Mexico's Central American Policy. Apologies, Motivations, and Principles

Society for Latin American Studies (SLAS)
Mexico's Central American Policy: Apologies, Motivations, and Principles

Author(s): Edward J. Williams
Source: Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Oct., 1982), pp. 21-41
Published by: Wiley on behalf of Society for Latin American Studies (SLAS)
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Mexico's Central American Policy:

Apologies, Motivations, and Principles
EDWARD J. WILLIAMS*
Professorof Political Science
Universityof Arizona
INTRODUCTION
Mexico has emerged as an important political factor in the CentralAmerican
region. On the diplomatic level, President Jose Lopez Portillo and Foreign
Minister Jorge Castafiedahave worked to diminish internationaltensions by
pushing for negotiationsbetween the United States and Nicaraguaand between
the United States and Cuba. The Mexican government has also joined with
France in calling for recognition of the Salvadoreanopposition as a 'representative political force', and the Mexicanshave urged negotiationsbetween the two
sides in the Salvadoreanstruggle. Nicaragua'srevolutionary government has
benefited from diplomatic, political and economic support from Mexico almost
from the very beginning when Mexico joined Costa Rica in early 1979 in
recognizing the belligerency of the Sandinistainsurgents.In addition to substantial economic support for Nicaragua,Mexico has extended economic aid
to the entire region by cooperatingwith Venezuelain an arrangementsupplying
cheap petroleumto the area'snations througha system of cut-rateloans.
All of that reflects Mexico's increasingly active foreign policy. The new
posture emanates from a number of developments including a longer range
evolution to a more active stance, initiated during the Adolfo L6pez Mateos
regime (1958-64), new-found petroleum muscle, and the relative decline of
US influence in the area. As a Mexican commentator has it, 'the hour of the
true CentralAmericanliberation coincides with the hour in which it is possible
for Mexico to operateinternationallyas an activemediumpower'.1
As Mexico's role in Central America grows, official and unofficial sources
have put together a series of apologies and policy positions designed to explain
Mexico's intrusion into the area. Some of these explanationspossess a certain
validity, but others are far less convincing.In still other cases, indeed, no mention has appearedof principlesthat logically inform the nation's concern with
the CentralAmericanregion. This paper, however,will considerin detail several
*Most of the researchand all of the writingfor this articlewere accomplishedduring
1981-82 when I was VisitingResearchProfessorwith the StrategicStudiesInstituteof the
US Army War College. I gratefully acknowledgethe support of the Strategic Studies
Institute and the US Army during that period, but the views, opinions, and/or findings
contained in this article are mine and should not be construedas official Departmentof
the Armyposition,policy or decision.
I also gratefullyacknowledgea critiqueoffered on an earlierversionof this paperby my
colleagueat the Institute,Col. William0. Staudenmaier.
22
BULLETINOF LATINAMERICANRESEARCH
explanations that have been put forward for Mexican foreign policy in the
region; each of these will be put forward, examined and, where necessary,
criticized.
SOCIO-CULTURAL
ATTACHMENTS
At the highest level of abstraction,Mexicanapologistsare wont to wax enthusiastic about the socio-culturalties that bind them to their CentralAmerican
neighbours. Those 'well known . . . cultural affinities which exist between
Mexico and the Central American and Caribbeannations are derived from
geographicdeterminantsand similarorigins'and presumablycompel Mexican
decision-makers
to a fraternalconcernfor theirCentralAmericanbrethren.2
the
Although argumentis diffuse, it flows from a premisethat carriesa degree
of validity. Both Mexico and the CentralAmericannationsfeaturesocio-cultural
value systems informedby the Hispanic-Catholic
tradition.In a variationof that
unifying bond, mestizo socio-racialconfigurationspredominatein Mexico and
significantlyinfluence the make-upof most of the CentralAmericannations,
particularlyEl Salvador,Honduras,and Nicaragua.In still anothergradationof
culturalbonds, the indigenouspeoples of southernMexicoand northernGuatemaladerivefrom the sameethnic and socio-linguistictraditions.
Some elements of socio-culturalinterchange,moreover,may be seen as contributing to those fundamental bonds of language, religion, and tradition.
Reciprocal tourism is rather well developed between Central America and
Mexico, although the flow northwardis relatively higher than from Mexico
to Central America. Mexican revolutionary art is well known in Central
America,Mexican popularmusic has effectively penetratedthe nations to the
south, and the Mexican cinema is popularin the area.Although exact figures
are difficult to come by, finally, 'important numbers'of Central American
students have been trainedin Mexico over the years.3Combinedwith similarity
in basic cultural traditions, that social intercoursehas probably nurtured a
modicum of communitybetween the peoples of Mexicoand the severalCentral
Americannations and may have some influence in how the Mexicandecisionmakershave conceptualizedthe contemporaryagony of the CentralAmerican
maelstrom.
Conversely, several factors cloud and diminishthe effect of socio-cultural
bonds and similar tradition as an explanatory device in fathomingMexico's
ambitionsin CentralAmerica.The concept is too diffuse to offer precisionin
understandingcurrent Mexican policy. Even if an ill-definedand amorphous
sense of fraternitycould be regardedas playinga role in the way that Mexican
decision-makersthink about CentralAmerica,its weight in the overallcalculation of foreignpolicymakingis impossibleto discern.
Moreover,some nuances of the role of socio-culturalinfluences may well
imply disadvantagesfor Mexico's ambitionto strengthenits hand in the region.
If the Hispanicculturaltraditiontends to connote some contributionto unity,
for example, the equally salient cultural strains of contemporarynationalism
work the other way. The passage of time, indeed, tends to accentuate the
peculiar characteristicsof national culture and social patterns, thereby highlightingfeaturesthat separatenation statesratherthan unitingthem.
To push the argument one step further, cultural similarities may be a
MEXICO'SCENTRALAMERICANPOLICY
23
double-edgedsword, as exemplified by the indigenouspopulations of southern

Mexico and northern Guatemala.In both nations, the peoples inhabiting the
border regions have suffered from a long history of neglect by the central
governments and exploitation by the local elites. In both nations the native
populations are beginning to stir and the respectivenational governmentshave
been compelled to respond to their disquietude.It is certainly an exaggeration
to suggest strong separatist movements in those areas, but a history of such
initiatives exists and their resurrectionis not beyond the pale of possibility.
Writingin 1926, CarletonBeals describedthe scenario.
The similarityof MexicanMaya and GuatemalanQuich6 cultures has led,
during the 100 years of Mexican independence,to variousplots looking
towards the formation of a Maya-Quicherepublic.On various occasions
Maya Mexico has threatenedto withdrawfrom the MexicanFederation;it
has, in the past, applied for annexation,both to the United States and to
Guatemala.As late as 1920, Felipe Carillowas actively plotting to foment
a race-secessionmovement affecting all the territory from the Isthmus of
Tehuantepec to Central America. Five States and Territories,Tabasco,
Chiapas, Campeche, Yucatan and Quintana Roo, covering about 90
thousand squaremiles of mountain,plain, and marshwere to be wrenched
away and ultimatelyunited with Guatemala.4
The maturation of that scenario is, of course, quite beyond the realm of
possibility for the immediate future, but it does suggest a flaw in the argument
for socio-cultural unity as Mexico formulates and implements its Central
American policy. In tandem with increasing nationalism within the Central
American states and in the context of the fundamental imprecision of the
argument at the outset, it implies the insufficiency and inadequacy of the
apology from socio-cultural similarities as a serious explanation for Mexico's
contemporaryCentralAmericaninitiatives.
HISTORICALBONDS
The argumentfrom historicalbonds carriesabout the same mixture of validity
and myth. Sharedhistorical experiences are part of the picture, but they offer
little by way of understandingcurrent relations, their depth is often exaggerated, and they also carrythe seeds of conflict as well as harmony.
CarlosFuentes, a well-knownMexicanliterary figure, sets out the argument.
In lecturing US policymakers about Central America, he admits that 'Mexico
recognizesmany legitimateUS interestsin the area'.
But the United States must recognize that Mexico also has legitimate
interests there. First, there is historical precedent. From Guatemalato
Panama, Central America was part of the viceroyalty of New Spain
governedfrom Mexico City duringthree centuriesand for a few years after
independencein 1821, the provincesof the isthmuscontinued to be a part
of Mexico.5
Beyond the Colonial and early Independence periods, the historical record
offers additional evidence of some degree of shared experience and historical
contact during the 19th and 20th centuries. A Mexican commentarycaptures
24
one elementof 'the historicalparallelsthat havearrivedat a point of confluence'

in noting that both Mexico and the CentralAmerican'nationswere the first to
suffer the military,economic, and political actions of US expansionism'.6More
directly, independencebrought a long series of negotiationsover boundaries
between Mexico and Guatemalathat were peacefullyresolvedand finally confirmed in 1899. Duringthe third quarterof the 19th century, Mexico'sliberal
reformer,Benito Juarez, played politics in Guatemalaand later Porfirio Diaz
was a 'sporadicmeddlerin CentralAmericanaffairs'.7
Twentieth-century history also offers occasional examples of Mexico's
involvementin CentralAmerica.Shortly after the turn of the century,Mexico
joined the United States to encouragethe peaceful resolutionof international
disputesamongstthe chaotic CentralAmericannations. The enterprisebrought
about the foundation of the CentralAmericanCourt of Justice. Buttressedby
US and diplomaticpressures,the Court worked relativelywell for severalyears,
but eventually fell into disuse.Mexico's contributionto the effort ended with
the outbreakof the Revolutionin 1910.8
As the Mexican Revolution wound down after 1920, there was another
short period of Mexicaninterest in CentralAmerica.The revolutionaryzeal of
Mexico's leadershipsparkedit to carry the revolutionarymessagesouthward.
Accordingto a contemporary,the imperialisticcampaignhad Mexico 'creating
a conflicting sphere of influence [which] may have profound significancefor
the future history of this continent'. The Mexicanswere particularlyactive in
Nicaraguaduring that period, earningthe condemnationof the United States
for harbouring'bolshevik'agentswho were active in Nicaragua.Among several
others, Augusto Sandinoevolved close relationswith the Mexicangovernment.9
While this chronology only mentions the major examples of MexicanCentralAmericancontact,it does go some way towardsexplainingthe apologist's
claim for bonds of shared experience. On the other hand, this sharingis only
limited. Furthermore,several other considerationstend to diminishwhatever
sentimentsof amity may evolvefrom it.
At the outset, it is obvious that sharedhistoricalexperiencedoes not necessarilylead to feelings of fraternalconcern.To the contraryit frequentlyhas the
opposite effect, catalysingmutualhostility. In that sense,the recordof MexicanCentralAmericanrelationsis not without ambiguity.In point of fact, much of
the history is conflictingand not harmonious.Looking to the Colonialperiod,
a standardhistory of CentralAmericadescribesthe reality.
Yet therewereenoughinstancesin which the viceregalauthorityattempted
to intervenein CentralAmerica over the course of the Colonial period
that Central Americans developed some feelings of antagonismtoward
Mexico. The superiortrade privilegesand opportunitiesof Mexicansand
the Central Americans'resentment of the viceregal status held by the
inhabitantsof Mexico compoundedthis animosity.10
Although some Central Americansreacting against the autocratic rule of
Guatemala later welcomed the Confederationwith Mexico, others opposed
Mexicanclaims.Salvadorians,for example,fought the move and only succumbed
to a Mexicanarmy. Still later duringthe 19th century, the meddlingof Juarez
and Diaz catalysed opposition in Central America as did the imperialistic
25
campaign of the Mexican revolutionaryzealots during the1920s. In sum, the

historical record gives pause in accepting the argument for bonds of friendship.11
Evolving nationalism in the Central American region, moreover, works in
the other direction. Nationalistic sensitivities thrive on the mythology of real
and imagined transgressionsby neighbouringnations. As the CentralAmerican
nations fashion their various nationalistic ideologies, the fear of renewed
Mexican ambitions in the area may well become salient parts of the nations'
ideologicalformulations.
In any case, the incidents mentioned above are exceptional. In fact, Mexico
ignored its neighboursto the south until very recently. Writingin 1981, a commentator had it that 'until two years ago, Mexico paid scant attention to the
tiny republicssouth of its border'.Another student of the regiondates Mexico's
interest ratherearlier,but still supportsthe point in claimingthat 'priorto the
1970s, its [Mexico'sl regionalposturein CentralAmericanand Caribbeanaffairs
was low'. Reviewing Mexican foreign policy in 1963, Castafieda,the present
foreign minister, probablycomes closest to the markin datingincipientMexican
interest as crystallizingin the 1960s. Castafiedadecried the 'defensive'tone of
Mexico'sleadershipat the time:
The postwar attitude of Mexico towardthe outside world is still, however,
one of mistrust and partial disinterest, and its foreign policy is mostly
defensive and anti-interventionist.Until the inception of the present
administration, when the international outlook of the country began
gradually to change, Mexico's participation in the discussion of world
political and economic problems has been, generally, reserved,cautious,
and mainly defensive.
Drawingspecial attention to the CentralAmericanregion, Castafiedacontinued
that 'the successiveadministrationsmade no greateffort to asserta true political
and culturalMexicanpresencein LatinAmericaor even CentralAmerica.'12
IDEOLOGICAL
SYMPATHY
The ideologicalsympathymotivation as an explanationof Mexico'snewly found
interest in CentralAmerica differs a trifle from the others previouslydiscussed.
Apparently, it is not applicable to the entire region, but ratherlimited to the
governmentsand/or peoples in Central America 'in search of a higher level of
social justice'. In her conclusion to an examinationof 'new preoccupationsand
traditional notions' in Mexican national security, a leading Mexican scholar
argues:
Concerningthe situation in CentralAmerica, this brief re-examinationof
Mexico's traditional position in the Inter-Americansystem puts in relief
the grade in which sympathy for social changein that regionis embedded
in the profoundtraditionsof Mexicandiplomacy.
President L6pez Portillo (1976-82) captured another nuance of the argument
in proclaimingthe 'close ties uniting' the Mexican and Nicaraguangovernments
as deriving from their 'common popular origins and their coinciding objectives
of social transformation.Dialogue is easy', he concluded, 'between States which
26
understand the nature of revolutionaryprocesses'. The argument,in short,

proposes that Mexico's traditionalinterestin socialjustice and its own revolutionary experience compel it to a special sensitivityto and sympathywith the
forcesof changenow doingbattle in the CentralAmericanregion.13
While not without qualification,the argumentclaims some validity. Even
before the promulgationof the Estada Doctrine in 1930, Mexico evolved a
recognition policy acknowledgingthe legality of regimes covering the ideological spectrum. Later, of course, it maintained diplomatic relations with
Castro's Cuba. In his first address to the nation in 1971, President Luis
Echeverria(1970-76) reiterated the posture in emphasizingthe principleof
'political pluralism'as guiding Mexico's diplomatic relations.14Although less
dramaticallythan his predecessor,PresidentL6pez Portillo pursuedthe essence
of the policy. A diplomatic tour in 1980, for example, touched a series of
nations representingthe entire political spectrum.In manifestingMexico'snew
presence in Latin Americanaffairs, Lopez Portillo visited Brazil, Costa Rica,
Cuba,Nicaragua,Panama,and Venezuela.
The historical record also counts other examplesof Mexico'ssympathyfor
'revolutionary'regimesand its opposition to the ambitionsof the UnitedStates
to control 'subversion'in Latin America.In 1948, Mexico opposed the formation of the Inter-AmericanDefense Council. Later, Mexico supported the
Jacobo ArbenzGuzmangovernmentin Guatemala;it voted againstthe organization of the Inter-AmericanPeace KeepingForce in the DominicanRepublicin
1965 and, still later, offered a strong defence of the SalvadorAllende regime
in Chile. Supporting that stance, Mexico welcomed significant numbers of
political exiles fleeing Franco's Spain and right-wingregimesin Latin-America
-among them large contingents of Argentines, Chileans, Guatemalans,
Salvadorians,and Uruguayans.In sum, Mexico's diplomatictradition reflects
a specialsympathyfor 'revolutionary'governmentsand, in that sense,its present
posturein CentralAmericaflows from establishedpractice.
Conversely,severalfactors fly in the face of Mexico'sheraldingits ideological
sympathyfor the CentralAmericanLeft. The diplomaticrecordof supportfor
revolutionaryregimes,for example, is not so clean as it appearsat first sight.
The Mexican-Cubanequation is a salient case in point. Even though Mexico
continued to carry on diplomaticrelationswith Cuba, the largercontext of the
relationshipwas far from effusively friendly. One commentarywritten in the
early 1970s describedrelationsas being 'cool and formal'and specifieda number
of decidedlyunfriendlyactivities.
Travellersusing airlinesto Cuba are carefullyidentified, and the information is turned over to the United States and Latin Americanintelligence
services.Mexicohas also madeit difficult for Cubanbooks and propaganda
to enter the country, and so restrictedthe Cuban news service,Prensa
Latina,that it finally closed its doors.'5
A careful scrutiny of Mexico's contemporaryrelations with the Central
Americannations reflects a similarcombinationof revolutionaryand pragmatic
postures.The revolutionarydimensionis exemplifiedby politicaland economic
assistanceto the Nicaraguanrevolutionaries,measurablepoliticalsupportfor the
SalvadorianLeft, and a cool stance vis-d-visthe right-wingregimein Guatemala.
27
Conversely, a solid dose of calculating pragmatism winds its way through

Mexico's policy and calls into question official revolutionaryrhetoric.Mexico
continues to maintaindiplomatic relationswith El Salvadorand both President
L6pez Portillo and Foreign Minister Castaiiedahave assumed measuredtones
in policy declarationson El Salvadorcalculatedto maintain options as the uncertain struggle evolves. Through a petroleum supply arrangementin partnership with Venezuela, moreover,Mexico offers substantialamounts of financial
assistanceto the establishedgovernmentsin the area. El Salvador,for example,
receivedsome $30 million during1981.16
Without offering a comprehensive critique of the Mexican revolutionary
experience, it is certainly logical to suggest that the Mexican elites' commitment to revolutionary change must be imperfect, at best. If not quite dead,
the Mexican Revolution is certainly far from the robust vehicle for socioeconomic change that it was during the late 1930s. Products of that system,
in turn, are bound to be governed by relatively conservativenorms designed
to maintainstability ratherthan nurturerevolutionarychange.
None of those reservations,however, should be interpreted to deny ideological considerations a role in explaining Mexico's contemporary policy in
Central America. To be sure, the ideological sympathy is not so pure as the
rhetoric proclaims,but the facts suggest that it contributesto the dimensions
of Mexico's current policy in favour of rapid socio-economic and political
change. The diplomatic chronology demonstratesa solid strain of support for
revolutionary regimes over the years and Mexico's present policy in Central
America is consistent with that record. Although it has faded with time and
been corrupted by economic affluence, moreover, the revolutionaryideal has
not disappearedfrom the Mexican political culture. A strain of revolutionary
fervour continues to inform the Mexican world view. The Revolution, to be
sure, is still not much removedin time and vivid memoriesand personalattachments to its ideologicalideals continue to influenceMexicanpolicy.
ECONOMIC
ADVANTAGE
In recent history, economic advantage goes a long way towards explaining
Mexico's rapprochement with Central America initiated during the 1960s.
As Mexico's trade balance began to grow to serious negative proportions in
mid-decade and as the Central American Common Market(CACM)began to
take on increasing coherence, Mexican decision-makersset out a new policy
to strengthen relations. On different occasions, Mexico broached proposals
to affiliate with (and dominate?)the CACMand/or to fuse the CACMwith the
Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), to which Mexico adhered.
Mexico failed in both attempts, but in 1964 a Mexican trade commission
initiated a successful campaignto increasecommercialcontacts without formal
economic integration. In its footsteps, President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz (196470) launched in early 1966 the first goodwill tour of the Central American
nations ever undertakenby a Mexicanchief of state.17
From that beginning, the die was cast. In early 1971, PresidentEcheverria
encountered 'an unprecedented crisis in the Mexican balance of payments'
and respondedby meeting with the chief executives of Costa Rica, Guatemala,
and Nicaragua to 'explore the possibilities of increasing the exportation of
28
manufacturedproducts to Central America'.18Shortly after his accession to

power, PresidentL6pez Portillo followed the lead of his predecessorsin conducting a series of bilateralmeetings with his CentralAmericancounterparts
lookingto ongoinggrowthin Mexicanexports.
As Mexico's economic recovery advancedduring the late 1970s and as the
instability of Central America gave way to growing turmoil, economic considerationsin Mexico's policy have been supersededby other motivations.As
capturedby a Mexican analyst, however, at least some in Mexico continue to
see potential economic advantageas a part of the largerunfolding scenario.
After discussing socio-cultural and historical influences, his discussion goes
on to 'moresubtle'considerations.
The development of national markets, heretofore strangled by small
oligarchiesand feudal lords, would be able to extend the establishmentof
forms of economic cooperation [between Mexico and the Central
Americannations] mutuallybeneficialfor the countriesof the region.19
More specifically,the potentialfor economicadvantageincludesboth general
trade and investment and special considerations deriving from petroleum
exports. More than a decade ago, Mexican decision-makersbecame aware of
those possibilitiesand they continue to exist. Accordingto 1979 figures,the
CentralAmericannations (includingPanama)counted a GrossRegionalProduct
of almost $20 billion. Assuming a free trade area encompassingMexico and
its southeastern neighbours, Central America would increase the Mexican
market by almost 20 per cent. Including the Caribbeannations would add
another 54 per cent increase.2 In passing,it shouldbe noted, the collapseof the
CACM offers Mexico more opportunity to make inroads into the Central
Americanmarket than duringthe mid-1960s, when Mexico first began an economic courtshipof the region'snations.
Petroleum exports and the concomitant activities of Petroleos Mexicanos
(PEMEX)play a special role in the projection of economic advantage.Speaking in 1978, the oil monopoly's director-generaldeclared Central America
as a natural market for Mexican hydrocarbonsexports. Thereafter,Mexico
began to supply petroleumto severalnationsin the CaribbeanBasinand capped
those ad hoc initiativeswith the comprehensiveMexican-Venezuelanarrangement negotiatedin 1980. Now the keystone of Mexico'seconomicpolicy in the
CaribbeanBasin, the arrangementconnotes a generousprogrammeof assistance,
but it also implies the capture of additionalmarkets for Mexican crude. The
point is madein an analysisof Mexico'sCaribbeanpolicy.
It is clear that Mexican/Venezuelancooperationis necessaryin order for
Mexico to gain a Caribbeanmarketfor its crude.Mexicowants an assured
regionalmarketfor heavy crude which it may have difficulty sellingelsewhere. The San Jose Agreementstipulates that recipientcountriesmust
take 50 per cent each of Venezuelanand Mexicancrude, thus providing
an entree for the latter.21
In addition to petroleum exports, Petroleos Mexicanoshas launched other
programmesin the CaribbeanBasin designed to increaseMexico's economic
influence and advantage.In Costa Rica, PEMEXhas been engagedin several
29
programmesincluding technical advice and exploration. PEMEXhas donated

oil drillingequipmentto Nicaraguaand has been trainingNicaraguantechnicians.
Other cooperative ventures have been negotiated with Cuba and Panama. In
each instance, those initiatives increase Mexico's economic impact in the area
and, to the point, hold out the possibility of future economic advantage.
Potential gains for Mexico in trade and investment with Central America
and the Caribbeantake on added perspectivewithin the context of Mexico's
ongoing economic problems, dramatizedby the devaluationof February 1982.
The devaluation sent shock waves through the nation and precipitateda crisis
of confidence.22Most seriously, an 'emotionaltrauma'struckthe nation in mid1981 catalysedby a 'virtualovernightdownturnin prospectsfor crudeoil exports'.
As the year passed, the immediate crisis was overcome, but the international
petroleum market continued to be depressedand Mexico'shydrocarbonsexport
earnings for 1981 were less than $14 billion some $6 to $7 billion below
expectations. To make mattersworse,predictionsfor 1982 foresawthe possibility
of an actual drop in earings to $12 billion, the first declinein earningssince the
discoveriesof the mid-1970s.23
In tandem with other naggingeconomic problems in Mexico, in short, the
petroleum exporting crisis dramatized the vulnerability of the Mexican economy. Within the context of this analysis,furthermore,it impliessome evidence
in support of economic advantageas a factor in the overall calculation of the
nation's newly found interest in nurturingits CentralAmericanand Caribbean
neighbours.
Against this, however, those severalconsiderationsinvolve a relativelyminor
economic stake in Central America and suggest that economic advantageis
probably not an important part of the severalmotivations informingMexico's
currentCentralAmericanpolicy. In the first place, the CentralAmericanmarket
is comparativelysmall and poor. To make matters worse, the CentralAmerican
economies have been buffeted by rising energy costs, reduced prices for their
commodity exports, and economic dislocation and flight of capital resulting from political instability. At least for the short term, Central America
offers little hope for significant increases in trade and/or investment opportunities.
Moreover,as of now CentralAmericais only marginallyimportantto Mexico
as a tradingpartner.In 1978, CentralAmerica accounted for only 2.6 per cent
of Mexico's total exports and a miniscule 0.43 per cent of the nation's imports.
While some increases in relative exports were registeredfrom 1970 when the
figure stood at 2.16 per cent, they were hardly enough to invite the concerted
attention of Mexico's policymakers.Imports from Central America decreased
from 0.62 per cent during the same period.24In sum, therefore, economic
advantageis no longer (as it was in the 1960s) a major factor behind Mexican
policy towardsCentralAmerica.
POLITICALINFLUENCE
The political principles informing Mexico's contemporary Central American
posture feature both foreign policy considerations and domestic political
implications.The foreign policy part of the equation combinesan extrapolation
of the trends toward a more active foreign policy stance initiated in the 1960s
30
and a response to the present turmoil of the CentralAmericanregion. The

motivations flowing from domestic politics focus upon the governingelite's
need to respond to domestic pressuresin favour of supportingthe Central
AmericanLeft and opposingUS diplomacyin the area.
Official statements rarely highlightMexico's political ambitionsin Central
America, but their implications along with unofficial commentary provide
sufficient evidence to make the case for the argument.The official line sings
the praisesof noninterventionand dwells much on the dangersof the 'internationalization'of the domestic strugglesin the region.25This policy position
portraysMexico as providingprotection from outside intervention.As with the
oil supply arrangementand initiativesto protect coffee prices and tuna fishing
grounds,it projectsMexico into a role of leadershipin the region.Furthermore,
a stance against the internationalizationof the Central American conflicts
maximizesMexicaninfluence.
Another variationon Mexico'sdiplomacybuttressingits influencein Central
Americaevolves from its role as an intermediarybetweenthe United States and
the nations of the region. Taking off from the Mexican-UnitedStates 'special
relationship' principle, the image holds that Mexican policymakers possess
a more acute appreciationof the United States than others.They are,therefore,
able to bridgegaps of understandingthat sabotagediscussionswhen the parties
are not so intimately connected.PresidentLopez Portillogavetestimonyto the
principle early in his term when he offered to serve as a 'bridgebuilder' in
inter-Americanrelations.Later, he applied the principlein the context of the
negotiationsover the PanamaCanal,differencesbetween Cubaand the United
States, and in his attemptto mediatebetweenNicaraguaand the United States.26
The point is capturedby a Mexicanscholarin an analysisof Mexico'sCentral
Americanpolicy. After statingthat 'Mexicohas neitheran imperialisticvocation
nor ambition in Central America', he allows that the present situation does
'permit [Mexico] to play the role of confidentialinterlocutor,as much on behalf
of the CentralAmericanpeopleswho strugglefor their liberationas for interests
in the United Stateswho fight to impede [the peoples of CentralAmerica]'.The
analysis proceeds that 'in this context Mexico is able to introducevigorously
its own national interests, taking advantageof the contradictionswhich overwhelm the United States'. Later, the point is made that CentralAmerica is
a zone which relates 'to the nationalsecurityand internationalpoliticalprestige
of Mexico'. Foreign MinisterCastanedaused more measuredtones in an interview discussingpetroleum in Mexico's foreign policy, but the essential point
is similar.The ForeignMinistercautionedthat 'energysales cannot be reduced
to the level of mere commercialtransactions'and that Mexico 'shouldobtain
something more than their monetary value in return'.He then listed several
considerations concluding with the criterion of 'soberly-evaluatedpolitical
benefits'. Focusing on CentralAmerica, the Foreign Ministerstressedthat his
interpretationof those considerationsin foreign policy had guided Mexico's
relationswith the Sandinistagovernmentin Nicaragua.Reflectingthose analyses
on the contemporaryMexican scene, a foreign commentator reported that
Mexiconow describesthe CaribbeanBasinas its 'naturalareaof influence'.27
Several contextual considerationslend further credence to the argument
from political influence. They include historical trends in Mexican foreign
31
policy, the relative decline of US power, and, more speculatively,the messianic

qualities of the Mexican revolutionaryideology. Seen in historicalperspective,
in the first place, Mexico's increasing influence in Central America and the
Caribbeanis a perfectly logical extrapolation of almost two decades of evolutionary change leading the nation to assume an increasinglysignificantrole in
contemporary international affairs. The first steps toward a more open and
dynamic foreign policy were taken by President L6pez Mateos. The evolving
policy was marked by several significant commitments, including a specific
decision to affiliate with the Latin AmericanFree TradeAssociation(LAFTA),
a more implicit bid for expandedinfluencein Latin Americanaffairs,the hosting
of the 1968 Olympic Games, and a move toward an increased role in Third
World politics through sponsorship of the Charter of the Economic Rights
and Duties of Nations. In even more definite and theatricalform, the die was
cast by Echeverria who initiated a campaign for Mexican world leadership
involving a series of measures including his appearance at numerous conferences, his visits to even more numerousThirdWorld,Socialist, and European
nations, and his regime's establishment of diplomatic relations with 65 new
governments.28
WhilePresidentLopezPortillobacked away from his predecessor'sflamboyant
theatrics, he continued to pursue an active foreign policy after a short respite
when he was concentrating on Mexico's domestic economy. Making use of
Mexico's newly found petroleum power, Lopez Portillo negotiatedwith leading
world powers and definitely establishedMexico as a voice to be reckoned with
in the largerglobal arena.Mexico's acceptanceof a seat on the United Nations
Security Council in 1980 and its hosting of a North-South summit meeting in
1981 symbolized the success of the policy. Coupled with a series of economic
initiativescentred more specifically in the CentralAmericanregion, that evolution of Mexico's global political policy led quite naturallyto increasedconcern
with the problems of Central America and to a conscious policy to further
Mexican interests in the region. In short, the motivation of political influence
contributed to several other factors that had traditionally guided Mexican
policy in the area.29
Developments in the United States and US foreign policy also contributed
their part. During the period that Mexico's policy was evolving positively, the
relative influence of the United States was diminishing,thereby creatingnovel
opportunities for other nations to fill the gap. Believingthat the United States
could not restore the old order in Central America, Mexican policymakers
moved to formulate an alternative,thereby protecting their national interests.
A recent analysisposits the point.
Mexico has changedinternallyover the last decade, and so has the international environment. Most fundamental, the decline of United States
economic, political-ideological,and military hegemony throughout Latin
Americaand the Caribbeanover the 1970s in comparisonwith the decades
of the 1950s and 1960s has enabledMexico to assumean independentrole
in hemispheric affairs. ... Today Mexico faces an increasingly'Gaullist'
or 'balkanized'international system in which it is not only possible but
imperative for Mexico to assume a more assertive role to protect and
32
foster its national interests. The dissolution of the Pax Americanais
nowheremore in evidencenor more threateningto Mexicothan in Central
Americaand the Caribbean.30
In a more speculativevein, the argument from political ambition is supported by a messianicstrainthat winds its way throughMexicanrevolutionary
history. On the domestic scene, the messagehas been manifestedby the educational reforms of the 1920s, the taming of the militaryduringthe 1920s and
1930s, andthe resurrectionof the communalejido landholdingsand the agrarian
reform of the 1930s. Most dramatically,the messianicquality is reflected in
Mexico's successful drive for industrialization,sparked by President Lazaro
Cardenas (1934-40), consolidated by President Miguel Alemain(1946-52),
and pursuedto the present.
In decrying the excesses of the commitment to industrialization,Professor
FrankTannenbaumhad it that 'the idea of bignessis upon them'. The Mexican
elites were captured with the grandeurof 'big plans' and 'great industries'.
As that fascinationmanifesteditself, Mexicopushedthe constructionof sprawling steel mills, rationalizedassemblylines, enormous dams, and sophisticated
petro-chemicalplants. As a Mexican commentatorproposed, 'the Revolution
produceda new breed of public figure,almost fanaticallyproudto be Mexican,
and determinedto drivethat nationinto the modernworld'.31
As a more positive foreignpolicy has evolvedin Mexico,to pursuethe point,
the nation's elites have increasinglyextrapolatedthe 'idea of bigness' to the
global arena.A new sense of aggressivepride has capturedthe Mexicansand
suffused Mexico's conceptualizationof its role in the contemporaryworld.
President Lopez Portillo is anxious for his country to exercise influence in
internationalpolitics proportionateto its size, wealth, level of industrialization,
petroleum holdings, and political sophistication. The point of departureis
a sphere of influence in the CaribbeanBasin combined with a voice in Third
Worldpolitics.
It should be emphasized,furthermore,that Central Americanshave long
feared Mexico as its own 'Colossusof the North' and Mexico's policies have
intensified those concerns throughout the CaribbeanBasin. As early as the
1960s, when Diaz Ordaz laid the groundworkfor Mexico's present policy,
'contactwith CentralAmericanrulersgrewrapidlyenoughto engendersuspicion
on the part of some political elementsin the regionthat Mexico was becoming
a subimperialpower'. During the 1970s, the Prime Ministerof Trinidadand
Tobago criticizedVenezuela'sambition in the Caribbean.A leadingscholarof
the area suggeststhat 'his verbal attacks implied that he was concernedthat
perhapsboth Venezuela and Mexico were attemptingto play pivotal roles in
the CommonwealthCaribbeanregion'.On the contemporaryscene, the governments of Guatemalaand El Salvadorhave both complainedat Mexico'sinterventionisticandimperialisticinitiativesin the regionand a particularlybombastic
critique emanatedfrom a Colombianminister.He chargedMexico and Venezuela with 'exercisinga new type of "darkeyed" imperialismin the Caribbean
zone' and, in referringto traditionalUS activities in the area, explained that
'imperialismcomes not only from those with "gringo eyes", but also from
those with darkeyes'. What is happening',he concludes, 'is that Mexicowants
33
to continue commandingwith its imperialisticcourse in the seas to the North

[of Colombia]'.32
It is also worth discussing the imperatives of Mexican domestic politics
as making a contribution to Mexico's support of revolutionarycauses in the
CaribbeanBasin. The argumentstates that foreign policy measuresin favourof
the Left divert attention from conservativeand authoritarianpolicies at home
and, in the process, co-opt the Mexican Left and legitimize the regime in the
eyes of the Mexican people, who have been indoctrinatedwith the rhetoric
of Mexican revolutionaryideology. The analysisis sharedby both the Left and
the Right, at home and abroad.In analysingMexico's courting of Fidel Castro,
one Mexican commentator interprets the policy as flowing from international
economic and political ambition, but also 'as a question of the internalhealth
of the system. That is to say', she continues, 'that it makes foreign policy
a legitimizing element of internal politics'. A conservativeNorth American
agreesin positingthat 'undoubtedlythe reasonfor the L6pez Portillo favourable
approachto the forces of revolutionin neighbouringcountries' emanatesfrom
'the ability of the Mexican governingsystem and the PRI to substitute revolutionary symbolismfor revolutionaryaction in the domestic political context and
thereby absorband neutralizemost of the more radicalleft forces'.33
While it is true, in the words of a Westerndiplomat,that 'Mexicanpresidents
always like to wave their left hand abroadand use their righthand at home', the
argumentshould not be overemphasized.As noted in the discussionof the ideological contributionsto Mexico's policy, some degree of revolutionarycommitment continues to influence the world view of Mexico's elites. The waning of
that zeal does not necessarilyimply its total disappearance.Evenmore cogently,
the objective realities of Mexico's potential power have changed.While it may
be true that a revolutionary posture helps the maintenance of the Mexican
system, it is equally true that Mexican foreign policy is at a crossroads.The
movesto increasedinfluencein the CaribbeanBasinare much more than cynically
manipulative. Rather, they represent an incipient and potentially profound
new departurein Mexico's role in regionalglobal politics.34Even so, the argument from political influence must weigh heavily as an explanationfor Mexico's
contemporaryCentralAmericanpolicy.
STRATEGICCONCERNSAND NATIONALSECURITYINTERESTS
The official line denies that national security concerns influence Mexico's
contemporaryCentral American policy, but unofficial analysiscombined with
logical inference are clearly to the contrary. They demonstratethat security
motivations contribute their part to Mexico's overall posture. The argument
is catalysed by severalsecurity imperativesand supportedby Mexicaninitiatives
to bolster its military capabilities.Continuing problems in Mexico's southern
states and the security of the nation's southernoil fields are the most important
strategicconsiderations.The modernizationof the nation's military is the most
cogent point as evidence for the influence of nationalsecurity'scontributionto
Mexico'spolicy.
Mexico's new oil implies severalstrategicconsiderationsand nationalsecurity
concerns. The petroleum bonanza has catalysed further economic growth and
created novel strategic imperatives.Mexico's Defence Minister,General Felix
34
GalvanL6pez, made the point of explainingthe military'smodernizationprogramme.He emphasizedthat Mexico'sincreasingwealth and industrialgrowth
had created new 'necessities for protection and vigilance',making particular
referenceto the 'vital installations'of PetroleosMexicanosand the Compafia
Federal de Electricidad.'We have to give them security', he noted, and 'for
that reasonwe need more equipment,more means,andmore soldiers'.35
The location of the new petroleum reservesis especially importanthere.
Two key fields are located in the southeasternstates of Chiapasand Tabasco.
Both states border on Guatemalaand some of the reservoirsare less than 100
miles from the frontier. The protection of these oil fields is clearly part of
Mexico's larger Central American policy and contributes to the military's
increasingconcern with the nation's southern states. As a reflection of that
fact, the most important manoeuvresconducted by the nation's military in
the last 50 years were held in the southernoil fields in 1980. Thoughless frequently mentioned, an additional strategic considerationin the south is the
security of the transisthmianrailline, recentlyupgradedand destinedto become
a lucrativeeconomicasset for Mexicoas the 1980s unfold.36
The oil fields and the rail line, however, are only part of the scenarioin
Mexico'ssouth that relatesstrategicallyto the nation'sCentralAmericanpolicy.
A bombasticjournalisticmetaphormay exaggeratethe point, but it capturesan
essential concern among some sectors in Mexico in declaringthat 'Central
America is reachingnorthwardtowardMexico like a knife pointing at the proverbial soft underbelly'.37In truth, the areahas alwaysbeen unsettled and old
problemshavecombinedwith new ones to exacerbatethe situation.Traditionally,
the nation's southern states have been Mexico's poorest and least developed
region. The area also counts the nation's largest concentrationof indigenous
peoples, many of the same ethnic traditionas their brethrenliving in northern
Guatemala.The developmentalbackwardnessof the region implies the continuing existence of largehaciendas,socio-economicexploitation, and political
authoritarianism.
Overthe years,it has triggeredoccasionalpeasantchallengesto
governmentalauthorityand, in response,repressionof the local peasantry.
As the oil boom maturedin the area duringthe 1970s, it sparkedadditional
complexitiesas hundredsof thousandsflooded the areain searchof jobs. Those
interlopers imposed stresses and strains on the socio-politicalfabric of the
region. To make mattersworse, the exploitation of the area'spetroleumriches
also broughtland condemnations,soaringinflation, increasesin crime, environmental damage, water pollution, and unmanageabledemandsupon the local
infrastructure.All of that, in turn, catalysedan angryresponseon the part of
the southerners,including petitions, protest marches, road blocks, and the
occupation of drillingrigs and constructionsites. It is a familiarstory: an economic boom sparkingsocialdislocationleadingto politicalprotest.
But the story does not end there.Migrantsfrom the CentralAmericannations
have added their destabilizinginfluences.As the Salvadoriancivil war ragesand
as the Guatemalanguerrillaactivities heat up, thousandshave fled across the
Mexican border to seek refuge and/or to find better economic opportunity.
The entire southernregion,in short, is experiencingunparalleledchangeand, in
the process,creatingnovel challengesand implyingpotential securityproblems
for MexicoCity.
35
In response,the Mexicandecision-makershave launchedprogrammescombining carrots and sticks. The carrotsencompassdevelopmentalprogrammesincluding road construction, medical clinics, new governmentalstores, and agricultural
extension programmesinvolvingthe distributionof new seeds and the provision
of tractorsat token fees.
The stick is more germaneto the subject at hand. While the government's
agriculturalexperts and social workers ply their trade, the military presence
has also grown. The MexicanArmy has assignedone of its most seniorgenerals
to the Chiapaszone and reinforcedits garrisonin the state. A WashingtonPost
report quotes a 'well-placed official' as estimating that the military post at
Comitan grew from 3,000 to 8,000 men in early 1981. Rememberingthat the
entire militaryestablishmentin Mexico numbersonly a trifle more than 100,000,
an increaseof 5,000 men in one provincialpost is obviously significant.38
Beyond the strategicimplicationsof the southern oil fields and the security
considerationsof the rapid socio-economic and political change in the southern
states, Mexico's newly launched programmeto modernize its military forms
part of the context connecting to the nation's Central American policy. The
point of departureis to understandthat the Mexicanmilitaryis assuminga more
vigorous posture than it has for more than a generation. In the now famous
interview granted to Proceso in late 1980, General Galvianwaxed enthusiastic
about the military's modernization. In responding to a question reflecting
disquiet, General Galvan brushed aside the apprehensionsin praising the
initiative on the grounds that it 'will guaranteethe sovereignty and integrity
of our territoryand of all interiormissionswhich we [the military] have to complete'. Warming to the task at hand, he pressed further in defending the
military's modernization by proclaiming that it will make Mexico more
'respected'. 'The strong are more respected than the weak', he concluded.39
Buttressing that positive rhetoric, Mexico's military is being encouraged by
increasing financial support, with spending on the military increasing faster
than governmentspendingas a whole.4
That combination of rhetoric and resources has crystallized in added
presence and additional potential. Mexico's IndependenceDay celebrationsin
1980 exemplified presence as the military surprisedmany when it demonstrated its new power. A New York Times report captured the drama of the
event.
Dressed in new combat uniforms and wearinggreen, red, and blue berets,
about 8,000 soldiers ran the four-milelength of the paradeto provetheir
fitness. And behind them came hundredsof newly paintedmilitaryvehicles,
includingsome carryingsmallrockets, neverbefore seen in Mexico.4'
New combat uniforms, flashy berets, and fresh paint reflect only part of the
modernizationprogramme.The nation's cavalry regiments are tradingin their
horses for motorized vehicles. Mexico has acquiredfrom Germanythe rightsto
manufactureG3 automatic rifles and these are now being mass-produced.The
state-ownedDina Nacionalis manufacturinga Mexican-designedtank. According
to General Galvan the rockets paraded on Independence Day imply a 'very
modest' programme,but they have been successfullytested, they are to come
in four varieties,and they will be mobile.
36
The navy and air force are also being improved. The naval minister has
announcedthat he will renew fully half of the presentfleet. Six patrol boats
have already been purchasedfrom Spain with more to come. Spain has also
received an order for 'an undeterminednumber'of transportplanes. Finally,
the Mexican Air Force convinced the United States in mid-1981 to deliver
a dozen supersonicF5 jet fighters.As partof the salesarrangement,US advisers
consulted with the Mexican armed forces about necessarychanges to its airfields to handlethe F5s.
As those nuts and bolts of increasedmilitary might are assembled,Mexico
has also turnedto the formulationof sophisticatedstrategy.In the form of the
Colegio de Defensa, an additionaltier of advancedmilitaryeducationhas been
introduced to prepareMexico'smilitaryelite for generaloffice. At the highest
level of strategicthinking,moreover,the Mexicanelites have for the first time
in moder history begun to think through the formulationof an overarching
national security policy. Afforded wide diffusion by Defence MinisterGalvan's
interview, the incipient policy debate is mightily concernedwith the implications of Mexico's emergingrole as petroleum power and with the nation's
responsibilitiesand opportunitiesin CentralAmericaand the Caribbean.
All of that compels the conclusionthat Mexico'sCentralAmericanpolicy is
informed by strategic considerationsand national security interests, but the
argumenthas its limitations.Whileit is true, in the first instance,that Mexico's
south is experiencingserious socio-economic problems,the potential for the
spreadof CentralAmerica'srevolutionaryconflicts ought not to be exaggerated.
The governmentis respondingto the challengesand the Mexican system has
a proven record for the effective handlingof domestic political problems.As
for the relationshipbetween the military'smodernizationand CentralAmerican
turmoil, the connection rings true, but other factors also form part of the
explanationfor the modernizationprogramme.In truth, Mexico'smilitaryhas
suffered from comparativelylimited resourcesand is in need of repair.Equipment is scarce and outdated, the total force is relativelysmall, and the officer
corps is not as highly trained as in Argentina,Brazil or Peru, for example.
Mexico's petroleumboom, furthermore,has providedadditionalresourcesand
triggeredcompetition amongst claimants in Mexico anxious to get their fair
share of the financial pie. It is logical enough to see the military as having
a reasonableclaim to some of those resources,just as other sectors in Mexico
havevied for their piece of the new riches.
It is importantto emphasize,in that vein, that the Mexicanmilitaryis still
quite limited in relation to other nations. Comparativeanalysisillustratesthe
point. Lookingto the three 'regionalpowers'who may logically be in competition in the CaribbeanBasin (Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela),Mexico ranks lowest
in all relativeindices of martialmight and in only one areameasuringabsolute
quantitiesdoes it surpassVenezuela.Mexicois roughlysix times morepopulous
than Cuba and five times more so than Venezuela, yet data for 1979 show
Mexico spendingwell underhalf as much on its militaryas Cuba($519 million
versus $1,168 million) and considerablyless than Venezuela($706 million).
In per capita terms, Mexico spent $7.00 per head on its military,dramatically
below Cuba's $118, and Venezuela's $52. As a percentageof governmental
spending,Mexico's expenditureswere again far below Cuba and Venezuela,
37
respectively 1.1 per cent, 8.9 per cent, and 6.5 per cent. Only in absolutenumbers in the armed forces did Mexico surpassVenezuela, although it was still
far below Cuba. In 1980, Venezuela counted 40,500 men in arms; Mexico,
107,000; and Cuba, 206,000.42 Even with the increasedspendingin the 1981
budget, Mexico's military still claimed only 1.4 per cent of all public expenditures or 2.3 per cent of the generalgovernmentalbudget, which does not include
allocations for Mexico'sdecentralizedorganizationsand state-ownedenterprises.
CONCLUSION
Despite a pronounced policy line promulgatingthe virtues of nonintervention,
Mexico is deeply involved in the internationalpolitics of CentralAmerica.The
facts of the matter are clear, but the motivationsinformingMexico'srole in the
region are less clearly defined, even in Mexico. Often explanationsfor Mexico's
policy feature unctuously proclaimedad hoc and ex post facto artificialconfections compoundedby tight-lippeddisclaimers.
The truth of the matter is probably composed of a partly conceived and
semi-consciously articulated combination of the several influences examined
in this paper. By way of analytical organization,they may be defined as contextual influences, latent motivations, and operableprinciples.The contextual
influences informing Mexico's contemporary Central American policy derive
from socio-cultural attachments and historical bonds. The analysis presented
here shows those influences to be imprecise, exaggerated, and fraught with
negative nuances, but they are interpretedin Mexico as justifying the nation's
contemporary policy. Although a sense of self-indulgent myth pervades the
Mexican decision-makers'claims to socio-cultural similarities and historical
ties binding Mexico to Central America, the apologies are at least useful in
legitimizing Mexico's initiatives in the region. In fact, they are probably more
than that and probably make some small contribution to the formulation of
Mexico'scurrentset of policies.
The argument from ideological sympathy as a contextual influence shares
some of the same imperfections as the socio-culturaland historical apologies,
but it may have more validity as a guiding principle in the conceptualization
of policy. Mexican domestic policy has long since shed its 'revolutionary'zeal,
but the nation's foreignpolicy approximatesthe ideal more faithfully.
The argumentsfrom economic advantageand strategicconcernsand security
interests define latent motivations in large part, but they also lend substanceto
the dominant political principles informing Mexico's current policy. The
historical record revealsthe search for economic advantagein Mexico's Central
American policy from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, but its influence has
waned since then as other interests have increased in significance. Possible
economic gains continue to exist within the Mexico-CentralAmerican equation, of course, and they may assume increasingimport in the future, but they
are less consequential at present. As for the contribution of strategic/security
interests, the present policy is beginningto reflect their influence, but they are
still not crucial contributionsto the formulationof daily policy. If the Mexican
military's modernizationprogrammematures and if CentralAmericanconflicts
spread to Guatemala(or southern Mexico), strategic and security motivations
will certainlyplay an increasinglysalient role in the policy nexus.
38
From anotherperspective,however,Mexico'seconomicand strategic/military

policies imply importantcorollariesto the dominantpoliticalprinciplesguiding
the nation's contemporarypolicy. In the economic sphere,Mexico'spetroleum
supply arrangementfor the Central American nations legitimizes Mexican
concern for the region and offers the opportunity for political leverage.As
Mexico's military modernization programmeevolves, its political influence
will also matureas militarypower contributesto the severalother elements of
Mexico'soverallforeignpolicy posture.
At present, however, political ambition complementedby ideological sympathy are Mexico's guiding principlesand provide the keys for understanding
the nation'sCentralAmericanpolicy. As noted above,in the first place,Mexico
can validly lay claim to a fairly consistentrecordof revolutionarypropensities
in its foreign policy and an important strain of its present CentralAmerican
posture reflects that tradition.The policy also mirrorsthe nub of revolutionary
nostalgia that continues to inform the mentality(or spirit) of Mexico'spolicymakers.Moreimportantly,however,the nation's policy reflectsMexico on the
political make. The idea of bigness has transcendedthe drive for domestic
industrializationand now encompassesthe ambitionfor internationalprestige.
Enchancedby the power of petroleumand facilitatedby waningUS influence
in the region,CentralAmericais the first testing groundof that newly evolving
ambition.
NOTES
1. The quotation is from Socorro Diaz (1981), Fuerzas e intereses de las potencias
medianas regionales: El caso de Mexico, Discussion Paper, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,
Bonn, West Germany, 11 March, p. 8. For a description and analysis of Mexico's
Central American policies, see Edward J. Williams (1982), 'Mexico's Central American
Policy: Revolutionary and Prudential Dimensions', in Michael Erisman and John
Martz,ColossusChallenged:The Strugglefor CaribbeanInfluence, WestviewPress

(Boulder, Colorado), forthcoming.
2. Diaz (1981), Fuerzas e interesesde las potencias medianasregionales:El caso de

Mexico,p. 5.
3. Ren6 Harrera Zufiiga (1980), 'De cara al sur: Mexico ante Centroamerica', Nexos,
Afio III, Nuim.28 (April), pp. 5-7.
4. Carleton Beals (1926), 'Mexico Seeking Central American Leadership', CurrentHistory
(September), p. 842.
5. Carlos Fuentes (1981), 'For Too Long, America Has Cast a Blind Eye on Its Southern
Neighbor', Los Angeles Times, 4 January, p. 1.
6. Diaz (1981), Fuerzas e interesesde las potencias medianasregionales:El caso de

Mexico,pp. 5-6.
7. See Beals, 'Mexico Seeking Central American Leadership', p. 842; Edith B. Couturier
(1975), 'Mexico' in Harold Eugene Davis and LarmanC. Wilson (eds.), Latin American
Foreign Policies, Johns Hopkins University Press (Baltimore), p. 122; and Ralph Lee
Woodward, Jr. (1976), Central America: A Nation Divided, Oxford University Press
(New York), pp. 153-4.
8. See Woodward (1976), CentralAmerica: A Nation Divided, pp. 191-4.
9. For a fascinating discussion of Mexican activity in Central America during the period,
see Beals (1926), 'Mexico Seeking Central American Leadership'. The quotation is
from p. 839. For a more general discussion of United States and Mexican diplomatic
differences in Nicaragua during the period, see J. Lloyd Mecham (1965), A Survey of
United States-Latin American Relations, Houghton Mifflin Company (Boston), pp.
331-4. The Sandino flirtation is discussed in Neill Macaulay (1967), The Sandino
Affair,-QuadrangleBooks (Chicago), pp. 146-60.
39
10. Woodward(1976), CentralAmerica:A Nation Divided,p. 39.

11. See Beals, 'Mexico Seeking Central American Leadership',p. 842; MilesWortman
(1976), 'LegitimidadPolitica y Regionalismo:El ImperioMexicanoy Centroamerica',
HistoriaMexicana,XXVI, Num. 2 (October-December),especiallypp. 249, 259-60;
andWoodward(1976), CentralAmerica:A Nation Divided,pp. 153-4.
12. The quotations are from Alan Riding (1980), 'Mexico PursuesRole of Leaderfor
CaribbeanRegion', New York Times, 20 August, Information Services on Latin
America (ISLA) 536; Anthony T. Bryan (1981), 'Mexico and the Caribbean:New
Ventures into the Region', CaribbeanReview, Vol. X, No. 3 (Summer),p. 4; and
Jorge Castafiedain Carlos A. Astiz (1969), Latin AmericanInternationalPolitics,
Universityof Notre DamePress(Notre Dame),pp. 155-6.
13. In sequence, the quotations are from Olga Pellicerde Brody (1980), 'Pragmatismo
y tradicion revolucionariaen la politica exterior de Mexico', Proceso, 28 August,
p. 14; Pellicerde Brody (1980), 'La SeguridadNacionalen Mexico: Preocupaciones
Nuevas y Nociones Tradicionales',a paperpresentedin a seminarin the Programon
US-Mexican Studies, University of California,San Diego, September,p. 20; and
(1981) 'AcuerdoEntreMexico y Nicaragua',El Mercadode Valores,18 May, p. 510.
14. See Errol D. Jones and David LaFrance(1976), 'Mexico's Foreign Affairs Under
President Echeverria:The Special Case of Chile', Inter-AmericanEconomic Affairs,
Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer),p. 46.
15. Karl M. Schmitt (1974), Mexico and the United States, 1821-1973, John Wiley and
Sons (New York),p. 231.
16. For a more comprehensiveanalysis,see Williams,'Mexico'sCentralAmericanPolicy:
Revolutionaryand PrudentialDimensions'.
17. For the discussion and analysis, see Ramon Medina Luna (1974), 'Proyeccion de
MexicosobreCentroamerica',
in Centrode EstudiosInternacionales,
Mexicoy America
Latina: La Nueva Politica Exterior, El Colegio de Mexico (Mexico,D.F.), especially
pp. 15-20.
18, Pellicerde Brody (1976), 'El Acercamientode Mexico a AmericaLatina',in JamesW.
Wilkieet al. (eds), Contemporary
Mexico, Universityof CaliforniaPress(Los Angeles),
p. 449. Measuredin increasedtrade earningsthe campaigninitiatedin the mid-1960s
paid dividends. In 1970, Mexicanexports to the CACMtotaled $21.2 million and
imports $2.8 million. By 1980, Mexico exported goods and servicesworth $228.7
million and importedonly $32 million from the CACMnations.The surplusof almost
$200 millionwas the only significantcreditin tradefor Mexicoamongits severalmajor
tradingpartners.For the data, see Banco Nacional de Mexico (BANAMEX)(1981),
MexicoStatisticalData 1970-1980, BANAMEX(Mexico,D.F.), pp. 57-8.
19. Diaz (1981), Fuerzas y intereses de las potencias medianasregionales:El caso de
Mexico, pp. 5-6.
20. The data are from WorldBank (1980), 1980 WorldBankAtlas, WorldBank(Washington, D.C.),p. 18.
21. The quotation is from Bryan, 'Mexico and the Caribbean:New Venturesinto the
Region',p. 36. For the text of the petroleumagreement,see 'Programade Cooperacion
Energetica',El Mercado de Valores (11 August 1980), pp. 761 ff. The directorgeneral'sstatement is found in 'Suscribenun ComunicadoLopez Portilloy Oduber'
(1978), Diariode Yucatdn(Merida),12 January,p. 1.
22. For an excellent analysis,see AmericanChamberof Commerceof Mexico(AMCHAM)
(1982), 'Devaluationof the Peso', QuarterlyEconomic Report, AMCHAM(Mexico,
D.F.) (March),pp. 1-34.
23. The quotation is from AMCHAM
(1981), QuarterlyEconomicReport (July), p. 1. The
1982 predictionon earningsappearsin LatinAmericanWeeklyReport (1982), 'Labour
and businesscry "foul"as governmentincome shrinks',9 April,p. 3.
24. The data are from Berenice P. Ramirez Lopez (1980?), 'Mexico y Centroamerica:
Relaciones Establecidas,Situacion, y Perspectivas',UniversidadNacional Autonoma
de Mexico,no date, mimeographed,p. 9.
25. For statementsfrom the Presidentand the ForeignMinister,see 'ParaJLP, tambien
la URSS interviene in Centroamerica'(1981), Proceso, 23 March,p. 23; and 'La
CrisisSalvadorefna
PuedeSerDetonante'(1981), Excelsior, 18 March,p. 1.
40
BULLETIN OF LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH
26. See 'LopezPortilloSees Role as BridgeBuilder'(1977), ArizonaDailyStar(Tucson),

26 January;and BarbaraCrossette(1981), 'HaigAssertsthe Nicaraguans
MayDiscuss
ResumingTies',New YorkTimes,3 December,p. 1.
27. HerreraZufiiga,'De caraal sur:Mexicoante Centroamerica',
pp. 4, 9; Riding(1981),
'Oil and SalvadorIssues Upset Mexico',New York Times, 13 September,p. 3; and
'ForeignRelations:SomethingMoreThanOil on the PresidentialTour'(1980), CommercioExterior(June),p. 202.
28. For some recent analysesof Mexicanforeignpolicy, see GeorgeW. Grayson(1977),
'MexicanForeignPolicy', CurrentHistory (March),pp. 97 ff; WilliamH. Hamilton
Inter-American
Economic
(1975), 'Mexico'sNew ForeignPolicy: A Reexamination',
Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter),pp. 51-8; Jones and La France(1976), 'Mexico's
ForeignAffairsUnderPresidentEcheverria:The SpecialCaseof Chile',Inter-American
EconomicAffairs, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer),pp. 45-78; and Guy E. Poitras(1974),
EconomicAffairs, Vol. 28, No. 3
'Mexico's"New" ForeignPolicy', Inter-American
(Winter),pp. 59-77.
29. On the foreign policy of PresidentJose Lopez Portillo, see Kevin J. Middlebrook
(1980), 'Energyand Securityin US-MexicanRelations',Departmentof Government
and Centerfor InternationalAffairs,HarvardUniversity(Cambridge,Massachusetts);
and Pellicerde Brody (1980), 'Pragmatismoy tradicionrevolucionariaen la politica
exteriorde Mexico',Proceso,28 August,pp. 13-14.
30. BruceBagley(1981), 'Mexicoin the 1980s: A New RegionalPower',CurrentHistory
(November),p. 354.
31. For the quotationsand analysis,see FrankTannenbaumin CharlesC. Cumberland
(ed.) (1967), The Meaningof the MexicanRevolution, D. C. Heath (Lexington),
p. 82; Cumberland(1968), Mexico: The Strugglefor Modernity,Oxford University
Press(New York),p. 258; andManuelGermanParrain Cumberland,
op. cit., p. 85.
32. For the quotationsand analysis,see Bryan,'Mexicoandthe Caribbean:New Ventures
into the Region', p. 5; Bryan (1979), 'The Islandsand the Littoral:New Relationships' in RichardMillettandW. MarvinWill(eds), TheRestlessCaribbean:Changing
Patternsof InternationalRelations,PraegerPublishers(New York), p. 239; andPablo
Pedro Camargo(1980), 'Venezuela y Mexico, Imperialistasde Ojos Negros: L.
Arellano',Excelsior,11 November,p. 3A.
33. The quotations and concomitantanalysisappearin 'Un alivio para EstadosUjidos,
el convenio con Venezuela' (1980), Proceso, 18 August, p. 27; and Constantine
ChristopherMenges (1980), 'CurrentMexican Foreign Policy and United States
Interests'(Washington,
D.C.),mimeographed
(June),p. 29.
34. The quotationis from Riding(1980), 'Mexico,Bracedby Oil, Steps Out in Foreign
Affairs',New YorkTimes,24 April,ISLA 1473. For threeanalysesin agreementwith
the thrustof this argument,see Bryan(1981), 'Mexicoand the Caribbean:New Ventures into the Region', CaribbeanReview, Vol. X, No. 3 (Summer),p. 35; John F.
McShane(1981), 'EmergingRegionalPower: Mexico'sRole in the CaribbeanBasin'
in ElisabethG. Ferrisand JennieK. Lincoln,LatinAmericanForeignPolicies:Global
and Regional Dimensions,WestviewPress(Boulder,Colorado),p. 200; and Pellicer
de Brody(1981), 'Mexico'sPosition'in 'Strugglein CentralAmerica',ForeignPolicy,
No. 43 (Summer),p. 91.
35. For the interviewwith Galvan,see RobertoVizcaino(1980), 'La seguridaddel pais,
fin primordialdel Estado',Proceso,22 September,p. 7.
36. See HerreraZifiiga, 'De cara al sur: Mexico ante Centroamerica',
p. 3; and William
Chislett(1981), 'Mexico'sBid to Bridgethe Oceans',FinancialTimes, 15 May,ISLA
1948. The followinganalysisis extrapolatedfromWilliams(1981), 'Mexico'sModern
Review,Vol. X, No. 4, pp. 12 ff.
Military:Implicationsfor the Region',Caribbean
37. Guy Gulliotta(1980), 'MexicoIs FlexingIts New Muscle',MiamiHerald,31 August,
ISLA538.
38. MarliseSimons(1981), 'MexicoFightsUnrest',Washington
Post, 18 April,p. 1.
39. Vizcaino,op. cit., p. 7.
40. The budgetarydata are extrapolatedfrom AMCHAM(1981), QuarterlyEconomic
Report(January),p. 23.
41
41. Riding (1980), 'MexicanArmy, ParadingPride Raises Concern',New York Times,

5 October,ISLA 1371.
42. 'Balancingthe MilitaryBooks' (1980), LatinAmericanWeeklyReport, 19 September,
p. 9.

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Mexico's Central American Policy: Apologies, Motivations, and Principles

Mexico's Central American Policy:

double-edgedsword, as exemplified by the indigenouspopulations of southern

one elementof 'the historicalparallelsthat havearrivedat a point of confluence'

campaign of the Mexican revolutionaryzealots during the1920s. In sum, the

understand the nature of revolutionaryprocesses'. The argument,in short,

Conversely, a solid dose of calculating pragmatism winds its way through

manufacturedproducts to Central America'.18Shortly after his accession to

programmesincluding technical advice and exploration. PEMEXhas donated

and a response to the present turmoil of the CentralAmericanregion. The

policy, the relative decline of US power, and, more speculatively,the messianic

to continue commandingwith its imperialisticcourse in the seas to the North

From anotherperspective,however,Mexico'seconomicand strategic/military

Martz,ColossusChallenged:The Strugglefor CaribbeanInfluence, WestviewPress

2. Diaz (1981), Fuerzas e interesesde las potencias medianasregionales:El caso de

6. Diaz (1981), Fuerzas e interesesde las potencias medianasregionales:El caso de

10. Woodward(1976), CentralAmerica:A Nation Divided,p. 39.

BULLETIN OF LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH

26. See 'LopezPortilloSees Role as BridgeBuilder'(1977), ArizonaDailyStar(Tucson),

41. Riding (1980), 'MexicanArmy, ParadingPride Raises Concern',New York Times,

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