AKD INTELLIGENCE.

212
Oceanography.

graphy/ or the science which

[chap.

treats of the tides, the cur-

except the tides,


and other phenomena of the ocean
these almost exclusively depend on the winds and on temperatures, so that oceanography can scarcely be separated
;

rents,

from the theory of climate.^ Next in the order of vastness

and simplicity come the sciences of those phenomena


which are less extensive than the entire siu-face of a planet
Geography.
Geology.

Mineralogy-

these are geography, or the determination of the outlines

and the heights of mounscience which treats of


geology,
or
the
and
physical
tains
the constitution of the crust of the earth, and the causes
The facts of geology, as
to which that constitution is due.
I have already remarked, cannot be referred to any single
Next in the order of the magnitude and
set of laws.
generality of the phenomena comes mineralogy, or the
science of the molecular structure and chemical composiof coasts, the courses of rivers,
;

tion of the rocks

it is,

in fact, the molecular, chemical,

and crystallographic branch of geology, and is related to


physical geology much in the same way that molecular
and chemical physics are related to general dynamics.
And last of all, for the special and limited character of
phenomena,

palasontology, with the laws of the dis-

Palaeontology,
and the

its

distribution of

a great degree depend on those of biology, though, as I

species.

is

tribution of living

species

the facts of this science in

have shown in the chapter on Distribution,^ this dependence is much less rigid than might have been expected.
There is thus a kind of rough approximate parallelism

and the
Of course there is no cosmic science in any
cosmic.
CorreBut astrosijondences Way Corresponding to logic and mathematics.
between
nomy pretty accurately corresponds to dynamics terrestrial magnetism corresponds with perfect accuracy to the
series.
between the two

series of sciences, the abstract

Or what Maury

calls the

"physical geography of the sea."

absui'dity of the expression "grcography of the sea"

by

translating

it

into

German, in which language

may
it

The

be best shown

would be " Erd-

beschreibung des Meeres."

The general theory of the tides belongs to astronomy, but those more
phenomena which cannot be deduced from the general theory,
but must be ascertained by observation, cannot be called astronomical.
-

special tidal

Chapter XVIll.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.

XLIII.]

magnetism

abstract theory of

213

meteorology and oceano-

graphy nearly correspond to the sciences of heat, electhough the tides, which belong to
tricity, and light
oceanography, are purely dynamic phenomena. Geology

does not correspond to any abstract science in partictdar,

but mineralogy corresponds to the chemical group of


sciences, and palaeontology, with the laws of the distribution of species, to biology.

We may

now enumerate

following tabular form

the cosmic sciences in the

Tabular
enumera-

Astronomy.
.

Terrestriai magnetism.

tion of the

cosmic

with the theory of climate.


Meteorology,
o-^
'

sciences.

Oceanography.

Geography,
Geology.

Mineralogy, or chemical geology.


Palaeontology, with the laws

of the distribution of

living species.

As

I have said of the tabular enumeration of the abstract

sciences, this

enumeration also

may

probably admit of

improvements in detail but if the principle of the series


is right, of which I think there can be no doubt, the
details are of but little importance.
The order in which cosmic phenomena have been enu- imaginary
;

merated in the foregoing list of the cosmical sciences is ^^-^


that in which they would be witnessed by a being with coming
iiear the

n
Ti
powers of perception like our own, it it were to come universe
,

J.

At
of infinite space.
towards our world from the regions

first it would see suns and planets as mere movmg points


of light, and could distinguish nothing about them except
.-^

t^" order
in which

he would
^^-^^^^^_

Coming nearer, it mena,


their magnitudes and their motions.
would discern the phenomena on their surfaces the spots
;

on the sun and the peculiar currents of his atmosphere,


and the clouds and winds and other phenomena of the
atmosphere of the earth, with the ocean and its currents
and if it were possessed of our means of observation, it
would perceive the magnetic properties of the earth, and

HABIT AUD INTELLIGENCE.

214

doubtless also of the sun and

all

[chap.

the planets.

JSText

in the

would see the outlines


and forms of coasts, of rivers, of lakes, of mountains, and
aU that forms the subject-matter of geography and on
coming a little nearer, it would see glaciers among some
it would
of the mountains, and volcanoes among others
structure
and
see differences not only of form but of
composition between the masses that form the crust of
the earth, and all the things which constitute the sub-

order of descending magnitude,

it

ject-matter of geology.

And

last of all,

supposing this

imaginary being to have microscopic powers as well as


telescopic, it

would

see those facts

subject-matter of mineralog}'- and

the geographical distribution of

Chain of
each
;

supposing

it.

Parallel to
the
this

laws of

life

^"^^'

it

presuppose the special laws of matter, espe-

and heat

the special laws of

and
the laws of general dynamics presuppose those of mathematics, which are based on the properties of space and
In the actual distribution of things, which contime.
g^j^^-.^j-gg

^j^g

subiect-matter of the cosmic sciences, there

ditiou of

is

''

a Set of parallel relations to these.

of

step

matter presuppose the laws of general dynamics;

arrange-

ment

At every

see less general

comer^""^ cially those of chemistry


before

life.

and more complex phenomena.


As we have seen, there is a chain of laws in nature,
^^^^-^ -^^^ presupposing that which comes before it.
The

would
laws

which constitute the


and

of palaeontology,

life,

that

It is a necessary con-

living beings should

be surrounded

with vast masses of unorganized matter in earth, water,

The

the waters, and the surface of the earth

and

air.

are

the seat of that play of forces which, with

air,

results, constitute the subject-matter

geology with their allied sciences

of meteorology

their

and

but these forces have

no action except on the surfaces of the planets; their


And the planets and stars themcentral masses are inert.
selves are but insignificant in magnitude when compared
with the vast empty spaces in which they move. To state

Living beings are but


the foregoing in fewer words:
Living
beings are
with the masses of
ingioiiificant
in mass when compared
^

small
proportion unorganized matter that surround them.
Those masses

ma

ei.

^^ matter

on the surface

of

our planet whereof

the

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.

XUII.]

215

changes are seen in the facts of meteorology and geology,

when compared with the vast,


unchanging central masses of the planets. And the
planets and suns are but insignificant in magnitude when
compared
with the vacant celestial spaces
around.
AU
^
'^

proportion

these are cases of the general law, that the simplest pro-

to space,

are iusignificaut in mass

inert,

Matter

is

^'^^^^ "?

and laws are in force over the widest spaces, and


on the largest scale. The properties of space are simpler The widest
than those of matter the dynamical properties of matter, ^^^^ ^^^
which alone act in causing the celestial motions, are simplest,
perties

simpler than
properties

thermal, electric, magnetic, and chemical

its

and

these, again, are simpler

than the charac-

teristic properties of living beings.

The same

relation of laws to each other holds good in and act

The simplest laws

time as in space.

are the

most uniform

*|jg''^^''

and the most general in their action, not only in space but longest
^'
also in time.
The only truths,. in any science, which we
are safe in pronouncing to be absolutely unchangeable by The only
any agency whatever, are the simplest and most funda- ^j^gUg"!-^
mental of all truths, namely, those of logic. It is not able truths
possible even to Omnipotence to make a contradiction of^iog^^''
The properties of space and time, on the contrary,
true.
may be capable of change by the Divine will I do not
;

assert

that

they are so

that they are not

mathematics

and

may

if it

only say
is

so,

we cannot

assert

of course the laws of

be changed with them.^

Space and

1 I do not mean that it is within the power of Omnipotence to make a


mathematical absurdity true ; for this would be to make a contradiction

Omnipotence could not make two right lines enclose an area that
make two right lines as we understand right lines,
enclose an area as we understand an area ; for this would be to make
either a right line or an area, or both, be what they are, and yet different
which would be a contradiction. But it is to me credible that Omnipotence might, without any contradiction being involved, have made the
properties of space and time different from what they are.
And I see no

true.
is

to say, could not

absurdity in thinking that the


three,

but

infinite

number

of dimensions in space

may

only that the universe to which we belong

be not

is cajiable

so that we have experience of


of motion in but three of the dimensions
but three, and cannot form a conception of any more. See the chapter on
;

Perception (Chap.

XXXVI.).

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

216
Time and
space were
before
matter.

Gravitatiou is tlie
onl}- constantly
acting
force.

time, again, are conceived

and

force

came

by us

into existence

[chap.

as being before matter

and

tliis is

actually true,

the universe had a beginning in time ; wbicb I regard


Among forces also, gravitation, which is the
as proved.^
simplest, is the only one that is always in action the

if

molecular and chemical forces act only under favourable

and it
nebula.^
primeval
work
in
the
was
Finally, the most complex and special of all modes of
and
activity, namely life, was of later origin than matter
origin
than
functions,
mind
was
of
later
vital
the
amons
circumstances, but gravitation never ceases to act

also the first force to

Life

and

mind

are

the latest
products.

unconscious

life.

Thus, in both space and time, the most complex proare

perties

The

constantly in action.

highest
products
are the

results of the

least in

quantity,

and the

the least widely distributed,

least

iNow, as the highest results are the

most complex properties and

forces, it follows

from the necessity of the case that the liighest natural


products are comparatively small in quantity and this we
;

have seen to be the fact

life

being a late and comparatively

scanty product of nature, and mind a later and scantier

product

still.

Thus nature may be compared to a tree, " expanding


from the whole into the parts," to quote SchiUer's expression;

constantly branching

plicity, complexity,

and

out into greater multi-

variety.

All nature widens upward.

Evermore

The simpler essence lower lies.


More complex is more perfect, owning more
Discourse, more widely wise."^

And,

most beautiful trees the flowers come at


the completion of the development of the plant, and are
less abundant than the leaves, though of higher organization

and the
last in
time.

as in the

come at
them, and are

so in the universe, the highest products

the end of long ages of preparation for

then less abundant than the lower products.

See the chapter on the Motive Powers of the Universe (Chap. VI.).
See Chapter VI.

Tennyson's Palace of Art.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.

XLIII.]

It is

the

many remarkable
man and the nniverse

harmonies between Hamiony

one of the

mind

217

which

the l^j^f of
noblest product, that this distribution of the products of man with
of

nature, both in space

and

of

in time, is that

beautiful to the artistic sense.

which appears

maxim

It is a

is

it

in art that

the highest beauty should be introduced in relatively

small quantity : thus, in architecture, which

perhaps

is

.'
.

rule of
i^efnty in
least

the best instance, such parts as cornices and capitals, which

and conspicuous, can scarcely be too


richly ornamented but the effect would be very bad if
the ornament which suits a cornice were spread over a
wall, or if that which suits a capital were continued down
are at once small

In

the shaft of the column.

whatever, the effect

all art

of an equal distribution of beauty over every part

In

good.
rises

is

not

whatever, any part of a composition which

all art

above the general level of the whole in dignity or

beauty will add dignity or beauty to the whole, provided that

it

is

properly placed

below the general


whole.

level,

it

any part sinks

wliile if

lowers the character of the

These principles are applicable alike to those arts

which address themselves

and those which

to the eye,

ear.
But in the latter that is
and music, in which the parts of a com-

address themselves to the


to say in poetry

position are not simultaneous but successive

maxim

is

this

and, in

further mugjif

at"

to be observed, that the highest beauty not only ^^^ end.

ought to be small in quantity, but ought to come last;

and every previous part of the composition ought to lead


up to it. In thus arranging his work, the artist, without
knowing it, follows the example of nature, which, as I
have already said, produces the liighest results at the end
of long ages of slow preparation, and then in comparatively small quantity.

If

it is

asked whether I believe that

capable of being
the two tabular

have confined myself so

positive science

things which are Not

all

are capable of being included in is'hicluded


series that I have drawn out in tliis in the

chapter, I reply that I have


I

all

known

that

no such notion.

far as possible to

is to

say, science

In this work enume-

what

having

is

its

called

data in

^
^f**^*^

chapter.

218

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

[chap.

the facts of observation, or at least in facts external to


I believe
in meta-

Even

mind.

in psychology I have endeavoured, so far as

keep clear of

physics

possible,

and

metaphysical methods.

to

tlie

metaphysical questions and

But

this is not

from any belief

theology.

On

that metaphysics are either impossible or worthless.

the contrary, I believe both in metaphysics and in theology as

firmly as I believe

in positive

science

it

is

not from unbelief or indifference that I have said so


little about them in this work
it is rather from a con;

viction of their transcendent importance that I have kept


for a future

work the subject

of their relation to positive

science.^
Opposition of

There

is

also a very large portion of

literature

which never can become

and

right in opposing literature

history to
science.

scientific.

human knowledge

Common

sense

is

and history to science. The


essential matter in science is for knowledge to be reasoned
and formularized, and a fact that will not fit into any formula simply stands over until the right formtila is found.
But in literature and history, the essential matter is the
display of human character and this fascinates and instructs us most when it defies all formulae most completely.
;

It is true

at least I believe

sible as a science of history,


it is.

Nature of
historical
science.

But, at the most,

it

so

that

such a thing

pos-

is

and a most important science

can never be anything more than

a science of general tendencies in history; and between


understanding these and really knowing history, there is
exactly the same kind of difference that there

is

between

understanding psychology as a science and understanding

human

nature.

distant

and prosperous colonies will probably become

dependent, but

It is

it is

true as

not

a general tendency that

tlie less

the character and the

in-

desirable to understand

life of Washington.
It is true that
nations tend to become politically consolidated, but it is
not the less desirable to understand the character and the
life

of Cavour.

See Preface.

AND HUxMBOLDT ON THE

COIITE

XLIII.]

219

SCIENCES.

NOTE.
COMTE AND HUMBOLDT ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.
It will be perceived

the idea of the series of the abstract

tliat

which I have drawn out in some detail in the foregoing


chapter, is taken from Comte's " Positive Philosophy."
Comte's
sciences,

series of the sciences is the

following

My

obliga^'" ^

Mathematics, including dynamics.

His

Astronomy.

of the

-r,,

series

sciences.

Physics.

Chemistry.
Biology.
Sociology, or Historical

My

series is the

points of detail.

and

same

The

are as follow

and

Political Science.

as this in principle,

differences

may be

hut

diifers in

some

very briefly enumerated,

"Where

from

my

^'?'*
his.

I regard general dynamics as a branch, not of mathematics, Position


of
but of physics ; meaning by physics the whole of the dynamical dynamics

group of sciences.
at

I do not place astronomy iu the series of the abstract sciences of astroall, but in the parallel series of the cosmic sciences
because "y;

astronomy, or the science of the celestial bodies, has not to do

with a special

set of laws,

force of gravitation,
terrestrial

but a special set of phenomena.

The

and the laws of motion, are exemplified in

motions as well as in

celestial ones
the law of the
motion of a cannon-ball, or of a stone thrown from the hand,
for instance, is of the same kind with the law of a planet's

motion.

It is the error of cross division to classify the sciences

partly according to

the nature of their subject-matter, as in

separating biology from

according

to

its

locality,

physics
as

in

and

chemistry,

and partly

separating astronomy from

terrestrial physics.

With

respect to the place of chemistry

rangement agrees with Comte's.

and biology,

my

ar-

by which barbarous
compound Comte means the science of history and politics,
occupies the place in his series which I have assigned to a group
of sciences not yet systematized.

Sociology,

Historical science is one of

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

220
g

this group,

and

tlie

science of language is another.

[ch. XLIII.

It is a great

language
fault in Comte's series of the sciences, though only a fault of
omitted by
^^^g^^i ^jjj j^q^ pf principle, that he has left no possible place
for the science of language.

My

obli^ations to

"

^ *^^ series of the cosmic sciences is taken from


volume of Humboldt's " Cosmos," though Humboldt
has not given it in a tabular shape, nor has he formally separated
Humboldt's
the subject of his work into its natural divisions.
arrangement of his subject appears to have been thought out

^J ^^^^

the

first

without any suggestion whatever derived from Comte.

The

parallelism between the series of abstract sciences as arranged

by Comte, and the


Humboldt, has not,
before.

series

of cosmic sciences as arranged

so far as I

am

by

aware, been pointed out

CHAPTER XLIV.
KEMAEKS ON THE HISTOEY OF

ACCOEDINGr

to the principles laid

SCIENCE,

down

in the pre- Agree-

ceding chapter, the logical order of arrangement for


the sciences

is

in
an arrangement

series,

most simple and


those whereof it is more com-

whereof the

those

beginning with
.

subject-matter

is

^j^e his-

toncal
order of
the evolu^

and going on to
*|,ig^gg*
with their
plex and special.
This, which is the logical order, is also in a great degree o|gr^
Those sciences whereof the subjectthe historical order.
matter is simple and general have for the most part come
into existence as sciences earlier than those whereof the
subject-matter is more complex and special. This is what
we might have expected, and for two reasons. In the first

general,

place, the simplest subject-matter is the easiest to master;

and in the second place, it is necessary to understand the


more general laws before the more special ones can be
understood. Thus, mathematics is necessary as the key
general dynamics as the key to the laws of
to dynamics
heat and electricity the sciences of heat and electricity
as the key to chemistry and chemistry as the key to
In a word, the most general truths were the
physiology.
;

As

in painting a picture, the artist

first

to be discovered.

first

sketches the outline, and completion does not

mean painting a

covering more canvas, but filling in the outline with more


detail

so in the history of science the widest truths have

been laid down first and progress consists in the discovery of a constantly increasing number of more special
;

truths,

general

and in the ascertainment of


ones.

Ilhistra-

their relation to the

Thus, for instance, the most important

pictm-e.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

222

[chap.

which has probably been made

single step

the time

gress of science since

of

in the pro-

Newton

consists in

the discovery of the laws of heat, and their establishment as a particular case of the more general theory of
force.

But, like
scientific

mere

all

illustrations,

comparison

this

of

progress to the progress of a picture towards

completion

only partially applicable

is

and

it

is

not

The truth rigidly true, but only an approximation to the truth, to

^^Y ^^^^^ ^^^ historical order in which the sciences have


been successively evolved corresponds to the logical order

above is
only ai>
'

of their arrangement, beginning with the most general

simple subjects, and going on to the more special

complex.

The

and
and

logical order of the sciences throws a real

on their history. But it is, after all,


only a logical formula a logical formula will be always
misleading if it is mistaken for actual historical fact and

and

valuable light

this formula only explains half the facts.

the progress of science

is

It is true that

from more general truths to

more special ones but it is also true that it consists, at


the same time, in the discovery of special facts and in
Thus the progress of science is
generalizing from them.
of
twofold, and in two directions at once it is at once down;

The

progress
seience is
twofold,

...

'

ward, or deductive, consisting in the application of

^^"^

^^'^'^

and^

^0 ^*^^^ cases

known

and upward,

or inductive, consisting in

new laws by

a process of generalizing

inductive,

the discovery of

Mathe-

from facts.^ These two processes of discovery, the deducIn mathetive and the inductive, sometimes go on apart.
^^^tics, all is

deductive
chemistry
inductive

deduction

and

heat.

But

at other times induction

operate, as in the instance just

ment

both.

and deduction

co-

mentioned of the ascertain-

of the theory of heat as a particular case of the

general theory of force and energy.

the

heat i5

now has

in chemistry, all until

been induction, except the deductive element which enters


i^^o ^^^ relations of chemistry with the laws of electricity

The laws of heat


were ascertained inductively, by experiment, and by generalized inference from a variety of experiments
and the
;

See " The Genesis of Science," in vol.

Essays.

i.

of Herbert Spencer's collected

EEMAEKS ON THE HISTORY OF

XLiv.]

applied by

laws of force were

223

SCIENCE.

deductive

reasoning

to

explain the laws of heat.


It

is,

however, roughly and approximately true, that the

order in which the sciences have been historically evolved

corresponds to the logical order of their arrangement, be-

ginning with simple and general laws and going on to

more complex and

special ones.

But, in addition to what

has been said in the last paragraph, this

must be under-

stood with two other important qualifications.

though each science is logically based The logical


relations of
1
1-1
1
on that more simple and general science which comes science
In the
,

first

place,

g^

before

it

in the series, yet this is not always, nor generally, are not

when

apparent at the time

the study of the science

is first obvious

Most sciences have been begun independently,


and without any reference in the minds of their founders
In most cases each science has
to any other science.
been commenced, and has made considerable progress,
before its students became aware of its relation with
begun.

that science w^hich comes

and on which
step
of

without

the

dynamics

aid

of

is

especially

is

on

the series,

in

This

is

not the

unable to take a single

mathematics.

sciences of observation and

chemistry
did not

the

it

logically based.

is

it

case with dynamics

next before

^^ ^'^*-

But

it

experiment.

is

true

Thus,

based on the dynamical group of sciences,


those

prevent

of electricity

chemistry from

and heat but this


making a beginning, A
:

and being in a tolerably forward state, before electrochemistry and thermo-chemistry were thought of. In
the same way, biology is based on chemistry for such

science

"^.^uate
indepen-

physiological laws as those of nutrition

and of respiration

involve chemical laws, and cannot be stated without pre-

and yet biology had made considerable


progress before this relation was perceived.
"Were it not
possible for a science to be thus begun independently, the
progress of science would have been much slower than it
actually has been. The fact is, however, that most sciences and
have been begun independently; and the perception of^^g^^j^^^g
the true relation of each science to the rest, and of the so.
right place of each in the scientific scale, has been, not an
supposing them

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

224
orifiiiial

condition of

its

[chap.

commencement, but a

late result

of its progress.

an approximation to the
truth to say that the early development of a science
depends on the simplicity and generality of its subjectWhatthe matter. AVhat really causes a science to be developed
^^I'ly i^ partly the accessibility of the facts which constiorf In of
a science
tute its data, and partly the obviousness of its fundamental
In the second

conceptions.

on!"^^

place, it is only

This, I think,

is

as nearly true as a general

statement of the kind can be.

It is very interesting to

observe that the early development of a science does not

appear to be in any degree prevented by the elaborateness

Mathematics.

and intricacy of the reasoning processes which it requires.


Thus, there is no other science in Avhich the reasoning
processes are so elaborate and intricate as in mathematics,
and yet it was the first among the sciences, with the
exception of logic, that attained to any high development:
the reasons of this evidently are, that the facts which
constitute its data are perfectly accessible, and its fundamental conceptions very obvious.

Geometry
alsebra.

This

especially true

The data of

algebra, like those of geometry, are perfectly accessible;

but

fundamental conceptions are not so obvious as

its

those of geometry, and consequently


Cliemistiy.

is

of the geometrical branch of mathematics.

it

was

The fundamental conceptions

developed.

later in being

of chemistry,

on

the contrary, are so obvious as to present no difficulty

whatever

but

its

data are not very easy of access, because

they do not lie open to observation, but have to be sought


out by experiment and the same remark applies to all
:

the experimental sciences.


Sciences of if
tio^uare
easier

It is sufficiently obvious, that

the other difficulties are

than experiment.

This

is

make

equal, a

science

of

obser-

than one of
not so much because experiment is

vation will necessarily

earlier progress

experi-

laborious, as because in the infancy of a science there is

ment.

hardly anything to guide


dark.

It

to devise,

it
it is a mere searching in the
would have needed more than human ingenuity
d priori and all at once, a set of experiments to
;

discover the composition of water


tively

easy to

while it is comparaexamine the anatomy of a limb, or to


:

REMARKS ON THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE.

XLIV.]

225

compare and classify plants and animals of various kinds.


Thns organic morphology, including anatomy and syste- Morphomatic natural history, attained to some considerable degree ^'
of progress at a comparatively early period in the history
of science, because the

more elementary of its fundamental


conceptions present no difficulty, and the facts wliich
constitute its data are open to observation.

The fact that mathematics was earlier developed than


any physical science, is, when properly considered, a very
interesting and significant fact. Science began with mathe- Science
]'^^'^^ ?\
matics.
It might
have been expected that its beginnins

==
o the point
would be at some point nearer to human life and duty
most
that it would have begun at biology, or psychology, or
f^^^''
politics, and not at mathematics, which of all possible l^uman
'-

the remotest from human life. Socrates regarded wal' cTn


a useless waste of time and thouo'ht to studv external s^quently
ciGemsd.
nature, while he knew so little about the nature of man useless
studies

is

it as

and
"

Galileo's contemporaries

Why

might have plausibly said,


which are far off, while
of the flowers which are under your

do you gaze on the

stars,

you know so little


feet ? "
Such objections were,

so far as I can see, quite


unanswerable in the infancy of science they could not
be refuted, and they were overcome only by the refusal of
the scientific instinct to listen to them. But now we have
;

learned more of the external world than


ever

know

of man, and

motions of the stars than


the growth of the flowers.

we

shall probably

we have learned more of the


we shall probably ever know of

was too
remote from human life to be obviously useful, and would
never have made any progress whatever if it had waited
to justify its existence by its usefulness
its first progress and still
was due to its own intrinsic intellectual interest. ^ And ^*^ moving
power IS
.-.
.11
,1
,1
the same is stiil practically true, although the usefulness not useMScience, at its origin,

Chemistry

is

a partial exception

the search after the process for

making gold appears to have done something for its progress. But the
effect of this was probably very slight
and the gi'eat discoveries of
Lavoisier and his contemporaries, which really founded the science of
chemistry, were made without any such stimulus.
;

VOL.

II.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

226
ness,

but

iutellec-

of science

is

now no

[chap.

longer doubted by any except the most

ignorant: the motive power of scientific progress

tiial

as at the

interest.

first,

not

its

usefulness but

its

is

still,

intellectual interest.

Were science always engaged in the search after obvious


and direct utilities, the highest discoveries would never
be made, and the greatest

utilities

would

in all probability

be missed.
" So 'twere to
Sliovild

was not

cramp its use, if I


it to some useful eud."

hook

in seeking for

some rapid and

certain

means of

The

It

telegraph.

telegT:aphmg, that the properties of the electric current

were discovered.

was at the
remotest point from human life, is true also in a somewhat
different sense from that which has been insisted on above.
All science all inorganic science, at least depends on

The remark, that the beginning of

science

All
inorganic
SC1GI1C6
science

depends on

Sentsrf
space.

measurement: and all other measurements ultimately


Now space is
depend on the measurement of space.
think
in time and
we
mind
altogether external to the
not in space ;^ yet the measurement of time depends on
that of space, and not the converse and geometry, which
:

is the science of the properties of space,

was the

earliest

of the sciences.

NOTE.
Jleasurement of

spaces

Equal

linear spaces, or equal lines, are those

which

are capable

q beina brought alongside of each other so as to coincide.

measurement of superficial and of solid magnitudes,

The

and

all

other measurements whatever, depend on this.^


1

Tennyson's Day-dream.
See the Chapter on the Relation of the Miud to Space and Time

(Chap.
3

XXXVII.).

This remark

is

made in-H.

Spencer's First Principles.

REMARKS ON THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE.

XLiv.J

227

Equal velocities are those which keep at the same distance

when moving

in the

same direction on the same

line or

of velocity:

on

parallel lines.

Equal times

are those in

which equal

velocities traverse equal of time

spaces.

Equal
times.

which,

which produce equal velocities in equal


a corollary from this), equal forces are those

forces are those

Or (what is
when acting

in

opposite

directions,

neutralize

of force

each

other.

Equal resistances are those which neutralize equal

forces.

Equal quantities of energy are those which overcome equal


resistances through equal spaces.

Q 2

of resist^?*^

CHAPTEE XLV.
REMARKS ON THE LOGIC OF THE SCIENCES.

we have seen in the preceding


AS methods
of discovery belong

chapter, different

to different sciences;

thus, demonstration pre-eminently belongs to mathematics,

and experiment to chemistry. Mathematical methods have


not yet been successfully applied to chemistry, though
perhaps it may some day be found possible to do so;
but we may positively assert that they never can be
applied to the science of

Indeed

life.

it

may

be stated

The more as a general truth, that the more special and complex
special and
are the facts which constitute the subject-matter of a
complex
is the
science, the less susceptible is it of mathematical treatsubject of
a science,

the less

is

mathematics
applicable
to it.

Thus, general dynamics

ment.

tical science;

is

altogether a

mathema-

the secondary dynamical sciences

(sound,

radiance, heat, electricity, and magnetism) are so in great


part chemistry may perhaps become so but the sciences
that involve life can never by any possibility become
;

mathematical.
In connexion
with this,
the facts
of life are
in some

degree indefinite.

This peculiarity of the sciences of

life

is

connected

even when perfectly


well ascertained, are not capable of being determined
with the same kind of precision as those of the inorIn chemistry, for instance, the proporganic sciences.
tions in which two substances combine are in many cases
with

the

truth that

their

facts,

accuracy, and are in all


In biology, on the
known.
cases capable of being so
contrary, no such accurate determinations are possible:

known with

this

is

diflicult

perfect numerical

not because the


to determine

it

quantitative relations
is

are

too

because they are variable.

229

REMAKKS ON THE LOGIC OF THE SCIENCES.

CH. XLV.]

within moderate limits no doubt, but without any ascerThus, in that branch of biology which is
tainable law.

most nearly connected with chemistry,

it

impossible to

is

same

state the effect of medicines, or of poisons, with the

kind of accuracy to which we are accustomed in chemistry.


We know that laudanum will produce sleep, and that
strychnine will kUl but, even if the constitution of the
patient is known, it is impossible to say how much
laudanum will be sufficient to cause sleep, or how much
strychnine will be sufficient to kill, with the same kind of
precision with which we can say how much of an acid is
;

required in order to saturate a given quantity of alkali.


But the determinations of biological science, though thus This

does

^
inferior in precision to those of the inorganic sciences, are any"min no sense, and in no degree, inferior to them in certainty, certainty.

and even more eminently so, in the


higher branches of biology. Thus, the law that all actions
tend to become habitual, is as well established as it is
possible for such a law to be but it is impossible, in any
case whatever, to say how many times an action must be

The same

true,

is

make

repeated in order to

long

by

it

it

habitual,

must be discontinued in order


In the sciences of society

disuse.

or,

again, for

how

to destroy the habit


also, in

morals and The same

in politics, there are laws of general tendencies, but no ^oy^g"


quantitative laws consequently there is certainty without
;

It

precision.

be, that the

happiness

is,

tendency of falsehood

but

for instance, as certain as

it is

any particular falsehood


bearing of this truth

Certainty

human

precision,

injurious to

is

never possible to

anything can

tell

how much

will do, or has done.

very important, but

is

The
it

injury
ethical

does not

belong to the subject of this work.

We may

enumerate four

relation of mathematics

They

all,

fallacies

and of

logic to the other sciences. anrUhdr

their origin in the fact

I believe, have

mathematics and logic were the


field;

and they are


spirit,"

earliest sciences

that

in the

of the time when those were


and when Pascal wrote of " the
meaning the scientific spirit. These
relics

almost the only sciences,


geometrical

on the subject of the Four

four fallacies are as follow

origin

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

230

[chap.

The fallacy that logic is an organon of discovery,


"^^^^^ ^^^ ^^^ eiTor of the scholastic philosophy, and was
orsauou of
discovery: that against which Bacon's whole philosophical career was
employed in contending.
It is now so completely dis-

that logic

1.

many words in refuting it.


have stated in a former chapter^ what is now the universally received conclusion on this subject
namely, that
credited that I need not spend
I

the function of logic, regarded as a science,

is

not to extend

the structure of our knowledge, but to fix

its

foundations,

that

The

2.

of SCIGIICC

that

is

'
'

that

fallacy

Mathematics

science.

matictis
the type

to Say,
"

sequently

it

it is

mathematics
is

is

the type of

all

altogether a deductive science;

a science of pure reasoning

and con-

cannot possibly be the type of sciences of

anatomy and histology, or sciences of


Even if chemistry hereafter

observation like

experiment like chemistry.

becomes in part a mathematical science, as the sciences


of electricity and heat have done, yet, like them, it must
always continue to be in part experimental, and in so far
as it is experimental, it cannot be mathematical.
that

aud

The

3.
intel-

hgibleness
are tests of
truth:

Descartes,

who

down

laid

sophy that what


true.

intelligibleness are

This was formularized as an axiom by


.

must be

and

fallacy that simplicity

of truth.

tests

is

as the foundation of his philo^


conceivable with perfect clearness

This was the error of a geometrician

true

and whatever

conceived as soon as

is

true

it is

must necessarily be

fully understood.

it

is

clearly

In physical

mere truth of

science, -on the contrary, truth is

for,

in geometry, nothing can be clearly conceived unless

and
error consequently involves no logical absurdity
and a
conception may be clear and yet not true.
But though it
fact,
;

is

not true that clearness

is

a test of truth, yet

that inability to attain to clearness

knowledge.
caution
ledge

Yet even

for there are

is

it is

true

a proof of imperfect

must be applied with


many subjects on which our knowthis

test

must always be imperfect

I do not

mean merely

limited in extent, but surrounded with a kind of haze of

mystery

this is especially true of the

the conscious and the unconscious


^

The chapter on the

life,

mutual relation of
and of all the facts

Classification of the Sciences (Chap.

XLIIL).

231

REMAKKS ON THE LOGIC OF THE SCIENCES.

XLV.]

of unconscious

intelligence.

contradiction

a proof of error

caution in

is

application

its

It

for

but

it is

true that self-

also

is

tliis

test also

needs

always necessary, and

often difficult, to determine whether a contradiction

is

real

or only verbal.
4.

Lastly, the fallacy that precision is the criterion of that


I

certainty.

have insisted above

at

some length on the

important truth that certainty without precision or definiteIt is important


ness is characteristic of the facts of life.

is^i^e

criterion of

between certainty and


precision, because a vague notion appears to be very common, that precision is the criterion of certainty, and that
no truth can be perfectly certain unless it is capable of
being stated with numerical accuracy and consequently
that the certainty which is attainable in the moral and
political sciences is inferior in degree to that which is
clearly to conceive this distinction

This notion
it

mathematical and the physical ones.

in the

attainable

is

never, I think, stated as a formula

would refute

itself if it

were

for

were

it

indeed,

true that no

numerically indefinite proposition can be quite certain, it


would follow that because no man knows how long he has
to live,

it

is

therefore not quite certain whether he

is to

would be impossible to

a conclusion which it
But
the notion of some necessary connexion beaccept.
tween certainty and precision is, I think, implied in such
expressions as " mathematical certainty " and " mathematical precision;" and in the belief, which is often
die at all

avowed and oftener implied, that no general truths are


attainable concerning the social relations of
historical

and

man

that

political science are consequently impossible,

and ever must be, a mass of mere facts,


and politics a chaos of mere opinions. The prevalent unbelief in the possibility of historical and political science,
and that history

however, though

is,

it

allies itself

with the lingering notion

that determinations cannot he certain unless they are also


precise, is chiefly due to the fact that the political group
of sciences

is

still

in a very

immature

have remarked in the introduction


1

Vol.

I.

p. 6.

state.

pre-

But, as I

to this work,^ the time

232

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

Extension is
of the

word

*^f

[cHAP.

coming wlien the use of the word science in the sense


oi^^y mathematical and physical science will be extinct,

or, if it

survives, will survive merely as a relic of

SC16I1C6

habit of thought.

We

an extinct

have already begun familiarly to

use such expressions as the science of language, the science


of history, and the science of politics

word

vives that such a use of the

a notion

science

is

inaccurate extension of the meaning of the

still

a somewhat
word but I
;

believe that in another generation such expressions

come

to be used with

sur-

wiE

no more sense of inaccuracy or of

paradox than we have when we speak of the science of


chemistry or the science of astronomy.
Double

an important truth, that perfect

It is

scientific

science.

consists in the co-operation of the inductive

Induction

methods
of

^^^^

tion must
co-operate, results

and deductive

and perfect
two methods

coinciding.

of induction

and of deduction, that

scientific

method

proof consists in the results

Thus in astronomy the


is

to say of

observation and of calculation, coincide within very small


limits of error;

and the same

true of the sciences of

is

sound, radiance, heat, electricity, and magnetism.

None

of these sciences could have attained to anything at all

comparable to their present perfection without the use of


this double method
in which the calculated results of
:

deduction are checked and verified

theoretical

by the

by induction from observation and experiment while at the same time, by the converse process, the
results obtained by induction from observation and experiment are checked and verified by the calculated results
of theoretical deduction.^
In language which is at once
fS'^iliai' ^^^ accurate, this is called tlie coincidence of
results obtained
;

Theory
vatioli'^'''^'

the results of theory with those of observation.


1

As was

It is usual to call the experimental result the verification of the theo-

retical one.

According to Comte, in physical science the results of theory

by observation or experiment but in historical science the


are first generalized from observation, and then verified by theory

are verified

results

(the theoretical data in this case consist, of course, in the general laws of

human nature).

This

may be true, but

it is

tant and universal truth on the subject

is,

not very important. The impor-

that the results of the theoretical

and of the experimental methods each need

to be verified

by the

other.

EEMAKKS ON THE LOGIC OF THE

XLV.]

233

SCIENCES.

remarked by Paracelsus, before tlie time of Bacon, theory Failure of


alone will lead to mere fantasy, and observation alone will ^^
Paracelsus.
The best instance of the powerlead to mere empiricism.
.

lessness of observation alone

is

perhaps the present state

of meteorology, or the science of the weather

we have

which Mcteorowant of ^^'

in

a vast mass of observations, and yet, for

knowing how

to bring deductive theory to bear

on them,

from knowing the laws and

"we are almost as far as ever

causes on which the changes of the weather depend.

The

shown by the

utter

powerlessness of theory alone

is

best

failure of all attempts to account for the facts of

human

society and historical change by merely theoretical deduc-

tion from the laws of

human

nature.

It is of course imjjossible that historical science

become

mathematical in form

can ever

nevertheless I think

we

are

^'^^*^"

'IS

safe in asserting
" that the relation of theory to observation
is

Historical

the same in the historical sciences as in the mathematico-

physical ones, such as astronomy and the science of heat,

}ts

niethod

tiie

same

as that of
science!

Certainty in the science of historical principles (of course


I do not

mean mere

historical facts) is attained only

when

the laws generalized from the observed facts of history,

and the laws

theoretically

deduced from the general ten-

human nature, coincide so as to verify each


As an instance of this not perhaps the best

dencies of
other.

instance that might be mentioned, but the most familiar


I will

now

mention the conclusion which

all

unprejudiced

dustry and exchange, or what


trade.

This conclusion was

first

some of the commonest facts of

is

familiarly called

has had the wisdom to adopt

may

free Free

trade.

deduced by theory from

human

nature, and has

been amply verified by the experience of every


It

men

accept, of the economical benefit of freedom of in-

state

which

it.

be thought that mathematics

is

an exception

to In what

the law of the necessity for verifying the results of the one ^atheit may be thought that the matics
method by those of the other
;

deductive results of pure or abstract mathematics need no

no doubt the fact that we take them as


true without demanding verification that is to say, when
we are satisfied of the accuracy of a mathematical calcula-

verification.

It is

fication.

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCK.

234
tion,

we

[ch. xlv.

are satisfied of the truth of the result,

and do not

But I think,
need to test it by counting or measuring.
though I do not wish to speak dogmatically on a question
which rather belongs to metaphysics than to logic, that the
reason

why we

do not demand verification for the results

of mathematical reasoning

is

only that general experience

assures us of their trustworthiness.

which, though not possible,

is

But

to

put a case

quite conceivable

if

the

whole algebraic calculus had been invented before any part


of

was applied to actual use,


man would have been

it

reasonable

do not think that a

justified in feeling abso-

untH they had

lutely certain of the truth of its results

been tested, checked, and verified. But this is not because


of anything uncertain or contingent in the nature of mathematical truth

makes

is

only because of the limitation of our

This remark, however, applies to

powers.
alike

it

it
it

is

only the limitation of

all

the sciences

human powers

that

necessary to verify the results of theoretic de-

duction by observation.

We

can imagine an intelligence

similar in kind to ours, though very

much more

powerful,

which should be able to calculate and predict all' the


special facts of nature by pure deduction from the primary
laws of matter and of life, and this with such unerring
certainty as to be independent of any verification by the
observation of facts.
Conclusion

have in several places insisted on the

universal tendency of science

throughout nature

and

is to

truth, that the

establish unity of laws

I believe that in the present

work

I have done something to extend the domain of sound


scientific ideas,

by showing that Habit and

both of them co-extensive with


History.

But

it is

Life,

Intelligence are

with Mind, and with

obvious that there must be somewhere

a limit to such generalizations as these

it

is

obvious

that all the facts of nature can never be brought under

can never, for instance, be possible to


refer the laws of chemical combinations to those of motion

a single law.

and gravitation
it is

It

and, as I have argued at some length,

equally impossible to dedixce Intelligence from Habit,

or from any unintelligent principle whatever.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.
As
is

indicated in the title-page of this work,

its

principal purpose

what I believe to be the laws of Habit and the laws


for believing
; and further, to show my reasons

to state

of Intelligence

that intelligence

is

a distinct principle, not capable of being re-

solved into habit or into any other unintelligent agency.

work

far as this

is

a controversial one at

all, its

purpose

In

so

is

to

prove the independent and ultimate character of intelligence.


This question as to the ultimate character of intelligence,

which may be thus stated


1. Is life a mere result of physical and chemical forces
something transcending aU chemistry, and having its

three closely related questions,

it

of Three

It is the second of a series

however, does not stand alone.

^^'^'^

or

is Is life

origin ^^^^^

an
^

power 1
Are the organizing power which builds up the wondrous Are organstructures of the body, and the intelligence of the mind, mere Jf^^^ ^T
results of habit, variation, and natural selection ? or are they intelliboth due to a principle of intelligence which is not capable of ^^ateVcts^?

directly in creative
2.

being resolved into any unintelligent principle 1


3. Is the moral sense to be accounted for by the laws of the
association of ideas

altogether peculiar,

thing else

In

this

that

is

to say, of

mental habit

or is

it

and incapable of being resolved into any-

aU these questions in the same


belief that life, intelligence, and the

I have answered

lower than

With

^^ ^
ultimate

work

I have expressed my
moral sense are each incapable of being resolved into anything

way

Is the

answer

^fg^^^-^^
tive.

itself.

respect to the moral sense, I have briefly stated

conviction that although

it

is

my Moral

developed out of the love of^^'

pleasure and the fear of pain, yet

it

contains an element

which

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

238

altogether transcends organic

life

and

sion of the grounds of this belief,

out of place in this

work

sensation.^

and of

full discus-

its results,

would be

I intend to endeavour to do justice

to the subject in a future one.


Intelli-

gence,

With

respect to organizing

and mental

intelligence

gence, the most important chapters of this

work

intelli-

consist of

an

attempt to prove that they are not capable of being resolved into

any unintelligent

my
Life.

agencies.

It

would be needless

to recapitulate

reasonings on the subject here.

But with respect to life, I have somewhat more to say. In


the chapter on the Chemistry of Life, I have stated my belief
that " life, like matter and energy, had its origin in no secondary
cause, but in the direct action of creative power;" ^ giving as

my

principal reason that no merely chemical force appears to be

capable of vitalizing matter

matter can be

vitalized,

and living

beings can be produced, only by beings which are already alive

and no science appears to be able to bring us to the origin of


life, any more than to the origin of matter.
Since the hrst volume of this work has been printed, Professor Huxley has published the opposite opinion to mine, in an
article "

sort,

On

the Physical Basis of Life."

must request the reader not

In a question of this

to permit

Huxley's high

authority to influence his conclusion, but to weigh

my

reasoning

against his.

some
mixed

I quote Huxley's words, italicising


Quotation

Z^\

"

When

hydrogen and oxygen are

of

them

in a certain propor-

tion,

and an

pear,

and a quantity of water equal to the sum of their weights


There is not the slightest parity between

electric

spark

is

passed through them, they disap-

appears in their place.

the passive and active powers of the water and those of the

oxygen and hydrogen which have given

rise to

it.

At

32

Fahr. and far below that temperature, oxygen and hydrogen are
elastic

gaseous bodies whose particles tend to rush away from

Water at the same temperature


is a strong though brittle solid, whose particles tend to cohere
into definite geometrical shapes, and sometimes build up frosty
one another with great

imitations of

Nevertheless,

force.

complex forms of vegetable foliage.


these and many other strange phenomena

the most

we

call

the properties of the water

and we do not

See Chapter XXII.

Fortnightly Review, Febniary 1869.

hesitate to believe

Yo\.

I.

p. 89.

239

APPENDIX.

way or another they result from the properties of


We do not assume that
the component elements of the water.
a something called aquosity entered into and took possession
of the oxide of hydrogen as soon as it was formed, and then
that in some

'

'

guided the aqueous particles to their places in the facets of the

amongst the

crystal or
trary,

we

live in the

of molecular physics

On

the con-

hope and in the faith that by the advance


we shall by and by be able to see our way

from the constituents of water to the properties of


are now able to deduce the operations of a watch

as clearly

water as

the hoar-frost.

leaflets of

we

and the manner in which they are


any way changed when carbonic
acid, water, and ammonia disappear, and in their place, under the
influence of jyre-existing living jnvtoplasjn, an equivalent weight

from the form of

of the matter of
is

no

parts

its

Is the case in

put together.

makes its appearance 1 It is true that there


between the properties of the components
of the resultant, but neither was there in the
It is also true that what I have spoken of

life

sort of parity

and the properties


case of the water.

as the influence of pre-existing matter is


telligible

but

any one quite comprehend the modus


spark which traverses a mixture of

does

operandi of an

something quite unin-

electric

oxygen and hydrogen

What

justification is there, then, for the

assumption of the existence in the living matter of a something

which has no representative or correlative in the not living


matter which gave rise to it % What better philosophical status
has vitality 'than aquosity 1'"
'

'

This reasoning, on a

first

perusal, looks lucid

but I think a thorough examination will show


lucidity

is

produced by leaving

out

the

and convincing
that

its

apparent
of

difficulties

the

question.

The analogy
ment.

of a watch really

we

It is true that

makes against Huxley's argu- My

are " able to deduce the operations of ^

a watch from the form of its parts, and the

manner

in

which

may be true, for anything I have


to say to the contrary, that if we understood an organism as
well as we understand a watch, and if we understood life as
well as we understand mechanics, we should be able to deduce

they are put together

"

and

it

the properties of living beings from those of carbonic acid,


But here, where Huxley takes a paralwater, and ammonia.
lelism for granted, there
living

matter,

wliicli

is

is

really a

chiefly

wide divergence

for the

formed of combinations

of

reply

'*

240

HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

carbonic acid, water, and ammonia, has the power of organizing

and in order to make the parallel a valid one, the brass


and steel that compose the watch ought to have the power of
putting themselves together, which they have not.
If, then, the
case of an organism is really analogous to that of a watch, a
being who understood an organism as well as we understand a
watch would be able to perceive that it has been organized by a
power namely life or intelligence which is as totally unlike
itself

the properties of the mere chemical elements as the skill of


the watchmaker

is unlike the properties of brass and steel.


Huxley's argument about " aquosity " is less easy to answer.

But I think the suggested analogy between the


electric

spark in producing water out of

effect of " pre-existing living

stances of the food,

is

protoplasm

" in vitalizing

The only

altogether unsound.

effect

of heat

is

is

when

the substance of food

previously vitalized matter, or

the subeffect

to enable the constituents of

vitalized

is

when

by the

affinities

vitalized matter assumes

any sjjontaneous tendency of matter.

THE END.

LONDON

R.

CLAT, SONS,

AND

action of

organic structure, I see no proof nor probability that this


to

of

probably to pro-

the water to combine according to their spontaneous

but

of the

elements, and the

its

the electric spark in the formation of water

duce heat, and the

effect

TAYI.On, PRINTKnS.

is

due

i6,

Bedford Street, Covent Garden, London.


April,

Macmillan

of Works in
Biography,

Catalogue

Departments of History,

the

Travels,

With

Lettres.

General

Co:s

&-

1870.

Poetry,

some

short

and

Belles

Account

or

Critical Notice concerning each Book.

SECTION

I.

HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY, and TRAVELS.


Baker

Samuel W.). the NILE tributaries OF

(Sir

ABYSSINIA, and the Sword Hunters of the Hamran Arabs.


By Sir Samuel W. Baker, M.A., F.R.G.S. With Portraits,
Maps, and

Third Edition, 8vo.

Ilkistrations.

21s.

Sir Samuel Baker here describes twelve 7nonths' exploration, during

which he examined the

rivers that are tributary to the Nile from Abyssinia,

including the Atbara,

Settite,

and

the

Blue

Nile.

The

Royan, Salaam, Angrab, RaJiad, Dinder,

interest attached to these portions

of Africa

differs

of Upper Egypt
and Abyssinia is capable of development, and is inhabited by races having
some degree of civilization; while Central Africa is peopled by a race oj
entirely froj}i that

of the White Nile

savages, %vhose futtire is

regions, as the -whole

more problematical.

THE ALBERT N'YANZA

Great Basin of the Nile, and Explo-

New and Cheaper Edition, with


Two vols, crown Svo. i6j.

ration of the Nile Sources.


Portraits,

Maps, and

"Bruce won

Illustrations.

A.

I.

Tooo.4.70.

Blue Nile ; Speke and Gra?tt won the


White Nile ; and I have been permitted to

the source of the

Victoria source of the great

Baker

(Sir

Samuel

"W.)

{continued)

succeed in completing the Nile

Sources by the discovery of the great


of the equatorial waters, the Albert Nyanza, from which the
river issues as the entire White Nile."
Preface.
reservoir

NEW AND CHEAP


I

vol.

crown 8vo.

EDITION OF THE ALBERT N'YANZA.


With Maps and

Illustrations,

CAST UP BY THE SEA;

or, The Adventures


By Sir Samuel W. Baker, M.A., F.R.G.S.
Crown 8vo. cloth gilt, 7^. 6d.

"
to

us

story of adventure by sea

to be the best

that establishedfavourite very

"No

and land

book of the kind since


close.

'

of

Ned Grey.

Third Edition.

in the good old style. It appears


Alasterman Ready,'' and it runs

Pall Mall Gazette.

book written for boys has for a long time created so

or been so successful.

6d.

^s.

Evry parent ought to provide his

much

interest,

boy with a copy."

Daily Telegraph.

Barker (Lady). STATION LIFE IN


By Lady Barker.

Crown

8vo.

J' These letters are the exact account

and less

is.

new ZEALAND.

6d.

of a lady's experience of the brighter


They record the expeditions, ad-

practical side of colonization.

and emergencies diversifying the daily life of the wife of a New


Zealatid sheep farmer ; and, as each was written while the novelty and
excitement of the scenes it describes were fresh upon her, they may succeed
ventures,

in giving here in

England an adequate

andfreeown highly-wrought civiliza-

impression of the delight

dotn of aft existence so far remcruedfrom our

tion" Y-&-E? KC^.

"

We have

never read a more truthful or a pleasanter

little

book."

Athen^UM.

Baxter (R. Dudley, M.A.). THE TAXATION OF THE


UNITED KINGDOM. By R. Dudley Baxter, M.A. 8vo.
cloth, 4^. 6d.

HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY,
Baxter (R. Dudley, M.A.)

&-

TRAVELS.

{cotitmued)

The First Part of this work, originally read before the Statistical
of London, deals with the Amount of Taxation ; the Second Pari,
which now constitutes the 7nain portion of the work, is almost entirely new,
Society

and embraces

the important questions of Ratittg, of the relative Taxation

and Industry, and of the direct effect of Taxes upon


The author trusts that the body of facts here collected 7nay be of
permanent value as a record of the past progress and present condition of
the population of the United Kingdom, independently of the transitory
of Land, Persoitalty,
Prices.

circumstances of its present Taxation.

NATIONAL INCOME.
Part
Classes.

"

With Coloured Diagrams.

8vo.

Classifcation of the Population, Upper, Middle,

I.

3^-.

6d.

and Labour

Income of the United Kittgdom.

II.

A painstaking and certainly most interesting inquiry." Pall Mall

Gazette.

FOUR LECTURES ON SUBJECTS CONNECTED


WITH DIPLOMACY. By Mountague Bernard, M.A.,

Bernard.

Chichele Professor of International

Law and

Diplomacy, Oxford.

8vo. pj.

Four Lectures, dealing with


of Policy ;

(3)

(i) The Congress of Westphalia ; (2) Systems


Diplomacy, Past and Present; (4) The Obligations of

Treaties.

Blake. THE LIFE OF WILLIAM BLAKE, THE ARTIST.


By Alexander Gilchrist.

With numerous

Illustrations

Blake's designs, and Fac-similes of his studies of the "

Job."

Two

vols,

medium

These volumes contain a Life of Blake ;

with occasional

notes,

of

8vo. 32^.

from his Writings,


and Drawings,
There
of Blakis Engravings and Writings.
a 2
Selectiojzs

including Poems ; Letters ; Annotated Catalogue ofPictures


List,

from

Book

GENERAL CATALOGUE.
are appended Engraved Designs by Blake ;

one photo-lithographs

from

the originals

(i)
(2)

The Book of Job, twentySongs of Innocence and

Experience, sixteen of the original Plates.

Bright (John, M. P.). SPEECHES ON QUESTIONS OF


Edited by
By John Bright, M. P.
PUBLIC POLICY.
Second
Vols.
8vo.
Two
25^.
Rogers.
Professor Thorold
Edition, with Portrait.
"

have divided the Speeches contained in these volumes ittto groups.


for selection are so abundant, that I have been constrained
I have
many
a speech which is worthy of careful perusal.
omit
to
naturally given prominence to those subjects with which Mr. Bright has

The materials

been especially identified, as, for example, India, America, Ireland, a7td

Parliamentary Reform. But nearly every topic of great public


which Mr. Bright has spoken is represented in these volut7ies"

interest

on

Editor's Preface.

AUTHOR'S POPULAR EDITION.


Edition,

Bryce.

y.

THE

Extra fcap. 8vo.

cloth.

Second

6d.

HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE.

By James Bryce,
[Reprinting.

B.C.L., Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford.

CAMBRIDGE CHARACTERISTICS. &^ Mullinger.

CHATTERTON

Biographical

Study.

By Daniel Wilson,

LL.D., Professor of History and English Literature


College, Toronto.

Crown

8vo.

in University

6s. 6d.

The Author here regards Chatterton as a

Poet, not as

a mere "

resetter

and defacer of stolen literary treasures.'''' Reviewed in this light, he has


found much in the old materials capable of being turned to new accowit
and to these materials research iit various directions has enabled him to
make some

additions.

HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY,

6-

TRAVELS.

Clay. THE PRISON CHAPLAIN. A Memoir of the Rev. John


Clay, B.D.,

late

Chaplain of the Preston Gaol.

With

Selections

Reports and Correspondence, and a Sketch of Prison


By his Son, the Rev. W. L. Clay, MA.
Discipline in England.

from

his

8vo.

15^-.

" Feiv books have appeared of late years better entitled to an attentive
It prese)its a complete narrative of all that has been done and

perusal.

attempted by various philanthropists for the amelioration of the condition and


the improvement of the morals of the criminal classes in the British

LONDON

dominions.

Review.

By Charles
Cooper. ATHENE CANTABRIGIENSES.
Cooper,
F.S.A.
and
Thompson
F.S.A.,
Henry Cooper,
Vol.

I.

8vo.,

150085,

This elaborate work, which

i8j-.

is

Vol.

II.,

1586 1609,

dedicated by permission to

iSj-.

Lord Macaulay,

contains lives of the eminent men sent forth by Ca7nbridge, after the
" thence Oxoiiienses."
fashion of Anthony h Wood, in his famous

Cox

(G. v.,

By

G. V.

M. A.). RECOLLECTIONS OF OXFORD.

Cox, M.A.,

New

College, Late Esquire

Coroner in the University of Oxford.

Second Edition.

Bedel and

Crown

8vo.

loj. 6d.

"An amusing {sirfago of atiecdote, and will pleasantly recall in


a country parsonage the memory ofyouthful days. 'Times.

Dilke.

GREATER BRITAIN.

speaking Countries during 1866-7.

By

Sir

Edition.

Record of Travel

6^.

Enghsh-

(America, Australia, India.)

Charles Wentworth Dilke, M.P.


Crovra 8vo.

in

many

Fifth and

Cheap

GENERAL CATALOGUE.
" Mr. Dilkc has written a book which is probably as well worth reading
as atiy book of the same aims and character that ever was written.
Its
merits are that it is written in a lively and agreeable style, that it implies
a great deal of physical pluck, that no page of it fails to show an acute and
highly intelligent observer, that it stimulates the imagination as well as the
judgment of the reader, and that it is on perhaps the most interesting
subject that can attract an Englishman who cares about his country."

Saturday Review.

Diirer (Albrecht).

HISTORY

BRECHT DURER,
Letters and Journal,

OF THE LIFE OF AL-

Numberg. With a Translation of his


and some account of his works.
By Mrs.
of

Charles Heaton. Royal 8vo. bevelled

boards, extra

gilt.

31^-. 60'.

This work contains about Thirty Illustrations, ten of which are producand are printed in peririanent tints

tions by the Autotype {carbon) process,

by Messrs. Cundall

and Fleming, under

pany, Limited ; the

rest

are Photographs

license

and

from

the Autotype

Com-

Woodcuts.

EARLY EGYPTIAN HISTORY FOR THE YOUNG.

See

"Juvenile Section."
Elliott.

LIFE OF HENRY

VENN

ELLIOTT,

ot

Brighton.

By JosiAH Bateman, M.A., Author of "Life of Daniel Wilson,


Bishop of Calcutta," &c. With Portrait, engraved by Jeens ;
and an Appendix containing a short sketch of the life of the Rev.
(who met with accidental death while ascending the

Julius Elliott

Schreckhom

in July, 1869.

Crown Svo.

?is.6d.

Second Edition,

with Appendix.

"A

very char7ning piece of religious biography; no one can read

without both pleasure

and profit

it

BRITISH QUARTERLY Review.

Fairfax. A LIFE OF THE GREAT LORD FAIRFAX,


Commander-in-Chief of the

Army

of the Parliament of England.

By Clements R. Markham, F.S.A.


Plans, and Illustrations.

Demy

Svo.

With

Portraits,

Maps,

i6j.

HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY,
No full
and it

is

&-

TRAVELS.

Commander has appeared


upon careful research in con-

Life of the great Parliamentary

here sought

temporary records

Forbes.

to

produce one

based

and upon family and

LIFE

other documents.

PROFESSOR EDWARD FORBES,

OF

By George Wilson, M.D., F.R.S.E., and Archibald

F.R.S.

Geikie, F.R.S.

8vo. with Portrait,

I4J-.

" From the first page to the last the book claims careful reading, as being
a full but not overcrowded rehearsal of a tnost instructive life, and the true
picture of a mind that was rare in strength and beauty^
Examiner.

Freeman.

HISTORY

from the Foundation

OF federal government,
Achaian League

of the

to the Disruption of

By Edward A. Freeman, M.A.

the United States.

Vol.

History of the Greek Federations.

General Introduction.

I.

Svo

2is.

" The task Mr. Freeman has undertaken


It is also a task of an almost

importance.

is

one of great !?iagnitude

and

entirely novel character.

N'o
give the history of a political pnnciple occurs to
us, except the slight contributions to the history of representative govern-

work professing

other

ment that

is

to

contained in a course of M. Gttizot's lectures .... The


a principle is at least as important as the

history of the development of


history of a dynasty, or

of a

race.''

SATURDAY Review.

old ENGLISH HISTORY FOR CHILDREN.


Freeman, M.A.,

late

Five Coloured Maps.

"Its

object is to

or indeed
first.

Ijf

any

show that
subject,

clear, accurate,

may

I have, I hope, shown

and scientific

and also

to

views of history,

be easily given to children

that

it is

from

the very

perfectly easy to teach children,

the very first, to distittguish true history alike ft


invention,

By Edward A.
With

Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford.


Extra fcap. 8vo., half-bound. 6s.

om

legend

andfrom

from

wilful

understand the nature of historical authorities, and

GENERAL CATALOGUE.
weigh one statement against another. .... I have throughout striven to
of England with the general history of civilized Europe,
and I have especially tried to make the book serve as a}i incentive to a more
to

contiect the history

accurate study of histotical geography."

French (George
GENEALOGICA.

Preface.

Russell).

SHAKSPEAREANA

cloth extra,

8vo.

Uniform with the

IS J.

"Cambridge Shakespeare."
Fai-t I.

Identification

the historical plays,

of the dramatis personse ?

from King John to King Henry VIII. ; Notes on Characters in Macbeth


and Hamlet ; Persons and Places belonging to IVanuickshire alluded to.
The Shakspeare and Arden families and their connexiotts, with
Part II.

The present

Tables of descent.

is

the first attempt to give a detailed de-

of each of the dramatis personse in Shakimmortal chronicle-histories, and some of the characters have been,

scription, in consecutive o?-der,

speare^ s

it is believed,

A clue is furnished which,

herein identifiedfor the first time.

may

followed up with ordinary diligence,


the pursuit, to trace

enable

any

one,

with a

a distinguished Shakspearean worthy

to

taste for

his lineal

representative in the present day.

Galileo.

THE

principally

PRIVATE LIFE OF GALILEO.

from

Correspondence

his

daughter^ Sister Maria Celeste,


S.

Matthew

in Arcetri.

With

Nun

and

in the

Portrait.

that

Compiled

of his

eldest

Franciscan Convent of

Crown

8vo.

Is.

6d.

It has been the endeavour of the compiler to place before the reader a
plaifi,

ungarbled statemeiit of facts

Galileo, his friends,

and his

and as a means

to this

end, to allow

judges to speak for themselves as far as possible.

Gladstone (Right, Hon. W. E., M.P.). JUVENTUS


MUNDI. The Gods and Men of the Heroic Age. Crovra 8vo.
cloth extra.

With Map.

lOJ'.

6d.

Second Edition.

HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY,
Gladstone (Right. Hon.
This ttew work of Mr.

W.

&-

TRAVELS.

E., yi.V.){continiied)~

Gladstone deals especially with the historic


and furnishing by its aid a

element in Homer, expounding that element

full accou7ti of the Homeric men and the Homeric religion. It starts, after
the introductory chapter, with a discussion of the several races then existing
It
in Hellas, including the influence of the Phcenicians and Egyptians.
contains chapters on the

Ethics

and

Olympian

system, with

its

several deities ; on the

the Polity of the Heroic age; on the geography of

the characters of the

and primitive

society

Homer; on

Poems ; presenting, in fine, a view of primitive life


To this New
as found in the poems of Homer.

Edition various additions have been ?nade.

"GLOBE" ATLAS OF EUROPE.

Uniform

in

size

with Mac-

millan's Globe Series, containing 45 Coloured Maps, on a uniform


scale and projection ; with Plans of London and Paris, and a

copious Index.

back,

Strongly bound in half-morocco, with flexible

gs.

This Atlas includes all the countries of Europe in a series of i,% Maps,
the same scale, with an Alphabetical Index to the situation of
more than ten thousand places, and the relation of the various maps and

drawn on

All the maps


is defined in a general Key-map.
being on a uniform scale facilitates the comparison of extent and distance,

countries to each other

and conveys a just impression of the relative magnitude of different countries.


The size suffices to show the provincial divisions, the railways and main
"This atlas," writes the
roads, the principal rivers and mountain ranges.
or
British Quarterly, " will be an invaluable boon for the school, the desk,
the traveller'' s portmanteau."

Godkin (James). THE LAND

WAR

IN IRELAND.

By James Godkin, Author of "Ireland


History for the Times.
8vo 12S.
and her Churches," late Irish Correspondent of the Times.

History of the Irish

land

Question.

GENERAL CATALOGUE.

lo

Guizot.

(Author of

"John Halifax, Gentleman.") M.

DE

BARANTE, A
M. Guizot.
Gentleman."

Memoir, Biographical and Autobiographical. By


Translated by the Author of "John Halifax,

Crown

8vo.

6d.

6^-.

" The highest purposes of both history and biography are answered by a
memoir so lifelike, so faithful, and so philosophical."
British Quarterly Review.

HISTORICAL SELECTIONS.

Readings from the best Authorities


Selected and arranged by
on English and European History.
Crown 8vo. bs.
E. M. Sewell and C. M. Yonge.

When young children have acquired the outlines of history from abridgeand catechisms, and it becomes desirable to give a more enlarged
view of the subject, in order to render it really iiseful and i}iteresting, a
Two courses are open, either
difficulty often arises as to the choice of books.
to take a general and consequently dry history op facts, s^ich as RusselVs
ments

Modern Europe, or
subject,

to choose

some work treating of a particular period or


and Froude. The former course

such as the ivorks op Macaulay

usually renders history tininteresting


it is

not sifficiently cottiprehensive.

continuous

and chronological, have

the larger works of Free7na7i,


serve as distitict

landmarks of

the latter

To remedy

is

unsaiisfactoty, because

this difficidty, selections,

in the present volume been taken

Milman, Palgraze, and


historical reading.

"

others,

which

from

may

We know of scarcely

anything," says the Guardian, of this volume, "which is so


to a higher level the average standard of English education."

likely to raise

Hole. A GENEALOGICAL STEMMA OF THE KINGS OF


ENGLAND AND FRANCE. By the Rev. C. Hole, M.A.,
Trinity College, Cambridge.

The

On

Sheet,

is.

different families are.printed in distinguishing colours, thus facili-

tating reference.

HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY,
Hole

{continued)

&>

TRAVELS.

ii

A BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY.

Compiled and
Arranged by the Rev. Charles Hole, M.A. Second Edition.
i8mo. neatly and strongly bound in cloth, 4J. dd.

One of the

t?iost

comprehensive

and

accurate Biographical Dictionaries

in the world, containing more than \%,<X)0 peisons of all countries, with
Extreme
dates of birth and death, and what they wei-e distinguished for.

care has been bestowed on the verification of the dates ;


errors, current in in'evious ivorks,

for the

desk,

"An

and thus numerous


Its size adapts it

corrected.

portmanteau, or pocket,

invaluable addition to our manuals oj reference, and,

moderate price, cannotfail

Hozier.
its

have been

become as popular as

THE SEVEN WEEKS'

Incidents.

vols.

to

8vo.

This work

is

By H. M. Hozier.

WAR

it is

usefid."

Its

from

its

Times.

Antecedents and

With Maps and

Plans.

Two

28j-.

based upon

letters

reprinted by permission

from " The

Times. " For the most part ii is a product of a peisonal eye-witJiess of some
of the most interesting incidents of a war which, for rapidity and decisive
restdts, may claim an almost unrivalled position in history.

THE BRITISH EXPEDITION TO ABYSSINIA.


Authentic Documents.

Assistant Military Secretary to

Compiled from

By Captain Henry M. Hozier,


Lord Napier of Magdala.

8vo.

late

^'Several accounts of the British Expedition have been published. ....


They have, Jurwever, been written by those who have not had access to those
authentic documents, which cantiot be collected directly after the termination
The endeavour of the author of this sketch has been to
of a campaign
present to readers a succinct and impartial account oJ an enterprise which
has rarely been equalled in the atinals of war T PREFACE.

GENERAL CATALOGUE.

12

Irving. THE ANNALS OF OUR TIME. A

Diurnal of Events,

which have happened in or had relation to


the Kingdom of Great Britain, from the Accession of Queen
Victoria to the Opening of the present Parliament.
By Joseph
Social and Political,

Irving.
"

We

8vo. half-bound.

have before

tis

\%s.

a trusty and ready guide

thirty years, available equally

to the eve/tts

for the statesman, the

of the past

politician, the public

If Mr. Irving'' s object has been to bri7tg


most noteworthy occurrences which have happened
since the beginning of Her Majestfs reign, he may justly claim the credit
of having done so ?nost briefly, succinctly, and simply, and in such a
manner, too, as to furnish him with the details necessary in each case to
writer,

and

the general reader.

before the reader all the

comprehend

the event

of which he

Reflection will serve to

journalist

show

is

in search in

an

intelligent

work as
one who feels an

the great value oj such a

and statesman, and indeed to every


and we may add that

the progress of the age ;

its

value

is

manner.

this to the
intei-est

an

creased by the addition of that most important of all appendices,

TlMES.

accurate atid instructive itidex."

Kingsley

on THE ANCIEN REGIME

(Canon).

in

C07isiderably in-

as

it

on the Continent before the French Revolution.


Three Lectures delivered at the Royal Institution. By the Rev.
C. Kingsley, M.A., formerly Professor of Modern History
Crown 8vo. 6^.
in the University of Cambridge.
Existed

These three lectures discuss severally

The Explosive Forces by which

(l)

Caste, (2) Centralization, (3)

the Revolution luas superinduced.

The

Preface deals at some length with certain political questions of the present

day.

THE ROMAN AND THE TEUTON.


delivered before the

Kingsley, M.A.

University of

8vo.

Contents: Inaugural

Series

Cambridge.

of Lectures

By Rev.

C.

\2s.

Lecture

Empire; The Human Debige ; The

The Forest Children; The Dying

Gothic Civilizer; DietricKs End;

The

Nemesis of the Goths ; Paiilus Diaconus ; The Clergy and the Heathen ;
The Monk a Civilizer ; The Lombard Laws ; The Popes and the Lombards ;

The Strategy of Providence.

Kingsley (Henry, F.R.G.S.)-TALES OF OLD


TRAVEL. Re-narrated by Henry Kingsley, F.R.G.S. With
Eight Illustrations by

Huard.

Crown

8vo.

6^-.

Contents: Marco Polo; The Shipwreck of Pelsart ; The Wonderftil


Adventures of Andrew Battel; The Wanderings of a Capuchin; Peter
Carder; The Preservation of the '' Terra Nova ;" Spitzbergen; D' Ernienonvill/s Acclimatization Adventure ; The Old Slave Trade ; Miles Philips
The Sufferings of Robert Evei-ard ; John Fox; Alvaro Nunez; TheFoundation ofati Empire.

Latham.
Tour

black and white

in the

at-Law.

United

8vo.

a journal of a Three Months'

By Henry Latham, M.A.,

Mr. Latham has

written about our brethren in

commendable in high degree." ^A.tu'ET^jexsvi.

is

Law. THE ALPS OF HANNIBAL.

By William John Law,

M.A., formerly Student of Christ Church, Oxford.


8vo.

Barrister-

\os. 6d.

" The spirit in which

America

States.

Two

vols.

2 1 J.

can read the luork and not acquire a conviction that, in


addition to a thorough grasp of a particidar topic, its writer has at
cominafid a large store of reading and thought upon tnany cognate points
of ancient history and geography. "^Qvawv^ruy Review.
"

No

07ie

Liverpool. THE LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION OF


ROBERT BANKS, SECOND EARL OF LIVERPOOL, K.G.
Compiled from Original Family Documents by Charles Duke

GENERAL CATALOGUE.

14

YONGE, Regius

Professor of History and English Literature in


and Author of " The History of the
;

Queen's College, Belfast

Navy," " The Histoiy of France under the Bourbons,"

British

Three

vols. 8vo.

etc.

ofls.

Since the tif?ie of Lord Burleigh no one, except the second Pitt, ever
enjoyed so long a tenure of power ; with the same exception, no one ever
held office at so critical a time .... Lord Liverpool is the very last
minister who has been ablefidly to carry out his own political views ; who

has been so strong that in matters of general policy the Opposition could
extort no concessions from hi?n which were not sanctioned by his own
deliberate jtidgment.

The present work is fotinded almost entirely on the


him by Lord Liverpool, and now in the possession

correspondence left behind

of Colonel and Lady Catherine Harcourt.

"Full of information attd instruction."

Maclear.

See Section,

Fortnightly Review.

"Ecclesiastical History."

Macmillan (Rev. Hugh). holidays on high


LANDS or, Rambles and Incidents in search of Alpine Plants.
By the Rev. Hugh Macmillan, Author of "Bible Teachings in
;

Nature,"

etc.

Crown

8vo. cloth,

ds.

"Botanical knowledge is blended with a love of nature, a pious enand a rich felicity of diction not to be met with in any works

thusiasm,

Miller.''''

Daily

FOOT-NOTES FROM THE PAGE OF NATURE.

With

of kindred character, if we except

those

of

Hugh

Telegraph.

numerous

Illustrations.

" Those

who have

and ferns

subjects,

Fcap. 8vo.

derived pleasure
it is

pleasing

Sj.

and profit from the study of flowers


now everywhere popular by

to fitui,

descending lower into the arcana of the vegetable kingdom, will find a still
more interesting and delightful field of research in the objects brought under
revieiv in the following pages."

Preface.

Macmillan (Rev. Hugh), (continued)


BIBLE TEACHINGS IN NATURE. Fourth
6j.6V^a/j(7

Martin (Frederick)

Fcap 8vo.

Edition.

"Scientific Section."

the STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK

and Historical Account of the States of the Civilized


Manual for Politicians and Merchants for the year 1870.

Statistical

World.

By Frederick Martin.
8vo.

The new

Seventh

Annual

issue

has been entirely

ments of the World, in reply

and corrected, on the


of the leading Govern-

re-tvritten, revised,

basis of official reports received direct from the heads

''^Everybody

Crown

Publication.

61/.

IOJ-.

to letteis sent to

who knows this work

is

them by the Editor.

aware that

it is

a book that

pensable to writers, financiej's, politicians, statesmen,


directly or indirectly interested in the political,

and

social,

all

is

indis-

who

are

industrial, com-

and financial condition of their fellow-creatures at home and


Mr. Mai-tin deserves warm commendation for the care he takes
making The Statesvian^s Year BooV complete atid correct."
Standard.

mercial,

abroad.
in

'

HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY BIOGRAPHY.


Frederick Martin, Author
Extra fcap. 8vo.

of

"The

By

Statesman's Year-Book."

6^.

This volume is an attempt to produce a book of reference, furnishing in


a coitdensed form so!?ie biographical particulars of notable livijig men.
The leading idea has been to give otily facts, and those in the briefest form,

and to

exclude opinions.

Martineau.

biographical

By Harriet Martineau.
Crown 8vo. %s. 6d.

Collection

sketches,

Third Edition, with

of Memoirs under these several sections:

18521868.

New
(l)

Preface.

Royal, (2)
These

Politicians, (3) Professional, (4) Scientific, (5) Social, (6) Literary.

Memoirs appeared originally in the columns of the " Daily News."

GENERAL CATALOGUE.

i6

Masson (Professor).^ESSAYS, BIOGRAPHICAL AND


CRITICAL.

JOHN MILTON.

LIFE OF

Poetry and Belles Lettres. "

See Section headed "

Narrated

in

connexion with the

and Literary History of his Time. By


David Masson, M.A., LL. D., Professor of Rhetoric at EdinEcclesiastical,

Political,

Vol.

burgh.
It is

I.

Vol. II. in the Press.

8vo. iSj.

^\^th Portraits.

intended to exhibit Milton s life in

its

connexions with all the moj-e

notable phenomena of the period of British history in which it was cast


its state politics, its ecclesiastical variations, its literature and speculative

Commencing

thought.

in 1608, the Life of Milton proceeds through the

last sixteen years of the reign of James I. , includes the whole of the reign
of Charles I. and the subsequent years of the Commonwealth and the
Protectorate, and then, passing the Restoration, extends itself to 1674, or

through fourteen years of the nevj state of things under Charles II.
volume deals with the life of Milton as extending from 1 608 to
which was the period of his education and of his minor poems.

first

M orison. THE
Abbot of

LIFE

AND TIMES OF SAINT BERNARD,

By James Cotter Morison, M.A.


Crown 8vo. "js: 6d.

Clairvaux.

Edition, revised.

The
1 640,

New

" One of the best contributions in our literature towards a vivid, intelligent, and worthy knowledge of European interests and thoughts and
feelings

during the

and one of the

twelfth century.

best products

delightful

of the modern

and

instructive volutne,

historic spirit.'"

Pall Mall Gazette.

Morley

(John).

EDMUND BURKE,

John Morley, B.A.


" The

style is terse

and

Oxon.

incisive,

Crown
and

But

reasoning,

and

social

cordially

"js.

brilliant with

It contains pithy aphoristic sentences which

disowned.

a Historical Study.

8vo.

Burke

these are not its best features

By

6d.

epigram and point.


not have

hi7?iself would
its

sustained

power

0/

wide sweep of observation and reflection, its elevated ethical


tone, stamp it as a work of high excellence, and as such we

its

recommend it

to

our readers."

SATURDAY REVIEW.

HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY,

TRAVELS.

&^

17

CAMBRIDGE CHARACTERISTICS IN THE


SEVENTEENTH CENTURY. By J. B. Mullinger, B.A.

Mullinger.
Crown
It

"

is

77^1?

8vo.

4J. 6d.

a veiy entertaining

and readable

chapters on the Cartesian Philosophy

are admirable."

Palgrave.

Athenaeum.

HISTORY

land.

By

Sir

and the Cambridge Platonists

of normandy and of Eng-

Majesty's Public Records.

Volume

SATURDAY REVIEW.

Francis Palgrave, Deputy Keeper of Her


Four

of William Rufus.

Empire

book,"

Completing the History

vols. 8vo.

^4

to the

Death

4^.

General Relations of MedicEval Europe


The Carlovingian
The Danish Expeditions in the Gauls A7id the Establishment
I.

Volume II. The Three First Dukes of


of Rollo.
Guillaume Longue-Epee, and Richard Sans-Peur

Normandy ;

The

Rollo,

Carlovingian

Volume III. Richard Sans-Peur


the Capets.
Richard Le-Bon Richard III. Robert Le Diable William the Conquey'or.
Volume IV. William Rufus Accession of Henry Beauclerc.
line supplanted by

Palgrave (W.

G.).

JOURNEY THROUGH
ARABIA,

1862-3.

the Eighth Regiment

NARRATIVE of a YEAR'S
CENTRAL AND EASTERN

By William Gifford Palgrave, late of


Bombay N. I. Fifth and cheaper Edition.

With Maps, Plans, and Portrait


Crown Svo. ds.
Jeens.

of Author, engraved on steel by

" Considering the extent of our previous ignorance, the amount of his
and the importance of his contributions to our knowledge, we
cannot say less of him than was once said of a far greater discoverer. Mr.
achievements,

Palgrave has indeedgiven a new world to Ettrope."

Parkes (Henry).

AUSTRALIAN VIEWS OF ENGLAND.

By Henry Parkes.
" The following
the

years 86 1 and
1

Pall Mall Gazette.

letters

1862,

Crown

8vo. cloth.

3^-.

6d.

were written diiring a residence in England, in

and wei-e published


B

in the

"Sydney Morning

Herald" on

the

arrwal of

the

monthly mails .... Oj! re-perusal,

these

contain virws of English life and impressions of English


notabilities which, as the vieios and impressions of an Englishman on his
letters

return

appear

to his

to

native country after

'without interest to the

mixing with

an absence of twenty years, may not be


The w}-iter had opportunities of

English reader.

different classes

of the British people,

on passing events from opposite standpoints of

and of hearing opinions


Author's

obseii'ation."

Preface.

Prichard. THE ADMTNLSTRATION OF INDIA.

From
The First Ten Years of Acliniiiistration under the
By Iltudus Thomas Prichard, Barrister-at-Law.
Demy 8vo. With Map. 2\s.

1859 to 1868.

Crown.

Two

vols.

hi these volumes the author has aimed to supply a full, impartial, ana
independent account of British India between 1 859 and 1868 which is
in many respects the most important epoch in the history of that country
which the present century has seen.

Ralegh. THE LIFE OF

SIR

WALTER RALEGH,

based

By Edward Edwards. Tonow first collected. With Portrait.

upon Contemporary Documents.


gether with Ralegh's Letters,

Two

vols. Svo.

32^.

" Mr. Edwards has certainly written the Life


of Ralegh from fuller
information than any previous biographer. He is intelligent, industrious,
sympathetic : and the world has in his two volumes larger fueans afforded
it

of knowing Ralegh than

it

The new

ever possessed before.

the newly-edited old letters aJ-e in

themselves a

boon."

letters

Pall

and

Mall

Gazette.

Robinson (Crabb). DIARY, REMINISCENCES, AND


CORRESPONDENCE OF HENRY CRABB ROBINSON.
Selected and Edited by Dr.
Edition.

Three

vols.

Sadler.

Svo. cloth.

^6s.

With

Portrait.

Second

HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY,
Mr. Crabb RobinsotCs Diary

&-

TRAVELS.

19

extends over the greater part of three-

It contains personal reminiscences of some of the


quarters of a century.
most distinguished chaj-acters of that period, including Goethe, Wieland, D<:

whom Mr.

Quincey, Wordsworth (with

great intimacy), Madatne de

and includes a vast


and miscellaneous.

&=c. &'c.
astical,

Sta'e'l,

Crabb Robinson zvas on terms of

Lafayette, Coleridge,

Lamb, Milman,

variety of subjects, political, literary, ecclesi-

Rogers (James E. Thorold). HISTORICAL GLEANINGS A Series of Sketches. Montague, Walpole, Adam Smith,
:

By Rev.

Cobbett.

J.

Crown

E. T. Rogers.

Professor Rogers' s object in the follozving sketches


historical facts,

form of

grouped round a principal figure

4^. (id.

is to

present a

set 0/

The essays are in the

lectures.

HISTORICAL GLEANINGS.
J.

8vo.

E. T.

Rogers.

Second

Series.

Series of Slvetches.

Crown

8vo.

By Rev.

ds.

companion ivlume to the First Series recently published. It contains


In these lectures the
Wiklif Laud, Wilkes, Home Tooke.
author has aimed to state t/ie social facts of the time in which tJie individual
whose history is handled took part in public business.

papers on

Smith (Professor Goldwin). three ENGLISH


STATESMEN PYM, CROMWELL, PITT. A Course of
:

Lectures on the PoHtical

Smith, M. A.
"

work which

neglect.'"

History of England.

Extra fcap. 8vo.

New and

By Goldwin

Cheaper Edition,

^s.

neither historian nor politician can safely afford to

Saturday Review.

SYSTEMS OF LAND TENURE IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES.


A Series of Essays published under the sanction of the Cobden
Club.

Demy

8vo.

Second Edition.
B 2

\2.s.

GENERAL CATALOGUE.

20

The subjects treated are: l. Tenure of Land in Ireland ; 2. Land


Laws of England ; 3. Tenure of Land in India ; 4. Land System of
Belgium and Holland ; 5. Agrarian Legislation of Prussia during the
Present Century;

6.

Legislation of 1861 ;

Land System of France ; 7. Russian Agrariati


Farm Land and Land Laws of the United

8.

States.

Tacitus.

THE
By A.

English.

With

Map and

HISTORY OF TACITUS,
J.

Church, M.A. and W.

Notes.

Svo.

J.

translated

into

Brodribe, M.A.

lOs. 6d.

The translators have endeavoured to adhere as closely to the original as


was thought consistent with a proper observance of English idiom. At
the same time it has been their aim to reproduce the precise expressioiis oj
This work is characterised by the Spectator as " a scholarly
the author.

and faithful

translation.

"

THE AGRICOLA AND GERMANIA.


A.

J.

Church, M.A. and W.

and Notes.
The

Extra

readers

With Maps

6d.

have sought to produce such a version as may satisfy


who demand a faithful rendering of the original, and English
who are oftended by the baldness and frigidity which commonly

The

disfigure translations.

this

2s.

translato7-s

scholars

notes,

fcap. Svo.

Translated into English by

Brodribb, M.A.

J.

maps,

and a

work that

it is

treatises

chronological

are accompanied by introductions,

summary.

" a version at once readable

perused with pleasure by

all,

The Athenseum says of


exact, which may be

and

and consulted with advantage by

the classical

student.''''

Taylor (Rev.

Isaac).

WORDS

and PLACES

or

Etymological Illustrations of History, Etymology, and Geography.

By
\2.s.

"

the Rev.

Isaac Taylor.

Second Edition.

Crown

Svo.

6d.

Mr. Taylor has produced a

alone in our language."

really useful book,

Saturday

Review.

and

one which stands

HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY,

TRAVELS.

21

Trench (Archbishop). gustavus adolphus


By

Aspects of the Thirty Years' War.

D. D.

Archbishop of Dublin.

" Clear and lucid in

whom

the subject

Trench (Mrs.
of the late

style, these lectures

unfamiliar."

is

Fcap. 8vo

R.).

Dublin

Edited by

Trench
sidered.

Being Selections from


and Cheaper Issue,

New

illustrating the social life of the period

miscellatieous pieces by

(1799

Historically,

1827).

It includes also

Mrs. Tmich.

(Capt. F., F.R.G.S.).


By

THE

RUSSO-INDIAN

and

Strategically,

" The Russo-Indian, or Central Asian


reasons been attracting

much public

questioji

con-

Politically

Trench, F.R.G.S. With a Sketch


and Map of Central Asia. Crown Svo.

Capt.

Asiatic Politics

to

6j.

and anecdotes

QUESTION,

many

Archbishop Trench. Remains

extending over a quarter of a century


poems and other

2s. 6d.

will be a treasure to

her Journals, Letters, and other Papers.


with Portrait, 8vo.

Social

Evening Mail.

RICHARD TRENCH.

Mrs.

Contains notices

Chenevix Trench,

R.

of Central
7^-.

(yd.

has for several obvious

attention in Englatid, in Russia,

also on the Continent, within the last

year or two.

and

I have thought

that the present volume, giving a short sketch of the history of this question

from

its earliest

and condensing much of the most recent and inteand on its collateral phases, might
Author's
to those who take an interest in it."

origin,

resting information on the subject,

perhaps be acceptable

Preface.

Trevelyan (G.O., M.P.).


Plan.
petition

"

l7t this

CAWNPORE.

By G. O. Trevelyan, M.P., Author


Wallah." Second Edition. Crown Svo.
book

feelings are not

we are not spared one


harrowed by

fact

the recital of

good for us at home that we have one mho

Mr. Trevelyan."

Pall Mall Gazette.

illustrated with

of

"The Com-

6^-.

of the sad story ; but our


imaginary outrages. It is

tells

his tale so well as does

GENERAL CATALOGUE.

22

Trevelyan (G.O., M.P.)

[continuea)

THE COMPETITION WALLAH. New Edition.


" The

Crown

8vo.

6j.

earlier letters are especially interesting for their racy descriptions

of European

lije

Those that follow are of more serious


Hindoo character and English

in India

import, seeking to tell the truth about the


influences,

good and bad, upon

it,

as well as to suggest some better course of

treatment than that hitherto adopted." EXAMltiER.

Vaughan

(late

Quarterly).

Rev. Dr. Robert, of the British


MEMOIR OF ROBERT A. VAUGHAN.

Author of "Hours with the Mystics." By Robert Vaughan,


D.D. .Second Edition, revised and enlarged. Extra fcap. 8vo. $s.
" It deserves a place on the same shelf with Stanley's

and CarlyWs

'Stirling^

'

Life of Arnold,''

Dr. Vaughan has performed his painful but

not all unpleasing task with exquisite good taste

and feeling."

NONCON-

FORMIST.

Wagner. MEMOIR OF THE

REV.

GEORGE WAGNER,

Incumbent of St. Stephen's Church, Brighton. By the


Rev. J. N. SiMPKiNSON, M.A. Third and Cheaper Edition, cor^s.
rected and abridged,

M. A.,

"

late

more edifying biography we

ha^'e rarely

met with.'"

LITERARY

Churchman.

Wallace.

THE

MALAY ARCHIPELAGO:

Land

the

of the

A Narrative of Travel
Orang Utan and the Bird of Paradise.
with Studies of Man and Nature. By Alfred Russel Wallace.
Second Edition. Two vols, crown
With Maps and Illustrations.
8vo.

"A

24J.

carefully

our readers

to

and

do as

-Jiif

composed narrative.
have done, read his book through."

deliberately

We

Times.

advise

HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY,

&-

TRAVEIS.

23

(Professor). THE HOUSE OF AUSTRIA IN THE


Two Lectures, vith Notes and Illustrations.
By Adolphus W. Ward, M.A., Professor of History

Ward

THIRTY YEARS' WAR.


Owens

in

College, Manchester.

Extra

fcap. 8vo.

2s. bJ.

" Very compact and instructive:' YOKTlKlcnT-Ly Review.

Warren. AN ESSAY ON GREEK FEDERAL COINAGE.


By

the

Hon.

J.

Leicester Warren, M.A.

8vo.

2s. dJ.

" The present essay is an aUenipt to illustrate Mr. Freeman's Fedei-al


Government by evidence deduced from the coinage of the times and countries
Preface.
therein treated of"'

Wilson. A MEMOIR OF GEORGE WILSON,


"

M. D.,

F.R.S.E.,

Regius Professor of Technology in the University of

Edinburgh.

By his Sister. New Edition. Crown 8vo. 6.f.


and touching portrait of a rare and beautiful spirit.'"

An

exquisite

Guardian.

Wilson

(Daniel,

OF SCOTLAND.

LL.D.). PREHISTORIC ANNALS


By Daniel Wilson, LL.D.,

History and English Literature


New Edition, with numerous
8vo.

Professor of

University College, Toronto.

in

Illustrations.

Two

vols,

demy

36J.

This elaborate

and

learned work

is

divided into four Parts.

Part

I.

Aboriginal Traces, Sepulchral

The Primeval or Stone Period


&rc. Ss^c.
Memorials, Dwellings, and Catacombs, Temples, Weapons,
Transition, Primitive
Metallurgic
The
Period
Bronze
The
Part IL,
Habits, with
Bronze, Personal Ornaments, Religion, Arts, and Doviestic
Introduction
The
of Iron, The
other topics; i'ar/ ///., The Iron Period
Period
Christian
The
IV.,
Part
&^c.;
Strongholds, ^-c.
deals with

'

Roman

Invasion,

Historical

Data,

Ecclesiology,

the

Norriis

Ecclesiastical

and

Law

Relics,

Primitive

Miscellaneous Antiquities.

furnished with an elaborate Index.

and Medmval
Th. work

is

GENERAL CATALOGUE.

24

Wilson

(Daniel,

LL.D.)

PREHISTORIC MAN.
with numerous

New

Illustrations.

{continued)

Edition, revised and partly re-written,

One

vol. 8vo.

21^-.

This work, which carries out the priticiple of the preceding one, but with
scope, aims to " view Alan, as far as possible, unaffected by those

a wider

modifying influences tvhich accompany the development of ttations and the


maturity of a true historic period, in order thereby to ascertain the sources
from whence such development and maturity proceed." It contains, for
example, chapters on the Pri??ieval Transition ; Speech

Mound-Builders ; Primitive Architecture ;


Blood of the West, &'c. &^c.

CHATTERTON

the

Biographical Study.

Crown

8vo.

6.s'.

the

Red

By Daniel Wilson,

LL.D., Professor of History and English Literature


College, Toronto.

Metals ; the

American Type;

in University

6d.

Poet, not as a " mere resetter


Reviewed in this light, he has
capable of being turned to nnu accoimt

The Author ha'e regards Chatterton as a

and

defacer of stolen literary treastires. "

found much in

and

to these

make

the old 7naterials

materials research in various directions has enabled

sotne additions.

him

to

SECTION

II.

POETRY AND BELLES LETTRES.

Allingham. LAURENCE BLOOMFIELD IN IRELAND;


or, the New Landlord.
By William Allingham. New and
Cheaper

Issue, with a Preface.

Fcap. 8vo.

In the new Preface, the state of Ireland, with


Church measure, is discussed.
''''

It

is

vital 'lUith the national character.

and GoldsmitK s
AXHENiEUM.

point

simplicity,

Arnold (Matthew).
Two vols.

touched

to

POEMS.

Extra fcap. 8vo. cloth.

cloth, 4s. 6d.

special reference to the

It has something of Popi


a more modern issue."

By Matthew Arnold.
2^.

Also sold separately

at 6^.

Poems; Volume

Dra-

each.

Volume
matic

and

I.

contains Narrative

Lyric Poems.

The

and

Elegiac

tivo

volumes ccnnprehend the First

Second Series of the Poems, and the

NEW

POEMS.

Extra fcap. 8vo.

New
6j-.

II.

and

Poems.
6d.

In this volume will befound " Empedocles on Etna ; " " Thyrsis " (writteti
in commemoration of the late Professor Clough) ; " Epilogue to Lessing's
All these
Laocoon ;" '^ Heine's Grave;'" ^' Obermami once more."
poems are also included iu the Edition {two vols. above-mentioned.
)

GENERAL CATALOGUE.
Arnold (Matthew) (continued)
ESSAYS IN CRITICISM. New Edition,
fcap. 8vo.

with Additions.

Extra

6s.

Contents
Preface ; The Function of Criticism at the present time ;
The Literary Infltience of Academies ; Maurice de Cuerin ; Eugenie
de Cuerin ; Heinrich Jr/eine ; Pagan and Jlfcdicrz'al Religious Sentiment
:

fouhert

Spinoza

and the

Bible

Alarcus Atirelius.

ASPROMONTE, AND OTHER POEMS.


extra.

Contents

"Uncommon
Churchman.

Poems for
lyrical

Italy

8vo.

cloth

Dramatic Lyrics ; Miscellaneous.

pcwer and

Barnes (Rev. W.).

MON

Fcap.

4j. 6d.

deep poetic feeling.'"

POEMS OF

ENGLISH.

By

the

Rev.

Literary

RURAL LIFE

IN COMW. Barnes, Author of

" Poems of Rural Life

Fcap. 8vo. 6j-.


in the Dorset Dialect."
" In a high degree pleasant and novel.
The book is by no means one
which the lo-<.'ers of descriptive poetry can afford to lose." Athen^UM.

Bell.
ROMANCES AND MINOR POEMS.
Glassford Bell. Fcap. 8vo. 6.f.
" Full of life and genius." COVRT CIRCULAR.

By Henry

Besant. studies in early french poetry. By


Walter Besant, M.A. Crown. 8vo. 8j. 6d.
A sort of impression rests on most minds that French literature begins
with the " siecle de Louis Quatorze;" any previous literature being for
the most part unknown or ignored.
Few know anything of the enormous
literary activity that began in the thirteenth century, was carried on by

Marie de France, Caston de Foix, Thibaidt de Champagne,


; was fostered by Charles of Orleans, by Margaret of Valois,
by Francis the First ; that gave a crowd of versifiers to France, enriched,
strengthened, developed, and fixed the French language, and prepared the
The present work aims to offcrd
way for Corneille and for Racine.
Rttlebcuf

and

Lorris

POETRY
and

information

S-

BELLES LETTRES.

direction touching the early efforts of

rj

France in poetical

literattire.

In one moderately
very

best,

sized

if not to all

of

volume he has contrived

the early French foetsy

to

introduce us

Athen^^UM.

to the

Bradshaw. AN ATTEMPT TO ASCERTAIN THE STATE


OF CHAUCER'S WORKS, AS THEY WERE LEFT AT
HIS DEATH. With some
By Henry Bradshaw, of

Notes of

their

Subsequent History.

King's College, and the

Library, Cambridge.

University

[/ the Press.

Brimley. ESSAYS BY THE LATE GEORGE BRIMLEY,


M.A.

Edited by the Rev.

Cheaper Edition.
Essays on literary

topics,

Stirling,^'

Spectator,

and like periodicals.

Poem.

the Greek legend of Daitae

Extra fcap.

8vo.

Portrait.

from

Carlyle's

Fraser, the

Dramatic

Fcap. 8vo.

5j.

Perseus.

Mr. Broome's

many passages.'"

Cura A.

characteristics

AtheN/EUM.

TENNYSONIAN^,

HOR.E
J.).
Tennysono Latine redditas.
(A.

With

'''Poems,'''

reprinted

SERIPHOS.

and

oj expressiott are

these qualities are displayed in

Sr'c.,

By Fkederick Napier Broome.

" Grace and beauty

Church

Tennyson

such as

THE STRANGER OF

Fotmded on

and

Clark, M.A.

G.

3^. dd.

"Bleak House,"

"Life of

Broome.

W.

Fcap. 8vo.

J.

Sive

Eclogs

Church, A.M.

6^-.

Latin versions of Selections from Tennyson. Among the authors are


the Editor, the late Professor Co7iington, Professor Seeley, Dr. Hesse)',

Mr.

Kehbel,

and

other gentlemen.

GENERAL CATALOGUE.
Clough (Arthur Hugh). the POEMS AND PROSE
REMAINS OF ARTHUR HUGH CLOUGH. With a
Selection from his Letters and a Memoir.

With

Two

Portrait.

crown

vols,

Edited by his Wife.

2U.

8vo.

Or Poems

sepa-

below.

rately, as

late Professor Clough is -well known as a graceful, tender poet,


The letters possess high
as the scholarly translator of Plutarch.
discussing, as they do, the
inte>-esi, not biographical only, but literary

The

and

The
most important questions of the time, ahvays in a genial spirit.
^^ Remains" inclitde papers on " Retrenchment at Oxford;" on Professor
F. W. Neivman's book " The Soul ;" o>i IVordsiujrth ; on the Formation
of Classical English ; on some Modern Poems [Matthew Arnold and the
late Alexander Sinith), &^c. &^c.

THE POEMS OF ARTHUR HUGH CLOUGH,


of Oriel College, Oxford.

Second Edition.
"

From

vative

the higher

England, in

sometime Fellow
With a Memoir by F. T. Palgrave.

Fcap. 8vo.

6s.

mind of cultivated,

this

all-questioning, but still conser-

our puzzled generation, we do not know of any

utterance in literature so chai-acteristic as the

Clough."

Eraser's

poems of

A}-thtir

Hugh

Magazine.

Dante. DANTE'S comedy, the hell.


W. M. RossETTi. Fcap. 8vo. cloth.

Translated by

5j-.

" The aim of this translation of Dante

may

be

summed up

in one

word

Literality.
line for
To follow Dante sentence for
has been my strenuous endeavour. "
wordfor word neither more nor
Author's Preface.
.

sentence,

line,

less

De

Vere.

THE

INFANT BRIDAL,

and other Poems.

By

Aubrey De Vere. Fcap. 8vo. 7.f. 6d.


" Afr. De Vere has taken his place among the poets of the day. Pure
and tender feeling, and that polished restraint of style which is called
classical,

are the charms of the volume"

SPECTATOR.

POETRY
Doyle

(Sir F. H.).

BELLES LETTRES.

&^

Works by

Sir

29

Francis Hastings Doyle,

Professor of Poetry in the University of Oxford

THE RETURN OF THE GUARDS, AND OTHER POEMS.


Fcap. 8vo.

7^-.

" Good wine needs no bush, nor good verse a preface ;


Doyle's verses

run bright and

clear,

and smack

and Sir Francis

oj a classic vintage.

His chief characteristic, as it is his greatest charm, is the simple manliness


which gives force to all he turites. It is a characteristic in these days rare
enough.'"

Examiner.

LECTURES ON POETRY,
Oxford

in

868.

Crown

8vo.

delivered before

the University

of

3^. 61/.

Three Lectures : (i) Inaugural ;


"Dream of Gero7itius."

(2)

Provincial Poetry;

(3)

Dr.

Ne2mnan''s

"Full of thoughtful discrimination and fine insight:


'

Proviiuial Poetry'' seems

Spectator.

to

us singularly

true, eloquent,

the lecture

on

and instructive."

BROTHER FABIAN'S MANUSCRIPT, AND


OTHER POEMS. By Sebastian Evans. Fcap. 8vo. cloth.

Evans.
6s.

" In this volume


faculty

divine.''

Furnivall.

we have full assurance that he has the vision and


Clr^jer and full of kindly humourP G'LQ'R'E..
'

LE MORTE

M.S. 2252,

the

D' ARTHUR. Edited trom the Harleian

Museum. By F. J. Furnivall, M.A.


Herbert Coleridge. Fcap. 8vo. 'js.dd.

in the British

With Essay by

the late

Looking to the interest shown by so many thousands in Mr. TennysojCs


Arthurian poems, the editor and publishers have thoicght that the old
It is a reprint of the celebrated
version would possess cotisiderable interest.
Harleian copy ; and is accompanied by index and glossary.

30

GENERAL CATALOGUE.

Garnett. IDYLLS AND EPIGRAMS.


By Richard Garnett.

Anthology.

"A

charming

For English
will open a new world of thougJitP

lations

little

book.

GUESSES AT TRUTH.
Title,

and Frontispiece.

Two

By

Chiefly from the Greek

Fcap. Svo.

readers,

Mr.

2j. dd.

Gariuti's transla-

Westminster Review.
Brothers.

New Edition,

With

with Memoir.

Vignette,

Fcap. Svo.

6j-.

" The followittg year was jnemorable for tJie commencevunt of the
He and his Oxford brother, living as they did in
constant and free interchange of tho tght on questions of philosophy and
*

Guesses at Truth.

literature

which

is

and

the

'

art ; delighting, each of them, in the epigraminatic terseness

charm of the Pensees of Pascal, and


'

Briiyere agreed

to utter

'

anonymously, in two volumes, in 1827."

Hamerton.

a painter's camp.

Hamerton.

Book
This

is

I.

Second Edition,

In England;

the story

the

and
Memoir.

themselves in this form,

of an

Book

II.

Artist''s

revised.

'

Caratt^res

'

of La

the book appeared,

By Philip Gilbert
Extra fcap. Svo.

6s.

/ Scotland; Book III. In France.


encampments and adventures.
The

headings of a feiu chapters may serve to convey a notion of tJie character


of the book: A Walk on the Laneashire Moors; tht Author his own
Housekeeper and Cook ; Tents and Boats for the Highlands ; The Author
encamps on an tmi/tkaiited Isla?td ; A Lake Voyage; A Gipsy Jourtiey
to Glen Coe ; Concerning Moonlight and Old Castles; A little French
City ;

A Farm

in the Autiiiwis, ^'c. &^c.

" His pages sparkle with happy tttrns op


anecdotes, and many observatiojis which are
wise reflection on the complicated

unconscious

nature.^''

expression, not a few well-told


the fruit of attentive study

phenomena of human

Westminster Review.

etching and ETCHERS. A

life,

and

as well as oj

Treatise Critical and Practical.


G. Hamerton. With Original Plates by Rembrandt,
Callot, Dujardin, Paul Potter, &c
Royal Svo.
Half

By

P.

morocco.

31^-.

6d.

POETRY
"

It

It

sibility

have been the author^

Helps.

ness,

8vo.

By Arthur Helps.

Edition.
,

and above

fancy,

man

of a

Herschel.

all, so

or

much

wise ki?idliness, that

woman who

By

Sir

John Herschel,

Translated into English


Bart.

is

admirable,

the

not only for

Void

By OuTis.
The main

8vo.

object

iSj-.

question of Homeric

discussed in the Preface.

is fully

mail! s tribute to Genius."

HIATUS

8vo.

The

version of the Iliad in English Hexameters.

translation

we should think

likes the book."

the ILIAD of homer.

Hexameters.

"It

Cheap

bs.

says:

all the better

work, by the Author of "'Friends in Countil," the Saturday


" Underneath the form [that of dialogtie) is so much shrewd-

this

Review

31

SATURDAY Review.

REALMAH.

Crown

Of

BELLES LETTRES.

a -work of wkicJi aiilhor, prinlcr, and publisher may alike feel


is a work, too, of tvhich none but a genuine artist could by pos-

is

proud.

&^

in

many

Illustrated

intrinsic merits, but as a grea

London News.

Modern Education.
8j-.

Its

Cause and Antidote.

6d.

of this Essay is to point out hoiu the emotional element


Fine Arts is disregarded and undeveloped at this time

zvhich underlies the


so

far as

{despite

a pretence at filling

it

up)

to constitute

an Educational

Hiatus.

HYMNI ECCLESI^. &^


Kennedy.

"A

Theological Section."

LEGENDARY

CELTS.
8vo.

"

FICTIONS

Collected and Narrated by

With Two

Illustrations.

7^'.

OF THE IRISH

Patrick Kennedy.

Crown

dd.

very admirable popular selection of the Irish fairy stories and legends,
who are familiar with Mr. Crokers, and other selections

in zvhich those

of the same kind, will find tnuch that is fresh, and full of ike peculiar
and humour, and sometimes nen of the ideal beauty, of the true

vivacity
Celtic

Legend^

Spectator.

GENERAL CATALOGUE.

32

"Historic Section," "Works


OF Fiction," and "Philosophy;" also "Juvenile Books,"
a(/" Theology."

Kingsley (Canon).

THE

See also

SAINTS' TRAGEDY or, The True Storj' of


By the Rev. Charles Kingsley. With
:

Hungary.

the Rev. F. D.

Maurice.

Third Edition.

ANDROMEDA, AND OTHER POEMS.


8vo.

Elizabeth of

a Preface by

Fcap. 8vo.

Third Edition.

55.

Fcap.

5j.

PHAETHON

or,

Crown

Edition.

Loose Thoughts
8vo.

Loose Thinkers.

for

is.

"Works of
(Professor). AMONG MY

Kingsley (Henry).

Lowell

See

Fiction."

BOOKS.

By James Russell Lowell, M.A., Professor


Crown 8vo. "js. 6d.
in Harvard College.
Six Essays: Biydeu

Two

England

Witchcraft;

Centuries

Third

ago;

Six Essays.

of Belles Lettres

Once More ; New


Rousseau and the Senti-

Shakespeare

Lessing

mentalists.

UNDER THE WILLOWS, AND OTHER POEMS.


Russell Lowell.

" Under
short as it
ration^''

the Willows

is

Saturday

one of the most admirable bits of idyllic workj


it is short, that have been done in our getie-

Review.

(Professor).

CRITICAL.

ESSAYS,

Chiefly on
LL.D., Professor of Rhetoric
8vo.

By James

ds.

or perhaps because

is,

Masson

Fcap. 8vo.

I2J-.

BIOGRAPHICAL AND

the British Poets.


in the

By David Masson,

University of Edinburgh.

i)d.

" Distinguished by a remarkable power of

analysis,

a clear statement

of the actual facts on ivhich speculation is based, and an appropriate


beauty of Language.
These essays should be popndar uith serious men.''''

Athen^um.

POETRY
Masson

belles LETTRES.

Sh-

(Professor)

{continued)

AND THEIR STYLES.

BRITISH NOVELISTS

33

Being a Critical

Crown

Sketch of the History of British Prose Fiction.

8vo.

" Valuable for its lucid analysis of fiindamcJital principles,


of vie7v, and sustained animation of style" SPECTATOR.

its

Is.

6d.

breadth

MRS. JERNINGHAM'S JOURNAL.

Extra fcap. 8vo.

y.

6d.

of the boudoir or domestic class, purporting to be the journal

Poem

of a newly-married lady.

" One
tion,

the

is

quality in the piece, sufficient

that

it is

manner of its

Mistral
lated

" This
terms

to

sweetness

Myers

conception

(F.).

MIRELLE:

is

is

claim a moment's atten-

not too strong a

in

word

Pall Mall Gazette.

a Pastoral Epic of Provence.

Extra fcap. 8vo.

Trans-

6j-.

a capital translation of the elegant and richly -coloured pastoral

of M. Mistral which, in 1859, he dedicated in enthusiastic


It would be hard to overpraise the
Lamartine.

and pleasing freshness of

(Ernest).

Extra fcap. Svo.

" //

itself to

o_f

indeed,

and execution."

by H. Crichton.

is

epic poet/i

original,

tmique

not too

and showing
expression."

much

THE

cloth,

zs.

to call it

this

charming

puritans.

epic."

AtheNjEUM.

By Ernest Myers.

6d.

a really grand poem,

stately

and dignified,

not only a high poetic mind, but also gi'eat power over poetic

Literary

Churchman.

W.

H.). ST. PAUL. A Poem. By F. W. H.


(F.
Myers. Second Edition. Extra fcap. Svo. is. 6d.
tuith a singular
^^ It breathes throughout the spirit of St'. Paul, and
stately melody of z-^r^^." Fortnightly Review.

Myers

Nettleship.

POETRY.

essays
By John

on

ROBERT

T. Nettleship.

BROWNING'S

Extra fcap. Svo.

ks. 6d.

GENERAL CATALOGUE.

34

Noel. BEATRICE, AND


RoDEN Noel. Fcap. Svo.
"

Beatrice

is

OTHER POEMS.

By

the

Hon.

ds.

in tnaiiy respects a Jioble

poem;

it

displays a splendour

of landscape painting, a strong definite precision of liigltlv-coloured description, which has not often been surpassed.''''
Pall Mall Gazette.

Norton.

THE

LADY OF LA GARAYE.

Norton.

With Vignette and

P'cap. Svo.

4^. 6d.

" The)-e

much

is

and may

THE

Orwell
TIMES.

the

Hon. Mrs.
Edition.

Si.xth

no Icuk of vigour, no faltering of poiuer, plenty of passion,


much musical verse.
Full of thoughts well-

bright description,

expressed,

By

Frontispiece.

be classed

among her

best

BISHOP'S ^VALK

Poems on

Times.

AND THE

BISHOP'S

days of Archbishop Leighton and the

tlie

By Orwell.

Scottish Covenant.

works."

Fcap. Svo.

5^.

" Pure taste andfaidtless precision of language, the fruits oj deep thought,
human nature, and lively sympathy.'" NONCONFORMIST.

insight into

Palgrave (Francis

T.).

ESSAYS ON ART.

Turner Palgrave, M.A.,


Oxford.

Extra fcap. Svo.

DyceHolman

Mulready

sationalism in

Art

late

Fellow of

By Francis

Exeter

College,

6^-.

HerbertPoetry, Prose,

Hunt

Sculpture in England The Albert

and

Sen-

Cross, &^c.

SHAKESPEARE'S SONNETS AND SONGS.


Palgrave.

Gem

Edition.

Edited by F. T.
With Vignette Title by Jeens. y. 6d.

" For minute elegance no volume could


Edition.'
Scotsman.

possibly

excel

the

'

Gem

POETRY
Patmore.

&^

WELLES LETTRES.

Works by Coventry

THE ANGEL

IN

Patmore

35

THE HOUSE.

The Betrothal; Book II. The Espousals ;


Tvo
With Tamerton Church Tower.
Faithful for Ever.

Book

I.

BOOK
vols.

III.

Tcap.

I2S.

Zvo.

*/ A New and Cheap


toned paper, price

Edition in one vol. \%mo., beautifully printed on

2J. 6(/.

THE VICTORIES OF LOVE.


The

Fcap. Svo.

45-.

6</.

poem will secure it a permanent place in


Mr. Patmore has fully earned a place in the catalogue

intrinsic merit of his

literature.

of poets by the finished idealization

of domestic

life.''''

SATURDAY

Review.

Rossetti.

Works by Christina Rossetti

GOBLIN MARKET, AND OTHER POEMS.


by D. G. Rossetti.
"She handles her

Second

little i7iarziel

Edition.

With two Designs

Fcap. Svo.

5J-.

with that rare poetic discrimination which

of its simple wonders by pushing symbolism too far, nor


In fact
keeps those wonders in the merely fabidous and capricious stage.
to
delightful
more
which
is
far
she has produced a true children's poem,
all.'"
to
delightful
would
be
though
it
children,
to
the mature than
neither exhausts

it

Spectator.

THE

PRINCE'S PROGRESS,

AND OTHER POEMS.

two Designs by D. G. Rossetti.

Fcap. Svo.

" Miss Rossetti' s poems are of the kind which

With

ds.

recalls Shelley's definition

the best and


of Poetry as the record of the best and happiest moments of
They are like the piping of a bird on the spray in
.
happiest tnifids.
zvhen
the sunshine, or the quaint singing with which a child amuses itself
.

it forgets

that anybody

is

listening." Satvrtiay

Review.

GENERAL CATALOGUE.

36

(W.

Rossetti

FINE ART,
Crown

M.).

chiefly

8vo.

dante's hell,

^-^-.f

"Dante."

By William M. Rossetti.

Contemporary.

\os. 6d.

This volume consists of Criticism on Contemporary Art, reprintedfrom


The Saturday Review, The Pall MaU Gazette, and other pub-

Eraser,

lications.

Roby.

STORY OF A HOUSEHOLD, AND OTHER POEMS.

By Mary K. Roby.

Fcap. 8vo.

5j-.

Shairp (Principal). KILMAHOE,


'
'

Kilmahoe

is

a Highland Pastoral,

Smith.

'with

Works by Alexander Smith


Fcap. 8vo.

warm

5^-.

soft air

remarkable gra^e

of

andpic-

A LIFE DRAMA, AND OTHER POEMS.


CITY POEMS.

Fcap. 8vo.

redolent of the

and Moors, sketched out


Saturday Review.

the Western Lochs


turesquenessj'^

a Highland Pastoral, with

By John Campbell Shairp.

other Poems.

Fcap. 8vo.

zs. 6d.

5^.

EDWIN OF DEIRA. Second Edition. Fcap. 8vo.


"A poem which is marked by the strength, sustained

S^.

sweetness,

and

compact texture of real life." i^ioKTn British Review.

Smith.

POEMS.

By Catherine Barnard Smith.

Fcap.

8vo. 5j.

" Wealthv
which

is

infecting, meaning, finish,

and grace ;

suppressed, bui the keener for that."

Smith (Rev. Walter).


CHRISTIAN
Fp.ap. S\o.

6^-.

LIFE.

not without passion,

Athen^UM.

HYMNS OF CHRIST AND THE

By

the Rev.

Walter

C.

Smith, M.A.

POETRY &= BELLES LETTRES.

37

" These are among the nveetest sacred poems tve have read for a hm^
With no profuse imagery, expressing a range of feeling and
expression by no means uncommon, they are true and eleinted, and their
timt.

pathos

is

profound and simple^

Nonconformist.

Stratford de Redcliffe (Viscount). SHADOWS OF


THE PAST, in Verse. By Viscount Stratford de RedCrown

cliffe.

" The

8vo.

who has acted vigorotisly.


and poet." Guardian.

vigorous words of one

the fen'our of politician

Trench.

Works

Dublin.

ot

\os. 6d.

POEMS.

by R. Chenevix Trench, D.D., Archbishop


" Philosophy," "Theology," &c.

See also Sections

Collected and arranged anew.

ELEGIAC POEMS.

Fcap. 8vo.

Third Edition.

Fcap. 8vo.

CALDERON'S LIFE'S A DREAM


World.

They coiuhiue

With an Essay on

his

"js.

6d.

2s. bd.

The Great Theatre

Life and Genius.

of the

Fcap. Svo.

4^. dd.

HOUSEHOLD BOOK OF ENGLISH POETRY.


arranged, with Notes, by R. C.

Extra fcap. Svo.

Dublin.

This volume
it is

is

called

confidently plactd in the

there

of

5^. dd.

a " Household Book,'''' by

that

book for all

Selected and

Trench, D.D., Archbishop

is

nothing in

this

it to

name implying that


it from being

prez'ent

hands of every member of

the household.

Speci-

tnens of all classes of poetry are given, including selections from living
The Editor has aimed to produce a book '^ which the emigrant,
authors.
fitiding

room for

in his trunk,
shelves

and

little

not absolutely 7iecessary, might yet find room for

the traveller in his knapsack,

where there are few books

" The Archbishop has


gift

this

might

and

that on some

narrow

be one."

confei-red in this delightful volume an important


Pall
on the whole English-speaking population of the world.

Mall Gazette.

GENERAL CATALOGUE.

38

Trench (Archbishop)

{continued)

SACRED LATIN POETRY,


for Use.

Selected and arranged

Chiefly Lyrical.

Second Edition, Corrected and Improved.

Fcap. 8vo.

is.

" The aim of the present volume is to offer to members of our English
Church a collection of the best sacred Latin poetry, such as they shall be
able entirely and heartily to accept andapproiie a collection, that is, in which

and to have the current of


coming upon that which, however beautifrd as
i?i which, too,
poetry, out of higher respects they must reject and ccnde?nn
they shall not fear that sjtares are being laid for them, to entangle them
they shall not be enermore liable to be offended,
their sympathies checked, by

unawares in admiration for ought 7vhich

and

fealty to their otun spiritual mother.

Turner.

SONNETS.

Turner.
8vo.

By

Dedicated to his

the

is i7iconsistent

Preface.
Rev.

brotlier,

with their faith

Charles

Tennyson

the Poet Laureate.

Fcap.

4J. 6d.

" The Sonnets are dedicated

to

Mr. Tennyson by

his brother,

and

have,

They both love to


independently of their merits, an interest of association.
write in simple expressive Saxon ; both love to touch their imagery in
than in formal similes ; both have a delicate perception
of rhythmical movement, and thus Air. Turner has occasional lines which,
He knows the
for phrase and music, might be ascribed to his brother.
haunts of the wild rose, the shady nooks where light quivers through the
Athen.EUM.
leaves, the ruralities, in short, of the land of imagination."
epithets rather

SMALL TABLEAUX.

Fcap. 8vo.

d^.

U.

" These brief poems have not only a pecidiar kind of interest for the
student of English poetry, but are intrinsically delightful, and will reward
a careful a7id frequent perusal. Full of naivete, piety, love, and knviuledge

of natural

objects,

and

each expressing a single

and

generally a simple

means of minute and original pictorial touches,


have a place of their own." Pall Mall Gazette.

subject by

these sonnets

Vittoria Colonna. LIFE


Crown

ROSCOE.

Svo.

AND POEMS.

By Mrs. Henry

gs.

of Vittoria Colonna, the celebrated Marckesa di Pescara, has


from any English writer, thotigh in every
history of Italy her name is mentioned with great honour among the poets
of the sixteenth century. "In three hundred and fifty years," says her
biographer, Visconti, "there has been no other Italian lady who can be

The

life

received but cursory notice

compared to
''It

is

her.

written with good

taste,

occasionally with a real freshness

with quick

and

and

intelligent

chd)-m 0/ style."

sympathy,

Pall

Mall

Gazette.

Webster.

Works by Augusta Webster

DRAMATIC STUDIES.
"A

Extra fcap. Svo.

volume as strongly marked by

5^.

perfect taste as by poetic power.

''^

Nonconformist.

PROMETHEUS BOUND OF ^SCHYLUS.


into English Verse.

" Closeness

Extra fcap. Svo.

and simplicity combined with

MEDEA OF

EURIPIDES.

Extra fcap. Svo.

3^.

Literally translated

3^. dd.

literary skill."

Athen^UM.

Literally translated into English Verse.

6a'.

" Airs. Webster s translation surpasses our utmost expectations.


photograph of the original without any of that harshness which
accompanies a photograph." \N.&T:umi-\:KK

WOMAN

SOLD,

"Mrs. Webster has

us that she

is

is

Review.

AND OTHER POEMS.


shozvji

It

so often

Cxovra. Svo.

"Js.

6d.

able to drazu admirably from

obsemations
the life; that she can observe with subtlety, arid render her
venture
and
conceptions,
complex
impersonate
can
that
she
;
delicacy
with
into

which few living

ivritcis canfolloio her."

Guardian.

GENERAL CATALOGUE.

40

AA/^ebster

{continued)

PORTRAITS.

Fcap. 8vo.

(yd.

3^-.

JVeister's 'Dramatic Studies'' and 'Translation of Promehave luon for her an honourable place among our female poets.
She writes with ranarkable vigour and dramatic realization, and bids fair
to be the most stucessful claijnant of Mrs. Browning's mantle."
British

'\AIrs.

thetis

'

Quarterly Review.

Woolner.

my BEAUTIFUL LADY.

With a Vignette by Arthur Hughes.


8vo.

" It

is

By Thomas Woolner.
Third Edition.

clearly the

product of no

idle

hour, but a highly-conceived

faithfully-executed task, self-imposed, aiul prompted by that

ing

Fcap.

Sj.

to utter

great thoughts,

poetic genius.

No man

and a

can read

and

inward yearn-

wealth of pcLssimiate feeling which is


poem without being struck by the

this

and fnish of the workmanship, so to speak, as well as by the chasand iinpreteiuiing loftiness of thought which pervades the whole''
Globe.

fitness

tened

WORDS FROM THE


Sunlight."
cloth

gilt.

POETS.

Selected by the Editor of " Rays of

With a Vignette and


zs. 6d.

Frontispiece.

Cheaper Edition, i8mo. limp.,

i8mo.
is.

Extra

GLOBE EDITIONS.
Under

the

issuing

a uniform

title

GLOBE EDITIONS,

carefully edited,

secure

whom

constitute

and

English

at a small cost.

indisputable

The

enough

guarantee

as

plied

The

and

the

elucidating

philological points, have

been sup-

and, to the older Authors, glossaries are appended.

series

Literature

is

especially adapted to Students of our national

while the small price places good editions of

certain books, hitherto

reach of

popularly inaccessible, within the

all.

Shakespeare.

the complete works of william

SHAKESPEARE.
Wright.

"A

to

to

been taken

greatest care has

ensure accuracy of text; adequate notes,

historical, literary,

Authors,

The names of

they have been fortunate

an

character of the Series.


to

the Publishers are

and elegantly printed on toned

clearly

paper, strongly bound,


the Editors

of Standard

Series

G. Clark and W. Aldis


Globe 8vo. y. bd.

W.

Edited by

Ninety-first Thousand.

marvel of beauty, cheapness, and compactness.

plays, poems,

and

sonnets

are

page is perfectly clear and readable.


For
for the workiiig Student, the Globe Edition is
.

.Shakespeare books."

The whole works

contained in one small volume

Athen^.UM.

the busy
the best

man, above
of

yet the
all

all existing

GENERAL CATALOGUE.

42

Morte D'Arthur. SIR THOMAS MALORY'S BOOK OF


KING ARTHUR AND OF HIS NOBLE KNIGHTS OF

THE ROUND TABLE.


Globe Svo.

Bart.

" // is

The

3^-.

New

6a'.

Caxton,

Edition of

With an Introduction by SiR

Modern Use.

revised for

Edward Strachey,

Edition.

with the most perfect confidence that we recommeitd this edition of

the old romance to every class of readers."

Scott. THE
SCOTT.

POETICAL
With

Globe Svo.

New

Mall Gazette.

WORKS OF

Biographical

3J. (>d.

Pall

SIR

WALTER

T.

Palgrave.

by F.

Essay,

Edition.

As a popular edition it leaves nothing to be desired. The want of


such an one has long been felt, combining real excellence with cheapness."
^^

Spectator.

THE POETICAL WORKS AND LETTERS OF


ROBERT BURNS. Edited, with Life, by Alexander Smith.

Burns.

Globe Svo.

3J-.

bd.

New

Edition.

" The works of the bard have never


in a single volume.'"

" Admirable in

been offered in snch a complete forni

Glasgow Daily Herald.


Spectator.

all respects."

Robinson Crusoe. THE ADVENTURES OF ROBINSON


CRUSOE.
J.

By Defoe.

Edited, from the Original Edition,

W. Clark, M.A., Fellow

With Introduction by Henry Kingsley.


" The

Globe Edition of Robinson Crusoe

printed after the original

editions,

is

Globe Svo.

a book

to

is

published in admirable style as regards type, paper,

likewise

and genial

an

have and

to keep.

and
and binding. A
Rlr. Henry Kijigsley,

is

is

6d.

3J-.

with the quaint old spelling;

It

well-written

biographical introduction, by

attractive feature of this edition"

by

Cambridge.

of Trinity College,

Morning

Star.

Goldsmith. GOLDSMITH'S MISCELLANEOUS WORKS.


With Biographical Essay by

Professor

This edition includes the whote of Goldsmitlis

GoldsmitK s
traits

^^

and

life,

liliscellaneoiis

Of the memoir the

the Vicar of Wakefield, Plays, Poems, &'c.

newspaper writes:

Globe 8vo.

iMasson.

Such an admirable compendium of

Works

'acOTSTAAti
the facts of

and minute a

so careful

of his peculiar character,

as

delineation of the mixed


a very ?nodel of a literary

to be

biography."

Pope.

THE POETICAL WORKS OF ALEXANDER POPE.


Memoir and Notes, by

Edited, with
8vo.

" The book

Professor

Ward.

Globe

6</.

3J-.

is

handsome and handy.

the matter of them

is

rich in interest."

The

notes are

many, and

ATHENAEUM.

Spenser.
the COMPLETE WORKS OF
SPENSER. Edited from the Original Editions and

EDMUND
Manuscripts,

by R. Morris, Member of the Council of the Philological Society.


With a Memoir by J. W. Hales, M.A., late Fellow of Christ's
College, Cambridge, Member of the Council of the Philological
Globe 8vo.

Society.

"A

3^. 6d.

and clearly printed

complete

edition

of the 7vhole 7uorks of Spenser,

carefully collated with the originals, with copious glossaiy, worthy

higher praise

it

of the

needs not

beautiful Globe Series.

edited with all the care so noble a poet deserves."

and

The work

Daily News.

is

Dryden.- the POETICAL WORKS OF JOHN DRYDEN.


Memoir, and Notes, by

Edited, with a Revised Text,

Christie.

Glole 8vo.

3^-.

* * Other Standard
*..*

The Volumes

of this Series

and

W.

D.

bd.

Works

may

are in the Press.

also be

calf bindings at very

had

in a variety of

moderate

Prices.

morocco

GOLDEN TREASURY
Uniformly printed

in

SERIES.

i8mo., with Vignette Titles by Sir

Noel Paton, T. Woolner, W. Holman Hunt, J. E.


Engraved on Steel by
MiLLAis, Arthur Hughes, &c.
Jeens.

Bound

in

extra cloth, 4^. dd, each volume.

Also

kept in morocco.
" Messrs. Macmillan have, in

their Golden Treasury Series especially,

</