Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Gonzales v. COMELEC
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 4880 on the grounds that it
violates their rights such as freedom of speech, of assembly, to form
associations or societies. More so, they question the forms of election
campaigns enumerated in the act.
Facts:
1. Congress passed a statute (RA 4880) which was designed to
maintain the purity and integrity of the electoral process and
calling a halt to the undesirable practice of prolonged political
campaigns, bringing in their wake serious evils not the least of
which is the ever-increasing cost of seeking public office.
2. Cabigao was an incumbent council in the 4th district of Manila and
the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the position of
Vice Mayor. He was subsequently elected to that position.
Meanwhile, Gonzales is a private individual, a registered voter in
the City, and a political leader.
3. They claim that the enforcement of RA 4880 would prejudice their
basic rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and
right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to
law. Specifically, they challenge the validity of two new sections
included in the Revised Election Code under RA 4880 which was
approved and took effect on June 17, 1967. The said sections
prohibit the too early nomination of candidates and limit the period
of election campaign and political activity. More so, after defining
the terms candidates and election campaign/partisan political
activity, the acts which constitute election campaign were
specified, and that simple expression of opinion and thoughts
concerning the election was not to be considered as part of an
election campaign. This prohibition was furthered by a proviso
which provided that nothing stated in the Act shall be understood
to prevent any person from expressing his views on current
political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of the
candidates for public office whom he supports.
4. The acts deemed included in the terms election campaign of
partisan political activity are: (a) forming organizations,
associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a party or candidate; (b) holding political
conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or
other similar assemblies for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or
2.
3.
2 In re: Laureta
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
3 In re: Laureta
14.
15.
16.
17.
any elective public office voted for at large earlier than 150 days
immediately preceding an election, and for any other elective
public office earlier than 90 days immediately preceding an
election. This provision affects the right of association. Political
parties have less freedom as to the time during which they
nominate candidates; the curtailment is not such, however, as to
render meaningless such a basic right. Their scope of legitimate
activities, save the above cited, is not unduly narrowed. Neither is
there such an infringement of their freedom to assemble. They
can do so, but not for such purpose. Thus, the Court sustained its
validity unanimously.
On the one hand, it cannot be denied that the limitations thus
imposed on the constitutional rights of free speech and press, of
assembly, and of associations cut deeply into their substance. On
the other, it cannot be denied either that evils, substantial in
character, taint the purity of the electoral process. The justification
alleged by the proponents of the measures weighs heavily with the
members of the Court, though in varying degrees, in the appraisal
of the aforesaid restrictions to which such precious freedoms are
subjected. They are not unaware of the clear and present danger
that calls for measures that may bear heavily on the exercise of
the cherished rights of expression, of assembly and of association.
The Court, with five justices unable to agree, is of the view that no
unconstitutional infringement exists insofar as the formation of
organizations, associations, clubs, committees, or other groups of
persons for the purpose of soliciting votes or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda or both for or against a candidate or
party is restricted and that the prohibition against giving, soliciting
or receiving contribution for election purposes, either directly or
indirectly, is equally free from constitutional infirmity.
The restriction on freedom of assembly as confined to holding
political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies,
parades or other similar assemblies for the purpose of soliciting
votes or undertaking any campaign or propaganda or both for or
against a candidate or party, leaving untouched all other legitimate
exercise of such poses a more difficult question. Nevertheless, the
Court rejected the contention that this should be annulled.
The other acts, likewise deemed included in election campaign or
partisan political activity tax, to the utmost, the judicial
predisposition to view with sympathy legislative efforts to regulate
4 In re: Laureta
more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements
as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger
doctrine.
21. It is undeniable, therefore, that even though the governmental
purpose be legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the
end can be more narrowly achieved. For precision of
regulation is the touchstone in an area so closely related to
our most precious freedoms.
22. It is of the opinion that it would be premature, to say at least, for a
judgment of nullity of any provision found in RA 4880. The need
for adjudication arises only if in the implementation of the Act,
there is in fact an unconstitutional application of its provisions.
1.
2.
It is clear from the laws and the regulations adverted to that the
respondent had the right to require the petitioner to submit the
manuscript of the speeches which he intended to broadcast.
The Court failed to perceive the cogency of such argument. It does
not bolster up the case for the petitioner. It impliedly admits that a
speech that may endanger public safety may be censored and
disapproved for broadcasting. How could the censor verify the
petitioners claim that the speeches he intended to broadcast
offered no danger to public safety or pubic morality, if the
petitioner refused to submit the manuscript or even its gist? If the
petitioner had complied with respondents requirement and the
respondent had arbitrarily and unreasonably refused to permit said
speeches to be broadcasted, he might have reason to complain.
Primicias v. Fugoso
Santiago, the campaign manager of the Popular Front Sumulong, asked Far
East Broadcasting for the purchase of air time for the broadcast of the
political speeches delivered at the Opera House. However, respondent
would only do so if the party submits in advance the complete manuscript
of the speeches to be delivered.
The Coalesced Minority Party applied for a permit for the holding of a
public meeting at Plaza Miranda for purposes of petitioning the
government for redress to grievances. However, the City Mayor, founding
his actions on Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927, did not
issue the permit.
Facts:
Facts:
1.
2.
Ruling:
1.
2.
3.
The Coalesced Minority Party applied for a permit for the holding of
a public meeting at Plaza Miranda on a Sunday afternoon,
November 16, 1947, for the purpose of petitioning the government
for redress to grievances.
However, the Mayor of the City of Manila (Valeriano Fugoso) did not
issue the permit. For this purpose, the campaign manager of the
party (Cipriano Primicias) instituted this action for mandamus.
Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 provides the
power of the City Mayor of Manila to grant or issue permits for the
holding of assembly or meeting, parade or procession. Moreover,
he would be able to determine where to hold such activities.
Ruling:
1.
5 In re: Laureta
2.
3.
4.
5.
Mutuc v. COMELEC
Mutuc seeks to be a delegate of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. In his
campaigns, he used political jingles in his mobile units equipped with
sound systems and loud speakers.
Facts:
1.
2.
3.
6 In re: Laureta
voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material,
under the above statute subject to confiscation.
Ruling:
1.
2.
3.
Ruling:
1.
2.
Reyes v. Bagatsing
The Anti-Bases Coalition planned to hold a peaceful march and rally. It
would start in Luneta Park and end at the gates of the US Embassy. After
the march, a program would follow whereby two brief speeches were to be
delivered. However, the City Mayor did not act on the request of
organization for permit.
Facts:
Navarro v. Villegas
The City Mayor offered the Sunken Gardens, instead of Plaza Miranda, as
venue for an assembly.
1.
Facts:
1.
2.
2.
7 In re: Laureta
3.
Ruling:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
8 In re: Laureta
peaceful character. Even then, only the guilty parties should be
held accountable. It is true that the licensing official, here
respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining
whether or not a permit would be granted. While prudence
requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly
occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant
circumstances, still the assumption especially so where the
assembly is scheduled for a specific public place is that the
permit must he for the assembly being held there. The exercise of
such a right, in the language of Justice Roberta, speaking for the
American Supreme Court, is not to be abridged on the plea that it
may be exercised in some other place.
9. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the
licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time
when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent
of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required.
Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the
public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid
objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another
public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or
modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard
for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an
imminent sad grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants
must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether
favourable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest
opportunity. Thus, if so minded, they can have recourse to the
proper judicial authority.
10. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with other intellectual
freedom, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values.
It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary even more
so than on the other departments rests the grave and delicate
responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such
preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of
course, dispense with what has been felicitously termed by Justice
Holmes as the sovereign prerogative of judgment. Nonetheless,
the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of
justice on the side of suds rights, enjoying as they do precedence
and primacy.
Cabansag v. Fernandez
Cabansag wrote a letter to the Presidential Complaints and Action
Commission seeking for the fast resolution of his case pending at the CFI
of Pangasinan. Fernandez prayed that Cabansag be declared in contempt
of court for a line in his letter.
Facts:
1.
2.
3.
Ruling:
1.
2.
9 In re: Laureta
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
10 In re: Laureta
8.
Ruiz v. Gordon
A prayer rally and parade/march was to be conducted by petitioners. They
allege that the Mayor of Olongapo City, Gordon, did not act on the matter.
Facts:
1.
2.
3.
Ruling:
1.
2.
As shown both in the manifestation and the answer, this action for
mandamus could have been obviated if only petitioner took the
trouble of verifying on November 23 whether or not a permit had
been issued. A party desirous of exercising the right to peaceable
assembly should be the one most interested in ascertaining the
action taken on a request for a permit. Necessarily, after a
reasonable time or, if the day and time was designated for the
decision of the request, such part or his representative should be
at the office of the public official concerned. If he fails to do so, a
copy of the decision reached, whether adverse or favourable,
should be sent to the address of petitioner. In that way, there need
not be waste of time and effort not only of the litigants but likewise
of a court from which redress is sought in case of a denial or
modification of a request for a permit.
The petition is dismissed. The Court deems it best to set forth the
above to specify in more detail, the steps necessary for the judicial
protection of constitutional rights with the least delay and
inconvenience to the parties and with the greater assurance that
the factual background on which is dependent the determination of
whether or not the clear and present danger standard has been
satisfied.
11 In re: Laureta
People v. Perez
Perez uttered phrases which called for the beheading of Wood in a
discussion on political matters.
Facts:
3.
1.
2.
Ruling:
1.
2.
US v. Bustos
The justice of peace filed a case against numerous citizens of Pampanga
after the latters case was dismissed. They were charged for the libellous
statements against him.
Facts:
1.
2.
3.
Ruling:
1.
12 In re: Laureta
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
13 In re: Laureta
1.
2.
3.
2.
Ruling:
1.
2.
3.
3.
Ruling:
1.
2.
14 In re: Laureta
3.
4.
5.
6.
People v. Alarcon
A columnist of the Tribune published the copy of a letter in his article. The
letter is about the conviction of 52 tenants of a hacienda.
Facts:
1.
2.
3.
Ruling:
1.
The elements of contempt by newspaper publications are welldefined by the cases adjudicated in this as in other jurisdictions.
Newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or
influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or
proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily
punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after cause has
ended. It must clearly appear that such publications do impede,
interfere with, and embarrass the administration of justice before
the author of the publications should be held for contempt. What
is thus sought to be shielded against the influence of newspaper
comments is the all-important duty of the court to administer
justice in the decision of a pending case. There is no pending case
to speak of when and once the court has come upon a decision and
15 In re: Laureta
2.
3.
has lost control either to reconsider or amend it. That, the Court
believes is the case at bar, for here the Court has a concession that
the letter complained of was published after the CFI of Pampanga
had decided the aforesaid criminal case for robbery in band, and
after that decision had been appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
fact that a motion to reconsider its order confiscating the bond of
the accused therein was subsequently filed may be admitted; but,
the important consideration is that it was then without power to
reopen or modify the decision which it had rendered upon the
merits of the case, and could not have been influenced by the
question publication.
It is suggested that even if there had been nothing more pending
before the trial court, this still had jurisdiction to punish the
accused for contempt, for the rule that the publication scandalized
the court. The rule suggested, which has its origin at common
law, is involved in some doubt under modern English law and in the
United States, the weight of authority, however, is clearly to the
effect that comment upon concluded cases is unrestricted under
our constitutional guaranty of the liberty of the press. Other
considerations argue against our adoption of the suggested
holding. As stated, the rule imported into this jurisdiction is that
newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass,
or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or
proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is summarily
punishable by the courts; that the rule is otherwise after the case
has ended. In at least two instances, this court has exercised the
power to punish for contempt on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle (Villavicencio v. Lukban), on the corrective
and not on the retaliatory idea of punishment (In re: Lozano and
Quevedo). Contempt of court is in the nature of a criminal offense,
and in considering the probate effects of the article alleged to be
contemptuous, every fair and reasonable interference consistent
with the theory of defendants innocence will be indulged, and
where a reasonable doubt in fact or in law exists as to the guilt of
one of the constructive contempt for interfering with the due
administration of justice, the doubt must be resolved in his favour
and he must be acquitted.
Respondent was acquitted.
2.
Ruling:
1.
16 In re: Laureta
2.
3.
4.
In re: Laureta
Ilustre, whose case before the Supreme Court was resolved against her
favour, wrote to the members of the First Division of the Court and
threatened them. Furthermore, she filed a complaint before the
Tanodbayan.
Facts:
1.
2.
Ruling:
1.
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan
Gonzales filed a motion for reconsideration. He was found guilty of
contempt of court and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and a
member of the bar.
17 In re: Laureta
Ruling:
1.
2.
18 In re: Laureta
US v. Kottinger
3.
Kottinger was charged for keeping for sale in the raided store of Camera
Supply Co. of obscene and indecent pictures. The pictures revealed six
different postures of non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines.
Facts:
4.
1.
2.
Gonzales v. Katigbak
Ruling:
1.
2.
The Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television, upon condition
that certain parts be changed and removed, classified the motion picture
Kapit sa Patalim as for adults only.
Facts:
1.
2.
Ruling:
1.
19 In re: Laureta
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
People v. Go Pin
Go Pin held an exhibition of what was alleged to be indecent and/or
immoral pictures in a recreational center.
Facts:
1.
Ruling:
1.
2.
20 In re: Laureta
3.
1.
2.
3.
2.
Ruling:
US v. Apurado
Several individuals compelled the members of the municipal council to
dismiss several officials and replace them with the people they had
recommended.
Facts:
1.
21 In re: Laureta
2.
3.
Ruling:
1.
2.
Malabanan v. Ramento
Student leaders at the Gregorio Araneta University, after holding the
meeting, marched towards the Life Science building using megaphones
and giving utterance to language severely critical of the school authorities.
Classes were disturbed while the non-academic personnels work was
interrupted.
Facts:
1.
2.
It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the
public assembly of the people to protest against grievances
whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is
always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the
grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a
rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their
irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be permitted to seize
upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual
members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as
a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the
right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would
become a delusion and a snare and the attempt to exercise it on
the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner
would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and
most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought to
attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities.
If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the
guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefore, but
the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line
between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an
essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising.
The evidence does not establish the guilt of the accused.
3.
4.
5.
Ruling:
1.
It is true that petitioners held the rally at a place other than that
specified in the permit and continued it longer than the time
allowed. Undeniably too, they did disturb the classes and caused
the work of the non-academic personnel to be left undone. Such
22 In re: Laureta
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Villar v. TIP
The facts are similar with Malabanan v. Ramento. However, the petitioners
have incurred failing grades thus were disallowed to enrol.
Facts:
23 In re: Laureta
1.
2.
Ruling:
1.
2.
3.
Ruling:
1.
2.
24 In re: Laureta
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
25 In re: Laureta
is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is
convicted by final judgment through a forced confession, which
violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination; or who is
denied the right to present evidence in his defense as a
deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, even after the
accused has already served sentence for 22 years.
4.
Ruling:
1.
2.
3.
2.
3.
26 In re: Laureta
4.
5.
2.
Ruling:
1.
2.
In re: Edillon
Atty. Edillon did not want to pay the membership dues. He questioned the
so-called infringement of the integration of the Integrated Bar on right to
association.
Facts:
1.
3.
27 In re: Laureta
4.
Subido v. Ozaeta
Petitioner wanted the Register of Deeds of Manila, in compliance to Justice
Circular No. 128, to furnish him a list of real estates sold to aliens and
registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Facts:
1.
2.
Petitioner, the editor of the Manila Post, prays that an order issue
commanding the respondents to furnish to petitioner the list of
real estates sold to aliens and registered with the Register of
Deeds of Manila since the promulgation of Justice Circular No. 128
or to allow the petitioner or his duly accredited representatives to
examine all records in the respondents custody relative to said
transaction.
Said request was first denied by the Register of Deeds and by the
Secretary of Justice, on appeal.
Ruling:
1.
6.
28 In re: Laureta
7.
8.
2.
Ruling:
1.
2.
3.
Baldoza v. Dimaano
To know the peace and order situation of the municipality, employees of
the Municipal Mayor of Taal wanted to examine the criminal docket records
of the municipal court. However, it was refused by the judge. As such, he
was charged of abuse of authority.
Facts:
1.
The said municipal trial court judge was charged with abuse of
authority in refusing to allow employees to access the records of
the Municipal Trial Court.
4.
29 In re: Laureta
5.
2.
2.
3.
4.
Ruling:
1.
5.
and the duty under Article III, Section 7 have become operative
and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter.
In recognizing the peoples right to be informed, both the 1973
Constitution and the New Charter, expressly mandate the duty of
the State and its agents to afford access to official records,
documents, papers and in addition, government research data
used as basis for policy development, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.
The guarantee has been further
enhanced in the New Constitution with the adoption of a policy of
full public disclosure, this time, which reads: Subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.
Government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure
of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose
sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said
agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the
right to information may be exercised by the public.
The Court is emphatic in the statement that the authority to
regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry
with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be made between
the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to a
particular information and the authority to regulate the manner in
which the access is sought to be afforded. The first is a limitation
upon the availability of access to the information sought, which
only the Legislature may impose. The second pertains to the
government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its
authority to regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end
that damage to, or loss of, public records may be avoided, undue
interference with the duties of said agencies may be prevented,
and more importantly, that the exercise of the same constitutional
right by other persons shall be assured.
While the manner of examining public records may be subject to
reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody
thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and
to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the
part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made
contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the
enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by
any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional
30 In re: Laureta
6.
7.
8.
9.
service eligible for the positions to which they were appointed. The
constitution expressly declares as a State policy that
[a]ppointments in the civil service shall be made only according to
merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and
except as to positions which are policy determining, primarily
confidential or highly technical, by competitive examination.
10. But, it is not enough that the information sought is of public
interest. For Mandamus to lie in a given case, the information
must not be among the species exempted by law from the
operation of the constitutional guarantee.
11. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern,
and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon
access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the
duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil
service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes
imperative.
Valmonte v. Belmonte
Valmonte, through a letter, requested the GSIS to furnish him a list of the
names of the opposition members of the Batasang Pambansa who were
able to secure a loan of Php 2 million.
Facts:
1.
2.
Ruling:
1.
31 In re: Laureta
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Ruling:
1.
2.
32 In re: Laureta
3.
4.
5.
6.
2.
Ruling:
1.
2.
3.
The labor union made use of its constitutional right to picket. From
the time of Mortera v. CIR, a 1947 decision, this Court has been
committed to the view that peaceful picketing is part of the
freedom of speech guarantee of the Constitution. The latest case
in point where such a principle was reaffirmed expressly is
Associated Labor Union v. Gomez, a 1980 decision. There is no
mention of the other placards but it is not unlikely that to bolster
its claim, mention was likewise made and in bold letter at that of
such alleged failing of its management.
It is a fact of industrial life, both in the Philippines as in the United
States, that in the continuing confrontation between labor and
management, it is far from likely that the language employed
would be both courteous and polite. Such being the case, there is
no affront either to reason or to the law in the complaint for libel
being dismissed. In pricing reliance on the constitutional right of
freedom of expression, this Court once again makes manifest its
adherence to the principle first announced by Justice Malcolm in US
v. Bustos. In no uncertain terms, it made clear that the judiciary, in
deciding suits for libel, must ascertain whether or not the alleged
offending words may be embraced by the guarantees of free
speech and free press.
Decision is affirmed.
33 In re: Laureta
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
The Expanded Value-Added Tax Law was challenged by several petitions.
The Philippine Press Institute contends that the law discriminates against
the press after the law removed the exemption of the press from the VAT
while maintained those granted to others.
4.
Facts:
1.
2.
Ruling:
1.
2.
3.