Beruflich Dokumente
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MEANING OF JUSTICE
567
UniversityofToronto
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568
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569
8 For a fuller statementof this view, see my article "Language and Ontology
in the Cratylus" in Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos,Phronesis Supplement Volume, forthcomingin 1973.
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570
103B7). Thus a given term signifiesor names primarilythe correspondingForm; it denotesor names derivatively(or trulyapplies
thatparticipatesin thisForm. And a sentenceof the
to) everything
form'x is F' will be true if and only if the given value for'x' falls
withinthe extensionof 'F', that is, if and only if the x in question
participatesin the Form F.
II. THE MEANING OF 'JUSTICE'
If we apply this semantictheoryto the concept of Justice,the implicationsare obvious. To specifythe meaning of 'justice' is to definea Form that can serve as a model for predication,so that we
trulyapply the term 'just' only if-and to the extent that-tlle
subject in question participatesin the Form of Justice,or resembles the Form,or is "of this sort."Now the ontologicaltheorythat
underlies this semanticsis unmistakablypresentin the Republic.
The Form of Justice is mentioned as soon as the doctrine of
Formsis introduced(476A4,479A5, 479E3, etc.) and a clear distinction is immediatelydrawn between a given Form and the things
that participatein it (476D1-3). But the semantic theoryitselfis
scarcelynoticed in the Republic. Socratesoffersa definitionof the
just city and the just man; he never even asks for a definitionof
Justiceitself.Can Plato have abandoned the view that to know
the meaning of 'justice' is to know the Form of Justice?Or does
he have a motive for leaving this doctrine more or less in the
background?
Some of Plato's reasons forreticenceare clear. The whole structure of the Republic (throughBook VII) is ingressiveand heurisIt is like a slow mountic,ratherthan deductiveor demonstrative.
tain climb out fromthe Cave and up the Divided Line. But the
final perspectivefrom the summit-a full discussion of Dialectic
and the Form of the Good-is expresslyomitted from the work.
The theoryof Formsas such is introducedonly at the end of Book
V, afterthe discussionof justice in cityand in man.
The strategicadvantages of this procedure are also clear. The
Republic is primarilyconcernedwith moral theoryand political
reconstruction.
The moral argument(that "justice pays") and the
political schemefor a good societyare presentedin such a way as
to be maximallyindependentof Plato's metaphysics.One need not
accept the doctrineof Forms,one need not even have heard of it,
in order to followhis defenseof justice as an intrinsicgood of the
soul and to be attractedby his vision of a harmonioussocietywith
a rulingelite trainedas servantsof the communityand deprivedof
all economic advantages and special class interests.Plato repeat-
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OF FORMS
571
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572
As David Sachs pointed out a number of years ago, Plato's argumentin defenseof justice cannot count as a valid answer to Glaucon and Adeimantus unless some very close connection is established between the Platonic conception (or conceptions)of justice
defended as an intrinsicgood for the soul, and the ordinarybehavioral notion of justice for which the challenge was raised.
Sachs claimed that Plato's argumentmustsatisfytwo requirements:
(1) he must prove that no man who is Platonicallyjust, according
to JM, will commitacts of injusticein the usual sense,and (2) that
everyman who is just accordingto the vulgar conceptionwill also
be Platonicallyjust.4Sachs asks, in effect,for a biconditionallinking Platonic and ordinaryjustice. By way of responseto this criticism,GregoryVlastos has formulatedjust such a biconditional.
4 "A Fallacy in Plato's Republic," Philosophical Review, LXXII, 2 (April 1963):
141-158; the claim in question is on pp. 152f.
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573
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574
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MEANING OF 'JUSTICE'
575
Plato's definitionof psychicjustice (JM) by analogy with the preceding definition(JC) of justice in the good citydepends upon the
principle that the two cases "will not differat all accordingto the
veryformor property(eidos) of justice" (435B1). Let us call this
the principle of univocity.Vlastos regards this as a fundamental
logical erorr which underlies the flaw in Plato's argument.8He
suggeststhat Plato could easily have avoided the fallacyif he had
seen the importanceof what Aristotledescribedas homonymyand
more particularlypros hen homonymyor (in G. E. L. Owen's
uses
phrase) "focal meaning." If he had seen, that is, that different
of the same predicate may have a common semantic core or a
common point of referencewhile differingconsiderably in the
cases, Plato could have avoided
propertytheyattributein different
the mistake in his defenseof justice. Now this objection can be
understoodin two ways,and the Platonic answer to it will differ
accordingly.
(i) If the objection means that the principleof univocityshould
theoryof
be sacrificedfor an open-textureor family-resemblance
heart
it
to
of
Plato's
view
of
language
and
the
meaning, goes
reality.If the meaning of basic evaluative predicates like 'just',
'good', and 'beautiful' is to be understood as a functionof the
shiftsin connotation,speaker's intention,points of contrast,and
other variable featuresof particularuses of the term in different
contexts,then the doctrine of Forms must be abandoned as an
account of the fixedsense or significationof general terms.But a
criticismof univocityalong these lines would seem to misconstrue
the principle as a false empirical claim about ordinarylanguage
as ordinarilyused. Plato is not concernedwith lexicography,not
even with the philosophical lexicographyof Metaphysics Delta.
His principleof univocityis an epistemologicalpostulate,a device
forgettingfromordinarylanguage to the true meaning of justice,
beauty,and the like, the meaning that is fixed in the nature of
thingsby an invariantForm. For Plato, the key termsin ordinary
language mustsignifysuch a Form if theyare to signifyrealityand
8 "Justice and Psychic Harmony in the Republic", this JOURNAL, LXVI, 16
(Aug. 21, 1969): 516-520. As already indicated, I do not agree that Plato's argument here depends upon this assumption, though of course not only the definition of psychic harmony by analogy with justice in the city, but in fact the
whole theoryof Forms does depend upon this principle of univocity.Note that
this and the previouslycited paper of Vlastos are published in a revised formas
"Justice and Happiness in the Republic" in Vlastos, ed., Plato, ii (New York:
Doubleday Anchor, 1971),pp. 66-95.
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576
SPECULATION
ON THE FORMS
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MEANING OF 'JUSTICE'
577
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578
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579
Universityof Pennsylvania
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