TROY UNIVERSITY SORRELL COLLEGE OF BUSINESS

Class - Public Choice, ECO 6660-TGAA

Instructor Dr. George R. Crowley
Student Zviad Barkaia
Email- zbarkaia@troy.edu
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AND EUROPEAN UNION
Abstract
The main questions of this paper include: how non-state interest groups are involved in
political decision making process? How they manage to mobilize members with
avoiding free rider problem? Does logic of collective actions works toward European
interest groups? And what is a positive selective incentive on supranational level?

2015
Introduction

Zviad Barkaia

The European tradition of representation of interest groups are different from practice in
the USA. As Tocqueville argues in his book Democracy in America, pressure groups in
U.S are multifariously represented. 1 It is maybe true that competition between states
exist, so local governments try to have influence on federal policymaking process, but
... there has always been a focus within the American polity on both the pluralist nature
of civic voice and its relevance to political life. 2
On the contrary, European states had tradition of strong political parties, bureaucracy
and administrative elites that play a much more important role in the socio-political life
and decision making process than private interests. However, after unification of
European states and creating of the European Union equilibrium has changed.
Therefore old assumptions about European collective action also are equivocal. Division
of institutions, fragmentation of power and political decentralization provide opportunity
for interest groups. We can assume that in the European Union (EU) simultaneously
exist two different types of interest groups that have different origins: First, a national
associations that have indirect coercive power to provide lobbying without byproducts
on the supranational level and second, private (non-state, Euro associations)
organizations.
Review of literature
B. Ekelund and D. Tollison in his paper The interest-group theory of government,
argue that interest group formation is like a traditional public good where the benefits
1.Tocqueville, A. (1831). Democracy in America - Saunders and Otley (London)
2 Greenwood J. & Aspinwall M. (1998). Collective Action in the European Union
Interests and the new politics of associability; Routledge p. 1
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Zviad Barkaia

from lobbying are non-rival and non-excludable, so this means that as traditional public
good, interest group formation is characterized by the issue of free riding. 3 Olson argues
that the organizations that have the selective incentives available are those that (1)
have the authority and capacity to be coercive, or (2) have a source of positive
inducements that they can offer the individuals in a latent groups 4 In the case of EU
national interest groups associations a priori have indirect coercive power for provision
lobbying on supranational level, but on the other hand non-state Euro associations are
in different position and they somehow should provide positive selective incentives
(reward) for avoiding free rider problem.
Collective action and EU
The Euro groups target is European Commission (and branches of EU in general)
which is the place where decisions are made. Interest groups usually try to influence
the process by selling information, which is essential for shaping the agenda. Therefore,
as a result interest groups have a capacity to shape outcomes.
The question of this paper is how non-state interest groups are involved in political
decision making process? How they manage to mobilize members by avoiding free
rider problem? Does the logic of collective actions work toward European interest
groups? And what is a positive selective incentive on supranational level?

3 Ekelund and D. Tollison (2001). The interest-group theory of government; The Elgar
companion to public choice.p. 357

4 M. Olson (1965). The Logic Of Collective Actions By; Harvard University Press p.
113
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Zviad Barkaia

According to the EUROLOB data EU associations organized more potential members,

compared to the national associations. They organized 79.2 per cent of members while
German groups could organize only 70.4 per cent; British organizations represent 70
per cent; and French organizations represent 61.8 per cent. Also it is important that all
these national firms (potential members) are joined at least one EU association. 5 We
can easily assume that national business firms are interested to be a member of EU
associations. (This is not our papers topic but it should be mentioned that in spite of the
fact that business associations are significant and important for observation, there are
also different type of associations for example: Public interests, Professions. etc.)
Greenwood and Aspinwall tested the rate of the importance of positive incentives that
EU associations offer to their members. As we can see in the Table # 1 the most
important incentives are the Representing members interests in Europe and Provision
of information (Technically, Advise Services and Information Newsletters are a form of
provision of information). Other intensives such as discounts, legal and business
services are less significant.
Table 1 Membership services provided by a sample of Euro groups: Business 6 (Table
is changed slightly by author in order to main topic of paper)
Service
Representing members interests in Europe
Access to EU advisory committees, working parties, etc.

N
260
179

%
98
68

5 EUROLOB data - http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/d7/en/projects/eurolob-iieuropeanization-of-interest-intermediation (Last update - 10/30/2015)

6 Greenwood J. & Aspinwall M. (1998). Collective Action in the European Union

Interests and the new politics of associability; Routledge p. 8
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Zviad Barkaia

Information newsletters
Advice services
Discounts with suppliers
Membership discounts of other organizations
Access to business services
Access to legal services
Consultants of favorable

170
170
10
3
25
46
10

64
64
4
1
9
17
3

However, this result still does not mean that national firms do not have interest to be
members of supranational associations. Indeed, we have seen in EUROLOB analysis
where percentage of involvement is significantly high. So we can assume that positive
selective incentives do not have significant or at least decisively significant effect on the
collective action logic in EU.7
Olsons theory has been criticized that it is empirically impossible that interest groups
can finance their lobbying movement with revenue by selling positive selective
incentives. We could see case where in spite of high standard of mobilization of national
firms in supranational associations positive selective incentives do not have the real
influence on the process.

Conclusion
We have argued that simple generalization of the logic of collective action and the role
of selective incentives are not assured. We have assumed that positive selective
incentives (rewards) do not have significant effect on national firms that want to be a
member of EU associations.
7R. Eising (2009) The Political Economy of State-Business Relation In Europe
Interest mediation, capitalism and EU policy-making. Routledge . p. 82-84
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Zviad Barkaia

Literature:

Ekelund and D. Tollison (2001). The interest-group theory of government; The

Elgar companion to public choice.

EUROLOB data - http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/d7/en/projects/eurolob-iieuropeanization-of-interest-intermediation

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Zviad Barkaia

Greenwood J. & Aspinwall M. (1998). Collective Action in the European Union

Interests and the new politics of associability; Routledge

M. Olson (1965). The Logic Of Collective Actions By; Harvard University Press

R. Eising (2009) The Political Economy of State-Business Relation In Europe

Interest mediation, capitalism and EU policy-making. Routledge

Tocqueville, A. (1831). Democracy in America - Saunders and Otley (London)

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