The Implicit Motives of Terrorist Groups How

The Implicit Motives of Terrorist Groups: How the Needs for Affiliation and Power Translate
into Death and Destruction

Author(s): Allison G. Smith
Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Feb., 2008), pp. 55-75
Published by: International Society of Political Psychology
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Political
Psychology,
Vol. 29, No.
1, 2008
The ImplicitMotives of Terrorist Groups: How the

Needs forAffiliation and Power Translate intoDeath
and Destruction
AllisonG. Smith
This studyexplored thedynamicsof terrorismthrougha quantitativecontentanalysis of

documents issued by terroristgroups and nonterroristcomparison groups. Thirteen ter
roristgroupswere matched with comparison groups thatshared thesame ideologies,and
theirdocuments were coded for ingroup affiliation,outgroup affiliation,and power
motive imagery.As hypothesized,compared with nonterroristgroups, terroristgroups
were significantly
higher in ingroupaffiliationmotive imageryand significantlylower in
outgroup affiliationmotive imagery in thefull sample of documents and in an indicator
sample that included only terroristgroups' preterrorismdocuments. Terroristgroups
were significantlyhigher than comparison groups inpower motive imagery in thefull
sample and marginally significantlyhigher in power motive imagery in the indicator
sample. These resultshighlight the importantrole thatgroup dynamicsplay in terrorist
groups.
KEY WORDS:
terrorism,motives, power, affiliation, social identity theory, content analysis
Dear America,
Today theLORD has visited our land in judgment. An invading force
has pierced the shores of our country to wreck havoc and devastation
upon us, on our cities and our people.
Because the immutable character ofGod never changes, letus consider
forwhat cause theLord has smitten us.
Could it be that the blood of over 44,000,000
pre-bom children has

to
our
letter toAmerica,"
shores?
destruction
open
this
("An
brought
2001)
55
0162-895Xi 2008 International
SocietyofPoliticalPsychology
Road,Oxford,OX4 2DQ,
Malden,MA 02148,USA, 9600Garsington
PublishedbyBlackwellPublishing.Inc.,350Main Street,
andPO Box 378CarltonSouth,3053VictoriaAustralia

Smith
56
Like most New Yorkers, I've been consumed with the attacks on the
World Trade Center. Unlike most New Yorkers, I believe the attack is a
direct result of America's sins against God.
It iswritten, "When a man's way please theLord, he maketh even his
enemies to be at peace with him" (Proverbs 16:7).
Has America been doing thatwhich pleases God? The answer is a
resounding
"No!" (Milliner,
2001)
These
statements were issued by members of two U.S.
reaction to the 9/11 attacks on theUnited States. While
pro-life groups in
the rhetoric of the two
groups is similar, the nature of their actions is quite different.The firstquota

tion is from a member of Operation Rescue
America),
a group that campaigns
(later renamed Operation
Save
against abortion using various nonviolent
access to clinics and displaying pictures of dead

fetuses. The second quotation is from a member of theArmy of God, an orga
nization whose members have engaged in various terroristactivities to stop abor
tion, including clinic bombings and the attempted murder of at least one
tactics such as blocking
practitioner.
In this project, a content analysis of the documents produced by groups such

as thesewas conducted in order to explore thepsychological dynamics of groups
that do and do not engage in terrorism. The goals of the study were to test
hypotheses derived from psychological theory and to examine whether content
analysis might provide indicators of a group's future terrorism.
StudiesofTerrorism
Although arguing for a particular definition of "terrorism" is beyond the
scope of this paper, it's important tomake explicit the criteria thatwere used to
label an activity as "terrorist" in this study. Specifically, I focused on three char
acteristics of terrorismon which there is a good deal of consensus (Wilkinson,
1990).
First, tobe labeled as terroristan act had tobe intended to create terror(Merari
& Friedland, 1985; Schmid, 1988; Wilkinson, 1990). Although terrorismmight
as anger, confusion,
also be intended to evoke other emotional reactions-such
of its primary goals is to create extreme fear in a population by
and despair-one
undermining its sense of security. For this reason, I did not consider acts of pure
economic sabotage or nonviolent activities to be terrorist.
Second, terrorismis intended to create terrorin an audience beyond itsvictims
(Bandura, 1990; Crenshaw, 1995; Schmid, 1988). Schmid (1988) discusses the
are often chosen to
distinction between targets of violence (or victims)-who
terror
iden
the targetsof
(or audience)-who
symbolize some largergroup-and
tifywith the victims or their larger group. Terrorist violence is sometimes instru
mental (e.g., when victims are actually individuals the actors want to punish or

The Implicit
Motives ofTerroristGroups
57
eliminate), but in this study only those acts thatwere also symbolic in nature were
consideredterrorist.
Third, to be labeled as terroristan act had to be intended to create terrorin a

larger audience in order to furtheranother end (Schmid, 1988; Wilkinson, 1990).
For the purposes of this study, these ends could be political, religious, and/or
social. I did not consider acts in which terrorwas created as an unintentional
consequence to be terrorist.
Researchers from a variety of fields have investigated the causes of terrorism,
and not surprisingly, theyhave approached this task at various levels of analysis.
At the structural level, both quantitative and qualitative analyses have shown the
importance of taking into account variables such as religion, economic circum
stances, ethnic relations, and government policies when trying to explain the
emergence of terrorismin a particular context (e.g., Crenshaw, 1995; Hafez, 2006;
LaFree, 2006; Palmer, 1995). At the other end of the spectrum, there has been
considerable research at the individual level on how personality and demographic
characteristics may be associated with an individual's decision to engage in
terrorism (e.g., Kellen, 1990; Laqueur, 1999; Post, 1990), although there is
increasing consensus that the characteristics of group members may vary both
across and within terroristgroups (Horgan, 2003; Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006).
While not underestimating the importance of structural or individual-level
variables in explaining terrorism, this study focuses on psychological character
isticsmeasured at thegroup level for three reasons. First, conceptually and empiri
cally, groups are an important level of analysis. There already exists a wealth of
research that highlights the important role that groups and networks play in
fostering themove towards terrorismwhether by providing the infrastructureand
training to support terroristactivity,promoting alternate value systems that isolate
group members from the rest of society, strengthening the bonds between indi
vidual members through rituals and practices, and/or rewarding members for
increasingly violent activity (e.g., della Porta, 1995; McCauley, 2002; Merari,
1990, 2002; Sageman, 2004; Sprinzak, 1990).
Second, the documents issued by groups that engage in terrorism are one
source of information that has been underused by social scientists.While many
researchers discuss the various writings and communiques of the groups they are
studying, few examine these documents systematically, or in great depth.While to
some degree, thismay be due to concerns that these documents are biased or
misrepresent these groups' truegoals, examining potential bias can provide insight
into these groups' perspectives, and further,analyses ofmore latentpsychological
variables, such as motive imagery,may allay some of the concerns about falling
prey to intentionalmisrepresentation.
Third, as will be discussed below, psychological theories and research have
linked certain aspects of group dynamics with aggression, and through a content
analysis of the motive imagery in group documents, it is possible to explore
whether these dynamics characterize terroristgroups.

Smith
58
Theories of Group Behavior
Social IdentityTheory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) is currently one of the domi
nant social psychological theories addressing group behavior. At its base, this
theorymakes a distinction between personal identities,which define individuals in
relation to other individuals, and social identities, which define individuals
in termsof theirmembership in significant social categories and groups (Brewer &
Brown, 1998).
In theirwork on the cognitive processes of self-categorization,
Turner and his colleagues (Turner, 1979; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty,
1994) have argued that as a significant social identity, e.g., membership in a
political or social group, becomes salient to individuals, theyundergo a process of
depersonalization-that
is, they begin to view themselves as interchangeable
members of thegroup as opposed tounique individuals. In addition, social identity
theoristshighlight the effect thatbelonging to a group has on members' behaviors
towards others inside and outside the group and, specifically, the tendencies
towards favoringmembers of one's own group (the ingroup; Tajfel, 1970) and
engaging in outgroup derogation or hostility (Brown, 1984). Research-most
using theminimal group paradigm-has
shown that these tendencies may be most
prevalent in people who highly identifywith theirgroups (Branscombe & Wann,
1994; Gagnon & Bourhis, 1996; Perreault & Bourhis, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, &
Mitchell, 1994; Struch & Schwartz, 1989).
Although very different in approach and method, early Freudian theory
describes some of the same characteristics of group behavior but focuses on the
role that instincts,ormotives, play in itsdevelopment. Specifically, inCivilization
and Its Discontents (1930/1961) and Group Psychology and theAnalysis of the
Ego (1921/1959) Freud argued thatparticipating in a group allows members to
express the two basic human instincts: theLife Instincts (which have the overall
aim tobinding things together) and theDeath Instincts (which have theoverall aim
of tearing things apart). He also described thenature of the ties thatbind thegroup,
positing thatgroups are formed as the consequence of two forms of identification.
the one hand, through identification with the group ideal, which can be
embodied in either a leader or an idea, group members' consciences become one
with that of the group-i.e.,
the group's goals and standards are internalized as
their own. At the same time, through identificationwith other members of the
group, group members satisfy their fundamental need for connection with others.
On
Finally, Freud believed
that the existence of external enemies
facilitates the
process of group formation by deflecting members' fundamental aggression out

wards, away from each other: "It is always possible tobind together a considerable
number of people in love, so long as there are other people leftover to receive the
manifestations of their aggressiveness" (Freud, 1930/1961, p. 72).
In summary, Social IdentityTheory and Freud's theoryof group psychology
both describe the key role that identification plays in the formation of groups and
the tendencies of groups, once formed, toprivilege theirown members and express

59
The Implicit
hostilitytowardsoutsiders.
This studywas designedto explorewhetherthese
dynamicsaremore evidentin therhetoric
of terrorist
groupsthannonterrorist
comparison groups as would be expected if, as many before have argued, the
terroristgroup plays a critical role in fostering itsmembers' violent activities. In
were assessed through

thisstudy,thesedynamics
thesegroups'use of implicit
affiliation and power motive imagery.

ImplicitMotives and Aggression
Unlike explicit, or self-attributed,motives, which can be readily identifiedby
those who possess them, implicitmotives may be viewed as involving goals that
are not always fully conscious (Winter, 1996; Winter & Barenbaum, 1999). Mea
sured using coding systems thathave been developed through systematic analysis
of the storieswritten by individuals inwhom a particular motive has been experi
mentally aroused, implicit motives have been shown to relate to spontaneous
behavioral trends over timewhile explicit motives have been shown to relate to
immediate
& Weinberger,
responsestospecificsituations
(McClelland,
Koestner,
In addition, measures of implicit and explicit motives are not highly

correlated, meaning, for example, that a group or individual's explicit statement
that itwants a motive-related goal is not necessarily related to the amount of
1992).
motive imagery ituses.'
betweenimplicit
motivesand aggressive
behavior
Studyingtherelationship
has a long history in personality psychology. From Freud's discussion the Life
Instincts and Death Instincts to the large body of empirical work relating political
leaders' use ofmotive imagery to various conflict outcomes, two general classes of
implicit motives have been
(Winter,
1996).
the focus of investigation: affiliation and power
Affiliation. The affiliation motive is broadly concerned with the need for
establishing and maintaining friendly relations with others. Individuals high in
affiliationmotive imagery tend to enjoy interactingwith others and actively look
for opportunities to do so (McAdams & Constantian, 1983). Further, on the
international stage, it has been shown that leaders high in affiliation motive
imagery tend to prefer cooperative outcomes: higher levels of affiliationmotive
imagery have been related to pursuing more interdependent foreign policies
(Hermann, 1980)
and making
concessions
in conflict situations (Langner &
Winter,2001).
1
This is the case in the current study inwhich groups' explicit endorsement of friendship values (which
could be taken to reflect explicit affiliation motivation) was significantly but not highly correlated
with groups' use of implicit affiliation motive imagery (r = .16, p < .05). Similarly, groups' explicit
endorsement of dominance and aggression values (which could be taken to reflect explicit power
motivation) was correlated but not highly correlated with groups' use of implicit power motive
=
.33, p < .001).
imagery (r

Smith
60
While on the surface these findingsmight seem to indicate that a high level
of affiliation motive imagery would be associated with a preference for
nonviolence-and
thuswould be uncharacteristic of groups thatengage in terrorist
violence-it's
important to note that no empirical studies have distinguished
between affiliationmotive
imagery aimed towards the ingroup versus the out
group, a distinction thatseems particularly relevantwhen studying group behavior.

Specifically, based on the theories discussed above, one might expect quite dif
ferentoutcomes depending on whether the group's affiliationmotive is directed
inward (resulting in a tight-knitgroup potentially hostile to outsiders) or outward
(resulting in a looser group that ismore willing to establish friendly relationships
with outsiders). In this study, I hypothesized that relative to their nonterrorist
comparison groups, terroristgroups would express higher levels of affiliation
motive imagery directed towards their ingroups and lower levels of affiliation
motive imagery directed towards their outgroups.
Power
The power motive
is concerned with the need for having impact,
control, or influence over others. In nearly three decades of research, Winter

(1980, 1993, 1996, 2007) has shown the association between power motive
imagery and aggression. For example,
in a study using the comparative case
study approach, Winter (2007) found that documents written by political actors
in crises that escalated towar contained higher levels of power motive imagery
than those written by political actors in crises thatwere peacefully resolved.
Other research has shown thathigh levels of power motive imagerymeasured in
presidential inaugural addresses were related to the likelihood of that President
engaging the country in war (Winter, 1996), and similar results were found in
leaders in southernAfrica, where those high in the power motive were rated by
a panel of experts as more likely to support armed conflict (Winter, 1980). Based
on these findings and the fact that terrorism is a violent activity intended to
have an impact on both its immediate victims and a larger audience that iden
tifieswith these victims, I would expect that terroristgroups would express
higher levels of power motive
imagery than their nonterrorist comparison
groups.
Methods
The goal of a structured, focused comparison is to "formulate the idiosyn
cratic aspects of the explanation for each case in terms of general variables"
(George, 1979, p. 46). In this study,my cases were comprised of groups thatdid
and did not engage in terrorism,and I attempted to formulate the explanation for
the differences between these groups by examining the levels of motive imagery
expressed in their documents. Again, for the purposes of this study, I defined a
group as engaging in terrorism if it engaged in violent activity intended to create
terror in an audience beyond its victims in order to furthera social, political, or
religiousend.

The Implicit
61
ChoosingCases
I identified 13 groups that engaged in terrorism in a specific context
and period and at least one comparison group from each context and period
that did not. Here, it is important to emphasize that some of the comparison
groups may have engaged in terrorism during periods not examined in this
study, but I don't consider this to be of great concern. My goal is to examine
the psychological dynamics associated with a group's choice to engage in ter
rorism in a particular time and place and not to uncover a static psycholo
gical profile that will indicate whether a group has or ever will engage in
terrorism.
I matched each of these 13 groups that engaged in terrorismwith groups
that inhabited the same political context during the same period and held a
similar ideology, but did not engage in terrorism.Groups were considered to
have similar ideologies if they viewed the same groups or individuals as oppo
nents and had comparable political and/or social goals vis-a-vis these opponents.
So, taking an example from this study, theNational Alliance and theOrder were
right-wing groups that supported a pro-White agenda and rejected the
legitimacy of theU.S. government, viewing it as incapable of defending "tradi
tional" values. Thus, these groups were considered to have similar ideologies. At
both U.S.
the same time, while the National Alliance promoted this ideology through
national congresses and its own media outlets in the mid-1980s, during this
same period, the Order engaged in terrorism-burning down an Idaho syna
gogue, bombing an X-rated movie theater, and killing an antiracist talk show
host.
As one of my goals was to examine the generalizability of findings across
different types of groups, I purposefully included a diverse set of groups in the
study. "The desideratum thatguides selection of cases in the controlled compari
son approach is not numbers but variety, that is cases belonging to the same class
thatdiffer from each other" (George, 1979, p. 60, emphasis in original). Specifi
cally, I selected terroristand comparison groups that inhabited a wide range of
historical periods and cultural milieus, ranging from firstcenturyCE Palestine to
the twenty-firstcentury transnational context. I included groups that focused on
achieving different types of ends: ethnic-nationalist (e.g., theLiberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka), left,wing (e.g., the Shining Path in Peru) right-wing
(e.g., theOrder in theUnited States), religious (e.g., al Qaeda), and single-issue
(e.g., theArmy of God in theUnited States). Finally, I chose comparison groups
thatwere recognized by theirpolitical opponents or the international community
as "legitimate" representatives of theircauses and participated in high-level gov
ernment or international structures and negotiations (e.g., the Social Democratic
and Labour Party inNorthern Ireland) and comparison groups thatpursued their
goals outside of government or international structures (e.g., theNational Alliance
in theUnited States).

Smith
62
The cases I examined are presented in Table 1. Further information on the

specific groups included in the study is available in a previously published paper
(Smith,2004).
ChoosingDocuments
In this study I collected documents that discussed the goals of the groups
being examined, i.e., documents that could be considered group "manifestos" as
opposed to personal lettersor memoirs written by individual members.2 While all
documents were written by individuals, they stood for thegroup and, in this sense,
were consensual. A comprehensive search was conducted for each group, and
every document thatmet this criterion and was published verbatim, as opposed to
paraphrased, was included in the study (n = 166).
Specifically, the following types of documents were analyzed: party plat
forms,proposals tomediators trying to explain the position of the group vis-a-vis
itsopponents, lettersor interviews given by official group representatives aimed at
explaining the group's principles and goals, and sections of books written by
active members about the purpose of an organization. The types and number of
documents analyzed in each context are presented in Table 1.
The documents included in the studywere found through open sources such
as university library collections,
the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service
(FBIS) Daily Report, newspapers, and, in some cases, internetsites set up by the
groups themselves. For documents not originally issued inEnglish, English trans
lations were analyzed. In previous studies using content analysis, translated docu
ments have been shown to yield about the same scores as originals as long as the
translations are of high quality (Hermann, 1980; Winter, 1973).
Coding Documents
In linewith standard coding procedures, after all identifying informationwas
removed from documents, theywere randomized and coded by a trained scorer
who demonstrated a category agreement of .85 or above on each motive with
calibration materials prescored by experts (Winter, 1989). The scorerwas blind to
the purposes and hypotheses of the study. In all cases, the unit of coding was the
sentence, and raw scores were converted into images per 1000 words, as is the
standard practice in studies of motive imagery.
In all but the four cases in which the documents were books,
the entire
document was coded formotive imagery.Due to the time-consuming nature of the

coding process, only the introductorychapter of each of the books was coded.
Descriptions and examples of the types of images coded for the power and
affiliationmotives can be found in Table 2.
2
A
list of the documents used
in this study is available
from the author.

The
Implicit Motives
of Terrorist Groups
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64
Smith
Table
2. Outline
Imagery
Type
of Power and Affiliation Motive
Scoring
inVerbal Material
Definition(Example)
Power
A concern with having impact on others or theworld through:

* Strong, forceful actions.
("They invaded our country.")
*
Comparison or regulation. ("They monitor our every action.")
* Attempts to influence or persuade. ("They convinced us
to support them.")
* Giving help that is not
explicitly solicited. ("We will fight for the oppressed.")
* Concem with prestige or impressing theworld at
large. ("We demand respect.")
* A strong emotional reaction to another's
action. ("Their indecision enrages
Affiliation
A concern with establishing, maintaining,
us.')
or restoring friendly relations through:
* The expression of positive, friendly, or intimate feelings towards others. ("We
loveour fellowbelievers.")
* The expression of negative feelings about separation or the disruption of a
friendly relationship. ("We are tormented by our separation from our families.")
* Affiliative, companionate
activities. ("We spent hours sharing our views.")
*
Friendly, nurturant acts. ("We must take care of our people.")
Note. Adapted
fromWinter
(1989). This outline is not adequate
for scoring purposes.
Power motive imagery is scored when an action expresses a concern with

having an impact on others. Examples include references to strong, forceful
actions having an impact on others or the world, comparison or regulation,
attempts to influence or persuade, and concern with prestige or impressing the
world at large (Winter, 1989). All power motive images are weighted equally such
that a reference to violently attacking another would receive the same score as a
reference to convincing another to change a position.
Affiliation motive imagery is scored when an action is described in a way that
expresses a concern with maintaining or restoring friendly relations with others.
Examples include references to positive, friendly, or intimate feelings towards
others, negative feelings about separation or the disruption of a friendly relation
ship, and companionate activities (Winter, 1989).
In addition, after the documents had been coded, each affiliation image was
examined. If the image expressed a concern with developing, maintaining, or
restoring relations with thosewho were considered part of thegroup or thegroup's
cause, ingroup affiliation was coded. If the image expressed a concern with
developing, maintaining, or restoring relations with the group considered oppo
nents, outgroup affiliationwas coded. Images thatdid not fall into one of these two
classifications-e.g.,
images that related to an opponent's concern with develop
ing,maintaining, or restoring relations with another group-were not included in
the following analyses. As this classification of affiliationmotive imagery fre
quently required knowledge of the groups beyond what was present in individual
documents, I determined the classification of the affiliation images. Although
this might be viewed as introducing potential bias, the fact that this coding
was conducted on documents which were mixed together in random order and in

The Implicit
65
which
specific groups were not identified resulted in virtual blindness as to

whether individual documents were issued by terroristor comparison groups.
Plan ofAnalysis
In order to determine whether specific variables were associated with engag
ing in terrorism,I took a case study approach and treatedeach context as a separate
case in which I testedmy hypotheses. When taking this approach, I firstused
t-tests to determine whether therewere differences in themeans of terroristand
nonterroristgroups within each context in ingroup affiliation,outgroup affiliation,
and power motive imagery.Then, in order to examine whether any variables were
significantly related to engaging in terrorismacross all of the separate comparison
cases taken together, I used the Stouffer method (Mosteller & Bush, 1954;
Rosenthal, 1978) to combine the results of the separate case studies.3
In addition to examining whether motive imagery variables were associated
with actively engaging in terrorism, I was interested in uncovering whether the
levels of motive imagery present in documents might indicate that a group was
moving towards terroristactivity. Specifically, I wanted to explore whether terror
ist groups were higher in ingroup affiliation and power motive imagery and lower
in outgroup affiliationmotive imagery than theirnonterrorist comparison groups
before the formerengaged in any type of terrorism. In order to do this, I created a
sample (the indicator sample) that included only those documents issued by
terroristgroups before theyhad engaged in any act of terrorism.Any documents a
group issued after it engaged in its firstact of terrorismwere not included in this
sample. If therewere no preterrorism documents for a particular terroristgroup,
neither itnor itsmatched comparison group was included in the indicator sample.
The question concerning which documents from terroristgroups' matched
comparison groups to include in the indicator sample was dictated by sample size.
While the fact that a terroristevent may affect all groups in the context inwhich
it occurs provides a compelling argument for comparing only the preterrorism
documents of both terroristgroups and theirmatched comparison groups, includ
ing only preterrorism documents from all groups would have leftme with a very
small sample of documents (n = 36). Further, preliminary analyses indicated that
therewere no significant differences in the levels of motive imagery variables
present in the documents issued by comparison groups after versus before terror
ism occurred in theircontexts.4Thus, in order to explore whether levels ofmotive
3
The
Stouffer method involves adding the standard normal deviates, Zs, associated with the ps
in each study (or in this case each context) and dividing this by the square root of the number
of studies (contexts) being combined. One of the strengths of this approach is that itweights each case
study evenly such that contexts inwhich there are more documents do not overpower those inwhich
there are fewer.
obtained
To test this, I created a sample that included all of the documents from comparison groups that had
issued documents both before and after terrorism occurred in their contexts. I then conducted t-tests
within each context to look for differences in themeans on each variable based on when documents

Smith
66
imagery variables might indicate whether a group was moving towards terrorist
activity, I compared terroristgroups' preterrorism documents with the documents
issued by theirmatched comparison groups both before and after the terrorist
group engaged in terroristactivity (n = 98).
Results
Motive Imagery
Ingroup
Affiliation
The differences inmean levels of ingroup affiliationmotive imagery-that is,
affiliationmotive imagery directed towards the ingroup-expressed by terrorist
and comparison groups in the full and indicator samples are presented inTable 3.
In the full sample, two terroristgroups expressed significantly higher levels of
ingroup affiliationmotive imagery than theircomparison groups (Palestine 1944
48: difference in Ms =3.18, p <.05; Transnational: difference in Ms =2.36,
p < .0 1), and terroristgroups expressed a significantly higher level of ingroup
affiliationmotive imagery than comparison groups when results were combined
across contexts (Z = 2.24, p < .05).
In the indicator sample, the same two groups expressed significantly higher
levels of ingroup affiliation imagery than their comparison groups (Palestine
difference in Ms = 2.10, p < .001; Transnational: difference in
1944-48:
Ms = 2.63, p < .05), and terroristgroups again expressed a significantly higher
level of ingroup affiliationmotive imagery than comparison groups when results
were combined across contexts (Z = 1.86, p < .05).
Outgroup AffiliationMotive
Imagery
The differences in mean levels of outgroup affiliation motive imagery

expressed by terroristand comparison groups in the full and indicator samples are
also presented in Table 3. In the full sample, two terroristgroups expressed
significantly lower levels of outgroup affiliationmotive imagery than their com
parison groups (Northern Ireland: difference inMs = -1.36, p < .05; Sri Lanka:
difference inMs = -1.25, p < .01), and terroristgroups expressed a significantly
lower level of outgroup affiliationmotive imagery than comparison groups when
resultswere combined across contexts (Z = 2.26, p < .05).
In the indicator sample, one terroristgroup expressed a significantly lower
level of outgroup affiliation imagery than its comparison group (Sri Lanka: dif
ference inMs = -1.25, p < .01), and terroristgroups expressed a significantly
issued (before or after terrorism) and used the Stouffer method to explore potential differences
contexts. There were no significant differences on any variable within or across contexts
=
= ns,
/? ns, power
p
outgroup affiliation motive: Z-.31,
(ingroup affiliation motive: Z=1.23,
motive: Z = .46, p = ns).
were
across

67
The Implicit
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68
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69
The Implicit
lower level of outgroup affiliationmotive imagery than comparison groups when

resultswere combined across contexts (Z = 1.86, p < .05).5
Power Motive
Imagery
Finally, the differences inmean levels of power motive imagery expressed by

terroristand comparison groups in the full and indicator samples are also presented
in Table 3. In the full sample, four terroristgroups expressed significantly higher
levels of power motive imagery than theircomparison groups (Palestine 1944-48:
difference in Ms =5.88, p <.05; Northern Ireland: difference in Ms =4.46,
p < .05; United States 1983-85: difference inMs = 4.84, p < .01; Sri Lanka: dif
ference inMs = 5.31, p < .01), and terroristgroups expressed a significantlyhigher
level of power motive imagery when results were combined across all contexts
(Z= 3.62, p<
.001).
In the sample that included only those documents terroristgroups issued
before they engaged in terrorism, two terroristgroups expressed significantly
higher levels of power motive imagery than their comparison groups (Palestine
1944-48: difference inMs = 6.87, p < .05; Sri Lanka: difference inMs = 5.44,
p < .01), and terroristgroups expressed a marginally significantly higher level of
power motive imagerywhen resultswere combined across all contexts (Z = 1.55,
p<.10).
Discussion
AffiliationMotive
Imagery and TerroristAggression
As hypothesized, therewere differences in the levels of ingroup and outgroup

affiliation motive imagery expressed by terroristgroups and their comparison
groups across contexts, and these differences were in the hypothesized direction.
Specifically, compared with their nonterrorist counterparts, terrorist groups
expressed significantly higher levels of ingroup affiliationmotive imagery and
significantly lower levels of outgroup affiliationmotive imagery in both the full
and indicator samples. This seems to indicate that the affiliationmotive of terrorist
groups ismore focused on creating tighterconnections with those considered "us,"
while the affiliationmotive of comparison groups ismore focused on creating new
connections thatblur the line between "us" and "them."
To give a concrete example of how the affiliationmotive imagery differed
in terrorist and comparison group documents, it is interesting to compare the
51 also conducted analyses to look for differences between terrorist groups and comparison groups in
overall affiliation motive imagery. In both the full and indicator samples, there were no significant
= ns, indicator
=
differences across contexts (full sample: Z=
.25, p
.44, p
ns).
sample: Z=

70
Smith
affiliationmotive imagery in a document issued by Hamas with that in a document

issued in the same month by thePalestinian Authority, its comparison group in the
Palestinian Territories.6 In an interview thata Hamas leader granted in July 2000,
therewas only one affiliationmotive image, which was focused on establishing
connections with members of the ingroup: "It is our natural right to defend our
kinsmen, our people, our citizens" ("Hamas leader," 2000).
In contrast, in a statement issued in July 2000 by theCentral Council of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization, therewere two affiliation images, both of
which were directed towards members of outgroups. The following is one
example:
The Council, while declaring thishistoric decision [the decision to estab

lish the Palestinian State] to enhance security,peace and stability in the
Middle
East, addresses its appeal to all peace loving nations to firmly

stand by international legitimacy resolutions and to work towards its
implementation. (Palestinian Central Council, 2000, p. 2)
Approximately twomonths after these statements were made, the visit of Israeli
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount set off demonstrations that
eventually led to terrorismon the part of Hamas. While I am not claiming that
differences in the objects of the two groups' affiliation imagery alone explains this
outcome, itmight have provided one indicator of it.
Power Motive
Imagery and TerroristAggression
The hypothesis that groups that engaged in terrorismwould express higher

levels of power motive imagery than their nonterrorist comparison groups was
strongly supported across contexts in the full sample. In the indicator sample, the
resultswere in the same direction but only marginally significant across contexts.
To understand why the results for power motive imagery did not reach the
conventional level of significance in the indicator sample, it's informative to look
at an excerpt from one of the documents issued by a nonterrorist comparison
group. The following quotation comes from a document issued by theAfrican
National Congress in 1956, thecomparison group for thePan Africanist Congress,
which engaged in acts of terrorduring the 1956-63 period examined during the
study:
To win the demands [of theFreedom Charter] calls for the organization,
launching and development of mass struggles on thewidest scale. They
will be won and consolidated only in the course and as the result of a
6
During the period under investigation, members
terrorism.
of Arafat's
Fatah
organization

did not engage
in
The Implicit
71
nation-widecampaignof agitation:through
stubborn
and determined
mass
struggles to defeat the economic
and political policies
of the
Nationalist
Government:
by repulsing
their
onslaughts
on thelivingstan
dards and liberties of the people. (Mandela, 1956/1977)
This
short excerpt is replete with power motive
imagery, e.g., references to
a struggle,
winningdemands,launching
agitating,
defeating
policies,and repuls
ing onslaughts. Clearly this group wanted to have an impact in South Africa and
viewed the struggle inwhich itwas engaged in power-related terms.That being
said, this group did not choose to engage in terrorismduring the period investi
gated in this study.7
This underlines the fact that groups that desire to have an impact on their
political and social contexts can do so in a variety of differentways. As itcould be
argued thatall of thegroups in this sample desired to have an impact on theworlds
they inhabited in that they all were advocating ideologies thatcalled for changing
the status quo, it becomes less surprising that the expression of power motive
imagery
alonedidnotdistinguish
terrorist
groupsfromtheir
nonterrorist
compari
son groups in the indicator sample.

Rather, itmay be thatwhen examining group behavior, it is only in combi
nation with the type of dynamics that both Social
Identity Theory and Freud's
theoryof group psychology describe that a high need forpower leads to violence
against theoutgroup. The following excerpt from theDeclaration ofWar issued by
theOrder (1984) seems to offer a prime example of how such group dynamics may
pave theway to terroristaggression, how the fusion of affiliation and power can
lead to death and destruction:
To these [slain] kinsmen we say, "Rise, rise from your graves, white
brothers! Rise and join us! We go to avenge your deaths. The Aryan
yeomanry is awakening. A long forgottenwind is starting toblow. Do you
hear the approaching thunder? It is that of the awakened Saxon. War is
upon the land." (p. 3)
Conclusionsand Limitations
At the most basic level, this study has shown that the group dynamics
described by Social Identity theorists and Freud seem to characterize terrorist
groups. Further, it has demonstrated that it is possible to distinguish between the
documents of groups that do and do not engage in terrorism through a content
analysis of motive imagery. Finally, its findings underline the importance of
7
During this period, theANC did engage
terrorism used in this study.
in economic
sabotage, which did not meet

the criteria for
72
Smith
examining the objects of affiliationmotive imagery (ingroup and outgroup) when

looking for indicators of group behavior.
At
the same time, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of the

taken in this study. A key criticism relates to my reliance on
matching groups that do and do not engage in terrorism and the fact that the
approach I've
validity of this approach rests on the selection of appropriate comparison groups

(Breslow & Day, 1980; Campbell & Stanley, 1963). Further, even ifgroups can be
found that share similar goals and opponents, it is open to question whether two
groups ever really inhabit the same context: i.e., groups that share the same
locations in time and space may have very different relationships with the gov
ernment, economic prospects, etc. It could be argued that these other contextual
factors-as opposed to group dynamics as revealed throughmotive imagery
determine whether a group chooses to engage in terrorism.
While I view the above points as valid criticisms, in this study I was par
ticularly interested in exploring whether results relating motive imagery to
engaging in terrorismgeneralized across contexts, and to do thismatching was
the only viable alternative. To some degree, the impossibility of finding groups
thatperfectlymatched is the cost of conducting applied research. In a study I am
currently conducting, I am attempting to overcome some of this limitation by
focusing inmore depth on a few groups that have (and have not) engaged in
terrorism during particular periods of their history and exploring whether the
variables coded in their documents-and
other contextual
psychological
factors-are related to their decisions to engage in or desist from terrorist
activity.
As forwhether variables other thanmotives influencewhether groups engage

in terrorism, I would argue that theymost certainly do. A behavior as complex as
engaging in terroristactivity is no doubt multiply determined. Still, regardless of
whether they cause, are caused by, or are independent from other variables that
may lead a group to adopt terrorismas a tactic, a group's ingroup and outgroup
affiliationmotive imagery and, to a lesser degree, its power motive imagerymay
serve as one set of indicators that a group ismoving in thatdirection.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This paper is based on a doctoral dissertation. Funding for this project was
provided by the Psychology Department, the Horace H. Rackham Graduate
School, and the International Institute at theUniversity ofMichigan. I would like
to thankDavid Winter, Abigail Stewart, Rowell Huesmann, Christopher Peterson,
and Clark McCauley for theiradvice on conceptual and methodological aspects of
this project and Carrie Paben for her work coding documents. Correspondence
concerning this article should be addressed toAllison G. Smith, 3726 Connecticut
Avenue, NW, Apt. 316, Washington, DC 20008. E-mail: allison.g.smith@
gmail.com

The Implicit
73
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