ODE 1 Activity - Example 1

General Situation

Internal armed struggle supported by external actors

Ineffective governance and security forces
UN mission ineffective due to security concerns. Peacekeepers are partially mission capable
Tori Pocket security and counter-terrorism in capital are priorities for SRSG
Negative STRATCOM trend in theatre

Focus for Development of JFC Assessment Contribution

STRATCOM framework to SHAPE and PDD to manage expectations, signal intent and shape operating
environment
Cdrs estimate for security force assistance to Tytan
Cdrs estimate for stability operations in support of UNMIKT in Tori Pocket as main effort
Cdrs estimate for CT operations in support of Tytan security forces in capital as supporting effort
Logistics estimate for a self-sustaining force with minimum HNS

Clarification Required

Ends and means must be reconciled. Objectives too ambitious for proposed force structure
Must refine CPOE. System of systems analysis on irregular threats to Tori Pocket and capital. Also
reconsider our relationship with Tytan and posturing towards Kamon and Stellaria
In-theatre coordination, collaboration and cooperation arrangements at the regional and local level with
partners

General Comments and Considerations

Plan for mission duration of two years (minimum)

NATO SOFA must be in place prior to troop deployment
Regional framework for political engagement must be further refined (UN, NATO, CU and other nations
in the AOI)
Force generation beyond IRF

Recommendations For Assessment Team Composition

Recommend JFC and SOCC participation

ODE 1 Activity - Example 2

General Situation

UNSC concludes Tytan situation a grave threat to regional peace and stability
Need robust international force
Prevent Tytan GOV collapse and further deteriorating situation
UNSG letter to NATO SG requesting NATO assistance in E.Cerasia under CH VII.
NAC Decision based on full Pol Mil Estimate
NAC tasked Civilian and Mil assessments
Draft LOU tasks more detailed than potential Missions in SACEUR Strategic Assessment
Failing state under threat by neighbour who is supporting anti Govt effort
Instability and aggression creates Humanitarian crisis
Kamon, supported by other theatre actors is complex situation
SLOC threatened by variety of threats
UN lacks capacity, needs NATO as enabler NATO/UN C2 relations
Nature of Problem - understand root of crisis
Timescales for conduct of operations

Focus for Development of JFC Assessment Contribution

Clarity of Strategic objectives vs end state

Relationship with CU and level of capacity building needs/training

No timescale

Means to ends balance

Overall means reasonable for initial assessment

Based on initial assessment of UN force
Must concentrate on Tytan
Will require prioritisation of tasks as force insufficient for all at once
Key Log support, C2, CIS, KD/Intel and Mobility in theatre

Criteria for Success: Measurement of achievement of Strategic goals

Stability in Tytan SSE

Tytan Security forces able to maintain stability and security
Freedom of navigation in theatre
Security sufficient for delivery of HA

Constraints Restraints

Theatre definition, Theatre PSYOPS / STRATCOM vs UN

Dealing with foreign fighters without dealing with bases outside of Tytan. Cross border ops?
NATO / UN C2 relations in theatre
NATO / UN priorities conflict resolution
NATO access vs UN access
ROE vs UN ROE clarity

Preconditions for success

NATO Commitment to Sustain

Priority vs other NATO Ops
Contribution of CU forces
Regional Access
Stratcom
Coord co-op mechanism with UN in place
Full co-op with GOT
CA (instruments of power)

Risks

Mission success vs dealing with root causes of crisis likelihood of resurgence.

Embargo means and opposition from other actors
Mission changes
Risk to NATO Strategic capacity
Clash of UN and NATO ops
Means to ends mismatch

Clarification Required

What is meant by E. Cerasia area theatre (JOA) etc

What is meant by providing Security Assistance to Gov of Tytan
To what extent can NATO influence nations
Sustainability, FOF
End of NATO mission vs End of UN mission (Political timeline)
Theatre definition, Theatre PSYOPS / STRATCOM vs UN
Dealing with foreign fighters without dealing with bases outside Tytan. Cross border ops?

General Comments and Considerations

Plan for mission duration of two years (minimum)

NATO SOFA must be in place prior to troop deployment
Regional framework for political engagement must be further refined (UN, NATO, CU and other nations
in the AOI)
Force generation beyond IRF

MROs
General

Nothing is related to time - need timescale assessment

Ability to provide security and or stability
Recognition of expanding contribution of CU, UN, PfP and other forces

MRO A (Minimal)

What impact will it make?

Can it achieve DES

Assessment of Capability of org.
NATO reputation risk if failure

MRO B (Focused engagement)

Most tailored to NRF. Force availability?

Still risk to NATO reputation if failure

MRO C (Robust)

Most demanding on NATO resource, can force level be achieved?

Risk to NATO cohesion if prolonged mission
Best prospect of success

Recommendations for Assessment Team Composition

Additions to assessment team

CIMIC
LOG
OPS
KD
STRATCOM
Potential OLRT locations (Unakos, Tori Pocket, Tigray Reg)

ODE 2 Activity - Example 1

Principal Characteristics

Regional theater requires Regional Approach

UN Mandate within a CA for SASE ISO HA
Internal armed struggle irregular actors supported by KA/ST
Ineffective governance and security in TY
UN/CU PKO partially effective. Importance of impartiality
ST can change the nature of the crisis
Ethnic, ideological, economic dimension

Key Mission Elements

Provide security in Tori Pocket

Assist TY Security Forces in disarming illegally armed group and disrupting arms flow
Enforcing UN embargo (all environments)
Develop capacity for TY Security Forces
Safeguard SLOCs (incl. Bab el Mandeb)
Deter/defeat acts of aggression by KA/ST
Within means and resources available, address SRSGs security concerns in Unakos

Key Issues and Areas of Special Attention

Force flow planning to reflect TY ownership and perception

KA/ST potential intent for escalation
Non attributable KA/ST actions against NATO
Logistics redundancy required (APODs/SPODs and Log Hubs)
HNS outside of TY (Sveland, Lakuta)
STRATCOM media coord
Force protection

Coordination and Liaison Requirements

UNSRSG OF6
UNMIKT - LNO Team
UN Country team/RC LNO Team
CU - LNO Team
GOT - LNO Teams (MOI, MOD)
Lakuta, Petroceros, Saribo - LNO through NATO contact embassies
Regional UN clusters (CIMIC Teams)

Time Critical Requirements

Receive MAB 7 Oct

Publish STRATCOM framework 8 Oct
CJ/TC SOR 10 Oct
COM and OLRT deploy 10 Oct
Force Generation Conference 12 Oct
OPLAN due to SACEUR 18 Oct
JFC-A Initial deployment 26 Oct

Main forces deployment 14 Nov

Force Readiness and Availability

What forces are available immediately

Enablers
Initial Entry Force
What additional NRF forces are available at which NTM
Consider FoF for rotation

ODE 2 Activity - Example 2

Principal Characteristics

Key Characteristics
HA
Security in Titan (and effect on region)
Upholding International Law
Embargo Operation
Security Mission Within a Comprehensive Approach
Complex - Broad Spectrum Op
BPFOR Asymmetrical Ops through to High End Warfighting
STRATCOM vital and identify Target Audience and approvals
International Approach
Land environnent Extensive complex terrain
Mobile Decentralised Ops

Key Mission Elements

Identify capability requirements and availability for Entry

Provision of support to UN Security in Tori Pocket HA
Deterrence of Stellaria / Kamon
Assist Tytan (internal security)

Key Issues and Areas of Special Attention

Identify Kamon / Stellaria triggers for offensive action

Understanding of fundamentalism, links and ties avoid insurgency
Force structure requirements (Embargo)
Balance of Force Entry vs apparent invasion (must not make matters worse)
Look at potential to bolster Capital Security spt to GOT

Coordination and Liaison Requirements

Engagement at 3 levels Regional/GOT and key IO/NGO actors

Recognise GOT primacy
Tytan Co-ord Commission (TOR and members)
Subordinate committees
SRSG rep in NATO / Rep in SRSG (1*? plus staff)
NATO / UN / GOT Combined Ops Co-ord meetings
Deconflict Logs, CIS etc.
Security Police role vs Military
CU
Liaison with IMO, IMB and other shipping Orgs
Determine other key actors for liaison theatre and prioritise deployment
Oil company influence, potential malign actor (appropriate target?)
Engage UN on restarting CFA

Time Critical Requirements

Prepare OLRT for deployment

Liaison with UN and GOT
Info exchange and sharing agreement
CA SME advice to Command - shortfalls in HQ setup
ID Key enablers and availability
Investigate availability of strategic lift (Air and Sea)
Stratcom: Key Messaging to prepare for deployment and engagement space
Activation of additional NATO CRMs


ODE 3 Activity - Example 1
Commanders Initial Intent
We are about to embark on a complex operation which will consist of two main thrusts.
I intend to secure the sea lines of communication and enforce the United Nations embargo in order to influence
Kamon by deploying a robust maritime force into the Red Sea. This force will have a secondary role of
deterrence/diplomacy aimed at encouraging Stellarian neutrality or cooperation.
Within Tytan, I intend to create a secure and safe environment in the Tori Pocket (ME) by deploying a Joint
Force, thereby allowing the resumption of UN humanitarian operations. Assisting UNMIKT and the Tytan security
apparatus in defeating insurgents and securing the borders will be secondary aims utilizing Special Forces, joint
enablers and expert training and support elements in order to build capacity and confidence in the Government
of Tytan. Throughout, we will be prepared to transition to high intensity operations to counter aggression should
the situation dictate.
In order to meet the concerns of the UN and the Tytan Government, the deployment of forces will be sequenced
to ensure a rapid and effective arrival which will not overwhelm Tytan capacity and take into account the political
sensitivities of such a large western forces footprint.
This operation will be planned and conducted within a comprehensive approach in full cooperation/liaison with
the UN and its forces, the Government of Tytan and the other regional actors involved in the Luxor Peace
Process.

Guidance for COA Development

Three courses of action should be developed:

COA 1 A simultaneous and rapid deployment to achieve early and substantial effect on all
fronts
COA 2 A sequenced and deliberate approach
COA 3 A minimalist approach

COA Selection Criteria

Sustainability

Within theater
Long term viability

Politically acceptable

For NATO, non- NATO nations

Within Region

Operational Flexibility

Risk

ODE 3 Activity - Example 2

Commanders Initial Intent
Principles followed
1. Pragmatic approach

Successive steps to achieve assigned operational objectives

Clearly-defined Lines of Operations inside each step
Each Line of Operation addresses either main action required to attain operational objective
or implied actions
Each step contains Main Effort & key Cdrs concerns

2. Three-step Operation

Shape, to enter into Theater & start business making an impact

Deter & Clear, to make the difference & attain objectives
Hold & Transfer, to consolidate success & prepare handover

SHAPE

Establishment of a deterrence posture in - and around the JOA

Pre-deployment in the TYT Capital area of enabling assets
Deployment in the TORI pocket of maneuver force sufficient to ensure local FOM
Conduct of aggressive INFO OPS
Conduct of initial entry operations
Expansion of deterrent action towards key areas of operations
Establishment of air - and naval superiority in- and around the JOA
Availability of credible over-the-horizon reserve

Main Effort: credible presence in Tori Pocket IOT show NATO resolve to face humanitarian crisis.
Key Concerns: force protection, reserve, logistic footprint, balance between robust presence and public
support.

SECURE & CLEAR

Acquisition of full situational awareness

Full-scale cooperation with local actors
Employment of existing un- and cu forces in static posture
Combined, clearing air - and ground operations in key areas, nato lead role in tori pocket, nato
supporting role in tigrai
Combined, air- and ground border surveillance operations towards kamon
Enforcement of international embargo against kamon
Maintaining fom on glocs
Provision of mentoring/training support to selected tyt sf
Provision of local support/qips to tyt gov
Credible in-theater reserve

Main Effort: secure Tori Pocket IOT allow free flow of HA

Key Concerns: force protection, reserve, logistic footprint, balance between high-intensity ops and public
support.

HOLD & HANDOVER

Continued information dominance

Continued cooperation
Continued combined air- and ground deterrent presence
Continued combined, air- and ground surveillance
Continued air- and naval enforcement of international embargo
Continued combined fom presence
Mentoring/training support extended
Continued support to tyt gov
Continuation of aggressive info ops
Availability of a credible in-theater reserve

Main Effort: establish reliable TYT

Key Concerns: force protection, international support, TYT GOV reliability

Guidance for COA Development

Adjust COA 3 to reflect HA as ME

Develop another COA 4 - Access via proxy countries

COA Selection Criteria

Transparency
Risk to Own of Force
Risk to local / regional stability
Deterrence
Resilient / Robust
Agile / flexible
Consistent Tempo (no voids)
Timely
Sustainable
IO / NGO coordinated (CA)

ODE 4 Activity - Example 1

Course of Action

Review Comds intent: COA 3 does not meet intent

Reduce Criteria for COA 1/2:
Early effect on early hum sit in TP
Freedom of Navigation
Best demonstrates NATO resolve
Endorse JOPG recommended COA 1
Issues and Guidance:
SRSG
Update UN assessment of:
Ground situation
UN refinement of priorities
COA 1:
Balance of forces TP/Capital
Advance enabling force

Operational Risk 1 Piracy

Related Objective: Secure SLOCs; Deter KA/ST

Source
Piracy against M/V
State sponsored
IAGs
Consequence
DPs D2, D5, D4, D7
Erode NATOs credibility
HIGH impact on public opinion
Severity
HIGH
Probability
MODERATE during deployment
LOW after deployment
Risk management
Passive and active measures
Improved SA and coordination
Neutralize ???
Branch Plan Coordinate with OCEAN SHIELD
Conclusions
Conditionally acceptable

Operational Risk 2 BLA Insurgency

Related objective: Sustainable Internal Security

Source:
BLA (indirect support KAM and ST)
Consequence: Internal security LOO; DP S5 and S6; partially impacts on S2 and S4
Severity: Short term (MODERATE); mid/Long term (HIGH)
Probability: LOW
Risk Management: Reduce vulnerability (Force Protection); Increase IC pressure on KA and ST;
Increase enablers for SOTG for north Corps; assign BPT to tactical reserve; assign BPT to strategic
reserve; BPT mission to MCC; prepare branch plan

Conclusions: Conditionally acceptable

ODE 4 Activity - Example 2

Operational Risk 1 Failure of Theatre Logistic Access
Sources of operational risk:
Opponents, Own Forces, Environmental
Consequence of operational risk:
Effects every phase and DP.
Possible mission failure for severe event
Categorisation of operational risk:
Extremely High Impact in early phase
What is the probability that the risk will be realized:
Low
Management of operational risk:
Environment no
Opponents yes mitigated by force posture and activity
Own Forces yes mitigated by SOPs and safety
Recommendations on operational risk:
Conditionally acceptable

Operational Risk 2 Blockage of Straits/SLOCS

Sources of operational risk:

Stelleria, Terrorism by proxy
Consequence of operational risk:
Failure of LOO 1
Categorisation of operational risk:
High - Possible partial mission failure
What is the probability that the risk will be realized:
Low
Management of operational risk:
Strong Maritime presence
Clearance of straits (time consuming)
Recommendations on operational risk:
Conditionally acceptable

Course of Action Selection and Factors

COA 1:

Key Criteria
Early Effect in Tori pocket
Change philosophy to Rapid Deployment and effects
STRATCOM
New Criteria - Escalation

ODE 5 Activity - Example 1

Principal Characteristics of the Operation

What has changed?

HA has improved in TP
Tigray region appears to be at high risk
Kamon posturing for offensive Ops.
Stellaria increasing aggressiveness

Key Issues and Areas of Attention

Deterrence and maritime operations

D2
Internal security in Tigray region
S5, S6
Security in the capital
S1
Humanitarian assistance in Tori Pocket
P1, P2

Requirements for Campaign Assessment

Current campaign assessment to determine status of Tori Pocket and Tigray region

Requirement for Operation Estimate

Create estimate for Kamon and Stellaria direct intervention

Potential contingency plans
Accelerate branch plan vs. BLA insurgency in Tigray
SPODS/APODS considerations
Use of Strategic reserve?
Examine NEO requirements in Tigray region
Size of operation?
Ensure our coord process with UN tight

Key Questions

Do we need to shift main effort?

Impact?
Will the nature of our operation change?
KA/ST posturing
How to gain initiative in Tigray region?
What is impact of mass IDP/DPRE movements out of Tigray?

Time Critical Requirements

Priorities
Campaign Assessment of main effort
Branch plan vs BLA insurgency
Estimate for KA/ST direct intervention

ODE 5 Activity - Example 2

Principal Characteristics of the Operation

Deterrence and Maritime Operations LOO

Negative impact on International shipping

State and non-state actors increased activity
Kamon forces build-up
Stellaria maritime involvement increasing

General: Deterioration in Maritime security but Embargo effective

Internal Security LOO

Security in capital and key areas not improving

Capacity of TSF not improving
Control of Tigray area diminishing. BLA not isolated, TSF defections
Terrorism increasing

General: GOT effectiveness reducing

Tori Pocket LOO

Security improving
HA status TBD
GOT presence decreasing Kamon rhetoric more effective than NATO

General: Security improving but HA remains to be determined

Across the Theater (common to all LOO, LOG, IO etc)

Kamon and Stelleria increase in activity

Log pinch point developing at Gambella
Effect of Tigray loss on mission
Effectiveness of influence ops

Key Issues and Areas of Attention

Key issues and areas requiring Staff attention

Is ME still valid?
Revised Troops to task to counter Kamon / Stellaria aggression
What benefit for Stelleria of confrontation with NATO

Requirements for Campaign Assessment

Conduct the following ASSESSMENTS

Review of operational priorities with a view to reprioritising ME

Reason for lack of progress of TSF capacity
Effectiveness of COIN ops
Status of HA ops
Effectiveness of NATO STRATCOM vs Kamon / Stellaria rhetoric
Why is internal security getting worse
Extent of collusion between Stellaria, Kamon, BLA and other non-state actors

Requirement for Operation Estimate

Conduct the following ESTIMATES

Stellaria posture vs embargo

Kamon offensive posture in NE
Countering BLA progression in Tigray
Revise estimate on failure of GOT

Time Critical Requirements

Time Critical Requirements

ROE revision
JPTL
Force generation requests
Activate Strategic reserve
Review CRM

CCIRs

At what point will Kamon lose effectiveness because of embargo

Kamon build up bluff or bargaining lever (I&W)

ODE 6 Activity - Example 1

Intent

Overview: Overall, the Campaign is experiencing significant challenges.

Where are we:
LOO 1 (Maritime and Det): Deterrence not successful. Threat of strait closure remains.
LOO 2 (Internal Sec): Increased threat in TIGRAY AREA. Concerns Capital, ASMARA
LOO 3 (TP): On track, retain initiative
Revised Msn Analysis and risk assessment: Deduction are:
Embargo (selected execution to be confirmed by SACEUR)
Deterrence
Shift of ME from TP to TIGRAY with focus on ASMARA and capital
Retain gains made in TP
Principal decisions
Agree with Most Likely Enemy COA
Adopt COA 3 (ME ASMARA)
Further assessments/developments required
2 x UNMITK Bns for TP
Lead time for political decision to commit STRATRES
Request MEU (C2 MCC)

Direction and Guidance

Short term (JOC)

Develop FRAGO to further increase liaison/cooperation with TYT (MOI/ MOD)
FRAGO to LCC on partnered operations with TSF (priority Capital)
Coordination (JCB):
Review embargo plan (if selected embargo plan is decided by SACEUR)
Prepare Joint Coordination Order to implement shift of ME
Revise priorities for air support, INTEL, JPTL, JTST, ROE
Plan (JOPG)
Review implementation of NTM -T branch plan
Develop a CONOPS for COA 3 (including a deliberate wargame) with or w/o STRATRES
Tigray potential UN Security phase 5 (accelerate NEO plan)

Requests and Consultation

SACEUR/SCR
NATO way forward on oil embargo
STRATRES
Possible extension of mandate and JOA
SRSG/SCR discussion output
Broad agreement on priorities
Consistency of messaging SRSG and ForcCom to respective SecGens
Clarify NATO strategic assessment and way forward on oil embargo (SCR)

ODE 6 Activity - Example 2

Intent
First of all, Id wish to thank you for the quality of your assessments and estimates. In the light of the changing
situation, I believe reasonable to underline 3 essential developments
1- The steady security progress in the Tori pocket
2- Deterrence and Maritime Ops
3- Internal Security

Therefore, my guiding intent is:

Through a continued Strategic Communication effort, affirm our determination to support in close
coordination with the GOT our HA mission in the Tori Pocket
Reaffirm our steadfast commitment to ensure Tytan territorial integrity
Resolve to protect freedom of movement through the sea lines of communication

In principle, I intend to:

Proceed with a shift in Main Effort from Tori Pocket to Asmara/Tigray region with Unakos as the
secondary effort. To do this I want a modified COA including elements of COA 2 and COA 3.

Deterrence

Reinforce our posture using the Strategic Reserve with 80% in Tigray and 20% in Unakos
Increase ISR activity and visibity to show force in the broad Northern Areas
Reduce risk to troops by preparing for escalation
In case of escalatin Reduce Kaman capability with Offensive Actions

Maritime OPS

Maintain level of effort with Embargo

Increase ISR (SCUD in KA and SE)
Develop New ROE for BeM protection (Offensive into SE

Internal Security

Increase posture (20% from STRATRES) in Capital area

Integrate UN forces and TSF with NATO Operations where possible
Regional Security focus conventional support of SOF (Tigray)

Tori Pocket

Maintain level of effort as we

Prepare Increase involvement of UN, Contractors and NGOs
Air drop critical supplies if necessary

Direction and Guidance

Short Term
Study/prepare for:
Reserve force employment 80% Tigray 20% Unacos
JOA expansion
Refocus ME in Tigray region to defend LLOC and Asmara Massawa
Increase ISR on Straits and KA border region
CRMs
NATO Training Mission-A increase priority
Hand over Tori Pocket to UN troops and redeploy to Tigray region
Increase op tempo to display resolve in Tigray
NEO in Tigray + additional refugee / HA situation if UN pulls out

Medium Term

Recommend revisions to log support in Gambella

Increased involvement of UN

Long Term

Develop branch for alt Tori Pocket log route via Lakuta
Develop plan for transition by UN forces in Tori Pocket
Develop a plan to address resettlement

DCom:

Coordinate with SRSG

Hand over Tori Pocket to UN troops
Integrated ops with UN force
Liaise with TSF for increased training and deployment in Tigray
Coordinate with IC & NGOs

Issues fpr SACEUR Attention

Force Generation
Activate existing Reserve
Regenerate a reserve
Use of SNFs
Sustainment of force
Use of National Forces (US MEU)
Liaise with UN
New Mandate to counter aggression / integrity of TY
Increase UN force
ROE revisions
for maritime force in straits and embargo ops
CRM
JOA size