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Spouses Wee vs Galvez

HELD:

Quisumbing, J.:

Not defective. It must be noted that the respondent in this case is


already a resident of the US and not of PH. Hence it was proper for
her to appoint her daughter to act as her attorney-in-fact. Pursuant to
the SPA granted by respondent to her attorney-in-fact, the latter was
duly authorized not just to initiate complaints but is specifically
authorized to sign all papers, documents and pleadings necessarily
connected with the filing of a complaint.

Facts:
Petitioner Rosemarie and respondent Rosario are sisters. The
present controversy stemmed from an investment agreement
between the two sisters. Rosario, represented by her daughter
Grace Galvez as her attorney-in-fact filed a complaint before RTC
Quezon to collect a sum of money from Spouses Wee.
It was alleged that the sisters entered into an agreement whereby
Rosario would send Rosemarie $20k. However, Rosario asked for
the return of the $20k and for an accounting and Rosemarie then
promised to comply but failed to do so.
Once again, Rosario, through her attorney-in-fact, sent Rosemarie a
written demand for her money and accounting but Rosemarie
ignored the demand, thus causing Rosario to file suit.
Then spouses Wee moved to dismiss the case in which one of the
grounds is the certification against forum shopping was defective,
having been executed by an attorney-in-fact and not the plaintiff, as
required by Rule 7, Sec. 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
However the trial court denied Wees motion to dismiss. On appeal,
the CA denied their petition. Hence the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the certification of Non-Forum shopping executed by
the plaintiffs attorney-in-fact is defective.

Pursuant to A.C. 04-94, which extended the requirement of a


certification on non-forum shopping to all initiatory pleadings filed in
all courts and quasi judicial agencies, as well as Rule 7, Sec. 5 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the aforementioned SPA must
necessarily include the certification of non forum shopping. To
conclude otherwise would render nugatory the SPA and also render
respondents constitution of an attorney-in-fact inutile.
As respondent points out, it is her attorney-in-fact who has actual
and personal knowledge whether she initiated similar actions or
proceedings before various courts on the same issue on
respondents behalf. Said circumstance constitutes reasonable
cause to allow the attorney-in-fact, and not the respondent, as
plaintiff in this case to personally sign the Certificate of Non-Forum
Shopping. Under the circumstances of this case, SC holds that there
has been proper compliance with rule proscribing forum shopping.

Heirs of Francisco Retuya


Vs CA
Peralta, J.:

Facts:
Severo and Maxima were husband and wife without any children.
Severo left several parcels of land registered under his name which
are located in Mandaue City.
Severo died intestate and survived by his full blood brothers and
sisters as well as his half blood siblings.
Maxima also died intestate and survived by her siblings.
Then petitioners herein filed with the RTC of Mandaue an action for
judicial partition of the properties left by Severo and Maxima.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision for partition of the properties
wherein the property belongs to the respondent heirs of Eulogio
covers only 42 sq. meters. The latter then filed a motion for
correction which the RTC amended it by changing the area of 42 sq.
meters to 255 sq. meters which decisions became final and
executory.
Petitioners then filed with the CA a petition to annul the judgment of
RTC. Initially the CA dismissed the petition but upon petitioners
motion for reconsideration which the CA granted, it reinstated the
petition.
Subsequently, respondent heirs of Eulogio filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of CAs resolution, on the ground that it was made
to appear in the petition for annulment of judgment that Quintin
Retuya, one of the petitioners, had signed the certification against
forum shopping on Mar. 18, 2003, when he had already died on Jul.
29, 1996.

The CA granted the respondents motion for reconsideration and


dismissed the petition.
CA: Sec. 5, Rule 7 of Rules of Court provides that the principal party
shall sign the certification against non forum shopping, as the
attestation requires personal knowledge by the party who executed
the same, otherwise it would cause the dismissal. Considering that
Quintin died on July 29, 1996, it could have been impossible for him
to sign the Petition dated Mar. 18, 2003.
In denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, the CA said in its
resolution while it may be true that when majority of the parties have
signed the certification against non forum shopping would constitute
substantial compliance, the CA cannot apply the same rule to
petitioners because the issue is not the parties substantial
compliance, but the dishonesty committed by the parties. The liberal
interpretation of the rules cannot be accorded to parties who
commit dishonesty and falsehood in court.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition.

HELD:
No. CA is correct. The SC agreed with the CA that the substantial
rule on the filing of the certification of N-FS is not applicable in this
case because of petitioners dishonesty committed against the CA.
Petitioners actuation showed their lack of forthrightness to the CA
which the latter correctly found to be a dishonest act committed
against it. PETITION DENIED

Jabalde vs PNB

Central Surety vs

REYES, J.:

C. N. HODGES and CA
Conception, C.J.:

Facts:
Jabalde seeks recovery of P10k allegedly deposited by him with
PNB, P5k in genuine PH currency on 1941 and another P5k on 1943
in mixed genuine PH currency and Jap. Military notes.
-Defendants answer was not under oath, admits the making of
deposits but denies the dates of deposit alleging that both deposits
were made in 1944 hence being not reimbursable for being null and
void under EO 49.

Issue:

Facts:
Prior to Jan. 15, 1954, two lots were sold by C.N. HODGES to
Vicente M. Layson for the sum of P43K on instalments.
As of the abovementioned date, Layson incurred an outstanding
balance of P15k. Layson persuaded C.N. to execute in his favor an
absolute deed of sale in order to obtain a loan with the bank.
Layson executed a promissory note in favor of C.N. for P15k with
interest thereon and the sum of P1.5k for attys fees and costs in
case of default.

Whether or not the banks failure to deny under oath the entries in
the passbook as copied in the complaint constitutes an admission
of the genuineness and due execution of the document.(Sec.8, Rule
8)

Then, the Petitioner Surety through its manager, Mrs. Rosita Mesa,
executed in favor of Hodges the surety bond.

Held:

Hodges then lodged a complaint in CFI to recover the sum total of


P17.8k plus attys fees.

SC: Ordinarily, such failure is an admission. However, this rule


cannot apply in the present case because the plaintiff introduced
evidence purporting to support his allegations of deposit on the dates
he wanted the court to believe, and offered no objection during trial
to the testimonies of defendants witnesses and documentary
evidence showing different dates of deposit. By these acts, the
plaintiff waived the defendants technical admission through failure to
deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the
document.

C.N. demanded to petitioner the payment when Layson defaulted in


his obligation and despite repeated extensions of time, petitioner still
failed to fulfil its obligation.

Layson then admitted the formal allgetions and denied the other
allegations while the petitioner failed to file its answer and been
declared as default.
Upon presentation of evidence of HODGES, judgment was rendered
in fovor of the latter but subsequently modified by CFI upon motion
for reconsideration by petitioner.
It was ruled that petitioner is liable only for the amount of P8K
because Mrs. Mesa could only issue security bonds not exceeding
P8k.

Both parties appealed to the CA and CA ruled that the petitioner is


liable for the whole amount of P17.8k plus attys fees and costs.
The CA found that the petitioner is liable for the full amount of surety
bond in view of petitioners failure to deny under oath the
genuineness and due execution of said bond, copy of which was
attached to the complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in applying the rule on implied
admission by reason of failure to deny under oath the authenticity of
a pleaded document.

HELD:
Sec. 8 Rule 8 of the Rules of Court is in authority.
SC: We have however, held that: .where a case has been tried in
complete disregard of the rule and the plaintiff having pleaded a
document by copy, presents oral evidence to prove the due
execution of the document as well as the agents authority and no
objections are made to the defendants evidence in refutation, the
rule will be considered waived.
In the case at bar, the parties acted in the complete disregard of
Sec.8, Rule 8. Hodges had neither objected to the evidence
introduced by petitioner in order to prove that Mrs, Mesa had no
authority to issue a surety bond, much less one in excess of P8k,
and took no exception to the admission of said evidence. Hence,
Hodges must be deemed to have waived the benefits of said rule
and petitioner herein cannot be held liable in excess of the sum of
P8k.

CAPITOL MOTORS vs YABUT


Villamor, J.:

Facts:
Capitol Motors filed a complaint against Yabut based on a
promissory note excuted by Yabut in favor of the plaintiff for the sum
of P30k payable on instalments. It was also stipulated that should
defendant fail to pay two successive instalments, the principal sum
remaining will become due and demandable. Then having Yabut
failed to pay the two instalments successively and thereupon having
failed to pay the whole debt upon demand, Capitol Motors prayed
that judgment be rendered in his favor.
Defendant filed an answer in this wise:
DEFENDANT thorugh his counsel alleges:
1. Paragraph 1 of the complaint is admitted.
2. Paragraphs 2,3,4,5,6 and 7 of the complaint are
specifically denied for lack of knowledge sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth thereof.
Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the ground
that the defendant failed to deny specifically the material allegations
of the complaint. The defendant did not file an opposition to the
motion. Then the lower court rendered judgment granting in toto the
plaintiffs prayer.
B4 the issue, said the SC: We agree w/ defendant that one of the
modes of specific denial contemplated in Sec.10, Rule 8, is a denial
by stating that the defendant is w/o knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment in the
complaint. The question however is

ISSUE:

Flour Daniel vs. EB Villarosa

Whether or not paragraph 2 of defendants answer constitutes a


specific denial under the said rule (Sec.10, Rule 8)

Quisumbing, J.:

Facts:
HELD:
No. The rule authorizing an answer to the effect that the defendant
has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of an averment and giving such answer the effect of a denial,
does not apply where the fact as to which want of knowledge is
asserted, is so plainly and necessarily within the defendants
knowledge that his averment of ignorance must be palpably untrue.
It is evident that a mere allegation of the facts alleged in the
complaint is insufficient to raise an issue; the defendant must aver
positively or state how it is that he is ignorant of the facts so alleged.

Two reasons why present appeal must fail:


1st The present action is founded upon a written instrument attached
to the complaint, but defendant failed to deny under oath the
genuineness and due execution of the instrument; hence, the same
are deemed admitted.
2nd Defendant did not oppose the motion for judgment on the
pleadings filed by plaintiff; neither has he filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of Sept. 13, 1966 which deemed the
case submitted for decision on the pleadings.

Petitioner and Fil-Estate entered into an agreement for the


construction of resort in Boracay Island. Respondent E.B. Villarosa
was one of the contractors engaged by petitioner.
Petitioner and respondent executed a separate contract for (1) civil
structure and architecture (2) for plumbing and fire protection and (3)
for millworks.
When Fil-Estate failed to pay monthly billings, petitioner did not pay
respondent.
Petitioner issued a notice of suspension of work to respondent.
Thus, respondent demanded payment for suspension cost and for
work so far performed. Respondent also filed with RTC a complaint
for a sum of money and damages against petitioner herein.
Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action. However the RTC denied
such motion.
On appeal, the CA affirmed RTCs decision. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action
against petitioner.

Held:
In this case, annexed to the subject complaint are the three contracts
above mentioned governing rights and obligations between petitioner
and respondent.
Records show that recurring in each of the said contracts is the
provision that payment by petitioner shall be subject to its timely
receipt of similar payments from Fil-Estate.

The said attached contracts, which define and delimit the rights and
obligations of the parties, clearly require a specific condition before

petitioner may be held liable for payment. The complaint, however,


failed to state that the said condition had been fulfilled. Without the
said condition having taken place, petitioner cannot be said to have
breached its obligation to pay.
Respondents complaint failed to pass the test of sufficiency of cause
of action. Thus, said complaint should have been dismissed on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action.

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