III.

Civil Procedure
A. Actions
1. Ordinary civil actions
An ordinary civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection
of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. A special proceeding, on the other hand, is
a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact. The Rules of
Court provide that only a real party in interest is allowed to prosecute and defend an action in
court. (Reyes vs. Enriquez, G.R. No. 162956, April 10, 2008)

2. Special civil actions

In the absence of special reasons, it has long been the rule that the Supreme Court will decline
original jurisdiction in certiorari, prohibition and mandamus cases, especially when it is
necessary to take evidence and make findings on controverted facts, since it is not a trier of
facts and that is a function which can better be done by the trial courts (Fisher vs. Yangco
Steamship Co., 31 Phil. 1)
By virtue of Sec. 3 of Rule 1, the provisions of Rule 16 on motion to dismiss are applicable in
special civil actions (National Power Corp. vs. Valera, L-15295, Nov. 30, 1961)
Xxx, a favorable judgment rendered in a special civil action for mandamus is in the nature of a
special judgment. As such, it requires the performance of any other act than the payment of
money or the sale or delivery of real or personal property the execution of which is governed
by Section 11, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which states:
SECTION 11. Execution of Special Judgment.When the judgment requires the
performance of any act other than those mentioned in the two preceding sections, a
certified copy of the judgment shall be attached to the writ of execution and shall be
served by the officer upon the party against whom the same is rendered, or upon any
other person required thereby, or by law, to obey the same, and such party or person
may be punished for contempt if he disobeys such judgment. (National Home
Mortgage Finance Corp. vs. Abayari, G.R. No. 166508, October 2, 2009)

3. Criminal actions
Thus, as a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and direction
of the public prosecutor. (Pinote vs. Ayco, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1944, December 13, 2005)
If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in case there are no public
prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution
Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case, subject to the approval
of the court. Once so authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case
until the termination of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority
is revoked or otherwise withdrawn. Id.
Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a whole and not
merely to the person directly prejudiced, he being merely the complaining witness. It is on this
account that the presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is necessary to
protect vital state interests, foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the
bedrock of peace of the people. Id.

4. Civil actions versus Special proceedings

Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite
adverse party. x x x As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the
decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate,pay its liabilities (Pacific Banking

Corporation Employees Organization v. Court of Appeals, 312 Phil. 578, 593 (1995) and to
distribute the residual to those entitled to the same (Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 402
Phil. 152, 161 (2001).
A special proceeding as a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact; In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later
to be duly recognized as among the decedents heirs, which would allow them to exercise their
right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent. Montaner vs.
Sharia District Court, Fourth Sharia Judicial District,Marawi City (576SCRA746)
The primary issue in this case is whether or not the respondents have to institute a special
proceeding to determine their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera before they can file an
ordinary civil action to nullify the affidavits of Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes, the
Extra-Judicial Settlement with the Sale of Estate of Dionisia Reyes, and the Deed of
Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale executed by the heirs of Dionisia Reyes
and the heirs of Anacleto Cabrera, as well as to cancel the new transfer certificates of title
issued by virtue of the above-questioned documents. We answer in the affirmative. (Reyes vs.
Enriquez, G.R. No. 162956, April 10, 2008)

5. Personal actions and real actions

Private respondent appears to be confused over the difference between personal and real
actions vis-a-vis actions in personam and in rem. The former determines venue; the latter, the
binding effect of a decision the court may render over the party, whether impleaded or not.
(Paderanga vs. Buissan, G.R. No. L-49475, September 28, 1993)
In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a
contract or the recovery of damages. In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real
property, or, as indicated in section 2(a) of Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to
real property or for the recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of a mortgage on, real property. (Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., No. L29791, 10 January 1978, 81 SCRA 75, 84-85)

6. Local and transitory actions

The following language is taken from The Earl of Halsbury's Laws of England (vol. 1, p. 50):
The old distinction between 'local' and 'transitory' actions, though of far less
importance than it was before the passing of the judicature acts, must still be borne in
mind in connection with actions relating to land situate outside the local jurisdiction
of our courts. 'Transitory' actions were those in which the facts in issue between the
parties had no necessary connection with a particular locality, e.g., contract, etc.;
whilst "local" actions were those in which there was such a connection, e.g., disputes
as to the title to, or trespasses to, land.
One importance of this distinction lay in the fact that in the case of local actions the
plaintiff was bound to lay the venue truly, i.e., in the county (originally in the actual
hundred) in which the land in question lay. In the case, however of a transitory action,
he might lay it wherever he pleased, subject to the power of the court to alter it in a
proper case. Local venues have now been abolished, and, therefore, so far as actions
relating to land in England are concerned, the distinction may be disregarded.
It is, however, important from another point of view, viz, that of jurisdiction as
distinct from procedure. In the case of real actions relating to land in the colonies or
foreign countries the English relating courts had, even before the judicature acts, no
jurisdiction; and, therefore, the removal by those acts of a difficulty of procedure
viz, the rule as to local venue which might have stood in the way, if they had and
wished to exercise jurisdiction, did not in any way confer jurisdiction in such cases.
The lack of jurisdiction still exists, and our courts refuse to adjudicate upon claims of
title to foreign land in proceedings founded on an alleged invasion of the proprietary
rights attached thereto, and to award damages founded on that adjudication; in other
words, an action for trespass to, or for recovery of, foreign land can not be maintained
in England, at any rate if the defendant chooses to put in issue the ownership of such
land. (The Manila Railroad Company vs. The Attorney-General, representing the
Insular Government, et alG.R. No. L-6287, December 1, 1911)

There is no decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in conflict with the
principles laid down in this opinion. Id.

7. Actions in rem, in personam and quasi in rem

The aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in personam,
or in rem or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these
only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations
brought against that person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may
involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to
control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. (Yu vs. Pacleb 580 SCRA
197)
An action for specific performance praying for the execution of a deed of sale in connection
with an undertaking in a contract, such as a contract to sell, is an action in personam. It is
binding only upon the parties properly impleaded therein and duly heard or given an
opportunity to be heard. (Ching vs. CA, 181 SCRA 9)
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a
proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its
nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce
personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of
the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific
property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of
the court. The purpose of the proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a
court, some responsibility or liability disrectly upon the person of the defendant. Of this
character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a
pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a
judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the property to
determine its state. It has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce
personal rights or obligations; such action is brought against the person.
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject
the property to such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem,
an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions in quasi in rem deal
with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate
on these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain
or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding
only upon the parties who joined in the action. (Domagas vs. Jense, 448 SCRA 663 [2005])

B. Cause of Action
1. Meaning of cause of action
Section 2 Rule 2 the Rules of Civil Procedure defines a cause of action as the act or omission
by which a party violates the right of another. Its essential elements are as follows: 1) A right in
favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; 2) An
obligation on the part of the main defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and 3) An
act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff, for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. (Heirs of Tomas
Dolleton vs. Fil-Estate Management, Inc., 584 SCRA 409; Heirs of Loreto C.Maramag vs.
Maramaag, 588 SCRA 774; Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation vs. Philippine National
Construction Corporation, 602 SCRA 723;Subic Telecommunications Company, Inc. vs. Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority, 603 SCRA 470)
A cause of action is the fact or combination of facts which affords a party a right to judicial
interference in his behalf. (Subic Telecommunications Company, Inc. vs. Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority, 603 SCRA 470)

2. Right of Action versus Cause of action

The term "cause of action" has been held to be synonymous with "right of action", but in the
law of pleading (Code Pleading) one is distinguished from the other in that a right of action is a
remedial right belonging to some person, while a cause of action is a formal statement of the
operative facts that give rise to such remedial right. The one is a matter of right and depends on
the substantive law, while the other is a matter of statement and is governed by the law of
procedure. (Marquez vs. Varela, G.R. No. L-4845 December 24, 1952, citing 37 Words and
Phrases, 642 and Phillips, Code Pleading, section 189, page 170)

3. Failure to state a cause of action

The fundamental test for failure to state a cause of action is whether, admitting the veracity of
what appears on the face and within the four corners of the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to the
relief prayed for. Stated otherwise, may the court render a valid judgment upon the facts
alleged therein? Indeed, the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material
allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be
maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be presented by
defendants. (AC Enterprise vs. Frabelle Properties Corp. G.R. No. 166744. November 2, 2006)

4. Test of the sufficiency of a cause of action

The test of sufficiency of a cause of action rests on whether, hypothetically admitting the facts
alleged in the complaint to be true, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same, in
accordance with the prayer in the complaint. However, this rule is subject to well-recognized
exceptions, such that there is no hypothetical admission of the veracity of the allegations if: 1.)
the falsity of the allegations is subject to judicial notice; 2.) such allegations are legally
impossible; 3.) the allegations refer to facts which inadmissible in evidence; 4.) by the record
or document in the pleading, the allegations appear unfounded; or 5.) there is evidence which
has been presented to the court by stipulation of the parties ot in the course of the hearings
related to the case. (Heirs of Loreto C. Maramag vs. Maramag, 588 SCRA 774)

5. Splitting a single cause of action and its effects

The rule against splitting a cause of action is intended to prevent repeated litigation between
the same parties in regard to the same subject of controversy to protect the defendant from
unnecessary vexation; and to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits. (Chua
vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, 596 SCRA 524)
Even if the two cases contain two separate remedies that are both available to petitioners, there
two remedies that arose from one wrongful act cannot be pursued in two different cases. The
rule against splitting a cause of action is intended to prevent repeated litigation between the
same parties in regard to the same subject of controversy, to protect the defendant from
unnecessary vexation; and to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits. It comes
from the old maxim nemo debet bis vexari, pro una et eadem causa (no man shall be twise
vexed for one and the same cause) (Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. vs. Icarangal, 68 Phil. 287)
There was a foreclosure of a mortgage due to the debtors failure to pay an obligation. The
debtor filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of the foreclosure proceedings. Then, there
was a complaint for damages arising out of the foreclosure proceedings. There was splitting of
causes of action resulting in forum shopping because of the filing of multiple cases based on
the same cause of action although with different prayers.
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court proscribe the splitting of a single cause of action
as they provide that a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. If
two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
(Chua, et. al. vs. Metrobank, et. al., G.R. No. 182311, August 19, 2009)
Forum shopping occurs although the actions seem to be different, when it can be seen that
there is a splitting of a cause of action. (Cuenca vs. Atas, 535 SCRA 48 [2007])
A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the
defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. It is true that a single act or
omission can violate various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a
violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. However, where there is only one

delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may
have been violated belonging to one person. (Joseph vs. Bautista, 170 SCRA 540)

6. Joinder and misjoinder of causes of action

Xxx joinder of several causes of action, the pertinent provision of which is embodied in Rule
2, section 5, which provides that "Subject to rules regarding venue and joinder of parties, a
party may in one complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party claim state, in the
alternative or otherwise, as many different causes of action as he may have against an opposing
party. (Sps. Perez, G.R. No. 147417, July 8, 2005)
While this rule appears simple, however, difficulties may arise in its application, for it does not
state specifically the cases where several causes of action may be joined, each case apparently
depending upon the nature of the transactions involved. But one thing is clear: That the joining
of causes of action must be subject to the rules regarding venue and joinder of parties. If these
rules are violated, then a misjoinder of causes of action may arise. Id.
Former Chief Justice Moran gives several illustrations of how this rule may be applied which
are interesting. On this point he makes the following comment:
This rule, which is expressly extended to counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party
claims, is subject to the limitation regarding venue, whereby several causes of action
with no common venue cannot be joined. For instance, if A, a resident of Manila, has
against E, a resident of Baguio, two causes of action, one for money, and another for
title to real property located in Zamboanga, he cannot join them in a single complaint,
for the venue of the first action, which is either Manila or Baguio, is different from
the venue of the second, which is Zamboanga.
The rule is likewise subject to the limitation regarding joinder of parties. For instance
plaintiff A has a cause of action against B, another cause of action against C, and
another cause of action against D, the three causes of action cannot be joined, because
there would be a misjoinder of parties defendant, each of them being interested in the
cause of action alleged against him not in the other causes of action pleaded against
the others. A claim on a promissory note against three defendants may not be joined
with a claim on another promissory note against two of the defendants, for again there
is a misjoinder of parties, the third defendant in the first cause of action not having an
interest in the second cause of action.2(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol.
1, 1952 Ed., p. 24). Id.

C. Parties to Civil Actions

1.

Real Parties in interest

A suit may only be instituted by the real party in interest. (Excellent Quality Apparel, Inc. vs
Win Multi-Rich Builders, Inc. 578 SCRA 272; Pantranco Employees Association (PEAPTGWO) vs. NLRC, 581 SCRA 598)
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Id.
Interest within the meaning of the Rules refers to material interest in issue to be affected by the
decree or judgment of the case. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the
the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff (or petitioner) in action (NHA v. Magat G.R. No.
164244, July 30, 2009).

Indispensable parties
The defendants could not be blamed if they did not raise the issue of failure to implead
indispensable parties in their answer because in an action for partition of real estate, it is the
plaintiff who is mandated by the rules to implead all the indispensable parties, considering that
the absence of one such party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want

of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. (Quilatan vs.
Heirs of Lorenzo Quilatan, 597 SCRA 519)
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void
for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
(Valdez-Tallorin vs. Heirs of Juanito Tarona, 605 SCRA 209)
Without the presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot
attain finality. One who is not a party to a case is not bound by any decision of the court;
otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to due process. (Aron vs. Realon, 450 SCRA 372
[2005]) That is why the case is generally remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings. (Modex Realty, Inc. vs. HLURB, 525 SCRA 198 [2007])
Non-impleading of an indispensable part could result in a possible violation of due process.
The inclusion of an indispensable party is necessary for the effective and complete resolution
of the case and in order to accord all parties the benefit of due process and fair play (Pepsi
Cola, Inc. v. Emerald Pizza Inc. G.R. No. 153059, August 14, 2007; n Lagunilla, et al., v.
Velasco, et al., G.R. No. 169276, June 16, 2009, (Nachura, J]).
In Commissioner Domingo v. Scheer, (466 Phil. 235), Lotte Phil. Co., Inc. v. Dela Cruz, (464
SCRA 591), and PepsiCo, Inc., v. Emerald Pizza, Inc. (530 SCRA 58 [2007]), the non joiner of
indispensable parties is not a ground of the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead
the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by the order of the court, on
motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such time as are
just. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court,
then the court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiffs failure or comply with a lawful
court order (Lagunilla, et al. v. Velasco, et. al G.R. No. 169276, June 16, 2009)

Representatives as parties
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the
suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total
lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely Section 3, Rule 3
and Section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan v. Young, this
Court recognized the legal standing of the heirs to represent the rights and properties of the
decedent under administration pending the appointment of an administrator. Thus:
The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or
to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing
the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has
already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in which
special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no
administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to
wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the
administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the
interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the
properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated. (Rioferio vs. CA, G.R. No.
129008, January 13, 2004)
Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions, viz: (1) if
the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and (2) when the
administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of and he is made a party
defendant. Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover property of the
estate is as compelling when there is no appointed administrator, if not more, as where there is
an appointed administrator but he is either disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty
parties himself. Id.
All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of
property of the estate during the pendency of administration proceedings has three exceptions,
the third being when there is no appointed administrator such as in this case. Id.

Necessary parties;
An example of a necessary party may be found in Seno v. Mangubat. Petitioner therein sold
her property through a deed of sale to three vendees. Two of the vendees then sold their shares
to the third buyer, who then sold the property to another set of persons. Thereafter, petitioner,
who claimed that the true intent of the first sale was an equitable mortgage, filed a complaint
seeking the reformation of the deed of sale and the annulment of the second sale. The question
arose whether the two vendees who had since disposed of their shares should be considered as
indispensable parties or necessary parties. In concluding that they were only necessary parties,
the Court reasoned:
In the present case, there are no rights of defendants Andres Evangelista and
Bienvenido Mangubat to be safeguarded if the sale should be held to be in fact an
absolute sale nor if the sale is held to be an equitable mortgage. Defendant Marcos
Mangubat became the absolute owner of the subject property by virtue of the sale to
him of the shares of the aforementioned defendants in the property. Said defendants
no longer have any interest in the subject property. However, being parties to the
instrument sought to be reformed, their presence is necessary in order to settle all the
possible issues of the controversy. Whether the disputed sale be declared an absolute
sale or an equitable mortgage, the rights of all the defendants will have been amply
protected. Defendants-spouses Luzame in any event may enforce their rights against
defendant Marcos Mangubat. (Chua vs. Torres, G.R. No. 151900 August 30, 2005)
In Seno, the persons deemed by the Court as necessary parties may have had already disposed
of their interests in the property. However, should the lower court therein grant the prayer for
the reformation of the deed of sale, the ruling will undoubtedly have an effect on such parties,
on matters such as the purchase price which they may have received, and on whatever
transmission of rights that may have occurred between them and the vendor. Id.

Indigent Parties;
Recapitulating the rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for exemption meets
the salary and property requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the
application is mandatory. On the other hand, when the application does not satisfy one or both
requirements, then the application should not be denied outright; instead, the court should
apply the "indigency test" under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in
determining the merits of the prayer for exemption. (Algura vs. LGU of the City of Naga, G.R.
No. 150135, October 30, 2006)

Alternative defendants
Considering that the action against Delgado Shipping Agencies, Inc. is one of admiralty and
belongs to the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance while the action against the Manila
Port Service and the Manila Railroad Company is based on the arrastre contract which because
of the amount involved, comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court, can the
instant case be taken cognizance of by the former upon the theory that both defendants are
sued in the alternative? The answer must be in the affirmative bearing in mind that the cause of
action against the alternative defendants arises out of the same transaction which is the
recovery of the value of the lost merchandise and the nature of the loss could not be
determined at the moment. This view finds support in Section 5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court
which provides (for the rule on joinder of causes of action). (Rizal Surety and Insurance
Company vs. Manila Railroad Company, et al., G.R. No. L-21623, April 30, 1966)

2. Compulsory and permissive joinder of parties

The general rule with reference to parties at civil action requires the joiner of all necessary
parties, where possible, and the joiner of indispensable parties under and any and all
conditions. The evident intent of the Rules on the joinder of indispensable and necessary
parties is the complete determination of the possible issues, not only between the parties

themselves but also as regards the other person who may be affected by the judgment (Moldes
v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 161955, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 697; Lagunilla, et al, G.R. No.
169276, June 16, 2009).

3. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties

Neither a misjoinder nor a non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may
be dropped or added by order of the court, on motion of any party or on the court's own initiative at any
stage of the action. The RTC should have ordered the joinder of such party, and noncompliance with the
said order would have been ground for dismissal of the action. (Cabutihan vs. Landcenter Construction
& Development Corporation, G.R. No. 146594, June 10, 2002)

4. Class Suit
Courts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit, which is the exception to the
requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties. For while no difficulty may arise if the decision
secured is favorable to the plaintiffs, a quandary would result if the decision were otherwise as those
who were deemed impleaded by their self-appointed representatives would certainly claim denial of due
process. (Board of Optometry v. Colet, 328 Phil. 1187, 1204 [1996].)
Xxx the requisites of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general
interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them
all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the
class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned. (Banda vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April 20,
2010)
An action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings.
Whether the suit is or is not a class suit depends upon the attending facts, and the complaint, or other
pleading initiating the class action should allege the existence of the necessary facts, to wit, the
existence of a subject matter of common interest, and the existence of a class and the number of persons
in the alleged class, in order that the court might be enabled to determine whether the members of the
class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, to contrast the
number appearing on the record with the number in the class and to determine whether claimants on
record adequately represent the class and the subject matter of general or common interest. (Mathay v.
The Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 157 Phil. 551, 563-564 [1974])
Indeed, in MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc., we observed
that an element of a class suit or representative suit is the adequacy of representation. In determining
the question of fair and adequate representation of members of a class, the court must consider (a)
whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the other members of the
class; (b) the proportion of those made a party, as it so bears, to the total membership of the class; and
(c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class. (Banda
vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010)

5. Suits against entities without juridical personality

But even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that Lapanday does not have a juridical personality, it may
nonetheless be sued under such a name considering that respondents commonly know petitioner by the
name Lapanday Group of Companies, as shown in their alleged letter of intent to relinquish their
rights over the subject land. This brings to mind Section 15, Rule 3, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 15. Entity without juridical personality as defendant. - When two or more persons not
organized as an entity with juridical personality enter into a transaction, they may be sued
under the name by which they are generally or commonly known, (Lapanday vs. Estita, G.R.
No. 162109, January 21, 2005)

6. Effect of death of party litigant

The action that led to the present controversy was one for cancellation of title, which is a real action
affecting as it does title to or possession of real property. It is an action that survives or is not
extinguished upon the death of a party, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. Section
16, Rule 3 lays down the procedure that must be observed when a party dies in an action that survives.
The rule is intended to protect every party's right to due process. The estate of the deceased party will
continue to be properly represented in the suit, through the duly appointed legal representative.
Moreover, no adjudication can be made against the successor of the deceased if the fundamental right to
a day in court is denied. (Regalado vs. Regalado, G.R. No. 196919, June 6, 2011)

D. Venue
The controlling factor in determining venue for cases is the primary objective for which said cases are
filed. (Olympic Minds and Development Corporation vs. Platinum Group Metals Corporation, 587
SCRA 624)

1. Venue versus Jurisdiction

A former colleague, the Hon. Florenz D. Regalado (Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1, Sixth Revised
Ed., p. 6.), differentiated jurisdiction and venue as follows: (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and
determine a case; venue is the place where the case is to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of
substantive law; venue, of procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and
the subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and,
(d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the
act or agreement of the parties. (Nocum vs. Tan, G.R. No. 145022, September 23, 2005, Chico-Nazario,
J.)

2. Venue of real actions

In accordance with the wordings of Sec. 1 of Rule 4, the venue of real actions shall be the proper court
which has territorial jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof,
is situated. (Irene Marcos-Araneta vs. CA, G.R. No. 154096, August 22, 2008)

3. Venue of personal actions

T he venue of personal actions is the court where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides,
or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. (Irene Marcos-Araneta vs. CA, G.R.
No. 154096, August 22, 2008)
Sec. 2 of Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that when there is more than one plaintiff in a personal action
case, the residences of the principal parties should be the basis for determining proper venue. According
to the late Justice Jose Y. Feria, "the word `principal' has been added [in the uniform procedure rule] in
order to prevent the plaintiff from choosing the residence of a minor plaintiff or defendant as the
venue." Eliminate the qualifying term "principal" and the purpose of the Rule would, to borrow from
Justice Regalado, "be defeated where a nominal or formal party is impleaded in the action since the
latter would not have the degree of interest in the subject of the action which would warrant and entail
the desirably active participation expected of litigants in a case. Id.

4. Venue of actions against non-residents

As a general rule, when the defendant is not residing and is not found in the Philippines, the Philippine
courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his
person, unless he voluntarily appears in court. But, when the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiff residing in the Philippines, or is intended to seize or dispose of any property, real or personal,
of the defendant, located in the Philippines, it may be validly tried by the Philippine courts, for then,
they have jurisdiction over the res, i.e., the personal status of the plaintiff or the property of the
defendant, and their jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. Venue in

such cases may be laid in the province where the plaintiff whose personal status is in question resides,
or where the property of the defendant or a part thereof involved in the litigation is located. (Mabanag
vs. Gallemore, G.R. No. L-825, July 20, 1948)

5. When the Rules on Venue Do not Apply

At the outset, we must make clear that under Section 4 (b) of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the general rules on venue of actions shall not apply where the parties, before the filing of
the action, have validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue. (Sps. Lantin vs. Lantion, G.R. No.
160053, August 28, 2006)

6. Effects of Stipulations on Venue

The mere stipulation on the venue of an action, however, is not enough to preclude parties from
bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. In
the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement
on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. (Sps. Lantin vs. Lantion, G.R. No.
160053, August 28, 2006)

E. Pleadings
The rule allows the pleadings to be signed by either party to the case or the counsel representing that
party. (Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. vs. Santos, 595 SCRA 67)

1. Kinds of Pleadings
a. Complaint
A complaint may be dismissed when the facts establishing prescription are apparent from the complaint
or the records. First Philippine Holdings Corporation vs. Transmiddle East (Phils) Equities, Inc., 607
SCRA 605.

b. Answer
Xxx the RTC had indeed acquired jurisdiction over the person of private respondent when the latter's
counsel entered his appearance on private respondent's behalf, without qualification and without
questioning the propriety of the service of summons, and even filed two Motions for Extension of Time
to File Answer. In effect, private respondent, through counsel, had already invoked the RTCs
jurisdiction over her person by praying that the motions for extension of time to file answer be granted.
We have held that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with
motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. When
private respondent earlier invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC to secure affirmative relief in her motions
for additional time to file answer, she voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC and is thereby
estopped from asserting otherwise. (Palma vs. Galvez, G.R. No. 165273, March 10, 2010)
If the defendant fails to file his answer on time, he may be declared in default upon motion of the
plaintiff with notice to the said defendant. In case he is declared in default, the court shall proceed to
render judgment granting the plaintiff such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its
discretion requires the plaintiff to submit evidence. The defaulting defendant may not take part in the
trial but shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings. (Santos vs. PNOC Exploration Corp.,
G.R. No. 170943, September 23, 2008)

Petitioner failed to file his answer within the required period. Indeed, he would not have moved for the
admission of his answer had he filed it on time. Considering that the answer was belatedly filed, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying its admission. Petitioners plea for equity must fail in
the face of the clear and express language of the rules of procedure and of the September 11, 2003 order
regarding the period for filing the answer. Equity is available only in the absence of law, not as its
replacement. Equity may be applied only in the absence of rules of procedure, never in contravention
thereof. (Santos vs. PNOC Exploration Corp., G.R. No. 170943, September 23, 2008)

(1) Negative defenses

Section 5, Rule 6 of the 1964 Rules of Court states: SECTION 5. Defenses. (a) Negative
defense is the specific denial of the material fact or facts alleged in the complaint, essential to
the plaintiff's cause or causes of action. (Mongao vs. Pryce Properties Corp., G.R. No.
156474. August 16, 2005)
A negative defense (specifically) denies the material facts averred in the complaint essential to
establish the plaintiff's cause of action xxx. (La Naval Drug Corp. vs. CA, G.R. No. 103200
August 31, 1994)
Rule 8, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, as amended, requires a defendant to specify each
material allegations of fact, the truth of which he does not admit, and whenever practicable, to
set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a
defendant desires to deny part of an averment for a qualification thereof, he is mandated to
specify so much of the averment as true and material and shall deny the remainder. If a
defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a
material averment in the complaint, he is bound to so state and this shall have the effect of a
denial. In such a case, it is indispensable that the matter regarding where lack of knowledge is
alleged be clearly set forth so that the adverse party is informed of what is denied. The
purpose of requiring the defendant to make a specific denial is to make him disclose the
matters alleged in the complaint which he succinctly intends to disprove at the trial, together
with the matter which he relied upon to support the denial. The parties are compelled to lay
their cards on the table. (PNB vs. CA, G.R. No. 126153. January 14, 2004)
A denial is not specific simply because it is so qualified by the defendant. A general denial
does not become specific by the use of the word specifically. When the matters of whether
the defendant alleges having no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief, are
plainly and necessarily within the defendants knowledge, his alleged ignorance or lack of
information will not be considered as a specific denial. Section 11, Rule 8 of the said Rule,
provides that material averments in the complaint other than those as to the amount of
unliquidated damages shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Id.

(2) Negative pregnant

A negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at
least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with
qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified
are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the
fact itself is admitted. (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, et. al., G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003)

(3) Affirmative Defenses

For the defendant, an affirmative defense is one which is not a denial of an essential ingredient
in the plaintiffs cause of action, but one which, if established, will be a good defense i.e. an
"avoidance" of the claim. (DBP Pool of Accredited Insurance Co. vs. Radio Mindanao
Network, Inc., G.R. No. 147039. January 27, 2006)
Xxx an affirmative defense in an allegation of a new matter which, while admitting the
material allegations of the complaint, would, nevertheless, prevent or bar recovery by the
plaintiff. (La Naval Drug Corp. vs. CA, G.R. No. 103200 August 31, 1994)

c. Counterclaims
Where the defendant has interposed a counterclaim (whether compulsory or permissive) or is
seeking affirmative relief by a cross complaint, the plaintiff cannot dismiss the action so as to
affect the right of the defendant in his counterclaim or prayer for affirmative relief. (Mendoza
vs. Paule, 579 SCRA 341)
A counterclaim is considered an original complaint and, as such, the attack on the title in a case
originally for recovery of possession is not considered a collateral attack on the title. (Luna, Jr.
vs. Cabales 608 SCRA 193)

(1) Compulsory counterclaim

A counterclaim is compulsory when its object arises out of or is necessarily connected
with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing
partys claim.and does require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. (Reillo vs. San Jose, 589 SCRA 458)

(2) Permissive counterclaim

It is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the
subject matter of the opposing partys claim.(Lafarge cement Phils., Inc. v.
Continental Cement Corp., 443; Lopez v. Gloria, 40 Phil. 26[1919]).
In this case, the action was for annulment of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate. The answer alleging counter-partition and accounting of other parcels of land
is not a compulsory counterclaim as it did not arise out of or is necessarily connected
with the action for Annulment of the Deed. (Reillo, et al. v. San Jose, et al., G.R. NO.
166393, June 18, 2009, Peralta, J).

(3) Effect on the Counterclaim when the complaint is dismissed

The cause of action of a defendants counterclaim for damages and attorneys fees
arising from an unfounded suit is not eliminated by the mere dismissal of the
plaintiffs complaint. (Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Royal Cargo
Corporation, 602 SCRA 545)

d. Cross-claims
The filing of a cross-claim is provided for in Rule 10, sections 2 and 8 of the Rules of Court,
the purpose being to settle in a single proceeding all the claims of the different parties against
each other in the case in order to avoid multiplicity of suits. (People vs. Paredes, et. al., G.R.
No. L-12546; May 20, 1960)

e. Third (fourth, etc.) party complaints

The third-party complaint, is x x x a procedural device whereby a third party who is neither a
party nor privy to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought into the case
with leave of court, by the defendant, who acts as third-party plaintiff to enforce against such
third-party defendant a right for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in
respect of the plaintiffs claim. The third-party complaint is actually independent of and
separate and distinct from the plaintiffs complaint. Were it not for this provision of the Rules
of Court, it would have to be filed independently and separately from the original complaint by
the defendant against the third-party. But the Rules permit defendant to bring in a third-party

defendant or so to speak, to litigate his separate cause of action in respect of plaintiffs claim
against a third party in the original and principal case with the object of avoiding circuitry of
action and unnecessary proliferation of lawsuits and of disposing expeditiously in one
litigation the entire subject matter arising from one particular set of facts. Prior leave of Court
is necessary, so that where the allowance of a third-party complaint would delay the resolution
of the original case, such as when the third-party defendant cannot be located or where matters
extraneous to the issue of possession would unnecessarily clutter a case of forcible entry, or the
effect would be to introduce a new and separate controversy into the action, the salutary object
of the rule would not be defeated, and the court should in such cases require the defendant to
institute a separate action. x x x. (Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. of the Philippines v.
Tempongko, G.R. L-24399, March 28, 1968, 27 SCRA 418)

f. Complaint-in-intervention
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings,
becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest
which may be affected by such proceedings. (Asias Emerging Dragon Corporation v.
Department of Transportation and Communications, G.R. Nos. 169914 and 174166, March 24,
2008, 549 SCRA 44, 49)
Intervention is defined as "a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted
by the court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the
complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding
something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by which a third person becomes a
party in a suit pending between others; the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an
original party to pending legal proceedings, by which such person becomes a party thereto for
the protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings.
(Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Br. 39, G.R. No. 89909,
September 21, 1990, 189 SCRA 820, 824)
Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal interest in the
matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the parties; (3) or an interest against the
parties; (4) or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition
of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. (Alfelor v. Halasan, G.R. No.
165987, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 451, 460)
Xxx the initial lack of the complaint-in-intervention of the requisite verification and
certification on non-forum shopping was cured when the intervenors, in their motion for
reconsideration of the order denying the motion to intervene, appended a complaint-inintervention containing the required verification and certificate of non-forum shopping.
(Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Heirs of Estanislao Mioza, et. al., G.R. No.
186045, February 2, 2011)

g. Reply
Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses founded upon a written instrument
and provides the manner of denying it. It is more controlling than Rule 6, Section 10 which
merely provides the effect of failure to file a Reply. (Casent Realty Development Corp., vs.
Philbanking Corp., G.R. No. 150731, September 14, 2007)
Thus, where the defense in the Answer is based on an actionable document, a Reply
specifically denying it under oath must be made; otherwise, the genuineness and due execution
of the document will be deemed admitted. (Toribio v. Bidin, No. L-57821, January 17, 1985,
134 SCRA 162, 170)
Since respondent failed to deny the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and
Confirmation Statement under oath, then these are deemed admitted and must be considered by
the court in resolving the demurrer to evidence. (Casent Realty Development Corp., vs.
Philbanking Corp., G.R. No. 150731, September 14, 2007)

Xxx when the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed admitted because of
the adverse partys failure to make a specific verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be
presented formally in evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact. (Philippine American
General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Sweet Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 87434, August 5, 1992, 212 SCRA
194, 204)

2. Pleadings allowed in small claim cases and cases covered by the rules on summary
procedure
In the United States, Massachusetts was the first to pass a state-wide act providing for a procedure on
minor claims because it was there found that "the poor man with a small case in many instances, found
the courts practically closed to him, because the fees for entry and service of process were more than he
could afford and because of the expense of employing counsel to pilot his title case through the
intricacies of pleadings, evidence, and trial procedure." (Report of Committee on Small Claims and
Conciliation Procedure, A. B. A. J., Vol. X, p. 828.) Other states have followed suit under the same
spirit, such as the States of California, Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey,
Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Kansas, and the Cities of Chicago, Cleveland,
and Philadelphia, and others. (See Columbia Law Review, Vol. 34, p. 932; Willoughby, Principles of
judicial Administration, pp. 307-319.) Because litigants cannot afford to avail themselves of the services
of attorneys, the procedure in such cases requires generally no formal pleadings but a mere statement of
the claim to the clerk of the court, and hearing is conducted in such manner and form and with such
methods of proof as the court deems best suited to discover the facts and to determine the justice of the
case. (Cabangis vs. Lopez, G.R. No. 47685, September 20, 1940)
The purpose of the Rules on Summary Procedure is to prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases
and to achieve this, the filing of certain pleadings is prohibited, including the filing of a motion for
reconsideration. However, the motion for reconsideration that petitioners allege to be a prohibited
pleading was filed before the RTC acting as an appellate court. The appeal before the RTC is no longer
covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure. The Rules on Summary Procedure apply before the
appeal to the RTC. Hence, respondents motion for reconsideration filed with the RTC is not a
prohibited pleading. (Macadangdang vs. Gaviola, G.R. No. 156809, March 4, 2009)

3. Parts of a pleading
A pleading is sufficient in form when it contains the following:
1. A Caption, setting forth the name of the court, the title of the action indicating the names of
the parties, and the docket number which is usually left in blank, as the Clerk of Court has to
assign yet a docket number;
2. The Body, reflecting the designation, the allegations of the partys claims or defenses, the
relief prayed for, and the date of the pleading;
3. The Signature and Address of the party or counsel;
4. Verification. This is required to secure an assurance that the allegations have been made in
good faith, or are true and correct and not merely speculative;
5. A Certificate of Non-forum Shopping, which although not jurisdictional, the same is
obligatory;
6. An Explanation in case the pleading is not filed personally to the Court. Likewise, for
pleading subsequent to the complaint, if the same is not served personally to the parties
affected, there must also be an explanation why service was not done personally.
Likewise, for all other pleadings, not initiatory in nature, there must be:
A Proof of Service, which consists in the written admission of the party served, or the official
return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date,
place and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an
affidavit of the person mailing. If service is by registered mail, proof shall be made by such
affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office.

In case a party is represented by counsel de parte, additional requirements that go into the form of the
pleading should be incorporated, viz.:
1. The Roll of Attorneys Number;
2. The Current Professional Tax Receipt Number; and
3. The IBP Official Receipt No. or IBP Lifetime Membership Number.
4. MCLE Compliance or Exemption Certificate Number and Date of Issue (effective January
1, 2009).
(Sps. Munsalud vs. NHA, G.R. No. 167181, December 23, 2008)

a. Caption
The designation or caption is not controlling more than the allegations in the complaint. It is
not even an indispensable part of the complaint. (Sps. Munsalud vs. NHA, G.R. No. 167181,
December 23, 2008)
The trial court is reminded that the caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature
of the action. The caption of the pleading should not be the governing factor, but rather the
allegations in it should determine the nature of the action, because even without the prayer for
a specific remedy, the courts may nevertheless grant the proper relief as may be warranted by
the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced. Id.

b. Signature and address

While an unsigned motion under Section 10, Rule 15 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 7 of the 1997
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure has no legal effect and may be deemed a mere scrap of
paper, We brush aside this procedural deficiency as it appears to be a mere inadvertence on the
part of respondents counsel. In fact, respondents have filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve and
Second Urgent Motion to Resolve their unsigned motion, which We deem as substantial
remediation of the lack of signature of counsel in the unsigned motion. (Fama Realty, Inc. and
Felix Assad vs. Sps. Trinidad, [G.R. No. 179811 : June 06, 2011)

c. Verification and certification against forum shopping

The requirement of verification may be made by the party, his lawyer or his representative or
any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading. (Tanjuatco vs.
Gako Jr., 582 SCRA 200)
Even if the verification is flawed or defective, the court may still give due course to the
pleading if the circumstances warrant the relaxation of the rule in the interest of justice. Id.
Lack of verification is not a fatal defect; verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional
requirement; it could easily be corrected by directing compliance therewith, it purpose being
simply to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition (or complaint) have been
made in good faith, or are true and correct, not merely speculative. (Bacolod-Talisay Realty
and Development Corporation vs. Dela Cruz, 587 SCRA 304)
The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations in a
petition have been made in good faith, or are true and correct, not merely speculative;
verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional requirement. (People vs. De Grano, 588
SCRA 550)

(1) Requirements of a corporation executing the

verification/certification of non-forum shopping
In a case where the plaintiff is a private corporation, the certification may be
signed, for and on behalf of the said corporation, by a specifically authorized
person, including its retained counsel, who has personal knowledge of the
facts required to be established by the documents. (Expertravel & Tours,
Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 152392. May 26, 2005)
Unlike natural persons, corporations may perform physical actions only
through properly delegated individuals; namely, its officers and/or agents.
(National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134468, August
29, 2002)
Indeed, the certificate of non-forum shopping may be incorporated in the
complaint or appended thereto as an integral part of the complaint. The rule
is that compliance with the rule after the filing of the complaint, or the
dismissal of a complaint based on its non-compliance with the rule, is
impermissible. However, in exceptional circumstances, the court may allow
subsequent compliance with the rule. If the authority of a partys counsel to
execute a certificate of non-forum shopping is disputed by the adverse party,
the former is required to show proof of such authority or representation.
(Expertravel & Tours, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 152392. May 26, 2005)

d. Effect of the signature of counsel in a pleading

It was contented that since the lawyer did not sign the petition and the MR, the same are mere
scraps of paper as they were considered as unsigned. In brushing aside the contention, the SC
said that the rules allow the pleadings to be signed by either the party to case or the counsel
representing that party. In this case, petitioner opted to sign its petition and its motion for
reconsideration in its own behalf, through its corporate president who was duly authorized by
the Board to represent the company in prosecuting the case. Therefore, the said pleadings
cannot be considered unsigned and without any legal effect. (Sameer Overseas Employment
Agency, Inc. v. Santos, G.R. No 152579, August 4, 2009)

4. Allegations in a pleading
The allegations of the pleading prevail over its title in determining the character of the action taken.
(Tomas vs. Santos, G.R. No. 190448, July 26, 2010)

a. Manner of making allegations

(1) Condition precedent
The characteristic of a condition precedent is that the acquisition of the right is not
effected while said condition is not complied with or is not deemed complied with.
(Parks vs. Province of Tarlac, G.R. No. L-24190, July 13, 1926)
P.D. No. 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition
precedent for the filing of a complaint in Court. Non-compliance with that condition
precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his
complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or
prematurity. The condition is analogous to exhaustion of administrative remedies, or
the lack of earnest efforts to compromise suits between family members, lacking
which the case can be dismissed. (Morata vs. Go, 125 SCRA 444 [1983], and Vda. de
Borromeo vs. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217 [1983])
The conciliation procedure required under PD 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement
in the sense that failure to have prior recourse to it does not deprive a court of its
jurisdiction, either over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant. Noncompliance with the condition precedent under said law does not prevent a court of
competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over a case where

defendants fail to object to such exercise of jurisdiction. But such objection should be
seasonably made before the court first taking cognizance of the complaint, and must
be raised in the Answer, or in such other pleading allowed under the Rules of Court.
(Junson vs. Martinez, G.R. No. 141324, July 8, 2003)
A complaint or petition filed in court or other government office without compliance
with the precondition may be dismissed on motion of any interested party on the
ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action. The defect may however be
waived by failing to make seasonable objection, in a motion to dismiss or answer, the
defect being a mere procedural imperfection which does not affect the jurisdiction of
the court. (Agbayani vs. Belen, G.R. No. L-65629, November 24, 1986)

(2) Fraud, mistake, malice, intent, knowledge and other condition of the
mind, judgments, official documents or acts
Section 5, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
Section 5. Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. - In all averments of fraud
or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated
with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge or other condition of the mind
of a person may be averred generally.
Again, the complaint falls short of the requirement that fraud must be stated with
particularity. The complaint merely states:
4. That sometime in the year of 1997, the consolidator-facilitator of the
Defendants FGPC and Balfour by means of fraud and machinations of words
were able to convince[] the plaintiff to enter into CONTRACT OF
EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY wherein the latter granted in favor of the
defendant FGPC the right to erect [its] Tower No. 98 on the land of the
plaintiff situated at Barangay Maigsing Dahilig, Lemery 4209 Batangas
including the right to Install Transmission Lines over a portion of the same
property for a consideration therein stated, a xerox copy of said contract is
hereto attached as [] ANNEXES "A" up to "A-4" of the complaint;
5. That the said contract, (Annexes "A" up to "A-4") was entered into by the
plaintiff under the "MISREPRESENTATION, PROMISES, FALSE AND
FRAUDULENT ASSURANCES AND TRICKS" of the defendants[.]
(Luistro vs. CA, G.R. No. 158819, April 16, 2009)
Xxx this Court, it will not be amiss, to state, finds that the allegations of threats,
intimidation, harassment made by plaintiffs are couched in general terms contrary to
Section 5, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court which states that in (sic) all averments of
fraud, or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with
particularity. (Associated Bank vs. Sps. Montano, G.R. No. 166383, October 16,
2009)

b. Pleading an actionable document

The pertinent rule on actionable documents is found in Rule 8, Section 7 of the Rules of Court
which provides that when the cause of action is anchored on a document, the genuineness or
due execution of the instrument shall be deemed impliedly admitted unless the defendant,
under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts. (Permanent
Savings and Loan Bank vs. Velarde, G.R. NO. 140608, September 23, 2004)

c. Specific denials
(1) Effect of failure to make specific denials
Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court likewise provides that material allegations in the
complaint which are not specially denied, other than the amount of unliquidated damages, are

deemed admitted. A denial made without setting forth the substance of the matters relied upon
in support of the denial, even when to do so is practicable, does not amount to a specific
denial. (Rep. V. Southside Homeowners Assn., Inc., 502 SCRA 587 [2006]; Rep. v. SB; 406
SCRA 190 [2003]
The denials were not specific as the petitioners failed to set forth the substance of the matters
in which she relied upon to support her denial. The petitioner merely alleged that consent was
given; how and why, she did not say. If indeed consent were given, it would have been easy to
fill in the details. She could have stated in her pleadings that she verbally informed the
respondent of the need for the repairs, or wrote him a letter. She could have stated his response,
and how it was conveyed, whether verbally or in writing. She could have stated whrn the
consent was solicited and procured. These, she failed to do. Ergo, the petitioner is deemed to
have admitted the material allegations in the complaint. (Terana v. Hon. De Sagun, et al., G.R..
NO. 152131, April 29, 2009)

(2) When a specific denial requires an oath

Under Sec. 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, when the cause of action is anchored on a
document, the genuineness or due execution of the instrument shall be deemed
impliedly admitted unless the defendant, under oath, specifically denies them, and
sets forth what he claims to be the facts. Said rule should be read in conjunction with
Sec. 9 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which provides, in substance,
that when the parties have reduced their agreement to writing they have made such
writing the only repository and memorial of the truth, and whatever is not found in the
writing must be understood to have been waived or abandoned, unless he puts in issue
that there is a mistake or imperfection in the writing, or that it does not express the
true agreement of the parties, or that the agreement is invalid or that there is an
intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. (Maunlad Savings & Loan Association, Inc., vs.
CA, G.R. No. 114942. November 27, 2000)
In the instant case, while the specific denial in the original answer was not under oath
and thus gave rise to the implied admission of the genuineness and due execution of
the contents of the promissory note, private respondent, thru his testimony, was able
to put in issue and present parol evidence to controvert the terms of the promissory
note, which are essentially the bedrock of his defense. The presentation of the
contrariant evidence for and against imputations of genuineness and due execution
undoubtedly cured, clarified or expanded, as the case may be, whatever defects in the
pleadings or vagueness in the issues there might have been as presented in the original
answer. Id.

5. Effect of failure to plead

1. Failure to plead defenses and objections

The fact that the plaintiff's own allegation in the complaint or the
evidence it presented shows clearly that the action had prescribed
removes this case from the rule regarding waiver of the defense by
failure to plead the same. (B & I Realty Co., Inc. vs. Teodoro Caspe And
Purificacion Aguilar Caspe, G.R. No. 146972, January 29, 2008)
2. Failure to plead a compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim

In Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. vs. Glodel Brokerage Corporation

(G.R. No. 179446, January 10, 2011), the Supreme Court held in
resolving the issue of whether Glodel can collect from Loadmasters, it
having failed to file a cross-claim against the latter:

Undoubtedly, Glodel has a definite cause of action against Loadmasters for

breach of contract of service as the latter is primarily liable for the loss of the
subject cargo. In this case, however, it cannot succeed in seeking judicial
sanction against Loadmasters because the records disclose that it did not
properly interpose a cross-claim against the latter.
Glodel did not even pray
that Loadmasters be liable for any and all claims that it may be adjudged liable
in favor of R&B Insurance. Under the Rules, a compulsory counterclaim, or a
cross-claim, not set up shall be barred. Thus, a cross-claim cannot be set up for
the first time on appeal.

6. Default
a. When a declaration of default is proper

The effects of a defendant's failure to file an answer within the

time allowed therefor are governed by Sections 3 and 4, Rule 9 (on
Effect of Failure to Plead) of the Rules of Court. If the defendant fails to
file his answer on time, he may be declared in default upon motion of
the plaintiff with notice to the said defendant. (Santos vs. PNOC, G.R.
No. 170943, September 23, 2008) In Santos vs. PNOC, supra, respondent
moved only for the ex parte presentation of evidence, not for the
declaration of petitioner in default. The Supreme Court held:
As is readily apparent, the September 11, 2003 order did not limit itself to
permitting respondent to present its evidence ex parte but in effect issued an
order of default. But the trial court could not validly do that as an order of
default can be made only upon motion of the claiming party. Since no motion to
declare petitioner in default was filed, no default order should have been issued.

b. Effect of an order of default

In case he is declared in default, the court shall proceed to render

judgment granting the plaintiff such relief as his pleading may warrant,
unless the court in its discretion requires the plaintiff to submit
evidence. The defaulting defendant may not take part in the trial but
shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings. (Santos vs. PNOC,
G.R. No. 170943, September 23, 2008)

To pursue the matter to its logical conclusion, if a party

declared in default is entitled to notice of subsequent
proceedings, all the more should a party who has not been
declared in default be entitled to such notice. But what happens if
the residence or whereabouts of the defending party is not known
or he cannot be located? In such a case, there is obviously no way
notice can be sent to him and the notice requirement cannot
apply to him. The law does not require that the impossible be
done. Nemo tenetur ad impossibile. The law obliges no one to
perform an impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted in a
way that they are in accordance with logic, common sense, reason
and practicality. (Santos vs. PNOC, G.R. No. 170943, September
23, 2008). Hence, even if petitioner was not validly declared in
default, he could not reasonably demand that copies of orders
and processes be furnished him.
Regarding judgments by default, it was explained in Gajudo
vs. Traders Royal Bank (G.R. No. 151098, March 21, 2006) that
complainants are not automatically entitled to the relief prayed
for, once the defendants are declared in default. Favorable relief
can be granted only after the court has ascertained that the relief
is warranted by the evidence offered and the facts proven by the
presenting party. In Pascua, this Court ruled that it would be
meaningless to require presentation of evidence if every time the
other party is declared in default, a decision would automatically
be rendered in favor of the non-defaulting party and exactly
according to the tenor of his prayer. This is not contemplated by

the Rules nor is it sanctioned by the due process clause. Being

declared in default does not constitute a waiver of rights except
that of being heard and of presenting evidence in the trial court.
(Gajudo vs. Traders Royal Bank, supra)
In other words, a defaulted defendant is not actually thrown
out of court. While in a sense it may be said that by defaulting he
leaves himself at the mercy of the court, the rules see to it that
any judgment against him must be in accordance with law. The
evidence to support the plaintiffs cause is, of course, presented
in his absence, but the court is not supposed to admit that which
is basically incompetent. Although the defendant would not be in
a position to object, elementary justice requires that only legal
evidence should be considered against him. If the evidence
presented should not be sufficient to justify a judgment for the
plaintiff, the complaint must be dismissed. And if an unfavorable
judgment should be justifiable, it cannot exceed in amount or be
different in kind from what is prayed for in the complaint. (Gajudo
vs. Traders Royal Bank, G.R. No. 151098, March 21, 2006)
c. Relief from an order of default

A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different from an ordinary

motion in that the Motion should be verified; and must show
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and meritorious
defenses. The allegations of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable neglect, and (2) of meritorious defenses must concur.
(Banco De Oro-Epci, Inc. vs. John Tansipek, G.R. No. 181235, July
22, 2009)
d. Effect of a partial default

Sec. 3(c) of Rule 9 states that when a pleading asserting a

claim states a common cause of action against several defending
parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the
court shall try the case against all upon the answers thus filed
and render judgment upon the evidence presented. Therefore, the
answer filed by a defendant inure to the benefit of all the
defendants, defaulted or not, and all of them share a common
fate in the action. It is not within the authority of the trial court to
divide the case before it by first hearing it ex parte as against the
defaulted defendant and rendering a default judgment (in the
instant case, partial decision) against it, then proceeding to hear
the case, as to the non-defaulted defendant. This deprives the
defaulted defendant of due process as it is denied the benefit of
the answer and the evidence which could have been presented by
its non-defaulted co-defendant. (Heirs of Mamerto Manguiat vs.
CA, G.R. No. 150768/160176, August 20, 2008)
e. Extent of relief
No recent jurisprudence on this topic.

f.

Actions where default are not allowed

The purpose of the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or

the Solicitor General is to ensure that the interest of the State is
represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the
parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence. While the
appearances of the Solicitor General and/or the Public Prosecutor are
mandatory, the failure of the RTC to require their appearance does not

per se nullify the Compromise Agreement. (Maquilan vs. Maquilan, G.R.

NO. 155409, June 8, 2007)
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e)
of the Rules of Court, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
also requries the participation of the public prosecutor in cases
involving void marriages. It specifically mandates the prosecutor to
submit his investigation report to determine whether there is collusion
between the parties. (Llave vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No.
169766, March 30, 2011).
g. Rule 133 Sec. 1 vs. Rule 9 Sec. 3

Between Sec. 1 of Rule 133 and Sec. 3 of Rule 9, there is no

incompatibility that would preclude the application of either one of
them. To begin with, Section 3 of Rule 9 governs the procedure which
the trial court is directed to take when a defendant fails to file an
answer. According to this provision, the court "shall proceed to render
judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may
warrant," subject to the courts discretion on whether to require the
presentation of evidence ex parte. The same provision also sets down
guidelines on the nature and extent of the relief that may be granted. In
particular, the courts judgment "shall not exceed the amount or be
different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages."
(Gajudo vs. Traders Royal Bank, G.R. No. 151098, March 21, 2006)
In sum, while petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex
parte under Section 3 of Rule 9, they were not excused from
establishing their claims for damages by the required quantum of proof
under Section 1 of Rule 133. Stated differently, any advantage they may
have gained from the ex parte presentation of evidence does not lower
the degree of proof required. Clearly then, there is no incompatibility
between the two rules. (Gajudo vs. Traders Royal Bank, G.R. No.
151098, March 21, 2006)
7. Filing and Service of pleadings
I.

Payment of docket fees

General Rule: Mandatory

Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege, thus,

appeal must be made strictly in accordance with the provision set by
law. Furthermore, upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay
to the CA clerk of court the docketing and other lawful fees; noncompliance with the procedural requirements shall be a sufficient
ground for the petitions dismissal. Thus, payment in full of docket fees
within the prescribed period is not only mandatory, but also
jurisdictional. It is an essential requirement, without which, the decision
appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal has
been filed. (Saint Louis University, Inc. vs. Cobarrubias, G.R. No.
187104, August 3, 2010)
Exception: 2 Requisites

The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory. A court acquires jurisdiction over any
case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. The strict
application of this rule was, however, relaxed two (2) years after in the
case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. vs. Asuncion (233 Phil. 579 (1987)),
wherein the Court decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. This ruling
was made on the premise that the plaintiff had demonstrated his

willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees

required. Thus, in the more recent case of United Overseas Bank vs. Ros
(252 Phil. 280 (1989)), the Court explained that where the party does
not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of docket fees,
and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional
docket fees when required by the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated
in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict regulations set in
Manchester, will apply. It has been on record that the Court, in several
instances, allowed the relaxation of the rule on non-payment of docket
fees in order to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their
cases on the merits. (The Heirs of the Late Ruben Reinoso, Sr., vs. CA,
G.R. No. 116121, July 18, 2011)
Thus, the liberal application of procedural rules is allowed only
when two requisites are present: (1) there is a plausible explanation for the
non-compliance, and (2) the outright dismissal would defeat the administration
of justice. (Domingo vs. CA, G.R. No. 169122, February 2, 2010)
II.

Filing versus service of pleadings

Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons.

Plainly, such should expedite action or resolution on a pleading, motion
or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely
to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the
inefficiency of postal service. Likewise, personal service will do away
with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort
to the following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing
pleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the
latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance, responsive
pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the post
office that the registered parcel containing the pleading of or other
paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating
before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby
causing undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other papers.
(Domingo vs. CA, G.R. No. 169122, February 2, 2010)
III.

Periods of filing of pleadings

No recent jurisprudence on this topic.

IV.

Manner of filing

Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that if a pleading

is filed by registered mail, then the date of mailing shall be considered
as the date of filing. It does not matter when the court actually receives
the mailed pleading. (Russel vs. Ebasan, G.R. No. 184542, April 23,
2010)
If the pleading filed was not done personally, the date of mailing,
as stamped on the envelope or the registry receipt, is considered as the
date of filing. Under the Rules, should the last day of the period to file a
pleading fall on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, a litigant is
allowed to file his or her pleading on the next working day. (Padre vs.
Badillo, G.R. No. 165423, January 19, 2011)
V.

Modes of service

Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,

personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of
service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or
filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place and
person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service
or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which
must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal
service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the
plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the

importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved

therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be
expunged for violation of Section 11. The courts cannot rule otherwise,
lest they will allow circumvention of the innovation introduced by the
1997 Rules in order to obviate delay in the administration of justice.
(Domingo vs. CA, G.R. No. 169122, February 2, 2010)
(1) Personal service

As a rule, personal service of judgments is done by delivering

them personally to the party or his counsel, or when they are left in his
office, with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. In case
this is not possible, the copy of the judgment may be left at the partys
or his counsels residence with a person of sufficient age or discretion
residing therein. (DBP vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 166933,
August 10, 2006)
(2) Service by mail

Section 7 of Rule 13 contemplates service at the present address

of the party and not at any other address of the party. Service at the
party's former address or his last known address or any address other
than his present address does not qualify as substantial compliance
with the requirements of Section 7, Rule 13. Therefore, service by
registered mail presupposes that the present address of the party is
known and if the person who receives the same is not the addressee, he
must be duly authorized by the former to receive the paper on behalf of
the party. (Sps. Belen vs. Chavez, G.R. No. 175334, March 26, 2008)
(3) Substituted service

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the

defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the
case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who
does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal
service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons
within a reasonable time, substituted service may be made in
accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of
the country, any of the following modes of service may be
resorted to:
(1) Substituted service set forth in Section 8;
(2) Personal service outside the country, with leave of court;
(3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or
(4) Any other manner the court may deem sufficient. (Sps. Belen
vs. Chavez, G.R. No. 175334, March 26, 2008)
However, in an action in personam wherein the defendant is a nonresident who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the
court, personal service of summons within the state is essential to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. This method of service is
possible if such defendant is physically present in the country. If he is
not found therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person
and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him. An
exception was laid down in Gemperle vs. Schenker wherein a nonresident was served with summons through his wife, who was a resident
of the Philippines and who was his representative and attorney-in-fact
in a prior civil case filed by him; moreover, the second case was a mere
offshoot of the first case. (Sps. Belen vs. Chavez, G.R. No. 175334,
March 26, 2008)
On the other hand, in a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to

confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires

jurisdiction over the res. Nonetheless, summons must be served upon
the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction
but merely for satisfying the due process requirements. Thus, where the
defendant is a non-resident who is not found in the Philippines and (1)
the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) the action
relates to, or the subject matter of which is property in the Philippines
in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest; (3) the action
seeks the exclusion of the defendant from any interest in the property
located in the Philippines; or (4) the property of the defendant has been
attached in the Philippines-- service of summons may be effected by (a)
personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication,
also with leave of court; or (c) any other manner the court may deem
sufficient. (Sps. Belen vs. Chavez, G.R. No. 175334, March 26, 2008)
(4) Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions

Judgments, final orders and resolutions are appealable.

It is
necessary that they be served personally or, if not possible, by
registered mail accompanied by a written explanation why the service
was not done personally, in order that the period for taking an appeal
may be computed. (DBP vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 166933,
August 10, 2006)
On many occasions, the Court has strictly construed the
requirements of the proper service of papers and judgments. Both in
Heirs of Delos Santos vs. Del Rosario and Tuazon vs. Molina, the service
of the trial court's decision at an adjacent office and the receipt thereof
by a person not authorized by the counsel of record was held
ineffective. Likewise, the service of the decision made at the ground
floor instead of at the 9th floor of a building in the address on record of
petitioners' counsel, was held invalid in PLDT vs. NLRC. In these cases,
there was no constructive service of the decision even if the service was
made at the offices adjacent to the address on record of the parties'
counsels and even if the copies eventually found their way to persons
duly authorized to receive them. (DBP vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
166933, August 10, 2006)
(5) Priorities in modes of service and filing

In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the

defendant is the preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of
the summons to the defendant in person. If the defendant, for
justifiable reasons, cannot be served with the summons within a
reasonable period, then substituted service can be resorted to. While
substituted service of summons is permitted, "it is extraordinary in
character and in derogation of the usual method of service." (Sps. Belen
vs. Chavez, G.R. No. 175334, March 26, 2008)
If defendant cannot be served with summons because he is
temporarily abroad, but otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of
summons may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines
under Rule 14, Section 15. In all of these cases, it should be noted,
defendant must be a resident of the Philippines, otherwise an action in
personam cannot be brought because jurisdiction over his person is
essential to make a binding decision. (Sps. Belen vs. Chavez, G.R. No.
175334, March 26, 2008)
(6) When service is deemed complete

There is no doubt that under the Rules, service by registered mail

is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee. However, if the
addressee fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days
from the date of the first notice, service becomes effective upon the
expiration of five (5) days therefrom.14 In such a case, there arises a

presumption that the service was complete at the end of the said fiveday period. This means that the period to appeal or to file the necessary
pleading begins to run after five days from the first notice given by the
postmaster. This is because a party is deemed to have received and to
have been notified of the judgment at that point. (Quelnan vs. VHF Phil,
G.R. No. 138500 September 16, 2005)
(7) Proof of filing and service

When service of notice is an issue, the rule is that the person

alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service. The
burden of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence. In
civil cases, service made through registered mail is proved by the
registry receipt issued by the mailing office and an affidavit of the
person mailing of facts showing compliance with Section 13, Rule 13 of
the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. (Republic vs. Resins, Inc., G.R. No.
175891, January 12, 2010)
Mere photocopies of the return slips are also insufficient. The
original copies of the registry receipt or, in lieu thereof, the unclaimed
notice and a certification from the postmaster of the issuance of notice,
should be presented. (Republic vs. Resins, Inc., G.R. No. 175891,
January 12, 2010)
While we concede that there may be a presumption of regularity,
in the ordinary course of events, that the Clerk of Court sent the
Judgment to the [parties to the actino], such presumption should fail
when the [concerned party] itself denies receipt. When the service of
the judgment is questioned, there is a need to present both the registry
receipt registry receipt issued by the mailing office and the affidavit of
the person mailing. (Republic vs. Resins, Inc., G.R. No. 175891, January
12, 2010)
8. Amendment

Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be

liberally allowed in furtherance of justice so that every case may so far
as possible be determined on its real facts and in order to prevent the
circuity of action. (Quirao vs. Quirao, G.R. No. 148120, October 24,
2003) However, an amendment cannot be allowed when the court has no
jurisdiction over the original Complaint and the purpose of the
amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court. (Siasoco vs. CA, G.R.
No. 132753, February 15, 1999)
a. Amendment as a matter of right

Section 2, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly states

that a pleading may be amended as a matter of right before a
responsive pleading is served. This only means that prior to the filing of
an answer, the plaintiff has the absolute right to amend the complaint
whether a new cause of action or change in theory is introduced. The
reason for this rule is implied in the subsequent Section 3 of Rule 10.
Under this provision, substantial amendment of the complaint is not
allowed without leave of court after an answer has been served,
because any material change in the allegations contained in the
complaint could prejudice the rights of the defendant who has already
set up his defense in the answer. (Remington vs. CA, G.R. No. 133657,
May 29, 2002)
Conversely, it cannot be said that the defendants rights have
been violated by changes made in the complaint if he has yet to file an
answer thereto. In such an event, the defendant has not presented any
defense that can be altered or affected by the amendment of the
complaint in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 10. The defendant still
retains the unqualified opportunity to address the allegations against

him by properly setting up his defense in the answer. Considerable

leeway is thus given to the plaintiff to amend his complaint once, as a
matter of right, prior to the filing of an answer by the defendant.
(Remington vs. CA, G.R. No. 133657, May 29, 2002)
The right granted to the plaintiff under procedural law to amend
the complaint before an answer has been served is not precluded by the
filing of a motion to dismiss or any other proceeding contesting its sufficiency.
Were we to conclude otherwise, the right to amend a pleading under
Section 2, Rule 10 will be rendered nugatory and ineffectual, since all
that a defendant has to do to foreclose this remedial right is to
challenge the adequacy of the complaint before he files an answer.
(Remington vs. CA, G.R. No. 133657, May 29, 2002)
Moreover, amendment of pleadings is favored and should be
liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice in order to determine
every case as far as possible on its merits without regard to
technicalities. This principle is generally recognized to speed up trial
and save party litigants from incurring unnecessary expense, so that a
full hearing on the merits of every case may be had and multiplicity of
suits avoided. (Remington vs. CA, G.R. No. 133657, May 29, 2002)
b. Amendments by leave of court

It is clear from Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 10 that once a case has

already been set for hearing, regardless of whether a responsive
pleading has been served, substantial amendments such as those
contained in petitioners Amended Answer may only be made upon
leave of court. (Maranan vs. Manila Banking Corp, G.R. No. 164398,
March 30, 2007)
The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that
under the new rules, the amendment may (now) substantially alter the
cause of action or defense. This should only be true, however, when
despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or
defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher
interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote
the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. (Ching Tiu
vs. PBC, G.R. No. 151932, August 19, 2009)
The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter
particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court; and
that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the
amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or
alter the theory of the case, or that it was not made to delay the action.
Nevertheless, even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of
action or defense, such amendment could still be allowed when it is
sought to serve the higher interest of substantial justice; prevent delay;
and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and
proceedings. (Ching Tiu vs. PBC, G.R. No. 151932, August 19, 2009)
c. Formal amendment

Substitution of the party plaintiff would not constitute a change in

the Identity of the parties. The defect of the complaint is merely formal,
not substantial. No unfairness or surprise to private respondent Dolla,
defendant in the court a quo, would result by allowing the amendment,
the purpose of which is merely to conform to procedural rules or to
correct a technical error. (Juasing Hardware vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. L55687 July 30, 1982) There being a "defect in the designation of the
parties", its correction could be summarily made at any stage of the
action provided no prejudice is caused thereby to the adverse party.
(Genato vs. Genato, G.R. No. 169706, February 5, 2010)

Amendments of pleadings may be resorted to subject to the

condition that the amendments sought do not alter the cause of action
of the original complaint. More aptly, in another case, the Court
pronounced that amendment of pleadings may be resorted to, so long
as the intended amendments are not inconsistent with the allegations
in the initial complaint, and are obviously intended to clarify the
intrinsic ambiguity in it with respect to the time of accrual of the cause
of action. (Bormaheco, Inc. vs. Malayan Insurance Co., G.R. No. 156599,
July 26, 2010)
d. Amendments to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence

Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that if

evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within
the issues raised by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to
be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the
merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be sub
served thereby. Thus, what is needed is presentation of the parties'
evidence on the issue. Note also that under Section 5, Rule 10,
necessary amendments to pleadings may be made to cause them to
conform to the evidence. (Planners vs. City of Urdaneta, G.R. No.
162525, September 23, 2008)
e. Different from supplemental pleadings

f. Effect of amended pleading

F. Summons
1. Nature and purpose of summons in relation to actions in personam, in rem and
quasi in rem
2. Voluntary appearance

Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be acquired not

only by proper service of summons but also by defendants voluntary
appearance without expressly objecting to the courts jurisdiction, as
embodied in Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, viz:
SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendants voluntary appearance in the
action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.

The filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit

answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a
default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for
reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction
of the court. (Atiko Trans, Inc. vs. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance,
Inc., G.R. No. 167545, August 17, 2011)
3. Personal service

Summons through an agent

Where service of summons upon the defendant principal is
coursed thru its co-defendant agent, and the latter happens to be a
domestic corporation, the rules on service of summons upon a domestic
private juridical entity must be strictly complied with. Otherwise, the
court cannot be said to have acquired jurisdiction over the person of
both defendants.
And insofar as the principal is concerned, such
jurisdictional flaw cannot be cured by the agents subsequent voluntary

appearance. (Atiko Trans, Inc. vs. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance,

Inc., G.R. No. 167545, August 17, 2011)

Summons on Foreign Juridical Entity

When the defendant is a foreign juridical entity, service of
summons may be made upon:
1.
2.
3.

Its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that

purpose;
The government official designated by law to receive
summons if the corporation does not have a resident agent;
or,
Any of the corporations officers or agents within the
Philippines (Atiko Trans, Inc. vs. Prudential Guarantee and
Assurance, Inc., G.R. No. 167545, August 17, 2011)

4. Substituted service

5. Constructive service (by publication)

The required prior or contemporaneous service of summons may

be dispensed with in the following instances: (a) when the summons
cannot be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent
efforts, (b) when the adverse party is a resident of the Philippines
temporarily absent therefrom, or (c) when such party is a nonresident.
(Gonzales vs. State Properties Corporation, G.R. No. 140765 January 25,
2001).
a. Service upon a defendant where his identity is unknown or where his
whereabouts are unknown
b. Service upon residents temporarily outside the Philippines
6. Extra-territorial service, when allowed
7. Service upon prisoners and minors

8. Proof of service
G. Motions
1. Motions in general
a. Definition of a motion
b. Motions versus pleadings
c. Contents and form of motions
d. Notice of hearing and hearing of motions

When hearings are not required: Non-litigious motions

1. Motion for Issuance of Alias Summons is non-litigious in nature,
which does not require a hearing under the Rules, as the same
could have been acted upon by the RTC without prejudicing the
rights of the respondents. All facts necessary for the
determination of the motion are already specified therein or a
matter of record and there was yet no adverse party to dispute
the same as the court had not even acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the respondents. It was serious error on the part of the

trial court to have denied the first motion for issuance of alias
summons for want of notice of hearing. It was also not mandatory
for the trial court to set the second motion for hearing. (PCI
Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. Antonio C. Milan, et al., G.R. No.
151215, April 5, 2010)
e. Omnibus motion rule
f. Litigated and ex parte motions
g. Pro-forma motions
2. Motions for Bill of Particulars
a. Purpose and when applied for
b. Actions of the court
c. Compliance with the order and effect of noncompliance
d. Effect on the period to file a responsive pleading
3. Motion to Dismiss
a. Grounds
b. Resolution of Motion
c. Remedies of plaintiff when the complaint is dismissed
d. Remedies of the defendant when the motion is denied
e. Effect of dismissal of complaint on certain grounds
f. When grounds pleaded as affirmative defenses
g. Bar by dismissal
h. Distinguised from demurrer to evidence under Rule 33
H. Dismissal of Actions
1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff; Two-dismissal rule
2. Dismissal upon motion by plaintiff; effect on existing counterclaim
3. Dismissal due to the fault of plaintiff

Sec. 3, Rule 17 enumerates the instances when a complaint may

be dismissed due to the plaintiffs fault:
(1)
(2)
(3)

If he fails to appear on the date for the presentation of his

evidence in chief on the complaint;
If he fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length
of time; or
If he fails to comply with the Rules or any order of the court.
(PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. Antonio C. Milan, et al., G.R.
No. 151215, April 5, 2010.)

The dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute has the effect of

adjudication on the merits, and is necessarily understood to be with
prejudice to the filing of another action, unless otherwise provided in
the order of dismissal. Stated differently, the general rule is that
dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is to be regarded as an
adjudication on the merits and with prejudice to the filing of another
action, and the only exception is when the order of dismissal expressly
contains a qualification that the dismissal is without prejudice. (PCI
Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. Antonio C. Milan, et al., G.R. No. 151215,
April 5, 2010)
While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur,
the real test for the exercise of such power is whether, under the
circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in
failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. In the absence of a
pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton
failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of
the plaintiff, courts should decide to dispense with rather than wield
their authority to dismiss. (PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. Antonio C.
Milan, et al., G.R. No. 151215, April 5, 2010)

4. Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint

I. Pre-trial
1. Concept of pre-trial
2. Nature and purpose
3. Notice of pre-trial
4. Appearance of parties; effect of failure to appear
5. Pre-trial brief; effect of failure to appear
6. Distinction between pre-trial in civil case and pre-trial in criminal case
7. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
J. Intervention

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally

impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him,
her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected
by such proceedings. It is a proceeding in a suit or action by which a
third person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either
joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting
with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding
something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by which a
third person becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the
admission, by leave of court, of a person not an original party to
pending legal proceedings, by which such person becomes a party
thereto for the protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be
affected by such proceedings. (MCIAA vs. Heirs of Estanislao, G.R. No.
186045, February 2, 2011)
1. Requisites for intervention

The purpose of intervention is to enable a stranger to an action to

become a party in order for him to protect his interest and for the court
to settle all conflicting claims. Intervention is allowed to avoid
multiplicity of suits more than on due process considerations. To
warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites
must concur:
(1)
(2)

The movant has a legal interest on the matter in litigation;

and
Intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the claim
of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a
separate proceeding. (Metropolitan Bank vs Intl Exchange
Bank, G.R. No. 176008/ 176131, August 10, 2011)

Intervention cannot be allowed when the trial court has already

rendered its Decision, and much less, as in the case when even the
Court of Appeals had rendered its own Decision on appeal.
(Metropolitan Bank vs Intl Exchange Bank, G.R. No. 176008/ 176131,
August 10, 2011)
2. Time to intervene
3. Remedy for the denial of motion to intervene

Intervention is merely accessory to the principal action and, as

such, is an interlocutory proceeding dependent on the case between the
original parties. (Union Bank of the philippines vs. Concepcion, G.R. No.
160727, June 26, 2007)

K. Subpoena
1. Subpoena duces tecum
2. Subpoena ad testificandum
3. Service of subpoena

4. Compelling attendance of witnesses; Contempt

5. Quashing of subpoena
L. Modes of Discovery
1. Depositions pending action; Depositions before action or pending appeal
a. Meaning of deposition
b. Uses; Scope of examination
c. When may objections to admissibility be made
d. When may taking of deposition be terminated or its scope limited
2. Written interrogatories to adverse parties
a. Consequences of refusal to answer
b. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories
3. Request for Admission
a. Implied admission by adverse party
b. Consequences of failure to answer request for admission
c. Effect of admission
d. Effect of failure to file and serve request for admission
4. Production or inspection of documents or things
5. Physical and mental examination of persons
6. Consequences of refusal to comply with modes of discovery
M. Trial
1. Adjournments and postponements
2. requisites of motion to postpone trial
a. for absence of evidence
b. for illness of party or counsel
3. Agreed statement of facts
4. Order of trial; reversal of order
5. Consolidation or Severance of hearing or trial
6. Delegation of reception of evidence
7. Trial by commissioners
a. Reference by consent or ordered on motion
b.Powers of the commissioner
c.Commissioners report; notice to parties and hearing on the report
N. Demurrer to Evidence
1. Ground
2. Effect of denial
3. Effect of grant
4. Waiver of right to present evidence
5. Demurrer to evidence in a civil case versus demurrer to evidence in a criminal
case
O. Judgments and Final Orders
1. Judgment without trial
2. Contents of a judgment
3. Judgment on the pleadings
4. Summary judgments

Summary judgment is a procedural devise resorted to in order to

avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays.
When the
pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of facts to be
tried, the Rules of Court allows a party to obtain immediate relief by
way of summary judgment. That is, when the facts are not in dispute,
the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to
the material facts. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine
issue, summary judgment is not proper. A genuine issue is such fact
which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a
sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. (Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer vs.
Spouses Alfredo Diaz, et al., G.R. No. 165300, April 23, 2010) Section 3
of the said rule provides two (2) requisites for summary judgment to be
proper:
(1) There must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except
for the amount of damages; and

(2) The party presenting the motion for summary judgment must
be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Manuel
Bungcayao, Sr., et al. vs. Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings and
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 170483, April 19, 2010)
A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on
their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and
admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are
not genuine. (Manuel Bungcayao, Sr., et al. vs. Fort Ilocandia Property
Holdings and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 170483, April 19,
2010)
To stress, trial courts have limited authority to render summary
judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as
to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are
disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take
the place of trial.
The trial court should refrain from issuing the
summary judgment but instead proceeded to conduct a full blown trial
of the case. (Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer vs. Spouses Alfredo Diaz, et al., G.R.
No. 165300, April 23, 2010)
a. for the claimant
b. for the defendant
c. when the case not fully adjudicated
d. affidavits and attachments
5. Judgment on the pleadings versus summary judgments
6. Rendition of judgments and final orders
Amendment and Supplemental Judgement

There is a difference between an amended judgment and a

supplemental judgment. In an amended and clarified judgment, the
lower court makes a thorough study of the original judgment and
renders the amended and clarified judgment only after considering all
the factual and legal issues. The amended and clarified decision is an
entirely new decision which supersedes the original decision. Following
the courts differentiation of a supplemental pleading from an amending
pleading, it can be said that a supplemental decision does not take the
place or extinguish the existence of the original. As its very name
denotes, it only serves to bolster or adds something to the primary
decision. A supplement exists side by side with the original. It does not
replace that which it supplements. (Associated Anglo-American Tobacco
Corporation, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 167237, April 23, 2010.)
Deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence is the principle that a
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable.
As such, it may no longer be modified in any respect even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law
and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land. In light of the foregoing, it would be
unnecessary, if not useless, to discuss the issues raised by petitioner.
(Republic vs. Tango, G.R. No. 161062, July 31, 2009)
The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental
principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of
occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial
agencies must become final on some definite date fixed by law. The only
exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the
so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party,
void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality
of the decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable.
(Republic vs. Tango, G.R. No. 161062, July 31, 2009)

7. Entry of judgment and final order

P. Post Judgment Remedies

1. Motion for New Trial or reconsideration
a. Grounds
b. When to file

As a general rule, the statutory requirement that when no motion for

reconsideration is filed within the reglementary period, the decision attains
finality and becomes executory in due course must be strictly enforced as they
are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly
discharge of judicial business. The purposes for such statutory requirement are
twofold: first, to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus,
procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business, and, second, to
put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which are
precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights
and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite
period of time. (Guash vs. Dela Cruz, 589 SCRA 297 [2009])
However, in exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity
considerations warrant the giving of due course to an appeal by suspending the
enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules of procedure. Certain elements are
considered for the appeal to be given due course, such as:

1. the existence of special or compelling circumstances,

2. the merits of the case,
3. a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of the rules,
4. lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory, and
the other party will not be unduly prejudiced thereby. (Guash vs. Dela Cruz,
589 SCRA 297 [2009])
c. Denial of the motion; effect
d. Grant of the motion; effect
e. Remedy when motion is denied, Fresh 15-day period rule

A litigant is given another fresh period of 15 days to perfect an

appeal after receipt of the order of denial of his/her motion for
reconsideration/new trial before the RTC. (Go vs. Sunbanun, G.R. No.
168240, February 9, 2011)
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to
afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
(Go vs. Sunbanun, G.R. No. 168240, February 9, 2011)
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40
governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to
the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to
the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial)
or any final order or resolution. (Go vs. Sunbanun, G.R. No. 168240,
February 9, 2011)

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal

within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file
it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final order) denying
his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the
new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed;
otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of
the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. (PCI Leasing
and Finance, Inc. vs. Antonio C. Milan, et al., G.R. No. 151215, April 5,
2010)
2. Appeals in General

The provisions of law and the rules concerning the manner and
period of appeal were mandatory and jurisdictional requirements
essential to enable the appellate court to take cognizance of the appeal.
(Dadizon vs. CA, G.R. No. 159116, September 30, 2009)
a. Judgments and final orders subject to appeal

Some matters where appeal is the proper remedy

1. A denial of a motion for the execution of judgment is appealable
under Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. (Valdez vs.
Financiera Manila, Inc., G.R. No. 183387, September 29, 2009)
2. An aggrieved party affected by the decision of a cabinet secretary
need not appeal to the OP [office of the president] and may file a
petition for certiorari directly in the Court of Appeals assailing the
act of the said secretary. (Manubay vs. Garilao, G.R. No. 140717,
April 16, 2009)
b. Matters not appealable
Some matters where appeal is NOT the proper remedy
1. Certiorari is not the proper substitute for a lost appeal. (Valdez vs.
Financiera Manila, Inc., G.R. No. 183387, September 29, 2009)
However, it admits of several exceptions, thus:
a. Where the appeal does not constitute a speedy and
adequate remedy (Salvadades vs. Pajarillo, et al., 78 Phil.
77), as where 33 appeals were involved from orders issued
in a single proceeding which will inevitably result in a
proliferation of more appeals (PCIB vs. Escolin, et al., L27860 and 27896, Mar. 29, 1974);
b. Where the orders were also issued either in excess of or
without jurisdiction (Aguilar vs. Tan, L-23600, June 30, 1970,
Cf. Bautista, et al. vs. Sarmiento, et al., L-45137, Sept.,
231985);
c. For certain special consideration, as public welfare or public
policy (See Jose vs. Zulueta, et al. L-16598, May 31, 1961
and the cases cited therein);
d. Where in criminal actions, the court rejects rebuttal
evidence for the prosecution as, in case of acquittal, there
could be no remedy (People vs. Abalos, L-29039, Nov. 28,
1968);
e. Where the order is a patent nullity (Marcelo vs. De Guzman,
et al., L-29077, June 29, 1982); and
f. Where the decision in the certiorari case will avoid future
litigations (St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Campos, et al.,
L-38280, Mar. 21, 1975)
2. The remedy of appeal is not available from an order dismissing an
action without prejudice. (Positos vs. chua, 609 SCRA 154, 2009)
3. By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a
summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As
a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial

courts judgment in a summary proceeding. (Republic vs. Tango,

G.R. No. 161062, July 31, 2009)
c. Remedy against judgments and orders which are not appealable
d. Modes of appeal
In Murillo vs. Consul (G.R. No. 115104, October 12, 1998), the Supreme Court
had the occasion to clarify the three (3) modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC,
namely:
(1)
(2)
(3)

ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a

civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction,
covered by Rule 41;
petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise
of appellate jurisdiction, covered by Rule 42; and
Petition for review to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The first mode of appeal is taken to the CA on questions of fact or mixed

questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions
of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated
to the Supreme Court only on questions of law. (Macababbad, Jr. vs. Masirag, 576 SCRA
70 [2009])
e. Issues to be raised on appeal
Issues Raised for the First time

Section 15, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides that the
appellant may include in his assignment of errors any question of law
or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is within the
issues framed by the parties. It is a fundamental rule that this Court
will not resolve issues that were not properly brought and ventilated in
the lower courts. Questions raised on appeal must be within the issues
framed by the parties and, consequently, issues not raised in the trial
court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. An issue, which was
neither averred in the complaint nor raised during the trial in the lower
courts, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal because it would be
offensive to the basic rule of fair play and justice, and would be
violative of the constitutional right to due process of the other party.
(Heirs of Lorenzo Vidad and Carmen Vidad, et al. vs. Land Bank of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 166461, April 30, 2010)
Thus, points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to
the attention of the trial court will not be and ought not to be
considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal. Basic consideration of due process impels this rule.
(Hubert Nuez vs. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., G.R. No. 180542, April
12, 2010)
Errors Raised by the Parties

As a general rule, the appellate court may only pass upon errors
assigned by the parties. By way of exception, even unassigned errors
may be taken up by the court on appeal if they involve:
(1) errors affecting the lower court's jurisdiction over the
subject matter,
(2) plain errors not specified, and
(3) clerical errors. (Madrid vs. Mapoy, 596 SCRA 14 [2009])
In the present case, we note that the award of attorney's fees
appears only in the dispositive portion of the RTC decision without any
elaboration, explanation, and justification. The award stood there all by
itself. We view this as a plain legal error by the RTC that must be
rectified. (Madrid vs. Mapoy, 596 SCRA 14 [2009])

Factual Findings of the Trial Court

Factual findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and
respect by the Supreme Court, more so when they are affirmed by the
appellate court. However, the rule is not without exceptions, such as:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on

speculations, surmises, and conjectures;
The inferences made are manifestly mistaken;
There is grave abuse of discretion; and
The judgment is based on misapprehension of facts or
premised on the absence of evidence on record. (Anthony L.
Ng vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 173905, April 23,
2010)
when the findings of fact are conflicting;
when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based;
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and
when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record (Catores vs.
Afidchao, G.R. No. 151240, March 31, 2009)

Especially in criminal cases where the accused stands to lose his

liberty by virtue of his conviction, the Court must be satisfied that the
factual findings and conclusions of the lower courts leading to his
conviction must satisfy the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
(Anthony L. Ng vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 173905, April 23,
2010)
Questions of Fact

Settled is the rule that questions of fact cannot be raised in an

appeal via certiorari before the Supreme Court and are not proper for
its consideration. The rationale behind this doctrine is that a review of
the findings of fact of the trial courts and the appellate tribunal is not a
function this Court normally undertakes. The Court will not weigh the
evidence all over again unless there is a showing that the findings of
the lower courts are totally devoid of support or are clearly erroneous
so as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. (Alejandra S. Lazaro, et
al. vs. Modesta Agustin, et al., G.R. No. 152364, April 15, 2010)
Samples of Questions of Fact:
1. The issue of whether or not the accused acted in self-defense
(People of the Philippines vs. Benancio Mortera y Belarmino, G.R.
No. 188104, April 23, 2010)
The well-entrenched rule in our jurisdiction is that only questions
of law may be entertained by this Court in a petition for review on
certiorari.
This rule, however, is not iron-clad and admits certain
exceptions, such as when:

1.
2.
3.
4.

the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or

conjectures;
the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
there is grave abuse of discretion;
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

5.
6.

the findings of fact are conflicting;

there is no citation of specific evidence on which the
factual findings are based;
7. the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the
presence of evidence on record;
8. the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those
of the trial court;
9. the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion;
10. The findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the
issues of the case; and
11. Such findings are contrary to the admissions of both
parties. (Heirs of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. vs. Mingoa,
Sr., 608 SCRA 394)
If the appeal raised involves mixed questions of fact and law, no
error can be for invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the CA through
an ordinary appeal. ()
f. Period of appeal

g. Perfection of appeal

The perfection of an appeal within the period laid down by law is

mandatory and jurisdictional, because the failure to perfect the appeal
within the time prescribed by the Rules of Court causes the judgment or
final order to become final as to preclude the appellate court from
acquiring the jurisdiction to review the judgment or final order. (Sps.
Lebin vs. Mirasol, G.R. No. 164255, September 07, 2011)
Under Rule 41, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, a notice of appeal
is only required to indicate (a) the parties to the appeal, (b) the final
judgment or order or part thereof appealed from, (c) the court to which
the appeal is being taken, and (d) the material dates showing the
timeliness of the appeal. In usual court practice, a notice of appeal
would consist of one or two pages. (PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs.
Antonio C. Milan, et al., G.R. No. 151215, April 5, 2010)
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the
case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the
expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. Each party only
has at most 15 days from their receipt of the final order to appeal it.
(Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 167237, April 23, 2010)
h. Appeal from judgments or final orders of the MTC
i. Appeal from judgments or final orders of the RTC

It is not possible to take an appeal by certiorari to the Court of

Appeals. Appeals to that Court from the Regional Trial Courts are
perfected in two (2) ways, both of which are entirely distinct from an
appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court. They are:
a) By ordinary appeal, or appeal by writ of error - where judgment
was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the
exercise of original jurisdiction; and

b) By petition for review - where judgment was rendered by the

RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. (Dadizon vs. CA,
G.R. No. 159116, September 30, 2009)
The petition for review must be filed with the Court of Appeals
within 15 days from notice of the judgment, and as already stated, shall
point out the error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or
modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed. An
ordinary appeal is taken by merely filing a notice of appeal within 15
days from notice of the judgment, except in special proceedings or
cases where multiple appeals are allowed in which event the period of
appeal is 30 days and a record on appeal is necessary. (Sps. Lebin vs.
Mirasol, G.R. No. 164255, September 07, 2011)
There is therefore no longer any common method of appeal in civil
cases to the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. The present
procedures for appealing to either court and, it may be added, the
process of ventilation of the appeal are now to be made by petition for
review or by notice of appeals (and, in certain instances, by record on
appeal), but only by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
(Sps. Lebin vs. Mirasol, G.R. No. 164255, September 07, 2011)
j. Appeal from judgments or final orders of the CA
k. Appeal from judgments or final orders of the CTA
l. Review of final judgments or final orders of the COA
m. Review of final judgments or final orders of the COMELEC
n. Review of final judgments or final orders of the CSC

o. Review of final judgments or final orders of the Ombudsman

p. Review of final judgments or final orders of the NLRC

q. Review of final judgments or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies

While Section 9 (3) of BP 129 and Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Rules

of Court does not list [National Water Resources Board] as among the
quasi-judicial agencies whose final judgments, orders, resolutions or
awards are appealable to the appellate court, it is non sequitur to hold
that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over [NWRBs]
judgments, orders, resolutions or awards. It is settled that the list of
quasi-judicial agencies specifically mentioned in Rule 43 is not meant to
be exclusive. The employment of the word among clearly instructs
so. (National Water Resources Board (NWRB) vs. A.L. Ang Network, Inc.,
G.R. No. 186450, April 14, 2010)
Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished

Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are

substantial distinctions which shall be explained below.
As to the Purpose.
Certiorari is a remedy designed for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure
Foods Corporation vs. NLRC, the Supreme Court explained the simple
reason for the rule in this light:
When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while
so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when
the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would
deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a
void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice
would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that

the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not

correct[a]ble through the original civil action of certiorari.
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ
of certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the
intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court on the basis
either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal
soundness of the decision.
Even if the findings of the court are
incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is
normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one
of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact a mistake of judgment
appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its
appellate jurisdiction and power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher
court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of
control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. An appeal
is thus a continuation of the original suit, while a petition for certiorari
is an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that
had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of.
The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. In
contrast, the parties to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved party
(who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or quasijudicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the private
respondents, respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those
that the Rules of Court so declare are appealable. Since the issue is
jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an
interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the
judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate
remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within
fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from.
Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant must file a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said notice of
judgment or final order. A petition for review should be filed and served
within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the decision, or of the
petitioners timely filed motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed
also within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order, or of
the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later
than sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was timely filed, the
period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for
reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition for
certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the
alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate
remedy expressly available under the law. Such motion is not required
before appealing a judgment or final order. (Sps. Leynes vs. CA, G.R. No.
154462, January 19, 2011)
3. Relief from judgments, orders and other proceedings
a. Grounds for availing of the remedy
b. Time to file petition
c. Contents of petition

4. Annulment of Judgments or final orders and resolutions

Let it be stressed at the outset that before a party can avail of the
reliefs provided for by Rule 47, i.e., annulment of judgments, final
orders, and resolutions, it is a condition sine qua non that one must
have failed to move for new trial in, or appeal from, or file a petition for
relief against said issuances or take other appropriate remedies
thereon, through no fault attributable to him. If he failed to avail of
those cited remedies without sufficient justification, he cannot resort to
the action for annulment provided in Rule 47, for otherwise he would
benefit from his own inaction or negligence. (Republic vs. Sps. De
Castro, G.R. No. 189724, February 7, 2011) Applying the said doctrine in
Republic vs. Sps. De Castro, supra, the Supreme Court held:
In the instant case, not only did petitioner fail to avail of the ordinary and
appropriate remedies in assailing the questioned judgments of the trial court,
but he also failed to show to the satisfaction of this Court that he could not have
availed of the ordinary and appropriate remedies under the Rules. According to
petitioner, he allegedly learned of the cases filed against him by respondent
bank only when the writs of execution were issued against him. At the very least
then, he could have moved to quash the writs of execution. In the alternative, he could
have filed a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38. Instead, petitioner merely
alleged that he approached Atty. Gregorio Salazar, the banks counsel, for
clarification and assistance, which is not one of the ordinary and appropriate
remedies contemplated by the Rules. Petitioners failure to explain why he failed
to avail of said remedies, which were still available to him at that time, in both
Civil Case No. 7355-M and Civil Case No. 2856-V-88, is fatal to his cause. To be
sure, a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is not a substitute for ones own
neglect in not availing of the ordinary and appropriate remedies, but a peculiar remedy
granted under certain conditions to those who failed to avail of the ordinary remedies
without their fault. Thus, in our considered view, based on the cited reasons and
circumstances, the Court of Appeals did not err when it denied the petition for
annulment of judgment

a. Grounds for annulment

b. Period to file action
c. Effects of judgment of annulment
5. Collateral attack of judgments
Q. Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments
As a general rule, the writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion
of the decision to be executed; an execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the
original judgment or award. The settled general principle is that a writ of execution must
conform strictly to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated, and may not
vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of
the judgment sought to be executed. Nonetheless, a judgment is not confined to what
appears on the face of the decision, but extends as well to those necessarily included
therein or necessary thereto. (Narciso Tumibay, et al. vs. Sps. Yolanda T. Sora, et al.,
G.R. No. 152016, April 13, 2010.)
1. Difference between finality of judgment for purposes of appeal; for purposes of
execution

2. When execution shall issue

a. Execution as a matter of right
b. Discretionary execution

When an appeal had been duly perfected, execution of the

judgment, whether wholly or partially, was not a matter of right, but of
discretion provided good reasons therefor existed. The compelling
grounds for the issuance of the writ must be stated in a special order
after due hearing. Aside from the existence of good reasons, the rules
also require that the motion for partial execution should have been filed
while the trial court still had jurisdiction over the case. (Associated
Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 167237, April 23, 2010)

3. How a judgment is executed

a. Execution by motion or by independent action
b. Issuance and contents of a writ of execution
c. Execution of judgments for money
d. Execution of judgments for specific acts
A judgment for the delivery or restitution of property is essentially an order to
place the prevailing party in possession of the property. If the defendant refuses to
surrender possession of the property to the prevailing party, the sheriff or other proper
officer should oust him. No express order to this effect needs to be stated in the
decision; nor is a categorical statement needed in the decision that in such event the
sheriff or other proper officer shall have the authority to remove the improvements on
the property if the defendant fails to do so within a reasonable period of time. The
removal of the improvements on the land under these circumstances is deemed read into
the decision, subject only to the issuance of a special order by the court for the removal
of the improvements. (Narciso Tumibay, et al. vs. Sps. Yolanda T. Sora, et al., G.R. No.
152016, April 13, 2010)

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

e. Execution of special judgments

f. Effect of levy on third persons
Properties exempt from execution
Proceedings where property is claimed by third persons
a. in relation to third party claim in attachment and replevin
Rules on Redemption
Examination of Judgment Obligor When Judgment is unsatisfied
Examination of Obligor of Judgment Obligor
Effect of Judgment or Final Orders

A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law.

Finality becomes a fact when the reglementary period to appeal lapses
and no appeal is perfected within such period. As a consequence, no
court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a
decision that has became final. (PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs.
Antonio C. Milan, et al., G.R. No. 151215, April 5, 2010)
General Rule: Immutability of Executable Final Judgment

When a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and

unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect either by the
court which rendered it or even by this Court. The doctrine is founded
on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point
in time.
The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment
has a two-fold purpose: (1) to avoid delay in the administration of
justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial
business and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of
occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Controversies
cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant
must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. (PCI Leasing
and Finance, Inc. vs. Antonio C. Milan, et al., G.R. No. 151215, April 5,
2010.)
The Exception: Relaxation of the Rules

However, the Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve

substantial justice considering:
(b) Matters of life, liberty, honor or property,
(c) The existence of special or compelling circumstances,
(d) The merits of the case,
(e) A cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of
the party favored by the suspension of the rules,
(f) A lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory, and

(g) The other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or
even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter
even that which this Court itself had already declared to be final. (PCI
Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. Antonio C. Milan, et al., G.R. No. 151215,
April 5, 2010)
Rule 39 Sec. 47(b) and (c) comprehends two distinct concepts of
res judicata: (1) bar by former judgment and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment. Under the first concept, res judicata absolutely bars any
subsequent action when the following requisites concur:
(a) The former judgment or order was final;
(b) It adjudged the pertinent issue or issues on their merits;
(c) It was rendered by a court that had jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; and
(d) Between the first and the second actions, there was identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. (Hacienda
Bigaa, Inc. vs. Chavez, et al., G.R. No. 174160, April 20, 2010)
Where no identity of causes of action but only identity of issues exists,
res judicata comes under the second concept i.e., under conclusiveness
of judgment.
Under this concept, the rule bars the re-litigation of
particular facts or issues involving the same parties even if raised under
different claims or causes of action. Conclusiveness of judgment finds
application when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue,
judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of
competent jurisdiction. The fact or question settled by final judgment
or order binds the parties to that action (and persons in privity with
them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind them while
the judgment or order remains standing and unreversed by proper
authority on a timely motion or petition; the conclusively settled fact or
question furthermore cannot again be litigated in any future or other
action between the same parties or their privies and successors-ininterest, in the same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction,
either for the same or for a different cause of action. Thus, only the
identities of parties and issues are required for the operation of the
principle of conclusiveness of judgment. (Hacienda Bigaa, Inc. vs.
Chavez, et al., G.R. No. 174160, April 20, 2010)
While conclusiveness of judgment does not have the same barring
effect as that of a bar by former judgment that proscribes subsequent
actions, the former nonetheless estops the parties from raising in a
later case the issues or points that were raised and controverted, and
were determinative of the ruling in the earlier case. In other words, the
dictum laid down in the earlier final judgment or order becomes
conclusive and continues to be binding between the same parties, their
privies and successors-in-interest, as long as the facts on which that
judgment was predicated continue to be the facts of the case or
incident before the court in a later case; the binding effect and
enforceability of that earlier dictum can no longer be re-litigated in a
later case since the issue has already been resolved and finally laid to
rest in the earlier case. (Hacienda Bigaa, Inc. vs. Chavez, et al., G.R. No.
174160, April 20, 2010)
10. Enforcement and Effect of Foreign Judgments or Final Orders