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THE POLICE POWER

1.Stone v. Mississippi
101 U.S. 814 (1879)
Facts:
In 1867, the Legislature of Mississippi granted a charter to a lottery
company for twenty-five years in consideration of a stipulated sum in
cash, an annual payment of a further sum, and a percentage of receipts
from the sale of tickets. A provision of the constitution adopted in
1868 declares that
"The legislature shall never authorize any lottery, nor shall the sale
of lottery tickets be allowed, nor shall any lottery heretofore
authorized be permitted to be drawn, or tickets therein to be sold."
Issue: Whether or not the charter granted by the Mississipi Legislature
is in conlfict the above provision of the constitution?
Held:
1. That this provision is not in conflict with sec. 10, art. 1, of the
Constitution of the United States, which prohibits a State from "passing
a law impairing the obligation of contracts."
2. That such a charter is in legal effect nothing more than a license to
enjoy the privilege conferred for the time, and on the terms specified,
subject to future legislative or constitutional control or withdrawal.
3. The legislature cannot, by chartering a lottery company, defeat the
will of the people of the state authoritatively expressed, in relation
to the continuance of such business in their midst.
Affirming the judgment, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that it was too
late to contend that public contracts were not within the prohibition
of contractual impairments (p. 816). Instead, the Court held that the
state legislature could not bargain away by contract the inalienable
police power. Admitting difficulty defining the extent of this
reservation the Court concluded that the police power included the
prohibition of a lottery that presented a grave injury to public morals.
The Court further ruled that persons who ran lotteries pursuant to a
state charter had merely a license or privilege, not a contract. Thus,

the effect of Stone was a narrowing, but not an abandonment, of the


application of the clause to public contracts.

2. ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ


Facts:
The Congress of the Philippines enacted the act which nationalizes the retail
trade business, Republic Act No. 1180 entitled An Act to Regulate theRetail
Business, prohibiting aliens in general to engage in retail trade in
ourcountry.Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
residents,corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of
RA No.1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act
isunconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether Congress in enacting R.A. No. 1180 violated the UN Charter, theUN
Declaration of Human Rights and the Philippine-Chinese Treaty of Amity.
Held:
The UN Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rightsand
freedom of their subjects, and the Declaration of Human Rights containsnothing
more than a mere recommendation, or a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Republic of China guarantees equality of treatment to the
Chinese nationals upon the sameterms as the nationals of any other country.
But the nationals of China are notdiscriminated against because nationals of all
other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights
by the Constitution, are allprohibited from engaging in the retail trade.But even
supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty isalways subject
to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, and the samemay never
curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State.

3. BAYAN MUNA VS. ROMULO

Facts:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to
represent the marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now
deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this
case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then
Executive Secretary.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Having a key determinative
bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal
Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most
serious crimes of international concern and shall be complementary to the
national criminal jurisdictions.
These serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under
international law,such as genocide,crimes against humanity, war crimes and
crimes of aggression. On Dec.28,2000, the RP, through Charge d-Affaires
Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which,by its terms, is subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As the filing of the
instant petition, only 92 out of 132 signatory countries appear to have completed
the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is not among
the 92.
Issue:
Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for
contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with
universally recognized principles of international law.
Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.
Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing
immoral obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally
recognized principles of international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the
fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves criminals immune from
responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of
humanity; x x x it precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to
the [ICC] x x x.63
The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners earlier position, which,
as already discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement,
virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty
obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles.

The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the nonsurrender agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an assertion
by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. x x
x The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the countrys
judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly
and judiciously.

4. ERMITA-MALATE and MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOC., INC


Vs
CITY MAYOR OF MANILA

Facts: On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No.
4760 with the following provisions questioned for its violation of due process:
1. refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it
fills out a prescribed form in the lobby in open view;
2. prohibiting admission of less than 18 years old;
3. usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 or 150% and 200%
respectively (tax issue also);
4. making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and
5. cancellation of license for subsequent violation.
The lower court issued preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the case to
SC
on
certiorari.
Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with the due process requirement of the
constitution?
Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices
hurtful to public morals. There is no violation of constitutional due process for
being reasonable and the ordinance enjoys the presumption of constitutionality
absent any irregularity on its face. Taxation may be made to implement a police
power and the amount, object, and instance of taxation is dependent upon the
local legislative body. Judgment of lower court reversed and injunction lifted.

5. LUTZ Vs. ARANETA


Facts: Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as Sugar Adjustment Act
was promulgated in 1940 to stabilize the sugar industry so as to prepare it for
the eventuality of the loss of its preferential position in the United States market
and the imposition of export taxes. Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as
Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks
to recover from the Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P14,666.40 paid by
the estate as taxes, under Sec.3 of the Act, alleging that such tax is
unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support of the sugar
industry exclusively, which in plaintiffs opinion is not a public purpose for which a
tax may be constitutionally levied. The action has been dismissed by the Court of
First Instance.
Issue: Whether or not the tax imposed is constitutional.
Held: Yes. The act is primarily an exercise of the police power. It is shown in the
Act that the tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the
rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry.
It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of
taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that inequalities which result from a
singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation.
The funds raised under the Act should be exclusively spent in aid of the sugar
industry, since it is that very enterprise that is being protected. It may be that
other industries are also in need of similar protection; but the legislature is not
required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of all or none.
6.TIO VS VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD
Facts:
In 1985, Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled An Act Creating the Videogram
Regulatory Board was enacted which gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate
and supervise the videogram industry. The said law sought to minimize the
economic effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate the sale of videograms
as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms
has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry,
and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of
the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs.

In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is unconstitutional


on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is a rider
and is not germane to the subject matter of the law.
2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an
administrative body, because the law allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its
discretion, other government agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the said
PD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tios arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
1. The Constitutional requirement that every bill shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof is sufficiently complied with if the title
be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks
to achieve. In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane to,
and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the
PD, which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in
its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general
subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and
control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not
being tasked to legislate. What was conferred to the VRB was the authority or
discretion to seek assistance in the execution, enforcement, and implementation
of the law. Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the
BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a fixed and limited period with the
deputized agencies concerned being subject to the direction and control of the
[VRB].

7.Association of Small landowners Vs. Secretary of Agrarian


Reform
FACTS: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights
includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The
State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of
farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively

the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of
the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated
in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution
among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners.
In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land
ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of
still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their
payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform
program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for
its (PP131s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of
R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while
considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives
them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception
from the land distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is
comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not
exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7
hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under
R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In
short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they
claim to belong to a different class.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must
be in terms of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different
class exempt from the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has
been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it
must conform to the following requirements:

(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;


(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must
be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The
Association have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a
different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of
other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform
must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of
owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to
elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in
providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and
respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the
detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in
classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in
the courts. However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the
DAR from determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that
amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government even without
judicial intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can determine just
compensation through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial
intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that, the just
compensation determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the
landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an
administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the latter
shall be the final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept
in traditional exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a
revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require billions of
pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash if everything is in
cash, then the government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and
other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.

8. Manila Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Secretary of Department of


Social Welfare and Development

FACTS: On April 23, 1992, RA 7432 was passed into law, granting senior
citizens the following privileges. Petitioners MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC.
AND LA FUNERARIA PAZ-SUCAT, INC assail the constitutionality of Section 4
of Republic Act (RA) No. 7432,3 as amended by RA 9257,4 and the
implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and DOF insofar as
these allow business establishments to claim the 20% discount given to senior
citizens as a tax deduction. Senior Citizens are given 20% discounts on on their
purchases from or use of hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants
and recreation centers, medicine; uneral and burial services.

ISSUES:
A. WHETHER THE PETITION PRESENTS AN ACTUAL CASE OR
CONTROVERSY.
B. WHETHER SECTION 4 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9257 AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS, INSOFAR AS THEY PROVIDE
THAT THE TWENTY PERCENT (20%) DISCOUNT TO SENIOR CITIZENS MAY BE
CLAIMED AS A TAX DEDUCTION BY THE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, ARE
INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

RULING
The Petition lacks merit.
There exists an actual case or controversy. An actual case or controversy exists
when there is "a conflict of legal rights" or "an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution. The Petition must therefore show that "the
governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. In this case, the tax deduction scheme challenged by petitioners
has a direct adverse effect on them. Thus, it cannot be denied that there exists
an actual case or controversy.

The validity of the 20% senior citizen discount and tax deduction scheme under
RA 9257, as an exercise of police power of the State, has already been settled in
Carlos Superdrug Corporation.

9. Carlos Superdrug vs. Department of Social Welfare and


Development

Facts: Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating


drugstores in the Philippines. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section
4(a) of RA 9257, otherwise known as the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.
Section 4(a) of RA 9257 grants twenty percent (20%) discount as privileges for
the Senior Citizens. Petitioner contends that said law is unconstitutional because
it
constitutes
deprivation
of
private
property.
Issue: Whether or not RA 9257 is unconstitutional
Held: Petition is dismissed. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power
which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.
Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential, insistent and the least
limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs. It is the
power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish
all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to
be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the
same.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the
legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because
property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.

10. Jacobson vs. Massachusetts


Facts of the Case
During the early years of the 20th century, Massachusetts witnessed a large
increase in the number of smallpox deaths. In response, many communities
there required vaccinations of their residents to try to stop the spread of the

disease. In 1903, because the plaintiff, Henning Jacobson, believed that the
smallpox vaccination was unsound for his health, he refused to have the
vaccination that the city of Cambridge required of all of its residents. Pursuant to
applicable law of the commonwealth, Jacobson was fined $5 for his refusal to be
inoculated.
Jacobson then unsuccessfully filed suit, as the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts found that the local statute was consistent with the
commonwealths constitution. On further review, Jacobson argued before the
U.S. Supreme Court that the law violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to
liberty, because it took away his right to care for his own body in the way that he
deemed best.

ISSUE
In order to protect public health and safety, does the scope of the state"s police
power include the authority to enact reasonable regulations to do so?

The Courts Ruling


In unanimously upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the Court pointed
out that part of being in a civilization meant giving up some personal freedom in
exchange for belonging to that society. As such, the Courts decision hinged on
the fact that Jacobson would enjoy the fact that he would be protected from
smallpox because his neighbors had been inoculated, while he would not
personally have had to accept the risk that was inherent in the vaccination. The
Court viewed his rejection as an attempt to get a free ride from society.
The Supreme Court next considered whether Jacobsons right to contest the
scientific basis of the vaccinations was legitimate. Although conceding that some
people still doubted the efficacy of the vaccination, the Court determined that the
legislature was within its prerogative in adopting one of many views based on its
own study of the alternatives. The Court thus ruled that commonwealth officials
engaged in a legitimate use of their police power in exercising the right to protect
the public health and safety of citizens. The Court concluded that because local
boards of health determined when mandatory vaccinations were necessary, such
a requirement satisfied the Fourteenth Amendment, because it was neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary. Vaccinations, of the kind at issue in Jacobson, are

still a topic of some discussion and controversy, as occasional lawsuits still


challenge the legitimacy of mandatory vaccinations and inoculations as a
precondition of having children attend school.

11.Us vs Toribio
Facts:
Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be
slaughtered. His request was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit
for work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license.
He was eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one
way or the other argued that the law mandating that one should acquire a permit
to slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise of police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it is not a taking of
the property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just
and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain
such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to
the rights of the publics. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition
that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair
the public rights and interests of the community.

12.Taxicab Operators vs Board of Transportation


Facts:
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic
corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of
Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other
place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads:
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case
No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to
allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of
model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided
that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.

ISSUES:
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in
accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby
safeguarding the petitioners constitutional right to procedural due process?
B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural
requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation
and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners
constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?
HELD
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the
overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the
dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its
police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things
hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property
rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando the necessities
imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to
regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests
are disregarded.

13.White Light Corporation vs City of Manila


Facts:
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An
Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses,
pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light
Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance
be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons.
The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal
liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that
the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the
City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of
cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.
The CA ruled in favor of the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes
upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a
guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance
invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash
up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who
needed rest or to wash up or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be
avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of
people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to
the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest
or public welfare.

14.Social Justice Society vs Atienza

Facts: On November 20, 2001, The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Maynila


enacted Ordinance No. 8027. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, jr. approved the said
ordinance on November 28, 2001. and it became effective on December 28,
2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from
industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses
disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses
within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the
businesses situated in the area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of the oil
companies Caltex, Petron and Shell.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy
entered into a memorandum of understanding with the oil companies in which
they agreed that :scaling down of Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and
practicable option. Under the memorandum of understanding, the City of Manila
and the Department of Energy permits the Oil Companies to continuously
operate in compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting
from the joint operations and the scale down program.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the memorandum of understanding in
Resolution No. 97. In that resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the
memorandum of understanding was effective only for a period of six months
starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted
Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003
and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil
companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the
ordinance.
Issue: Whether or not respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals. And
Whether or not the June 26, 2002 memorandum of understanding and the
resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.

Held: The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as City
Mayor of Manila, to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of
the city. One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he
has the duty to put into effect Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been
repealed by the Sanggunian or negated by the courts.
On the other hand assuming that the terms of the memorandum of understanding
were contradictory with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and
made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only
until April 30, 2003. There is nothing that legally hinders respondent from
enforcing Ordinance No. 8027. Wherefore the Court Ordered Hon. Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the city of Manila to immediately enforce Ordinance No.
8027.

15.Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court


Facts:
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos
(EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned
the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of
carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from
Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred
EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due
process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate
carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled
against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to
promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of
carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process.
EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The
movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent
slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and
explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated.
The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police
power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied
the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial
functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,

finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned


therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken.

16.Fernando vs St. Scholasticas College


Facts: Respondent SSCs property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence.
Marikina City enacted an ordinance which provides that walls and fences shall not be
built within a five-meter allowance between the front monument line and the building line
of an establishment. The City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents
ordering them to demolish, replace, and move back the fence. As a response, the
respondents filed a petition for prohibition with an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Marikina.
The RTC granted the petition and the CA affirmed. Hence, this certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the Marikina Ordinance No. 192, imposing a five-meter setback, a
valid exercise of police power.
Held: No. Police Power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes
and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety
and general welfare of the people. Two test have been used by the Court the rational
relationship test and the strict scrutiny test: Under the rational relationship test, an
ordinance must pass the following requisites: (1) the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of the particular class, require its exercise; and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. The real intent of the setback requirement was to
make the parking space free for use by the public and not for the exclusive use of the
respondents. This would be tantamount to a taking of the private property for public use
without just compensation. Anent the objectives of prevention of concealment of unlawful
acts and un-neighborliness due to the walls and fences, the parking area is not
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of these goals. The Court, thus, finds
Section 5 of the Ordinance to be unreasonable and oppressive. Hence, the exercise of
the police power is not valid.