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CASE NOTE
LAW SOCIETY OF SINGAPORE v SINGHAM DENNIS
MAHENDRAN [2001] 1 SLR 566

Introduction:
Section 83 of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161, 1997 Revised Edition)
(the Act) provides that:
(1) All advocates and solicitors shall be subject to the control of
the Supreme Court and shall be liable on due cause shown to be
struck off the roll or suspended from practice for any period not
exceeding 5 years or censured.
(2) Such due cause may be shown by proof that an advocate and
solicitor
...
(b) has been guilty of fraudulent or grossly improper conduct in
the discharge of his professional duty or guilty of such a breach of
any usage or rule of conduct made by the Council under the
provisions of this Act as amounts to improper conduct or practice
as an advocate and solicitor;
...
(h) has been guilty of such misconduct unbefitting an advocate and
solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an
honourable profession; ...
To what extent a sexual liaison between a solicitor and his client is
considered grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional
duties within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Act has never been
before the courts until recently in Law Society of Singapore v Singham
Dennis Mahendran (the Respondent) [2001] 1 SLR 566. This is the
first case in Singapore of an advocate and solicitor facing disciplinary
action for sexual misconduct.
The Case:
A Disciplinary Committee had been appointed to hear and investigate
inter alia 1 , a charge formulated by the Law Society of Singapore against
the Respondent that he was guilty of grossly improper conduct in the
discharge of his professional duties within the meaning of section 83(2)(b)
of the Act in that he carried on a sexual relationship with a client of his
firm of which he was a partner during the period when he was the solicitor
having conduct of divorce proceedings instituted by the client. The

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Disciplinary Committee eventually found the Respondent guilty of this

charge.
An Originating Summons was then filed by the Law Society for the
Respondent to show cause why he should not be dealt with under the
provisions of section 83 of the Act.
At the Show Cause hearing before the Court of three judges, the
Respondent was ordered to be suspended from practice as an advocate
and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore for a period of three
years and he was also ordered to pay the Law Societys costs in the present
proceedings and of the proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee.
The brief facts leading to the charge against the Respondent as found by
the Disciplinary Committee were that the Respondent was consulted by
the client on 10 April 1995 whilst he was a senior partner in a firm of
advocates and solicitors. He was asked to represent her in divorce
proceedings which she wanted to bring against her then husband. Between
April 1995 when the clients divorce petition was filed and October 1995
when the decree nisi was made absolute, the Respondent initiated and
carried on a sexual relationship with her whilst there was a solicitorclient relationship in existence between them. After the client had started
divorce proceedings, her then husband made several attempts to reconcile.
By then, the client was convinced by the Respondent that there was no
way her then husband could treat her as well as the Respondent had
done. By September 1995, the Respondent was introducing the client to
some people as his wife. The relationship broke down after two years
and the client eventually consulted lawyers on the Respondents breach
of promise to marry her. The Respondent then offered $200,000 as a
parting gift which the client accepted. This was encapsulated in a Deed
of Settlement which stated that the parties had mutually agreed to end
their two-year relationship. These facts were unchallenged by the
Respondent at the Show Cause hearing and were relied upon by the
Court.
The Disciplinary Committee found that the Respondents conduct in
engaging in a sexual relationship with the client while he was her solicitor
amounted to grossly improper conduct within the meaning of section
83(2)(b) of the Act. Though this finding was not challenged by the

The alternative charge formulated by the Law Society was that the Respondent was
guilty of such misconduct u n b e f i t t i n g an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the
Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of
section 83(2)(h) of the Act in that he carried on a sexual relationship with a client of
his firm of which he was a partner during the period when he was the solicitor having
conduct of divorce proceedings instituted by the client. As the first charge was found
to have been made out, there was no need for the Disciplinary Committee to consider
the alternative charge and the alternative charge was not an issue before the Court of
three judges.

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Respondent, the Court proceeded to determine whether the Respondents

conduct did indeed amount to grossly improper conduct within the
meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Act and if so, the appropriate sanction
to be imposed in such cases.
The only reported Commonwealth authority the Respondent had relied
on was the decision of the High Court of Australia in Bar Association_of
Queensland v Lamb (Stevens v Lamb) (1972) ALR 285. This was an
appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of
Queensland relating to the admission of Lamb to the Bar in the face of
several allegations of misconduct. One of the allegations which was
accepted as proven was that whilst the respondent was acting for a female
client in contested matrimonial proceedings, he had a sexual relationship
with the client after the decree absolute, but before questions of custody
and maintenance had been determined. Menzies J endorsed the approach
of the Acting Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The
misconduct of Lamb was identified as possibly affecting the pending
proceedings of custody and maintenance which were in the event
determined by consent. He endorsed the Acting Chief Justices comment
that while Lambs conduct was unprofessional, (Windeyer J described
such conduct as reprehensible), it should not disqualify Lamb from
admission to the Bar.
In the Acting Chief Justices judgment, his view was that Lambs adultery
was unprofessional as it potentially prejudiced his client in the unresolved
issues relating to property and custody. He, however, placed emphasis
on the client being a mature woman of 36 years, a successful
businesswoman; that (Lamb) did not seduce her, that the adulterous
association in no way caused the breakdown of the marriage; that the
breakdown was caused by the husbands cruelty.
The Court said that in the context of divorce and matrimonial proceedings,
female clients who approach solicitors with a view to ending an unhappy
marriage are almost invariably in a very distressed state mentally and
emotionally. They are in a desperate situation and in an extremely
vulnerable state. The Respondent had taken advantage of her
vulnerability. The Court went so far as to hold that the fact that the
relationship was consensual and genuine and might have led to marriage
did not provide the Respondent with an excuse to engage in such conduct
and relationship with the client. Even if there was no possibility of any
reconciliation between the client and the solicitor, that was beside the
point.
The test adopted by the Court as to what amounts to grossly improper
conduct in the discharge of a solicitors professional duty under section
83(2)(b) of the Act was uncontroversial: whether the conduct is
dishonourable to him as a man and dishonourable in his profession. See
Law Society of Singapore v Ng Chee Sing [2000] 2 SLR 165 at 174; Law

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Society of Singapore v Heng Guan Hong Geoffrey [2000] 1 SLR 361 at

367; Law Society of Singapore v Marshall David Saul [19721974] SLR
132; Re Han Ngiap Juan [1993] 2 SLR 81. Applying this test, the Court
found the Respondent guilty of grossly improper conduct.
While the authorities are at one in condemning such behavior on the
part of solicitors, the punishment accorded to such solicitors has been
disparate. In Re Bowen 542 N.Y. S. 2d 45, the attorney made improper
advances to eight women who had either retained or consulted him
regarding their matrimonial or child custody problems. The court found
that the charges sustained against the respondent reflected adversely upon
his fitness to practice law as well as upon the legal profession as a whole,
and that they warranted condemnation by the court. The court then
proceeded to suspend the respondents license to practice law for two
years to deter similar misconduct and preserve the reputation of the
Bar.
In People v Zeilinger 814 P.2d 808, the respondent was retained by a
woman to act for her in a divorce matter involving a dispute as to the
custody of minor children and property settlement matters. The
respondent was her attorney of record through the final decree of
dissolution of the marriage. During the time when the respondent was
the attorney of record, he engaged in a sexual relationship with his client.
The court ordered that the respondent receive a public censure for his
conduct.
In an unreported proceeding before the New Zealand Practitioners
Disciplinary Tribunal involving a solicitor who had acted for a client in
matrimonial matters and subsequently entered into a personal relationship
with her, the solicitor was censured and fined and ordered to pay
compensation to the complainant and to bear the costs of the proceedings.
In Bar Association of Queensland v Lamb (Stevens v Lamb) (supra), the
Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland, although admitting the
respondent as a barrister, criticized his conduct as unprofessional.
Windeyer J in the High Court, considered the respondents conduct as
reprehensible but not, as described by the Supreme Court of
Queensland, such as necessarily to disqualify from membership of the
legal profession.
The Court in deciding on the appropriate punishment to mete out to the
Respondent, found that the authorities mentioned above were only of
limited assistance and held inter alia, that the standards to be applied in
such cases would be influenced by factors such as societal values and
culture. As such, perhaps reflecting the more traditional and conservative
values imbued in our society, the Court held that although no dishonesty
was involved on the Respondents part and his misconduct did not warrant
a striking-off, such misconduct was very serious and warranted a more
serious sanction than a mere censure. The Court placed much weight on

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the fact that the duel objectives of disciplinary sentencing had to be

achieved: that of protecting the public and protecting the interests and
reputation of the legal profession. To that end, the sentence had to be of
sufficient deterrence to prevent the Respondent or any other solicitor
from engaging in such conduct. As such, the Court ordered that the
Respondent be suspended from practice as an advocate and solicitor for
three years and that he bear the costs of the disciplinary proceedings
taken against him by the Law Society.
This case is authority for the proposition that a lawyer who has a sexual
relationship with a client whilst having conduct of the clients divorce
proceedings can expect to be found guilty of grossly improper conduct
within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Act and face a suspension.
The case also acts on general principles (essentially of conflict of interest
and duty), which principles would also apply to cases which fall closer to
the other end of the spectrum: where the solicitor has a relationship with
a client where the brief is not of a divorce matter.
In coming to its decision that the Respondent was guilty of grossly
improper conduct, the Court held that [solicitors, as members of an
honourable profession, have the duty to exhibit the highest standards of
professionalism in their relationships with clients. Personal service in a
professional relationship must be distinguished from getting involved in
the personal lives of the clients. If solicitors become too involved in their
clients personal lives during the existence of the solicitor-client
relationship, they may find themselves placed in a position of conflict of
interest and the clients interests may be seriously prejudiced. Further, it
is unbecoming for solicitors to abuse the relationship of trust and take
advantage of vulnerable clients for their own purposes.
However, to what extent would all types of a personal and sexual
relationship between a solicitor and a client be wrong? Is it a matter of
course that a solicitor who has a sexual relationship with a client will
face a Disciplinary Committee hearing for grossly improper conduct?
Some guidance is given by the Court when it said that it is unbecoming
for solicitors to abuse the relationship of trust and take advantage of
vulnerable clients for their own purposes. The test as adopted by the
Court of Appeal appears to centre largely on the breach of the fiduciary
duties owed by a solicitor to a client and the vulnerability of the client.
It would appear that it would be grossly improper conduct for a solicitor
acting for a distressed and confused client in a matrimonial matter, to
take advantage of the clients state of mind and seduce him or her.
In coming to this conclusion that all personal and sexual relationships
are clearly wrong, the Court had relied on the cases cited (supra) which
all dealt (with one exception, in People v Gibbons in which the solicitor
was acting for the client in a criminal matter) with matrimonial and
custody related matters. What then, of cases that fall outside of these

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Notes and Comments

221

categories? It is submitted that not all instances of a sexual relationship

between a solicitor and a client would be clearly wrong.
For a finding that a solicitor who had entered into a sexual relationship
with a client has been guilty of grossly improper conduct, it is submitted
that the following factors are relevant: the nature of the subject matter
of retention, the age of the parties to the relationship and the
sophistication of the client. These factors would have a bearing in
determining the vulnerability of the client. For example, if the client is of
mature age, a successful businesswoman and the subject matter of the
retention is say, a conveyancing matter, it is submitted that it would be a
less convincing argument to say that the client was in a vulnerable position
and that the solicitor had abused his relationship of trust with the client.
The Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct of
The State Bar of California has had occasion to issue an opinion2 on the
ethical issues when a lawyer engages in a sexual relationship with a client.
The Committee recognised that each sexual relationship may be
characterised by a distinct set of circumstances (such as the maturity of
the parties, the vulnerability of the client and the nature of the subject
matter of retention) and that it did not believe that a lawyer-client sexual
relationship would per se impair the lawyers ability to competently
perform the legal services required and neither did it believe that there
should be a per se ban on any sexual relationship with a client. However,
the Committee went on to caution that because of the very nature of the
trust and confidence which is inherent in a fiduciary relationship such as
that of lawyer and client, a clients consent to a sexual relationship may
be unduly influenced by the professional relationship. The fiduciary
relationship and the breach of that relationship by the Respondent appears
to have been given great weight by the Court when considering the
sentence to be imposed on the Respondent. The Committee recognised
that there were many perils in such a relationship. To this end, a solicitor
should always be cautious before entering into such a relationship.
The English position is that a solicitor who becomes involved in a sexual
relationship with a client should consider whether this may place his or
her interests in conflict with those of the client or otherwise impair the
solicitors ability to act in the best interests of the client. This stems from
the principle that a solicitor must not act where his or her own interests
conflict with the interests of a client. A solicitor who acts in breach of
this principle may (and not must) be subject to disciplinary action.3

2
3

The Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct of The State

Bar of California (Formal Opinion No. 198792)
The English Guide to the Professional Conduct of Solicitors

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The perils of such a relationship between solicitor and client have been
variously described as the potential for bias that could arise from the
sexual relationship4 and the potential for harm that may be suffered by
the client in the management of the case5 . This includes problems such
as a conflict of interest or an impairment of the solicitors competence to
discharge his or her professional obligations to the client.
The issue appears to be a question of degree, to be looked at in its totality,
including the age of the parties, the vulnerability of the client, together
with the sophistication of the client and the nature of the subject matter
of the retention. To this end, it would appear that to say that all personal
and sexual relationships between a solicitor and a client would be clearly
wrong would be overly broad. Each case should to be looked at
individually with the guiding principles being the potential for harm to
the client that could arise from the sexual relationship. The case though,
is helpful clarification that the disciplinary wrong lies not so much in the
sexual relationship per se and the principles will extend to relationships
of a non-sexual but intimate nature. However, the solicitor should think
long and hard before entering into such a relationship with a client. The
solicitor may be better served to keep his/her feelings in check and wait
for the completion of the proceedings before engaging in such a
relationship with a client.
KEVIN KWEK*

4
5
*

The Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct of The State

Bar of California (Formal Opinion No. 198792)
Solicitor/client sexual relations an abuse of power, Louise Akenson, Law Institute
Journal, May 1995, pp 450453
B.A. (Hons) (Keele), Barrister-at-Law (Middle Temple), Advocate and Solicitor
(Spore). I am grateful to Mr Kenneth Tan, SC for his kind and helpful comments on
an earlier draft of this case note. However, I alone remain responsible for any errors
that remain.