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n time immemorial, have generated words,
'scribethem, words to interpret them, words
orkeep theirmagicat bay.Manyofthe most
nd insightful of those words.from the Bible
to contemporary visualculture studies, are
Igetherin thisremarkable collection, which is
ned to be a standard reference in itsfieldfor
to came.
sable resource for image analysis. The best
seenin this field by a long way.

There are many fine an

none that offer such a co.
of the theoretical
interdisciplinaryfield.
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important subject. I ~es: A Reider
it is readable.

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CONT ENTS

Editori.,1 intr odu ctions and arran gem ent Sunil Manghani.

Art hur Piper and Jon Sim ons 2006

AcknowledBCIlI CtlCS

xiii

Publishers' Permissions

xiv

GenerallncroJuctiOlJ

firs t pu blished 2006

Apar t from all)' Iair de.tiing for the purposes of research o r

pr ivate study. or criticism or rc vicv..., as per mitt ed under the

Cop)Tight , D'''igns and Patent' Act . I988, this public.nlon may

bc reprod uce d, sto red or I ran sm ittcd in any fo r m , or by any

m ean s, an i)' with ,hl, ; prior permissio n in w riti ng of th e

p ublishers. or in tI", case of reprogra phic reproducti on. in

ac-cordance with the k il ns of licences issued by th e Copyr ight

Part One:

I:

Historical and Philosophical

Precedents

19

From Genesis to locke

20

Introduction

21

1.1 Man Created in God's Image

Gen esis I : 26 and 27

24

1.2 Graven Images

Exodus 20: 4-6

24

1.3 Abraham and the Idol Shop of' His Father Terah
Midrash Rabbah

24

1.4 The Simile o f the Cave

25

Li n:n ~ ing Agem.:)', Enqu ir-ies co ncer n ing rep rod ucti o n o utside:

those ter ms should be sent to th e pubb sher s.

($)

SAGE Publication s Ltd

I O liver 's Ya rd

55 Cit) Road

Lon don EC 1Y 1SP

SAGE Publications Inc,

24>5 'It-lll-r Road

Thou sand O aks. Californ ia 9 I 320

SAGE Publi cat ions India Pvt Ltd

B-42. Panchshcc-l Enclav

Po, t Box 4 I 09

Plato

1.5 Ar t and Illusion

New Delhi 110 0 17

29

Plato
Briti,h Lihrar)' Cata loguing ill Publication data
A catalog ue record for this book is available
from the Hritish Library

ISBN, IO 1-4 129-00++- 1

ISBN 10 1-4129-004 5-X

1.6 The Origins of Imitation

r5flN 13 97H- I 4 I ,19 OQ4-, 7

1.7 Thinking with Images

ISflN .I l 97S. 1-4 129-0045-4 (pbk)

Aristotle

Li brary ofCongrt.ss Control Numbcs-: 200591054 1

Typ"" ,t hy C&M Dlg it.,I , (p ) I.td ., Chcnnai, India

Pr in k d ond bou nd in G reat Br itain v)"The Cromwell Press l.td, Trow b ridgl~ . \Vi!t <> hire
Prin ted on pdper fr o m susta inabl e re so ur ces

31

Ar isto tle

1.8 John of Damascus

32

33

1.9 Horos at Nicaca, 787

AD

33

1.10 Horos a t Niera, 754

AD

34

CONTENTS:VII

2:

1.11 Image and Idolatry

Thomas Hobbes

34

3.2 Society of the Spectacle

Guy Dehord

69

1.12 Evil Demon

Rene Descer tes

36

3.3 The Precession of Simulacra

Jean Baudrillard

70

L13 Optics
Rene Descartes

37

3.4 Image as Commodity

Fredric Jameson

74

1.14 OfIdeas

39

3.5 'Race' and Nation

Paul Gilroy

76

lulul Locke

78

from Kant to Freud

3.6 Never just Pictures

Susan Bordo

Art History

82

Introduction

83

Introduction

41
42

2.1 Representation and Imagination

Immanuel Kant

45

2.2 Space and Time

Gotthold Lcs~ing

48

4.l Studies i.n Iconology

Erwin Panofsky

86

2.3 Camera Obscura

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels

49

4.2 Invention and Discovery

Ernst Uombrich

9l

2.4 The Fetishism of Commodities and the

Secret Thereof

4:

50

4.3 Interpretation without Representation, or,

The Viewing of Las Menina.'i'
Svetlana Alpers

94

2.5 How the Real World at Last Became a Myth

Friedrich Nietzsche

52

4.4 Towards a Visual Critical Theory

99

2.6 On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense

Friedrich Nietzsche

53

2.7 Images, Bodies and Consciousness

54

Karl Mar-x

Susan Buck-Moras

Henr-i Berg~on

2.8 The Dream-Work

Sigmund Freud

5(,

s:

Semiotics

lUI

Introduction

102

;.1 Nature of the Linguistic Sign

lOS

Ferdinand de Saussure
;.2 The Sign: IconIndex, and Symbol

107

Charles Sanders Peirce

Part Two:
3:

Theories of Images

61

S.3 The Third Meaning

Roland Bar-rhes

109

115

Ideology Critique

62

;.4 From Sub- to SuprasemioticrThe Sign as Bvent

Introduction

61

Mieke Bal

3.1 Television: Multilayered Structure

Theodor Adamo

66

S.S The Semiotic Landscape

Gunter Kress and Theo van Leeuwen

11.

 .. _-""""1;.,"1.;11

6:

CONTENTS:

Phenomenology

Introduction

8.3 This is Not a Pipe

Michel Foucault

6.1 Thing and Work

Martin Heidegg er

128

6.2 Eye and Mind

Maurice Merleau-Ponty

131

8.4 The Despotic Eye and its Shadow: Media Image

in the Age of literacy
Robert D. Romanyshyn

6.3 Description

Jean-Paul Sartre

188

134

8.5 Images, Audiences, and Readings

Kevin Deluca

6.4 Imagination

Mikel Dufrenne

138

Image as Thought

193

Introduction

194

9.1 Picture Theory of language

ludwig Wittgenstein

197

9.2 Body Images

Antonio Damasio

199

9.3 Involuntary Memory

Marcel Proust

202

9.4 The Philosophical Imaginary

Michele Le Doeuff

204

9.5 Thought and Cinema: The Time-Image

Gilles Deleuze

207

9.6 The Dialectical Image

Walter Benjamin

211

9.7 Ways of Remembering

John Berger

214

6.5 Scientific Visualism

Don Ihde

7:

Psychoanalysis

Introduction

7.1 The Gaze

Jacques Lacan

7.2 The All-Perceiving Subject

Christian Metz

7.3 Woman as Image (Man as Bearer of the look)

Laura Mulvey

141

14-5
146

149
,
152
156

7.4 Cindy Sherman's Untitled Film Stills

Joan Copjec

159

7.5 Two Kinds of Attention

Anton Ehrenzweig

164

Part Three: Image Culture

8:

IX

124
125

Images and Words

Introduction

167
168
169

'I.

I
I

9:

179

183

10: Fabrication

217

Introduction

218

10.1 Taking a line for a Walk

Paul Klee

221

8.1 The Roots of Poetry

Ernest Fenollosa

172

10.2 On Montage and the Filmic

Fourth Dimension
.Sergei Eisenstein

8.2 Icon and Image

Paul Ricoeur

175

10.3 ElectronicTools
William]. Mitchell

223
227

CONTENTS".

,CONTENTS

to.; Images Scatter into

11.~ Cu1tur~1

2U

10. Can.era Lucida

Da'id Hoeknn

~t,
D~ta.

in'oln.age'

'"
1:1:

II:

visual Culture

,.2

Introduction

'"

11.I The Medium is the Me ..ag'

!~~

Marshall Mel""an

11.2 'Ineln.ageoftheCily
Knin hneh

)1/

11.:1 The Inlage_Worid

Small SoIlLl.g

'"

11..1 The Philosopher as An,h, warhnl

1;4

11.5 Symbol, Idol and Marti: Hindu I;od-Inlages

and the Politics of Mediation

GIToon'
o , Price Grie"~

256

11.6 Th., United Colors of Diversity

C"h. Lurv

J61

11.7 Th" Unhucahle Lightness ofSighl

26,1

M~;l",g Chm~

1],

\'i6ion and "'i.uality

Introduction
12.1 Mod"rnhing \,;"ioo

2'"

'"
no

J"n.ld-w, C''''y

12.1 'lhe In'/Pulse 10 See

R~,-,I;,,,1 K"u"
12.,1 Ughting lor Whiteue

lU"h.lhl Ilv,r

27.
278

292

IlTIaseStudic.
Introduction

m
296

13.1 'Inefamilyofln'ages
W,J.T. Mitchell

13.2 Art llislory and

Jame' Elkin>

ImagesTh~{ Are

Not Art

"'"

1LJ A Conslcot:tiv;';l MAnifeslo

Harhara Maria 'ilalloru

JOl

13.4 Image., Nol Signs

Rio"i,
Debra"'
o

""
""

U.S Whal is Iconodash?

Aruno LalOUr

Anhur I)anto

1M

.. tin ja,.'

11.; 'fhe ModularitJ- ofVision

."-,,,,ir'ldli

D.ta C.thu

Peter Gahson

Relalivism and the Visual Turn

\'",. on (oIl"ibmofj
No',," on F.J,w'F
Index

.11 5
]24

,12>

,<X : P U B LI S H E R S ' PERMISS IONS

Figure 5 .3

Vermeer, Johannes, Wom an Holding a Balance, Widen er Co llec tion. Image

2006 Board of Trustees, National Gallery of Art, Wa shington .

Figure 6.1

Van Gogh, Vincent, A Pair of Shoes. Van Gogh Museum, Amsterdam.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Figure 7.1

H ans Ho lbein the Younger, Jean de Dinteville and Georges de Selve (T he

Amb assador s') lD Nati onal Gallery London .

Figure 7.2

Cin dy Sherman, Unt itl ed Film Still tt2 (1977). Courtesy of Metro Pictu res.

f igure 7.3

Cindy Sherman, Untitled Film Still #35 (1979). Courtesy of Metro Pictu res.

fi gure 8.2

Magritt e Rene, Les Deu x M ysteres (1966) AOAG P, Paris and DACS,

London, 2006.

fi gure 10.11
,

Paul Klee, Fabtafel (auf maiorem Grau)/ Colo ur Table (in grey major), 1930,

83 from Zentrum Paul Klee DACS, London .

Paul Klee, Speci ell e O rdnungl Pedagogical Sketchbook, PN30, M 60!1 01

Recto from Zentrum Paul Klee DACS, London.

Figure 10.12

Giotto (1266-1336): Scenes from the Life of Saint Francis: Death of the Knight

of Celano - detai I. Assisi, San Francese iLl 1990 . Photo Scala, Florence.

Figure 10.14

Masolino (1383-1447): Healing of the Lame Man and Raising of Tabitha.

Florence, Santa Mari a del Carmine 1991 . Photo Scala, Florence/Fonda

Edifici di Culto - M inistero dell'lnterno.

Figure 10 .1 5

Robert Camp in, 'A M an' National Gallery London.

Figure 12.1

Ersnt, M ax, A Littl e Girl Dreams of Taking the Veil (1930) A DAG P, Paris and

DACS, London , 200 6 .

f igure 12.3
Duchamp, M arcel, Rotorelief No .1. 'Carol les' (19 35) Succession M arc I
Duchamp/ADAGp, Paris and DACS, London 2006.
e
Duch arnp, Ma rcel , Ro to rel ief No.3 ' Ch inese Lantern ' (193 .5) If)
"'.. Suecess .io n
M arcel Du champ/ADAC P, Paris and DACS.

IMAGES, IMAGE CULTURE AND IMAGE STUDIES

The approach to th e st udy o f im ages proposed by this book is
interdisciplinar y, concerned wi th the n oti on of the 'i mage' in all it s
theoretical , cri t ical and practical co ntexts, uses and history.The Reader is, in
part, a r esponse to W.J.T. Mitchell 's regret (198 6 : 155 ) , that 'there is, at
I' ld" In th e h umaruties
. . . . . no u icono
.
1ogy "th at stu eli es tJre
present, no re al " lie
problem of p erceptual , conceptual, verbal and graphic images in a unifi ed
way' . In our response to this call , th e Reader suggests a holi sti c field of
inquiry rath er than a Sing le discipl inar y pr acti ce. Th e approach of the Reader
is interdisciplinar y in th at it creates an inte rdisciplinary space for the study
of images, not lim ited to the humaniti es. Th e Reader accommodates and
examines th e different types of obj ects of study that vario us disciplines and
perspecti yes make of im ages, rath er th an deSignating images as a new object
of study. In so far as im ages are objects of study and enquiry in disciplines
from art history t o neuroscien ce, from p oliti cal science to cultural st udies,
it cann ot be assum ed that th e int erdisciplin ar y terrain is already mapped
out, ready for scholarly investigation. The creation of a single 'interdiscipline'
would, therefore, be inappropriate. Th e Reader instead encourages users to
pursue imagin ative com binations of theor ies, images, disciplines and
debates in the interdisciplin ar y field . In pr esen ting the histori cal and
philosophical tr ajecto r ies alon g which th e study of images has developed ,
the Reader also provide s a guide to som e of th e differences and similarities
between the var ious disciplinary approaches to images.
: "his book is also a response to th e fact th at images appea r to b e a prominent
f ~atun' of contemporary life .Today im ages see m to inhabit every part of our
lives, and everything seems to be or have an im age. Our eyes ar e bombarded
by visual images, most obviously those produced and disseminated by
c~Hnm crcial enter tainme nt and information m edia , from advertising
btllboards, new spap er photo graph y, th e int ernet, tel evision , film s and
COmpu:cr games. The urban environme nt is replete with the visual displ ays
of architectural deSign , inte rio r decor, lands cape , shop and business fronts,
and traffic signals . Pri nt culture has gradually expanded its abil ity to include
m all)' visu al images along with text at rela ti vely low cost , io technical
Inst r u ct ion m anuals, educat io nal pu bli ca ti o ns, t our ist brochures , maga zines
and sh opping cataJogues, to nam e but a few. In the sciences, the po ssibi lity
of seeing what is to be known has pl-ogrcsscc1 from attend ance at
exp~r imen ts and autopsies to th e vicwino and nroducuon of dcctronic ,

2: I M A G E S

images. Visual scientific images of previously invisible or un seen realm s

from a nebula across the galaxy to a strand of DN A - are no long er limited
to what our eyes can see through optical instruments such as the te lesco pe
and microscop e, but are generated by electronic instrum ents and compute r
programs that translate data into images , such as thos e mad e by MRf
scann ers and radio telescopes. The gen eral techni cal capacity to produce
visual images has vastly increased, from manual crafting to chemi cal and
th en digital photography, from draftsmanship to computer- aide d d esign .
Th e past can be Visually re constructed and th e future imagined not only in
our minds but also before our eyes . At the point at which elec tronic,
co mputer-gen erated images be come simulat ions or virtual realities, it is no
longe r a qu estion of seeing images but r ather of inhab iting th em.
But the ubiquity of visual imagery is only half th e story of contemporary
image culture. In capitalist consumerism, there has been increasing em phasis
on advertising not the product, but the image or identi ty of the brand .
Consume rs buy trainers and cars for their logos, for the lifestyle or
exper ience associated with brand image, such that the im age has becom e the
co mm odity (jameson , 3.4; Klein, 2000) .The corp orations that produce such
co mm odity images , such as Nik e and Microsoft, also have th eir own im ages
that constitu te a large part of their financial value. Politics, particularl y
electoral compe tition, is said to have b ecom e a matt er of images-and their
pr ofessional mark etin g. In this context image is understood as ' the reputation,
tru stworthiness and cre dibility of the can didates or parties) (Scamme l, 1995 :
20) . W riting in the United States in 1961 , Daniel Boorstin ( 1992: 185-6)
obse r ved th e confluence between political and commerci al images,
character ising an image as a 'pseudo-ideal' , as ' a studiously crafted per sonality
profil e of an individual, institution, corporation, product or service ' . This
notion of images reaches into our very sense of our selves, not only in terms
of how we and others perceive our personality, but also in terms of body and
gender images that inform our physic al shape and th e different ways we
display ourselves visually, such as through cosmetics an d fashion (Bordo, 3. 6).
We seem to be images liVing in a world of images.
A key motiv ation for this anthology is to pro vide an aid for makin g sense of
contemp or ary im age culture in the \Vest. Th e Reader critically ex amines
im ages and debates about them in various histo rical, th eoreti cal and cult ural
conte xts . \Ve understand image culture to include not only the institu
tionalised culture of galler ies, museums and p erformance spaces, not only
th e popular culture of the mediasphere , not only the cornmer cialised
cu lture of consume ri sm ; but also the culture of polities, of the economy, of
science and technology, of idea s, thought and kno wl edge, of bodies, social
classes , ge nde r and race , of subjectivity and identity. Image cult ure is as
br oad as th e cult ure of everyday life and as pertinent to eac h specialised
sphere of activity as any other.
Yet , despite th e shee r pr evalenc e of images , despite the many academic
engage me nts with th ern , de spite {he frequent acknow ledge men ts that we

GENERAL INTRODUCT ION : 3

live in an image culture, th er e is a p ersi st ent, even consistent, lack of

cohere nce and understanding about what images are. Images thus constitute
a problematic field for contemp or ary intellectual endeavour. If im age
culture is on e of th e spurs for coUating thi s book, another is an acute n eed
to und er stand th e vari ous meaning s of th e t erm 'image ' as it is used in
different co nte xts. When we say the word 'image' we do not always seem
to know what we mean , or, rather, we may mean too much Or too Little.
Wittgen st ein argu es that att empts to define the essence of a vague term
such as 'image' ar e futil e. A word doe s not show us the essence of a thing,
but for the most part ' the meaning of a word is its use in language '
(W ittgens te in, 1958: 43). We often know what words such as ' image '
mean when they crop up in everyday use without being able to explai n that
meaning in pr ecise t erms. Th ere is no Single definition or 'essenti al nature'
of image s, differ ent m eanin gs haVing only some semantic overl ap in
com mon . Wittgen stein further sugges ts that we mak e sense of a term such
as image by p erceiving a comple x network of relations , which he cans
'family r esemblances' , between different meanings. Rather than striving for
absolute clarity in a philosophical concept that can guid e our re search in
advance, we shou ld take our cues from the everyday language in which
'image culture' is used .
Mitchell ( I 3. 1) direct ly invokes a Wittgenst einian appr oach to the multiple
meanings of th e wor d ' image ' by figurin g images as a family that includes
graphic , opti cal, perceptual, me ntal and verbal forms. His 'family tree of
images' is a graphic illustrati on of the many different 'instit utionalized
discourses' , types and sites of images and of how difficult it is to develop an
adequate taxonomy of images that will serve every purpose. Mitchel1 points
out that only some. images, such as the on es m entioned in the first para graph
above, are visual . Dreams, fantasies, memories, literary images, m etaphors,
ideas and sense impressions have also been understood as images. TIle
corporate, political, personal , bodil y and commodity images menti oned
above that are so int egral to image culture are also not predominantly visual
images, though they genera lly have visual manifestations.
This collection of readings, then , do es not atte mpt to define the image as
such, but inst ead presents a representative but not exhaustive range of th e
historical contexts, institu tionalised discourses , theoretical approaches and
~cbates that are pertinent to the stu dy of images. Only by figuring out the
family resemblances between the use of the term images in all of the se
settings, only by understanding the meaning of images across theories and
debates , will an appreciation of the significance of images for contemporary
culture eme rge. Not least among the relations to be mapped are tho se
between the allegedly strict, literal or 'proper' me anings of images in visual
Senses and extended , fi beurative meanings. Mit chell (I
. 3. 1) advises us not
to overlook th e latter as 'bastard children ' in the fam ily, of image s. Th e
rclanons between the proliferatio n of visual imagery and th e t ransformation
(or experience) of objects, events and ideas as images is crucial to any
character isation of contemporary image culture.

<1_: I MAGES

GE NERA L IN TR O DUC T I O N:,S

Yet , th e analysis of images thro ugh histo r y, theory and cult ure requ ires,
th erefore, not only the analysi s of different types of visual and n on- visual
images, in t er ms of their conditions of productio n, dissemination and
int erpret ation . It also requires an appre ciation of the roles of and attitudes
to images in the ir var ious academic, cultu ral and eco nomic contexts . A
brain scan can be enjoyed aesthetically, but in a hospital setting its fun ct ional
use as evide nce fo r pa th ology is paramount, r equiring speci alised
in ter pr etati ve skills. Each of the various do ma ins of images de ser ves study
in its own r ight as well as an aspect of the network of rel ation s that
constitute image cult ur e . Moreover, th e interdisciplinary study of ima ge
culture must also b e historical an d compar ative. W hat is the ju stification
for con sidering it more imag istic than previous cult ures? Ho w have the
ro les of images changed ove r tim e, suc h as in r elat ion to other modes of
sign ification (Debray, 13.4)? 0 ne of the central them es of this bsook is how
images have b een discussed and contested from some o f the first writings
on the subject to the pr esent day. Th e study of im age cult ure entails a
histor y of the past as well as of th e pr esen t.

art and ar t history, traditi on ally divided betwe en eit her aesthetic or social
and cultural history enquiry. Even to day those bes t suited to understand
images in th e broader sens e h ave been those trained in pr actical cr itic ism
th e stud y of ar t, for example, sitting so me where b et we en theory and
practice . The capaci ty of ar t history and criticism to d eal with im ages of all
sor ts has also b een enhanced by cat ering for a far gr eater co mp lex ity
of ar tistic production and performance , including those using new
te chn ologies . It is thus n ot surpr ising th at two of the pioneers of image
studies nam ed abo ve ar e ar t hist orians. Elkins ( 1999), for exa mp le , has
called int o question th e w ho le ' doma in of images ' by app lying cr itical and
analytical tools to 'non-art' images. Stafford (1996) ur ges art history to re
inve nt itself as 'i maging studies ' . Ar t hist ory as it sta nds currently, she
sugges ts, is t oo na r row a base from w hich to st udy all th e rel ati ves within
a 'fa mily of im ages'. It is soo n appare nt, for exa m p le, th at Stafford 's
interests in cognitive scien ce and computer scr eens, through which she
aims to demon strate th e 'i ntelligence o f sight ' , cannot he containe d , or
susta ined, by her ho me discipline.

Anoth er motivation for com piling thi s volume is to array the discur sive
apparatus required for th e study of images. In this respect, we have been
influence d most immediately by th ose w rite rs we have gath ered together
under the heading ' Image Studi es' (Section 13), especially W J.T. Mitchell ,
Jame s Elkins and Barbara Mari a Stafford . The Reader aims bo th to define th e
interdisciplinary field of' image studies' and create the discursive conditions for
making ima ge studies a reality. In presenting a selection of key read ing s across
the domains of phil osophy, art, literature, science, critical the or y and cultu ral
studies, the Readertells the story o f the image through intellec tual histo ry from
the Bible to the present. By including both well-established writings and more
recent and inn ovative research , the Reader outlines the specific dev elopments
of the forms of discourses about images eme rging today.

Given that there is already a relatively esta blished int erdiscipl inar y area of
visual studi es, and given th at even the scholar s mentioned above do not
un equivo cally call for th e institution alisation of image st udies or a clear
di fferenti ation from visual culture (Elkins, 2003: 7), w hy is th ere a need for
yet ano ther new acade mic field? Mit chell 's (1986) plea for the reviv al of
ico nology as the study of all members of the family of images op ens the door
t o a truly rnulti -disciplin ar v approach t o the subject that transcends th e
strictur es of ar t history. It is clear from his inclusion of p er cep tual, mental
and verbal images in th e famil y of image ~ that th e interdiscipl inarv st udy of
images is n ot to be und er stood as co nce r ned sole ly with the narrower
concepts such as 'vision' and 'visualitv ' : Image studies thereby marks itself
out fro m the recent growth in visual cultur al studies, which wo rks largely
from within a cultural studies perspecti ve (Evan s and Hall , J 999; Mirzoeff,
1998 ) . In our fram ework , visual cultural studies can be sub sumed into a
Wider frame of analy sis and critical p erspective, though not all of its
practices should b e welcom ed un cr itically. For exa mple , Elkins (20 0 3: 83)
suggest s that ' visual im ages might not always be th e optima l place to look
for signs of gender, identity, politics, and the other qu est ions that ar e of
in terest to scho lar s'.Th e interdisciplinar y study of ima ges turns to a broader
set of perspect ives fro m w hich to ex plor e the purported 'pi ct ori al turn '
identified by Mitchell ( 1994: 1 1).The perceived predominance of th e visual
is, in thi s light , exa mi ned as bo th an object of enquiry - a visual culture op en
to interpre tati on - and cq ua llv as a perspect ive of enquiry.

Each of th e pion eers in thi s incipie nt , inte r disciplinary fiel d has pr ovided
th e impetus to reconsider how, why, and in rel ation to wh at we might
exa mi ne and und er stand images. Th ey con sider wh at demarcates th e field
of im ages , th e historical, social and cult ura l complex es th at image s r eveal
and w hat ro le ima ges can play in th e broa der in terests of thought and
crit ique . Th ere is an overriding concern among th ese and oth er writers in
the field to do justice to im ages, rather than treat them r eductively through
the twin orientations of ico no ph obia and iconophilia - th e hatred or love of
images, respecti vely. This entails an effo rt to understand images in their
ow n t er ms and to allow for th e many differe nt types of imag es. As a re sult,
the interdisciplinary study of images is not r estricted t o a single
theor isation .Th e Reader- thro ugh its variety of entri es - therefore ex plores
differe n t contexts and m ethod ologies.
Th e need fo r an interdisciplinary st udy of im ages is dicta ted by th e
limitations of th e current disciplines and multidiscipli nary arrangements ,
particularly by th e division bet ween the scie nces and th e hUl:l anit ics. By
and lar~e , im ag e s have be en st udied ac aclcmicailv thr ough the dISCiplines of

A t th e r isk of esta blishing an overl y ant,!-gonist ic rela tionship with visual

.~ t u d i cs , w(~ offer so me further just ificatio n for the distinct de velo pme nt of

im age stud ies. T he usage of visual culture to refer t o all t.ypes of im ages and
imag e culture is a featur e of the 'p ictllralising of the do m ain -of
all aspe cts
imagc/ th at has 'continued inexorably till the full spectr um of invisible -and
inn er-bo dily images were mo del led on , or reconceived in pictorial te r ms'

or

G ENER AL INTRODUCTION : 7

6 : IMAGES

(Van D en Berg , 2004: 10) . The colonis atio n o f the im age catego ries by
visual or pictorial ones is not an innocent process but one that expresses an
ideology of ocularcentrism that privileges vision above oth er senses, enn obling
vision with the authority of knowledge of and power over th at w hich is
seen . Similarly to Romanvshyn (8.4), Van Den Berg argues tha t Western
culture is deeply implicated with ocularcentric id eology, through practices
and institutions such as the invention of perspective in realistic visual
representation, detached, objectifying scientific observation, Panoptical
social surveillance, and in short all asp ects of the 'gaze ' . Even if this
argument is exaggerated or even unfounded, some explanation is required
for th e tendency of visual meanings of the word image to colonise the
others, as if a mental image is an obj ect looked at in the m ind, or as if an
idea must conjur e up a picture. Image st udies r esists th e 'pictur alising ' of
images (or even the visuali sing of the invisible ) because it is inappropriate
to conside r all for m s of images as if they are visu al.
An exa m ple that illustrates the sign ificance of the distincti on between visual
im ages o r pictures and non -visual images is Susan Sontag's (20 04) essay on
th e photographs of the torture of Abu Ghraib pri son ers. Th e ph otographs
a re undoubtedly pictures of e no r m ous politic al import an ce . The
pred ominant trope of Sontag's essay is nicely sum med up by th e first-p age
subhea ding : ' Susan Sontag on th e real m eanin g of th e Abu Ghraib pictures ' ,
Sontag treats the pictures to a p olitical hermeneutic, arg uing that 'complex
cr imes of leadership, policies and auth ori ty [are] r evealed by th e pictures'.
By looking at the pictures, Sontag can r ead the p athologies of US po litical
power and socio-cultural existence.

Sontag's essay, though, is as much abou t w hat th e photogl"aphs do, or she

would like them to do, as what they reveal or mean. First, she notes that
photographs have accrued 'an insuperable power to determine what people
recall of events'. Despite the Pentagon's planning, th en, these pictures of
torture would stick in people's minds as much as , sa)', the contrived
toppling of Saddam Hussein's statue . Sec ond, they ' tarnish and besmirch the
reputation - that is the imag e - of Am erica'. Bush w as 'so r ry that people
seeing these pictures didn't understand th e tr ue nature o f th e American
heart', while Rumsfeld worried abou t th e reputat ion of the US armed
forces 'who are courageo usly an d respon sibly and professionally protecting
our freedoms across the globe' . Sontag repo rts that th e Bush admi nistrat ion
principally deplored th e dam age d one to America 's image by th e pictures .
Th ere is an importan t di stinction between the visua l im ages , the
photographs that have poli tical meanings an d effects, and the political
im age, or reputation th at is affec te d . While there are ce rtainly visual aspe cts
to w hatever image of Amer ica Bush and Rumsfeld we re co ncer ned about
(t he flag, an apple pie, George Washington 's face , th e Statue of Liberty),
these pictures ar e not en ough to capt ure the concepts of lTeedom and
democracy that they so often invoke. An aspect of livin g in VIsual .culture is
that th ere are so m any visual associa tions even for such abstract Ideas, hut
th ey do not provide the com p lete picture .

Having said th at, th er e is considerable ove rlap between image studies and
th e more thou gh tful fo r ms of visual stud ies. Im age studies in an extensive
and inclu sive sense m ight be achieved by following what Elkins (200 3: 7)
sugge sts need s to be risked for a futur e visual stud ies, w hich he de scribes as
a kind of ' unconstricted , un anthropolo gical int erest in vision' , an inter est
that, im por tan tly, can go beyond any 'niche in the humanities'. Elkins
advocates that th e current remit of visual studies 'b e el'en more general,
welcoming scientists from vario us disciplines, moving beyond premodern
Western visuality and into non-Western art, archaeology, and the visual
elements of linguistics ' (p, 41). This conception of visual studies accords for
the most part with our vision for imag e studies. Yet, whilst Elkins refers to
an extremely broad 'image domain ' , his account is still vel"Y much attached
to what h e describes as 'a love for the visual world' (p. viii). We add to th at
a 'love' of othe r kinds of images in the broad , complex family . We do not
propose a disc ipline of image studies as a 'ma ster science'. The current
excitement (and co ntinued co ncer n) abo ut imag es will perhaps temper and
be better sustained as an underlying inter est or condition, rath er than a
disciplin e. And th e ' condition' of image studies will gain greater de pth
th rough inter disciplinary understanding and dialogue .

HOW TO USE THE READER

Th e Reader is divid ed into three parts, w ith a total of 13 separa te sec tions .
Each sec tio n is preceded by a shor t introduction , which explains th e
significance of the section for image studi es, as well as the major theoreti cal
co ncepts, m ain themes and co ntentiou s issue s in the section. Paragraph s on
each sel ection sh ow how they r elate to the understanding of images and
some of th e m or e gene ra l them es traced by individual writers. We also r efer
within th ese introduction s to connections with selections from other
secti on s, so that the threads of debates focused in one section can be
followed beyond it. 'vVe also dra-w attention to some texts that we were
unabl e to include for rea sons of space, so that the short bibliographie s th at
app ear at the end of th e int roduction to each section can be used for funher
resear ch . Also, included below, are four alternative tables of contents.While
the Reader neither advocates any particular thcorisation of imag es nor m akes
any gene ra l overriding po int abo ut the meaning of im ages, it is possible to
discern some recurr ing th em es and tropes that resonate today. We have
attem pted to r eflect these views in the str u ct ur e /sj of thi s bo ok . T he
selectio ns th at we have ma de fall into three m ajor parts.
Par t O ne, Historical and Philosophical Precedents , se ts th e
backg round for co nte m por ary de bates abo ut images. Images have always
played a central role in helping t o define social order s, from the cave
paintings of l.ascaux, Chauvet and Alt ami ra, to th e pedagogical frescos in
m ed iaeval church es and the iconog r aphy of militar y regim ~s . Before
assuming that co ntem porarv, culture is mor e prcd o m ina nrlv, an imac0 e
cult ure than other and previous cu lt ur es, more hist ori cal r eflection is
required on what images meant in and to past societies. Some of the

S: I M A G E S

readings in this part introduce major theore tical app roaches to im ages
cove re d in the seco nd part, notabl y Marx (2.3, 2 .4 ) fo r ideology critiq ue
(Section 3) and Fre ud (2 .8) for p sychoanalysis (Section 7).
Mor e significant ly, th ough , th ese sele ction s indi cat e the extent to 'which
attitudes expressed th ou sands and hundred of years ago still fram e cur rent
de bates about im ages. As th e introduct ion to Secti on 1 exp lains , th e
antagonism to im ages, or iconophobia, expressed in the rejection of idolatr y
is still prevalen t tod ay. Mitchell ( 1994: 15) claims that the re is a paradox
p eculi ar to the contempo ra ry 'pict or ial turn' :
On The one hand, It seems so overwh elmmglv obvious that the era of video and cyber net ic
technolog)', the age of electro nic r epro duction , has developed new fo rms or visual
sti mulation and illusionism w ith unprece dented power, On th e other hand , the fear of the
image, (he an xiet) that the ' P OWt;T of images' may finally destroy even their cre ator, and
manipulator s, is as old as image-making itself.

In other word s, we are both fascinated by the seemin gly pervasive power of
these new im ages, yet, at th e same time, br ing age-old fear s to the deb at e
abo ut their mean ing, Man ifestati on s of icon ocl asm can thus be found not
only in the first sectio n , bu t also in contemporar y cu ltural ana lysis (Debo rd ,
3,2 ; Baudr illard , 3, 3) and science (Cal ison, 10 .5) . In a sim ilar way, ea rlier
conceptions abo ut th e forms of tho ught, ideas and me nta] image s in th e
mind, as well as the relati on between mind and bod v (Aristotle , 1.7 ;
Descar t es I . 12, 1, 13; Locke, J. J4 ; Kan t , 2 . I ) have had an eno r mous
influen ce o n later and co nte mpo ra ry psychol ogical and cognitive theories
(M crleau -Pon tv, 6 ,2; Sar trc, 6 .3; Dufrenne 6.4; Dam asio , 9 .2; Ze ki, 12. 5) .
Part Two, on Th eories of Images, provides key texts of the major
approaches through which images have been conceptualised in th e twen tieth
century and beyond . Ideology critique is not so much a theoreti cal perspective
itself as an offshoo t of Marxism that can he understood, as it is by Mit che ll
( 1986), as an icon oclastic for m of icon ology, one which is particularly suit ed
to cri ticism of th e images of mass, con sum er, popul ar cultur e. Ar t histor y is
also a discipline , rath er than a Single th eoretical approach, but its own sense of
crisis about its cur re nt pertine nce has prov ide d m uch of th e impe tus for
establishing image studies , Moreover, its practi ces of aesthetic ju dgement ,
close attention to detail , elaborati on of histori cal and contextual issues and its
variety of interpretative techniques are invaluable to any conception of im age
st udies. Semiotics, as the study, or even science, of signs has made the
strongest claims to holding th e key for und erstandi ng both visual and lingujst ic
signs , but its amb itious scope and scientific aspirations have been challenged.
Phenom enology is philosophically rooted , focusing on the conscio us and
un consciou s percep tion and ex perience of images, while also pr o\-iding
inSights for sci en t ific , cognitive approaches to images. Psychoanalysis'
scientific claim s are hotly co n tested, but that has not di mini shed its reputation
for acute analysis of the illlco nscious processes at work in makin g and
in tc r pn ':ting images, pa rtscular lv of subjectivity.

GE N E RA L I NTROD UCTION : 9

Part Three, Image Culture, intr-oduces some of the more recent debates
abo ut im ages and today's visual e nvironment. Th e de bate abo ut the relativ e
value of wo rds and im ages, language and pict ur es easily escalates into fierce
dispute s abo ut the ration al, cog niti ve and aesthetic value of each m ode of
signific ation. Sim ilarly, deb ates abo ut the linguistic or imagisti c character of
hu man thought, particul arly cog nitive and critical thinking, are often heat ed
and loaded . Thi s brings us to some of th e issues pr evalent in contem porary
image culture . One feature of such culture is the shee r power, scop e and
diversity of image pr odu cti on, insti tutions and techn iques. 'vVe cover same
o f this di ver sit y in readings fro m scientists, philosophers of scien ce and
tec hnology and various image-makers in Section 10 . In Section 11 th e
r eadings address diffe rent aspects of visual cult ur e as well as approac hes for
understa nding the sign ificanc e of differ ent visual pr actices and experiences .
A key feature of visual cultura l studies has been analvsis of visualitv as th e
cu lt~ra l, historical and socio-political shaping of visio n. As ~ve ll as
identi fying the social im pact of different forms of visua lity, the se analyses
lead into de bates about the cult ural relativism and cu ltur al constr uction of
vision. Th e Reader closes with selections from the three pioneers of image
studies , mentioned above , as well as others w hose work esta blishes
frameworks for image studies.
We re cognise that tables of conte nts and introdu ctions, no m att er how
short, can carry too much authori ty in setting o ut an ap proa ch . We have,
th er efore, also pr ovided alte rnative tables of contents to pave th e way for
other po ssible readi ngs and constellations of texts , as alternat ive ways to
approach the sele ctions in this Reader and as alte r nati ve frameworks for
consider ing images. In listin g the r eadings und er different headings , we have
erred on the side of inclusivene ss, in the spir it of allowing connections to
emerge from the read ing rath er th an being imposed from abo ve by th e
structure of th e volum e ,

Fo r alternative tabl es of co nten ts, see pages 10-17.

GE NER AL I N T R O D U C T I O N : I I

I CY I M A GES

Table 1

Theoretical approaches to the analysis of Images

Th eoretical approaches to th e
analysis of images
Marxi st id eology cr itique

Disciplines dealing with images

-Disciplines de aling with images

Relevant readings

Rele van t readings

- - - - - - - - -- - -- - - - Marx and Engels (2.3) , Marx (2.4) , A dorno (3. 1),

Debord (3.2). Jame son (3.4) , Benjamin (9.6),
Berg er (9.7)

Non-Marxist ide ology critique

Gilroy (3.5), Bordo (3.6) , Kress & van Leeuwen (5.5) ,

Lacan (7.1), Met z (7.2) , Mulvey (7.3), Rom any shyn
(8.4), Sontag (11 .3) , lury (11 .6) , Chen g (11.7), Dyer
(12 .3), Mitch ell (13. 1)

Psyc hoanalysis

Freud (2.8), Adorno (3.1), Lacan (7.1), Metz (7.2),

Mu lvey (7.3), Co pjec (7 .4), Ehre nzw eig (7.5).
Roman yshyn (8.4), Krauss (12.2)

Sem ioti cs

rable 2

Baudrillard (3.3), Gilroy (3.5), Sa ussu re (5. 1), Peirce

(5.2) , Bar thes (5.3) , Bal (SA ), Kress & van Leeuwen
(5.5) , Lacan (7.1), Metz (7.2) , Deluca (8.5), Berger

Art and art history

Plato (1.5) , Lessing (2.2), Panolsky (4 .1),

Gombri ch (4.2) , Alpers (4.3) , Buck-Morss (4.4) ,
Bal (SA), Heidegger (6. 1), Merleau-Ponty (6.2) ,
Lacan (7.1), Copjec (7.4) , Ehrenzweig (7.5),
Foucault (8.3). Klee (10 .1), (William) Mitcheil
(10 .3), Hackney (10 .4), Danto (11.4), Krauss
(12.2), Elkins (13.2) , Stafford (13.3)

Architecture

Lynch (11.2)

Film studies

Ba rthe s (5.3) , Metz (7.2), Mu lvey (7 .3), Copjec

(7.4), Deleuze (9.5) , Eisen stein (10.2), Dyer (12.3)

Cultu ral, co mmunication and

me dia studies

Ad orno (3.1), Debord (3 .2) , Baudrillard (3.3) ,

Jam eson (3.4), Gilroy (3.5), Bordo (3.6), Saussure
(5.1), Peirce (5.2), Barthes (5 .3), Kress and van
Leeuwen (5.S), Lacan (7.1) , Metz (7.2), Mulvey
(7 .3), Copj ec (7.4) , Romanyshyn (8.4), DeLuca
(8.5), Deleuze (9.5) , Benjamin (9.6), Berger (9.7),
Eisenstein ( t 0.2), (Willi am ) Mitchell (10 .3),
McLuh an (n .u, Sontag (11.3), Dante (11.4),
Grieve (11.5), Lur y (11.6), Dyer (12.3), Jay (12.4) ,
Debray (13.4), Latour (13.5)

Visual culture studies

Debord (3.2), Bo rdo (3.6), Al pers (4.3), Buck

Morss (4.4) , Barthe s (5 .3) , Ba l (5 .4), K ress and
van L eeuwen (5.5) , Ihde (6.5), Lacan (7.1) , Metz
(7 .2), Mulvey (7.3) , Copjec (7.4), Foucault (8.3),
Rom anyshyn (8.4) , DeLuca (8.5) , Deleuze (9.5) ,
Berger (9 .7), Hockney (1OA), Galison (10 .5) ,
Lyn ch (11.2) , Sontag (11.3), Danto (11.4), Gr ieve
(1 1.5) , Lury (11.6), Cheng ( 11.7), Cra ry (12.1),
K rauss (12.2) , Dye r (12 .3), Jay ( 12.4), Mitch ell
(13. t ), Elk ins (13.2) , Staff ord (13.3), Debray
(13.4), Latour (13.5)

Neu roscience

Damasio (9.2), Zeki (12 .5)

Science studies

Ihde (6.5), Gal ison (10.5), Latour (13 .5)

Historical studles

Alp ers (4.3) , Benjamin (9.6) , Crary (12 .1)

Literary stud ies

Ari stotl e (t .6), Less ing (2.2) , Saussure (5.1), Bal

(5 ,4), Fenollesa (8.1), Rico eur (8.2), Proust (9.3) ,
L e boeuff (9.4)

Anth ropology and sociology

Marx and Engels (2.3 ), Marx (2.4) , Debord (3.2),

Baudrillard (3.3), Gilroy (3.5) , Kress and van
Leeu wen (5 .5) , Sontag (11.3), Gr ieve ~1 1 .5), lury
(11.6) , Dyer (12.3), Jay (12.4), Debrsy (13.4)

(9.7)
Aesth etic value analysis

Plato (1 .5 ), Less ing (2.2), Panofsky (4 .1) , Gombrich

(4.2). Alpers (4.3), Ba rth es (5.3), Bal (5.4), Heidegger
(6.1), Merleau-Ponty (6.2), Ehren zwe ig (7.5),
Fenollosa (8.1), Hockne y (10.4), Danto (11.4) , Elkins
(13.2), Stafford (13.3)

Feminism/ Gender studie s

Bordo (3.6), MUlvey (7.3), Copjec (7.4), Lury (11.6) ,

Che ng ( 11.7)

Postcolonialism and race

Gilroy (3.5) , Lury (11.6) , Dye r (12.3)

Table I list s selections acco r ding to theoretical or methodological

approaches to im ages that are not treated in separat e sections in Part Two ,
while also indi cating which selec tions could also be includ ed in th ose
sections bu t ar e locat ed elsewher e. Int erested r eaders can th us choose to
re ad as a set th e selections pertinent to aesth etic value analy sis (the
ju dgem ent of im ages according to aesth etic cr iter ia) , femi nism and gende r
stu dies , post colonial theory and critical race studies .

(Co ntinue d)

GENERAL IN TRODUCT ION : ! 3

12 : I M A G E S

Table 2

Table 3

(Continued)

(Continued)

Oisciplin es dealing with images

Relevan t rea dings

Types of imag es

Relevant readings

Philosophy

Plato (1.4 , 1.5), Aristotle (1.6, 1.7), Ho bbes (1.11),

Descar tes (1.12 ,1.13), Locke (1.14), Kant (2.1),
Marx and Engels (2.3) , Marx (2.4) , Nietzsche
(2.5), Bergson (2.7), Heidegger (6.1) , Merleau
Ponty (6.2), Sartre (6.3), Dufrenne (6.4), Ihde
(6.5), Wittgenslein (9.1), Le Doeu fl (9.4), Del euze
(9.5), Benjamin (9.6), Danto (1 1.4)

3.D artefacts (sculptures

McLuhan (1 t.1), Lynch ( t 1.2), Gr ieve (11 .5)

History of psychology

Hobbes (1.11), Descartes (1.12, 1.13) , Locke

(1.14), Kan t (2 .1), Bergson (2.7), Freud (2.8),
Merleau-Ponty (6.2), Sartre (6.3)

Education

Buck-Morss (4 .4), Kress and va n Le euw en (5.5)

and buildings)
Optics

Plato ( 1.4), Descartes (1.13) , Marx and Engels

(2.3), lacan (7.1), Hockney (10.4 ). Crary (12.1) ,
Zeki (12.5) , Mitchell ( 13.1)

Verbal ima ges

Ar istotl e (1.7) . Lessing (2.2), Nietzsche (2.5, 2.6) ,

Sau ssur e (5.1) . Peirce (5 .2), Sal (5.4), Sartre
(6.3) , Fenollosa (8.1), Ricoeur (8.2), Fouc au lt
(8.3), Wittg enstein (9.1), Proust (9.3) , Le Doeufl
(9.4 ), Mitche ll (13 .1), Stafford ( 13.3)

Menta l imag es

Plato (1.4) . Aristotle (1.7) , Hobbes (1.11).

Descart es (1.12,1.13) , Locke (1.14). Kant (2.1),
Marx and Engels (2.3), Nietzsche (2.5), Bergson
(2.7), Freud (2.8) , Baudrillard (3.3) . Bordo (3.6).
Panofsky (4.1). Gomb rich (4.2) , Saussure (5.1),
Peirce (5.2). Sar tre (6.3) , Du frenne (6.4), lacan
(7.l), Metz (7.2), Ehrenzweig (7.5), Wittgen ste in
(9.1), Damasio (9.2), Prou st (9.3), Le Doeuff (9.4),
D eleuze (9.5), Benjamin (9.6), Be rger (9.7),
Mitchell (13 .1)

Perceptu al Ima ges

Plato (1.4, 1.5), Ar istotle (1.7) , Hobbes (1.11),

Descartes (1.12 ,1 .13) , locke (1.14), Kant (2. 1),
Mar x and Engels (2.3) , Bergson (2.7), Adorno
(3.1), Debord (3.2 ), Baudrillard (3.3), Jameson
(3.4), Gilroy (3.5), Bordo (3.6) , Panofsky (4.1),
Sau ss ure (5.1), Peirc e (5 ,2), Ba rthes (5.3), Bal
(5.4), Kress and van Le euwen (5.5) , Heidegger
(6 .1), Me rlea u-Ponty (6.2) , Sartre (6.3) , Dufrenne
(6 .4) , Ihde (6.5) , Lacan (7.1) , Metz (7.2), Mulvey
(7 .3) , Copjec (7.4), Ehren zweig (7.5), Romanyshyn
(8 .4), Deluca (8.5) , Wittgenstein (9.1), Damasio
(9.2), Deleuze (9.5), Berg er (9.7 ). Eisenstein
( t 0.2), Hockney (10 .4), McLuhan (11 .1), Lynch
(11.2), Sontag (11.3), Danto (11.4) , Grieve (11.5),
Lury (11.6), Cheng (11 .7), Krauss (12.2) , Dyer
(12.3), Mitchell (13.1) , St affo rd (13 .3)

Icons, idols , symbo ls and

logos

Genesis (1.1), Exodus (1,2), Midrash Rabbah (1.3).

Iconodules and Iconoclasts in Byzantium (1.8, 1.9,
1.10), Hobbes (1.11), Marx (2.4), Freud (2.8),
Jameson (3.4) , Panolsky (4.1), Saussure (5.1), Peirce
(5.2),lhde (6.5), Fenollosa (8.1), Foucault (8.3),
McLuhan (11.1), Lynch (11.2), Danto (11.4), Grieve
(11.5). L.ury (11.6), Mitchell (13.1), Latour (13.5)

Table 2 lists selections according to the academic disciplin es to which

t hey belong or within which they are likely to be read . The categor ies in this
table should be self-explanatory, but as several selections appear un der more
than one heading, the interdisciplin ar y nature of image stud ies is highlighted.
Table 3

Types of images

Types of images

Relevant rea dings

Draw ing and illustration

Kress and va n Leeuwen (5.5), Ehrenzweig (7.5),

Benjamin (9.6), Klee (10.1), Hockn ey (10 .4),
Krauss (12 .2), Elkins (13 .2)

Paintings

Plato (1.5), Less ing (2.2). Panofsky (4.1) .

Gombrich (4.2), Alpers (4.3), Bal (5.4), He id egger
(6.1), Mer leau -Ponty (6.2) , Lac an (7. 1), Foucault
(8.3), Hockn ey (10.4). Danto (11.4), Elkins (13.2)

Pho tog raphs (chemical)

Barthss (5.3) , Copjec (7.4), Berg er (9.7 ), Hockne y

( 10.4 ), So nta g ( 11.3), Crary (12.1) . Dyer (12 .3)

TV

Adorno (3.1), Ro man yshyn (8.4) . DeLu ca (8 ,5),

Dyer (12.3)

Film

Barthes (5.3) , Mulvey (7.3) , Cop jec (7.4 ), Deleuze

(9.5 ), Eisenstein (10.2). Dyer (1 2.3), Jay (12 .4)

Magazine, newspaper
and sti lt ads

Gilro y (3.5), Bordo (3.6), Danto (1 1.4), Lury (1 t .6)

Com pu ter screen im age s

(intern el)

(W illiam) Mitchell (10 .3) , Hackney (10 .4), Stafford

(13.3), Deb ray (13.4)

Scientific Images (incl.

human sciences)

Kress an d van Leeuw en (5. 5), Ihde (6.5), Damas io

(9 .2), Hackn ey (l OA ), Gali son (10.5) , Zek l (12.5),
_ _ _ _ __
E_l
kins (13 .2), Staff ord (13.3), Latoll r (13 .5)

Table 3 lists selectio ns according to t he type of image discussed . H~wever,

as men t i on e d above, no particular typology of j 111age~ . is satisf<1ctory fo r
all issues and approaches . In add ition to th e t ypes of Image includ ed in
Mitch e lJ's ( 13.1 ) fa mily tree, we have categor ised selections acco rclin p to

GENERAL INTRODUCTION : 15

14 ; IMAGES

Table 4

Tabl e 4

Issues and debates in image studies

Issues and debates in image

studies

Issues and debates in image

studies

Relevant readings

Contemporary culture as image

culture (hyper-reality, media
and science images )

Adorno (3.1), Debord (3 ,2), Baudri llard (3.3),

Jameson (3.4), Bordo (3,6), Buck-Morss (4.4), Bal
(5.4), Kress and van Leeuwen (5.5), Ihde (6.5),
Copjec (7 .4), Foucault (8.3), Romanyshyn (8.4),
Deluca (8.5), Damasio (9.2), Berger (9.7), Galison
(10.5), Mcluhan (11.1), Sontag (11.3), Danto
(11.4), Lury (11.6), Cheng (11.7), Crary (12.1),
Krauss (12.2), Dyer (12.3), Jay (12.4), Mitchell
(13.1), Elkins (13.2), Stafford (13.3), Debray
(13.4), Latour (13.5)

Tension between word and

Image (Iogosphere/videosphere)

Plato (1.4), Lessing (2.2), Nietzsche (2.6),

Saussure (5.1), Bal (5.4), Kress and van Leeuwen
(5.5), Fenollosa (8.1), Ricoeur (8.2), Foucault
(8.3), Romanyshyn (8.4), Deluca (8.5),
Witlgenstein (9.1), Le Doeuff (9.4), Benjam in (9.6),
Galison (t 0.5), Grieve (11,5), Jay (12.4), Mitchell
(13.1), Stafford (13.3), Debray (13.4), Latour (13.5)

Visual semiotics and rhetoric

(verbal interpretation of the
visual)

Power of images (iconophobia,

ideology critique, political
images)

(Con tin ued)

Gilroy (3.5), Bordo (3.6), Panofsky (4.1), Gombr ich

(4.2), Alpers (4.3), Buck Morss (4.4), Saussurs
(5.1), Peirce (5.2), Barthes (5.3), Bal (5.4), Kress
and van Leeuwen (5.5), Heidegge r (6.1), Merleau
Ponty (6.2), Ihde (6.5), lacan (7.1), Metz (7 ,2),
Mulvey (7,3), Copjec (7.4), Ehrenzweig (7.5),
Fenollosa (8.i ), Foucault (8.3), DeLuca (8.5),
Deleuze (9.5), Berger (9.7), Galison (10.5), Grieve
(1i .5), Lury (11.6), Dyer (12.3) , Elkins (13.2),
Stafford (13.3)
Genesis (i .1), Exodus (1.2), Midrash Rabbah
(i.3), Plato (1.4, 1.5), lconodules and Iconoclasts
in Byzantium (1.8, 1.9, 1.10), Hobbes
(1.11), Descartes (1.12), Marx and Engels (2.3),
Marx (2.4), Adorno (3.1), Debord (3.2), Baudrillard
(3.3), Jameson (3.4), Gilroy (3.5), Bordo (3.6),
Barthes (5.3), Kress and van Leeuwen (5.5.),
Heidegge r (6.1), Lacan (7.1), Metz (7.2), Mulvey
(7.3), Copjec (7.4), Romanyshyn (8.4), Deluca
(8.5), le Doeuff (9.4), Deleuze (9.5), Benjamin
(9.6), Berger (9.7), McLuhan (11.t), Sontag (11.3),
Danto (t1.4), Grieve (11.5), Lury (11.6), Cheng
(11.7), Krauss (12.2), Dyer (12.3), Jay (i2.4),
Mitchell ( 13.1), Stafford (13.3), Debray (13.4),
Latour (i3.5)
(Cont inued)

Relevant readings

Relation of images to language

and thought

Plato (r .s), Aristot le (1.7), Hobbes (1.11),

Descartes (1.13), Locke (1.14), Kant (2.1),
Nietzsche (2.5, 2.6), Bergson (2.7), Freud (2.8),
Panofsky (4.1), Saussure (5.1), Peirce (5.2),
Barthes (5.3), Kress and van Leeuwen (5.5),
Heidegger (6.1), Merleau-Ponty (6.2), Sartre (6,3),
Dufrenne (6.4), Ihde (6.5), Lacan (7.1), Metz (7.2),
Mulvey (7.3), Copj ec (7.4), Ehrenzweig (7.5),
Fenoliosa (s.t), Ricoeur (8.2), Foucault (8.3),
Romanyshyn (8.4), DeLuca (8.5), Wittgensle in
(9.1), Damasio (9.2), Proust (9.3), Le Doeuff (9.4),
Deleuze (9.5), Benjamin (9.6), Berger (9.7), Klee
(10.1), Galison (10,5), Mcluhan (11.1), Grieve
(11.5), Cheng (11.7), Krauss (12.2), Mitchell
(13.1), Stafford (13.3), Debray (13.4), Latour (i3.S)

Relation of visual to other per

ceptual modes, auralityfmusic

Plato (1.S), Iconodules and Iconoclasts in

Byzantium (1.8,1.9,1.10), Lessing (2.2), Bergson
(2.7), Barthes (5.3), Romanyshyn (8.4), DeLuca
(8.5), Damasio (9.2), Proust (9.3), Eisenstein
(10.2), McLuhan (11.1), Debray (13.4)

Scopic regimes, techniques

of visibility

Debord (3.2), Gilroy (3.5), Alpers (4.3), Barthes

(5.3), Bal (5.4), Metz (7.2). Mulvey (7.3), Copjec
(7.4), Ehrenzweig (7.5), Romanyshyn (8.4),
Deleuze (9.5), Eisenste in (10.2), (William) Mitchell
(10.3), Hockney (10.4), Galison (10.5), McLuhan
(11.1), Lynch (11.2). Grieve (11.5), Lury (11.6)
Crary (12.1), Krauss (12.2), Dyer (12.3), Debray
(13.4)

What IS an image? (object,

way of seeing, physical
perception)

Genesis (1.1), Plato (1.4), Aristotle (i.7) ,

Iconodules and Iconoclasts in Byzantium (1.8, 1.9,
1.10), Hobbes (1.11), Descartes (1.13), Locke
(1.14), Kant (2.1), Marx (2.4), Nietzsche (2.6),
Bergson (2.7), Freud (2.8), Baudriilard (3.3),
Jameson (3.4), Panofsky (4.1), Gombrich (4.2),
Peirce (5.2), Barthes (5.3), Heidegger (6.1),
Merleau-Ponty (6.2), Sartre (6.3), Dufrenne (6.4),
Ihde (6.5), Lacan (7.1), Copjec (7.4), Ehrenzweig
(7.5), Foucault (8.3), Wittgenste in (9.1), Damasio
(9.2), Proust (9.3), Le Doeuff (9.4), Deleuze (9.5),
Benjamin (9.6), Klee (10.1), Lynch (11.2), Krauss
(12.2), Mitchell (i3.1), Elkins (13.2), Stafford
(13.3), Debray (13.4), Latour (13.5)
(Continued)

'o : IMAGES

Table 4

G E NE R AL I NTROD U CT I ON : 17

(Continued)

Issues and debates in image

stud ies
Theories as images

per ceivin g th e world and im ages. The rea dings under this heading r elate to
tha t sense of theori sing.
Relevant readings
Exodus (1.2), Midrash Rabbah (1.3), Plato (1.4),
Iconodules and Iconoclasts in Byzantium (1.8, 1.9,
1.10), Hobbes (1.11), Descartes (1.13) , Locke
(1 .14), Kant (2.1) . Marx and Engels (2.3), Marx
(2.4), Nietzsche (2.5), Adorno (3.1), Debord (3.2),
Jameson (3.4) , Gilroy (3.5). Bordo (3.6), Gombrich
(4.2), Barthes (5.3), Bal (5.4). Ihde (6.5), lacan
(7.1), Metz (7.2). Mulvey (7.3) . Ricoeur (8,2),
Romanyshyn (8.4), Wittg enstein (9,1). Le Doeuff
(9.4), Deleuze (9.5), Benjamin (9.6), Berger (9.7),
Kl ee (10.1), Eisenstein (10.2) , Galison (10.5),
McLuhan (11.1), Lynch (11.2), Sontag (11.3),
Danto (11.4). Grieve (11.5). Lury (11.6) , Cheng
(11.7), Krauss (12.2), Dyer (12.3), Mitchell (13.1),
Stafford (13.3). Debray (13.4)

Tabl e 4 lists selec t ions accor ding to issu es an d d ebates in image

studies. Some of the headings her e includ e fuller listings of selections
relevant to issues and debat es iden tified in Par t Three of the r ead er, notably
Secti on 8 on relations betw een wor ds an d im ages, and Section 9 on rel ation s
between images and thought. Th e category on conte m porar y image culture
incl udes read ings that bo th characte rise contemporar y cult ur e as an ima ge
cultur e an d explore differ en t aspects of it. Th e ' visual sem iot ics or rh etoric '
head ing covers sel ections that addre ss th e fra ught qu esti on , discussed in the
int roduction to Sec tion 5, of w hether particular modes of ana lysis can work
for both lingui stic and i m agi ~ti c (or visual) signs and r epr esentations . Th e
catego ry about th e power of images expands the discu ssion on icon ophobia
(in the introduction to Sec tion 1) and ideology crit ique (Section 3) to cover
the range of readin gs that addre ss the p o,ver that images are said to have
over our minds and in establishing or legitimising social power relations .
aile of th e m ain doub ts about th e p ertin en ce of char ac ter ising
cont em po rar y culture as visual cult ure is that so ma ny of its featu res are
m ultimedia, normally includi ng sound. Th e rel ation be tween visuality and
auralitv, as we ll as other senses and mod es of per ception o f im ages, is
the refor e covered by anothe r head ing. Visu ality, th e mod e of seeing and
lookin g , is not uni for m but, as discusse d in the introduct ion to Sect ion 12,
is orga nised by vary ing ' sco pic regim es' or techniques of rend ering visible ,
readings abo ut whic h are also liste d un d er that heading.T he vexed question
of how to define or conceive im ages also deser ves its O V.rr1 category, w hic h
includes readings pointing to som e clear differences betwee n, for exam ple,
im ages as static or moving objects that are pr odu ced an d viewed , images as
human, ph ysical perceptions th at come from or with the ~c:t of VieWing, and
im age s that ar e not vlewcc l physically at all. Finally, the G n ' c:.k etymological
roots of th e word ' t h e m ')" refer to se c:ing , such that theori es are ways of

Vv'c arc, of cour se, aware of the ir ony of pr oducing a Reader about images,
especially as som e of the readings question the validity of analysing visual
im8ge~ verba lly. That we have done so is a reflection of the limitations of our
situation as scholars vvol'l<.i ng in th e humanities, wher e instruction and re search
are still largely conduct ed textu ally, even in fields such as visual culture. Were
we compiling a science t extbook, the budget might well have allowed for an
accompanying disk packed with visual images, th ough th e cost of copyright fo r
the medi a ima ges that are so pr evalent in image culture wo uld be prohibitive.
Our backgrollild in the hum anities also ex plains the limited range of disciplines
in Tahle 2. Elkins (2003) not es that the sciences tend to be far more visual as
disciplines than the hum aniti es, so the re is a wealth of academic visual material,
as well as a whole ser tes or issues about the imagistic character of scientifi c
theor ising, that we have barely tappe d in to . Like Elkins , our int er - or
transdisciplinar y am bitions for image studies include the stud), of image making
and interpretin g across the natural and social sciences as well as the huma nities.
We are also aware that the Reader deals predominantly with Weste rn image
culture and Wester n approaches to analysing images, espe cially regarding the
historical and philosophical backgro llild in Part O ne . No Single volum e could
do justice to the range and depth of writings on images.'vVe could not hop e to
map the ent ire territory of images, but we do hope that the Reader will open a
few new pathways for novi ces and professionals alike. Ov er all, thi s volum e sets
out a range of mat er ials that read ers can draw on and use in fashionin g th eir
own approach to image studies.

EDITING CONVENTIONS
Many of the texts chose n have bee n ed ited . Wher e we have cut words, we
have used ' . . . ' to indicate an omission of a few wo rd s within a sent ence ;
'[...J' eith er em bedde d in a paragraph , or appeari ng at th e beginning o r
end , to indicat e th e elision of a sentence or two of that paragraph; ' [.. .]' on
a new line to ind icat e th at anything from a paragraph t o mo re is missing; and
a centred '* ' t o ind icat e a signifi cant break in the text , the removal of a
subheading or chapte r.
We have also removed rnanv of th e footnotes to the texts chosen, which has
allowed us to incl ude m ore' sele ctions . We have oc casionally added our own
footnote s, w hich are identifi ed as such . Refer ences such as ' (Kant , 2. 1)' are
to sd ections in this volum e, giving th eir ordering accor ding to the sec tio n
In which they are located .

REFERENCES
BODTst in, D.J . ( 199 2) The Im G8 e: ,1 G" ide ro Pseudo-E vents in Am erica, 25th
'
anniversary edition. N e w York: Vintage: Books.
Elkins, J. ('19 99) The Domai n '!.j"JmascL Ithaca, NY: C ornell Un iversity P ress.
Elkins, J. (2003) Visua l Studies: A SkeptiCal l nt roduction , London: Routl edge.

18: I MAGE S

Evans , J. and Hall , S. (eds) ( 1999) Visual Culture:The Reader. London : Sage .

Klein , N. (2000) No Logo. Lond o n : Flam ingo.

,'VUr w d T, N. (ed .) ( 1998 ) Th e Visual Culture Reader. Lond on : Rou tl edge .

Mitchell , W ].T. ( 1986) lconoloqy: lmaqe, Text, Ideology. Chicago : Universit y of

Chicago Pr ess.

Mitche ll, w.J. T. (1 994) Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation ,

Chicago : Univer sity of Chicago Press.

Scammell, M . (1995) Designer Poluics: H ow Elecuons are Won. New York:

St Martin 's Press.

Sontag, S. (2004) 'What have we done?' , The Gua rdian , G2 section , 24 May.

pp. 2- 5.

Stafford, B. ( 1996) Good LookIng: Essays on the Virtue if' lmages. Cambridge, MA:

MIT Pr ess.

Van D en Berg , D. (2004) ' W hat is an image and what is im age power ?' . lmaq e

and N arrati ve, 8 ( May) Published o n -line at www.imagea nd na r rative .

be/ issue081dirkvandenbergh .htm

W ittgenstein, L. ( 195 8) Ph ilosophical Investigations, 3rd edn, 0'. G.E.M .

Anscorn bc, New York: Macmillan.

PART O N E

HISTORICAL &, PH ILOSOPHICAL

PRECEDENTS

~l

FROM GENESIS TO LOCKE

INT RO D U C T IO N
I: I
I: 2

G rave n Im ages

1:3

Abraha m and the Idol Sho p of H is Fath er Terah

1:4

The Sim ile of the Cave

1:5

Art and Ill usio n

Pleto

1:6
I: 7

Exodus 20: 4-6

Mkiresh Rsbbeh, Noah, Portion 38, Section 73

Pleto

Th e O rig i ns of Im itatio n

Aristotle
Th in ki ng w ith Im ages

Aristotle

1:8

Jo h n of Damasc us

1:9

H oros at N icaea , 787 AD

I: 10

Heros at N iera, 754 AD

I: I I

Man Created in God's Im age

Genesis 7: 26 and 27

lmage and Idol atry

Thoma s Hobbes

I: 12

Evi l D em o n

I: 13

O ptics

I: 14

Of Ideas
John Locke

Rene Descarles
Rene Descartes

Current debates about the meaning, interpretation and status of images are
based on a rich and complex hi story dat ing from the beginning of writing in
the W est. M any of these early arguments h a ~e for med the basis for a great deal
of writi ng on images dow to the present time. Kno.w ledge of this tradit ion is,
therefore, crucial for understandi ng what kind of. issues are at stake in talking
about images.
Tw o predominant attitudes held about images by mod ern-day th inkers arise
first in bot h b iblical w riting and earl y G reek phi losophy: ico nophobia and
icon oph ilia - the fear (or hatred) of images and the love of im ages, res
pectively. Iconophobia is associated with a deep mistrust of images, or
particula r kinds of images, and can be seen at w or k in w riters as diverse as
Plato (1 .4 and 1.5 ), Karl M arx (2 .4), Sigmund Freud (2. 8), Jean Baudrill ard
(3.3) and amo ng man y modern scienti sts. Iconophobes have oft en sought .to
challenge established beliefs by qre.akj ~ g or decryin g Images and are also
known as ico noclasts.
This impulse can be foun d at work in th e first pages of the Bib le and in the
Torah. Abraham, for exampl e, literally smashed the idols in his father's shop
because he was co ncerned that-peopl ewould .wor ship false god s rather than
the one, true Go d (1.3). Simi larly, in one of the most in fluential passages on
images in the history of philosop hy, Plato (1.4) has Socrates descr ib e how
ordi nary peopl e are l ike slaves c hain ed in a dark cave awa it ing
enlig htenment. In dispell ing the illusion , ratio nal tho ught - th e right w ay of
seeing - provi des access to tr ue know ledge and emanc ipatio n.
Bot h W.j.T. M itc hell (1986) and Bruno Latour (13.5i havewritten recent ly
~ bo ut how iconoclastic argu ments share cer tain assumptions. First,
Iconoclas ts purport to possess a truth denied to ord inary peopl e becau se they
ctl.nnot ~ee beyo nd the appearances of everyday, sensory real ity. They
mi stake Images for tr uths and, in doi ng so, threaten the fabric of the socia l
order. Second, icon ocl asts have access to the truth h idden behin d these
supe rfic ial images (~ ! th er throu gh divin e insight, or because of the acq uisit io n
of a special method of inquiry. Third, on ly by the iconoclastic action of
smashing our everyday beliefs in the images that surro und us can the rest of
soci.ety becom e privy to the real trut h, w hil e at the same time be ing free d
from the da ngero us and illusory world of th e senses. Fina lly, in bot h b ibl ica l
and p hilosoph ica l text s the false images of thi s wor ld, or w ay of li fe, are
repl aced by the true ones of the next.
Mitch ell has noted, ico nocl asm entai ls both an ep istemo log ica l and an
ethica l cl aim (198 6: 19 7). So it is perh a\?s no ~~ ci d ent that Plato 's analogy of
the cave appears as a centre pie ce of his political text The Rep ub lic (1955 ),
which aimed to show how an ideal state w ould b~ run. Painting the existing
p.,olil if"";' I "1;>1"" noon "" ;, hi"",. r",;,lilv hasbeen.a tacnc prnnl""o.-! I... . _ .
I\S

INT R O D U.CTI O N

IMA G ES

th i n ~e rs , i nCl u d i n g 'Ma'rx a nd Engels (2.3 ), Friedrich Nietzsche (2.5 and 2.6),

Guy Debord (3.2) and Theodo r Adorno (3.1) - mos t of whom gro und ed the ir
eth ical claims In epi stemological term s. "

The influenceof such th inke rs on later commentators owes a great dealto

the strength of the critical images that they deploy in their own work. Plato 's
prisoners in the-cave, or..Rene Desc artes' (1.12),evil _de mon o f images, ar e
such powerful p ictures that th e)' have become complex reference points fo r
, . a w ho le way of thinking. For example, when Susan Bordo (3. 6) talk s abo ut
learning tolivewith the ima ges in Plato's cave sh~ is ack now ledging her debt'
to his idea s.at the same time as making them relevant -for today,

.-

Given the central 'ro le afforded ~ to ico ns, statuary an d, later, pa j [l~ings in
th ose early Western so cieties dominated by reiigious Iife, t he s ta.kes ove rthe
ownership, meaning a ~fUnt,~rp'retation of images w ere'dhlgh: ty\bre' ofteri
't han not, debates o Q images w e re underpinn<:d by real social upheaval .T he.
controversy Over icon sin eighth -centur y ~yzantium (1:8:"'1 :10) was no t a
debate about art, but ,? 'c ris[s o~erth~ 'p lkte and role of-the ho ly in society;
as Peter Brown "(19 8] ),h as' ar gued. Successive Arab invas ions in the late
seve nthcentury created the need for soci a l cohesion. The libera l icon od ules:
., who had seen pictorial icon s' as haVing ho ly status, suddenly looked like
idolaters. Fearing fJ!rth:r divine retr ibution, the ico no clasts destroyed the
icon s a n d 'rep l a c e(:I'thein ~ w it h thesimple, unifying political symbol of the
cross. Simi lar trajectories could be traced during the English Civil War - see
Tho mas Hobbes' ~r i ti n g on ido latry (1.11) - and the Cultural Revoluti o n in
'China.

z:

-z

Ico~ophobictha~ e~tended.fo C1,rt itself. Plato (1.5) s uggested tha t the re~li ty
depicted .in paintings 'e nds up being an image of a sh adow; "a corru pt ing
so ciety: Many writers have followed' Plato's mistrust ofarf as a
influen ce
vehiclefortruth arid m:argina iise theimportance.of arttheory. in t~~jr \'Vo rk:

In"'t;:qntrast, 'Aristotle's (1. 6) d iscu ssio n of. mimesis -:: orthe human~ capaci ty

f6 r :ma kir:jg mea ningfu l represe ntations of their ~oCia l world - acted ras a

~counte r to Plato's iconophobia and i ~founed eighteenth:centu ry,debate~.on

thejr{atu r~. of representation that stllf'r'erri

a in relevant to : a ri~ n istory.
:

on

Desp ite. the c ~ncerns r;ised by~Plat'o a nd ot he rs ibout the .u n~~ liability:6J

\ eflsor y experience, images have freqllentl'y. ,Q~en use q o)? theorists as 'a.~aY

ofdescribing how .we can hav~' true knowledge of the world. Afisto.t l ~!s .( l.z)

fa mous remark about 'the soul's never thinking withou t-an imag e' ~plateo

images at the ce ntrE; of .episternologica] theory, a trend that can be trac ed

from the sixteenth century to the p'reseht day. FO( 'example, lmmanuel !<;,?Jlt

(2, 1\ ' Henri Bergson (2.7), Ludwig Wittgenstein (9.1 ) and Antonio Damasio

(9 .2) have each argued that mental images are repositories'of knowledge.
It may appear to day that the cognitive sciences have .answered tmany of the
Hobbes (1,11), Descartes
traditional ques tions posed by philosophers such
(1.12 and 1.13) and John Locke (1:14). New brain-imaging technologies have
p!omi sed to open up , ~ho u ght itse lf to di ~ect .observati(:m. But, a:~ H<.:JWard
Gardner (1987) has noted, the new sciences of the -brain are attempting to
answe r some of the very questions po sed by these earlier thin kers. For
exa mple, the philosopher Dan iel b e nnett (1991) ar;:.d the neuroscientist
Anton io Damasio (1994 ) have publi shed major works that exp lic itly
acknowledge their conceptual debt to Descartes. They ask, for exam'ple, is it
right to talk about images in the m ind asthough they repres~nted the extern al
world? If we onl y know the wo rld thro ugh s u ch . re pre~en tatlons car: we have
access to any unmediated truth? And what could it mean for Images to

as

represent? In doin g so, the y e ithe r implicitly re ly on seventeenth-century

assumptio ns about the n ~tur: ~!mental irnagesas rep resentat io ns of th e
external world , or attem pt to prove tha t such <l rglJ m~nts ere w rong;
But it w ould be a mista ke to thin k,that e pistem oio gica'i t heo ry is not
influe nced by social forces, eve n when it is,,9ivorced from the.kindo! ethical
injunction req uired b y lco r:.oclasm .The ;~quest i ons abou,t images raised by
Hobbes, Descartes an d Locke emer ged out ()f a social world comi ng.to te rms
with its new-found em pirici sm, asSteven Shapi n2'(1988) has a rgued : Locke 's,
(1.14) image of the so l i ta ry,: p ~j lo~ p he~_ observi~g his 0"";[1 eXRer i e nc~~~ t,a9,d
drawin o univers a l. conclu sionssolely art the-basis-of the Images refl t7qd ~i !:,
his m in~i-is mirrored byJhefigure \>f th(scien~ fic experimenter dem9 ~s tr~t i ng
how ob jediW know ledge could be po ssib le ~nd I ~-g j ti .mate in irw od d where
God still provided ult~mate autho rity.E:pist~ mq legi:a ltth esry~helps.Ta~e the
socia l enterprise of science seem as natural as 10o ~l l)g at a 'R ,ece'of'w.i~x .
Without know ledge of th e reach and rLchn~s S" ()ih61 s ;tra d itlo'n,"'o ur"uride r"
im pov~r i s hed .
stan ding of images is greatly
-;...
..,...
0

.." ,

"

REFERENCES

870\1'0, P. (1982) 'A Dark A ge crisis: aspects 'pf the ' i~90~ lasti c coo,trove rsy', in
P. :BrqY"tl {ed .I, .Societv-e nd the Holy n Late An tiqu ity. London:. Faber & Faber.
pp: } 5f c'301 .

. ....

'

",. '

'. '

..

..

Darnasio,,", A.R. (1994 ) Descertes' Sirrot : Emotion,' Reason and 'the ~H[Jm irn iJ'Bra in _

New York: G.P.' Putna1n's Sons.

.. .
. " OS

Denn e~ , D. C. (1991) Con scious ness Explained. Bosto n, MA: Li ttle/ Brow n &' Co,

1rg n~r/ H.) 1 9 7) The Mirl'd 's New Science: A"History 'Ofthr:JCgnitlve 'Re iioTution.

N<,;w;York: Basic Bo o ks."

..
"
i\1hi~c,h.;)}; WJJ . (1 ?86)'" !cogo logy:' l!nag~; Text, Ide ology: ChicagoT: Universityiof
lCagg Pless. ,
' c,'

Plato ,(1955) The Rep ublic, tr. Desmond Lee. Loildo'1:: F'enguin B()()ks:

Shapin,.. . S. (19&8) ' House'.cf experime nt ih , ~eve riteenth~century" EnglaYid~; Isis" .79:
373240 4:
"~,,
,
'
"
~

s:

2 "': I M A G E S

I: I

MAN CREATED IN GOD'S IMAGE

26: And God said , Let us make man in ou r image, after our liken ess: and let
them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of th e air, and
over th e cattle, and over all the ear th , and over every cr eepin g thing that
crce peth upon th e ear th .
27 : So God created man in his own image , in the image of God created he
him; male and female created he the m.

I :2

FROM GENESIS TO LO C K E ~ :' ':'::,

'H ere , take it and brin g it be fore (the ido ls].' Abraham stood up, took a
stick, broke all the idols, and put th e stick back in th e hands of the biggest
idol am ong them. W hen his fath er r eturned he asked: 'Who did this to
them ?' Abrah am answe red : ' I will not deny you the truth. A woman came
with an otfering of fine flour and asked m e to bring it before th em . So (
brought it before them , and each said, ' I shall eat first .' Then the biggest one
stood amo ng them , he took a stick in his hand and broke the m all.' So Ter ah
said to him : 'Why do you mock m e? Do these [idols] know anything [to
speak anti move]?' And Abrah am replied: ' Won 't your ears hear what your
mouth speaks?'

GRAVEN IMAGES
4 : Thou shalt not mak e unto thee any graven image, or any likeness ?f' any
thmg that is in heaven above , or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the
water under th e ear th :
5: Thou shalt not bow clown th vself to them , nor serve th em : for I the
LORD thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the father s upon
the children unto the third and fourth g eneral100 of them that hate m e;
6: And shewing m er cy unto tho usand s of th em th at love me, and Keep my
commandments.

1:3

Intelligence ,
Pure thought or
Dialectic

A
Intelligible
world
(Forms )

Knowledge

ABRAHAM AND THE IDOL SHOP

OF HIS FATHER TERAH

Mathematical
reason ing (uses
objects from C
as illustratIons)

Opinion or

Physical things

belief

Rabbi Hiya the son of Rabbi Ada said that 'lcrah [Abr aham 's father] was an
ido l wor shipp er. One day Terah had to leave the store [in which he sold
ido ls]. He left Abraham to manage the store in his absence . A man came
and want ed to buy an idol. Abraham asked him: 'How old are you?' And he
res pon ded : ' Fifty or sixt y years old.' Abraham then said : ' Pit iful is th e man
who is sixty and wor ships idols that are only a day old .' So the man left in
embar rassmen t. Once, cam e a woman with an offering of fine flour. She said
to him [Abraham]:

Physical
world

Betief
Illusion

D Shadows and images

F IG U R E 1.1
Plato's The Divided Line

'Ccnesrs, Chap ter I ' and ' Exodus, Chapter 20', on The Bible Au,h.r>?eJ KmS Jam", I'ell/ on wj,h Apu((Jph a ,
O xford and New Yor k: Ox for d Llrnvcr sity Pr ess. 1997, pp. I. and 89-90
From ' Mrdrash Rabbab, Noah . Portion 38 ) Sectio n 13' . te, Shat Lavi, in lcon()(la.~h B ~onJ u u: ImQB~
W.urs In ~G ;~n('", Atli,q;o(J. and An , ed . Bru no Latour, and Pete r. Weib cl , C.lmhTjdgl~ . M A , MIT Pr ess
7.002,.p. 38.

PI. to , "11..; dh 'i< bllinc ' , In n . RtpubIK. tr H.n.p. Lee . Lond on . I'<ngu.in Classics , 1955. p. 275
Copyright {) H .D.!'. l.cc. 19 , 3. 1974 . nd 19R7 R"p r<"llln :d b~' permission .,rr'<:nguill Books-ltd ,

FROM GENESIS TO LOCKE : 27

26: IMAGES

1:4

THE SIMILE OF THE CAVE

PLATO

'I want you to go on to picture the enli ghtenm ent or ignorance of our human
conditions somewhat as follows. Imagine an underground chamber, like a cave
with an entrance open to the daylight and rtmning a long "'Nay underground.
In thi s cham ber are men who have been prisoners there since they were
children , their leg s and necks be ing so fastened that the y can only look straight
ahead of them and cannot turn their heads. Behind them and above them a fire
is burning, and between the fire and the prisoners runs a road, in front of
whi ch a cur tain- wall has been built, like the screen at puppet show s between
the operators and their audience, above which they show their puppets.'
'1 see.'

'Imagine further that there are men carrying all sorts of gear along behind the
curtain-wall, including figures of men and animals made of wood and stone
and other materials , and that some of th ese m en, as is natu ral, are talking and
some not.'
' An odd pi cture and an odd sor t of prisoner.'
'They are drawn from life ,' I replied. 'For, tell me, do you think our prisoners
could see anything of themselves or their fellows except the shadows thrown
by the fire on the wall of the cave opposite them ?'
'H ow could they see anything else if they were prevented from moving their
heads all their lives ?'
' And would they see anything more of the ob jects carried along the road?'

near er reality an d see ing more correctly, because he was tu rned to wards

object s that we re mo~e real ; and if on top of that h e were co mp elle d to say

what each of the passmg obj ects w as when it w as pointed out to hi m , don 't

you think he would be at a los s, and think th at what he used to see wa s more

real than th e obj ects now b ein g pointed out to him?'

'~luch more real. '

'And if he were m ade to look directl y at the light of the fire , it would hurt his

eves and he would turn back and take refuge in th e things whi ch he could see,

,,; hich he would think really far dearer than the things being show n him.'

'Yes.'

'And if,' I went on, 'he were for cibly dragged up the steep and rocky ascent

and not let go till he had been dragged out into th e sunligh t, the process would

be a painful on e , to which he would much object , and when he em erged into

the light his eyes would be so overwhelmed by the brightness of it that he

wouldn't be able to see a Single one of th e things he was now told were real. '

'Certainly not at first ,' he agreed .

'Because he would ne ed to grow accu stomed to the light before he could see

th ings in the world outside the cave . First he would find it easiest to look at

shadows, next at the reflections of men and other objects in water, and later

on at the objects themselves. After that he would find it easier to observe the

heavenly bodies and the sky at night than by day, and to look at the light of

the m oon and stars, rather than at the sun and its light .'

'Of course .'

'Of course not.'

'The thing he would be able to do last would be to look directly at the sun,

and observe its nature w ithout using reflections in water or any other

medium, but just as it is.'

'Then if they were able to talk to each other, would they not assume that the
shadows they saw were real things?'

'T hat must come last .'

'Inevitablv.'
/
'And if the wall of their prison opposite them reflected sound, don't you
think that they would suppose, whenever one o f the passers-by on the road
spoke, that the voice belonged to the shadow passing before them?'
'They would be bound to think so.'

'Later on he would come to the conclusion that it is the sun that produces

th e changing seasons and years and controls everything in the visible world,

and is in a sens e responsible for everything that he and hi s fellow-prisoner s

used to see .'

'That is the conclusion which he would obviously reach.'

'And so they would believe that the shadows of the objects we mentioned
were in all respects real .'

'And when he thought of his fir st home and what passed for wisdom there,

and of his fellow-prisoners, don 't you think he would congratulate himself

o n his good fortune and be sorry for them?'

'Yes , inevitably.'

'Very m uch so.'

'Then think what would naturally happen to them if they were released
from their bonds and cured of their delusions . Suppose one of them were let
loose , and suddenly compelled to stand up and turn his head and look and
walk towards the fire; all these actions would be pai nful and he would be too
dazzled to see properly the objects of which he used to see tIK, shadows. So
if he wa s told that what he used to see was men: illusion and that he was now

'There was pr obably a certain amount of honour and glory to be won among

the prisoners , and priz es for keen-sightedness for anyone who could remember
the order of sequence among the passing shadows and so be best able to predict
thei r fut ure app earances. W ill our released pris oner hanker after these prizes
or envy thi s power orhonourj Wo nt he be more likely to led , as Homer says,
that he woul d far rather be "a serf in the ho use of some landl ess ma n", 1 or
ind eed anything else in the wo rld , th an live and think as th ey do?'

11. f~lawlllol

I c cc

_~

...

28 : IM AGES

FROM G ENES IS TO L O C K E : 2 9

' T hen wh at do you think would happ en ; I asked , ' if he went bac k to sit
in his old seat in th e cave? Wouldn 't his eyes be blinde d by th e dar kness,
because he had co me in suddenly out of th e daylight ?'

stronge r light o f the clearer world to w hich it has escaped from its p rev io us
iM orance. Th e firs t state is a reason for cong ratu lation, th e second for
sym pathy, tho.ugh if one wa nts to laugh at it one ca l~ do so with less absurd ity
than at the mmd that has descended from th e daylight of the upper world .'

,Ce r tainly.'
'And if he had to discriminate between the shadows, in competition with
the othe r p rison ers , while hc was still blinded and before his eyes go t used
to th e darkness - a pr ocess that might take so me tim e - wouldn't he be
likely to make a fool of himself? And th ey would say that his visit to th e
upp er wo rld had ruined his sight , and that th e ascen t was not wo r th even
attem pting. And if anyon e tried to release th em an d lead them up , th ey
wo uld kill him if they co uld lay hands on him .'

NOTES
1. Odyssey , XI, 489 .
2. That is, the simile of the Sun and the analogy of the Line. Th e det ailed
relations betw een the three figures have been much disputed . Th e tran slation
assumes the following main cor respondences:

'They ce r tainly wo u ld.'

Illusion

Freed prisoner in the cave

Belief

Looking at shadows in the world

outside the cave

Reason

Looking at real things in the world

outside the cave

Int elligence

Looking at the sun

Vision of the Form of Good. [. . . J

' Now, my dea r Glau con,' 1 went on, 'this simi le must be connect ed,
throughou t, with wh at pr eceded it .2 Th e visible rea lm corres po nds t o the
prison , and th e light of th e fire in th e pri son to th e powe r of th e SWl. And
yo u wo n 't go 'wr ong if you connec t th e ascent into th e upper world and the
Sight of the o bjects ther e wi th the upward progress of th e mind into the
in telligibl e realm - tha t 's my guess , which is wh at you are anxio us to hear.
Th e tr uth o f the matter is, after all , known only to God. But in mv opinion,
for wha t it is wo r th , the final thing to be p er ceived in th e intell igi~le realm,
and percei ved only with difficulty, is th e absolu t e fo rm of Good ; once seen,
it is inferr ed to be re spon sible for everything r ight and good, pr odUcing in
the visible realm light and the source of light, and bein g , in the inte lligible
realm itse lf, contro lling source of reality an d intelligence. And anyone who
is going to act rationall y either in public or privat e mu st perceive it.'

' Can you give m e a ge nera l de finit ion of representation? I'm not sure th at 1
know, myself, exactly wh at it is.'

' I agree,' he said, ' so far as 1 am ahle to und er stand you.'

'Then it's not very likely I shall!'

' Then you will pe rhaps also agree with me that it won 't be sur prisi ng if
th ose who get so far ar e unwilling to r eturn to mundane affairs, and if th eir
m inds lon g to remain among higher things . Th at 's what we should exp ect if
our simile is to be tr uste d .'

'Oh , I don't know,' I said . 'Sho rt Sight is sometimes quicker than long Sight .'

ART AND ILLUSION

PLATO

'True enough ,' he r eplied . 'But w it h )'0 1.1 here , if J did see anyth ing,
shouldn 't mu ch want to say so. You m ust use your ow n eyes .'

'Nor will you think it strange that anyone who descends fro m conte m plation
of the divine to the im perfections of human life sho uld blund er and make a
fool of him self, if, while still blinded and unaccustom ed to the surroun ding
darkn ess, he 's forcibly put on trial in the law- courts or elsewh er e about th e
images of justice or their shadows, and made to dispute about the conce ptions
of justice held by men w ho have ne ver seen absolute ju stice.'

'Then let us take an instan ce . For exa m ple , th er e arc many particular b eds
and tables .'

' Yes .'

'T here's nothing stra nge in that .'

' But anyo ne wit h any sense ,' I said, 'will re mem be r that the eye s may be
unsighted in two ways, hy a transition eithe r fr om light to da rk~ess or from
dar kness to .Iight , and that the same.distin ction applies to the mind , So .when
he sees a mmd con fused anel unable to see clearly he w il] not laugh witho ut
thinking , but will ask himself wh ether it has co me from a clearer world and
is..coniwcd.h.v-the-unac:c:us.wm.ed darknes s.nr whe ther it is daz;-;bl hy- the,

,et:

'T hen shall we star t whe re we always do ?You know th at we alw ays assume
th at there is a single essential Fo rm co rrespo nding to eac h class of particular
th ings to which we app ly the same nam e?'
'Yes, [ know.'

' Yes, th at' s t o be exp ect ed .'

Tied prisoner in the cave

' But th ere ar e onl y tw o For ms , one of Bed and on e of Table .'
'Yes.'
,_
I fbe~ we normally say th at the m aker of either of these kind s of furnitu re
nas h~ s .eye on ~e ap propr iate .Fo n~ ; and simi larly '~i th oth er t.hings . For no
one coulcl possibly make the Form Itself, cou ld he ?
Plato ' Part Ten (Bo kT r . Th R hi
1/ l> I' L
t I I'cnguIU Ch"ics 19 55
~- 1 ~
l;P"';" .b..c !.i.J..U:l..-~;l::"'~'7::._::~,, ;, .. ~c o:::~ ;jO~ ;~~ " -, .

... . . .

FROM GENES IS TO LOC KE : 3 1

30: IMAGES

'No.'

'Yes, that is so.'

'I wonder what vou would call a man who could make all the obj ects
produced by indi~idual craftsm en ?'

'So painter, carpenter, and God are each responsible for one kind orbed.'

'H e would be a remarkably clever man.'

'Just a minute , and you ' ll be more sur pr ised still. For this same craftsm an
can not only make all artificial objects, but also create all plants and animals,
himself included , and, in addition , earth and sky and gods , the heavenl y
bodies and the underworld .'
'An astonishing bit of craftsmanship!' he exclaimed.
'You don't believe me?' I asked. 'Tell me do vou think that a craftsman of this
sort couldn't exist, or (in one sense, ifn~t in'another) cre ate all these things?
Do you know that there's a sense in which you could cre ate th em yourself?'
'What sense? '
'It 's no t di fficult, and can b e done in various ways qui te quickly, Th e quickest
way is t o take a mirror and turn it round in all dir ection s; before long you
will creat e SWl and stars and earth, yourself and all other animal s and plants ,
and all the other obj ects we mentioned just now.'

'Yes.'
'God creat ed only one essential Form of Bed in the ultimate nature of
thing s, either because he wanted to or because some necessity prevented
him from maki ng more than on e; at any rate he d idn 't produce more than
one , and more than on e could not possibly be pr oduced .'

'Why?'
'Because, suppose he created two onl y, you would find th at they both shared
a comm on charac ter or for m, and this common character wo uld be th e
ultimate reality.'
'That's true.'

'And [ suppose that God knew it, and as he wanted to be th e real creator of
a real Bed, and not ju st a carpenter making a particular bed, decided to
make the ultimate reality unique.'
'1 suppose so.'

' Yes, but they, would only

be reflections,' he said , ' not real things.'_
J

'Th en do vou
think we might call him author of th e nature of thin bus or some
,
such name?'

' Q uite right,' 1 replied , 'and very much to th e point . For a painter is a
craftsman of just thi s kind, I think. Do you agree? '

'\Ve could do so with ju stice; for all his creations are ultimate realities.'

'Yes.'

'And wh at abo ut the carpenter? Do esn 't he manufacture the bed? '
'Yes.'

'You may perhaps object that the things he cre at es are not real; and yet there
is a sense in which the painter creates a bed, isn't there ?'
'Yes,' he agre ed, 'he produces an appearance of on e .'
'And what about the carpenter? Didn't you agr ee that what he produces is
not th e essential Form of Bed, the ultimate reality, but a particular bed?'
'I did .'
'If so, then w hat he makes is not the ultimat e realit y but so me th ing that
resembles that reality. And anyone who says th at th e products of the
car pe nte r or any other craftsman ar e ultimate r ealiti es can hardl y be telling
the truth , can he?'

'No one familiar with the sor t of argumen ts we're using could suppose so.'

'And wh at about th e ar tist? Does he make or manufacture?'

'No.'
'Then what does he do?'
' I think that we may fairly say that he represents what the other two make.'

' Good ,' said 1. 'Then the artist's representation sta nds at thi rd remove from
reality ?'

r ..J
'Th e ar tist's representation is .. . a long way removed from truth, and he is
able to reproduce everythi ng because he ne ver pen etrates ben eath the
superficial appea ra nce of anythi ng.' [... J

'So we shan 't be sur pr ised jf the bed the carpe nte r m akes lacks the precision
of re alitv7'
,
'N o.'

THE ORIGINS OF IMITATION

'Then shall we try to define representation now, in the light of this

ARISTOTLE

ill u stration?'
' Yes, please .'
' W e have seen that there are three sor ts of bed .The first ex ists in the ultimate
n ature of th ings , and if it w as made by any o ne it m ust , I s~pp ose , have b ee n
1 1...,. r: .. 'U'J p-r h .... ~""'''''H nrl i ~ TTlo ~ c1 6'"l h v -th.... r~rrtP nte. r_ the third bv the h::. int-oPpo '
"10..

[..1 The instinct

fo r imitati on is inherent in man fr o m hi ,

earlie~t da~cs; he

elil}"cI"s from other ani m als in that he is the mo st imitative of creatu r r: ~, and
t\risto t ll:, 'T he: or ig ms and devel opment of po et r y' t from On th e-itrl '?f Poet ry. in Clo.ukaJ LUt td T)' Cfll iorm,
I nnril .n . p ,pftal li n JLv.L-.. 1(,1;; t;" n vs. COD)' Ti ~..tll iO.T,S. 1Jor:w:h 1 96 ~ .

tT,T.S . J)nrlt.t-h

1:6

32 : I M AGES

he learns his earliest lessons by imitation. Also inborn in all of us is th e

instinct to enjoy wo rks of imitati on . What happ ens in actual ex perience is
evidence of this ; for we enjoy looking at th e most accura te representation s of
things wh ich in th em selves we find painful to see, suc h as the for ms of th e
lowes t animals and of corpses . Th e reason for this is that learning is a very
great pleasur e, not for philosophers only, but for other people as well,
however limited their capacity for it may be . Th ey enjoy see ing liken esses
because in doing so they acquire information (they reaso n out wh at each
re presen ts, and discover. for instance , th at ' this is a pictu re of so and so'); for
if by an)' ch ance th e thing depicted has not been seen before, it will not be
th e fact that it is an imitat ion of something that gives the pleasur e, bu t th e
exec ution or th e colour ing or some other suc h cause .
Th e instinct for imit ation , t hen, is natural to us , as is also a fe eling fo r music
and for rhythm - and metres are obviously detached sections of rhythms.
Starting from these natural aptitudes, and by a ser ies of for th e mo st par t
gradual imp rovem ents on their first efforts , men even tually crea te d poetry
from th eir improvisations .

F R OM GE N ES IS TO LOC KE : -3 3

-..JOH N OF DAMASCUS
When we set up an image of Chris t in any place, we appea l to the senses, and

indeed we sanctify the sense of sight, which is the highest amo ng the perceptive

senses, just as hy sacred speech we sanctify the sense of healing. An image is,

after all, a reminder ; it is to the illiterate what a book is to the literate, and what

the word is to the hearin g, th e image is to Sight. All this is the approach through

the senses: but it is with the mind that we lay hold on th e image. 'I'Ve remember

that God ordered that a vessel be mad e from wood that would not rot, guilded

inside and out, and that the tables of the law should be placed in it and the staff

and the golden vessel containing the manna - all this for a reminder of what

had taken place, and a foreshadowi ng of what was to come. What 'was this but

a visual image, more co mpe lling than any ser mon? And this sacred thing was

not placed in some obscure corner of the taberna cle; it was displayed in full

view of the people, so that whenever they looked at it they would give honour

and worship to the God who had thlough its contents made known his design

to them. The)' were of course not worshipping the things them selves; they were

being led through them to reca ll the won derful works of God , and to adore him

whose word s they

had witnessed.

I:

THINKING WITH IMAGES

ARISTOTLE

Perce iving ... is analog ous to me r e saying and th ink ing , but when it is of the
pleasant or pai nful the soul engages in pursuit or avoida nce and these are
analogous to asser tion and denial.
In fact , to ex perience pleasure and pain is to be active with th e perceptive
mea n in rel ation to goo d or bad as such. Avoidance , wha t is marc , and d esire
are, in their actualized state , the same thing, nor are th eir faculties different
eithe r from each othe r Or from the perceptive faculty, but th eir way o f b eing
the same tIling is differen t. For in th e thinking soul, im ages p lay the part of
percepts, and the asser tio n or negati on of goo d or bad is invaria bly
acco mpanied by avoidance or pursuit , whic h is the r eason for the soul's
neve r thinkin g withou t an image. !

NOTE
1. It is interesting that the wor d translated here as 'image' IS not phatitasma but
aisthema , a rare word only used once elsewhere in the De AnIma . As Hamlyn
suggests, its use there seems to remind us of the d ose d ependence that Aristotle
sees ill the intellectual soul on the sensitive soul immediately below it in the
hierarchy. [... j
Art srotlc , C hapter Hf.7 , D c/l n:mGl On the- jo ul , tr H ugh Laws on-Tan crcd . Lnnclt)T'! : PengUin Cla:\,''i-ics , 1986 ,
PI" 20 &anel 24 8 . Cop~' r1gh (:j;; Hu gh Law, on-Tancr cd 19&6 .

HOROS AT NICAEA, 787

AD

We define with all acc uracv and care th at the venerable and bolv icons be set
up like th e form of the ve~erable and life-giVing Cross , in a sm~ch as matter
consisting of co lours and pebbles and other matter is appropr iate in th e holy
Church of God , o n sacre d vessels and vestments , walls and panels, in hou ses
and on the roads, as we ll as th e images of our Lord and Gael and Saviour
Jesus Chri st, of our undefi led Lady of th e Holy Mother of God , of the ange ls
,:"or thy of honour, and of all the holy and piou s m en. For th e more
frequently th ey are see n by means of pict orial representation the more th ose
who behold them are aro use d to rem emb er and de sire th e protot)1)CS and
to give them greeting and wo rship of hono ur - but no t th e true worship of
Our faith which befits only th e divin e nature - but to offer th em both
i ~.c cnse and candles, in the sam e way as to U1e for m and the venerable and
hfe-giVing Cross and t he holy Gospel b ooks and to the other sacred objects,
as Was the custom even of th e ancients .

U l nnl ng;h~lt~ ~ ;

!:r Ofl1 !c()nGclmm , erls An thon v Bryer and Judah He r-rm.

I ~7; . pp 1~ 3--4 . Reprod uced w ith p...Imi ~S I (>n o f t ht: c:d ll(JfS .

U oi \-"<.'.r slty

(If

Blr'm jrlg~l "Hh

Pr ess

1:9

FROM GEN ESIS TO LOC KE : 3 5

34 : I M A GES

I: I 0

I: I I

HOROS AT NIERA, 754

AD

The divin e nature is co mpletely un circumscribable and cannot be depi cted

or represented by artists in any medium wh atsoever. The word Christ mean s
hoth God and Man, and an icon of Christ 'would therefore have to be an
ima ge of God in th e flesh of the Son of God . But this is im possible. Th e ar tist
would fall either into th e heresy which claims that the divine and human
natures of Christ ar e separate or into that whi ch holds that th ere is only one
nature of Chr ist .

IMAGE AND IDOLATRY'

THOMAS HOBBES

An IMAGE (in th e most strict signification of the word) is the Re semblance

of some thing visible : In which sense the Phantasticall Formes, Apparitions,
or Seemings of visible Bodies to th e Sight, are onely Images; such as are the
Shew of a man , or other thing in th e Wat er, by Reflexion, or Refraction ; or
of the Still, or Star s by Direct Vision in th e Air ; which are nothing re all in
the things seen , nor in the place where they seem to be e; nQI' ar c their
magnitudes and figures the same with th at of th e object; but changeable ,
by the variation of the organs of Sight , or by glasses; and ar e pr esent
oft en-tim es in our Imagination, and in our Dreams, wh en th e obj ect is
absent; or changed into other colours , and shapes, as things that depend
onely upon the Fancy. And these are the Images which are originally and
most pr operly called Ideas, and IDOLS, and derived from the language of
th e Gra ccians , with whom th e worn signifieth to See. They are Elow also
called PHANTASMES, which is in th e same langu age, Appariti ons. And from
the se Images it is that on e of the faculties of mans Nature, is call ed the
Imagination. And from hen ce it is mani fest, that th er e n either is, nor can bee
any Image m ade of a thin g Invisible .
It is also evident , th at th er e can b e no Image of a thin g Infinite : for all the
Images, and Phantasmes that are made by th e Impression of things visible,
are figUJ'ed : but Figure is a quantity every way det ermined : And th er efore
th er e can bee no Image of God ; nor of th e Soule of Man ; nor of Spir its; but
on ely of Bodies Visible, that is, Bodies that have light in themselves, or are
by such en ligtened.
And wh ereas a man can fanc), Shapes he never saw ; making up a Figure out
of the parts of divers creatures ; as th e Pacts make th eir Centaures ,
Chimaera s, and oth er Monsters never seen: So can he also give Matter to
those Shapes, and make th em in Wood, Clay or Metall. And these are also
called Images, not for the resemblance of any cor po rca lJ thing , but for the
-fh o m..1.!i J [ ()hh(. ~s . ' O f th e Jdngd om e. of darkn cssc". in Levun han, Px.d : p..., Chapl{:r 4 ; . Lo ndo n : Pengu in
Clasxlcs , 19 8 5, pp. 66 8- 75 .

mblance of some Phantasticall Inhabitants of the Brain of th e Make)', But

-ese
h
. . 11 . th
in these Idols, as t ey are ong.m a ly m c Brain , and as th ey are painted ,
Tlloulded, or moulten m matter, th ere is a similitude of th e one to
carYed ,
.
.
the oth er, for which th e Matenall Body made by Art, may be said to be the
Image of the rhantasti callldoll made by Natur e .
But in a lar ger use of th e 'Nord Im age , is contained also, any R epresentation
of one th ing by ano ther. So an ear thly Soveraign may be called th e Image of
God : And an inferiour Magistrate the Image of an ear thl y Soverai gn. And
DIany t imes in th e Idolatr y of th e Gentiles th er e was little regard to the
similitude of th eir Mat erial] Idol to the Idol in th eir fancy, and yet it wa s
called the Image of it . For a Stone unhewn has been set up for Neptune, and
divers other shapes far differen t from th e shapes they conceived of thei r
Gods, And at thi s day we see ma ny Images of th e Virgin Mary, and other
Saints, unlike one ano th er, and without correspondence to anyone mans
Fancy; and yet ser ve well enough for the purpose th ey were errected for;
which was no more but by the Nam es on ely, to represent the Persons
mentioned in the Histor y; to whi ch every man apply eth a Mentall Image of
his own e makin g, or none at all. And thu s an Image in the largest sense, is
eithe r the Resemblance , o r th e Representation of some thing Visible; or
both togeth er, as it happencth for th e most part.

[ .. ,]
To worship an Image , is volunarily to doe those exter n all acts, which are
signes of ho no ring either th e matter of the Image, which is Wood, Stone,
Metall , or some other visible creatur e ; or the Phantasme of th e brain , for
the resemblance, or representation whereof, th e matter was form ed and
figured ; or both together, as on e animat e Body, co m posed of the Matt er and
the Phanta sm e, as of a Body and Soul e.

[ .. .]
[. . .] But to 'wor ship God, as inanimating , or inh abiting , su ch Image , or
place; that is to say, an infinite substance in a finite place, is Idolatry : for such
finite Go ds, are but Idols of the brain, nothing rea l]; and are comm only
called in the Scripture by the names of ~'lni 0' , and I.;yes, an d NothmB' Also to
worship God , not as inanimating, or present in th e plac e , or Image; but to
the end to be put in mind of him, or of som e works of his, in case the Place,
or Im age be dedicated , or set up by private auth or ity, and no t by th e
a ~tho r i ty of them that are our Sover aign Pastors, is Idolatry. For the
Com man dement is, Thou shalt not make to rhey se!fe an)' graven Image . [. . . J

I...]
Be.'\idesthe Idol atrous Worship ofIm ages, th er e is also a Scandalous Worship
o.f them. ; w hic h is also a sin ; but not Idolatry, For Idolatry is to worship by
slgncs of an internall , and reall honour: but Scandalous WorshJp... is but
Seem ing Worsh ip ; and may som eti mes bee joined with an inward, and
hearty detestation , both of th e Image , and of th e Phant astic all D ~e mon , or
[dol, to w hich it is ded icated ; and proceed oncly from th e fear of death , 0 ) '

F RO M G E.N ES IS T O LOCKE : .3 '/

::'?S; I M AGES

other gr ievo us punishment; and is neverth elesse a sin in th em th at so

wo rship, in case th ey be men wh ose actions are looked at by o thers, as lights
to gu ide th em by; becau se following th eir w ays, they cannot b ut stum ble,
and fall in the way o f Religion: Whereas th e exa m ple o f those we regard not,
wo rks n ot on us at all , but leaves us to our ow n dili gence and caution ; and
consequen tly arc no causes of our falling,

areat deceiver that , ho wever power ful and cwming he may be , he will never
be able to impose o n m e.

OPTICS
RENt DESCARTES

(... J

The summc of that whi ch I have said hitherto, concerning th e Wo rshi p of

Images, is thi s, th at he that wor shipp eth in an Image , or any Cre at ure , eith er
the Matter ther eof, or any Fancy of his ow n, w hich he thinketh to dwell in
it ; or both together; or belccvcth that suc h things hear his Pr ayers, or see his
D evo tions , witho ut Ears, or Eyes , co m m itteth Idol atry: and h e that
co unte r feite th such Worship for fear of punishment, if he bee a m an whose
exam ple hath power am ongs t his Brethren , committeth a sin : But he th at
worshipp eth the Creator of th e world before suc h an Image, or in such a
place as he hath not made, or chosen of himselfe, but tak en fro m the
com m andem ent of Gods Word, as the [ewes d id in worship pin g Go d befo re
the Cherubins , and before the Brazen Serp en t for a time , and in, or towards
th e Temple of Jerusalem , whi ch wa s also hut for a tim e , com m ittc th not
Idol atr y.

NOTE
1. Marginalia and original page number ing that appears w ithin the text have
been remov ed .

I: I

EVIL DEMON
RENE DESCARTES

1shall suppos e, therefore , that there is, no t a tr ue Go d , w ho is th e sovereign

source of truth , but some evil demon, n o less clmning an d d eceivin g than
powerful, who has used all his art ificc to deceive me. I will suppose that the
heaven s, th e air, the ear th, colo urs, sha pes, so un ds and all ex te rn al things
th at we see , arc on ly illusions and deception s w hic h he uses to take m e in . I
will co nsider myself as having no hand s, eyes , flesh , blood or senses , but as
believing 'wrongly that I have all these th ings. I shalJ cling ob stinatel y to thi s
notion ; and if, by this m ean s, it is not in my p ower to arrive at th e
kn owl ed ge of any truth , at th e very least it is in my power to susp end my
judgem ent . Th is is why I shall tak e gre at car e not to acce pt into my belief
anythi ng false, and shall so well prepar e my mind agains t all the tr ick s of th is
R l"n t' D t: -'; ('olrh =~~ "Fir st m ed itatron ", in D i scourse on Met hod an d rIa' ,J.{c:J,r-f1rJorI.C , t r. E E . Su tdi ffc . LOUdon :
PengUin C1 3 S$ic~ . t 9 6 S. p. 10 0 . C() p ~, ,-jgh t C
<? E E. Sutc liffe, 1968 .

[. ..j (I]t is necessary to ,b e~v arc of as sum~g that in orde,r to sense , th e :nind
needs to pe rceive certain Images transm itte d by th e objects to th e bra in, as
our philosophers commonly suppo se; or, at least , th e nature or th ese images
must be co ncei\'ed quite othen ..' ise than as th ey do. For, inasmuch as [the
philosophers] do not consider anything about these imag~ s except that th ey
must resemble th e objects th ey represent , it is imp ossible for them to show us
how they can be form ed by th ese obje cts , received by the extern al sense
organs, and transm itt ed by th e nerves to th e brain . And th ey have had no other
reason for positing them except th at , obser ving that a picture can easily
stimulate our minds to concei ve the objec t painted there, it seemed to them
that in the same way, the min d should be stim ulated by tittle pictures whi ch
form in our head to conce ive of those objects that t ouch our senses; instead ,
we should consider th at there are m any other things besides pictures w hich can
stimulate our tho ugh t , such as, for ex ample, signs and words, which do not in
any way resem ble the th ings which they signify. And if, in order to depar t as
little as possible from currentl y accepted beliefs, we prefer to avow that the
objects which we per ceive trul y transmit th eir ima ges to th e inside of our
brain, we mu st at least observe that th er e are no images th at must resemble in
every respect th e objects th ey rep resent - for oth erwise there would be no
distinction between th e object and its image - but th at it is su fficien t for th em
t,o resemble the objects in b ut a few ways, and even th at their perfection
frequently dep end s on their no t resembling them as m uch as they might. For
example, you can see that engravings, being made or nothing but a little ink
placed here and ther e on the paper, represent to us forests, town s, men , and
even battles and stor ms, even thou gh , am ong an infinit v of diver se qualities
which they make us conce ive in these objects, only in shape is ther e actually any
resemblance . And even this resembl ance is a very imperfect one, see ing that,
on,a com pletely flat sur face, they rep resent to us bodi es which are of differ ent
heights and distances , and even that followin g the rul es or per spective, circl es
~re ~ ften better represent ed by ovals rath er th an by other circles ; and squares
y dIamonds rath er th an by other squares; and so for all oth er shapes . So that
often , in order to be m ore per fect as im ages and to represent an object better,
they mu st not resemble it. Now vee must think in th e same way about the
Hcnl:.D c.sC: <l .-tr:~ ) "Opncs" , Discou r-ses 4---6 1 m 1) iSt;OU( $t on AJt:chQd, O..,u c:;, Geeme::!..."'. and Mt'.c~ro l()8Y ' tr. ~11 1 J.
(~ I.camp . Revised ed itio n . lndian apo lts: Hac kett Publi.J> ing Comp. ny, 200 1, PI' 8 9- 9 1 'n and 100 - I .
F,r' t ed ition co pyr ight (9 1% \ h) the Aohb, - Mnrr ill Company. Inc. Revised editio n eo pyrig ht:O 200 1 by
Hackett Pub lishing Co mpa ny, Inc. Repr mu-d b)' per-m ission of J Iacket t Pu hlishing Co m pany. Inc . All d ghLo;
r(~ :<i 't~ r v c d_

I:I

tII1'

FROM GENES I S TO L O CK E: 3 9

3S : I M A G E S

imag es that are formed in our brain , and we must note that it is on ly a qu estion
of kn owing how the y can enable the mind to perceive all the diverse qualities
of the objects to which they r efer ; not of [knowing] how th e imag es th ems elves
resemble their objects; just as when th e blind ma n .. . tou ch es some obje ct
with his cane, it is certain that these objects do not tr ansmit anything to him
exc ept that, by making his cane move in different ways according to their
different inherent qualities, the y likewise and in the same way move the nerves
of his hand, and then th e places in his brain where these nerves originate .Thus
his mind is caused to pe rceive as many different qualities in the se bodies, as
there are varieties in the movements that they cause in his brain.

*
Thus you can clearly see that in order to perceive, the mind need not
contem p late any images resembling the things that it sen ses. But this makes
it no less true that the objects we look at do imprint very perfect images on
the back of our eyes. Some people have very ingeniously explained this
already, by com parison with the images that appear in a chamber, when
haVing it completely clos ed except for a Single hole , and having put in front
of this hole a glass in the form of a len s, we stre tch behind, at a specific
distance, a white cloth on which the light that com es from the objects
outside forms these images. For they say that this chamber represents the
eye; this hole , the pupil; this lens, the crystalline humor, or rather, all those
parts of the eye which cause some refraction; and this cloth, the interior
membrane, which is co mpos ed of the extremities of the optic nerve.

*
Now, having thu s seen this picture in the eye of a dead animal , and having
considered its causes , you cann ot doubt that an entirely similar one is
formed in the eve of a live man, on the interior membrane ... and even that
it is formed mu~h better there, because its humors, being full of spirits, are
more transparent and have more exactly the shape which is requisite to th is
effect. And also , perhaps in th e eye of an ox the shape of the pupil, which is
not round, prevents this picture from being so perfect there.
Neither can we doubt that the images which we cause to appear on a white
cloth in a dark cham ber are formed there in the same way and for the same
reasons as on the back of the eye; and indeed, because they are ordinar ily
m uch larger there , and form there in many more ways , we can more easily
note different details there , of which I here desire to in form you so that yo u
can test for them , if you have not already done so . [.. . j

[ j not only do the images of objects form thus on the back of the eye, but
they also pass beyond tu the brain [.. .]

f this resem blanc e th at the pi cture causes u s to p er ceive th e obj ects , as if

~ere 'were yet other eyes in our brain with which we co uld apprehend it ;
but ra the r, that it is the movements of w hich th e pi cture is com pose d w hic h ,
acting immed iat ely on our mind inasmuch as it is unit ed to our body, are so
establi shed by natu r e as to make it have suc h perceptions [. . . j

OF IDEAS
JOHN LOCKE

1. Ever y man being conscious to himsel f th at he thinks, and that which his
mind is applied about whi lst thinking be ing th c ideas that are there, it is past
doubt th at m en have in their minds several ideas su ch as those expr essed
bv the words wtnteness, hardness, sweetness, tbinkina, motion, man, elepbant, army,
d;llnkenness and others: it is in the fir st place then to be inquired , how he
comes by them ? I know it is a recei ved do ctrine that men have native ideas
and ori ginal characters stamped upon their m inds in th eir very fir st being.
This opinion 1 have at large examined already; and , 1 suppose, what 1 have
said in the foregOing book will be much more easily admitted when I have
shown whence the understanding may get all the ideas it has, and by what
ways and degrees they may come into the m ind ; for which I shall appeal to
everyone's own ob servation and experience .
2. Let us th en supp ose the mind to be , as we say, white paper void of all
characters , wi thout any ideas. How comes it to be fur nished? \ Vhence comes
it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fan cy of man has painted
on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of
reason and knowledge?To this I answer, in one word, from experience; in that
all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our
obscr vation, employed either about external sensible obj ects, or about the
internal operations if our mmds perceived and r ~J1ect ed on by ourselves, is that which
supplies our understandings 1V1tn all the materials ?f tbmkmg. These two are the
fountains of knowledge , from whence all th e ideas we have , or can naturally
ha~;c , do spring.
3. First, our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects , do convey into
the tmnd several distinct perceptions of things , according to thos e various ways
\\"?crein those objects do affect them. And thus we come by those ideas we have
ofyelJo w, "bite , heat, cold, s<ji , bard, biuer, sweet, and all those which we call sensible
qualities ; which when I sav the senses convey into the mind I mean the y from
: x~em ;>.1 objects convey ~to the mind wh;t produces the:e those 'perceptions.
nus great source of most of the ideas we have, depenJing wholly upon our
senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call SENSATION.

*
Now although this picture, in being so transmitted into. o ur head, always
reta ins some rese mblance to the objects from which i t proceed s,
neverthel ess, as I have already show n, w(: must not hold that it is by me ans

Joh n Lo ck e, 'Of id (. ;J.~ in ecncrnl and th eir OrJ;!h l <) I' ) in An Essor (,m a m IIJa Hum an Undcrst( lU'lJfJ8 .
Ch
"
,
,
O\ph :r 1. Loruj on an d V t:I"ln nn1: r:. v~~r; J)")a Jl. 199,{) pp. 4 :; 7 .

Jknk

11 ,

I: I

t. C: I MAG E S

4 . Secondly, the other fountain fro m which exp erience furni sheth the
understanding with ideas is the perceptJon if the operations if OlI T own minds within
us, as it is employed about the Ideas it has got; wh ich op eratio ns, \,.. hen the soul
com es to reflect on and consider, do fur nish the Wlder standing wit h ano ther
set o f ideas, which could not be had from thin gs witho ut. And such are
percepu on, r)JJnking, doubeina, believing. reasoning, knowinB' willmg, and all the
different aetin gs of our Own minds; w hic h we, be ing cons cious of and
observ ing in ourselves, do from these recei ve into our unde rstandings as
distinct idees as we do from bodi es affeCting our senses. TIn s so urce of uleas
every man has wh olly in himself; and though it be no t sense, as having nothing
to do with exte rnal obj ects, yet it is very like it , and might prop erl y enough
be called int ernal sense. But as I call th e o ther sensmlOn , so I call this
R EFLECTI ON, the Idea ; it a(Tonls being such on ly as the mind gets by
reflecting on its own operations within itself. By REFLECTION then , in the
following part of this discour se, I would be understood to m ean that notice
which th e mind takes of its own operations, and th e m anne r of them, by
r eason w he reof th ere co m e to b e ideas of th ese op era tio ns in th e
understanding. Th ese two, I say, viz. exte rn al mat eri al things as the obj ects of
SENSATION, and the operat ions of our own minds within as the obj ects of
REFLECTION, ar e to me the onl y or iginals from whence all our ideas take
th eir b eginnings. The t erm operatJOTlS here I use in a large sense, as
com pre hending not bar ely th e actio ns of the mind abo ut its ideas, but some
sort of passions arising some tim es from th em , such as is the satisfactio n or
un easiness arising from any thought .

[ 1
6. He that attentively cons iders th e sta te of a child, at his first com ing into
th e wo rl d, will have little reason to think him stored with plent y of Ideas,
that are t o be the matter of his future k now ledg(~ . It is by degrees he comes
to be furnished with the m. And tho ugh th e ideas of obvious and familiar
qualiti es impr int th em selves before the mem ory beg ins to keep a register of
time order, yet it is often so late before so me unu sual qu alities come in the
way, th at th ere ar e few men th at canno t recollect the beginnin g of their
acqu aintance 'with th em . And if it we re wor thwhile, no doubt a child might
be so o rd ered as t o have bu t aver)' few, even of the o rdinary Ideas, till he
we re grow n up to a ma n . But all th at are bo rn int o th e wo rl d being
surrounded with bodies that p erpetu ally and diver sely affect th em , variety
of ideas, vvhether care be taken abou t it or no , are im printed on the minds
of ch ildren . Lighe and colours are bu sy at hand everywhere when the eye is
but o pen; sounds and so me tangible qualities fail not to solicit the ir proper
senses and force an entrance to th e m ind; bu t yet, I th ink it will be granted
easily th at , if a child were kept in a place where he n ever saw any other bu t
black and white till he were a man , he would have no more ideas of scar let
or green th an h e th at fro m his childho od never ta~ tcd an oyster or a
pin eappl e has of th ose p ar ticular relish e s .

FROM KANT TO FREUD

. 1

2: I

Representatio n and Imagination

Immanuel Kant

2:2

Space and Time

2:3

Camera Obscura

2:4

The Fetishism of Com modities and the Secret Thereof

2:5

How the Real World at Last Became a M yth

2:6

On Truth and Lies in

2:7

Images, Bodies and Consciousness

2:8

Coubold Lessing
Karl Marx an d Friedrich Engels

Karl Ma rx

Fried ric h Nietzsch e

a No n-Mora l Sense

Fried rich N ietzsche

He n ri Bergson

The Dream-W ork

Sigm un d Freud

IN T R O D U C T I O N

ineteenth and early twentieth }::entudes- Karl Ma rx, Friedrich N ietzsche'

nnd Sigmund Freud .; : belonged to 3 ' 'school of suspic ion' 't hat aimed to
demystify the wo rld through acritique of con sciousness.
For M arx, Nietzsc h~ and -Freud the abilit.yto ~e~ the truth requires.anactof
interpretation . As Ricoeur (1970: 3-34) says:

INTRODUCTIO N
In the late eighteen th century and throughout the nineteenth century,
European attitudes to im'ages began to . radic ally alter. Images had been
linked throughout the l\1 i d d l~ Ages ana ,up untilthe seventeenth century
primarily w ith the sacred. But following.ifie critical revolutio n ini tiated qy
such thi nkers as lrrimanuel Kant
t he 'products of socia I activity began
to be seen as auto 11.0 mous Objects in-need of special forms of interpretqtion.

e?-n

In the Critiqve of Pure ReaSon (178 1), K a n~t made t he ratio nal subject the
basis of intelJigibility for human experience of the world, by showing thatthe
organi sing framework of the mi nd regulated how the world could -be
understood . We need reasoni ng prior to experience to turn sense impression
into knowledge. Experience.ofthe world comes through the basic intuition s
of perception, namely time and sp ace, and categories of undersrandin g,
such as the not ion of causality.
".Kant identifiedand differentiatedbetween particu lar cognitive capac ities.
Imaginat ion was shown to organise the 'sche rna'sthat themind appliedto
empirica l sense data in order to produce a unified image of the wo rld in
our minds, by linking experience and understanding. Kant's view dire ctl y,
co ntrasts with Locke's (1 . 14) empiri cal concept of the reflected images of the
w orld playing on the 'whi te paper' of a passive mind. For Kant, the mi ~tJ 's
'Imaging' capacity ?is a' precondition' for our percept ion of im agesof-the
w orl d. "

Kant's amb itious phi losophical systern incl udes, a' senseithat diffetyDt
cognitive faculties and form s of sreasorii ng" are . appropriate to diffe'rent
.i ntellectual realm s br forms, such as scientific understandi ng and aest h ~tiF
.j udgement. An emphasis on cu ltura l forms has deeply influenced analysis
and criticism in l iterary studies and art history . For example, in Gotth old
Lessing's (2.2) attempt to delimit the separat9 domains of art and literatu re,
Lessing justified his argument by saying that the former was concerned
primarily w ith spate and the latter with time. Those draw ing on Less ing's
work argue for the evaluation of di fferent artworks based on the purity of
form . For example, the North Ameri can art criti c Clement Greenberg (1940)
denig rated the impurity of Surrealism because of its narrative -and temporal
qualities. Critics still argue about the relative merits of cultural forms, but, as
W.J.T. Mitc~e l l (1986: 10) has argued, such debates tend to serve hidden
powers and interests,
Kant bel ieved that when pure reason over-reaches its el~ by using concept'>
unempirically, it engages in metaphysical speculation that. generates
illu sions , It was possible to misunderstand th~ world and th~ obj ects within
it. Improper reasoning could lead th~ mll1d . or CO~sCl o u s ness to be
captivated by illusions, just like the prisoners III PI~to ~ ( 1.4 ) Cave, Paul
Ricoeur (197 0: 32) has s,u&i.esl~d that the L!Jr!:e, .~aJ o r IconoClasts of th~

Beginl1i ng with them, understanding is h~rmeneut ics; hen.ceforward, to .seek

meaning is no longerto spell out -the consCl ~us n.e~s of mearung, but to deClph~r
irs expressions ." W}1at. all t~ree a.ttcmpt~d , . III dl~er ent ways, was .to n;ake their
'conscious' methods 01 deciphering coincide with the 'unconscious work of
ciphering which they attribute to the will t o power, to social being", to the,
unconsciouSpsychisrn.
If nothing could be taken _ at face y'~l u e, . 'then everythi ng in need of
interpretation should be conside~ed an ! Illage, :;or a~ illusi?n. For M~rx'<t~ d
Engels (2. 3), that meant that SOCIal realit y was W?Jected .mto the m m d s~~f.
citizens 1ike an Image In a camera obscura, as SOCIal relations produce-their
dw n't opsy-l urvy, ideolog ical version of reality, Critique turns that im age,th ~~
rigQt way up by dcci~he~ring its. effects on soci.a lco.~sciousn ~ss: th er~?y
dispell ing the powerof.the [alse 1m-age on the mind ot ItS obserYers .Ma~ 's
(2.4) analysis of the commodity as a.religious-fetishis one such interpretati sm
of the effects of capital ist prod uction on its consurnersc- thy worshj R
commodities.' in the same way that those in Ab rahaf"Q's "fa the r's' sh~I)
worshipped thei r ido ls (1 .3) . Marx's analy?is was subsequently developed
into a genre of ideology critique (see Sectio n 3).
Kant held that the categor ies Jn the mind are necessary universal and accord
w ith the structure of the woild. N ietzsche (2.5 and -z .e) reconceives these
cognitive concepts as metaphors" as aesthetic forms that are contingent
and serve buman purposes. For Ni etzsche, cognitio n is a fundamenta lly
metaphorical activity, the conc~R.ts through whi ch we interpret reality raving
no fo undation in it. Human jlrtistry translates sense impress ions into -images'
and thence into concepts, wh ich appear 'true' to us only because we iorget
our role . inrnaklng them. Nlet,zschg u rges ~u sto ' ac kt1 owl edge i.i h d~a ke
responsibil ity for the human"r9 le in " im?ging' or co ns.tructingreal ity, rathEli'
than accept ing sediment ed "interpretat ions of the worl d as the truth. His
emphasis on themetap horical l1?ot i.!re,ci.f meCining, 'if n()t truth, is ta ke ~,up ' b.y, '
phi losophers s uch ~J ~,tcoeu r (8.21 ~ n~ L,e Q(~euff (9 .4 ~
Fre ud~s (2.8) invention of ps ychoa nalysis'. as a/talking cyre/for those
s u ff~rm g from mental disorders q l n be seen as a science for the deciphering
and under standing of the repressed, uncons cious processes of the psyche,
rnanlfest not only in irrationa l behaviour and beliefs but a lso in dream
Images, in which the latent message is hidden behi nd the manife st content.
~hl' rationality of language serves as the orderin g principle for bringing to
light the sense latent in irration al images. The theor y beh ind Freud's
p~yc h Qanal y sis was to have a major impact on contemporary image culture.
HIS ,nephew, Edward Bernays, used freud 's unde r~tanding of unconscious
mOfwati,ons wh en establishing the principles of the public relations industry.
In, the academic world, Freud's methods have been appli ed to analyse
cnt:cally a range of cultural symbols, from literature through to art irnagcs
and films (sec Section 7: Psychoanalysi s).
Despite the profound influence the 'school of suspicion' exerted' on the
thinking of many tw entieth-century writers, where there is often a merging
_

_ _

_ ,. _ ,

IM AGES

of these interp retative techniques w ithin a single piece of writing, some

philosophers ~o ntjnued to bui ld upon Kant's - work in oth er ways. ~o r
example, Henri B[~ rgs o n (2.7) place d the body at the centre of unde rstandi ng
in a way that is reminiscent of Kant's transcend ental subject as the world's
unifyin g princi ple . For Bergson, the world becomes an 'agg regate of images'
and perception of the world occu rs w hen ' these same images [are] referred
to the eventual action of one particular image, my body' . Whil e Bergson
impli es a non-rational aspect to cognition th rough the use of the bo dy ima ge,
it arises out of a critique of Kant and is meant to help provid e a positive,
affective aspect to thought w hich resonates in di fferent fields that have dealt
w ith psycho logy, such as phenomenol ogy (Ma urice Merleau-Ponty (6.2) and
Jean-Paul Sartre (6.3) ), the philosophy of Gill es Deleuze (9.5) and the
neuroscience of Antoni o Dam asio (9.2).

REFERENCES

Greenberg, C. (1940 ) 'Toward a newer Laocoon', Psrtisen Review, 7 (J uly-August):

296-3 10.
Kant. I. (1929 [17811) The Criti que of Pure Reason , tr. N. Ke mp Smith. New York:

St Martin's Press.
Mitchell, \lV.j.T. (1 986) lconology: Image, Text, Ideology. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
.

Ricoeur, P. (1970) Freud and Philosophy.' An Essay on tnterp retsuon . New Haven, CT:

Yale University Press.

F R O M K A N T T O FREUD : 4 5

REPRESENTATION AND
IMAG INATION I
IMMANUE L KANT

It is a merely empirica l law, that representations whi ch have oft en follow ed

or accompanied one another finally become associat ed , and so are set in a
relation whe reby, even in the absence of the obje ct , one of the se repre
sentations can , in accordance with a fixed rule, hr ing about a transition of
the mind to the othe r. But this law of reproduction presupposes th at
appearanc es arc thems elves actually subject to such a rul e , and that in th e
manifold of th ese rep resentations a coexisten ce or sequ en ce takes place in
conformity with ce r tain rules . Otherwise our empirical im agination wou ld
never find' opp ornmity for exercise appropr iate to its powers, and so would
remain concealed within the mi nd as a dead and to us unknown faculty. [. . . J
There mu st then be som eth ing vvhich, as the a priori gro lilld of a necessary
svnthetic unity of appe arances , makes their reproduction po ssible. What
that something is we soon discover, when we reflect that appearances are
not things in th em sel ves , but are th e mere play of our representations, an d
in the end red uce to determinations of inner sense . For if we can show th at
even our purest a priori intuitions yield no knowledge, save in so far as th ey
contain a co mbination of th e manifold such as render s a th oroughgOin g
synthesis of reproduction possible , th en th is synthesis of imagination is
likewise grounded , ant ecedently to all ex pe rien ce, upon a pttoti principles;
and we must assum e a pure transce ndental synth esis of imagination as
conditioning the very po ssibilit y o f all exp er ience. For ex perience as such
necessarily pr esupposes the r eproducibility of app earances. When I seek to
draw a lin e in th ought, or to think of the time from on e noon to another,
or even to repr esent to myself some particular number, obviously th e
various manifold representations that are involved must be app rehended
by me in thought one after the oth er. But if I were always to drop out of
thought the pr eceding represen tations (the first parts of the lin e , th e
a~ tecedent parts of the time period, or the units in the order represented) , and
did not r eproduce them whil e advancing to those that follow, a complete
representation wou ld never b e obtained : none of the above-mentioned
th ou~hts > not even th e purest and mo st eleme ntary r epresentations of space
and time, cou ld ar ise.
The synthesis of appre hension is -thus inseparably bound up . . vith th e
synthesis of r eproduction . And as th e form er constitutes the transcendental
ground of th e possibility of all modes of knowled ge whatsoever - of th ose

fm rn~nu c:l KAn t. from "Transcendental deducti on ", and ' Schcrnarism ' I m Tnt Crl liq (1~ oJ rure Reason ,
tr . I\orrnan Kemp Sm tih . Londo n: M acm,lIan Pr css., 192 9, p p. 13 2-3, 142-3 and 18 1--.3 _<0 Ma<:m.ilJ.:n
Pn.:s:-:. R (:prQ d U ~'f:d with p crmis..';lon hy Macm illan PtCS~ .

4 6: IMAGES

FROM KANT TO FREUD : 4 7

that are pure a priori no less than of those that are em pir ical -- the reproductive
synthes is of the imagination is to be co unte d among th e tr anscendental acts
of th e mind . We shall therefore enti tle this faculty the tr anscen dental faculty
of imaginatio n .

*
[. .. ] The tra nsc en dental un it)' of appercepti on . . . rel at es to the pure
synthesis o f imagination , as an a priori condition of th e p ossibility of all
com binati on of th e manifold in one knowled ge . But o nly th e producti ve
synthesis of the imagination can tak e place a pnori ; the rep roducti ve r ests
upon empir ical cond itio ns. Thus th e principl e of th e nec essary unity of pure
(prod uctive) synthesis of ima gination, prior to app erception , is the ground
of th e pos sibility of all knowledge, especially of exp erience.
We e ntitle the svnthesis of the manifold in imagination transcendental, if
without distinction of intuitions it is directed ex clusively to th e a priori
com bination of th e manifold; and th e unity of this synthesis is called
transcendental, if it is represented as (j priori necessary in relation to the
or iginal unit y o f apperception . Sinc e thi s unity of apperception un derl ies
the po ssibility of all knowledge, th e transcendental unit)' of the syn th esis of
im agination is the pure form of all possibl e knowled ge ; and by means of it
all obj ects of possible expe rien ce mu st be r epresented a priori. ~

?I

if

The unity
apper ception m relation to th e !!ynt hesis
Imaginati on is th e
understanding ; and this same uni ty, with referen ce to th e transcendental
sym hesis of th e im agination , th e p ure understanding . In th e und er standing
there are th en pure a pnori modes of knowledge whi ch conta in the nec

essary unity of the pure synth esis of imagination in re spect of all possible
app earan ces. These ar e th e caugories , that is, the pure con ce pts of
understanding. Th e em pir ical faculty of knowledge in man must therefore
contain an un derst andi n g wh ich r elat es to all object s of th e senses , altho ugh
only by ' means of intuition and of its synthesis through imagination .
All appearances , as data fo r a possible ex pe r ience , ar e subje ct to this
under standin g. Thi s relation of appearances to po ssible ex pe rience is ind eed
necessary, fo r otherwise th ey would yield no kn owledge and would not
in any way co ncer n us. We have , therefore , to recognise that pure under
standing , by means of th e categories, is a for ma l and synth etic principle
of all experiences, and th at app ea rances have a necessary rela tion to the
understanding .

*
[ . ..J For we have seen that con cepts ar e altogethe r imp ossibl e, and can
have no meaning, if no obj ect is given for th em , or at least for the elemen ts
of which th ey are co m pose d. Th ey cann ot , therefore, b e view ed as app li
cable to thin gs in themselves, ind ep end ent of all question as to wh eth er and
how th ese may bc gi ven to us. We have also pro ved t hat the onl y manner
in whi ch obj ects can be given to us is b v m odi ficati on of out' sen sib ilit v;
and finally, that pure: a priori con cepts: in add ition t o th e func tion ;)f
understanding e x pressccl in the cat~gor y, must co nta in a prio ri c er ta in

formal conditions of sensihility, namely, tho se of inner sense . These conditions

of sen sihility co nstitute the uni vers al cond ition under 'w hich alone th e
category can be appli ed to any obj ect. This formal and pure condition of
sensibility to which th e employmen t of the concept of understanding is
restricted , we shall entitle the schema of the concept. Th e procedure of
under stanwng in th ese schemata w e shall entitle the schctuatism of pu r e
understanding.

The schema is in itself always a p roduct of imagination . Since, however, th e

synth esis of im aginatio~ ~i~ s at no special intuition, but ~ nl~ at ~n ity in the
determination of senslbJlity, the schem a has to he distinguished from
the image. [ .. . 1
Indeed it is schemata, not imag es of objects, whi ch und erli e our pure
sensible concepts . No imag e cou ld ever be adequate to th e conce pt of a
triangle in gen eral. It would never atta in that universality of the concept
which re nders it valid of all tri angles, whether right-angl ed, obtuse-angled,
or acute-angled; it would always be limited to a part only of this sphere. The
schema of th e tri angle can exist nowhere but in thought . It is a rule of
synthes is of th e im agin ation, in respect to pure figures in spac e. Still less is
an object of exp erien ce or its image ever adequate to the em pirical concept;
for this latter always stan ds in immediate rel ation to the schem a of imagina
tion , as a rule for th e determination of our intuition, in accordance with
som e specific uni versal con cept. Th e conce pt 'dog ' signifies a rule according
to which my imagination can delin eate the figure of a four-footed animal in
a geocra l manner, 'witho ut limitation to any Single de term inate figur e such as
exper ience, or any p ossible image that I can rep resent in concreto , actu ally
pre sents. Thi s schematism of our trndersta nding, in its appli cation to
appearance s and their mere form , is an art concealed in th e depths of th e
human soul, wh ose r eal modes of acti vitv nature is hardlv likelv ever to allow
us to discover, and to have open to au/ gaze . This much only 'we can assert;
th e ima8e is a product of th e em pirical faculty of reproductive imagination;
the schema of sensible co ncepts, suc h as of figures in space, is a product and ,
as it were, a monogram, of pure a prior: imagination , through which, and in
~ccordance with wh ich , images thems elves first become possible . These
Images can be conne ct ed with the co ncept only by means of the schem a to
which th ey belong. In th em selves th ey are n ever com pletely congr uent with
the concept. On th e other hand, the schem a of a pure concept of
unders tanding can nev er be br ought into any image whatsoever. It is simply
the pure syn the sis, det ermined by a rule of that unity, in accordance with
concepts , to which the cat egory gives ex pression. It is a transcendental
~r oduet of im agination, a product which concer ns the determination of
er sense in general according to conditi ons of its form (time) , in respect
of all r epresentations, so far as these representations are to be connected a
prion in one con cept in confor m ity with the unity of apperception .

In:

NOTE
1. All footn ote s ha ve been re m oved from th is passage.

'';'8 : I MAGES

~2

SPACE AND TIME

GOTTHOLO LESSING

I reason thus; if it is true that in its imitations painting uses compl etely

different means or signs than does poetry, namely ngures and colors in space

rather than articulated sounds in time, and if these signs must indisputably

bear a suitable relation to the thing signified, then sign s existing in space can

express only objects whose wholes or parts coexist, while signs that follow

one another can express only objects whose wholes or parts are consecutive.

Objects or parts of objects which exist in space are called bodies.

Accordingly, bodies with their visible properties are the true subjects of

painting.

Objects or parts of obj ects which follow one another arc called actions.

Accordingly, actions are the true subjects of poetry.

However, bodies do not exist in space only , but also in time . They persist in

time, and in each moment of their duration they may assume a different

appearance or stand in a different combination. Each of these momentary

appearances and combinations is the result of a preceding one and can be the

cause of a subs equent one, which means that it can be, as it were, the center

of an action. Consequently, painting too can imitate actionsv but only by

suggestio n through bodies.

On the other hand, actions cannot exist ind ependently, hut must be joined

to certain beings or things . Insofar as these beings or things are bodies , or

ar e treated as such, poetry also depicts bodies, but only by suggestion

through actions.

Painting can usc only a single moment o f an action in its coexistmg

compositions and must th erefore choose the one which is most sugge stive

and from which the preceding and succeeding actions are most easily

com prehensible .

Similarly, poetry in its progressive imitations can use only one Single

property of a body. It must therefore choose that one which awakens the

most vivid image of the body, looked at from the point of view under which

poetry can best use it. From this comes the rule concerning the harmony of

descriptive adjectives and economy in description of physical objects.

I should put little faith in this dry chain of reasoning did 1 not find it
completely confirmed by the procedure of Homer, or rather if it had not
been just this procedure that led me to my conclusions. Only on these
principl es can th e grand style of the Greek be defined and explained, and
only thus can the proper position be assigned to the opposite style of sO
Gottbold Ephrram Lessm g, Laocoon /1n 6 .'Oaf oil {he Lrmus if P131."ltJng and Poetry; tr. Edw~yQ Allen
McCormick . Baltirn ore, MD : Johns H opkins Un;v"r ,'ty Press. 193 1, PI." 7~:-'" 19 84 John, Hopkms
Uriivcr-srtv Press. Rc prf n t c.d wrth per mi s.~ ion of Th e [ohns Hop kin=- U n n ( ~r:-'lt) Press.

FROM KANT TO FREUO : 4 9

many modern poets, who attempt to rival the painter at a point where they
mus~ necessarily be surpassed by him.

CAMERA OBSCURA
KARL MARX AND FRIEDRICH ~NGLS

The production of ideas , of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly

interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men,
the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the m ental intercourse of
men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour.
The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of
politics, laws, morality, religion, m etaphysics, etc. of a people. Men are the
producers of their conceptions, ideas , etc. - real , active men, as they are
conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the
intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness
can never he anything else than con scious exist en ce , and the existence of
men is th eir actual life-process . If in all ideology men and their
circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscure, this phenomenon
arises just as mu ch from their historical life-process as the inversion of
objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.
In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to
earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven, That is to say, we do not set
out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated,
thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. \Ve
set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process
we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes
of this life-process. The phantoms formed in t}1C human brain are also,
necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is em pirically
w:rifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics,
all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness,
thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have nO
history, no development; but men, developing their material production
and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence,
their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not d etermined
by consciousness, but consciousness by life. In th e first method of
app~oach the starting-point is consciousness taken as the living individual;
In the second method, which conforms to real life, it is the real living
mdiYiduals themselves , and consciousness is considered solely as their
co nscio usness.

Karl Ma.rx and Prledrrc k Engd."i . fro m ' Feuer-bach ". In Th ~ (ser mon ldl.:oJ0!JX 2nd edn , (.~{ 1. C. ]. Art hu r.
l (md o n ; Law ren ce & Wishar-t , 1974, p. 47 . Translan on :D t 9 70 LA.....-ren ce & W ish ar-t ,

fil~

::, () : I MAGE S

2:4

THE FETISHISM OF COMMODITIES AND

THE SECRET THEREOF'
KARL MARX

A commodit y appea rs, at [irst sight , a very tri vial thing, and easily
understood. Its analysis shows that it is, in reality, a ver y que er thing ,
ab ounding in metaphysical subtleties and th eolo gical niceties. So far as it is
a value in use , there is nothing myst erious abo ut it, whether we con sider it
from th e point of view th at by its properties it is capable of satisfying human
wants, or from th e poin t th at tho se properties are th e product of human
labour. It is as clear as noon-day, th at man , by his industry, changes th e forms
of the mat eri als furn ishe d by Nature, in such a way as to make th em useful
to him .Th e form of wood, for instance, is altered , by maki ng a tabl e out of
it . Yet, for all that , the table contin ues to be that commo n, eve ry-day th ing,
wood . But , so soo n as it ste ps forth as a commodity, it is changed into
som ething transcendent. It not only stands wi th it s feet on the ground, but,
in relation to all other comm odities, it stands on its head, and evolv es out of
its wooden br ain grote sg LIe ideas , far mo re wo nderful than 'table- tu rning'
ever was.
The mystical cha rac te r o f comm odities does not originate , therefore, in
their use- valu e. Just as littl e do es it proceed from the nature of the
determining factors of valu e. For, in th e first place, however varied the
useful kind s of labour, or productive activ itie s, may be , it is a physiological
fact , that th ey are functions of the human organism , and that each suc h
function , whatever m ay be its nature or form , is essentially the expen diture
of human brain , nerves, mu scles, &c. Secondly, w ith r egard to that whic h
forms the gr ound -work for the quantitati ve determination of value, nam ely,
the duration of th at expenditure , or th e qu antity o f labour, it is qu ite clear
that there is a palp able difference b et ween its quantity and quality. In all
states of society, the labour-t im e tha t it costs to produce the means of
subsistence, mu st necessarily be an obje ct of inte res t to m ankind , though
not of equ al interes t in different stages of development. And lastly, from th e
moment that me n in any way work for one anothe r, th eir labou r assumes a
social for m .
Whence , then , ar ises th e e nigmatica l charac ter of the product of labou r,
so soon as it assumes the form of com mo dities? Clea rly from this form
itself. The equality of all sor ts of hum an labou r is exp resse d objectively by.
their products all being equally values; th e meas ure of th e expenditure of
labour-power by the du ration of that expenditure, takes th e form of the
quantity of value of the pr odu cts of labou r ; and finally, th e mutual relations
of the producer s, withi n which th e social charact er of th eir labour affirrns
itself, take th e form of a social relation b etween the products.

Ka rl M olTX, fr o )')'} ' The r(t j ~h is1T1 o f co m m o d it ies and t he $Cl' Tc t tlwf(:uf '. JIJ (;Fa ,,1, Vol. l , . 4 ,
(r, S. Mo or e am i E. Avc ling. London : Charles H . Ke rr & Co. , 19 1'). pro H1-4 lInd 8 5- 6 . C op yr-ig h t 1906 .

F ROM KA N T TO

FREUD: ~'> l

A commodity is th erefore a myst erious thing, sim ply becaus e in it th e

social char acter of m en's labour app ears to them as an objective character
stamped up on the pr oduct of that labour ; beca use th e relati on of th e
ro d ucer~ to th e sum total of th eir own labo ur is pr esent ed to th em as a
~oc ial relation, existing not bet ween th em selves, but be tween th e pr oducts
of the ir labour. Thi s is the reason why th e p rodu cts of labour become
commod ities, social th ings whose qu alities are at the same time perceptible
and imp er cep tible by the senses . In th e same way the light from an object
is perceived by us not as th e subjective excitatio n of o ur optic nerve , but
as the objective form of some thing outside the e ye itself. But , in th e act of
seeing, th ere is at all eve nts, an actu al passage of light from on e thing to
another, fro m the external object to th e eye . There is a physical relation
betwe en phv sica] things. But it is different with commo dities. There , the
existence of th e thi ngs qua commo d ities, and th e value -r elation bet ween
the produ cts of labo ur wh ich ~tamps th em as commo di ties, have absolutely
no conn ection with the ir physical properti es and with the mat erial
relations ari sing therefrom. There it is a definit e social relation between
men , that assumes , in their eyes , th e fantastic form of a relation between
things. In orde r. th erefore , to find an analogy, we must have re course to
the mi st-envelop ed reg ions of the religiOUS wo rld . In that world th e
productions of t he hu man br ain app ear as indep end en t b eings endowed
with life, and ente ring into relation both with one another and the human
race. So it is in th e world of com modities with the produ cts of m en's
hands. This J call the Fetishism which atta ches itse lf to the products of
labour, so soo n as th ey are pr odu ced as commodities, and which is
therefore insep arable from the production of com mo dities.
This Fetishism of commod ities has its orig in , as th e for egOing analysis has
already show n, in the peculiar social char acter of th e labour that produces
them .
As a general rul e , ar ticles of utility becom e commodities, only because they
are products of the labour of private individuals or groups of individuals
who carryon their work independently of each other. The sum total of the
l~bour of all these private individuals form s the aggregate labour of socie ty.
Since the pro ducers do not co me int o social contact with each othe r until
r.hey exchange their products , the specific social characte r of each pro ducer 's
labour does not show itself except in the act of exc hange . In oth er words,
the labour of the individual asser ts itself as a par t of th e labour of societv
"
onIy by m eans of th e relation s which the act of exc hange establishes directly
between th e pr odu cts, and indirectly, through them , between the producer s.
T~ the latter, therefor e, the relations connecting th e labour of one individual
With that of the rest appear, not as dir ect social relati ons between individuals
at work, hut as what th ey really are, mater ial relatio ns between persons and
.,: ad al rel ation s between things. [. .. J
I-fc:nce, when we bring th e products of ou r labour into rel ation with each
other as values, it is not because we sec in the se articles the mat er ial
receptacles of hom ogen eous human labour. Q uite the contrary ; wh en ever,

:', 2 :I M A G E S

by an exchange, we equat e as value s our different products, by that ver)'

3. The rea l world , unattainabl e , undemonst rable, cannot b e promised, but

act, we also equate , as hu man labour, the different kinds of labour

expended upon them. \Ve are not aware of thi s, nevertheless we do it.
Value, therefor e , do es not stalk about with a label describing what it is. It
is value , rather, that conv erts every product into a social hieroglyphic.
Late r on, we try to decipher the hier oglyphic, to ge t behind the sec ret of
our ow n social pr oducts; for to stamp an o bject of utility as a valu e, is just
as m uc h a social product as language. The recen t scien tific discovery,
th at th e products of labour, so far as they ar e values, ar c but mat erial
ex press ions of the hum an labour spe nt in th eir pr oduction , m arks, ind eed ,
an epoch in the history of th e development of th e human rac e, but, by no
means, dissipates the mi st through wh ich the social charac ter of labour
appe ars to us to be an obj ective character of th e pr oducts them selves. Th e
fact, that in th e parti cular for m of p roduction with whi ch we are d ealing,
viz ., th e production of com modi t ies, th e spe cific social char acter of privat e
labo ur car r ied on independ ently, consist s in th e equality of every kind of
that labour, by virtue of it s bein g human labou r, which characte r,
th erefore, assumes in the product th e form of value - this fact appears to
th e producers, notwithstanding the discovery above referred to, to be ju st
as re al and final, as th e fact, that, after th e discover y by science of th e
com pone nt gases of air, th e atm osphere it self rem ained un altered .

even w hen m erely thought of a consolation, a duty, an imperat ive.

NOTE
1. All footnotes have been removed from this passage.

2:5

FROM KA N T T O FR EUD : 5 3

HOW THE REAL WORLD AT LAST

BECAME A MYTH

(Funda me ntally the same old sun , but shining th rough mist and
scepticism ; th e idea gr own sublime , pale , northerly, Konigsbergian .)2
4. The real wo rld -- unattainable? Un attained , at any rat e . And if un attained
also unknown. Consequ ently also no consolatio n, no redemption, no d uty :
how could we have a d uty toward s some thing unkno wm?

(Th e g rey of dawn. First yawnings of r eason . Cockcrow of positi vism .) l

5.The 'real world ' - an idea no longer of any usc, not even a duty any longer _
an idea gro wn usel ess, supe rfluo us , consequently a refuted idea: let us
abolish it !
(Broa d daylight; breakfast ; r eturn of cheerfuln ess and bon sens; Plato
blushes for shame; all free spirit s run riot.)
6. We have abo lishe d th e re al wo rld: what world is left? th e appare nt wo rld
perhap s? . . . But n o! with th e real world we have also abolish ed th e appar ent world!
(Mid-day ; moment of th e shor test shadow ; end of the longest error;
zenith of mankind; [NCIPIT Z ARAT H USTRA. )+

NOTES

1. The tru th Wahrh eil, correspo nding to wahreWelt real worl d .

2. That is, Kantian , from the northerly German ci ty in which Kant was born and

in which he lived and died .

3. Here meaning empi r icism, philo soph y founded on observation and

experiment .
4 . Here begins Zara thu stra. [. . . J

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE

HISTORY OF AN ERROR
I .Th e real wo rld , attainable to the wise , the piou s, the vir tuo us man - he
dw ells in it, he is it.
(O ldest form of th e idea, rel ativ ely se nsible, Sim ple , convinci ng.
Tra nsc riptio n of the proposit ion ' I, Plat o, am the tru th.') 1
2. The real wo rl d , un attai n able fo r the moment , but pr omi sed to th e wise,
th e piou s, the virtuous man (' to the sinner who rep ents').

(Progre ss of the idea: it grows more refined, more enticing, more

in compreh ensible - it becomes a woman, it becomes Chr istian .. .)
Fl""i ed rich Nietzsche, "Ho w the "r-ea l world) at last. ~' :C ;:UTl (; a m vt h ". in i ;,", lrah [ uI ~h~ !d oh : 0,. H QOt'" to
J. H nl hng c1a)..; . 1 .(H\ (~ f)n : t\;~g u : r: C lasSIC::'.. i96 8 , Pl' . 4-0- 1.
Cop)'l"lght R-I. Holling .l:1\.k. 19 t;A. Re produced by p crrt"H:'i$1011 uf P, ~n .gU1n B()ob Ltd.
Phtl osopniu wizh a H r:H
: rtmu , TneA nti-Cim It , !T. R

ON TRUTH AND LIES IN A

NON-MORAL SENSE
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE

What then is truth ? A mov able host of metaphors, metonymies, and

anthropomorphisms: in sho r t, a sum of human relations which have been
poetic ally and rh etorically intensified , transferred, and em bellishe d, and
wh ich, after long usage, see m to people to be fixed, canonical, and
bind ing. Truths are illusions wh ich we have for gotten ar e illusi o ns ; th ey ar e
metapho rs which have become wor n out and have b een dr ain ed of
S(:nsuous for ce, coins which have lost th eir em bOSSing an d are now
considered as metal and no lon ger as coins.
Friedrich Niet zsc he . fTorrl rh ilf) .t(Jp ~v (Jr'ld7T(,c!J Sd <:!( ,OM j ;-(J>f/ NJel 7..H.:h(; ~ S() l~book) ?j":.J-U! l:,ar~r'
tr , Danie l Breaz ea le . ..\tlanti ~ : ! J 'ghhmd~, 0:J : I tuma u.tf cs P n~ !'i ~ , i 979 . p . g4,

J J1 70~ .

cd. ;)od

2.

5 4 : I M A GE S

IMAGES, BODIES AND

CONSCIOUSNESS
HENRI BERGSON

\ Ve will assume for th e moment th at we know nothing of theori es of m atter

and theories of spir it , nothing of the discussions as to th e realit y or ideality
of the exte rnal world. Here I am in the pr esen ce of imag es, in th e vaguest
sense of the word , images perceived when my senses are opene d to th em ,
unp erceived wh en th ey are dosed. All th ese im ages act and r eact upon one
another in all th eir elem ent ar y parts accordi ng to constant laws w hich I call
laws o f natur e, and, as a p erfect knowl edge of th ese Jaws would probably
allow us to calculate and to foresee wh at wi ll happ en in each of th ese
images, th e fut ur e of th e im ages must be containe d in their present and will
add to th em nothing ne...v.
Yet there is one of them which is distinct fro m aU the others, in that I do not
know it onl y from without by perceptions, but from within by affections: it
is my body. I exam ine the condit ions in w hich th ese affections are pr oduced:
I find th at th ey always inter pose the mselves b etween the excita tio ns that]
receive from without and th e movemen ts whi ch I am about to execut e, as
thou gh th ey had som e und efined influ ence on th e final issue . I pass in r eview
my differe nt affections: it seems to me that each of them conta ins , aft er its
kind, an invitati on to act , with at th e same tim e leave to wait and even to do
n othing. ] look close r : I find movem ents begun , but not ex ecu ted, th e
indication of a more or less useful decisio n , bu t no t that con straint whi ch
precludes ch oice . I can up , I co mp are my recollecti ons: I rem ember th at
eve ryw her e, in th e o rgan ic world , I have thought] saw this sam e sensibility
appea r at the very m om en t when n ature , haVing con ferred up on th e liVing
be ing the pow er of m obility in space, gives warning to th e species, by m eans
of sensation, of th e ge nera l dan ger s which threaten it , leaVing to the
ind ividual th e pr ecaution s necessar y for escapin g from th em. Lastly, I
int errogat e my consciousnes s as to th e part which it plays in affec ti on :
consciousn ess r eplies th at it is present ind eed , in th e for m o f feeling or of
sensati on , at all th e step s in which I b elieve that I take the initi ative , and th at
it fades and disappea rs as soon as my activity, by becoming auto matic, shows
th at consc io usn ess is n o lon ger neede d . Th er efore, ei ther all th ese
ap pear ances are dece pt ive, or the act in which th e affecti ve state issues is not
o ne of th ose wh ich might b e r igo ro usly de d uced from anteced ent
phenomena, as a mo vem ent from a m ovement; and, hence , it really adds
something new to the uni verse and to its hist or y. Let us hold to the
appearanc es ; I will formulat e purely and sim ply w hat I feel and what I see :

FR OM KAN T T O FREUD : 5 5

I pass now to the study, in bodi es similar to my own, of the str uctu re of that
articular image which I call my body. ] p erceive affer ent nerves whi ch
~ansm i t a disturbance to the nerve cente rs ; then effere nt nerves wh ich start
froIll the cent er, conduct th e disturbance to the periphery, and set in mo tion
parts of the body or th e body as a wh ole. I question the physiologist and the
psychologist as t o th e pur pose of both kind s. Tht'y an swer that , as th e ce n
trifugal movem ents of th e n er vou s syste m can cal! forth a mo vem ent of the
body or or parts of th e body, so th e ce nt ripe tal mov em ents, or at leas t som e
of them , gi ve birth to th e representation I of the ex te rnal world . What ar e
we to think of this?
The afferent ner ves are images, the br ain is an image, the disturbance traveling
throu gh the sensory ner ves and propagated in the brain is an image too. If th e
image which I term cerebral disturbance really begot ex te rn al images, it
would con tain th em in o ne way o r another, and the rep resentation of th e
who le material uni verse would be im plied in th at of this molecul ar
movement . Now to state this prop osition is eno ugh to show its absur dity.Th e
brain is part of the materi al wo rld ; the material world is not part of the brain.
Eliminate the image which bears the nam e m aterial world , and you destroy at
the same time the br ain and the cere bral disturbance which are parts of it .
Suppose, on the con tra ry, that these two images, th e brain and the cere bral
disturb ance , vanish : ex hypothesi you efface only these, that is to say very littl e ,
an insignificant detail fro m an imm ense picture .Th e picture in its totality, that
is to say th e wh ole univer se, rem ains. To make o f the br ain the conditi on on
which the w hole image depends is, in truth, a contradiction in terms, since
the brain is by hypothesis a part of this im age . Neither ner ves nor nerve
centers can , then, condition th e image of the universe.
Let us consider this last point. Her e are ex ternal images, then my body, and,
lastly, the changes brought abo ut hy my body in the surrounding images. I
See plainly how external imag es influ ence the image that r call my b ody: th ey
transmit movement to it. And I also see how th is bo dy influ ences external
images: it gives back movement to them. My body is, ~h en, in th e aggregate
~h e m aterial worl d, an image w hich acts like other im ages, re ceiving and
gJ\'mg back m ovement, w ith, perhaps , thi s differen ce only, that my body
appear s to choose, wi th in cer tain lim its the manner in which it shall restore
~v ha t it receives. But how could m y bod~ in general , and my ner vous system
In partk-ular, b eget the who le o r a part of my representation of th e universe?
may say that my body is matt er, or that it is an image : th e word is of no
Impon ance. If it is matt er, it is a part of th e materi a! world ; and th e material
~vo rld , con sequen tly, exists around it and with ou t it. If it is an im age, that
ITna? c can give bu t what has been put into it , and since it is , by hypothesis,
the Image of my bo dy only, it would be absurd to exp ect to get fro m it that
of the wh ole uni verse. My body , an obj ect destin ed to move other objects, I S, th en,

0:

:ou

All seems to tak e place as if, i n this 0fJ8 , e8ate if images which 1 call t he universe,
notbln8 , cally new could happ en except through th e m edium if certa in particular
Images, the ty pe if whic h lSJurnlshed me by my body

a center

HI

H enr-i R ~. rgs.o n. 'Of the selectio n o f i mag e~ for con sciou s p resen tat ion . What o ur h'.xly mt~ ., n~ and docs' .
,~au ~r an d ;}fcn:lO r)' ~ tr. Na ncy Margar et Paul .md Vy: Scou Palme r. Nc ....' Yor k - Z(JJ\t: Bo ok s, 199 1,

new acti on upon th e sur rounding objects, it ~ u st occu py a l~ ri vil cged

pp . 17- 22. Re pr-oduced b.y pcr nu sslo n of Z on e UQ()k ~ .

position in re gard to t hem. As a r ule , any image mfluences ot her Images in

if action; it cannot give birth

to a reprl?.> enw tion.

But if my bod y is an o bjec t capable of exercising a genuine and therefore a

FROM KANT TO FREUO :S7

.IMAGES

a manner which is determined, and even calculable, through what are called
the laws of nature . As it has not to choose, so neither has it any need to
explore the region round about it, nor to try its hand at several merely
eventual actions. The necessary action will take place automatically, when its
hour strikes. But] have supposed that the office of the image which I call my
body was to exercise on other images a real influence, and , consequentl y, to
decide which step to take among several which are all materially possible.
And since these steps are probably suggested to it by th e greater or lesser
advantage which it can derive from the surrounding images , these images
must display in some ,,'ay, upon the aspect which th ey present to my body,
the profit which my body can gain from them . In fact, I note that th e size,
shape, even the color, of external objects is modified as my body approaches
or recedes from them; that the strength of an odor, the intensity of a sound,
increases or diminishes with distance; finally, that this very distance
represents, above all , the measure in which surrounding bodies are insured,
in some way, against the immediate action of my body.To the degree that my
horizon widens, the images which surround me seem to be painted upon a
more uniform background and become to me wore indifferent. The more I
narrow this horizon , the more the objects which it circumscribes space
themselves out distinctly according to the greater or lesser ease with which
my body can touch and move them. They send back, then, to roy body , as
would a mirror, its event ual influence; they take rank in an order
corresponding to the growing or decreasing powers of my body. The objects
which surround my body rdleet its pOSSible action upon them.
[... ] I call matter the aggregate if images, and perception of matter these same
J mages rqerred CO the eventual action if one particular image, my body.

NOTE
1. The word representation is used throughout . . . in the French sense, as
meaning a mental picture, which mental picture is very often perception.
(Translators' note.)

2 :8

THE DREAM-WORK
SIGMUND FREUD

Until now every other effort to solve the problems presented by dreams has
latched directly on to the dream's manifest content as it is present in the
memory, and has attempted to use this as the basis of an interpretation; or,
if it dispensed with an interpretation, it sought to substantiate its judgement

Sigmund Fre ud, from "Dr -ea m \v-or k". in The Imapraati o(l (IDuanl.l" . tr. Jo)'(;,: Cri ck, Oxford: Ox.font
Un ivc r sit )' Pres s, 1999 , pp . 2 1 1- 1.2. 2 32 - 5 an d 254 .6 . Tran:-;btion c.. :<.> py r ig ht (i':; jny<.: \: Ct i,,:k, 1'=-)99 .
Rep roduced by pe r -mission o f O xfo rd Llmver stty. Prcss.

of the drcam by reference to its content. We are alone in confronting a

different state of affairs ; as we see it, there is a new kind of psychical
material intervening between the content of the dream and the results of
our reflections: the latent dream-content reached by our procedure, or the
dream-thoughts. It is from this latent content, not the manifest, that we
\\'orked out the solution to the dream. This is why a new task faces us which
did not exist before, the task of investigating the relationship of the manifest
dream-cont(~nt to the latent dream-thoughts, and of tracing the processes by
which the former turned into the latter.
The dream-thoughts and th e dream-content lie before us like two versions
of the same content in two different languages, or rather, the dream-content
looks to us like a translation of the dream-thoughts into another mode of
expression, and we are supposed to get to know its signs and laws of
grammatical construction by comparing the original and the translation.
Once we have learnt what these are, the dream-thoughts will be easy for us
to understand without any further ado. The content of the dream is given as
it were in the form of hieroglyphs whose signs are to be translated one by
one into the language of the: dream-thoughts. We would obviously be misled
if we were to read these signs according to their pictorial value and not
according to their referentiaiity as signs . Suppose I have a picture-puzzle, a
rebus , before me: a house with a boat on its roof, then a Single letter of the
alphabet, then a running figure with his head conjured away, and the like.
Now I could fall into the trap of objecting that this combination and its
constituent parts are nonsense. A boat docs not belong on the roof of a
house and a person without a head cannot run; besides, the person is bigger
than the house , and if the whole is supposed to represent a landscape, then
Single letters of the alphabet do not fit in there, as they certainly do not
occur in Nature. Obviously the correct solution to the rebus can only be
reached if I raise no such objections to the whole or to the details, but take
the trouble to replace each picture by a syllable or a word which, through
some association, Can be represented by the picture. The words connected
in this way are no longer nonsense, but can yield the most beautiful and
lUeaningfu I po etic saying. The dream is a picture-puzzle of this kind, and our
rred~cessors in the field of dream-interpretation made the mistake of
Judging th e rebus as if it were a pictorial composition . As such, it seemed to
them to have no meaning or value .

*
The first thing the investigator comes to understand in comparing the
drea.m-content with the dream-thoughts is that work if condensation has been
earned OUt here on a grand scale. The dream is scant, paltry, laconic in
COmparison to the range and abundance of th e dream-thoughts. Written
clown , the dream will fill half a page; the analysis c()ntain~~g rh e dream
thoughts -vlll require six, eight, twelve times as much space. if he r~ti o. varies
for diffen :nt dreams; as far as r can check, it never chan ges I ts inte nt.
As a rule, in taki ng t he dream-thoughts brought to light to be aU'tlw
dream -material there is, one is underestimating the degree of compr<.;ssioll

~) 8 : I M A G E S

FROM KANT TO

that takes place, whereas further work of interpretation is able to reveal

fresh thoughts hidden behind the dream. We have already had to note that
actually one is never certain of having interpreted a dream in its entirety;
even when the solution seems satisfying and complete, it is always possible
for a further meaning to announce its presence through the same dream .
The quota tj' condensation is thus, strictly speaking , indeterminabl e. One
conclusion to be drawn from this disproportion between dream-content and
dream-thoughts might be that a wholesale condensation of the psychical
material takes place during the dream's formation. [... J

*
While we were collecting examples of dream-condensation, another
relationship , probably no less significant, must alread y have caught our
attention. We could not fail to observe that the elements pushing to the fore
in the dream-content as essential components certainly did not play the same
part in th e dream-thoughts. As a corollary, this sta tement can also be
reversed .What is clearly essential in the COntent of the dream-thoughts does
not need to be represented in the dream itself at all. The dream, one might
say, is centred differently; its content is ordered around a centre made up of
elements other than the dream. thoughts. [... ] In my patient's Sappho dream,
[for ex ampl e], climbing up and down, bemg up above and down below are mad e to
be its cen tre ; but in fact the dream deals with sexual relations \vith persons
of the lower orders, so th at only one of the elements in the dream-thoughts
seems to have entered the dream-content, but then to an undue extent. [. ,.J
Dreams of this kind give the impression of displacement with good reason. In
complete contrast to the se exam ples, the dream of Irma's injection shows
that in the formation of a dream indi vidual elements are also ahle to r et ain
the pla ce they occupy in the dream-thoughts. When we firs t recognize this
new relation, which is entirely variable in meaning, between dream- thoughts
and dream -content, it is likely to fill us with astonishment . If in the course of
some normal psychical process we find on e idea being Singled out from many
others and becoming particularly vivid in our co nsciousness, we usually
regard this success as proof that it has been accorded the especially high
psychical value (a certain degree of interest) which is its due. But now we
discover that this value accorded to particular elements in the dream-thoughts
is not retained or not taken into account in forming a dream. After all, th ere
is no doubt as to which are the most valuabl e elements in the dream
thoughts ; our judgement needs no help to tell us. But in dream -formation
these essential elements, charged though they are with intense interest, are
dealt wi th as if they were of little value, and instead their place is taken in the
dream by other elements which certainly had little value in the dream
thoughts. At first this gives the impression that the p sychical intensity' of the
particular ideas was not taken into consideration at all. in their sele ction for
the dream , but only the varying nature and (!egree ol the ir determination.
What enters the dream , one might think, is n ot what b important in the
dream-thoughts, but what appears frequently a~d variously in
However,
thi s assum ption wi ll not, take OlU- under~taodJng of drearn -fon nation much

0em,

FREUD : ~~ 9

further, as from the outset it leaves no room for thinking that thes e two
fact or s in selecting elements for the dr eam - multiple determination and
inherent value - must necessarily work along the same lines to produce the
same meaning. 1t supposes that the ideas which are the most important in the
dream-thoughts are likely to be the ones that recur in them most often, for
the particular dr eam -thoughts radiate from them as it were from a centre.
And yet the dream can rej ect these elements, even though they are
emphasized so intensely and reinforced so variously, and it can take up into
its content other elements which are characterized by the second quality,
inherent value, alone.

(.. 1
The thought suggests itself that a psychical power is operative in the
dream-work which on the one hand strips the psychically valuable elements
of their int ensity, and on the other creates new values by way if OJ'eT
determmation out of elements of low value; it is the new values that then reach
the dream-content. If this is what happens, then a trangerence and displacement
rd the psycbical intensi0' of the individual elements has taken place; as a
consequence, the difference between the texts of the dream-content and the
dream-thoughts makes its app earance. The process we are assuming here is (he
essential part of the dream-work; it has earned the name of dream-displacement.
Dream-displacement and dream-condensation ar e the two foremen in charge of the
dream-work, and we may put the shaping of our dreams down mainly to their
aotivitv.
,

*
So far we have been occupied with exam ining how the dream represents
relations between the dr eam -thoughts, but in doing so we frequently
returned to the broader topic of the general nature of the changes
undergone by the dream-material for the purposes of dream-formation.
Now we know that the dream-material , largely divested of its logical
relations, und ergoes a con centrat ion , while at the same tim e displacements
of intensitv among it s elem ent s n ece ssarily bring ab out a p sychical
transvaluation of this material. The displacements we were considering
turned out to be substitutions of one particular idea by another somehow
dosely associated with it; and they were useful in condensation, for in this
way, instead of two el ements, an int ermediate factor com mon to them both
g~i ned entry to the dr eam . We have n ot yet mentioned another kind of
(hsplacement. But we Jearn from our analyses that th ere is such a thing, and
that it makes its presence known in a transposition in the words used to express
the thought concerned . In both cases it is a matter of displacement along a
chain of associations, but th e same procedure tak es place in different
psychical spheres, and the result of thi s displacement is that in one case on e
: lerncn t is replaced by another, whil e in the other one elem ent exc?anges
Its verbal formulation for another.
This .i~F ond kind of displ acement occurring in the f?rmation of drc:ams is
not ocily of gn~at theo retical interest ; it is also parllcularly well sUlted"'to

6 0 : IMA GES

ex plain the app earance of fantastic absur dity in which dream s disguis.
themselves. As a rule , the displacem ent [ollows the dir ecti on taken when
co lourless and abstract ex pre ssion of th e dream -th ought is ex change d for
pict orial and concrete on e . The advantage, and thu s th e intenti on of t
substi tution, is obvious. For the dream , what is pictorial is capable ~
representation, can be integrated into a situation whe re an abstract expressioj
would cause similar difficulties for the dream -r epresentation to those ii
political leadin g ar ticle , say, would make for an illu strated new s-magazin
But not only representabilitv has to gain from thi s ex cha nge ; th e sever,
interest s of con densation and the censors hip are able to do so too . O nce
abstract, unusable thought is transformed into a picto ri al language, th ~
co ntacts and identities whic h the dream -work requires - and will creats
where th ey are not present - come abo ut bet ween thi s new expression an
th e rest o f th e dr eam -m ateri al more easily than before, for langu age ha;
develop ed in such a way th at the concrete words of every language are fa}
richer in associa tions than its conceptual term s. O ne can imagine tha t
good bit of th e intermediary work in th e pro cess of dr eam -formation talo
place in thi s way - by appropriate Linguistic transfor m ation of th e ind ividu
th ough ts - for it aims at reducing the separate dr eam -thought s to th e mo
eco nomical and unified expression possible in the dream . !... ]

NOTE

TWO

1.The psychical intensity, value, weight of inte rest , of an idea is of course to

kept separate from the sensory intensity of its represent ation .

THEORIES OF IMAGES

IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE

INTRODUCTION
3: I

Telev ision: M ultil ayered Structur e

Theodor Adorno

3:2

Soci ety of the Spectacl e

Guy De bord

3:3

The Precession of Simula cra

Jean Baudrillard

3:4

Image as Com mod ity

redric Jameson

3:5

' Race' and Natio n

'auf Gilroy

3:6

Never Just Pictur es

Susan Bordo

Karl Marx and Friedrich .Engels (2.3) ini tiated a .traditi on of SOCial analysis
that sees: ideo logy as pervading and distorting human relations and
consciousness. lri their initial critique of 'German ideology', the version of
Hegelian thought popular in Germany in th eir tim e, they argued that the
hilosophers had an inverted vision .of reality because they im agined that
ideas change the world. Hence, the Cerrnan ideol ogists' phil osophi cal
critique of-the 'false conceptions' and .'chimeras ' in the ruli ng ideas was
useless, because it did not change the material cond itions reflected by those
ideas, Marl' did not him self develop further the notion of ideol ogy, the term
'false consciousness ' being a later inventio n. But W.J.T. M itchell (1986) and
others argue that M arx's (2 .4) analysis of the capitalist commodi ty as a
mysterious fetish is, like ideology critiq ue, part of M arx's iconoclastic
critique of capitalist idolatry. M arx moves from the mental idolatry of the
inverted ideas of the German idealist philosophers to the material idolatry of
commodities. Mitthe ll l l .986: 4) claims that 't he noti on of ideol ogy is rooted
in the concept of imagery, and reenacts the ancient struggles of iconoclasm,
idolatry, and fetishisrn' . Ideology critique thus entails the problems discussed
in the introduction to Section 1. '
' .
..
.

Ideology critique is also an analysis of th ~ power relations invo lved in the

reproduction of capitalism, w hich legitimates itself by means of a set of
:uling idcas.T1ie critique unmasks those ideas as false, partia l, mythicalor
Imaginary images of capita list society, w hich generally obscure the
contradictions and explo itation in capitalist eco nom ics and class relations. .
Marx's idea of ideology has been developed in many ways, some of which
do not regard ideol ogical consciousness as false, or as an epistemological
error ('zit ek, 1994) . Ideo logy critique has-been a pow erfu l tool for the critical
~ n al ys i s of contemporary ' image culture', particularly useful for unmasking
Images of society, subjectiv ity and human relatio ns broadcast by the mass
media (Nichols, 198 1; Wi lliams, 19 74). Versions of ideo logy critique
adopted in cu ltural and media studies often employ other concepts and
~e t hods of image analysis, such as semiotics and psychoanalysis (see
Introductions to Sections .5 and 7).

~s With Ma rx's analysis of the commod ity, critical theorists focused on the
lormof ideo logical representation in order to reveal its ideological function.
Max Horkhei rner and Theodor Adorno (199 3) cri tiqued the capitalist
structure of the 'c ulture industry' as a tool of 'mass deception', whose
landardi sed produc ts rob the audience of their facult ies of ima ginatron and
reflection, turni ng le isure time into the wo rk of consump tion and
onformism. Adorno's (3 . 1) <l ila lysis of the television image lin ks this type of
struclural investigation with Freud's UJI) language (Jf psy choa na lvsts.

fMAGES

The harmonious 'manifest' co ntent of the image masks a contradictory and

harmful social reality - the 'l atent' base out of which the image grows. The
role of the critic is to describ e the relation ship between these two elements
so that the audienc e can see the social truth behind the image.
If Horkeimer and Adorno had theorised the commodification of mass
culture, Guy Debord (3.2) concei ves the spectacle, of which the mass media
are the most obvious manifestation, as the comm odification of all social li fe.
Analysing, unlike Marx , conditions. of economi c abundan ce rather than
poverty, he consid ers how workers have become isolated consumers of
illusions or pseudo-needs. He also refers back to Marx's key figures of
ideology, conceiving the social relations of the spectacle as fetishistic. Yet,
he regards the spectacl e not as the inverse image of reality, but as an
inversion or negation of 'real' life. a false reality that is thematerial isation of
ideology. There is also a clear resonance wi th Plato's (1.4) iconoclasm; in
that the 'spectator's consciousn ess' r ls ' imprisoned ... by the screen oh he
spectacle' which 'is his "mirror image" (Debor-d. 1983: 2 1B).
Jean Baudrlllard (3.3) concurs with Debord 's analysis that ideol ogical images
have lost thei r illus ionary character to becom e reality. But Baudrillard
critic ises Marxi sm and ideology critique for serving as alibi s for the
disappearance of reality into simulation and hyperreality, Hi s basic argument
is that both produ ction and signification lose their .connection with realit y,
such that referent ial value (in respect of use value or the referent) is
annihilated and everythin g 'collapses-into simulation ' (Baudrillard, J 993: 8).
The world that has been transformed into images is-riot a society of the
spectacl e, which is ' a li extensi on of the commodity for m' (Best, 1994: 51),
but is a dernaterlalisation of everyth ing into signs. Following the
ramifications of Byzantine icQ\1oclasm (1.8 to 1.10) to the limit, Haudril lard
con cludes that the hyperrealslmulated irnage does not conceal anything,
so ideology crit ique is redundant.
Fredric Jameson (3.4) adopts ideas from Hor kheimer and Adorno, Debord
and Baudril lard. among many other influences, while retaining a M arxist,
historical materlaltst approach, He expli citly characterises contemporary
spectacl e or image culture, w hich he takes to be the cultural logic of a new,
mul tination al or late stage of capitalism, ,as postmodern. In this .rnode of
capitalism, that is more extensive and intrusive than earlier stages, the
di stinctionbetween economi c base and cultural superstructure is eclipsed,
so that we seem obliged ' to talk about cultural phenomena .. . in business
terms' (Iarneson, 1991: xx i). The commodified media arc central to this
identification, as the market merges with media into an image of social
total ity, legiti mated by the consumption of consumption, of produ cts as
images.
The underl ying approach of ideology critique in revealing that whi ch is
concealed by im ages has proved useful for cultu ral analysis that is not only
or primarily concerned with unveilin g capitali sm . Other forms of
oppression, such as racism and sexism, can be show n to be at work, often
unconsciously, in images. Critical race analysis o~en highlights the visibility
of race (Fanon, 1986). Paul Gilroy (3.5 ) p~ov,dcs ,:n eX<lmpl e of how
ostensibly incl usive images of class, ~i.ti~en shlp or natlonalit~ ideologi call y
conceal racist exclu sions. Feminist cr.J tlcl sm has often been dir ected against
demeaning and reduct ive representations of.wome n .that not only express or
promote sexist attitudes to wome n (Dworkin, 1981, M ulvey, 7.3), but also

INTRODUCTION

hape women's sense of self. Susan Bordo (3.6) focuses on the normalising
of images of women's bodi es, such that women embody images, lik e
~ audrjll ard 's simulacra that precede reality. Bordo invokes Plato's (1.4) scene
i the power of images in the cave, but claim s that cultural critics must
~ema in in the cave of mystifying cultural images while trying to demystify

S ower

them,

REFERENCES

Baudrillard. J. (1 993) Symbolic Exchange and Death. tr. I.H. Grant. London: Sage.

Best, s. (1994) 'The commoditication of reality and the reality of commodification:

Baudrillard, Debord, and postmodern theory', in D. Kellner (ed.), Baudr illard : A

Crilica l Reader. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 41- 67.

Debord.. G, (19IB ) Society of the Spectacle. Detroit: Black & Red.

Dworkin. A. (1981) Pornography. New York: Perigree Books.

Fanon, F. (1986) Black Skin, White Mash , tr. C L Markmann. New York: Grove Press.

Horkheimer, M. and Adorno, T. (1993) Di alectic of Enlightenment, tr. J. Cumming.

New York: Continuum.

Jameson. F. (199 1) Postm odernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Cap italism. London:

Verso.

Mitchell, w.rT. (198 6) Ico nology: Image, Text, Ideology , Chicago: University of

Chicago Press.

Nichols, B. (1981) Ideology and the Image. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Williams, R. (1974) Television : Techn ology and Cultura l Form, London: Fontana.

Ziiek, S. (ed.) (1.994 ) Mapping Ideology . London: Verso.

I D E O L O G Y CRITIQUE : S 7

66: I M A G E S

TELEVISION: MULTILAYERED
STRUCTURE'
THODOR AOORNO

A depth-psychological approach to tel evision h as to be focus ed on its

multilayered st ructure, Mass media are not simply the sum total of th e
act ions they portray or of the messages that radiate fro m th ese actions . Mass
m edia also consist of various layers of m eanings superimpo sed on on e
another, all of which contribute to the effect . True, du e to th eir calculative
nature, these rationalized products see m to b e more clear -cut in their
m ean ing than authentic works of art, whi ch can never be boil ed down to
so me unmistakabl e ' message' . But the h eritage of polymo rphic meaning has
been taken over by cultural industry ina smuch as what it conveys becomes
itsel f o rganized in order to enthral th e spectators on var ious psychological
levels simultaneously. As a matter of fact, th e hidden m essage may be more
important than th e overt, since this hidd en message will escap e th e controls
of consciousness, will not be 'looked throu gh' , will not be ward ed ofT by
sales r esistance, but is likely to sink into the spectator 's m ind .
Probably all th e various levels in mass medi a involve all th e m echani sm s of
co nsci ousness and unconsciousn ess s tressed by p sycho-an alysis . TIle
differ ence between th e sur face content, th e overt m essage of tel evised
mat erial , and its hidden m eaning is gener ally m ark ed and rath er clear -cu t.
Th e ri gid sup erimposition of various layers probably is on e of th e features
by whi ch m ass media are di stinguishabl e from th e integrated products of
autonomous art , where the various layer s ar e much mor e thoroughly fused.
Th e full effec t of the material on th e sp ectator canno t be studied w ithout
conside r ation of the hidden meaning in conjunction with the overt one,
and it is precisely this interplay of various layer s whi ch has hitherto
been neglec te d and which will be our foc us. Thi s is in accordance w ith the
assumption shared by num erous soci al scientists that certain political and
social trends of our time, particularly those of a totalitarian nature , feed to
a co nside r able ex te nt on irrational and frequently un con scious motivations .
Whether th e conscious 01 ' the unconscious m essage of our material is more
imp ortant is hard to predict and can he evaluate d only after care ful analysis.
'vVe do appreciate, however, that th e overt m essage can be interpreted much
m ore ad equat ely in the light of psychodynami cs - that is, in it s relation to
instin ctual urges as well as control - than by looking at th e overt in a naive
way and by ignoring its implications and presupposition s.
The relation betw een overt and hidd en m essage will prove higWy complex
in practice . Thus, the hidden m essage frequent ly aims at reinforcing
conventionally r igid and 'pseudo -realistic' attftud.e, similar to th e accepted
ideas more rationali stically propagated by the surface message. Convers ely, a
number of repressed gratifications which playa large ro le O Il the hidden level
r (..-d . I . [It'r n;ll;t d n I
J

o , from . He" v to loo k at tdc", l.~ i()n ' . In The Culture Induurr
l\rnJ\Jl'dg<." 19':)( . pp.
175 -7 . R cprodu ct-.d w ith pcnnb .'I.iotl . Origin all\' Ir 1/
. ,( )O ( on :

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are somehow allowed to manifest th emselves on the surface in jests, off-colour

remarks , suggestive situati ons, and similar devices. All this interaction of
various levels, however , points in some definit e dir ecti on : the tendency to
channeli;t.e audi ence reaction. Thi s falls in line with the suspicion Widely shar ed ,
waugh hard to corroborate by exact data , that the majority of television show s
today aim at producing, or at least reproducing, the very smugness, intellectual
passivity and gullibility that seem to fit in . . vith totalitarian creeds even if the
explicit surface message of the shows may be anti -totalitarian .
\Iv'ith the means of modern psychology, we will try to determine th e
primary prerequisit es of shows e liciting mature , adult, and responsible
reactions - implying not only in con te nt but in th e very way things are being
looked at, th e idea of autono m ous individuals in a free democratic society.
We perfectly reali ze that any d efinition of such an individual will be
hazardous; but we know quit e w ell what a human being deserVing of the
appellation ' autonom o us indi vidual ' should n ot be, and this ' not ' is actually
the focal point of our consideration ,
When we speak of th e multilayered str uctur e of television shows, \ve are
thinking of various supe rim posed layers of di fferent degrees of manifestness
or hiddenness that ar e utilized by m ass cult ure as a technological means of
'handling' the audience . Thi s w as ex pressed felicitously by Leo Lowenthal
when he coine d th e t erm 'p sychoanalysis in reverse ' .Th e implication is that
som ehow the psycho analyti c co nce pt of a multilayered personality has be en
taken up by cultural industry, and that the con cep t is used in order to
ensnare the con sumer as com ple tely as po ssible and in order to engage him
psycho-dynamically in the serv ice of prem editated effects. A clear-cut
division into allowed gratifications , forbidden g r atifications, and recurrence
of the forbidden gratifications in a somew hat modified and deflected form
is carried through.

To illustrate the concept of the multilay er ed str uctu re: the heroine of an
extremely light co me dy of pranks is a young schoolteacher who is not only
underpaid but is incessantly fined by th e caricature of a pompous and
authoritarian school principal. Thus, she has no money for her meals and is
actually starving. Th e supposedly funny situ ations consist mostly of her trying
to hustle a meal from various acquaintances, but regularly without success. The
;nention of food and eating seems to induce laughter - an observation that can
;rcquently be made and in vites a stu dy of its own , 0 vertl y, the play is just slight
amusem ent mainly provided by th e painful situati ons into which the heroine
and ~er arch-opponent con stantly run .The scr ipt do es not try to 'sell' any idea.
Th.e hidden me aning ' em erges sim ply by the way the story looks at human
b~lngs; thus th e audien ce is invited to look at the character s in the same way
Witho ut being made aware that indoctrination is present. Th e character of the
underpaid, maltreated schooleeachc r is an att empt to reach a compromise
between preVailing sco rn for thc intellectual and the equally conventionalized
r ~ spc,ct for 'cu lture'. The hero ine shows suc h an intellectual superiority and
hl~h -spirjtedness th at identification with he r is inv ited, and co mpensation is
oflercd for the inferiority of her position and that of her ilk in the social
Set-un. .Nol o n l". i.. th.....>n t r " l character supposed to b !..l .ve.n&.c hartnin a h ilI ..h ..

62 : IMAGES

I D E O L O G Y CR IT IQ U E : b 9

wisecracks con stantly. In terms of a set pattern of identificati on , the scr ipt
implies: 'If you are as humorous, good-natured, qui ck-witted , and charming as
she is, do not worry about being paid a star vation wage .You can cope with your
frustration in a humorous way; and your superior w it and clever ness put you
not only above materia l privations, but also above the rest of mankind' . In other
words , the script is a shrewd me thod of promoting adjustm en t to humiliating
conditions by presenting them as objectively comica l and by giving a picture
of a person who exp eriences even her own inadequate position as an obj ect
of fun apparently free of any resentment.

Of course, this latent m essage cannot be considered as unconscio us in the

strict psychological sense , but rather as 'inobtrusive "; thi s message is hidden
only by a style wh ich do es n ot pretend to touch anything serious and
expect s to be r egarded as feath erwei gh t. N e ve rtheless, even su ch
amus ement tends to set patterns fo r th e m emb er s o f the aud ience w ith out
their being aware of it.
[. . . J

Here, an obj ection may be raised : is such a sinister effect of the hidd en
message of tel evision known to those who control, plan, write and direct
show s? O r it may even be asked: are those traits possible projections of the
unconscious of the decision -makers' 0\'Vl1 minds acco r ding to-the Widespread
assumption that works of art can be properly und erstood in term s of psy
chologica l projections of th eir author s? As a m atter of fact , it is thi s kin d of
reasoning th at has led to the suggestion that a specia l socio-psycho logical study
of decision -ma kers in th e field of television b e ma de. We do not think that
such a study would lead us very far. Even in th e sphere of autonomous ar t, the
idea of projection has been largely overrated. Although the authors' motivations
cer tainly enter th e ar ti fact, they are by no m eans so all-d etermining as is often
assum ed . As soon as an ar ti st has set himself his problem, it obtains some
kind of im pact of its own; and, in m ost cases , he has to follow the obj ective
requirements of his product m uch more than his own urge s of exp ression
when he translates his primary conception into reality. To be sure, these
objective requirem en ts do not play a deci sive ro le in m ass media , which stress
the effect on the spectator far beyond any artistic problem . However, th e total
set-up her e tends to limit the chances of the ar tists' projections utterly.
Those wh o produce th e material follow, often grumblingly, innumerable
requirem ents, rules of thumb, set patterns , and mechanisms of contro l which
by necessity reduce to a mini m um the ran ge of any kind of artistic self
express ion. Th e fact that most products of m ass m edia ar e not prod uced by
on e individual but bv
collective coll aboration - as happ ens to be true with
J
most of the illustrations so far discussed - is only one co ntr ibuting factor to
this generally prevailing condition. To study television show s in te rms of the
p sycho logy of th e auth ors would almost be ta~tamo u nt to stud)i ng Ford cars
in ter ms of the psych oan alysis of the late Mr fo rd .

[tu ral and pedagogical problem presented by tel evision , we do not think

novelty o f th e sp ecifi c finding s should be a pri m ary concern. We

know from p sychoanalysis th at th e reasoning, ' But we know all thi s!' is often

a defence . This defence is m ade in order to dism iss inSights as ir rel evant

because they ar e actually uncomfortable and make life m ore diffi cu lt for us

than it alre ady is by shaki ng our conscienc e w hen we are supposed to en joy

the 'simple pleasures of life ' . Th e investi gatio n of the telev ision problems we

have here ind icat ed and illu strat ed by a few examp les select ed at random

demands , most of all, taki ng ser iously notions dimly familiar to most of us

by putting them into thei r proper co ntext and persp ecti ve and by checking

them by pertinent mater ial. We p ropose to co nce ntra te o n issues of which

we arc vaguely but unco mfortably aware, even at th e expense of OUT

discomfort's mounting, th e further and the more syste matically our studies

proce ed . 'The effor t here req uir ed is of a m or al nat ure itself: kn OWing ly to

face psycholog ical mechanisms operating on various levels in ord er not to

become blind and passive victims.'We can change this m edium of far-reaching

potentialities only if we look at it in th e same spirit whi ch we hope w ill one

day be expressed by its imager y.

~at the

NOTE
1. Footnotes re moved.

S O C IE TY OF THE SPECTACLE
GUY DEBOR D
1. In SOCIetIes w here modern conditions of production prevail, all life

presents itself as an immense accum ulation of spectacles. Everything that w as

directly lived has m oved away in to a representation.

2. The im ages detached from every aspect of life fuse in a common stream
in which the unity of thi s life can no lon ger be reestab lished . Reality
considere d pa rtiall)' unfold s, in its own ge nera l un ity, as a pseudo-world
pan , an obj ect of m ere con te mp lation . The spe cialization of im ages of th e
world is completed in m e wor ld o f the autonomous im age, w here the liar
~as lied to himself. Th e specta cle in ge neral, as th e co ncre te inversion of life,
IS the autonom o us movem ent of the non-liVing.
3. The ~pe eta cl e presen ts it sel f Sim ultaneously as all o f society, as part of
sock ty, and as instrum ent if unifi catIon . As a part o f societ y it is sp ecificallv
the sec tor wh ich co nce ntrates all gazing and all consci o usness . Du e to the
Very fact that thi s sec to r is st>parate , it is th e Com m on gro und of the deceived
gaze and of false con sciousness, and the uni fication it achi eves is nothing but
all Official langu age of ge ne r alized separa tion.

'"

W e do not pretend that the individual iIl ust r~ti ons and ex amples , or th e

, . , . 'J C 'l are inte rpreted , are basically new. But in view of the

Guy Debor d, from SOCk!} :ith e ,'1:= aclc, I k tm i, : Black & R,,d. 1983 .

""' IS

1- 5 .10<1 21 \.

3:2

I D E O L O G Y CRITIQU E ; ~' ;

70 ; I M A G E S

4 . The spectacle is not a collection of images, but a social rel ation am ong
peopl e , m ediated by images.
5.Th e spe ctacle cannot be understood as an abuse of the wo rld of vision, as
a produ ct of the techniques of mas s dissemination of inlages. It is, rather, a
WelranscnauunB which has become actual , materiallv, tran slated . It is a world
vision whi ch has become objectified.

*
2 15 .Th e spectacle is ideology par excellence, because it exposes and manifests
in its fullness the essence of all ideolo gical system s: the imp overishment,
ser vitu de and negation of real life. Th e spe ctacle is materially 'the expression
of th e separation and estrangement between man and man .'Through the 'new
power of fraud ,' concentrated at the base of the spectacle in this production,
' the new domain of alien being s to whom man is subservi ent . . . grows
coextensively with th e mass of objects .' It is the highest stage of an expansion
which has turned need against life. 'The need for money is thu s the real need
produced by politi cal economy, and the only need it produces' (Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts). The spectacle exte nds to all social life the principle
which Hegel (in the Realphilosophie of Jena) con ceives as the principle of
mon ey: it is 'the life of what is dead, moving within itself.'

3 :3

THE PRECESSION OF SIMULACRA I

JEAN BAUDRfLLARO

The simulacrum is never what hides the truth - it is truth that hides the fact that there is none.
The sim ulacr um is tru e. - Ecclesiastes

If once we were able to vievv the Borges fable in which th e car t ographe rs of
th e Empir e dr aw up a map so detailed that it ends up cover ing th e ter ritory
exac tly (the d eclin e of th e Empire witnesse s the fraying of this m ap, little by
littl e, and its fall into ruins, though som e shreds are still discer nib le in the
deserts - th e metaphysical beauty of thi s ruined abstraction testifying to a
pride equ al to the Empire and rotting like a carcass, returning to the
substance of the soil , a bit as the double ends by bdng confused with the real
throu gh aging) - as th e mo st beautiful allegory of simulation, this fable has
now com e fu ll circl e for us, and possesses nothi ng bu t th e discrete char m of
seco nd- order simulacra.
Today abstraction is no longer that of the map, the do uble, th e mirro r, or the
concept . Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referenti al being , or a

substance. It is the generation by mod els of a real wi tho ut origin or reality:

a hvpcrrea l. Th e territory no lon ger pr ecedes th e map, no r does it survive
it. 'It is nevertheless the m ap that precede s th e territory - precesslOn if
51mulacro -- that engenders th e terri tory, and if on e must return to the fable ,
today it is the territory whose shr eds slowly r ot acro ss the extent of the
map: It is the real, and not the map , who se vestiges persist here and there in
the deserts that are n o longer tho se of th e Empi re, but ours. The desert ?f the
rea/ltse!f
~

*
To dissimulate is to pr etend not t o have what on e has .To simulate is to feign
to have what on e doesn 't have . O ne impli es a pr esen ce, the other an
absence. But it is mo re co mplicated th an th at because simulating is not
pretending: 'Whoever fakes an illness can Simply stay in bed and make
everyone beli eve he is ill. Whoever simulates an illn ess produces in him self
some of th e symp to ms ' (Littre) . Th erefor e, pretending, or dissimulating,
leaves th e principle of realit y int act : the difference is always clear, it is
simply masked , wh ereas simulation threatens th e difference between th e
'true' and the 'fals e,' the 'real' and the 'im ag inar y.' Is the simulator sick or
not, given that he produ ces 'true ' sympt oms ? Obj ectively one cannot treat
him as being eithe r ill or not ill. Psychol ogy and medi cine stop at thi s point ,
forestalled by th e illness's hen cefor th undiscoverabl e tr uth . For if any
sympt om can be 'pro duce d,' and can no longer be taken as a fact of nature,
then every illn ess can be consid ered as simulatable and simulated , and
medicine loses its meaning since it on ly know s how to treat 'real' illnesse s
according to their objective causes. Psychosom atics evolves in a dubious
mann er at the borders of th e principle of illness . As to psychoanalysis, it
transfers th e symptom
of th e oroanic
order to the unconscious order: th e
,
b
latter is new and taken for 'real' more real than th e other - but why would
Simulation b e at th e gates of the uncons ciou s? Why couldn 't the ' ~ork ' of
the lillcon scious b e 'p rod uced ' in the sam e way as any old symp tom of
classical medicin e? Dr earn s alrea dv are.
-'

Certainly, the psychiatrist pur por ts th at 'for ever y form of m ental alienation
~erc is a particular order in the succession of sym ptoms of which the
Simulator is ignorant and in th e absence of which th e psychiatrist would n ot
he d ~ ceived.' This (which dates from 1865) in orde r to safeguard the
p,rtnclple of a truth at all costs and to escape the interrogation pos ed by
Simulation - th e knowl edge that truth , referen ce, objective cause have
ceased to exist . Now, what can m edicin e do with what float s on either side
of illness , on either side of health , with the dupli cation of illness in a
dIscou rse tha t is n o lon ger either true or false?What can psychoanalysis do
WI t h the duplication of th e discour se of the un con scious in the discourse of
simulation th at can never again he unmasked , sin ce it is not false either ?
What can the army do about simulators? Traditi onally it unmasks them and

Jean Bau d rrllerd , 'The prcccsxio n o r sim u l.acra . from Sl mo l a a Q an~ .~J~n: ~dCiQn . rr. Sh t.ila 1:dria G I-lset',
Ann Ar bor, MI : Un jvt:rs ity o f M k higa rl Pres s, i 9 94. pp . 1 and 3- 7. g J he U nlV (:n~il)' o f M k higan 19 94 .
Rep ro d uce d wit h p e r m ission.

p~n i sh e s th em, according to a clear principle of ide ntification , Today it can

rhscharge a verv good simu lator as exactly c,<juivalcnt to a ' real' ho m osexual
a h eart~patien;, or a mad man. Even military psychology draws back from

/ Z ; IMAGES

IDEOLOGY CRITIQU E.

Cartesian certainties and hesitates to make the distinction between true and
false, between the 'produced ' and the authentic symptom. 'If he is this good
at acting crazy, it's because he is.' Nor is military psychology m!stakcn in this
regard: in this sen se, all crazy people simulate, and this lack of distinction is
the 'wor st kind of subversion. It is against this lack of distinction that classical
reason armed itself in all its categories. But it is wh at today again outflanks
them , submerging the principle of truth .
Beyond medicine and the army, favored terrains of simulation, the question
returns to religion and the simulacrum of divinity: 'I forbade that there be any
simulacra in the temples because the divinity that anim ates nature can n ever be
represented .' Inde ed it can be. But what becomes of the divinity when it reveals
itself in icons, when it is multiplied in simulacra? Docs it remain the supreme
power that is Simply incarnated in images as a visible theology? Or does it
volatilize itself in the sim ulacra that, alone, deploy their power and pomp of
fascination - the visible machinery of icons substituted for the pure and
int elligible Idea of God?lbis is precisely what was feared by Iconoclasts, whose
millennial quarrel is still with us today.This is precisely because they predicted
this omnipotence of simulacra, th e faculty simulacra have of effacing God from
the conscience of man, and the destructive, annihilating truth that they allow
to appear - that deep dO\\11 God never existed , that only the simulacrum ever
existed, even that God himself was never anything but his own simuJacrum-
from this came th eir urge to destroy the images . If they could have believed that
thes e images only obfuscated or masked the Platonic Idea of God, there woul d
have been no reason to destroy th em . One can live with the idea of distorted
truth, But their metaphysical despair came from the idea that the image didn 't
conceal anything at all, and that these images were in essence not imag es, such
as an original model would have made them, but perfect simulacra, forever
radiant with their own fascination. Thus this death of the divine referential must
be exorcised at all costs .

One can see that the iconoclasts, whom ODe accuses of disdaining and
negating images, were those who accorded them their true value, in
contrast to the icono later s who onlv saw reflections in them and were
content to venerate a filigree God. O~ the other hand , on e can say that the
icon worshipers were the most modern minds, the most adventurous,
because, in the guise of having God become apparent in the mirror of
images, they were already enacting his death and his disappearance in the
epiphany of his representations (which, perhaps, they already knew rio
longer represented anything, that th ey were purely a game, hut that it was
therein the great game lay - knowing also that it is dangerous to unmask
images, since they dissimulate th e fact th at there is nothing behi nd them).
This was the: approach of the Jesuits, who fouml ed their pollucs on the
virtual disappearance of God and on the w,or,ldly and sp ectac ular,
manipulation of consciences -- the evane: ~ c enc c of God in the epiphany oJ
power - the end of transcendence, which now onIY,S{T"C:S as an alibi for a
st.rategy altogether free of influenc:c.') a~~ 1 signs. Bchin cl the bal'oqueness of
images hides the eminence g rise 01 p o liti cs .

This way the stake will always have been the murderous power of images ,
murderers of the real , murderers of their own model, as the Byzantine icons
could be tho se of divine identity. To this murderous power is opposed that
of representatiOns as a dialectical power, the visible and intelligible
mediatio n of the Real. All West ern faith and good faith becam e engaged in
this wager on representation: that a sign could refer to the depth of
meaning, that a sign could be exchanged for m eaning and th at something
could guar ante e this exchange - God of cour se . But v~rhat if God himself can
be simulated, that is to say can be reduced to the signs that con sti tute faith ?
Then the whole system becomes weightless, it is no longer itself anything
but a gigantic simulacrum - not unreal, but a simulacrum , that is to say
never exchanged for th e real , but exchanged for itself, in an uninterrupted
circuit without r eference or circumference .
Such is simulation, insofar as it is opposed to representation. Representation
stems from the principle of the equ ivalence of the sign and of the real (e ven
if this equival ence is utopian , it is a fund amental axiom). Simulation , on the
contrar y, stems from th e utopia of the principle of eguivalen ce, .Jrom th e
radical negati on of tbe sian as value, from the sign as the reversion and death
sentence of every reference. Whereas representation attempts to absorb
simul ation by interpreting it as a false rep r esentation , sim ulation envelops
the whole edific e of repre sentation itself as a sim ulacr um .
Such would he the successive phases of th e image:

It is the reflection of a profound reality;

It ma sks and denatures a profound reality;
It masks the absence of a profound realitv;
It has no relation to any reality whats oever: it is its own pure simulacr um .

In th e first case, th e image is a good appeara nce - representation is of th e

sacramental order. In the second, it is an evil appearance - it is of th e order
of malefi cence. In the third , it plays at being an app earance - it is of the
order of sor cery , In the fourth, it is no longer of the order of appearance~,
but of simulation.
The transition from signs that dissimulate som et hin g t o signs that
dissimulate that th ere is nothing marks a deci sive turning point. The first
rdle(,.is a theology of truth and secrecy (to which th e notion of ideology still
belongs) . The second inaugurates the era of simulacra and of simulation, in
which there is no longer a God to recogru:;;e his O,VB, no longer a Last
Judgment to separate the false from the true, th e real from its artificial
resurrect ion , as ever ything is already dead and re surrected in advance,
\J./hen the real is no lon ger wh at it was, nostalgia assum es its full meaning.
There is a plethora of myths of origin and of signs of reality ~- a plethora
of truth, of secondar y objectivity, and aut henticit y. Escalation of th e true,
of lived exper ience , resu rrecti on of the figuratiYC> where the obj ect and
substance have disappeared . Panic- stri cken producti on of th e real and of
th e referential , paralfU to and greater than the pani c of m at er ial

l L1: I MAGES

IDEOLOGY CRI T IQUE : 7 5

production: this is how simulation app ears in the phase that con cerns us
a strategy of th e real , of th e neoreal and th e hype rreal that everywhere is
the double of a strat egy of d eterrence .

NOTE
I . Fo otnotes removed.

IMAGE AS COMMODITY
~RDRIC JAMESON

Horkheimer and Adorno obs erved long ago, in th e age of r adio, the
peculiarity of the str ucture of a commercial ' cult ure industry ' in which th e
products were free . I Th e analogy between media and market is in fac t.
cem ented by this m echanism : it is not because the m edia is like a market that
th e two things are comparable; rather, it is because the ' mar ket ' is unlike its
' con cept ' (or Platonic idea) as the media is unlike its own concept that th e
tw o things are comp arab le. The media offers free program s in whose
conte nt and assor tme nt the consumer has no choice whatsoever but whose
selection is then rebaptized 'free choice.'
In the gradual disappea rance of the physical marketplace , of course, and th e
t end ential identification of th e com mod ity with its image (or brand name or
logo) , anothe r, m ore intimate, symbiosis b etween the market and th e m edia
is effectuate d, in . . vhich boundaries are washed over (in ways profoundly
charac teristic of th e postmodern) and an indifferenti ation of levels gradually
takes the pla ce of an old er sep aration between things and concept (or
indeed , econo mics and cu lture, base and supe rstructure ) . For on e thing, th e
products sold on th e marketpl ace be com e the very cont ent of the media
image, so that , as it were, th e same referent seem s to maintain in both
domains. [... ] Today the products ar e, as it were, cliffused throughout the
space and time of th e entertainment (or even ne ws) seg ments, as part of th at
content, so that [. .. J it is some tim es n ot clear wh en the narrative segment
has ende d and th e com me rcia l has begun .
[. . .] [T[he products form a kind o f hierarchy wh ose clim ax lies vcr)'
precisely in th e technology of reproduction itself, which now, of course, fans
out well beyond th e classical t ele vision set and has come in ge neral to
epitomi ze th e new informational or computer te chn ology of the third stage
of cap italism . We must th erefore also p osit another type of co nsum pt ion:
cons um ption of th e very pro cess of con swnption itself, above and beyond its
conte nt and th e imm edi ate commercial products. [. . . J Much of the
euphoria of postm oder nism derives from the cele bration of the very pr ocess

Fredrr c [am eson , from Posunodernism, or, Tbe

Press J99 1, pp. 275 -7 . Repr-oduced hy

<';u Jr u ['d! f.Cf/I(

pCTml"s lo=~ .

~ri. (/~C C:,:, pJ ~d/Hm J) urh~t:~,, > ~C .

Duke: l.hu vnr sit v

of high -t ech informati,..ation (the prevalence of current theorie s of

comm unication, language , or sign s bein g an ideological spinoff of this more
(Jcncral 'worldview ' }. Thi s is then [.. . J a second moment in which [... ) the
~ed ia 'i n gen eral ' as a unified process is somehow foregrounded and
exper ience d (as opposed to the content of individual medi a projecti ons);
and it wo uld see m to be thi s ' totalizatio n' that allows a bridge to be made to
fant asy images of 'th e market in general' or 'the market as a unified process.'
The third feature of the complex set of analogies between med ia and market
that underlies the force of the latt er 's cur rent rh eto ric may then be located in
the form itself. This is the place at which we need to return to the th eory of
the image , recalling Guy Debord's remarkable theoretical derivation (the
image as the final form of comm odity reification ). 2 At this point the pr ocess is
revcrsed, and it is not the commercial products of the market which in
advertising becom e im ages but rather the very enter tainment and narrative
pro cesses of commercial television, which are, in their turn, r~i.fied and
turned into so many commodities : fro m the serial narrative itself, with its
well-nigh formulaic and rigid temporal segments and breaks, to what the
came ra shots do to space, stor y, characters , and fashion , and very much
including a new process of the pro du ction of star s and celebritie s that seem s
distinct from the older and more fam iliar histori cal experi ences of these
matters and th at now converges with the hith erto 'secular' phenomena of the
forme r public sphere itself (real people and even ts in your nightly news
broadcast, th e transformation of nam es into som ething like new s logos, etc.) .
Man)" analyses have shown how the news broadcasts are structured exact ly like
narrative ser ials; meanwhile, som e of us in that other precinct of an official,
or 'high ,' culture, have tried to show the waning and obsolescence of
categor ies like 'fiction' (in the sense of something that is opposed to eith er the
'literal' or the 'factual'). But here I think a profound modifi cation of the publi c
sphere needs to be theorized: the eme rgence of a new realm of image r eality
that is both fictional (narrative) and factu al (even the characte rs in the serials
are graspe d as real 'named ' star s with extern al histories to r ead about) , and
which now -- like the for mer classical ' sphere of culture' - becom es
.s~miautonomou s and floats above realit)', with this fund am ental historical
cbfference that in the classical period reality per sisted independently of that
sentimental and romantic 'cu lt ur al sphere,' whereas today it seems to have lost
that separate mode of ex istence. Today, culture imp acts back on rea lity in ways
that make any independent and, as it were , non - or extr acultu ral form of it
prohlematical [. . . J so th at finally the th eoris ts unite their voice in th e new
doxa that the 'referent' no l onge~ exists.
At any rate , in this third m oment th e contents of the media itself have now
hecome commodities, whi ch are then flung out on som e wider vers ion of
~he . market with which they beco me affiliated until th e two things are
indistinguishable . Here, then, th e media, as which the market was itself
fantasized , now r eturns to the market and by becom ing a part of it seal s and
certi fies th e: for merly me tapho rica l or analogica l ident ification as a 'literal'
reality.

I e ; I MAGES

NOTES
I, Max Horkheimer and T.W. Adorno, Dialecu c ,?j'EnliBhtenment, John Cumming,
trans, (New York, 1972), pp. 161-67,
2. Guy Debord, SOCle0' rif the Spectacle (Detroit, 1977), chapter 1,

\!}5

'RACE' AND NATION

l!ll

PAUL GILROY

"

[. ,.J Britain's languages of ,race' and nation have been articulated together.
The effect of their co mbination can be registered even where 'race ' is not
overtly referred to, or where it is discussed outside of crude notions of
superiority and inferiority. The discourses of nation and people are saturated
with r acial connotations. [. ,. J

r... JTh e

Conservatives appeal" to recognize this and seek to play with the

ambi guiti es which this situation cr eates. [. . .]

The Conservatives' ethnic election poster of 19 S3 provides further inSight

into th e right's grasp of these complexities. The poster was presumably
intend ed to exploit am bigui ties b etween 'race ' and nation and to salve the
sen se of exclusio n exper ienced by the blacks who were its target. Th e post er
app ear ed in the ethnic minority press during May 1983 and was attacked by
black spokespeople for suggesting that the categories black and Briti sh were
mutually exclusive. It set an image of a young black man, smartly dressed in
a suit with wide lapels and flared trousers, above the caption 'Labour says he's
black. Tories say he's Briti sh' . The text which followed set out to reassure
rea de rs that 'w ith Conservatives there ar e no "blacks" or "w hite s", just
people '. A variant on th e one nation theme em erged , entwined with
criticism of Labour for tTeating blacks 'as a "special" case, as a group all on
your own'. At one level , the poster states that the category of citizen and the
form al belonging which it bestows on its black holders ar e essen tially
colourless, or at least co lo ur-blind . Yet [oO .J populist raci sm does not
re cogniz e the legal mem ber ship of th e national community conferred by its
legislation as a substantive guarantee of Britishness. 'Race' is, therefore.
despite the text, being defined beyond these definitions in the sphere of
cultu re. Th ere is m ore to Br itishness th an a passp ort . Nationhood, as Alfre d
Sherman pointed out in 1976,
Paul Gilroj' . from There Am ', No Blo,k io ,he Umon jod
b) pcr rnissto n of T&F Inform a,

Lond ono Routledge, t 992, Pl': 56-9, Reproduced

FIGURE 3.1 :
Con servative Party election
poster, 1978_ Courtesy of
The Conservative Party,

\'\litb the Conservatives, there

arc 11,) ' blacks, no'whites, j ust people,
Conservative" believe rhar
treating rninorincs as equals en
courages the majontv to treat them
as cquals.
Yet the Labour P arty aim (0
treat ~' ()U asa 'specialcase,' asagroup
all 0 /1 your own.
Is setting you apart from the
res!ofsocicty 8. sensible way to over
come raciaI prcjlid iccand social inc
quality?
The question is, should we
reallv divide the British people in
stead otunuing them?
WHOSE PROMISES

AilE YOU TO BELIEVE?

W'hen La bour wer e in govern

ment , th ev pr om ised to re pe al I m
migration ,\CH passed in 1962 and
1971. Both pronuscs were broken.
T his time, they arc promising
to throw out the British Nationality
,\ cL which g i \c~ lull and equal
cruzcnshi p i 0 en: 1;" ( me pcrrnan en t
lv sculed in Bnuun,
B Ul ho\\ do the (: \.) n ~lT\ ativcs'
pronuscs compare >
\\ 'C said thai \\ <.: \1 abolish the
'SUS' luw.
\'>;fC kepi our p rom ise.
\\ 'c \did we'd rc c r Ll i l m( lrl' U J]

ou red policemen, get I he po Iice

back into the communny,and tram
them for a beucr understanding of
you r needs .

We h:r1 our prurnrsc.

PUTnNGTHE ECOHQMY

BACKON ITS FEET.

T he Conscrvauc CS haw al
wavs said th ai I h ~ 0 111\' lung term
a nsw er to our ec onO!nlL' problems
was to conq lief i nib [ion ,

Inflation is n(}\\' !ower th

been forover a decade, keei)i

prices stable, wit h the price 0

now hardly rising at aIL

Meanwhile, manv bush
throughout Britain arh recov
leading to thousands of new jo
Firstly, inourt raditional il
nes, but JUS t as irnponanuy ir
technology areas such as n
electronics.
J11other words, the medi,
working,

Yet Labour want to cI

everything, and put us ba(
square one,
Thev intend to increase
lion, They intend 10 increas
National Debt.
T hey promise rmport an
port cont rols,
CdSl vour mind back 10 tt
Labour .governmcnt. Lab
methods d idn't work then.

Th evw on't work now.

A BETTER BJ!ITAIN
FOR All OF US.

The Conservativesbclicv:

every,me wants to work hard <l l

rewarded lor It.

.I'huse rewards will onlv (

;lbuul by creaung a mood of c
n r p or t U Jli l ~ ' for every one
Brirain. regardless of their
creed or colou r.

Th e difl crcnce you're v(

lor l~ ihis:
To the Labour Party, y OL
black person
. ['0 the Conscrv,ui\'cs" you
British Ciuzcn.
VOle Conxcrvativc. and
vote JlX a more equal, more pro.
ous Bruain .

LABOUR SAYS HE'S BLACK.

TORIES SAY HE'S BRITISH.

1 8: IMAGES
Rem ains ... man 's ma in focu s of identi ty, his link w ith the wi der world , the pa. t an d fut ure,

'a partnership with those who arc UVLng, those who are de ad and those who are to be
horn ' . . . It includes national cha racter reflect ed in the way of life . . . a passport or residence
permit does not auto matically im plant national values Or patr iotism .'

At this point the slightly too large suit worn by the young man, with its
unfashionabl e cut and connotations of a job interview, becom es a key signifier.
It conveys wh at is being asked of the black readers as the price of admission to
the colour-blind form of citizenship promised by the text . Blacks are being
invited to forsake all that marks them out as culturally distinct befor e real
Britishness can be guaranteed . National culture is present in the young man's
clothing. Isolated and shorn of the mugger's icons - a tea-cosy hat and the
dreadlocks of Rastafari - he is redeemed by his suit , th e signifier of British
civilization . Th e image of black youth as a problem is thu s contained and
rendered assimilable. Th e wolf is transformed by his sheep 's clothing. The
solitar y maleness of the figure is also highly signillcant. It avoids the hidden
threat of excessi ve fertility which is a con stant presen ce in the r epresenta
tion of Black women (Parmar, 1984). This lone young man is incapable of
swamping 'us' . He is alone because the logics of racist discourse militat e against
the possibility of making British blackn ess visible in a family or an inter
generational group.2 The black family is presented as incomplete, deviant and
ruptured .

REFERENCE
Parmar, P. ( 19 84) 'Hateful Contraries' Ten 8, no. 16.

NOTES
1. Sunday Telecrapl, 8 .9.76 .
2. Footnote removed .

IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE : 79

even be aware that they were artificially created by other human beings. If
~uddenl)' forced outside the cave, we would surely he confused and even
scornful of anyon e who tried to tell us that this, not the cave, was th e real
world, that we had been living inside an illusion, deceived into believing that
arti6cial images were the real thing. But our enlightenment would require this
recognition .
Never has Plato's allegory abou t th e seducti veness of appearances been
more apt than today, but note th e contempor ary tw ist. For Plato, the
artificial image s cast on the wall of th e cave are a metaphor for th e world of
sense perception. Th e illusion of th e cave is in mistaking that world - what
we sec, hear, taste, feel - for the Reality of end ur ing ideas, which can only
be 'seen' with the mind 's eye. For us, b edazzlement by cr eated im ages is no
metaphor ; it is the actual co ndition of our lives. If we do not wish to r emain
prisoner s of these image s, we must re cogni ze that they are not reality. But
instead of moving closer to this recognition , we seem to be mov ing farther
away from it , going deeper and deeper into the cave of illusion .

1..J
Unless one re cognizes on e's own enmes hment in cultur e, one is in no
position to theor ize about that culture or its effects on others. But unless
one striv es to develop critical distance on that enmeshm ent, on e is apt to
simply embody and perpetuate the illusion s and mystifications of th e cult ure
(for example, communicating anxie ty about body Weight and height to on e 's
childre n). So, for m e , th e work of cultural criticism is not exactly like tha t
of Plato's philosopher, whose enlighte nme nt requir es th at he transcend his
experien ce of ibis world and ascend to ano the r, purer realm. (Act ually, I'm
not so sure Plato believed that, either, but it is certainly the way his ide as
have been dominantly int erpreted.) C ult ur al criticism does not so mu ch ask
that we leave the cave as tu rn a light on i n it .

3.

NEVER .JUST PICTURES

SUSAN BORDO

In The Republu: Plato pr esent s a parable well known to stu dents in introducto ry
philosophy classes. He asks us to imagine our usual condition as koo'\vers
as comparable to life in a dark cave, where we have been confined since
childho od, cut off from the world outsid e . In that cave we are chained by the
leg and neck in such a way that we are unable to see in any position but straight
ahead , at a wall in front of us, on which is projected a procession of shadow
figures cast by ar tificial puppets manipulated by hidd en pupp eteer s. In such a
condition, Plato asks us. would not these shadow images, these illusions, seem
to be 're ality' to us? Th ey would be the only world we knew ; we would not
Su san U<Jrt [u, ' Never )u....t prcru r es", from TwiJiahl Zan,,':' TIll' Hlddc() t,..fi,if ~:u !:, ..Tt3J Im( JJ~s./rl)ln PlOLo tc
O. J. Ucrk~ J c)'. C/\ : Llrn ve r -sitv o f C lll;fr:)1"n ia Pr ess, J9 9 7 , pp. I 2. J 2:, 6 . 't ; 1997 Th ('" i{.(:g(:nt :-: ().f l !h~
U nive rsity o f Califo r nia. Rep ro d uced 'w llh pC' ~-mj s sl()(l .

~Ithough [th e organisation Boycott Anorexic MarketillS] and th e fashion

Industry seem to be standing on opposite sides of th e fence in th e deba te
about cu ltural images and eating disorder s, they (and People and th erapists
Mead and Strober) share an important and d efective assumption about th e
way we .int eract with medi a imag er y of slende r ness. Because these images
use ~odl es to sell surface adornm ents (such as clothing, jew elry , footwear) ,
the lrnages are taken to be advertising , at most, a certain ' look ' or st yle of
app e.arance . What that ' loo k' or sty le might proj ect (intelligen ce ,
sophisticat ion, childliken ess) is unacknowl edged and unexplored , along
\ ~l th the values that the viewer might bring to the experience of looking.
1 ~oughout th e literature on eati ng disorders. wh ether 'fashion ' is b eing let
off th e hook or condemned, it app ears as a whimsical , capriciou s, and
_
Socially disembodied for ce in our lives.
This tr i\;alizing of fashion reflec ts a m?re gener al failur e to recognize that
looks arc more than skin deep , that bodies speak to us.T he notion that bodi es
arc mere bodi es, empty of meaning. (k~ v() id of mind, just materia l stuff

I D E O L O G Y C R I T I QU E : 8;

EK ' : I M A G E S

occupying :,;pace, goes bac k to the philosoph er De scartes. But do we ever

interact with o r exper ience ' mere' bodies? Peo ple who are attracted to
certain size s and shapes of bodi es o r to a particul ar co lo r of hair or eyes are
m ista ken if th ey think thei r prefer ence is onl y abo ut particular b ody par ts .
Wh eth er we are conscious o f it o r not, w he the r our prefer en ces have their
or igins in (positive or negative) infant m emories, cult urally learn ed
associati ons, or accidents of our histories , we are drawn to wh at th e desir ed
b ody evokes for us and in us. I have always found certain kinds of ma le hands
stu rd y, st o ckv hand s, the kind one might find on a physical laborer or a
peasant - to 'be sex ually attracti ve, even strangely m oving. My father had
hand s like thi s, and I am conv inced my 'aesthetic' pr eferen ces he re derive
from a very ear ly time wh en my attitudes toward mv father's masculinity
were no t vet am'bivalent, wh en h e existed in my lifesimply as the strong',
J
"
om nipo te nt, secure hands that held me snu gly against harm.
Once we recognize that w e never respond on!y to particular body part.~ or their
configuration hut alwoys to the meanings they carry for us, the old femini st
charge of' objectification ' seem s inadequate to descr ibe what is going on wh en
women's bodies are depicted in sexualized or aestheticizcd ways. The notion
of wome n-as-objects suggests the redu ction of women to 'mere' bodies, when
actually what 's going on is ofte n far more disturbing than that , involving the
depiction of regressive ideals of feminin e behavior and attitude that go much
deeper than appearance . I rem emb er Julia Rober ts in j}~ystic Pizza when she 'was
still swinging he r (then much ampler) hips and throwing sass)' wisecracks, not
yet typecast as the perpetually star tled, em otional teet er -totter of later films. In
order for Roberts to project the vulnerability that became her tradema rk , those
hips just had to go.They suggested t oo much physical stability, too much sexual
asserti veness, too mu ch womanlines s. Todav the cam era fastens on the coltlike
legs of a m uch skinnie r Rober ts, often wobbly and off balance , not because she
has 'great legs' in some absolute aesthetic sense (actua lly, when they do
aesthe ticized dose-ups of her legs, as in PrettyWoman, they use a body doubl e!)
but because her legs convey the qualities of fragility that dir ector s - no doubt
responding to their sense of the cultural zeitge ist as well as their O\V n
preferences - have chosen to emphasize in her.

The criticism of ' ob jectification' came naturally to feminism b ecause of the

continual cult ural feti shizati on of w o m en 's bodies and body par ts - br easts
and le gs and butts, for exam ple. But these feti she s ar e not mere body p ar t~.
Often, features of women's bodies are arranged in representations pr ecisely
in orde r to suggest a particular attitude - de pende nce or sedu ctiven ess or
vulnerability, for ex am p le. Het erosexu al pornogra phy, which has been
accused of b eing th e worst p erpetrator of a view of women as mute 'meat,'
in fact seem s more interes ted than fashion layouts in animating wo men 's
bodi es with fantasi es of w hat's go ing on inside th eir minds. Even the
pornographic motif of spread legs - ar guahly the worst offender in reducing
th e woman t o the status of rri cr'c receptacle - seems t o me to use the b ody
t o 'speak ' in this way. ' Here I am ,' spre ad .le&s declar e, 'ut t erlv available t~
you, rcady t o be ami do whate ve r you d e sire .

Many women may not like wh at this fetish, as I have int erpret ed it, pr ojects
the woman 's wiUing collapsing of her ow n desire in to pleasing th e male .
Clearly, my interpretati on wo n' t make pornogr aph y less of a conce rn to
many femin ists. But it situates th e pr obl em differ ently, so we're not talkin g
about the re duction of wo men to mere bodies but about w hat thos e bo dies
express. This resi tuati ng also opens up the p ossibility of a non-polari zing
conversation between m en and wom en, one that avoids unnuanced talk of
' male dominanc e ' and contro l in favor of an ex plorati on of images of
masculinity and fem inin ity and the 'subjecti vities' th ey embody and
encourag e. Men and women ma y have ver y different in terpretations of those
images , differences th at n eed to be brought o ut into the open and
disinfected of sin, gui lt, and blam e .
Some femi nists, for example, might interp ret a scene of a man ejaculating on
a woman's facE' as a quintessential ex pression of the male need to degrade
and dominate . Many men , however, experience such motifs as fantasies of
uncondit ional acceptance. 'From a male poin t of view,' writes Scott MacDonald ,
'the desire is not to see women har m ed , but to mom entarily identify with
men who - despite their personal unattractiveness by conv entional cult ur al
definition , despite the unw ieldy size of their erections, and despite their
aggressiveness with th eir sem en - are ador ed bv the women they enco unte r
sexually.'1 Fro m this point of view, then, what ~u ch (soft) hetcr u'sexual porn
provides for men is a fantasy world in which they arc never judged or r ejected ,
never made to feel guilty or embarrassed. I think that all of us, male and
female alike, can identify with the desire to be un conditionally adored, our
most shame- hau nted body par ts and body fluids worshipped, our fears abo ut
personal excess and ugliness soothed and calm ed.
From the p er spective of many women, however, the fem ale att itudes that
provide reassurance to MacDonald - altho ugh he may, as he says, 'mean no
harm ' by th em - are demeaning. They are dem eanin g no t because th ey
redu ce WOmen to bodies but because they embody and pr omulgate im ages of
feminine subjectiv ity that idealize p assivity, compliance , even masochi sm .
Just as WOmen need to und erstand why men - in a cultu re tha t has required
them to be sex ual initiators w hile not per mitting th em th e 'weakness' of
feeling hurt wh en th ey are rejected - might cr ave un complicated adoration ,
so n;e n need to understand why women might find th e depicti on of fem ale
b? dleS in u tterly com pliant poses to be pro ble ma tic. In our gende r history,
alt er all , being un st intingly obliging - wh ich in an ideal world would b e a
sexual 'POSition' that all of us could joyfully adopt with each other - has
been int er twined with soc ial subordinati on . When bodies get together in
sex , a whole history, cultural as well as per son al, comes alon g with them .2

NOTES
l , Scott MacDonald , ' Confessions of a Feminist Porn Watc he r,' in Mich ael
Kim rnd , ccl., Men Confrom POTnogrophy (Ne w York: Me ridian , 1990 ), p. 4 1.
2. hlOtnote removed .

A R T H IS T O R Y

INTRODUCTI ON
4: I

Studies in Icanalogy
Erwin Panofsky

4:2

Invention and Discovery

Ernst Combrich

4: 3

Interpretation without Representation, or, The Viewing of Las Meninas

Svetlene Alpers

4:4

Towards a Visual Critical Theorv

Susan Bisek-Morss

'

Art history is the longest standing academic di scipline to be concerned with

the study of visual artefacts. In recent years, it has become a highly contested
discipline, particularly in relation to the emergent field of visual culture (see
Sections 11 and 12; and Buck-Morss, 4.4). GiorgioVasari's (1511- 74) Lives
oi the Artists is widely considered to provide the first coherent history of art
in which Vasari assesses the quality, style and technical achievements of
artists from antiquity to his contemporary present. Until the end of the
nineteenth century, art history was concerned primarily with objects of fine
art - drawings, paintings and works of sculpture - and most practitioners
wrote only about the art of the past. In that sense, the discipline at least had
a coherent field of investigation as its object, even if the concept of history
that influenced thinker s in the subject underwent radical transformations.
Theemergence of modern art at the turn of the nineteenth century was seen
by many critics as a radical break with the past. As Eric Fernie (1995: 15-16)
has said: 'Since the Renaissance the representation of the visible world
constituted one of the underlying principles of painting and sculpture, but
with the development of expressionism and abstraction in the early years of
the twentieth centu ry this ceased to be the case'. While art historians such
as Ernst Gombrich (4.2) emphasised aspects of historical continuity in
artworks and other images, the fact that artists began to question the
definition of art is well -documented (Foster et al., 2004) . Art historians began
writing more about contemporary images and about the nature of the
relationship between art and images.
One of the key methods in art history is the detailed description of individual
artworks and the effects that they have on the viewer. This entails paying
dose attention to the way particular images look that takes account of the
ontent of the work, the way that this content is presented and the materials
?ut of which the artefacts are made. The cultivation of a way of seeing that
15 sensitive to an image's pic torial elements is a practice that can be learnt
by c~mparing the appearance of a great number of images from many
hlstoncal periods (Acton, 1997). One of the aims of this form of visual
co~nois5eurship has been to attribute paintings, for example, to specific
artists and to categorise them into stylistic schools and historical periods - as
well as il;Jdging their quality and place in the historical canon (Fernie, 1995).
The diagrams of Alfred Barr can be seen as part of this tradition (Figure 4.2).
Art historians supplemenl this attention to images w ith knowledge about
particular artists and the historical circumstances In which they worked. In
thaI sense, art history is a highly empirical practice, but it has been criticised
Ior its relatively unreflective approach to its theoretical presuppositions. For
example. James Elkins (1988) has argued that this lack of reflection is one of
the characteristics of this form of cultura] analvsls that ~ ives It its particular

I N T R O D UC T IO N

IM AGE S

debates about the inhe rently political nature of images that have arisen from
post-structuralism more central to the field. In addition, T.). Clark (1985) has
developed a Marxist, historical ideological critique of art images, while
Griselda Pollock (1988) is one example of feminist criticism in art history.
rwin Panofsky's (4.1) iconography could be seen as one attempt to map
how the various pictorial elements in artworks are 10 be interpreted and
considered . His ambitious three-tiered scheme aims to synthesise the
different facto rs that are at play in our understanding of images, from basic
psychological processes to highly complex cultural influences that operate
at a symbolic level. This interp lay between the science of vision and the
cultural construction of vision has been considered as highly problematic by
later writers such as Jonathan Crary (1992 and 12.1). For Panofsky, only the
correct analysis of images at the level of detail and the identification of
'motifs' can give rise to the 'synthesis' of understanding needed to make
sense of all of the different threads of meaning that we attach to the image.
Ernst Gombrich (4.2), in the piece chosen here, compares visual innovation
in art to the development of knowledge in the natural sciences. In suggesting
that art arises from an inductive process of experimentation that has as its
materials both the technologies of production - canvas, oils, etc. - and the
stock of previous efforts by past artists, Gombrich shifts the emphasis of
interpretation from viewing and the observer, to making and the artist.
While both Panofsky and Gombrich wrote on a wide variety of subjects and
from a range of perspectives, they were among those theorists criticised for a
narrowness of view by the New Art Historians in the 1970s and 1980s, such
as Clark and Pollock. For example, Svetlana Alpers (4.3) suggests that neither
Panofsky nor Gombrich pay sufficient attention to those compositional
elements of pictures that enable us to understand pictures as representations
of real social relations in the world . She draws attention to the differences
between reality and imaging, differences that she accuses the earlier wri ters
of overlooking even though they can be discerned in the pictures themselves.
While Alpers holds on to the techniques of art historical analysis by praising
the virtues of paying close attention to the image (see also Bal, 5.4), she
emphasises the social and political implications of particu lar techniques oi
representation using theoretica l methods pioneered by Michel Foucault
(1973) .
Buck-Morss (4.4) also draws attention to the social context of images when
she questions the pertinence not only of art history but also of the traditional
concept of fine art in contemporary visual culture, in which capitalisl
consumerism coincides with the advent and pervasiveness of modern
imaging technologies . What is the place of art in a culture and economy
dominated by an imaging industry? TIle perceived shortcomings of art history
and its future as an academic discipline are also a central concern for those
trying to define a field of image studies. such as James Elkins (13.2) and
Barbara Maria Stafford (13.3). But they and other critics have suggested that
while art history's primary focus has been limited. to d~cribing and making
value judgements on the appearance and quality 01 'pilrticular images
rather than engaging with the ~ocial and cultural pra~t1ces that make those
images possible - its practice 01 derailed Image analvsls makes it an essential
<tarring point lor any form of visual research !Rose. 200 I,.

REFERE N C ES
Acton , M. (1997) Learning to Look at Paintings. London: Ro utledge.

Clark. T.). (1985) The Painting of Modern Life: Paris In the Art of Manet and his

followers . London: Thames & Hudson.

Crary, I. (19 90 ) Techniques of the Observer : On Vision and Modernity in the

Nineteenth Century. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Elkins, J. (1988) 'Art history without theory', Criticat tnouirv, 14: 354-78.

Fernie, E. (1995) ArC Historv and its ,"'ethods: A Critical Anthology. London: Pha idon

Press.

Foster, H., Krauss, R., Bois, Y.-A. and Buchloh, B.H.D. (2004) Art since 1900:

Modernism, AntiModernism, PostModernism. London: Thames & Hudson .

Foucault, M. (1973) The Order of Things, tr, unidentified collective. N ew York:

Vintage.

Moxley, K. (1994 ) The Practice of Theory: Poststructurelism, Cultural Politics and Ar t

History. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Pollock, G. (1988) Vision and Difference: Femininity, Feminism and the Histories of

Art. London: Routledge.

Rose, G. (200 1) Visual Methodologies. London: Sage.

Vasari. G. (1987) Lives oi the Artists: Volumes 1 and 2. London: Penguin Books.

..en:': : I M A G E S

S TU D IE S IN IC O N O L OGY
~RWIN PANOFSK Y

UO!llpe J.1 10 NOISH

Iconography is that b ranch of the hist or y o f art which con cerns itself with
the sub ject matte r or meaning o f works of ar t , as opposed to th eir for m .
Let us , then, try to define the d istinction between subject matter or meanJn8
on the one hand , an dJ orm o n the other.
When an acquain tance gre ets me on the stre et by removing his hat , what I see
from aJormal point of view is nothing but the change of certain deta ils within a
con nguration forming par t of the general patt ern of colour, lin es and volume s
which constitutes my world of vision. \Vh en I identify, as I automatically do , this
configuration as an object (gentleman), and the change of de tail as an Cl'cnl (hat
rem oving), I have already oyer stepped the limits of pu relyJormal perc eption and
ent ered a first sphere of subjectmatter o r meaninB' The meaning thus perceived is
of an elementary and easily under standabl e natur e, and we shall call it theJaaual
meaninB; it is apprehended by Simply ident ifying certain visible forms with
certain objects known to me from practical expe rience, and by identifying the
change in their relations with cer tain actions or events.
Now the obj ects and even ts th us identified will naturally produce a ce r tain
rea ctio n within myself. From the wa)' my acquaintance performs his act ion
I may he able to sense whether he is in a good or bad humour, and whethe r
his feelings to wards me are in different, frie ndl y or hostile. These
psychological nuances will invest th e gestures of my acquaintance with a
further meaning w hich we shall call expressional. It ditTers from the Jacrual
one in tha t it is apprehend ed , not b)' simpl e identification, but by 'empath y,'
To understand it , I need a certain sensitivity, but this se nsitivity is still part
of my pra ctical exper ience , that is, of my ever y-day familiarity with objects
and even ts. Th erefore both the fa ctual and th e expressional mcaninB rna)' he
classified t ogether : they constit ute the class of primary or natural meanings.
However, my realization that the lifting of the hat stands for a greeting belongs
in an altogeuler differen t realm of interpretation . Th is lorrn of salute is
peculiar to the western world and is a residu e of media eval chivalry: ar med
men used to remov e their helm ets to make clear their peaceful intentions and
their confidence in the peaceful intentions of othe rs. Neither an Australian
bushman nor an ancient Gr eek could he expected to realize that the lifting of
a hat L~ not only a practical event with cer tain expressional connotations, but
also a sign of polit eness. To unde rstand this signifIcance of the gentle man 's
action I mu st not only be familiar w ith the practical world of objects and
events, but also w ith the mo re-than- practica l world of customs and cultural
traditions peculiar to a cer tain civili7.ation . Conversely, my acquaintan ce could
not Icel im pelled to gn:e t me by rcmovin~ his hat were ~c not conscious of the
significance of this feat. As for the c"prcs.~lonal cu~otatl ons which accom pany
his action , he mayor may nu t be consctous 01 them . 111crefore, when 1

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SYNTHET ISM ~

>". I M A G E S

The meaning thu s discovered rna)' be called the intrinsic meanuu; or concem; it is
essential where the two other kinds of m eaning, the primary or natura} and the
secondary or convcmional, are phen omenal. It may be defined as a unifying
principle which underlies and explains both the visible event and its intelligible
significance. and w hich dete rmines even th e form in which the visible even t
takes shape . This mcnnsic mcaning or canrcnc is, of course, as much above the
sphere of cons cious volitions as the expressional meaning is benea th this sphe re.
Transferring the results of this ana lvsis from every -d ay life to a work of art ,
we can distingUish in itx subject matte r or meaning tl~e same three stra ta:

Seurot d.r 89/

NEO-IMPRESSIONISM

inte rpret the removal of a hat as a polite greeting, r recogn ize in it a me <lIling
which rna)' be called secondary or convent ionul; it differs fro m the primm)' or
natural one in that it is intelligible instead of being sensible, and in that it has
been consciously imparted to\ he practical action by which it is conveyed .
And finally: bes ides constitut ing a natural event in space and ti me, besid es
naturally indicating moods or fee lings , beside s con veying a conventional
g reet ing, the action of TIl)' acq uain tance can reveal ( 0 an experienced
obser- ver all th at goes to make up h is 'personalitv.' T his per so nality is condi
tioned by his being a man of the twentieth century, by his national, social and
educational background, by the pr evious history of his life and by his pr ese nt
surround ings, but it is also dist ingu ished by an individual manner of viewi ng
things and reacting to the world which, if rationalized, wo uld have to
be called a phi losophy. In the isolated action of a polite greeting all these
factors do not manifest themselves comprehensive ly. bu t nevertheless symp
t omatically. \Vc cou ld no t co nstruct a mental portrait of the- man on the basis
of this single action, hu t only by co-ordinating a large number o f simi lar
observations and by in lerpreting them in connection w ith our general info r
mation as to the gentleman 's period, nationality, class. in tellect ual traditions
and so forth. Yet all the qualities which thi s men tal po rtrait wo uld show
explicitly arc im p licit ly inheren t in every sing le action , so that, conversely,
ever y single action can be interpreted in th e light o f those quali tic..s.

>,

1886

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(ABSTRACT)

EXPRESSIONIS M

1911

IAL'nich

,
I

,
I

\
\

"

1. PRIMARY OR N ATU RAL SUBJE CT MATTE R, subdi vided in to

FA CTUAL and EXPRESSIO NA L. It is apprehended by identifying purejOrms,
that is: cer tain con figuratio ns of line and co lour, or certain peculiarly shaped
lumps of bronze or stone, as represe ntations of natu r al objeers such as hum an
beings, anim als, plants, houses, tool s and so forth; by idelltif)ing their mutual
relations as cl'emsi and by perceiving such expressional qualiti es as th e mournfu l
character of a pose or gesture, or the homelike and peaceful atmosphere 01' an
interior. The world or pure j onnI thus recognizee! as carriers of primary or

F IGURE 4 . 2
Alfred H. Barr, Jr, 'Th e Development of Ab str ac t Arl ', a chart
prepared for the dust-jacke t of the eXhibitIon catalogue,
Cubism and Abstract An . Mu seum of Modern Art , New York,
1936. Reproduced by pe rmiSSIon of the Museum or Modern
New 'lbrk DigItal Imag9 Q 2006, The Mus eum o f Mode m

en

I'

It

NON-GEOM ETRICAL ABSTRACT AR T

GEOMETRICAL ABSTRACT ART

A R T H IST O RY:

, ; : I MA G ES

mural meanings may be called th e worl d of artistic mo r!f~ . An enum eratio n of

these motifs wou ld be a pre-iconographical description of the work of ar t.
2. SECONDARY O K CON VEN T IO N A L SUBJECT MATr ER . It is
apprehended by realizing tha t a male flgure with a kni fe represenL~ St.
Bartholom ew, t hat a female figure wi th a peach in her hand is a personificatio n
fVlT3city, t hat a group of ligures sea ted at a dinner tah ll' in a certa in
ar rangem e nt and in certai n poses represents the Last Supper, o r that two
figures lighting each o ther in a certain manner represent the Combat ofVice
and Virtue. In doing th is we co nnect artistic mor!f.~ and combinations of ar t istic
(co mposiuons s wit h themes or conceprs. iHorifs thu s recogn ized as car r ie rs of
a secondary or convcnuonal mean ing may be calle d InIGaes, and combina tions of
Im ages arc wh at the ancient th eor ists of art called ' jrwcn71 vni;' we are wont to
call them ston es and allcqories. ' The ide ntification of such ImaBcs, stories and
allcqorics is the dom ain of iconography in the nar ro wer sense of the wo rd. In
fact , when we loosely speak of'subjea matter as op posed to f orm' w e chie fly
m ean th e sphere of secondary o r convenuonal subject m att er, vii'.. the wo rld of
spe cific themes or concepts man ifested in Images, ston es and allcaon es, as op po sed
to the sphere of primary or natural subject maUer man ifested in artistic motifs.
' Fo r mal analysis' in W olfllin's sense is largely an ana lysis o f motifs and
combinations o f mo tifs (compositions) ; fo r a formal anal ysis in th e strict sense
of th e word wo uld even have to avoid such expressions as ' man ,' ' horse .' or
'co lum n " let alone such evaluatio ns as 'the ugly triangle bet ween the legs of
Michelangelo 's David ' or ' the adm irable clarifi catio n o r th e joints in a human
body.' It
obvious that a co r rect tconoqraphical analysts III the narrowcr sense
presupposes a correct id ent ifi cat io n of the motifs. I. . .1

mocUs

T,

3. INTR[NS[C MEANING O R C O NT ENT. [t is apprehended hy ascer taining

those un der lying pr incip les which reveal the basic attitude of a nation, a pe riod ,
a class , a religiOUS or philosophical persuasion - unconsciously qua lified bv onc
pe rson ality and condensed int o one wo rk . N eedless to say, these prin cip les are
manifested by, and there/ore throw light on, both 'compositional m ethods' and
' ico nographical signifkance.' In the 14th and 1Sth centuries fo r instance (the
earliest example can be dat ed around 13 10) ,
traditional type of th e Nativity
with the Virgin Mary redining in bed or on a couch was frequently replaced
b)' a new on e w hich show s the Virgin kneelina befo re the Chi ld in adoration .
~
'"
From a co m positional point of view this change means, roughly spea king,
th e substit utio n o f a u'iangular sch eme for a rectangular o ne ; fro m an
iconographical point of view in the narrower sense of the term, it means the
introducti on o r J ne w theme textually formu lated by such writers as Pseu do
Bonaventura and 51. Hridget. Rut at
same time it reveals .1 new e m otio nal
atti tu de peculiar to th e I~tcr phases of the Mirldlc Ages . A really e xhaustive
int erpretation of th e intrinsic meaning or co~ltent might even sho w tha t the
technical proced ures characte r istic of a certain c~un try, ~criod, or artist, 1'01'
instance Michelangelo's prdercnce for scul~ lurc 111 stone IIlst('ad of in bronze,
the peculiar usc of hatchings 111 his draWings, arc. ~')'Tl1ptomati c of the same
basic attitud e that is discernible in ;J l lhc o ll.wr spl'ohc qu a/itk-.s of his sty le. In
thus co nceivi ng of pun' I'Jnn". nWlJls, lI TI ilg " S , stnr ics and allcgorie.' as
.
.
ruurufestations
of uruIer 1YII~ P' l nt: l IlJ l,~ ' w,. Interl)n!. ' \11 UH ,,- t! Jl O1enL..;\., W Il a l

me

me

=' ;

Ernst Cassirer has called 'symbolical' values. [. . . J111e discovery and interpretation
of ihese 'sy mbolical' values (which are generally unknown to the artist him sel f
and may even emphatically d iffer from what he conscio usly intended to
expr('s~) is th e object of what we may call IC(JIJoaraph.r III a deeper sense: of a
methOd of inte r pre ta tio n w hich arises as a svn thesis rather than as an analysis.
And as the co r rect id enti fication of th e mot!!s is the p rerequisi te of a co rrect
'c(1Mgraphical analysi: III the naffOWe.r sense, the correc t analysis of imases, stories
and "lIc80l/e~ is the pre requisit e of a co r rect onoqrapiucal Interpretation in a
Jeeper scmc. - unless we dea l wi th such wo rks of ar t in which the wh ole sphere
f secondary o r conventional subject m att er is eliminated, an d a direct
transition fr~m mot~fs to concCIll is striven for, as is the case w ith Eur op ean
landscape painting , still -life and genre; that is, on th e whole, with exce ptional
phenom ena, which m ark th e later, over -sophisticated phases of a long
de\e!opment.

NOT E
I . Footnote removed .

IN V E NT IO N AN D D ISC O VE RY '
~ R NS T GO M B R I CH
The revisi o n I advocate in the sto r v o f visual discoveries, in fact , can be
paralleled w ith the revision that h~s been demanded for th e history of
scien ce. Here, too , the nin e tee nth ce ntur y beli eved in passive recor ding, in
unbiased observation of un intc r p r c tcd facts . The tech n ical te rm for thi s
outlook is the bel ief in in du ct ion, the belief that the patie nt co lle ction of one
instance after L11l' o ther w ill gradually bu ild up into a co r re ct image o f
nature , provided always that no ob servation is ever colored hy subjective
bias . In this vie w nothing is m o re harmful t o the scientist th an a
preconceived notion, a hvp othesis . or an expectation which ma y adulterate
his resu lts. Scie nce is a reco rd of facts, and all kno w ledge is t r ustw o r th y o nly
in so far as it stems directly from se nso ry data .
This inductivisr ideal of pure ob servation has pro ved a mirage in science no less
than in art. The vel)' idea that it should be pos sible to observe without
l:~p ectation, that you can make your mind an innocent blank on which nature
will record its secrets, has co me in lo r strong criticism . Every ob servation, as
Kar l Popper has st ressed , is a resul t of a qu estion we ask n ature , and every
questi on im plies. a tentative hyp othesis. We look for some thing be caus e o ur
hypothesis makes us exp ec t ce r tain results. Let us see if th e)' follow. If not, w e
1l.1Ust revise our hypothesis and try again to l est it against obser vatio n as
rigorously as we can ; we do that by tryi ng to dis prove it , an d th e hyp othesis tha t'

-2

" " : IMA G E S

surv i ves that win nowing process is the one we feci e ntitled to hold , pro
tempore .
T h is de scription of the wa)' science works is eminently applicable to the
story of visual discoveries in ar t. O ur fo r m u la of schema and co r rection , in
fact , illustrates this ver)' procedure . Yo u must have a starti ng point , a
standard of com par iso n . in orde r to be gi n that pr ocess of making and
matching an d remaking w hic h finally be co m es embodi ed in the finished
image . The artist cannot star t from scratch but he can c r it icize his
fore'i-unn ers ,
There is an interesti ng pamphle t by a minor painter called Henry Rich ter,
published in 1817 - th e year Constable exhibite d W ivcnhoc Par k - which wel l
illustrates th e spiri t of creative research that an imated the yOlmg painters of the
nin etee nth century. It is called Day/isht :,1 Recent Discovcrv in the Art C!f Paintlnq ,
In this amusing dia logue the pa inter challenges the Dutch seventeenth -century
mas ters, or rather th ei r ghosts assem bled at an exhibition, w ith the question:
.Was there no d ear skv in your dol)', and did not th e broad blue light of the
atmosphere shine then , as it does now .. . ? [ find it is this whi ch gives the chief
splendour of suns hine bv contrasting the golden with the azure light" . . . . '
Like Constable , Richte r scr utinized the t rad itio nal formula handed down in
the scie n ce of pai nting and found that if yo u tested pictures painted in that
w ay th ev d id no t look like scenes in d aylight , H e t here fore advocated th e
addition' of m ore blue in co ntrast to' y~lIow in order to ach ieve that
equival ence to da yligh t wh ich had hi ther t~ el ud ed art.
Rich te r 's cr it icism w as right, but he docs not appear to have succeeded in
producing a satisfacto r y alternati ve. Perhaps he wa s no t inventive eno ugh to
put his hypothesis to the test of a successful paint ing , pe r haps he lacked t he
st amina for tr ying again and agai n, and so he disappeared into the oblivio n
of a tame and uninspired Victorian illustrator while Co nstable we n t o n
e xpe rimen ting till he fo und those bri gh te r an d coo le r harm onies w hich,
inde ed , took pain ting nearer to the plcin ai r .

Buf the e vid ence of histo r y suggests th at all su ch discoveri es involve tile
svsternatic co m par ison of past achi evements and pr~~s('nt motifs, in other
wo rd s, th e tentative pro je ct ion of works of art into nat ure . e xperimen ts as
to how far nature can in fact be seen in suc h terms . One of the most
infl ue ntial te ac her s o f ar t in n inete en t h -c en tury France , Leco q de
Boisbaudran , who wa s an ardent r eformer and advocat e of memor y
training . provides an other instance of th is intera ction . Cr itica l of accep ted
life -class ro utines and eage r to guide th e student toward ' th e immense field ,
alm os t une x plored . o f living action. of changin~, fugitive effects ,' he
obtained permission to let models pose in the ~pe~ air and m ad e them move.
fre ely. as Rodin wa s to do : ' O nce our ad~lIratlo~ rose to th e hei ght o l
e nth usiasm. One of our models, a man of splendid stature with a g re at
sw e eping bea rd, lay at rest upo n the hank ~r th.c po~d , : Iosc to a group of
ru shes, in an atti tude at once easy an d beauufu l. r he illUSion Was co mp lete
mvthologv made t rue lived hd 'o re our t: ~'cs, lor th e r r-, hdi)re us was a rive r
,
. -: . . . 1'. " . ;" ....; ...t d i1!llIt y ll\l r till: vour- Ill" hi s Wollc

ART H ISTORY : .

\Vhat an opportunity, w e rn a)' in fe r, to test traditi on an d improve upon it. It

such as th ese which explain the ~gr adu a l natu re of all ar tist ic
I~
changes , lo r var iati ons can b e co n tro lle d an d che c ke d o nly against a se t of
invJr i,Ult:-;,
. " c -';i1111jl lc"

Does not t he e x pe r ie nce of Le coq de Boisbaudran suggest the re vo lutio nar y

work of a mu ch greater innovator, Maner's Dejeuner sur l' herbe? It is we ll
kn O\\'1l th at this daring explo it of naturalism was based , not on an incid e nt
in th e enviro ns of Paris as th e scandalized pub lic beli eve d , but on a print
from Raphael's cir cle which no ne other than Frcar t de Chambray had
e xto lled as a masterpiece of co m positio n . Seen from our point of vie w this
borro wing los es much of its punling nature. The syst em atic explorer can
affor d les s than any on e els e to rei:' on random actio ns. He canno t just sp lash
colon abou t to see what happens, for e ve n if he shou ld like th e d fect he
coul d ne ver repe at it. The nat uralist ic im age , as \\T have seen, is a \'e r y
closel y kn it configuration of rela tionships w hich cannot be var ied b eyond
certain limits without becoming unin tellig ible to artist and public alike .
Man er 's actio n in m od ifying a co m p osit io nal schem a of Raphae l 's show s that
he knew th e value of th e adage 'One thing at a time .' Language grow s by
introducin g ne w words, but a langu age consisting only of new words and a
new syn ta x would be indistinguishable from gibberis h .
These co nside ratio ns mus t sur el y inc rease our r espect lo r the achie vemen t
of th e successfu l innovator. Mo re is ne eded than a rejection of trad itio n ,
more also th an an 'innocent eve ,' Art itself be comes the innovator's instr u
ment for probing reality. He" ca nno t sim ply batt le down that mental set
which m akes him sec, th e m o tif in te r m s of know n pic tures; he must ac tively
try that interpretation , but try it cr itically, varying h ere an d there to sec
whether a better match could no t be achieve d. He must st ep back from the
canvas and be his own merciless critic, in to lerant of all eas)' e ffe cts an d all
short -cut m ethods. And his rewa rd might easi ly be tile public'S finding his
egtrivalelll ha rd to re ad and ha rd to accept be cause it has not ye t been
trained to interpret th ese new co m bina tio ns in terms of th e visibl e world .

No won der the boldest o f th ese experiments led to th e co nvictio n that the
artist's vision is entire ly subj ective. With imp ressionism the popular notion of
the painter became that of th e man who pain ts blue tr ees and re d law ns and
who answers evcry criticism with a pr oud 'That is how I see it .' This is on e part
of the stor y but not, I beli eve , th e whole .This assertion of subjectivi ty can als
be overdo ne ,There is such a thin g as a real visual discoverv, and there is a way
of testing it despit e th e fact we n;a v never kn ow w hat the 'ar tist himself saw ; t
a certain moment. Whatever the initial resistan ce to impressioni st paintings.
when the fir st shock had wo rn oll', people learned to read th em . And haVing
lear:ned this language, th e)' went intu the fields and wo od s. o r looked o ut of
~~Ir window onto th e Par is boulevards, and found to their delight ~lat the
',slhle world could after all be seen in te rms of these br ight patches and dabs of
!laint. The transposition wo rked . The impressionists had taught th em, not,
Indeed, to see nature with an 1I11lo n 'rll eye , hut tu ex plo re an un expected
altcrnath'c that turned ou t to fit ("c r l.Jin ,xp,ricrw,... b ell e r tha n d id an v e-ar lie r

..: . I M A G E S

A R T HISTORY '

'nature imitates ar t ' became current. As O scar Wilde said, there was no fog in
London before W histler painted it .

N OTE
1. Images removed.

IN T ERPRETA TI O N W IT H OUT
R E P R ES E NTATI ON , OR , T H E
V IEW IN G O F LAS M E NINAS
S V E T L ANA ALPERS

?I

Along with Ver meer 's ,In

Paintinq and Courber's Scu JlQ , Velazq uez's Las
MClllnas (Figu re 4 ..3 ) is surely one of th e grl'atest representations of pict or ial
re prese ntation in all ofWeste rn painting. W hy has this work eluded full and
satis factorv discussion bv ar t histo r ians? W hv should it be that the major
stu dy, the 'most ser io us ;nd sustained piece ~f w r iti ng on this work in our
time, is by Michel Foucault?!T he re is, I shall argue, a st ruc tural explanation
built int o the interpretive procedures of the discipline itself that has made a
picture such as Las iHcninas lite rally unthinkabl e under the rubric of ar t
history. Before co nsidering the wo rk , as I propose to do, in representational
ter ms, let us consider why this should be so.
Historically, we can tra ce two lines of argum ent abou t Las Mcnmas: the first ,
most eleg~lt1y encapsulated in Theophile Gau tier's ' O ll est done le tableau?'
has been con cerned with the extraordinar ily real presence of the painted
wo r ld ." The frame appears to intersect a room w hose ceiling, floor, and
window bays exte nd. so it is suggested, to includ e the viewer, The light and
shado w-filled space is not only intended for the viewer's eyes - as in the case
of its mu ch sm alle r predecessor IltUlg at the Spanish court. Van Eyck' s ,irno!fi m
IIh /Jlng. Given the great size of the canvas, it is intended also tor the viewer>
body. Th e size of the ngures is a match fo r our own .This appeal at on ce to eye
and to hod )' is a rem arkable pictorial perfo rmance which contradicto ri ly
prescnts powerful human ligures by means of illusionary sur faces. In th e
nineteenth century it was a commonplace for travellers to Madrid to refe r to
it in what we can ca ll photographi c terms. Continuing a tradition starteel
in the eighteenth century about such works as Vermeer 's I',CIl' rj' De!ft, it was
com pared to nature seen in a camcro obscura , and Stirlin g-Maxwell, an early
wr ite.', not ed that Las Jfcllinas anticipated Daguerre. Th e pictorial quality of
presence is sustained in the apparently cas.ua,1 deportment of.the figures that i~
distinguish ed, as so often in the works ofVclazquez. bv a particul ar featu re : th
Iact that we are looked at by those at whom we arc looking. To twentieth
centu r y eves at least. this gives it the appearance of a 'napshot being taken . ln
the fo~g ;ounJ. th e littl e princess tu r n - to us [rorn her ento urage , as do cs a nt:
r"'J lll n

,,1 U"I

F IG U RE 4.3
Diego Velazquez , Las Meninas ,
1656, Museo del Prado . Mad rid
Rights reserved Museo
Nacional del Prado , Madr iv .
Reproduced with permission by
Museo Nacional del Prado,
Madrid.

of her maids, and a dwarf, and of course Velazquez himself who has ste pped
back li'om his canvas 1'01' this \'ery porpose .
The gazt' out of th e canvas is a con sistent feature in Velazquez's works. I...J It
~Iocs not initiate or att end to some occurrence ; em pty or expression , it is no t ,
in short, nar ratl vr- in nature .The gaze, "ath er, Signals from with in th e picture
hat the viewe r outside the pictu re is see n and in turn it ackno wledges the
state o r being seen .Though not invented for the occasion of Las Meninas, the
device is heighten ed here because it is thcm atizcd by th e situ ation , or possibly
the situatio ns at hand .
Just what the situati on is - hen ce what UII: subjec t of the work is - has been
~h c conce rn of the seco nd line of argument abo ut Las Menmas.111e problem
1\ not one of identiIlcati on an early co mm entato r identifi ed eac h
participant in the sce ne (even including the figure paUSing in the light of the
distant doorway whose role of marshal in the qu een 's ento urage signifi ~antl)'
matche s Velazque-z's rol e in service to the k.ing>: How ever the presence of
the king and CJuccn marked by thei r rdlc~l lon III the I?" o minent mirror at
l), l ' ce nter of th e far wall. and the I.trgt pKl un ' ~el' n fro m the hack on us

IMAGES

q ueen 01 ' w hat is the source o f thei r reflect ion s, and w hat is th e subject bei ng
pain ted on the unseen canvas? The impulse: in recent st ud ies has been to
answe r t hese q ues tions hy attempting to supply the plot - a littl e playlet as
one scholar calls it - of which this p ictur e is a scene . The litt le Infanta, So
t his accoun t goes, has d ro pped in to sec Velazquez at work. sto ps to ask her
m aid of ho no r for a drink of w ate r and loo ks up w hen surpr ised by th e
unex pected entrance of her parents, the king and queen.
It is characteristic of art histo rical practice that it is the question of plo t to
wh ich th e notio n of th e me aning of the wo rk is appe nded , rather th an to the
question o f the nature of the pictorial rep re sen tation [ . . . J. And it is on th is
basis th at th e meaning of Las tl!em nas is today interpre ted as a claim fo r the
nobility of p aint ing as a liberal art and as a personal claim fo r nob ility o n th e
pari of Velazquez himself. In sho r t, Las .Henirw 5 is now und e rs tood as a visual
statem e nt of th e social rank desired by th e painter.

[ . . .]
In o rder to re duce Las Meninas to its curren t me an ing two moves are
nece ssary : firs t , against th e evidence or th e pictu re it is argued that artist and
king are represented together and thei r proximity is see n as the ce ntral
feat u re of the wo rk ; seco nd , art histo r ians separate w hat th e y claim to be the
seven tee nth ce ntury meani ng of the work from its appearanCt" which is put
in its p lace as m er el y th e concern of mod ern viewer s.

It is th is insistence on the separat io n o f qlH.~s t io ns o f meaning fr o m questions

o f re prese ntation t hat m akes Las Meninas unthin kable within the es tablished
rub ric o r art history. The problem is endemic to the field . [ . . .] What is
missing is a no tion of representatio n or a co ncern w ith what it is to pict ur e
so mething, IJ
\ Vhy should art histor y find itself in this fix! The answe r lies , paradoxically,
in a great strength of t he d isci p lin e pa rticula rly as it has been viewe d and
used by lit e rar y scho larshi p. T he cornerstone of the ar t histo rical notio n of
meaning is iconography
so named by Panofskv w ho was its foun ding
fath e r in o ur time. Its great achievem ent was to demonstrate Ulat
representat iona l pictur es ar~ not intended so lely for p er cep tio n . but can be
read as having a secondary or deep e r le vel of m ean ing . \ Vhat then do we
mak e of the pi ctorial sur face itself? In hi s se minal essay on iconography and
ico nolog)'. Panofskv clearly e vades this question. He introduces his sub ject
with the sim ple example of meeting a fri end on the street w ho lift s his hat
in greeting. The blur of shapes and colors identified as a man and the sense
that he is i n a certain humor are called by Panofsky the primary o r nat ural
meanings, but the understanding tha t t.o raise th e hat is a greeting is a
secondarv o r co n ve ntio nal meaning. So far we have been dealing only with
life . Pan;ltsky's strategy is t he n to Si~lp), recomm:nd transferring the
resu lts of th is analysis from everyday lilt: to a .wo rk of art. So now we have
a piclUre of a man lift ing his hat. W hat Panotsky c~ooscs to ignore is that
the mall is not p rese n t hut is n. pn:St;n lcr.! III t ht; plclure . In what man ner,

A R T HI STOR Y ' .,

unO("J" wh at co nditions is the ma n represen te d in paint on the surface o f a

CJ.ll \JS?

Art hb tor ians answe r th is question in stylisti c te rms . Gombrich, q uite co n

sri ou ~ l y raking lip w here Panofskv left off, made it his major task to define

st"k. En capsulat ed in the brilliant phrase ' m aking co m es befo re ma tc hing,'

~{~ ruling inSight of Gombrichs Arc and Illusion has provi ded a generation
of liler'.lr)" cr itics w ith the to uchstone fo r the ir ana lyses of literary
conven tio n , But they have ignor ed th e ract tha t in the process of re-placing
an expressive notion of style w ith a representational one , Gombrich
efTccti\Tly e liminates just w hat he sets o ut to define. Despi te his emphasis
on 'making' or co nventio n , he is far Irorn the st r uct ur alist tha t he is
som elim es taken to he . Gombrich tr eats rep resent atio n as a matter of
skill - skill in rendering and skill in perception. Pictor ial co nve nt io ns in
Weste r n ar t , he arg ues, ser ve t he perfectio n o f na turalist ic representation
which Cornbrich significantly c hooses to call ' illusion .' Basing himself o n
the ir re fu table evidence olTered by the studv of perception . Gomb r ich
concludes by defin ing a perfect representation as indi sting uishable to our
eves from nature. Like the current commentators o n Lay Menmos ,
Gombrich ellectivel v cr edi ts the perfect re presentatio n wi th maki ng pic
ture s disappear: the question of re presentatio n re treats before th e p e r fect
illusion Velazquez prod u ces o f t he pa inter, the princess, and her en tourage,
Any meaning must dearly lie e lsew he re - be yond or ben eath the surface
of the p icture .

It is her e that the strength o f Fo uca ult 's commentary on l.as Aletnnas lies .
Beginning, as he does . w ith a de te r minate and de ter mining noti on of class ical
representatio n, he finds in this pai nting IC5 r e pres en tatio n . Fo ucau lt' s
exposition o r t his p o int proceeds through a careful viewing of th e w ork
which is impressive 1'01' its atten tive ness . His interest in repre sen ta tio n
gives him the m o tive fo r look ing which is lo st to th ose- who seek meaning
in signs of a claim to social st atu s. Foucau It finely e vo kc-, the th em e o f
reCiprOcity b e tw ee n an absent vie wer (before the painting) and the world in
VIew. He argues th at the ab sence of a subject- viewer is ess ential to classical
r~presentation . This seems to me wrong. Fo r the reci proci t)' be tween absen t
VIewer and wor ld in view is prod uced not hy t he absence of a conscious
human subject, as Foucault argues , bu t rather b;' Velazquez's ambit io n to
ern bra ce t wo conflicting m odes of representation, each of which constitu te s
t~e relationship between the vie wer an d the p ict ur ing of t he wo rl d
(hfT~: rell~ly. It is the te nsio n be t ween these two - as between UlC opposing
holes 01 two .m~gne ts tha t one might attempt to bring together w ith one's
ands - that Inform s this picture .

(~agine two

dilTercnt ki nd s o f pictures - the first is conceived to be like a

\~Jnclow on the perceived world .The artist positions himself on the viewer's

sld~ of the picture surface and looks through the frame to the world, ~"hich
he then re constructs 011 the surface of t he picture by means of the geometric
ronvC'lltion of linear perspecti ve. I J

A R T H I S T O R Y : "> ;;"

IMA G ES

T Ill" second mode is not a win dow but rat her a sur face on to which an irna
01' the world casts its elf. just as ligh t focuss ed through a len s forms a pict Ut,
on th e retina of the eye. In place of an artist who frames the wo rld to pictu
it , th e wo r ld produces its own image witho ut a necessar y frame. T
replicative imagc is jus t there for the loo king, withou t th e in tervention 0
hu m an ma ker. T he worl d so seen is conce ived of" as exi sting prior to
artist-viewer. [.. . 1The artist of the fir st kind claim s that 'I see the worl
wh ile that o f the second sho w s rath er that the wo rl d is 'being seen .'

T OWA R DS A VI S UAL C R IT IC AL T H E O RY
SUSAN BUCK -MORSS

1111' pro d ucti on of a dis course of visual culture entails th e liquidation of ar t

;l ' I I l' have kn own it . Th er e is no way within suc h a d iscour se for art to
sll ~t,li n a sep arate e xistence , not as a practi ce, not as a ph enomenon, not as
~l (>xpe r icnce , not as a discip line. Mu se ums would then need to become
double en casings, prescT\'ing art objects, and pre scT\'ing the art -id ea . Ar t
hi,to r:' de par tm en ts would be mov ed in with archaeo logy . And w hat of
I am not just imagining tw o kinds of pictures, but describing two modes
'artist,;' ? In the recently expired socialist societies, th ey printed u p call ing
representation that are central in Western art . I. . . 1 In Velazquez's Las Mem
we find the two as it were co m poun de d in a dazzling, bu t [un dam entaj] earth with thei r p ro fessio n liste d con fidentl y after their name and pho ne
unrcsolvahle way. While in th e Albertian picture the artist presumes himsd numbe r. In recen tly restructured cap italist societies, they became ca ught in
a di,l!ectica] cul-d: -sac, attem pting to rescu e th e au to nomy of art~ as a
to stand with the viewer b~foTe the pictured world in both a physica l
ep istemolog ical sens e , in th e de scriptive mode 11(" is accoun ted fo r, if at all rcl1en ivL' , cri tical practi ce by attacking the museum , the ver y institution
that sustains the illusion tha t art exists. Ar tists as a social class de ma nd
wuhm that world . A pict orial device signalling this is th e artist mirrored in
sponsors
: th e state , private patrons , co r po rations . Their produc ts enter the
wurk (as in Van Evck 's !lm o!flm ) or a figun:: situated as a looker with in, la th
market
through
a dealer-critic system that manipu lates value and is
like a su rve yor situ ated with in the very world he ma ps. In Dutch paint ings
rncdiatvd
bv
galle
ries,
museums , and private co llections . Tomorrow 's artists
this type: the looker w ith in the picture does no t look out. That would ind
rna>'
opt
t
~
~go
underground,
much like fre emasons o f the eighteenth
he a cont rad icti on since a picture of this sort docs no t assum e the ex isten ce
centu
ry.
Th
ey
may
choose
to
do
thei r wo r k esote ri cally, w hile employed as
viewer s pr ior to and external to it, as do es the Albertian m ode.
reducer s o f visual culture .
In l.as MellllJas th e looke r with in the p icture - th e on e whose view it is n
Their wor k is to sustain the critical moment uf aesthetic expe r ience . Our
on ly loo ks out , bu t is su itably none o ther than the artist himself. W hat
work as critics is to recognize it. Can this be done best , or done at all. w ithin
ext raor d inar y about thi s picture as a re presentat ion is tha t we must take
a
new int erdisciplinary field of visual studies? What would be the episeme, or
at once as a r cpl ication of the wo rl d und as a reconstruction o r the world
theoretical
frame , of such a field? Twice at Cornell over the past decade we
we view through the win dow fram e .The wor ld seen has pri or ity, but so 31
have
had
meetings
to discu ss th e cr eatio n o f a visual studies program . Both
do we , th e viewers on this side o f the picture surface , Let m e expl .
times,
it
was
painfully
clear that institutionalization canno t by itself produce
Parad ox ically, th e world seen tha t is prior to us is pr ecisely w hat , by loo kim
such
a
frame.
and
th
e
discussio
ns- am ong a dispara te g rou p or art historians,
o ut (and here the artis t is join ed by th e princess and part of her re ti nue
a,nthropol
ogists
,
computer
design
ers, social historians , and scholars of cinema,
co nfir m s or acknowledges us . But if lI 'e had not ar r ived to stand befo re th
did
not coalesce in to a program . Still, visual
lIterature
,
and
arc
hitecture
worl d to look at it , the pr ior it), o f the wo rl d se en wou ld not have bee
culture
has
become
a
presence
on
campus
, It has worked its way in to many of
defined in the first plac e . Ind eed , to co me full circle , the wo r ld seen
th
~
tr
aditi
onal
disciplines
and
lives
there
in
suspende d isolation, encapsulated
before us be cau se we (a long with th e king and quel.'n as noted in the d ist
\\"
Ithin
th
eore
tic
al
bubbl
es.
T
he
psych
oan
alytic-bubble
is the biggest , bu t there
mirror) ar c what com m and ed its prese nce.
are others. One co uld list a com mon set or readings , a canon of texts by
LJS Menmas is produced not out o f a singl e, classical noti on of rcprescn tati
~nhes , Benjamin, Fo ucault , Lacan , as \\'1:11 as a pr ccan on o f texts by a long
as Foucault sugg ests , but rath er out of spe cific pictorial traditio ns I list or co ntem po rary writers. Ce r tain them es are standard: th e reproduction
c prcsenrat io n . It confo u nds a stab le reading , not be cause of th e absence I of ~e imag e, th e soci ety of the spectacle , eJl\i sion ing the O ther, sco pic
th e viewe r -sub ject , but because the painting hold s in sus pension tl regimes, the simulacrum, th e fetish , the (male ) gaze , the machine eye . Today
cont rad ictor)' (and to Velazque z 's sense of things . insep ar abl e) mode>
the phrase ' visu al stud ies ' calls up 202 entries in a keyw ord search at th~
picturing the relationship of viewer, and picture, to world . O ne assu m es t~, Corne ll l.lniversitv Libraries. There is a me dia Iihrarv a "cinema pr ogram an
pri ority o f a viewer before th e picture who is the measure of the world at art museu m , a theater arts ce n ter, tw o slide libr~~ ies , and a half d o~en
th e other assu m es that th e world is prior to an )' human presen ce an d is t11' pOSS (~ssi \'d )' guarded . department -owned \'iclc:ocasscttc: plavers. If th e
essen tially imm easurable.
theoreti cal hubbies burst, there rc m~i ns . this infrastr ucture of teclm ol ogical
reproduction . Visua l cu lture , once a lor"lgner to the acade my, has gotten its
green card and is here tu stay.
NOTES
rngli~h Translation, N ew York: Rando'
I . Michel rnu
1louse , Vin tag'

~ 1,"1I1t1 "

I ~~Jf,.. rp. .L~ )

I' . ~\.. 1 1~96

.,_ : IMA G E S

Silent m ovies at the be ginning o f the cent ur y init iate d the u topian i
of a universal language of images, one that could glid e oyer pol iti
and ethnic borders, and set to right th e Tower of Rabel , Acti on fH
and MTV at the end of the ccnturv have realized this idea in secular iz
instr um entalized form, p rod ucing "subjects for t he next stage of glo
capitalism . In this w ay, visua l culture beco mes th e concern of the soc
sciences . ' Im ages in the m ind mo tiva te th e w ill,' wr ote Benjam in, alludj
to the political power of im ages claimed by Sur realism . But his wor
co uld provide the motto as well for th e adver tising industry, prod
sponsor ing , and po litical campaigni ng, w hereas today the fre edom
exp reSSion of artists is defended on formal grounds t hat stress It
Vir tuality o f the re presentation . The images o f art , it is argu cd , have
effect in the realm of deeds .
A critical analysis of th e im age as a social object is needed more urge n ~
than a prog ram that legi timates its ' cultu re .' We need to be able to l'
im ag es e m ble m atically and sym p to m atically, in ter m s at' th e m
fundamental questions o f socia l life . T his means that critical theo rie s ai,
need ed, theories th at ar e th em selves visual, tha t show rather tha n arglk
Such conceptual conste llations co nvince by their power to illuminate tf:
world , br inging to consciousness wh at was befo re on ly dim ly perceive d ,
that it becom es availabl e for critical re flectio n . I do not understand
de scription of 'anthro pol ogi cal' models and 'socio -histor ical' mo d els
antith etica l po les of th is theoretical pro ject , Any inter p re tation wor th its ~J ,~
d em ands both . It needs to provide a socio-historical and biographical ston
of o r igins th at estranges the ob ject from us an d shows us th at its tr uth is n
immediatel y accessible (the object's pre history) , and a sto ry of de fcrr e
action (it s afterhistor v) th at comes to terms wi th the po tenc~' of the 01*
wi thi n o ur own horizo n of concerns .
\V hilc the In ter net is the topic and the m edium for ne w co urses in digi
cu lture , it is str iking to anyo ne who has vi sited th e Intern et ho w visual!:
im pover ished a home- page can be. C vber digits rep roduce the mov ing imag
haltingly, and the static ima ge uni mp ressivelv. The possibility o f com pu"
scr eens replacing television screens may mean a great dea l to stockho kle
of telephone com pan ies, but it wi ll no t shake the worl d of the visual imag
Aesth eti c exp eri en ce (sensory ex per ience ) is not reducible to infonnaLio
Is it old-fashioned to say so ? Per haps the era o f images that ar e more ih
information is alr eady behind us. Perhaps discussions about visua l cu lt ure
a field have come to o late . It b w ith nostalg ia that we bo ycott the videos wf
and insist upon seeing movies on th e big screen ,
The producers of the visual culture of tomorrow are the cam era -worn
video /Hlm editor s, citv planner s, set desigrwrs for rock star s, touri
packagers, marketing c~nsultnnts, polifical consulC~llts, teIe \;sion produce
comm odity de signers, layout pt'rsons, an,d.cosme tic surgeons. Th ey arc
students who sit in our c lasses today. What IS It they need to kn o", ?What will i
gained, and by wh om , in (,fkring them a program ill visual studies ?

SE M IO T IC S

Nature of the Linguistic Sign

5 :I

Ferdinand de Saussure

5:2

The Sign: Icon, Index, and Symbo l

Charles Sanders Peirce

5 :3

The Third Mea ning

Roland Barthes

5 :4

Mieke Bal

5 :5

The Semiotic Landscape

Gunter Kress and Thea van Leeuwen

From Sub- to Suprasemiotic: The Sign as Even!

I NTR ODUCTION

IN T RO D U C T IO N
Semiotics - or the 'study of signs' - is concerned with meaning-making
representation in many forms. It has been app lied widely in the analysis
Images in medi a, communication and cultura l studies, as well as in
history, as a method of 'taki ng an image apart and tracing how it work
relation to broader systems of meani ng' (Rose, 2001: 68). Semiotics, ofte
conjunction with psychoanalysis (Silverman, 1983), came to prominenc
the height of French structurali st thought in the 1950s and 1960s (Haw
1977). Since this time, various semiotic approaches - exemplified by
journal Applied Semiotics - have been adopted and adapted across a wn
range of disciplines outside of the arts and humanities, including.
example, medic ine, law, business studies, engi neering and the cogm
sciences.
There are tw o mai n traditions recogni sed in semiotics. The first stems f
the work of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure and the second i
the American philosopher and logician Charles Sanders Peirce. Saussu
(5.1) structuralist, dyadic model of semiotics focuses on the linguistic si
which he argues does not correspond to its object or referent. Rather, t
is an arbitrary relation between the signifier, meaning a sign that is
acoustic image of a sound, and the signified, meaning the con
corresponding to the signifier. The meani ng of language comes from
differential relations betwee n signs, or the place of a sign in a w
structure of interrelated signifyi ng units. The impact of Saussure's v
relates directly to what Rorty (1979: 263) terms 'the linguistic tum ', w her
all of social and cultural life is critical Iv examined in terms of 'tex ts'
'te xtua lity' . In light of debates about contemporary image culture, W.
Mitchell (1994: 16) suggests there has been a furt her 'pictorial turn ', mar
by a 'postlinguistic, postsemiot ic rediscovery of the picture'; which argua'
might entail a visual semiotics .
Peirce's (5.2) semiotics , wh ich expressly engages wit h visual as well
linguistic signs, involves a triad ic model along with a series of layered
at tim es quite opaque taxonomies (Elkins, 2003 ). Similar to Saussu
signifier and signifi ed respectively. Peirce describes the interaction betv
a repr esememen (the iorm the sign takes) and an im erpretsnt (the se
made of the sign), but also includes an ?bjecl (to whi ch the sign re
However Peirce was no naive realist, argumg that all experience is medi a
by signs.' Overall, Peirce's notion of 'sem i~c; I~ ' - in con ~ra~ t to Saussu
synchronic emphiJsj~ .u p~ n str,!~ure . - r~esc,,?es a semIOtIC pro cess .
much adopted claSSifIcation 0 1 icoruc . md~xlcaf and symbol ic signs.
example, depends pri~aflly upon thr- use at the sign. thereby emphasis]
the 'role of the reader In <;(!11110 tIC analys ts (Eco, 1984).

'ThE' cultural and literary critic Roland Barthes (1972) initially combined
SJUssure's semiotics with Marxist ideology critique to uncover the myths of
contemporary society and politics. Applying semioti cs to political and
adv'ertising images, Barthes distinguished between thaI which a picture
;ctuall y signifies, or denotes (such as a Black French soldier saluting) and its
broader cultural and ideological meaning, connotation or signified (the
civilising role of French imperialism). Barthes claimed that the ideological
'rhetoric of the image' is underwritten by the seeming naturalness of photo
raphic denotation (1977: 32-51). But Barthes (5.3) became dissatisfied with
quasi-sci entific nature of structuralist semiotics, moving towards post
structura li sm and more open systems of meaning and criticism. He identifies
in images a 'third' level of meaning, which, following Julia Kristeva (1984),
he refers to as signifiying - a signifier without a signified. The third meaning,
as a supplementary signifier, is indifferent to, or free from, the narrative or
codes that surround it. The third meaning can structure a film differently to
established codes and connotations, without subverting the story, leading
Barthes to suggest that '[tlhe filmic is what, in the film, cannot be described'
(see also Eisenstein, 10.2).

fhe

Ar! historian Mieke Sal (5.4) takes inspiration both from Barthes and Peirce, as
well as drawing on psychoanalysis, feminism and narratology. She deploys
two new terms: sub- and suprasemiotic, which, respectively, refer to the
smallest, technica l aspects of a pictu re (in themselves not signs as such) and
the overarching, holistic interaction of signs. Her analysis of the relationship
between these two extremes leads her to see something akin to Barthes' third ,
obtuse meaning in painting. In conceiving of the sign not as a thing, but as an
event, which brings to mind Peirce's semiotic process, Bal acknowledges that
pictures do not stand alone, but 'move' because of the view er. Her use of
narratology as an aspect of visual semiotics accords with her critical move
beyond a word-image opposition (Bal, 1991; Bal and Bryson, 1991 ). But it has
also, along with her notion of non-semiotic elements, sparked a controversy
about the general appropriateness of semiotics for the analysis of visual images
and whether or not a properl y visual semiotics can be established (Elkins,
1995, 1996, 2003; Bal, 1996; see also Section 8. Images and Words).

~un.t er Kress and Thea van Leeuwe n

(5.5) have no qualms about applying

SOC,~ I semiotics' (Hall iday, 1978; van Leeuwen, 2005 ) across a broad socia l
l~rr~ 1n of communication, w hich they refer to as the 'semiotic landscape' .
NOting the increasing reliance on visual as opposed to linguistic moda lities
of Communication, wh ich reflects the shift to a more visual than literary
Culture (see Sections 11 and 12), they call for new forms of vi sual literacy
~al have hitherto been suppressed. The clear distinction they draw between
VISUal and linguistic modes of communication, simi lar to Romanyshyn (8.4)
and Debray (13 .4), also draws attenti on to the multi-modality of signs (Kress
~~d van Leeuw~n, 2001 ). Kress. and van Leeuwen develop a critical
SCo urs~ an.alysls of ~he conve.ntlons or grammar of contemporary vi sual
ornmUnlCatlon, drawing attenuon to the motives and interests behind as
Well as the effects of, domi nant forms of visual communica tion, as they s~ek
In change the 'sem iotic landscape' at the same tim e as interpreting it.

RE F ERENCES
B~I , M. ( I qql ) On Story-relling. L5sar~

In

Narrarl)IQgv, eO

PfJlt!bridge Press.

Ildl , M . ( 19 9 0) ' Sernlouc elements

in c"opmlt: pr... Iii

Job lrng. Sonoma, CA:

rtttc 01/ tnqutrv, 2 2 (3):

SEM I O T I C S :

IMAGES

c;

NAT U R E O F T H E LI N G U IS TI C SIG N

Bal. M. and Bryson, N . (1991) 'Sem iotic s and art history ', Art Bulletin, LXXIII (2)
174-208 .
Barth es, R. (1972 ) Mythologies, Ir. A. Lavers. London : Jona than Cape.

Barth es, R. (19 77) Image, Music. Text , tr, S. Heath. G lasgow: Fontana .

Eco, U . (19 84) The Role of the Reader, Bloomington, IN: Ind iana University Press.

Elkins , I. (1995) 'Ma rks, traces, trails. contours, orli, and splendo res: nonsem iotlc

clemen ts in pi ctures ', Critical Inquiry, 2 1 (Summer): 822-60.

Elkins, ]. (1996 ) 'W hat do we w ant pictures to be? Repl y to M icke Ba!' . Critical InqUIry

FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE

Some peo ple regard langu age , wh en re duced to its ele ments, as a
naming-proce ss only - a list of word s. eac h corresponding to the th ing that
it name., . For example :

22 (3): 590-602 .

Elkins, J. (2003 ) 'W hat does Peirce's sign theory have to say to art history?', Cultllr.

Theor y and Critique, 44 (1): 5-22 .

H all iday, M.A.K. (19 78) Language as Social Semiotic. Lon don : Arnold.

Hawkes, T. (1977) Structuralism and Sem iotics. London: Routledge.

Kress, G. and van Leeuwen, T. (200 1) Multimodal Disco urse: The Modes and Media.

of Contemporary Communication. London: Arnold .

Kristeva. j. (1984) Revolution in Poetic Language, tr, M . W all er. New York: Co lu mbia

Un iversity Press.
Mitchell. W.j.T. (1994) Pic ture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation
Chi cago: University of Chicago Press.
Rorty, R. (1979) Philosophy and the Mirror 0; Nature. Princeton, Nj : Princeton
Un iversity Press.
Rose, G. (200 1) Visual Methodologies: An Introduction Co the tm erp tet eti on of Visual

Materials. London: Sage.

Silverman, K. (1983) The Subje ct of Sem iotics. New York: Oxford Univer sity Press.

van Leeuw en, T. (2005) Introdu cing Social Semiotics. London : Routledge.

etc .

ARBOR

EQUUS

etc.

This conce p tion is 0pl'n to criticism at several points. It assumes that

ready-m ade ideas exist befor e words [.. . J; it docs not tell us w hether a
name is vocal or psych ol ogi cal in nature (arb or, for instance , can be
consider ed fro m either viewpo in t): finally. it let s us assume that the linking
of a nam e and a thing is a very Simple operation - an assumption that is
anything hu t true . But this r ather naive approach can brin g us near th e tru th
by sh ow in p us th at the linguistic un it is a double entity, on e for m ed by th e
associating of two term s.

[..1
The lingu istic sign un ites, not a thing and a nam e , b ut a concept and a
sound-im age. The lat ter is not the ma teri al sou nd , a purely phy sical thi ng,
but till" psych ol ogical imprint of the sound, th e impressio n that it ma kes on
? u.r sens es. The sou nd-im age is senso ry, and if I happen to call it ' m ater ial,'
u Is only in that sense , and by way of opposing it to the oth e r ter m of the
a~sociation , the con cept , which is gen erally m ore abs tr act.
Th e psycho log ical character of our so un d -irnapcs becomes app ar ent wh en
we ob ser ve our own speech . Without m OVin g our lips o r tongue , we can
talk to ours elv es or recite mentally a select ion of ver se. Because we reg ard
~h e words of o ur language as so und -images , we m ust avoid spea king of the
phonemes ' that make up the words . Thi s term, wh ich suggesl~ voca l
!",mU\~.n c l de S.ll u ~:mrc. rtom U -'lH':t( in " ''~nJll. .H ty uIUItJ :"'t', , , 'ror k . Mc. Gr,)" l h ll , 1966, pp. 6 5 R, 120 .
tr Rl~' Harrh I;J 19 S J Mu; H~ rn' . Engli. IlIt,m\"l. licm ,m, 1 t'tlil,-,d.J man e-' Rt p lT)lh.K"~ : d w it] . p', ~rm u.5JOn
uf 'm... I\t c l ~ r ., ,, Ildl <:() mI MOI4..~.

IMAGES

SE M I OTle s : 1':'7

activit v, is applicable to th e sp oken wo r d only, to the realization of the inner

irnav c in discourse . Vic can avoid th at m isunderstanding bv ~peakin g of the
.I'twnJ s and svllablc or J word p ro vided we re m e m ber th~t the names refer to
the so um l-irn ag,
Th e linguistic sign is then a t we-side d psych o logi cal entity that can he
represented by the drawing :

Sound-Image

[ . .. 1

The two cle m ents ar c intimately unitcd.und eac h recalls th e o ther. W heth er
we try to find th e meaning of the Latin wor d arbor o r th e wo rd th at Lat in
uses
design ate the con cept 'tre e,' it is clear that only the associations
sanctio ned by that language appear to us to co nfo r m to reality, an d we
disregard w hatever o thers migh t be imagi ne d .

;0

Our defin itio n o f th e lingui stic sign p oses an impor tan t question or
ter m inol ogy. r call th e combination of a concept and a sound -image a siBil ,
but in cu r re nt usag e the term ge ne rally designates only a sou nd -image , a
wo rd , for exam ple (arbor, N C. ) . One ten ds to forget that arbor is calle d a
sign o nly because it carries the concept ' tr ee ,' wi th the resu lt tha t the idea
till' sensory pa r t implies We idea of the w hole ,

or

t--- - l lI
arbor

II'

[. . . In l langu age there are on I)' dillerences. Even more im portant: a difference

gClled ly impli es positive ter ms between whi ch [he difference is set up : but in

laJ1i:--T1.lage ther e are on ly differ ence without posu ivc terms. Whethe r: we take the

signifl l.~d or the signifie r, langu age has neither ideas nor sounds that e xisted

b; fore the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phoni c dillc renccs that

han" issued fr;m the s)'stem .111e id e~ /sigllilk 'd j or phonic substance [signifier]

that a sign contains is or less im portance than the other signs that surround it.

Concept

'tree'

I I

The bond between the sign ifie r and the Signified is arb itrary. Since r m ean

b- sign th e w ho le that res ults fro m the associat ing o r the sign ifier with th e

si~1 i fkd, [ can simply sa)': the lingUIstiC Sign is arbitrary,

Ambiguity would disappear if We three notions involv ed here were

deSignat ed by three nam es, eac h suggesting and opposing the others . I
propose to retain th e word siBn [slgn eJ to designate th e wh ol e an d to re place
concept and sound-im aqe respectively by uon!fied [siBn!flel and siBnifier
l.sJgn!flant]; th e last t wo terms have th e arlvantage of indicating the
opposition tha t se para tes them from ~~ach other and from the whole of
which they arc parLs, As rega rds IIBn , it I am satisfi ed with it , this is sim ply
because I d " no t. know uf any wo rr] to re p lace it, th e ordinary languag~'
suggesl ing n nthl;;r.

But th e statem e nt tha t everyt hing in lan guage is negative is true on ly if the
sign itied and signifier are considered separately ; w hen we co nsid er the sign
in its to tality, we have som ethi ng th at is positive in it 0 \ \ '11 class. A linguistic
system is a se r ies of differe nc es of sound combined w ith a series of
<lifferen ces of ideas; but th e pair ing of a certain n umbe r of acoustical signs
with .1$ m any cuts made from the mass of thought engenders a system of
values; and this s)"S tem ser ves as the effective link be t ween th e pho n ic and
psyc ho log ical elements wi th in each sign .

T HE SI G N : IC O N, IN D EX ,
AND S Y M B O L '
C H A R L E S S A N D E:R S PEIR CE:
A sign, or represen tamen, is something w hich stands to somebody for
something in some respect o r capacity. It addresses so mebody, tha t is ,
creates in th e m ind of t hat per so n an equivalen t sign, o r pe rha ps a more
deVeloped sign . That sign which it create s I call the interpretant of th e firs t
sign. The sign stands for something, its object . It stands for that o bject , not in
all reSptT ts, bu t in refe ren ce to a sort of idea , which J han' sometimes ca lled
the a round or the representamen . ' Idea ' is he re to be understood in a sort of
Platoni c sense , ve ry famili ar ill ever yday talk I m ean in that sense in which
We say that o ne man catches another man's idea in w hich we say tha t w hen
m a~ recalls what he w as thinking uf at som e ~re\'ious time , h~ recalls the ,
sam e idea, and in which when a man co ntinues to think an ything, say for a
tenth o f a se co nd , in so far as th e th ought co ntinues to agree with itself
du ring that time, that is to have a like conten t , it is th e same id ea, and is no
at each instant o f th e interval a new idea .
Repnn ",<lI.y perm ,'"on of thr publbb "r lrom n.. c.Jkn.,J ropen '!!'C h" t l.. SanJ<n 1'<i tc 4. Vol, ll , ed
ChJ.r le'l Ha r talusr ne .Ind Paul \\lCh 'l. pp . Il S. 14 1-.... 1/,'91 .,. l ~mblidg\ - . MA rhc Bclkn.p Ilre u. ( .If
J f,an '.nl Unav("nlty J-'rtu . C V()"'rlghl ,f'" 1911, 1960. try thl Pr Clhll~lI and r, 'UtY'n or H. n 0"tnl CoJl\:ge .

5
.

, .

- v-,

I MAGE S

[ ... )
1\ sign is either an Icon . an Index, or a symbol, An Jean is a sign which would
p ossess th e characte r w hic h render s it sign ifican t , even though its object had
no exis tence : such as a lead -pe ncil streak as representing a geomctricalline.
An ind ex is a sign w hic h would, at o nce, lose the c harac te r w hich m akes it a
sign if its objeZ.t were removed , but wo uld no t lose that character if there
we re no in te r prctan t . Such , for ins tance, is a piece of mould w ith a
bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot ; for w ithout the shll t there wo uld have bee n
no hole ; bu t th ere is a ho le there , wh e ther anybody has th e sense to attribut e
it to a shot or not. A sym bo l is a sign w hich wo u ld lose t he cha rac ter w hich
rende rs it a sign if there were no inter pre tant . Suc h is any utt e ranc e or
speech whic h sign ifies what it docs only by virtue of its being understo od to
have tha t sit-,mifkation.

[. . .J
ICON : A sign whi c h refer s to the Object th at it deno tes m erely by virtue of
c haracters ~r its own, and \\hich it possesses , just t he same ,' whethe r am
suc h Ob ject actually exists or not , It is t r ue that un less there r eally is suc h
an Object , the Icon does nOI act as a sign ; but this has n oth ing to do with its
cha ract er as a sign , :'\n)'thing wh at ever, be it qua litv, e xistent individua l , or
law, is an leon o f anythi ng, In so far as it is like th at thing and used as a sign
o f it.
[ .. . ]

INDEX: A sign , or re present atio n , whic h refe rs to its object not so mu ch

be caus e o f an)' similar ity or ana logy with it, nor beca use it is associated w ith
ge ne ral ch aract e rs w hich th at ob jec t happens to possess, as beca use it is in
d yn ami cal (including spatial) connection both with the individual object, on
th e one hand , and w ith (h<: senses or memory of the pe rs o n fo r w hom it
serves as a sign , on th e other hand.
N o matter of fact can be stated w ith out th e usc of som e sign serving a." an
index . If /I. says to B, 'The re is a fire, ' B will ask , ' W he re?' Thereupon A is
force d to resort to an inde x , e ven if he o nly means somewhere in the real
universe, past and future . Otherwise, he has o'nl), said that there is such an idea
as lire , w hich wo uld give no information , since unless it w ere know n already.
the word '{irc ' would be unintelligible . [1':\ points his Hilger to the fire, ~is
finger is dvnamicallv con necte d with t he fire, as much as if a self-acting [ire
alar m had directlv ~rned it in that direction; whi le it also forces the eves of B
to turn th at w ay, 'his att e ntion to be ri veted upon it, and his und er standing t o
recognize that -his question is answered. If A's reply is, 'Within a thousand
vards of here,' the wo rd 'here' is an index; for it has precisely the same force
as if he had pointed energetically to the ground between him and B.

[ .. .]
Indices may be distinguished Irorn o ther ~ ign~. l~r represenlations, by th ree
characteristic marks: first, that the)' have no stgl1lficant n:scmblanet: to their
objects; second, tha t lite)' refer to indi vid uals , " i~g lc un it", ~ing lt: co llec tio ns
" I' u ni ts o r singk co n tinu,l; thln l Iholt t hrv tlln't1 tln, au enuon to tl u-ir

SEM I O T I C S : '

by blind compu lsion. But it would be difTicult if not impossible, to

instance an absolut ely pure index, or to find any sign absolutel y devoid o r
tht' indexical q ualit y. Psvcholoqically, the action o f indices depe nd s upon
as,;ociatlon by contiguity, and n o t u po n asso ciation hy resem blance 0 1' up on
inte llect ual o perations .
Ohjl'C[S

SYJ\l BOL : A Sign wh ich is consti tu ted a sign merely or main ly by th e Iact
that it is used and unde rstood as such , w hether the ha bit is natu ra l o r
con\ cntional, and witho ut re gard to the motives w hich originally gove rned
its selection. [. . 1

It is of th e nature of a sign, and in pa rticular of a sign which is rendered

significant bv a character which lies in the fact that it w ill be in terpre ted as
a sign. o r course, nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign; but the
charact e r which causes it to be int erprete d as referring to its object may be
one wh ich m ight belong to it irrespect ive of its object and though th at
object had neve r existed , o r it ma y be in a relation to its o bject w hic h it
would have just the same whether it were interpreted as a sign o r not. Rut
the tlieraa o f Burgcrsdicim seem s t o b e a sign which , like a word , is
connected with its ob ject by a co nve ntion that it shall be so und erstood , or
else by a natural ins tinct or 'intellect ual act w hich takes it as a represe ntative
of its ob ject w itho u t any action nccc ssar ily taking pla ce w hic h co uld
estab lish a factual connection between sign an d ob ject. If this was thl~
meaning o f Burgersdicius, his thcma is the sam e as th e p res en t write r' s
'symbol.' ,

NO TES
I. Editor's note : For the sake of claritv, and bre vit ,.v the order of UlC text from the
origillaI has been altered slightly. Also , the or iginal numbcl'ing of the paragr aphs
has been removed.
2. Edilor', note: Peirce is rd,ning here to Burgersdicius' LON,e (1., ii ., I ), of 1635,
in which the wo rd ' the rna' is coined. llle meaning of which, Peirc e suggests, is
equivalent to what Aristo tle sometimes ex presses by A6yo ~ (180'<) , being the
immediate object of a thought o r meaning.

T HE THI RD M EAN IN G
ROLAND BART HES

Here is ~n image fro m [Eisenstein's] hun the Terrible ( Figure 5.1 ): tw o

COUrtiers, confederates , or supernumeraries (it doesn't matter whether or
not I recall the story's details ex ac tlv) are shOwering the you ng tsar's he ad
with go ld. I believe 'l can Jisli nguis h three levels of m eaning in this scene :

l 'If'''' (11111 ~

w."g). I~K~ ,

PI" ~ I

i.I7~.

1 1.

SEMIOTI CS : ! !

' IMAG ES

here-w fo re inco mp lete sign is composed. T here is a certain density of th e

cow-til'r s' m akeu p, in one case thick and emphatic, in th e other sm~oth and
' d i~ t mguished ; ' there is the 'stupid' nose on one and the delicate line of the
cyd ids on the other, his dull blond hair , his wan complexion, the affected
S;;,oo tlmes s of his hairstyle which suggests a wig, th e connection with chalky
skin tints, with rice powder. I am no t certain wheth er my reading of th is thir d
meaning isjustified - if it can be generalized - but already it seems to me that
its signifier (the features I have just attempted to e xpress, if no t to describe)
poss~sses a theoretical individuality. For, on the one hand , this ~ignifier
cannot be ident ified w ith the simple Dasem of th e sce ne ; it exceeds the copy
of the re fe rential motif. it compels an inte r rogati \'e r ead ing - an
interrog,ltion bearing precisclv on the .~ igni fi c r, not on the signified, on the
reading, not on intellection : it is a 'poetic' apprehension. O n the other hand ,
it canno t be identified with the episode's dramatic meaning. To say tha t these
features reftr to a signifkan t 'e xp ression' of the courtiers, here remote and
bore d , there diligen t ('The)' are ~jmplj' dom.q their job as courtiers' ), does not
altog~,tlw r satisfy me . Snmething in these two faces transcends psychology,
anecdote, fun ction, and, in short. meaning, though with out being reduced to
the pcrsistencx: which am hu man bodv exerts hv merely being present. In
oppositi on to the first 'two levels, ~Ja t of c~11Inunication ~and tha t of
significati on, this thir d level - even if my rea ding of it is still uncertain - is
that of slgn.I!j'irw ["on!f)anccl, a wo rd that has the advantage ofreferrinq to the
field of the signifier (and not of signification) and of app roac hing , along the
trail blazed hy Julia Kr istcva , who proposed the term, a semiotics of the tex t.

F IGURE 5 . 1
From Eisenstein's Ivan the
Terrible. Source: British
11m Institute.

1. An informational level: ever vth ing I can learn from the setting the
COstu mes, the characters , their relati onships, their insertion in an anecdote
familiar (0 m c (however vaguely).This level is that of commumCGnon, If I had to
find a mode of analysis forit , i should resort to a primary semiotics (th at of
the ' message '), though 1 shall not dea l with this level and this semiotics he re .

2. i\ sym bo lic level: the sho wer of oold .Th is level is itsel f strat ified . There is

b
a refer ential sym bo lism : the imp e rial ritual of baptism by go ld . Then the re
is a diegetic symbolism : the theme of gold, of wealth (assuming it exists) in
Ivan the Terrible, which in this imag e would mak e a Signilkan t intervention .
Th er e is ,1150 an Eisensteinian symbolism - if, sav, a critic decided to show
tha t gold. o r a sho we r of gol d. ~r th e curtain co~ s titu ted by this shower. 0
the disfigurement it produces, can parti cipate in a system of displacements
and suhs t itutions characteristic of Eisenstein . Finally th ere is a historical
~ )'mholis m , if i t can be show n, in a manner even more gen eralized than tilL,
rnTl~ding , that gold introduce's a (theatrical) function, a scenogr aph)' 01
exchange whi ch we can locate bot h psydlOanalyticaIly and economicall)'.
i .c . ; sem io logically. This second level, in its totality, is that o f sJonylcatlon . [t~
mod e of analvsi s would be a more high I)' elaborated semiotics than the first.
a second or nco .semiotics no longer acccss ibk to a science of the message
but to sciences of th e sym bo l (psichoana l~'s i :> , economic:;, dramaturgy ).
Is this all ? No , for [ cannot yet detach m)'sdrfrom the im~gc . I read , [ rcceivv
(p rohably straight 00', in fact ) a third O1~anmg. erratic yet evident and
persistent. I I do not know what its signified , IS , ~~ ~castl cannot give it a name.
lh.- ~ lg l1lly mg alCldcnts Ill' which lids
hut I can clearly see tho: feature:>

.....

I...]The symbolic meaning (the shower of gold, power, wea lth, the imperial
rite) com pe ls my rel'ognition by a double determination. It is intentional (i
is what the author has meant) and it is selected from a kind of general ,
common lexicon of sym bols ; it is a meaning which seeks me out - me, the
recipient of the message , the subject of the reading - a me aning which
proceeds fro m Eisenste in and mo ves ahead <!l me . It is evident, of course (as
is the other meaning, too), but evident in a closed sense, participating in a
complete system o f destination . [ propose to ca ll this complete sign the:
~bl'1 ~l1.l meanin,q. [. . . [!n theology, we are told , the obvious meaning is the one
which presents itsel f (juit e naturally to the mind ,' and tills, too, is the case:
~ o me tile symbolics of a shower of gold has always seemed endowed with a
.~atura)' clar it v, As for the other, the third meaning, the one which appears
In ex cess,' as a supplement my intellection cannot quite absorb, a mean ing
both persistent and fugitive, apparent and evasive , [ propose calling it
he obtuse meaninB' This word readily comes to my mind, and miracu lo usly,
upo n exploring its etymology, f find it already yields a theory of the
supplementary meaning; obeu.ws means blunted . rounded. Now, tile features [
have indicated - makeup, whiteness, false hair, etc. - are they not a kind of
blunting of a too evident meaning, a.too violent meaning? Do the)~ not give
the obvious significd a kind of i~enahle round ncs.s, do they not cause my
reading to slad? An obtuse ang l{ IS ~rea ter than a right angle: an obtuse allBlc
of IO()", says the dic tionary: th. t hird nll~.lnlllg, too , St=ems lu me greater
than the pure pe rp cndil:uIJr. th. rr crn hant , l e~al upright of th e- nar ruu ve,

MAGES

SEMIO T iCS :

113

im.1g\' and its de scri ption , between defini tion an d approximation If we

CJJ1I; \)t descri be the obt use m eaning, this is be cause, unlike the obvious
l1leaning. it co pies nothing : how describe what re presents n othing? H ere the
p'c'wri,d ' n nd er ing of \\:ords is impossibk: Conscquerulv, if.we rem ain, you
and I, on the level of arti culated langu age m the presence of these images _
that is, 0 11 th e level of my ow n text - the obtuse meaning will not com e in to
kHlg. w ill not en te r into th e cri tic's me talanguage . Which means that
he llbtuSl' m eanin g is out side (a rticu lat ed ) language, bu t still with in
inter loc ution . For if you lo ok at these images I am talking about. you will
sec th e meani n g: We can understand each other abo ut it 'over th e sho ulder'
;)r 'on th e ha ck~' of articulated language : thanks, to th e image [.". J, indeed
thanks to what in the ima ge is purdy im age (and w hich , to tell the truth, is
ver v little in d ee d) , we d o without speech yet continue to un d erstand each
othe r.

"

FIGURE 5.2
From Ordinary Fascism.
Source: British Film
Institut e.

It seem s to me to op<:n the f1 ~' l d of me aning totally, i.c . , infinit e ly. I even
acc ~' p l , for this obtuse meaning , th e word 's pejorative co nno tation : t he
o btu se mean in g see ms to extend bev ond culture, kn owl edge , infor ma tio n.
Analvt ically, th::re is something ridi'cu]ous about it ; b ecau;e it opens onto
h e infinity of language , it can see m limited in the eye s of analytic reason. It
bel on gs to th e famil y of pun s, jokes , usel ess exertions ; indifferent to moral
or aesthetic categor ies (the tr ivial , the fu tile , th e art ificia l, the parodic), it
sides with the carn ival aspect of things. Obt u se therefore suits Illy pur pose
we II.

*
In this docum ent ary image (Figur e 5.2 ) from Ordinary Fascism I readi ly read
an obvious meanin g, that of fascism (an aesthetic and svmbo lics o f strength,
the theatrica l hunt), but I also rea d an obtuse supplement ; th e (again)
disguised blond stu pid it y o f th e youth car r Ying th e arrow s the slac kness of
his ~hand s and h is m outh (I am ~ot descri hing, I cannot n~anage that. ( am
m erely d esignating a site ), Go ering \ co ars e nails, his trashy r ing (here we
ar c alrea dy at the limit of th e mean obvious m eaning , like the vapid smi le of
the m an in glass es in th e background , obviously an ass- kisser ). In other
words, the obtuse meaning is not st ructurally situ at ed, a scmanto logiSJ
wo uld no t acknowledge its ob jecti ve existence (but What is an objccthe
reading?). t.. . 'T[hc obtuse meaning is a signil1c.r Without Sign ified ; whence
the di fficu lty of naming it: m ~' n:ading re mai ns ~u .'.pended betwe en the

In short , \\ hat the obtu se mean ing disturbs, ste ri lizes , is metalanguage
(cr iticism ). \\1(' can offer several reaso ns for th is. First of all, the obtus e
rnean ins is discontinuous, inJijJi:rem to the storv and to th e obvious meaning
this dissociation h;s a contra n<lcuram or at least ~
(as simUkation of th e story);
/
dhtancin g effect with regard to th e referent (to 'reality' as nature, a rea list
instance ). Eisens tein would probably have acknowledged and accepted this
'ncongr ulL)', th b irn -pe rtinencc: o f the .~ignil1 er, for it is he w ho remarks,
apropos of sound and co lour : ' Ar t begins the: moment the cr eaking of a hoo t
(o n the so und track) accompanies a differen t visual sho t and thereby provokes
corresponding associations,Th e same is t rw.' of colour: colour begins where it
no longer co r responds to nat ural co loration . .. '. Th ere upon , the signifier (th e
third mt~aning ) is nol filled ; it is in a perm anen t state of depletion (a ter m from
lint,'U.istics which designates the empt). all-purpose verbs - for exam p le, the
French verb I mre); we might also say, on th e o ther' hand - and this would be
quite as tr ue - that this same signifier is not emptied (cannot be emptied); it
maintains its e l]' in a state of perpetual erethism; in it desi re does not attain tha t
spasm
the si&rnificd which usually caus es th e subject to sink voluptuousl y
into the peac e of nomination . Ultimately th e obtuse meaning can he seen as
an accem. the very form of an em ergence , of a fold (even a crease) marking the
heavy layer of information and ~ ign i lkati on . If it cou ld he described (a
contradiction in terms), it would ha\~e exactly the be ing of the Japanese haiku:
an anaphoric gesture witho ut sigJuficam content , a kind of gash fro m w hich
m eaning (the de sire for meaning) is expunged . [. . . J
~

or

1../
[.. . T]he supplem entary Signi fier's ind!ffirence, or fre edom of po sition with
respect to narrative, permits locating Eisenstein 's hist ori cal, political ,
th eoreti cal achievements quite precisely. In his work , the story, the
anecdotal, Ji cgetic representation, is not destroyed; qu ite the con trary: what
finer story than that of h an . that of Potemkin ] T his stature of narrative is
necessar y in order LO he understood in a so cietv which, unable to resol vc th e
t'ontra d i ~t i ons of histo ry w ith out a lo ng pol itk-a l pr ocess, draws support
J

- ;I M AG E S

(provisionallyr) fr om m yth ic (narrat ive) solutions . T he p relent proble m is

no t to destroy nar rative but to subv ert it ; LO d issociate subversio n [rom
destruction is tod ay's task . Eisenstein makes, it see m s to me , just this
distinction . Th e presen ce of a supple mentary, ob tuse , third mean ing - even
if only in a Icw unages, but then as an imperishabl e signa ture, like a seal
whi ch endo rses th e entire work - and the entire OcU\Te - thi s pr esence
profoundly alt ers the th eoretical status of the anecdote . The story (diegesis)
(an age-old
narrative syst
is no lon toovcr m ere Iv
/ a powerful svstcm
)
...
.. em ), but also
and contr adict or ily a Simple spac e, a Held o f permanenccs and permutations;
it becom es tha t conflguration , that stage w hose false limits multiply the
signifier's permutatiw play; it is that vast outline which, by difference,
com pels a vertical reading (Eisenstein 's wo rd ); it is tha t .folie order which
p er m its us to avoid pure seri es , aleatory co mbin ation (chance is onl y a crude,
a cheap signifle r) , an d to achieve a structurarion wh ich leaks f rom Insi de.
Hence we can say that with Eisenst ein we have to rever se the cliche which
holds that the more gratuito us the meaning th e mo re it app ear s to be Sim ply
parasitic on th e ~tor )' to ld : o n the con trar y, it is this st ory whi ch becomes
somehow parametric to m e signifl cr , of which it is nu m or e tha n the field of
displa cem en t, th e constitu t ive. Ilegati\;ty, or again: the fellow tr aveller,

In short, the third me aning structures the film J!fIercnrtl'. with out subverting
th e story (at least in Eisenst ein) , and for thi s r eason , perhaps, it is at this level,
and o nly her e, that the 'filmic' at last app ears. Th e filmic is what, in the film ,
can not he described , it is the representation that cann ot be represented . The
filmi c beguls only where language and articulated me talanguage cease.
Everything we can say about h an o r Potemkin can be said about a written
text (w hich would he called h an the Tern blc or The Baulesiup Potcmkin), except
this - which is the obtuse meaning; I...1hence the film ic is precisely here, at
this poin t where articulated langu age is no mo re than approximative and
where another language becins (a languag e whose 'sci ence ' cannot therefore
be linguistics , soon~discard ed like a bo~ster ro cket). Th e third meaning, which
we can locat e theoreti callv hut not describe , then app ears as the transition
from language to si.gn![l'ing [slgnifJcance] and as the fOlmding act of th e filmic
itself. 0 hligcd to eme rge from a civi lization of the Signified, it is not surpr ising
that the filmic (despite the incalcu lable quantity of films in the world ) sho uld
still be rare (a few llasht,s in Eisenstein ; perhaps elsewhere "), to th e point
where we might assert that th e film, like th e text, does not yet exist: th ere is
onl y ' cinema: i.e., there is language , narrative, poetry, som etimes very
' modern : 't ranslated ' in to 'i mages' said to be 'ani mate d: Nor is it sur pris ing
that we can pe rcei ve the filmi c only after having traver sed - analyt ically - the
'essen tial ,' the ' depth : and th e 'complexity' of the cinematic work - all ric hes
belo nging ani)' to articulated language . ou t of which :"c constitu te th at w()~k
and believe we exhaust it. For th e Illrnic is diOcn :nt from the film : th e fllmic
is as far From the 111m as the nove listic is /Torn the novel (I can write
novcl isti callv without ever " Tiring novels) .
NOT E
1. Fooinou remove d

SEM IOT ICS :

F RO M SU B - TO S U PRAS E MIOTI C :
T H E S IG N A S EVE N T '
M/ E KE B A L

If we I I ant to assess to what exte nt we can circumscri be the signif)ing uni ts

ca.lkcl ,i gns and understand ou r dealings with them, we must delimit the field
of signs' and meanings in two directi ons . At on e extr eme there are the
subs'~l1 ioti c technical a.'peets of the works of art. Although they all contribute
to the ('onstr uction of signs, stvl istic variatio n , light and dark composition or
marc teclmical .1Spcct s like br~shstrokes , paint ~1.ickne s s , and lines are no~, a
prio r i, signs in themselves; not any more than in a literary text sheer ink on the
page, m (~'e pun ctuation marks , a~d synt actic structures ~re . Although tJley an :
par t of what make us int erpret the work, we do not give them meaning in
themse lves, exce pt in som e tr uly speci al cases. (. . . 1
:\ t the other extreme , there are the suprascm iotic holistic aspects of the
wor ks. AiLho ugh the re-has been a tendency to conflate the concepts of ' tex t'
and 'sign ,' and, by exten sion. of 'work' and 'sign ,' I think such a conflation
only displaces the pr oblem of what kinds of encounter s signs and meanings
such a position is that the com poun d sign wil]
arc. I... J The consequence
be subdivided into discret e unit s, and th is division ,vill become a gestu re at
best either of ar ticu lation or of slicing up, delimiting, what supposedly acids
up in the whole. T his subdivisio n is held mo re acceptable for verbal th an for
visua l ar t; indeed, m e distinction between the tw o is often based on the very
assumption that verbal works are com po sed of discrete units whereas visual
works are 'de nse : The distinction is dec eptively self-evident and can 1)('
deconstructcd only by reversing it and arguing that to some extent verbal
texts arc de nse - the sign of the effect of the real canno t be distinguished
From the work as a whole on whi ch it sheds a specific meaning - and that
visual texts are d iscr et e , w hich som e tim es, and in some resp ects, th ey are .
The distinction is untenable, but it nevertheless reflects different atti tu des of
reading that op erak conven tio nally for eac h art. I...]

or

*
Ver meer 's Woman Holdinq a Balance (Figur e 5.3 ), housed in the N ational
Gallery in Washington, I'e presents a woman in a blue dress, hold ing a balance
above a table; on th e wall, in the backgr ound , is a pain ting or the Last judgment.
light streams in From a stained -glass window at the upp er left . It is a strik ingly
~tlll painti ng. It avoids narrative - both the anec do ta l and the dvnamic . Instead
It presents an image in ter ms of visual rhythm , eq uilibrium, balanced contrasts,
and subtl~ lighting. [. . . 1
Svetl ana Alpers , I assume fr o m her Art if Descr ibinq ( 1985) , would call this a
c1esCriptivc painting, It is a pain ting that app eals to visuali ry if ever there was
on e , a case for Alpers ' oppositi on to Italian infatu at ion with nar rati vitv. Any

'!-

I M AGE S

SE M IO T I CS :

is ther e to balan ce th e 'work, to fo reground the simi larity, the rhym e , be t ween

God and this wo m an , has been displaced fro m an ear lier, 'original' position to
a belter, visuallv m o re convincin g balance , leaving on ly th e telltale trace of
a nail ho le? As it is, the woman stan ds right below God , a pos ition that
emphasizes th e simil arity be tween judging and weighing. Also , th e separatio n
betw.;en th e bk~ssed and the doo med is obliter ated by he r position ,
suggesting, perhap s, tha t the line between good and evil is a lin e on e. But
in the m idst of this specu lative nourish , I am caught up short by th e
renh.: mh rance that we are looking at a paintin g of th is balance, no t at a real
roo m . The paint e r surely did not need to paint the nail and th e hole. C\Tn if,
in setting up his studio, he actuall y may have di spla ced the Last j uda mem.
[ .. . J

FI GURE 5 .3
Vermeer, Woman Holding a Balance
c. 1662--4. Source: National Gallery,
Washington, DC. See colour Plate 1

attempt to read the painting as a narrative can onl y mis read it . It is a surface
carefully hal anced for visua l e xperience, wher e t he ap peal to visua lity is
wo rked ou t in the tin iest de tails, O n th e uppe r left part otthc painting, in
the wh ile wall near the rep resented Last j uJamenr, is a nai l, and ncar tha t
nail, a ho le in the w all. Th e m inutely de tai led wo r k of painting is so high ly
emphasized in these tiny details tha t both insi de: the: hole and next to the nail
we can scc a sha do w. The so ft , wa r m light streaming in from the window on
the upper left touches these two irregularities in the wall , as if to
d emonstrate that r ealistic description o f the wo r ld seen kn ow s no limits.

1.. 1
For' me it was the nail and the ho le th at th e light m ade visible, prod uced ; th at
instigate d a hurst of speculative fer tilitv, W hen I saw this nail, the ho le, and the
shadows , I was fascinated: I co uld not keep my eyes ofl' them . W hy arc they
the re ? I asked mvsclf', Arc th ese me rely mean ingless detai ls that Roland
Bar th es would cha'lk up to an 'dleCl of the real ' ? Arc tJ1CSC 1I11.' signs tha t make
a co nnotation of re alism shift to the place of denotat ion hCl<lU~e there is Jl
elcno ta t ivc m eaning available? Or do t ~ l<:v I~o i.n ' I () a ,han gt i ll th e signillc <I IJ('('
rcpn.,'tt:llh;d

!iJ.. ..... _

In the p,lin ting, narrathity so blatantly absent on first - and even second - glance
is found to have been inserted by m eans of a sign that makes a statemen t o n
visuality. Th e visual e xper ience tha t en codes the icon ic association betwee n
woman and God is no t displaced but, on the con tr ary, underscored by this
narrative aspe ct .We im agine someone tryi ng to hang th e painting in exactly th e
right place . We are suddenly aw are of m e wom an 's artificial po se : Instead of
changing the painti ng 's pmition , th e artist ar rangi ng his studio co uld simp ly have
changed th e. wom an 's place, o r his o wn ang le of vision . All of a sudden
som ething is happening , the still scene begins to mo ve, and the spell of stillness
is broken .
TIle na il and t he ho le , both visua l e lemen ts to w hic h no ico nographic
me an ing is attach ed , uns ettl e th e poetic descr iptio n an d th e passively
admiri ng gaze that it t r igg e red , and dyn amize th e act ivit)' o f th e view er.
W here as before t he dis covcrv o f th cse detail s the viewe r co uld gaze at th e
wor k in won der, no w he or : he is aw ar e o f his o r he r im aginath':'e additio n
in the very act of looking. The wo r ], no lo nge r stan ds alo ne ; no w th e vie wer
must ac know ledge that he o r she makes it work , and that th e surface is no
longer st ill bu t tel ls th e story of its makin g.

... ]

I..] \-Vhenever

a lite rary sc ho lar, moved by th e commenda ble inte nti on of

put tin g an end to th e current pr o liferation of interpre tatio n , sta nds up to
claim that some details in realistic texts have no na rrative func tio n, that they
merely serve to prod uce an ' effect of t he real' ( Barthes, 1968 ) o r an effect of
\'crisim ilituck l vrasscmblan ce; Genette, 1969) , someone else responds th at th e
exam pll~s given do have a narrative fun ction alter all, if o nly o ne looks hard
enuugh. There seems to be a res istance to meaningle ssness th at invar iably
loo.ks co nvin cin g As a consequence . we continue to assume that everything in
a work of art co ntributes to, and modifies , the mcaning of th e wo rk .
But if everyth ing in a wor k of art participates equa llv in the production of
rn ~aning. the n how do we know wha t tex ts and im ages are 'about' and wh y ? In

other wo rds, wh ich signs convey, ur lrigger, which m eanings? One answer L.,
that tlu-re is no answer becaus,' r.-xts and imag"s do nothi ng. th e interpreter
inn 'l1l<; the m eaning. I'ul tin~ tlw ~U~, s ltu,n dilflrc,mly, we may ask, On what

S E MI O TI C S ,

IMA GES

II '

tr ou blesom e in literary theory bec ause th e q uestio n int erf eres with th e
appan'nt ob viousness or the answer. Vve assume \\'1' know wh at signs ar e and
whic h signs we process because we know what a letter, a word, and a senten ce
are, and w e assume that wo rds arc the units we call signs in verbal works .
Her e, visual poeti cs reminds us of th is assumption's un tenabi lity by forcing US
to ask what the visual counterpart of a wo rd is: Is it an im age, as thl' phras e' word
and image ' too easily suggests ? Mulling over tills difficult c(luatio n, we become
less sure that words are, in fact, the ' stu ff" of verbal sign illcatio n .
The problem o f delimiting signs and delineating interpretation - of
d istingu ishing inter pretati on from descrip tion - is related . Since readers and
viewe rs bring to th e te xt s and images th ei r ow n cu ltu r al and per sona l
bagg age , th ere can be no suc h th ing as a fixed, pr ed eter mi ned m eaning, an d
the ve ry attem pt to summarize meanings, as we do in e ncyclo paedias and
textbook s, is by d efinition red uct ive . Yet as soon as w e ar c forced to draw
from th ese vie ws th e inevitable co ncl usio n tha t 'anything goes' and that
interpret ation is a futile scho larly activity sinc e it all dep ends on the
ind ivid ual in terpreter, we dra w bac k .\ Ve t he n turn ar ound, trying to loca te,
in the text or image , no t a m eaning, bu t th e 'occas ion "o f m eaning , th e thi ng
that triggers m eaning; not fixity, but a justificati on for o ur flexibility,
[ .. . J

The vi ew of signs to whi ch I [adh ere ... J posi ts th e basic de nsity of both verbal
and visual te xts. [ use the te r m 'd ensity ' in Goodman 's ( 1976) sense : as
conveying the fundamental insepar abilit y ~f individual ~igns , as th e o pposite of
discre te ness.Th is vi ew eliminates at least o ne differen ce between discourse ,1l1e1
imag e. Resisting the early W itt gel15tein 's anguish about, and sym pathizing wi th
his later happy endorse me nt o r, the cloudiness of langu age, I co ntend that the
sam e den sity that chara ct erizes visual texts ob structs the propositional clar ity of
verbal texts .j Thus , separate words C3IUlOt be taken to rule interpretation, and
the ideal ofpure ' pr op ositional conten t longed fo r in the Tractatus is untenable:
th e elements of a pro positio n canno t have ind epe nd e nt m eaning. This
recogniti on mea ns that tile differen ce between verba l and visual texts is
no longer o ne o r the status and delimitation of the signs that co nstitute them.
And the visual model, appare ntly pr ed omi na nt , overw hel ms th e concrete
par tic ular it y of the sigIufie r, giving rise to 'cloudiness' in each m edium . Hence,
th e \Vittgen stcin of the Traaat us mourns th e fact th at th er e is no no nde nsc
language, wh ereas later, in the lnvcsuqauons, \Vitt gcnstein denounces the
po siti\i stic illu sion th at makes visuali t y the bas is of in te r pretatio n, sacrificing
bo th the signifie r and the activit)' of semiosis. In th is later work he endors es the
view he earli er n 'gr ctt ed , that langu age is as dense as pictu re s.This may not make
language visual, but it does disp lace the diffe rence be t ween the two med ia.
Yet the density of both visual and linguistic signs is not rea lly the issu e . Rathe r,
it is th e dynamism of signs that the rccogni tio ~l of th eir t1cnsity mak es possible
th at is at Issue. T he per ceptiun of signs as static can. be traced to th e atomistic
view o f verbal signs , itself a relic uf.e.a~ ly . structurah s~ which , in its turn , had
In herited it from more cxplid tly PO"IUVIStlC scho o ls 01 rultUl -a1sc ho larship.t'The
.I" L" !llIl '" ,u r n ' of this. atortU"til

V1t. w olIl'

th~ "''-''OIutj-

'

,"

ontological status fo r the sign . lf the si!:,'T1 is a 'real thing,' then sigI1s mu st be
numerahle, hence discre te and intri nsically static. A rad ically dynamic vi ew,
hO\\',,:\'er, wo uld conceive the sign not as a thing bu t ,15 an event, th e issue being
not to <klimi t and isolate th e one sign from other SigI1S , but to trace th e possible
e IDl~rgen cl' of th e sign in a Concret e situation of wo rk-reader interacti on .
Wittgenstein's co ncept of language games posits a dynamic view of th e sign ,
which makes sigI1s as aem'c, and requ ires them to be both depl oyed accordinq to
rules and publu: /1 sign, then, I S not a lh lnS bue an CI'Cnc . Hen ce the meaning of a sign
is neither preestablished and fixed, no r purely subjective and idiosyncratic.
Altho ugh th is view seems to o pe n th e di scus sion to a paralyzing infinitude
of phenomena . this ap pare nt pro ble m disappears as soon as we ackn owledge
that sign eve nts occu r in sp eci fic. circumsta nces and acco rding to a fini te
nurnbcr o f cu ltu ra lly valid, co nventional, yet not unalterable rul es, which
semiot idans call 'cod es. lT ho sel ectio n of th ose r u les and th ei r combinati o n
leads to specific inte rp ret ive beh avio ur .

NOTES
I . Eduo r 's note : TIl t: opening paragr aphs of th is selection outlini ng the conce pts of
sub- and suprascrnio tic marks appear in Bal 's or iginal text as a lengthy foo tnot e.
It has been inclu ded here as a the oreti cal supplem ent to the mai n tex t.
2. Footnot e removed
3. Footnote rem oved .

WORKS CI TED
Alper s, S, ( 1983) \rt ':f Dcscribinq : Dutc h Arc In th e Seve ntee nt h Cem llly . Chicago :
Univer sity of Ch icago Press,

Barth es, R. (1968) ' L'Elle t de reel' , in COmmUrJl WClOnS , 4-: 84-9 . [English : 'T he

reality effect ", in Roland Barthcs , The Bust le C!f LWBl/aBc, tr. Richard Ho ward ,

New York: Hill & Wang. pp. 14 1 54,

Gene-lt c , G. (1 969) ' Vraisernblance ei rno tivatio n ", f lBures II, 71 -100 . Paris:
Editions du Scull.

Goodm an , N. ( 1976) La ng uo8c~ of /Irc: An Approach co a Theory 4' Symbols.

Indianapolis: Hac kett .

Witt genstein , L. (19 58) Philosophical Im'esri sa cions, tr. G.E.M. Anscornbc,

New York : Macm illan ,

W ittgenstein , L. (196 1) Tractotus 1.081co-Phllosophlcus, tr. B. F. McGuiness.

New Yor k: Hum anities Pres s.

THE SEM IOTI C LAND S CAP E

G U NTR K R S S A N D

THO V A N

t. ee u ws:

The place of visual com m un icatio n in a given societ)' can only be un derst ood
in the co ntext of, o n the o ne hand , th e range of forms or modes of publ ic
lid I'h"u

V;,t, 1l

l" 'U W r n

I " ndo n

IM AGES

S EMIOT ICS :

com m unication available in that society. and , on th e oth er hand , their uses and
valuation s. Vi e refer to this as 'the scm'iot ic landscape.' Th e m etaphor is worth
exp loringb a lillie, as is its cl\"mologv. J ust as the features of a landscape (a field,
a wood , J dump of tr ees, a house, a gro up of buildlngs) only make sense in
the co nte xt of thei r wh o le environment [.. . J so par ticular m od es of
com m unication should be seen in th eir enviro nm ent , in the environmen t of aU
the other modes of com m un ication which surround th em, and of th eir
func tio ns. The use of th e visual m ode is no t th c sam e now as it was e ven lifty
year s ago in Western societies, it is no t th e same from one so ciety to anomer;
and it is not the sam e Ir om one socia l group or inst itu tion to another.
~

~J

u vo v ur rs

: ll

T he place of language in public form s of communication is changing. l.3nguagc

is moving from its former, un challenged rol e as rhe medium of co mmunication ,
to a role as one m edium ai communication , and perhaps to the role of till'
medium of com ment , albe it mort' so in some domains than in others, and man '
rapidly in some areas than in other s. Although this is a relatively new
phenomenon in pub lic communication , children do this q uite 'naturally.'

*
Figure 5 . 5 comes from a science te xtbook for child ren in the early to m iddle
years of secon dar y schooling in England . Two qu estions can be asked . T he
first : ' W hat is the etTen of the m od e of rep resen tation on the e pist.cmolob':,
of science? ,' Do different modes of representation facilitate , or rule a lit ,
diHcrenl accou nts of natural phenom ena?' T he second qu est ion is, again, the
Cjllesllon of su bjecti vit y: th e implied re ader of th is page is ,1 fundamen ta lJ)'
differ-cnt reader fmm that of the older t ex tb,)ok sho wn in Figure 5 ,4 ,
Readers wh o have hecome ha bitu ated to the contemporary textbook pagc
( h gure 5. 5) not o nly havc a dilTerent co nce ptio n o f what scie nce is, but also
of w hal (being ) a scientist is. They have different notion s of au th o r i t~
rel ati ons, of the sta tus o f scien ce as a discipline , of epistemologica l
po sitions, and ~ (J o n - just as the design ers of th b pag e have rlilTercnt
co nce pti ons of th ese qu estions to those of tllt> page show n in Figure 5.4.

r...\Vh at ] is th e status of written language in Ihc~ <.' pages? In Figure 5.4 it is

th e cen tral m edium, th e medium nf informallon . Ilnag(~ !> have ml' functio n
of illustrating an argumt;:n t ca rr k rl by the written \'<'o n l, th at is, of
' ,p"Psl.1'-i ns' ) L!\[ ("(m tl'lIb .,1 U't \\'nl!~11 lilll u:ll!.t in Ol ,jiH ~: r ent

":L ~ l,~ Tlil ll ~ ITY

t h~ 1n 1l jl fU..ri, J!ll h ,.... ri ~ . l;:! (r l ...lw \\o'1f t he cornhined

.1111 l, 'I; \\' h ~'l1 t he Wlfr" h 1'1111".,1 be t wee n lite pol es .

Iif"lti of t'ai

~n( , tl u,t. ill F ig . ' J~ ((J 1 ' 111.1 (It), r.}w H ' l~ nrrn tl c on t Lt" It.'f t ( If

I.q r - liN" In t h,. "I m u'.l l i r f>l"t i ot l u '" tlli"~ uf rlw l -, kn llll Ildd.

thll"J, f' fin Up righl of th e wire ure LfL lh(! tl r l~'1 1t rl 11[ 1"'.'1'1.1011 .

( '''Il "t't _lllt~ lltl)' ill t he l'o m h i [J~'41 lk tfl o f l'j ~. 1~2 f d Lh r- nel l! til tIt':

Id t o l l.h C' wi re is til ro llg - tJw r, nT" n l t1 r~f..~ nu mhe r " f li nr, whi l

f ~"

\\ 1111('

rh- lid..! l oJ ,hi' right i~ wea k.

If \\"1 ; e svumc. with Faruduv, d C'''' t he Hill.es

. uf fa rel: L1!C in

1~' [l". IOrl ntul Lr-"" 1I 1~ lo lu.rten " i :\ \..(' p. l ~ 'I , we i-o howd c x p<x:t the

wrre tAl he ll rg l'( l to th e rl [JJIt. This is p n.'f' l "' '-'~ )y what. "0\"
(' lin d h.r

l' ~ r ( rnuent.

[ .. . J

The new r ealit ies o i m e scm io tic landscape arc [. . . ] primarily brough t
about by so cial an d cult ur al fact o rs: hy me intensifi cation of linguistic and
cu ltu ral d iversity wi th in the bounda ries of nation states, and by the
weaken ing o f thes e bound ar ies. d ue to mu lt icult ur alism. e lect r onic media of
co m m un icat io n, te chn o logi es of tr ansport an d g lobal econom ic
develo pm ents. Global flows of cap ital and in formation di sso lve no t on ly
cultu ral and politi cal boundaries but also semiotic boundar ies. T his is
already beginning to have the most far -reaching e fkcL~ on th e character istics
of Engl i~ h (an d Englishc: , globally, and even within the national boun da rie s
of England .

\ :-. p

.= I

l : i t0\ ~ '

!!II .

I I

I ! J!

lC I.f;;rH
I "

Ii

"

klj 1: l1liTIf-h r I ~JI!

TJr~

p'" II'" JIll' (:!

I I I t"1'l ~ . l b j r ll"'. J

"

'~

I
'.

I ~

.11I" r.-. curren t III

I .. 11,,,lta,:lU'n.. ~ :-" o:...

\,

;oJt

):1 :1.: (,::"

. rru l~ } 1 1

h d, 1

tl !

I,

WH(l. 0,) 1-i t-ll) .i n

l.ul " lid

(h ).

Oil' l'In J.riL "w!''' ,

T lt r~ .i Ulptr: .,Int.r ll ' ruotne r-rutxi, l , IIf u nll l pi"otf'd Itc t.\\'Ct.11 UH.'

Ii IK~rllUtll<" l lt Ol lil,:n c t ( set: l' i ~" (J:Jl. " "h a l 1\ cu rr ent i!'t

PI\.S.'-i('d. fh ruuC'h t.h l~ r" d ID thr-di rcctron illd iea tr.d III the H,I!u rc we

("till ...h....... h:. !IIJ P JyW;':- Vlt.: m illg 5 lett -ha nd ruh -, th at t.hl'" ' ~ft.

h4n d ... i\\l" of th e eot) wtll t cr.d t.o mr .vo flown n' lri t he fi ~ h t .h /m4t

..id, Tu ltu H e lip, j H Cl lI l' lu l H:r l h .:i l the ( li rtT t ~qll . tf tlu.: field d ue

tu tb(' pf'"l\r~ llr"!n t, IOn"wr is. f n m l lhl.: :\. l (\ ti ll ~ . 1'0 1...., I TI Hl" th:

' ",Ill wil l rot... . t( ~ i ll ,. t 'lltJ1lh~ r o dl w k wi,, ~ ' Uil't'l"t ion tn :1 vertiru l

IKt le", uf

(>V\ it illli

F IGU RE 5,4

Early twentieth-century science textbook.

McKenZie. 1938, Cambridge University P

medium. The subjectivit y of the reader is here formed in , and im p lied

by, th e hierarch ic organization of th e mode of (scientific) \\-Titing. It is a
sub jectiVity whi ch treats language natu rall y as the medium of information,
the medium of truth and of truth transmitted rdatin:lv transparentl v in th e
synt ax of th e wr iti~g ; Jnd it is a sub ject ivity h abi~uated to su;tained,
{~on ccntrated an alysis, atte nt io n , rdlecti on . In Figure 5.5 , images an; tlll~
Cl~Ol ra l medium o f inform ation, and the role o f language has be com e tha t of
medium o f commen ta ry. Image~ (and this includ es the layout of th e page )
carry the ar gum ent. Tb l" subjectivity of t he re ader is form ed in a m ix o f
semiotic mod es in wh ich the visual is ('learl v dominant . Tt is a subjectivity
which reli <;"s on the visual rather than o n' the verbal, as a m edium (;f
nt er ta inment a~ much as a medium o r inform ation' information in fac t
becomes relatively marginal a,:; an aim, both on th e ' part o f th e st ude nt
and on th e part of th e textbook designer, th ough for d ifferent J'easons, It is
als" a subjectiVity habituated 1.0 th, mor<- ready apprehension of th e
transparently presented visua l. The ~p~)rchension of facts displaces th e
concern with tru th . and m!" ernph,Ui 's IS no t on 'ustaint:(l. cOIlCl"ntrat ec!
anal v ,~is. but un th., qUKk apprdw'l.~illn or r.ll't. ;111<1 infurmal i'If>

' IMA GES

~~

SE M I O TIC S .

50n1t' materia l (paper. wood, vel lum , sto ne , m etal , rock . etc.) and it is
\\Tlttc ll wnl: so me thing (go ld , ink, (en )gra\'ings, dots of ink , etc .); with
!etters for m ed in systems influe nce d by aesthe tic , ps)'Chological , pragmatic
and othe r co nside ra tions; and w ith a layout im posed on the mat erial
suhstance, w he the r on th e page , the co m pu ter screen or a polished brass
plaque . Th e m ult irn o d alit y of writte n rex ls has, b), and large, been ignored ,
whet her in ed uca t iona l co nte xts , in linguist ic th eorizing or in popular
common sense . 'Iodav, in the age of 'multimedia ,' it can suddenly be
perccJ\'ed again.
.

f't8$

EIf8W
Energy

1 !.1W!I"C II ~

J . '. I

t mO ,.1\1 AM

1 M ~I''''' ob,.<u h...... ~

n. ta.Itet' t!MT 'C'2(M'If t.h.4

.~a
s 'E6Ho Cl&A bt

tlr.

o. UMtk .......,. u.,

klJ:I#tic
ban
~I U( t.d

"'-- ....a
-.,

n.~ l

LLW':'l:

----QL
- . . I u...t

1& 1

.,..ad,

....

(Of WW ~ .IIIM"C' LJ

(A1l.4 .... Dd&I .....-0

r.z.rc,.twd LD blewn.... "'-.... food aM rAOfto codtu '

. QobI .., I. ealW

,._IDiot.. aDH'O'

~'1IntJlCaJI~1~ """IDO"I"'I n.c """"'~L

t;KO''': tWnlU \.Q . " . . . 0l'TWlI
p 1WA tI.WI ., lI.an.- ...... _

".

..&eet:tkaJ .lMrv tn..

m.tl ~ ., to . . . . ,..

raap

Forces
A (o fte taa pu.ah. pWJ., tftM \at. CoM&c1 tc ~ act
...._ _ ol';IctI th&t\clladl . . _ _ .

FIGURE 5.5
Science textbook (Suffolk Coordinated
SCience. 1978, Longma n Educational) .

T he shift is based on changed re lations of pow("r in two distinct areas : in the

ar ea of so cial valuatio ns o f scientific kno w ledge , w here th e autho r ity of
science can no lon ger he tak en for granted ; and in th e area o f ed ucation,
wh ere the authority o f th e t ransm itt er s o f social values can no longer
he taken for grant~d , bu t has to be acbieved , ln this set of relati ons the
subject ivity of th e stu dent reader s in relat io n to power and authority i.'
changed . The)' no lon ger acce pt th e socia l valuations o f science and
ed ucation accepted hy most ea rl ier stude n ts, even if m any of th em tu rned
away fro m int ernalizing them as th eir ow n .

I..1
These changes in the se m iotic landscape ... re veal what has in fac t alw ays
been the case : language, w hether in speech or writ ing , has always ex isted as
just one mode in th e totality of modes involv ed in the prod uction o f any
tex t , spoken or wri tten . .A spoken text is not just verbal but also visual,
combining w ith 'non-ve rba l' modes of co m mu nication suc h as facial
expression . ge stu re, post ure and other form" of sd f' presentation. A wr-ittcrt
text . simil ar ly. involves more than languag e : It b wr itt en on so me thing, on

We can summarize this discussion in the form of a set of hypotheses: (a) hum an
societies use a var iety of mod es of rep re sentation ; (b) eac h mode has .
inherently, a differen t re presentational potential, a different potential for
meaning-making; (c) each mode has a specific social valuation in par ticular
social con te xts; (d ) differe nt pot ential for meaning-making may imply different
potentials for the for m ation of subjectivities, (e) individuals use a rang e of
representational mo des, and therefore have available a rang e of means of
meaninji-m aking , eac h allcc ting the formatio n of th eir subj ecti vity: (1) the
dillerent modes of representation arc not held discre tely, separ ately, as auto
norn ous do mains in tile br ain, or as autonomo us com muni catio nal resources in
a culture, nor arc they deployed discr etel y. eith er in representation or in
commun icatio n; rath er, th ey inte r rnesh and int eract at all tim es; (g) affective
aspects of human behaviour and bemg arc not discret e from other cogn itive
activity, and ther efore never separate from representational and comm unicative
behaviour; (h) eac h mod e of re presentation has a continuou sly evolving history,
in which its semantic reach can contra ct or expand or move into diffe r ent areas
as a result of the use to which it is put.
As modes o f rep resentati on are ma de and re m ade, they co ntribu te to th e
making and remaking of human societies a.nd of the subjectivities of th eir
members . No ne o f th ese hypotheses would, we imagine , att ract sign ifica nt
disagre<:mcnt, especially wh en put sing l),. Together, however. the)' represent
a l~ha llenge to the exis ti ng com mo n se nse on th e relati ons between langua ge
and thought , and on mainstrea m theor ies and practices in all areas of public
Communication. T his is a crucial feat ure of the new sem iotic lands cape.

PHENOMENOLOGY

INTRODUCTION
6: I
6:2

Thing and W ork

Martm H eidegger
Eye and Mind
Ma uric e Merleau -Ponty

6.3

Descripti on
Jean-Paul Sartre

6.4

Imagination
M ike l Oufrenne

6:5

Scientific Vi sual ism

Don Ihde

phenomenology is primaril y concerned wi th the structure of experience

and, in particular, how things appear to us in the way that they do. Art
images and artefacts have occupied a central role in phenomenol ogical
thinking because each type of object in the wor ld is thought to foster a
particular kind of consciousness. Writers such as M artin Heidegger (6.1)
have held that artworks have the potential to emancipate consciousness
because they elicit an imaginative and creative response to living in a wo rld
constrained by convention.
The key to understanding the phenomenological approach to images is the
concept of 'intentionality', first outlined by its founder Edmund Husser! in his
seminal wor k Logical Investigations ("I 970a). Husserl's basic i~s ig ht, which
drew on the psychol ogy of Franz Brentano, is that consciousness and the
world are co-constituting. In particular, each indiv idual experience involves a
particular type of intentional relation between consciousness and the wo rld
so the experience of a remembered image, a loved im age and a perceived
image can be understood as each having their own particular, defi ning
characteristics. On e task of phenomenology is to describe the structure, or
'essence', of such experiences by enumerating those characteristics. For
example, Husserl 's (2005) fine-grained analysis of 'image-consciousness' aims
to describe how we are able to see representatio nal paintings as both three
dimensional objects and as canvas and paint at the same time.
Sin"~e phenom enology attempts to deal w ith individual experiences, it often
begIns w ith a.detailed analysis of a particul ar image, or type of image, in a
simila r way to art history. For example, Martin Heidegger describ es a
painting of peasant shoes by Van Gogh in order to po int out the perceptual
Interplay betw een the oil and canvas of the painting as a thin g and its
representatio n of a pai r of shoes (Pattison, 2000). In a similar vein, Gaston
B~ch el ard (1969) has dealt w ith the images of architecture and the spaces
?t the home. However, phenomenol ogy also focuses on the role of images
In constituting subjectiv ities and, in that respect, is perhaps clo ser to
P~ychoanalys is than tradi tiona l art history. For example, Heideg ger's
dIstinction between a piece of equipment and a work of art is intended to
~ efl) on str ate not on ly that an art object is not used in the same way as, say,
a carpe n~er's hammer or a sack of coal, but that it engenders a partic ular type
of con sciousoess. Equipment fosters a utili tarian view of a world that is
pass ive ?efore the technological forces at work in society, whereas artwo rks
e ~ p has lse the ability of ~peop l e to create a w orld of meaning in harmony
WIth nature. Heide gger (1977) developed this romantic ised view of artwork
and its potential for social liberation into a full y-fle dged critique of modern
technol ogy.

I MAGE S

In oppos itio n to iconoclastic vi ew s of images that also pay close attention to

i ndi vidu al artefac ts, suc h as ideo logical cri tique and sem ioti cs,
p henome no logy bro adly understands ima ges posit ive ly and as having a high
degree of cogni tive content. How ever, thi s cog n itive cont ent is not
necessarily associated w ith con scious thought. Building on Hu sserl's (1989)
w ork on the body as a lived pheno menon, ,vlerleau -Ponty (6.2) expl ained
how meaning is created by the pre-consci ous, bodily activity of the artist as
a socia l b ein g in w h ich art becomes a-f orm of 'figured philosophy'. Images
and the consci ousnesses that accom pany the m are socia l pro ducts refracted
through the mediu m of the artist and his or her equipment.
The 'phenomenon ' of phenom enol ogy can be either a physical object, such
as a painting or a film (lngarden, 1989), or an obj ect o f conscio usness, such
as a dream, sensation, feeling Or mental im age. Phenomenologists such as
Jean-Paul Sartre (6.3 ) and Mikel Dufrenne (6 .4) have, therefore, also turned
thei r attentio n to w hat psychologists have vario usly called ment al images,
qualia, or the conte nts of consc iou sness. In doing so, they have appl ied the
same descriptive tech n iq ues used to analyse artworks and im ages of science
to reveal the struct ure, or essence, of cog nitio n. Bot h Sartre and Du frenne
critic ise the empi ricis t notion of David Hu me and John Locke (1.14) that
mental images arc somehow ' in' conscious ness, suggesting, instead, that
consciousness is made up of in tenti on al acts. For Dufrenne, as wi th Kant
(2.1), im agination is the organ ising prin cipl e that makes the process of
synthesising the mind 's rep resentative facu lties and empiric al sense-data
possib le. In one respect, this phenomenologi cal pract ice is intended as a
supp lement to psychology and cognitive science bec ause it is argued that by
pay ing close attention to the details of consci ou s exper ience scie ntists are
better ab le to discrimi nate the phenomena they wi sh to investigate (Petitot
et al., 1999).
While most texts of classical phenomenol ogy tend to focu s on either
traditio nal art objec tsa nd aesthetic theory, or differe nt aspects of cognltlon,
mo re recently writers have turn ed their ' attentio n to non-art images - a
subject that has become central to such art critics as James Elkins (13.2).
For examp le, Do n lhde (6.5) argues that the scient ifi c way of understanding
the world is p redom inant ly visual and tbe way that its images are constructed
by techno logy helps determine wh at can be accepted as know ledge In
that field. Ihde shows that the ' I ifeworld' (H usser], 1970b) of institutional
practices and technologies, such as those deployed in science, do not produce
neutral ways of seeing, but come with a sed irnented, cognitive content
that phenomenology can uncover, Othe rs have suggested combining such
' lifewo rld' analyses with a cl ose attention to particular images and the
perceptua l vision those foster to both art images (Brough, 2001 ) and non-art
im ages (Piper, 2006) .

REFERENCES
Bachelard. G. (1969) The Poetics of Space, tr. M . lol as. Boston , MA: Beacon Press
Brou gh , J. (2001) 'Art an d non ..;' rt: a millennial pu zzl e' , in S. Crowell, L. Embree and
S. j, jul ian (eds), The Reech of Refleclion: Issues for Phenomeno logy 's Second
Century. Electronica l ly published by the Centp.r for Advan ced Resear ch in

Phenomenology at www.e1ec tronp ress.com pp. 1- 16.

n 977 ) Qu estion Concerning Tochnolcgv and Other Essays, rr,
W . Lovitt. New York: Har pe r & Row.

Husser ]. E. (197 0<)) Logic al In ves tjg<lU?~5, tr. J.N. Findlay. London: Routl edge & Kegan

Pau l; Atlantic Highl an d s, NJ: Humamtles Pres s.

Heid egger, M.

IN TRODUCTION

Husser l, E.
970b) The Crisi s of Europea n Sciences and Transcenden tal

phenomenology, tr. D. Carr. Evanston, IL: Northwestern Un iversity Press.

HlJSSerl, E. (1989) Ideas Pert aining to a Pure Phenomenology and a Phenomenological

Philosop hy, Second Book, tr. R. Roj cew icz and A. Schuwer. D ordrecht: Kluwer

Academic.

HuSSCr!, t. (20 0S) Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memo ry (1898- 1925), tr, l.B.

Brough, Dordrecht: K luwer Academic.

IngJf den, R. (1989) Ontology of the Work of A rt: The M usical Work, The Picture, The

Architectural Work and The Film, tr. R. M eyer and I.T. G oldw ait. Athens, O H: Ohio

University Press.

Pattison, G . (2000) The Later Heideggcr , London: Rout ledge.

Petitot. l-. Varela, F.j., Pachou d, B. an d Roy, j. -M . (eds) (1999) Naturaliz ing

Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenolog y and Cognitive Science.

Stanford, CA: Stanford Un iversity Press.

.

Piper,. A. (200 6) 'Se nsible model s I n cognitive neurosci ence' , in Logos of

Phenornenology and Phenomenology of the Logo s, Book Four : 71Je Logos of Scient ific

Intffrrogation , Anelect Husserlisne, Vol. 91. Berlin: Springer. pp. 10.5-18,

';;~S : I M A G E S

6: I

P H E NOM E NOLOG Y : 129

THING AND WORK

MARTIN HfOGGER

doing this , mu st we not look ou t for useful equipme nt in it s u se rTh e peasant

coman 'Nears her shoes in the Iicld. O nlv here are thev what th ev are . Thev
arc all the m or e genUinely so, the less the peasant wom an thinks abou t th e
sholO S wh ile she is at wo rk, or looks at th em at all, or is even aware of them .
She st an d ~ and walks in the m . Th at is how ShOl~S act ually ser ve. It is in this
process of th e use of equip ment th at 'we mu st act ually encoun ter the
charact el' of equipment.
,,\

Vle choose as exam ple a common sort of equipm ent - a pair of peasant shoes .
\ Ve do not even n eed to exhib it actual p ieces of this sort of useful ar ticle in
o rder to desc ribe them . Everyone is acq uainte d with them. But since it is
a matter her e of direct description, it may be well to facilitat e the visual
realization of them . For this purpose a pictorial representat ion suffices. \Ve
shall choose a we ll-known painting by Van Gogh , who painted such shoes
several times. But what is there to see here? Everyone kno ws what shoes
consist of. If they are not wooden or bast shoes, th er e will he leath er sa les and
upp ers, join ed togeth er by thread and nails. Such gear serves to clothe the
feet . Depend ing on the use to which th e shoes are to be put, wh ether for
work in the fi eld or for dancing , ma tter and for m will differ.
Suc h stateme nts , no doubt co r rec t, on ly exp licate w hat we alrea dy kn ow.
The equipmenral quality of equipment consists in its usefulness. But wh at
abo ut this usefuln ess itself? In conc eiving it , do we already conceive along
with it the equ ipme ntal character of eq uipment? In order to succeed in

FIGURE 6.1

Vincent Van Gogh,

A Petr of Shoes: 188 7.

Source: Van Gogh

Museum. Amsterdam.

.}

As long as we only imagine a pair of sho es in general , or Sim ply look at th e

empty, unu sed shoes as th ey m erely stand the re in th e picture, we shall
never discover 'what the eq uipmental bein g of th e equipme nt in truth is.
From Van G ogh 's painting 'A e can not even tel l where these shoes sta nd.
There is no thing sur ro undi ng this pair of p easant shoes in or to whic h th ey
might helong - on ly an undefin ed space . Th ere are not even clo ds of soil
from the field or the field -p ath sticking to them , which would at least h int
at their use . A pair o f peasant shoes and noth ing more. And yet.
From the dark opening of th e worn insides of the shoes the toilsom e tread of
the worker stares forth . In the stiffly rugge d heaviness of the shoes there is the
accumulated tenacity of her slow trud ge throu gh the far-spr eading and ever
uniform furrows of the field swcpt by a raw wind . On the leather lie the
dampness and richness of the soil. Under the sales stre tc hes th e loneliness of
the field-path as evening falls. In the shoes vibrat es the silent call of the earth,
its quiet gift of the rip ening grain and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow
desolation of the wintry field . Thi s equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining
WOITy as to the ce rtainty of bread , the wordless joy of having once more
withstood want, the trem bling befor e the impending childbed and shivering
at the surrounding menace of death .This equipm ent belongs to the earth, and
it is protected in the world of th e peasant wom an , From out of this protected
belonging the equipme nt itself rises to its resting-within- itself.
~ut perhaps it is on ly in th e picture tha t we not ice all th is about th e shoes.
~he peasant woman , on t he oth er hand , Simply wears th em . If on ly thi s
Simple wear ing wer e so Sim p le. W hen sh e takes off her shoe s lat e in th e
e\:ening , in deep hut healthy fatigue , and reaches o ut for them again in th e
still dim dawn , or passes th em by on th e day of rest, she knows all this
\\'Jtho ut noticing or re lleeting. The equipment al b eing of t he equipment
consists ind eed in its usefuln ess, But this usefulness itself rests in th e
a~llndan ce of an essent ial Being of the eq uipme nt . We call it reliability. By
Virt ue of this reliability the peasant woman is made privy to th e silent call
of th e ear th; by vir tu e of the re liability of the eq uipment she is sure of her
World. Worl d and ea r th exist for her, and for th ose w ho are with her in her
~o<~ c o f being , only thus - in th e equipmen t. We say ' on ly' and th er ewith
all into erro r; for the reliabili ty of the eq uipme n t fir st gives to th e sim ple
World its secur ity and assures to th e ear th th e freedom of its steady thrust.

T~ e equipmental being of equipm ent , reliability, kee ps gathered with~ itself all
Mart in i -I ("id,~ t l . from Th ~ o r ig In d" th e ...(-'l"l ~) f art', in g cW L' Wr:rJll8 ~ R t, ~, !}~(! and I:Jtp w uJL'd /..d nron,
Lo ndo n : H. o u ll t ' dg\~, 1Y'J ; , PI" ! , ~ ()1. H.q)1-oclu<:Q{ ...vrth p, :rmb ~ J()n o f 'I ~~' I r;T 8.: Fr;m ci .~ Bo oks.
Co pyri ght i.e, 19 77 . 1 9 ~ 'i h) I )a\'id t-er-rell Kre ll. Re prrntcd by r l. rm i~ ... ion .)1" J J .lI"p t ~ rC()JJ in .s Pu blisher s.

t.hmgs according to the ir mann er and exte nt. The usefulness of equipm ent is
nevertheless on ly
, the essential consequence of reliabilit ,y. The for mer vibrates

; 30 : I M AGE S

in the latter and would he nothing without it . A sing le piece of equipm ent is
w orn out and used uP i but at th e same time the use itself also falls int o disuse,

wears away, and become s usual. Thus equiprncntalit y wastes away, sinks into
m ere stu ff. In such wasting, r eliability vanishes. This dwindling, however,
to 'which usc-things owe their boringly obtrusive usualness, is only one
mo re testim ony to the original essence of equipmc ntal being. Th e worn- out
usualness of the equipment then obtrudes itself as the sole mode of heing,
apparently peculiar to it exclusively, Onl y blank usefulness now r emains
visible. It awakens the impression that th e orig in of equipment lies in a mere
fabricating that im presses a form up on some matt er. Nevertheless, in its
gen Uinely equipme ntal being, equipment stems from a mo re distant source.
Matter and form and their distin ction have a deeper or igin.
Th e r epose of eq uip me nt resting within itsel f consists in its reliability. O nly
in this reliability do we discern what equipm en t in truth is. But we still
kn ow nothing of 'what we first sought: the thi ng 's thingl)' chara cter. And we
know no thin g at all of what we really and solely see k: the workly character
o f the work in the sense of th e 'wor k o f ar t .
O r have we already learned some thing un...vitt ingly - in passing, so to speak
ab out the work-being of the work?
Th e equipme ntal qu ality o f equipme nt was discove red . But how ? Not by a
d escri ption and exp lanati on of a pair of shoes actually pr esent ; not by a
re por t ab out the pro cess of making shoes; and also no t by the observation
of th e act ual use of shoes occurri ng here and th ere; but only by br inging
our selves befor e Van Gog h's painting.Thi s painting sp oke . In th e near ness of
the work we wer e suddenly som ewh ere else than we usually tend to be.
T he ar twork lets us know what shoes are in truth . It would be the worst
self-decep tio n to think th at o ur descr iption , as a subjective action, had first
depi cted everythi ng thu s and th en pr ojected it into th e painting. If anything
is qu estionable here , it is rather that we exper ienced too little in the
nearness of th e work and that we expr essed th e experience too cr udely and
too lit erally. But above all , the work did not , as it might seem at first , ser ve
m erely for a better visualizing of what a piece of equipme nt is. Rath er, the
equipmcnta lity of eq uipment first expressly comes to th e fore through the
work and only in the wo rk .
What happen s here? W hat is at work in th e wo rk?Van Gogh's painti ng is :~e
disclosure of what the eq uipme nt, th e p air of peasan t shoe s, is in tr uth .l his
being emerges int o the un concealm en t o f its Being. T he Gre eks called ~e
un concealme nt of bein gs alet he ia . We say 'tr uth ' and think littl e eno ugh In
using thi s word . [f there occurs in the work a disclosure of a par ticular
being , disclosing what and how it is, th en th ere is he re an occu r rin g, a
happ enin g of truth at work .
In the work of ar t the t ru th of beings has set itself to work . 'To set' means
here ' to b ring to stand .' Some particular ~ ~ing , a pair of peasan t shoes,
com es ill thc work to stand in the light o f us Being. Th e Bein g of beings
come s into the steadiness of its shin ing.

P H E NOM ENOLOG Y : l 3 i

The essen ce of art wou ld th en be th is: th e truth of bei ngs setting itself to
work . But until now ar t presum ably has had to do with th e beautiful and
beauty, and no t w ith truth .The arts th at p rod uce su ch works ar e called th e
[inc art s, in contrast with th e appli ed or industrial ar ts that manufacture
equipment . In fine art th e art itself is not bea utiful, bu t is calJed so because
it prod uces th e beauti ful. Tr uth, in contrast , b elongs to logic. Beauty,
however, is re served for aesth etics.
[... J

The work, therefore, is not th e reprod uction of so me par ti cul ar ent ity that
happens to b e at hand at any given tim e; it is, on the contrar y, th e
repr odu cti on of things' genc ral esse nce. [. . . J

EYE AND MIND

MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY

The painter 'ta kes his body with him ,' says Valery. Indeed we cann ot imag ine
how a mind could paint. It is by lendi ng his body to th e wo rld th at the ar tist
changes the world into paintings.To understand these transubstantiati ons we
must go back to th e working, actual body - not the body as a chunk of space
or a bundle of funct ions but th at body which is an in tertwining of vision and
movem ent .
I have on ly t o see something to know how to r each it and deal w ith it , even
if [ do not kno w how this happens in the ner vous machine . My mobile bod y
makes a differ ence in th e visible world, being a p art of it ; that is why I can
steer it through th e visible. Co nver sely, it is ju st as true that vision is
attached to m ovemen t. We see onlv what we look at. W hat would vision be
Without eye m ovem en t? And ho w"co uld th e m ovem en t of the eyes brin g
things to gethe r if th e m ovement were bli nd ? If it were o nly a reflex ? If it did
not have its antennae , it s clair voyance? If vision were n ot prefigur ed in it ?
In principl e all my changes of place figur e in a corner of my land scape ; th ey
are recorded on th e map of the visible. Everything I see is in prin ciple within
my reach , at least with in reach of my sight, and is marked upon the map of
the '! can .' Each of the two maps is complete. Th e visible world and the
World of my motor projects are each total parts of th e same Being.
This ext rao rdinary over lapping , which we never think about sufficientl y,
forbids us to conc eive of vision as an op era tion of th ought that would set up

~l~~I-~c, . j\1etl~:au , pnnt). TFu: Prim~uj' f!.( rl!rt:"r~ Jl'm . N ()f t ~wc~~l;.'r n Um..~:n-j t~

Studi o...In Ph en o m c.:ru.;]og)' and

-X I~t entJ a l Phi lcs o phv, Evanston, 11 .: No rt bwe su-r n UIlI"'Cl'Slty Pres.... ) 19 64 , pr. 16 2- 9 . CopYri ght t~ 1964
hy Nor-th "''''cs t c rn Un ivcr~ i t i' P ress. R e pr od uce d wit h rt~rn lh sj o (J o f Nor t h west er n Llntvc r-xitv Press,
Orig initll;. Coer! ~t l'eJpr i ~ :!-, Ed ition s Galllmard , Paras. Rcpre>clu<:td w ith p(rmis:iion .

PHENOMENOLOG Y ; 1.3 3

i3 2 : I M A G E S

before th e mind a picture or a represen tatio n of th e world, a world of

immanence an d of idealit y. Im mersed in the visible by his bodv, itself visible
the see-er do es not app: opr iate what he sees; he m er ely ap p roache s it b~.
looking, he opens hims elf to th e wo rld . And on its side, thi s world of Which
he is a part is not in itself, or m atter. My m ovement is not a decision made
by th e mind , an abso lut e doing which would dec ree, from th e depths of a
subjective retreat , some chan ge of place m iraculously exe cuted in extended
space . It is th e n atural co nsequence and th e maturation of my vision . I sav of
a thing that it is m oved ; but my bodv m oves itself, m y m ovement deploys
it self. It is not ignorant of itsel f; it is' not blind for itse lf; it radiates from' a
self. .. .

itS pulp and carnal o bver se [son envcrs charnel] exposed to view for th e fir st
.Ie In thi s sen se , Giacom etU2 says ene rg etically 'What interest s me in all
tI ." .
J
'
aintings is re semblance - th at is, what is r esemblance for m e : so me thi ng
~'hich makes m e discover m ore of th e world.' And th e imagin ar y is much
farthe r away from th e actual because th e painting is an analogue or likeness
nlv acco rd ing to th e body; because it doe s not present the tmnd with an
~C(~l s jOn to rethink the const itutive rel ations of things ; bec ause, rather, it
ot1'ers to our Sight rregard/, so th at it might join wi th them , the inward traces
of vision , and because it offers to vision its inw ard tapestries, th e im aginary
tc>:tu re of th e real. 3
[ . .. J

Th e en igma is that m y body sim ulta neo usly see s and is seen . Th at whieh
looks at aU thin gs can also lo ok at itself an d r eco gn ize, in what it see s, the
'other side' of it s po wer of looking. [. . 1

I" 1
[... ) Since things and mv bod y are made of the same stuff, VISion must
somehow t ake place in th em ; th~ir manifest Visibility must be repeat ed in the
body by a secr et visibility. ' Natu re is on th e inside,' says Cezanne. Q uality
light , co lor, depth , which are th ere before us, are th er e only because th~;
aw aken an echo in o ur body and because the body welcom es th em .

. !

T hings have an int ernal eq uivalen t in m e ; th ey aro use in m e a car nal fo rmula
of th eir pr esence. Why shouldn 't these [corresponden ces] in their tu rn give
r ise to so me [ext ernal] visible shape in whi eh anyone else would recog nize
those m otif s which supp or t his own insp ection of th e world ?' Thus there
appears a 'v isible' of th e seco nd po wer, a carnal essence or icon of th e first.
It is not a faded copy, a trompe l'oei], or an oth er thing. Th e animals painted
on th e walls of Lascau x are not th ere in th e sam e way as the fissures and
limeston e formations . But th ey arc not elsewhere. Pu she;l for war d here, held
back th er e , held up by th e \~ all 's m ass th ey use so adroit ly, th ey spread
around the wall without eve r br eaking from th eir elusive moorings in it . I
would be at grea t pain s to say where is the painting I am lo oking at . For I do
not look at it as J d o at a thing ; I do not fix it in its pla ce . My gaze 'wanders
in it as in the halos of Being. It is more accurat e t o say th at I sec according
to it , or with it, than that I see it:
Th e w or d ' im age' is in bad repute becau se w e have th oughtlessly bel ieved
that a design was a tracing, a cop y, a sec ond thing, and th at the m ental irnag:
was such a design , belonging among ou r private bri o-a-br ae . But if in fact It
is nothing of th e kind, then neither the design nor th e p ainting bel ongs to
th e in -it sel f any m ore th an the image do es.Th ey ar e th e inside of the o utside
and th e o utside of th e inside, wh ich the duplicity of feeling [Ie senti r] m akes
possible and without w hich w e would never unde r stand th e quasi p resence
and im minent visibility whi ch m ake up the who le proble m of th e im aginar )'
The picture and the acto r 's mi micry arc not devices to be borrowed from
th e real world in orde r to signify pro saic thi ng~ wh ich ar e abs ent. l-or the
im agi nal"y is much ne ar er to , an d much far ther aw ay fro m, t he actual -"
~p..; ~n.lnY b o d Y as a diagram of the 1''"_
_C .llle
L . acuuai,
,
' ~ L ....
_11
u " '"
W illI
J

, ..

..

..
.

In painti ngs them selves 'we cou ld see k a figure d phil osophy' of vision - its
iconogra phy, pe rha ps. It is no accid ent, fo r exa m ple, that fre quent ly in Dutch
paintings (as i ~ m any o thers) an t~ mpt)' inter ior is 'digested ' by th e 'ro und eye
of the mirror." Thi s pr ehurnan wa y of seeing things is t he painter 's way. Mort'
com pletely th an lights , shadows, and reflecti on s , th e mirror im age
anticipates, within things, the labor of vision. Like all other t echnical objects,
such as signs and tools, th e m irro r ar ises upon th e op en circuit [that goes ]
from seeing body to visible bod y. Every technique is a 'technique of the body.'
.A. technique outlines and am plifies the m etaphysical str ucture of our flesh.
The mirror appear s because I am seeing-vi sible [voyanr-visible), because the re
is a reflexivity of th e sensible ; the mirror tra nslates and reproduces th at
reflexivity, My outside com ple te s itsel f in and through th e sensible .
Everythin g I have th at is mo st secre t goes into thi s \'ISaBe, thi s face, thi s Oat
and closed entity abo ut whi ch my r eflection in th e water has alread y made
me puzzle. Schilder'' observe s th at , smoking a pipe befor e a mirror, I feel th e
sleek, burning surface of the wood not only wh ere my Hngers ar e but also in
those ghostlike fingers, those me rely visible Hnger s inside th e mirror. Th e
mirr or 's ghost lies outside rnv body, and by th e same toke n my own bodv 's
'invisibility' can invest the o{her b~dies I se e." Hen ce my bod; ' can a ssu~e
s l~gm e nts derived from the body of another, just as my su bstance passes into
them; man is mirror lo r m an . The m irror itself is th e instrument of a universal
:nagic that changes things in to a spec tacle, sp ecta cles into things, mysel f
lOtn anoth er, and another into myself. I... J Whcre in the realm of th e
und.C'rstanding can we place these occult operations , together wit h th e
~otl o ns and idols they concoct?What can we call th em ? Consider as Sart re
(lid in Xat/sea, the smi le of a long-dead kin g which continues to ex ist and to
reproduce its elf [de se produire et de se reprodulle] on th e surface of a canvas. It
IS too littl e t o say that it is th er e as an image or essen ce; it is th ere as its elf, as
;~at ~vhich wa s always most alive about it, even now as Llook at the pa inting.
he. worl d's instant' t hat Cezanne wanted to paint, an instant long since
passed away, is still thrown at us by his paintings.8 His Mount Saint Victor is
7a~ lc and rema de from on e end of th e world to the o ther in a way tha t is
~:'f~rcl ~ t from, .but no ~ess ~ergetic than , ~a~ of the ~ ar~1 .roc~ a bov~ A.ix .
:~c ncc and e xisten ce , Imagm ar)' and real, VI SIble and inv isibl e - a pamtmg
llllx e s up all our catcvo r ics in laVing out its oneiri c unive rse of car nal
f encctivc
If . II'k'"encsscs , of ,mute m ean ings
.
('sse nces,O
"
.

_,,-!-:

I MAG ES

PHENOMENOLOGY : 13 5

NOTES

mind? Our answer is.that the majority of psychol ogists ignore this primary

1, Footnote remov ed.

2, G. Charbonnier, Le tnonoloqu e du peintre (Paris, 1959 ), p. 172 .
3. Footnote removed .

knowledge and prefer to build explanato ry hypotheses concerning the

natur f of the image . I These like all oth er scientific hypotheses, never possess
more t han a certain probability: th e data of reflection are certain.

4 . ' . .. tme philosophi c f1gu d e . .. ' .

5. P. Claudel, lntr oduction fa pemwre holiandatse (Paris, 1935).
6. P. Schilder, The Ima8e and Appearcmce
the Human Body (London, 1935;
New York, 1950) , pp. 22 3-24). [. . . J
7 . Cf. Schilder, Image. pp. 281-82 - Trans.

All new ~tu(lies of the image should therefore begin with a basic distinction:
that it is one thing to describe the image and quite another to draw conclusions
regarding its nature. In going from one to the other we pass from certainty
to probabi litv, The first duty of the psychologist is obv iously to formulate
into concepts the knowledge that is immediate and certain.

8. Footnote remov ed .

DESCRIPTION
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE

Despite several preconceptions , to 'which we shall return shortly, it is

certain that when I produce the image of Peter, it is Peter who is th e' object
of my actual consci ousness, As long as that co nscio usn ess remains unaltered,
I could give a description of the obj ect as it app ears to me in the form ofan
image but not of the imag e as such .To determine the properties of the image
as image I must turn to a new ac t of consciousness; 1 mu st rqleet . Thus the
image as image is describable only by an act of th e seco nd d egree in which
attention is turned a"vay from the object and dir ected to the manner in
which the object is givcn. It is this refl ecti ve act whi ch permits the judgment
' I have an image.'
It is neccssary to repeat at this point what has been known since Des cartes :
that a reflective consciousness gives us knowledg e of absolute certainty; that
he who becomes aware 'o f having an image ' by an act of reflection cannot
deceive himself. There have been psychologists, no doubt, who maintained
that a vivid image could not be distinguished from a faint perception.
Titchener even cites some experiments in support of this view. But we shall
see further on that such claims rest on an error. In fact, the confusion is
impossible; what has come to be known as an 'image' occurs immediately as
such to reflection. But it is not a metaphysical and ineffable revelation that
concerns us here. If this cons ciou sness is imm ed iately diStinguishable from ~Il
others, it is because it presents itself to reflection with certain traits, ce:~n
characteristics, which at on ce determine the judgment 'I have an image. 1hc
act of reflection thus has a content of immediate ce r tainty which we shall cal!
th e essence of the image .This essence is the same for everyone; and the first task
of psychology is to explain this essence , to describe it, to fix it.
Why, then, should there be so many diffe re nt t heo ries concerning this
immediate knowledge on which all psychologi sts should cenainly be of one
lean . Pall} Sa r tn~> from

rs;

P.'>'yd~ol(}!1J 1 thc. JmaJ~imJlJ (m . Nt~W YU1'k : Ph ilo sophi cal Library. 194 8 , pp. l --8.
Reprod uced w ith pe rrn ixxio n of Tayle r & Pr -ancts .

So we shall ignore theories. 'vVe want to know nothing about the image but
what reflection can teach us. Later on we shall attempt, as do other
psychologists, to classify the consciousness of the image among the other
types of cons ciousness, to find a' famil y' for it , and we shall form hypotheses
concerning its inherent nature. For the pr esent we only wish to attempt
a 'phenomenology' of the image . Th e method is Sim ple : we shall produce
images, reflect upon them, describe th em ; th at is, atte m pt to determine and
to classify their distinctive characteri stics.

*
The ver y fir st refle ctive glimpse shows us that up to now we have been
guilty of a double error. We believed, without giving the matter any
thought , that the image was In cons ciou sness and that the object of the
image was i n the image. 'vVe pictured consc iousness as a plac e p eopled with
small liken esses and these likenesses were the images. No doubt but that this
misconc eption arises from our habit of thinking in space and in terms of
Space. Thi s we shall call: the illusion of immanence. The clearest expression of
this illusion is found in Burne, where he draws a distinction between
impressions and ideas:
'n lo.' e perception" which enter with most force and violence, W~ may name impressions,

By Ideas I me an the faint images of these in thinking and rea soning...

These ideas are none other than what we called image s. Now Hume adds
Se\'cral pages further on:
But to fo rm the idea of an obje ct, and to form an idea simp ly IS th e sam e clung; the re fere nce
of the idea to an o bject being an extran eou s deno mmation , or which in Itself it be ars no
lnark or ch aract er. Now as 'tis impossible to form an idea of an o bject , t hat " po sses t of
~IU ant ity and 'lu ality, and yet is possest of no pI-ease degr~e 0 1 either; It follows, that there
JS an eq ual irnp osslbihty of forming an idea , that i:, not limited and confin ed in both these
patticu lar, '

Ac:ctwding to this view my actual idea of chair has but an extraneous r elation
to an eXisting chair. It is not the chair of the external wor ld, th e chair r just
perCeived; it is not the chair of straw and wood by whi ch r am able to
~l Stingui s h my idea from the idea of a table or an inkwell. But, my actual
ldea is ne vertheless an idea oj ehai!". What can this m ean but th at, for Hum e,

"'5"": I M A G E S

PHEN O M E N O L O G Y ; , 37

th e idea of chair and th e chair as an idea are o ne and th e same th ing. 10 have
an id ea o f chair b to have a chair in consciousn ess. That this is so is show n by
the fact th at wha t is tr ue of th e object is also tru e of th e idea . If th e obje ~t
m ust have a de ter mi ned qu antity and quality, so must th e id ea ,
Psych ol ogi Sts and philosophers have in th e m ain ad opted thi s p oint of View.
It is also the point of view of common se nse. When r say that ' I have an
image' of Peter, it is beli eved that r now ha ve a ce rtain p icture of Pet er in rnv
conscio usness, Th e obje ct o f m y actual conscio usness is just th is pictu r; ,
'w hile Peter, th e man of flesh and bone , is reache d but ve ry indirectl y, in an
'extri nsic ' m anner, becau se of th e fact that it is h e who m the picture
re p resents . Likewise, in an exhibition , I can look at a po r trait for it s Own
sake fo r a lo ng ti me wi tho ut noticin g th e inscription at the bottom of the
pict ure ' Por trait of Pet er Z... .' In oth er words , an im age is in here n tly like
the mater ial ob ject it re p re sents .
W hat is su rprising is that the radical in co ngruity between co nsc iousne ss and
thi s co nce pt io n o f the image has never been felt. It is d oubtless du e to the
fact that the illusion o f immanence has alway s been taken for gr anted .
Otherwise it wo uld have been noticed th at it was im possible t o slip these
m at eri al portrait s into a conscious synthetic st r uct ur e with out dest roying
th e str uctu r e, w ithout br eaking the contact s, ar resti ng the flow , b reaking
th e co ntin uity. Co nscio usness wo uld cease being trans par en t to itself; its
un ity wou ld b e b roken in every direction by unassimilabl e, opa gue sc reens.
The works of m en like Spaier, Buhler and Flach , in w hich th e im age is shown
to be supple by being full of life , suffused wi th feeling and knowledge are
useless; for bvJ turning th e im age into an organism th ey/ did n ot m ake it an)'
the less unassirni labl e by con sciousnes s. It is for t his reason that ce r tain
lo gical minds, like F. Moutier," have felt that the ex isten ce of m ental im ages
must be deni ed if the integrity of the m ental synt he sis is to be saved . Such a
r adical soluti on is contr adicted by thc dat a o f introsp ect ion . I can, at will,
think of an im age of a horse , tree or house . But if we acce pt th e illusi'?ll of
imman ence , we are necessarily led to construct th e wor ld of the mind out
o f objects entirel y like those ~f the ex t ernal world, but w hich Sim ply obey
J i/Terent laws.

Let us ign ore th ese theo ri es an d see what refl ec tion teach es us, so that 'we

may, r id ourselves of th e illusion of imman ence.

'W hen I perceiv e a chair it would be ab surd to say that the chair is in ~)'
p er ception . According to the terminology we have adopted , my p er cept1 ()~
is a ce r tain co nscio usness and th e ch air is th e obj ea of th at co ns ciousness.
N ow I shut my eyes and ] produce an im age of th e cha ir I have just
p ercei ved . The cha ir, now occurring as an image, ca n no more en te r m CO
co nscio usness th an it could do so as an object. An im age of a chair is not,
and can not be a cha ir, In fact, whe ther I per ceive or imagine that cha ir of
st r aw on whi ch I am seat ed , it al w a;.. ~ rem ains o utsid e of conscio usness- In
both case s it is t her e , in space , in that roorn , in fr ont of {he desk . N ow --- and
this is what rd k ctiotl teaches us above all -, w hethe r I sec or imagi ne that

,;halr, the o ~ j ect o f my perception an d th at o f my im age are id entical: it is

that chair of st raw o n whi ch I am se ated . O nly co nsciousn ess is related in two
different way s to the same chair. The cha ir is envisioned in both cases in its
concrete individua lity, its cor po rea lity. Only, in one of th e case s, th e chair is
'enc ountered ' by conscio usness; in the o ther, it is not. But th e ch air is not
in cons ciousness ; not even as an im age. Wh at we find here is not a sem blance
of the chair which sud de nly w orked its way into consciousness and whi ch
bas but an ' extr insic ' relation to the exi sli ng ch air, but a certain type of
consciousness , a synthetic organi'lat ion , which ha s a direct rela tion t o th e;
existing chair an d whose ver y essence co nsists pr ecisely of bein g related in
this or that m anner t o th e existing chair.
And " hat exactly is th e image ? EV idently it is n ot th e chair: in general ,
the object of the image is n ot it sel f an im age . Shall we say then that
the image is the total synthetic organization , co nsci ousness ? But this co n
, ci o u~ nes , is an act ual and concret e n ature, which exists in and for it self
and whi ch can always occur to r eflecti on w ithout anv interrnediarv, The
word im agt~ can th erefore only ind icate th e rel ation 'of cons ciousn~ss to
the obj ect; in o ther word s, it m ea ns a ce r ta in m anner in w hich the obj ect
makes it s appearan ce t o co nscio usn ess , or, if o ne p refers , a certain way in
which cons ciousness presents an object to itse lf. Th e fact of the matter is
that th e expressi on 'm ental im age ' is co nfusing. It would b e b etter to say
'the conscio usness of Peter as an image ' or 'the im ag ina t ive consciousness
of Pet er.' But since the word im age is of long standing we cannot rej ect
it completely. H owever, in order to avoid all am bigu ity, we must r ep eat
at this p oint th at an image is nothing el se than a relationship . The
imaginative con scio usne ss I have of Peter is no t a co nsci ousness of th e
image of Pet er: Peter is directlv r each ed , m v atten tion is not directed on
,
an im age , but on an ob jec t .t '
Thus, in th e woof of the syn the tic act s of Conscio usn ess th ere appear at
times certain structures which w e sha ll call imagina tive co nscio u sness .They
are born, develop and disappear in acco rdance w ith laws p rop er to them and
\~~hich we shall try to ascerta in . And it wo uld be a grave error to con fuse thi s
h~ e of th e imaginative conscio usne ss, which last s, becomes organized, an d
chsrnte grates, w it h t he object of th is co nsciousness which in th e m eantime
can well remain im mutabl e .

NOTES
1_Cf. our critical stu dy L'lma8 ination, Alcan, 1936 .
2- ~I Treouse if Huma n Natu re. Oxford , 194-1 , p. 1.
3_lhjd, p. 20.
4 _F. Mou n or, l. opbaste de Broca. These de Paris. Steinheil, 1908. Cf. P: 244 : ' We
~) s ()llltely den y t he existe nce of images:
J. Cases may he cite d in which I produce an image of an object which has no real
~ x.i 5tc n(:e o utsi de myself. But the chim er a does not e xist 'as an image _' It exists
I)cithcr a, such no r othe r wise.

l 3 ~~ :

6.

IMAG E S

IMA G IN A T IO N
MIKEL OUFRNNE:

The adve nt of r epresentation occurs w ith the upsurge of space and tilne.
In agr eem ent with Heid egger's interpretation of Kant, we shall attribute
this up surge to the tr anscendental im agination . Th e em pirical imagination
prolongs this movement, converting appearan ce into obje ct. Th e trans_
cendental imagination prefigures the e mpir ical, mak ing th e e m pir ical
possible.Transcend ental imagination expresses the possibility of representation,
while em p ir ical ima gination accounts for a give n representation 's
m ean ingfuln ess and its int egra tion into a to tal representation o r a wo rld. As
transcendental , th e im agination sees to it that th er e is a given; as empirical,
imagin ation makes ce r tain that th is given , enr ich ed by possibles, po ssesses a
mean ing.
What is the source of these possibles? How do they int ervene in the for m of
an image?That which imagin ation actually contri butes to percep tion by way
of extending and anim ating appearances is not cre ated ex mlulo. Imagination
nourishes re pres entation with modes of implicit kn owledge [Ies savoirs]
previou sly constituted in lived experience . Mor e pr ecisely, imagination plays
a du al role . It mobilizes such knowledge , and it conver ts what is acquired by
exper ience [l'acquisJ in to som ething visible . In the former case, we must
consider knowledge as an aspect of im agination . For knowledge is a vir mal
state of the image, whose in te ntional corr elate is the possible. Imagination
mobili zes the knowledge which it furni shes to represen tation . Humc 's analysis
is rel evant here . Imagination constitutes the associations which fo rm the
indispensable commentary on present impression s and which enable us to
know an object . Th e only problem is that Hume's analysis is warped by the
sensati onali st prejudice which inspir ed it. Associations appe ar as a mechanical
miracl e , because they are effected bet ween ideas that are th e residues of
heter ogeneou s impre ssion s. Synthesis is achieved tllrough habit, which , even
though natural (not pr em editated or organized by a t ranscendental act ivity),
still re mains somewhat ar tificial. To avoid this ar tificiality, we mu st look to
th e expe r ience of presence, in w hich w hat Hu sserl calls ' passive synthesis
operat e ~ naturally by w eans of the body. J Thus, throu gh our body, we are on
an even level with the obje ct, though with out fully realiZing it. We acqu ire a
familiaritv with th e object which no act of thought can supplant and which is
indispens~bl e for all knowledge by acquaintance [connaissanceI. In affirming
this , we are on ly takin g Hume at his word . But we refuse to interpret habit as
a mechani cal means of associatin g ideas. Rath er, we envisage habit as the organ
of an inner condition and , in accordance with its etymology, of a mastery of
Mik el D ufeen ne, fr om < Rcp resenr eu o n and Jmagl !"'".ati oo ) In The PJu.o(Jmcnoloar tf Ae.sr.baJc Expel renee,
tr Ed.. .var d S. C asey, NOTthW C,:."1"c:rn Un l'\'enit y Stud H ~ "'" In Phcl1{Jmt:n o] ug)' an d Exist en rta l Ph i lo so phy
Evanston , Jr.: North",..~ s tc.nl Llru..'~ ~ t" s:ty Pr ess , 197 3. pp. 34 :;- 53_ C opyri ght (C;J 1973 bv No r th..vc-xtcr n
Uru ve.r ~l t)" P ress Repr odu ced Wifh pcr -rnisstcm of No r th w est er n Un b:e r :-tll}' Pr e ss. On~jnaBv
Nl ~n (lmblOh't! r f. de I'lxp~nen.< ~' ~'~lhbr (l [j e , Pr (~ss c ~ Llni.... crsita ire d e Fra mx -, 19 S3. Rcprod u t: (~d ~"' i (h
pc r rn lss ron.

PHENOMENOLOGY ; 13 9

the corp oreal object. Th erefore, if im agination mobilizes mo des of implicit

knowledge , it does so not so m uch by takino the initiative in an unpredictable
outbur st as by following the cour se of a p re\ious exp erience undergon e by the
body on the plane of pr esen ce .

As a result, the essentia l function of imagination is to conver t thi s

experience into some thi ng visible, giving it the status of re presentatio n. 'We
uld sa}' that representation is that wh ich makes u s think of, but we should
co

lace the em phasis on th e evocat ive capaci ty sugges te d hy the 'think : not on
~e conn ective capa cit y sugges ted by th e ' of' (a capacit y be longing to th e
bodv) . Th e cr ucial m att er is always th e transition from presence to
rep; esentation . On both th e em pir ical an d the tr anscendental le.vel s,
imagination is a fo rce whic h stri ves for Visibility. The transcendental
imaginat ion having opened up the area in w hich som ething given can appear,
the empi r ical im agination fills ou t thi s field . This is done w ithout
multipl ying th e given . Instead , images are elicited to form a qu asi given .
These images are not , st ric tly speaking, images of th e visible. Howeve r, they
put us en ro ute toward th e visible by conti nually appealing to perception for
decisive conl1r mat ion . For we mu st realize that th e modes of implicit
knowledge w ith whi ch ima.gination seeks to do minate app ear ances ar e
neither perceptual n or conceptual.Th ey exist in a prior form in whi ch they
can be an nexed to a re prese ntati on .
When we perceiv e, th ese modes of knowl edge are not evoked as
knowledge, that is, as supplementar y inl ormatio n added to the p erc eived
from the outside , or as a gloss adjoined to a text. They are there as th e very
meaning of th e perceived object, given with it and in it. Tills proxim it y of
knowledge to the p er ceived is the wo rk of im agin ation , for knowledge thu s
integrate d shou ld b e t erm ed an 'im age.' If I know th at snow is cold , I can
actualize th e memory o f expe rie nces that I have had of this co ldn ess; but
when I see sn ow, it app ears col d t o me without my etfe ctin g thi s
actualization . This mea ns, fir st , th at th e cold is not known by an inl1 uence
:;ohich woul d summon up a pr eviou sly consti tuted kn owl edge of cold .Yet it
IS .not felt in the way th at wh ite is seen (though we may, instructed by
pall1ter s, doubt that vvhit e it self is seen , and it cou ld b e shown that white is
not itself seen without the aid of im agin ation) . Thi s so r t of immedi ate
presenc e , non conceptual and yet non sensu ous , is the ' ima ge ' of cold whi ch
accon;ranies th e per ception of snow and renders it elo quent . My implicit
knO\\'k dge is conver ted into an abstract and yet real pr esence if something
~~n s.uo~~ which is adumbrat ed but not who lly given . Th e sam e holds for th e
s: robohc images in which com prehens ion is occa sion allv made determinate .
In ,Sart.r e 's exam ple, th e tumu ltu ou s and end less seaoJ is an im age of th e
prr~l c tariat ; it gives neith er a true no r an obj ective co mpre hen sion of th e
object deSign ated by it . 2 Co m prehe nsion in the for m of an image is an im age
of comprehension , ju st as the cold of unfelt snow or th e flavor of a ro ast
evoked. by a fam ishe d. m an is th e image of an unsen scd sensuou sn ess [un
senSible non .~ "nt l ) . } Second , the <.:old can be anticipate d only because it has
already b een kn ow n . When me mory takes the form of an im age,

; LO'I rvlAGES

an ticipation becomes reminiscence. Finally, the image adheres to perception

in constituting the object. It is not a piece of mental equipment in
consciousness but a 'Nay in which consciousness opem itself to the object,
prefiguring it from deep within itself as a function of its implicit knowledge:
Therefore , the world is present to us in flesh and blood only because it is at
the same time implicitly present in images.To unfold the empirical content of
these images, we must appeal to the modes of implicit knowledge wEich
con stitute expe r ience. However, in p erception such modes of knowledge.
rem ain in a lat ent state of ,empty intentions.' Consequently, we cannot assert
that perception is composed of sensations to which judgment adds modes of
knowledge . Modes of implicit knowledge ar e not known fconnu] as such.
Rather, as latent in the form of images, they are incarnate in objects. In this
manner, im ag ination comes to the aid o f perception. Th ere is an irrecusable
given whi ch eli cits and di re ct s the im agination: pe r ception is not wholly'
imagination. Bu t this given is onl y appearance, since it is contemplated and not
lived. Under its transcendental aspect, the imagination allow s the given to
ar ise, but as empirical, it restores on th e plane of representation a degree of
the density and warmth of presence. Th us, instead of saying that the imaginary
IS a qua si present, we pr efer to say that the imagination Jilmi shes a quasi
present, the equivalent of Jived Significations at the level of representation. It
is in thi s fashion that , for example, the word.JI Oll"Cr designates' l' absent e de tout
bouquet. " But the designatum is nevertheless a flower 'w hose look, fragrance,
jocund spontaneity, or naive pride exists in the margin of our consciousness.
Imagination, guided hy the t ext , creates a po ssible flower whi ch blossoms
forth from the word which names it. Similarly, the imagination mak es the
stone of a monument appear in its hardness, ob stinacy, and coldness. These
qualities are present as a halo around what I sec, enriching my perception
without encumbering or altering it.
'vVe can now verify the ultimate unity of the transcendental and empirical
imagination. The empirical imagination, which exploits the concr ete
knowl edge [Ie sQl'oir concret I that structures p erception , can be clarified only
in term s of the transcendental , w hich found s the possibility of seeing. The
unity of the two makes the amhiguity of imagination evident - an amhiguity
whi ch is finall y that of the h um an condition itself. In fact , imagination
appears to possess at Once the two faces of nature and mind [esprit]. It
belongs to the bodv~ to the d ecree
that it animates the modes of implicit
b
knowl edge inherited fro m th e exper ience of p resence, whil e op ening up
reflection to the degree that it allows us to substitute the p erceived for the
lived. !n this latter rol e , imagination interrupts the intimacy of presence by
introducing not so much an absence as th e distance within presence "...hich
constitutes representation, in te r m s of which the object confronts us at a
distance , open to a look o r t o jud gment.

NOTES
I . Sec Edmund H usscrl , Ano!Jsen r ut p()$siven Sy nt heSiS, cd , M. Fleischer (T he
Hagut:: N i jhol]", 19 6 6) , pa ssim . (Translatm"s not e).

PH ENOMENOLOGY : I '" I

2. See Jean -Paul Sartre, The Psychology qf lmaglnat,on, trans. B. Frechtrnan (New
york: \Vasmngton Square Press, 1966), pp. 133fT.
3. \Ve shall, perhaps, be criticized for juxtaposing the ex amples of a man who
pcrceiycs co.ld. in the Whiteness. of.sllo~ and of a famished man who dreams of
food. But it is incorrect to restrict ImagInation to the second case , Insofar as the
snOW is not in contact with my skin, its coldne ss is as absent as food is to the
famished . The whiteness alone is given to me. O f course, it is the whiten ess 1"
snow, for perception goes immediate!y to the object, and its coldness is then
given with , ~e . obj ec~. ~et the coldness is "" given ~n the same \"'ay as th e
whiteness: it IS nnphCit, r.e., a m anner ofbemg absent ill presence. In contrast,
the food which obsess es the famished man is rad ically absent . Nevertheless, it
is present enough to m ake his mouth wat er. Without being deluded, he at least
reaJjze~ the implicit savor and taste of meat and thus enters th e universe of
food. In the first case, we have an absent pr esence ; in the second , a pr esent
absence. It is the context prov ided by the world which determines whether the
image is illuso ry or valid . All dep ends on the extent to which th e image adheres
to perception. In both cases, however, the image is som ething implicit which
blossoms forth on the basis of th e real- whethe r to confirm or to hetray it.
+. This is a well -known phr ase of Mallarrn e, the French sym bolist poet.
(Translato rs note).

SCIENTIFIC VISUALISM
DON tHO:
It has frequently been noted that scientific 'seeing' is highly visuali sti c, Thi s
is, in part, because of h istorical origins '" arising in early Modern times in
the Renaissance, Leonardo da Vinci played an important bridge role here,
with th e invention o f what can be called th e ' engine er in g paradigm ' of
vision. t His depictions of human anatomy, particularly those of autopsies
which display musculature , org ans, tendons , and the like - 'exp lode d ' to
show parts and interrelationships - were id enti cal with the same style when
he depicted imagined machines in his technical diaries. In short, his was not
?nly a \\oay of seeing which anticipated mod ern anatomi es (later copi ed an d
Improved upon by Vesalius) and modern draughtsmanship, but an approach
which thus visualized both exteriors and interiors (th e exploded style).
1.1X)nardo was a 'handcraft ima gist.'
r.he move, first to an almost exclusively visualist emphasis, and second to a
kind of 'analytic' depiction , was faster to oc cur in some sciences than in
other s. In astr onomy, analytic drawing of telescopic sightings was accurate

I!ldt\ fro m E :l1'atlJ~ng H erroeneuctcs, I' ISI...ahs m In Scien ce. N or thwcst et-n Unncrdry Studies in

Ph~~n ~m1 -::tH : logy ~ri.d Lx ist cn na ! H111o:-:,o phy, E v anst on, iI.: North\'.t~ s t l.~ r n U ni w~rSll) Pr-os,s , 1998,

Pp. 1; 9 63 Cnp)' T lghc~;;' 19 9 8 by No rth",..es tern Lln ivcrsu v Press. Re prod uce d w id.. r-H~rmis s[ o n o f

:-';{) l ! h wl~s tl:rn Un l v~ ~ni lt)" Pn. ~~ .

()iJJ1

:5

PHE NO,"IE NO L O GY ; 1<1 .3

) 4.2 : I M A G E S

early on and is being redi scovered as such today.Th e 'red spot ' 00 Jupi ter Was
already depict ed in the seventee nth century. But her e, visual obser vations and
depictions we re almost the only sensory dim en sion which could be utiliz ed
Celestial phenomena wer e at first ope n only to visual inspec-tion, at most
magnifi ed through op tical instrumentation. It would be much later -- the
middl e of the twentieth centu ry - th at astronomy would expand beyon d the
optical and reach heyond the Ear th with instruments other than optical ones.
Medicine, by th e tim e ofVesalius , shifted its earl ier tac tile and even olfacto ry
ob serva tio ns in autopsy to the visualizations
]a cia Vinc ian style , but
co nt inued to use diagn ostics which includ ed palpitation s , osc ultatio ns , and
other tactile , kinesth eti c , and olfactory o bser vat ions . In th e medical
sciences, th e shift to the pr edominantly v i~ual mode fo r analysis began m uch
later. The inven t ion of bo th photogra phy and X-rays in the ninet eenth
ce ntu r y help ed these scien ces become m or e like th eir other n atur al science
peers.

Hermen euti cally, in th e pe rceptua list styl e of in terpr etation em phasized

her e - th e pr ogress of 'her mene utic sensor y translat ion devices' as they
might be called - ima8 i1l8 technolop ies have become dominantly visualist ,
These devices mak e non visual sources into visual ones . Th is, th rough new
visual p rob es of interiors, fro m Xvrays, to MRI scans, to ultrasound (in
visual form) and PET processes, has allowed m edi cal scien ce to deal with
bodies become transpar ent. 2
More abstract and semio tic -like visualizations also are p ar t of science's
sight . Grap hs, oscillograph ic, spectrogra phic, and o ther uses of visual
he r me neut ic devices give Lat our reason to claim th at such instrumentation
is simply a com plex wscr iptio n-makin8 device for a visualizable result. This
vector to ward forms of 'w riting' is rel ated t o, but different fw m , the var ious
isomorphic depicti ons of im aging. [. . .)
While all this instrumentation designed to turn all phenomena into
visualiza ble form for a 'r eading' illu strat es what I take to b e on e of science's
deeply entrenched 'her mene ut ic pra ctices,' it also poses something of a
problem and a ten sion for a st ricte r ph en om en ological understanding of
perception.
Although I shall outline a more complet e notion of perception bel ow, here
I wan t to underline the feat ures of perception whic h are the source of
a po ssible tension with scienti fic 'seein g ' as ju st described. Full human
perception , following Merleau -Pooty, is always mu ltul imensionol a~d
syn esthetic , In shor t , we ne ver just see someth ing but alw ays expe r ience it withlO
th e co m plex of sensory fields. Thus the ' reducti on' of perception to a
monodim en sion - th e visual - is already an abstraction from the lived
experi ence of act ive percep tion withi n a wo rld.
Does this visualizing pr actice within sc ie nce thus reop en the way to a division
of science from the Iifeworld? Doe s it m ake of science an essen tiallv reductive
practice ? I shall argue against ~i s by w ay of att emp ting to /show th at
visualizat ion in the scien tific sense IS a deeply hermeneuti c practice which plays a

, ed al role . Lat our's insight that exp er im ents deliver inscriptions helps

:~gge st the he rmeneutic analogy, which works well her e. W riting is language

through ' techn ology' in th at w ri tten langu age is inscribe d by som e

technologically em bodied m eans. I am suggesting that th e sophisti cated ways
in which science VIsualizes its phenomen a is another mo de by whi ch
understan ding or interpr etive activi ty is em bodied . Whether the technologies
are tr anslation tec hn olog ies (transfor ming nonvisual dim ensions into visual
ones), or more isomorphically visual from the outset, the visualization
processes th rough techno logies are science 's par ticular hermeneutic means.
First , what are th e epist em olog ical ad van tages of visualization? Th e
traditional answer, ofte n given w ithin science as well , is that vision is th e
'clearest' of th e senses, th at it delivers greater distinctions and clarities, and
this seemS to fit in to th e histories of per cep tion tracing all th e way back to
the Gre eks. But thi s is sim ply wrolla . My own earl ier researches int o
auditory phen om ena show ed that e ven measurable o n physiolo gical bases,
hearing del ivers within its dimension distin ctions and clari ties which equal
and in some cases ex ceed those of visual acuity. I" ,I It is sim ply a cult ural
prejudice to hold tha t visio n is ipso fact o the ' bes t ' sense.

I argue, r ath er, that wh at gives scientific visualization an advantage ar e its

repeatable Gestalt f eatures w hich occur within a technologically produced
visible for m , and which lead to the ri se and im por tance of imaging in both
its ordinary visual and specific h ermen eutic visual displ ays. And , her e, a
phenomenological understandin g of percepti on can actually enh ance the
hermeneutic process which defines th is science practice .
Let us. begin with one of the simplest of thes e Gest alt features , th e
appearance of a figur e against a ground . Pr esented with a visual displ ay,
humans can ' pick out ' so me feature which, o nce chosen, is seen against the
variable consta nt of a field or groun d . It is not the 'o bject ' w hich pr esents
this figu re itsel f - rath er, it is th e interaction of visual intentionality that a
figure can appear against a g round .

I~ astr onomy, for example, sighting come ts is one such activity. Wh eth er
SIghted with the naked eye, telescopic obser vation , or tertiary observations of
telescopic photographs , the Sighting of a comet comes about by noting the
movement of a single object against a field which remains relatively m ore
Constant . Her e is a determined and trained figure! ground p erceptual activity.
This is also an in terest -determm ed figure / ground obs ervation . While ,
~mpi ricany, a co met may be accident ly discover ed , to recognize it as a come t
IS to have sedirnented a great deal of previous informed perception.
These pheno m enological features of comet discovery stan d out by no ting
~hat the ver y structure of figur e ! groun d is not somethi ng Simp ly 'given' but
IS constJt l1u d by its context and field of signifi cations. To vary our set of
nbsen 'ahIes, on e could have ' fixed' upon any single (or sm all group) of sta r s
and attended t o these instead . Figu res 'stan d ou t' relat ive to int erest ,
atte ntion , an d even histo r y of pcrcci vabilit y win ch in cludes cult ural or
macroperceptu al j eawres as we ll, [. . . J

; 4 4 : I MA GES

When on e adds to this mix the var iability and cha ngea bility of instrum ents
or technologies, the process can rapidly change . As Kuhn has p ointed OUt,
with increased magnifications in later Mod ern telescop es, there was an
explosion of p lanet discove ries due to the availability of detecta ble' disc
size,' whi ch differentiated plan ets from star s much more easily. l

[ 1

;,~

PSYCHOANALYSIS

If laboratories (and other controlled ob servational prac t ices) are wher e one
pr epares inscriptions , they are also the pla ce wher e object s are made
' scienti fic ,' or, in this context, made readable. Things, the ultim ate r eferential
obje cts of scie nce, are never just naively or sim ply ob ser ved or taken , the)'
m ust be prepared or constituted . And , in late Modern science , this consti tut ive
pr ocess is incr easingly pe rv aded by technolog ies.
But , I shall also argue tha t the results ar e oft en not so much ' textlike,' but
are m ore like rep eatable, variable perceptual Gestalts. Th ese are som et imes
called (images' or e ven pictur es, but because o f th e vestig ial remains of
modernist epistemo logy, I shall call th em depicuons. Thi s oc curs with
increasing so phistication in th e realm o f ImaOIllB technologies w hic h often
do minate con te m p ora r y scientific hermen eutics.
To produ ce the bes t res ults, the now technocon stitutcd objects need to
stand for th with th e g reatest p ossible clar ity and within a cont ext of
variability and re peatability. For th is to occur, th e cond itions of instrumen
tal transpare nc Y need to be enhanced as well. Thi s is to say that the
instrumentation, in operation, m ust 'withdr a...v ' or itself b ecome transparent
so th e thing may sta nd 0 u t (wi th chosen or multiple features). Th e me ans by
w hich the d epiction becomes ' clear' is co nsti tute d by th e 'absen ce' or
invisibility of th e instr um entatio n .

Of co urse, the instrumentation can never totally disapp ear, Its 'echo effect '
will always rem ain within the medi ation. T he mallet (b rass, wood , or
r ubber) makes a difference in th e so und p rodu ced . Tn p art, this b ecomes a
reason in late Modern science for the del iber ate introd uction of multirarianr
instr ument ation or meas urem ent s. Th ese Instr umental phenomenological
variations as I have called the m also functi on as a kin d of m ult ipers pectival
equival en t in scie nti fic vision (which driv es it , n ot unli ke other cult ural
pr acti ces , tow ard a more p ostmoder n visua l model) .

NO T ES
1. Footno te removed .
2. Footno te removed .
3. Thom as Kuh n, Structure ?ISciem!fic Bevolutions, 1962, Chicago: Uni versity of
Chicago Press. pp. 115-16.

7: I

:2

The Gaze
jacqu es Lacan
The Ali-Perceivin g Subj ect
Christian M etz

7:3

Woman as Image (Man as Bearer of the Look)

Lau ra M ulvey

7:4

Cindy Sherman's Untitled Film Stills

j oan Copjec

7:5

Tw o Kinds of Attention
Anton Ehrenzweig

I N T R O D U C T IO N

well as the unconscious containing imagery, 'the image "c ontain s"

As consciou sness, primary processes that can be analysed', such that images

u~n be treated as sY~I?~oms of individual an.d soci al ~sychic pro cesses

~AUmon t, 1997: (4). Zizek and others use cinema to Ill ustrate psycho

IN T RO D U C T IO N
Psychoanalysis has always had a specia l relationship with images because
of the role of images in the unconscious . Freud (2.8) found evidence of the
prim ary psychic processes, meaning the repressed, unconsciou s mind in the
mental imagery of dreams. (See Section 9, Image asThought.) In his 'return
to Freud', Jacques Lacan (7.1) reworked the form of the psyche along
structuralist terms, cla iming that it consists of an j maginary, symbo lic and
real order. Very simply put, 'imaginary' refers to a psychi c register or realm
of images, 'symbolic' to language and the law-l ike orderi ng of society, and
the ' real' to the unobtainable sense of fulln ess that escapes symbolisation.
The form of the self corresponds not to the Cartesian subject. the unified and
self-aw are cogito (1.12, 1.13), but is radically spli t betw een the three orders,
and hence is an ex-centri c subject. In an effort to becom e a unified self, the
subject attempts, always unsuccessful ly, to make itself whole by means of
'acts of identification' wi th images or discourses (Stavrakakis, 2004: 23).
Sign ificant ly, l.acan defines identif ication as 'the transformatio n that takes
place in' the subject when he assumes an image' (Lacan, 1977: 4). The
prim ary, pre-Oedipal, imaginary identification with an image is both
fictional and opti cal. In the 'm irror-stage' the infant 'm isrecognises' its
uncoordinated, undifferentiated self in its reflection , raking itself to be a
coherent whol e. Imaginary ident ification s are thus ~ey to the subject's failed
attempts to overcome its ex-centricity, or alienation fro m itself.
Christian M etz (7.2) wo rks from Lacan's approach to posit that there is a
particul ar act of identification that occurs in cinem a spectatorship, on the
basis of the 'already constituted ego' that allows the viewers to identify with
themselves. Hisview contrasts with the common-sense noti on that, viewers
identify primarily w ith characters. The gaze itself, the act of looking, .is a.n
objec t of desire for the scopic drive, or urge to loo k, the source of whi ch IS
the biological visual system (Aumont, "1 997: 90). The scopic drive is one of
several human drives, which gains partial satisfaction in spectatorship. Lacan
first discussed the scopic drive in relation to painting , but the point has been
taken up subsequently, primaril y in relation to fi lm.
In l.acanian terms, ci nema viewers' identification wi th the gaze is another
attempt to occl ude the 'splitness' of th.e subjec t, as they are actually
identifying with onl y one of the many drives of ~ h c psyche. ln that s<:ns e,.
ci nematic identification is one of the many fantasises, wh ich may consIst at
irnases or di scourse, in which the subject hopes; vainly, to achieve fulln ess.
psv<?hoanalysis ble nds w ith ideol ogy cr itique as a ' hermeneutics of
suspici on". when it becomes.o. tool to analyse th~ fantastic identifications of
subjects, such as w ith the false f~lln es ~ promised by advertjsing images
(W illiamson, 1978) and as substantiated 111 the wo rk of Slavoj Ziz ek (1989).

( alytic theory, in addit ion to using psychoanalytic theory to illuminate the

~ea ni!Jg of film (1992). Freud (1995) analysed Leonardo da Vinci's paint ings
as traces of the latter's neurosis, but m~xe co m ~ o n l y cultu!al imag~s such as
films are analysed as sym p~o;ns ~f SOCial condl.tlons. Psycnoanalysl.s has had
a great influen ce Oil femm' ~ t film scho larsh.lp (COWIe, 1 9 ~ 7; ~"v~rma n ,
1988), which among other Issues has examined how ~he -irnplication of
viewers in the gaze is diffe rentiated by gender. Laura Mulvey (7.3) di ffers
from Metz in arguing that ci nema does invite the view er; to identify with the
active male protagon ist who moves the narrative alo ng, but not with wo man,
who appcars passively, as spectacle. Mu lvey'S analysis of class ical narrative
film exposes it as a site in whi ch male scopo phi lia (the perversion li nked to
the exacerbation of the scopic drive' (Aument, 1997: 91)) turns women into
fetishes and obj ects of sadistic voyeurism in order to assuage-male castration
anxieties. Cinem a is sympt omatic of gender inequal ity. Her ico noclastic
attitude to cinem a, even in its revised form (M ulvey, 1981), has,c,erta'inly
been challenged wi thin psychoanalyt ic feminism (Stacey, 1988):'Yef it doe'g
express a co nsistent fem in ist co ncern that 'med ia ima ges not only
misrepresent women (Friedan, 1963: 28-3 1) but also shape them into
something other than they are, as male fantasies of femi ni.nity: 'Ho ld still, we
are going tci do your portrait, so that you can begin looki ng like it right away'
(Cixous, 1981 : 263).
Cindy Sherman's photographic self-portraits seem to comment di rectly on
the social construction of femininity through media images. Joan Copjec's
(?.4) analysis of them, however, ind irectly undermi nes 'M ulvey's attack on
cinema, Copj ec conc urs wi th Mulvey's v iew that the cl ose-up of the
woman's face stands apart from the fil m's representation oft imeand space,
but not that her face simply becomes a fetish for the male gaze. Nor does
~he accept that the photogr aphs represent the splitti ng of the female subject's
Identification.betwe en her actual place In-the masculi ne or phall ic symbol ic
orger of the film and another imagined identit y, as a 'real' wo man. Rather,
the photographs affirm that femi ni nity exists only as image, appearance or
masquerape (Riviere, 1 98 ~). At the same, time/ though, they affirm the value
of Sherman's lov e for herself as a wom an and the cinem atic image of herself
as an O ther, as an object of desire. On this reading, the ci nematic image is
not sympto matic of misrepresentation and oppression but ill ustrative of the
possibility of-the split subject fi ndi ng love by recognising that w hol eness (as
woman, as subject) is unobt ainabl e.
From a non-Lacanian perspective, Anton Ehrenzweig (7.5).does.n6t read art
as a symptom but exami nes the unconscious struct ures that organise
artworks. Ehrenzw eig was both influ enced by modern artists such as Paul
Klee (l O. l) who tri ed to allow unconscious processes to emerge in their
Work, and. also influ enced artists such as Robert Morris and Robert Smithson
10 do the same. The vi ewer of a painting should, like the modern arti st and
the analyst allow the prim ary processes of the unconscious to come to the
fore in order to appreciate its full aesthetic eifeci. Eh renzwei g's psycho
analytic appro ach to images, his 'polyphonic', 'unconscious scanning'
becomes a hermeneutics of appreciation rather than suspicion .

I M A GE S

PSYCHOA N A LYS I S : 1.69

REFERENCES
Aumont, J. (1997) The Image, tr, C. Pajacko ws ka, London: 13ritish Film Institute.

Cixou s, H . (1981) 'The laugh of the Medusa', in E. M arks and I. de Cou rti vron (eds),

New French Femin isms, tr, K. Co hen and P. Coh en. New York : Schocken. pp. 245 - 64.

Cow ie, E. (1997) Representing the Woman: Cinema and Psychoanalysis. Lon don:

M acmillan.

Freud, S. (1995 ) 'Leonardo da Vin ci and a mem or y of his childhoo d' , in P. Gay (ed.),

The Freud Read er. N ew York: W.W. Norton . pp. 443-80.

Friedan, B. (19(3) The Feminin e M ystique. N ew Yo rk : Del l Pub lishi ng.

Lacan, J. (1977) Ecrits: A Selection, tr, A. Sher id an. Lond o n: Rou tled ge.

Mulvey! L. (198 1) 'Afte rtho ughts on "Visua l Pleasure and Narrative Ci ne ma" inspired

by Due! in the Sun', Framework. 15/ 16/ 17: 12-.15 .

Riv iere, J. (198 6) ' W oma nli ness as a masquerade' , in V. Burgin , J. Do nald and

C. l<apla n (eds). Formation s of Fan iasy. Lond on : M ethuen. pp. 35-44.

Silverma n, K. (1988) The Acoustic Mirror: The Female Voice in P5ychoanalysis and

Cinema. Bloom ington. IN: Indiana Un iversity Press.

Stacey, I. (1988) ' Desperate ly seeking d ifference', in L, Gam ma n and M. Marshment

(eds), The Female Gaze. London: Woma n's Press. pp. 112-200 .

Stavrakakis, Y. (2 004) 'Jacques Laca n', in J. Simon s (ed.), Contemporary Critical

Theor y: From Lacan to Said. Edinburgh: Edihbu rgh U ni versity Press. pp . 18-33.

Willi ams6n, J. (1978) Decoding Advertising: Ideology and M eaning ill Advertising.

London: Marion Boyars.

Z izek: S. (1989) The Sublime Object of Jdeology. Lon do n: Verso.

Zi zek, S. (ed .) (1992) Everything You Always Want ed to Know About Lacan (But Were

Too Afraid to A sk Hitchcock) , I.ondon: Verso.

THE GAZE
J ACQUES LACAN
But what is th e ga%:e?

I sbaJl set out fro m thi s first poin t of annihilation in w hi ch is m arked, in th e

field of the reducti on of the subj ect, a break - w hich warns us of the need to
introcluce ano ther reference, th at whic h analysis assumes in redu cing th e
pr ivileges of the co nscio usness .
psycho- analysis regards th e conscio usness as ir re me diably limited , and insti
tutes it as a prin ciple , nut only of id ealization, but of meconnaissance, as - using
a term that takes on new value by heing referred to a visible dom ain - scotoma ,
The ter m was intr od uced into the psycho-analytic vocabulary bv th e French
School. Is it Simp ly a met aphor? We tmd her e once again th~ a~biguity that
affect~ anything th at is inscri bed in the register o f th e scopic dri ve.
For us, consciousness m atters on ly in it s r elati on t o w hat , for propaed euti c
reaSODS, I have tr ied to show )'ou in the fictio n of the inco mplete t ext - on
the basis of which it is a qu estion of r ecentrin g the subjec t as speaking in the
ver)' lacu nae of that in whic h, at fir st Sight, it present s itsel f as speak ing. But
J am stating he re only the r elation o f the preconsciou s t o th e un conscious.
The dynamic tha t is attached to the co nsciousness as suc h, the attention
the subject brings t o his o wn text, rema ins up to th is po int, as Freud has
str essed , outside th eo ry and , strictly speaking , not yet ar t iculate d.
It is here that I propose th at the interest th e subject takes in his own split is
bound up with th at whi ch determines it - namely, a privileged object, w hich

FIGURE 7.1

Hans Holbe in: Th e Ambassadors, 15 33 .

SOu rce: Th eNation al Gallery. London.

7: I

so: I MAGES

PSYCHOAN ALYS IS: 15 1

has emerged from some prima] separation , from some self-mutilation induced

by the very approach of the real, whose name, in our algehra, is the objet a.
In the scopic relation, the object on which depends the phantasy from which
the subject is suspended in an essential vacillation is the gaze. Its privilege -_
and also that by which the subject for so long has been mi sunderstood as
being in its dependence - derives from its very structure.
Let us schematize at once what we mean. From the moment that this gaze
appears , the sub ject tries to adapt himself to it, he becomes that punctiform
object, that point of vanishing b eing with which the subj ect confuses his OWn
failure . Furthermore, of all the objects in which the subject may recognize his
dependence in the register of desire, the gaze is specified as unapprehensible.
That is why it is, more than any other object, misunderstood (meconnu), and
it is perhaps for this reason, too, that the subject manages, fortunately, to
symbolize his own vanishing and punctiform bar (trair) in the illusion of the
consciousness of seewg oneselfsee oneself, in which the gaze is elided.
If, then, the gaze is that underside of consciousness, how shall we try to
imagine it ?

[.. 1
We can apprehend this privilege of the gaze in the function of desire, by
pouring ourselves , as it were, along the veins through whi ch the domain of
vision has been integrated into the field of desire.
It is not for nothing that it was at the very period when the Cartesian
meditation inaugurated in all its purity the function of the subject that the
dimension of optics that I shall distinguish here by calling 'geometral' or
'flat ' (as opposed to perspective) optics was developed .

*
In my seminar, I have made great use of the function of anamorphosis , in
so far as it is an exemplary structure. 'W hat does a simple, non-cylindrical
anamorphosis consist of? Suppose there is a portrait on this flat piece of
paper that I am holding. By chance, you see the blackboard, in an oblique
position in relation to the piece of paper. Suppose that, by means of a series
of ideal threads or lines, I reproduce on the oblique surface each point of the
image drawn on my sheet of paper. You can easily imagine what the result
would be .,. you would obtain a figure enlarged and distorted according to
the lines of what may be called a perspective. One supposes that - if I take
away that which has helped in the construction , namely, the image placed in
my own visual field - the im pressio n I will retain, while remaining in that
place, will be more or less the sam e. At least , J will recognize the general
outlines of the image - at best, I will have an identical impression.
I will now pass around something that dates fro m a hun d red ye ars earlier,
from 1 ; 33, a re production of a painting that, I th ink ; youall know _. Hans
Holbein's The Ambassadors, It 'will serve to refresh the memories of those
w ho know the picture 'Nell. Those who do not should exa m ine it attent ively.
I shall co m e back to it sho rt ly.

Vision is o rdered according to a mode th at may ge nerally be called the function

ofimages.This fun ction is defined by a point-by -point corresponde nce of two
unities in space.Whatever optical intermediaries may be used to establish th eir
relat io n , whether their im age is vir t ual, Or real , the point-by -point
corr esp onden ce is esse ntial.Th at whi ch is of th e mode of the image in the field
of vision is therefore re ducible to the simple schema that enables us to establish
anamorphosis , that is to say, to the relation of an image, in so far as it is linked
to a ~ w'fa ce, with a certain point that we shall call the 'geometral ' point.
Anyth ing that is determined by this method , in which the straight line plays its
role ofbcing the path of light, can be called an image.
Art is mingled 'w ith science here . Leonardo da Vinci is both a scienti st , on
account of his d iopt ric constructions, and an artist. Vitruvius's treatise on
architecture is not far away. It is in Vignola and in Alberti that we find the
progressive interrogation of the geometra] law s of perspective, and it is
aroun d research on perspective that is ce ntred a privileged interest for the
doma in of vision - whose relation with the institution of the Cartesian
subject, which is itself a sort of geometral point , a point of perspective, we
cannot fail to see. And, ar ound the geometrai perspective, the picture - this
is a very im po r tan t function to which we shall return - is organized in a way
that is qu ite new in the history of painting.

[.. .J
Now, in The ;/mbassadon - I hope everyone has had time now to look at the
reproduction - what do you see? What is this strange, suspended, oblique
object in the foreground in front of these two figures?
The two Hgures are frozen, sti ffened in their showy adornments. Between
them is a series of objects that represent in the painting of the period the
symbols of vanitas. At the sam e period , Cornelius Agrippa w ro te his De Vanitale
SCientJamm, aimed as much at the ar ts as the scie nc es, and these objects are all
symbolic of the sciences and arts as they were grouped at the time in the
trivium and quadri vuun, What, then, before this display of the domain of
appearance in all its most fascinating forms is this object, which from some
angles appears to be flying through the air, at others to be tiltcdrYou cannot
know -- for you turn away, thus escaping the fascination of the picture.
Begin by wa lking out of the room in which no doubt it has long held your
attention. It is then that turning round as vou leave - as the author of the
Itnam orp hoses describes i; - you apprehend in this for m ... \Nhat? A skull.
Thi s is not how it is presented at first - that figure , which the author
compares to a cuttlebo ne and which for me suggests rather that loaf
com posed of two books w hich Dali was once pleased to place on the head
of an old woman , chosen del iberately for her wretched, filthy appearance
and , ind eed , because she seems to be un aw are of the fact, or, again , DaH's
soft watches, w hose significatio n is ob vio usly le ss phallic than that of the
object depicted in a flying position in the fo reground of this pi cture.

All th is shows t hat at th e very heart of t he p er iod in wh ich the subject

emerged and geometral optics was an object of research, Holbein makes

! ~~ 2 : I M A G E S

PSYCHOANALYSIS; 153

visible for us here something that is sim ply the subject as annihilated -_
annihilated in the form that is, strictly speaking, the imaged embodiment of
the minus-phi [(- <P)] of castration , 'which for us, centres the whole
organization of the desires through the framework of the fu ndamen tal drives.
But it is further still that we must se ek the function of vision. We shall then
sec eme rging on the basis of vision, not the phallic svrnhol , the anamorphic
ghost, but the gaze as such, in its pulsatile, dazzling and spread out function,
as it is in this picture.
This pi cture is simply what any picture is, a trap for the gaze.

*
In Holbein's picture] showed you at once - without hiding any more than

'I

usual - the Singular object floating in the roreg round, which is there to be
looked at , ill order to catch, J would almost say, to catch in its trap, the
obs erver, that is to say, us. It is, in short, an obvious way, no doubt an
exceptional one, and one due to some moment of reflection on the part of
the painter, of showing us that, as subjects, we are literally caned into the
picture, and represented here as caught. For the secret of this picture, whose
implications I have pointed out to you , th e kinships w ith the vanitas . the way
this fascinating picture presents, between the two splendidly dressed and
immobile figur es, everything that recalls, in the perspective of the period,
the vanit y of the arts and sciences - the secret of this picture is given at the
moment when , moving slightly a\"lay, little by little, to the left, then turning
around , we see what the magical floating object Signifies. It reflects our own
nothingness , in th e figure of the death's head. It is a use, therefore, of the
geometral dimension of vision in order to capture the subject, an obvious
relation with desire which, nevertheless, remains enigmatic.

[ ... ]

THE ALL-PERCEIVING SUB..JECT

CHRISTIAN MTZ

[Flilm is like the mirror. But it differs from the primordial mirror in one
essential point: although, as in the latter, e ve r yt hi n g may come to be
p roject ed , th ere is one thing and one thing only that is never reflected in it :
the spectator's own body. In a certain emplacement, the mirror suddenly
becomes clear glass.
In the mirror the child perceives the familiar household ohjects, and also its
object par excellence, its mother, who holds it up in her arms to the glass.
But above all it perceives its own image . Th is is where primary identification

Cl u-i.-; Jj ~o ~\kt'l,. . rlW':~ r~) < I) Odn:'t .('J mJJ Cm.;:lW. tr . Cdja Bruto n . A nnwv] \o\"illjanl ~ . Ben Bn:.-.wxt cr ,1.ncl
Alfr ed Guzzc t ti , Lond on : .\o1ac m illan . 19 H2. pp. 4-5- 9 . Reproduced w lth pcrm issron

(th r form.ation of the ego) get.s certain of its ~ain characteristics: the child
seO itself as an other, and beside an other. This other other is its guarantee
that the first is really it : by her authority, her sanction, in the register of the
sVTl1boJic, subsequently by the resemblance between her mirror image
~d the child 's (b oth have a human form). Thus the child 's ego is formed by
identification w ith its lik e, and this in two senses simultaneously,
rnetonymically and metaphorically: the other human being who is in the
glass, the own r eflection whi ch is and is not the body, which is like it. The
child identifies with itself as an object.

In the cinema, the object remains : fiction or no, there is always something
on the screen . But the reflection of the own body has disappeared. The
cinema spectator is not a child and the child really at the mirror stage (from
aroUDd six to around eighteen months) would certainly be incapable of
'following' the simplest of films, Thus, what makes possible the spectator's
absence from the screen - or rather the intelligible unfolding of the film
despite that absence - is the fact that the spectator has already known the
experience of th e mirror (of the tru e mirror), and is thus able to constitut e
a world of object s without having first to recognise himself w ith in it . In this
respect, the cinem a is already on the side of th e symbolic (which is only to
be expected): the sp ectator knows that objects exist, that he himself exists
a, a subject , that he becomes an object for others: he knows himself and he
knows his like : it is no lon ger necessary that this similarity b e lit erally
depicted For him on the screen, as it was in the mirror of his childhood. Like
every other broadly 'secondary' activity, the practice of the cinema presupposes
that the primitive undifferentiation of the ego and the non-ego has been
overcome.
But with what, then, does the spectator identify during the projection of the

film? For he certainly has to identify: identification in its primal form has
ceased to be a current necessity for him, but he continues , in the cinema
if he did not the film would become incomprehensible, considerably more
incomprehensible than th e most incomprehensible films -- to dep end on that
permanent play of identification without which there would be no social life
(thus, the Sim plest conversation presupposes the alternati on o f the I and the
-:Oli, hence the aptitude of the two interlocutors for a mutual and r eversible
Identification). What form docs this cont in ued identification , whose essential
role Lacan has demonstrated even in the most abstract reasoning ' and which
constituted the 'social sentim ent ' [or Freud 2 (= the sublim ation of a
homosexual libido, itself a reaction to the aggressive rivalry of the m embers
o~ a Single generation after the murder of the father), tak e in the sp ecial case
01 one social practice among others, cinematic projection?
ObViously the spectator has the opportunity to identify with the character
of the llction. But there still has to be one. This is thus only valid for the
nalTJ.th"(,-representational flI m, and not for the psychoanalytic constitution
of the signifier of th e cin..c ma as such. The sp ectator can also identify
with the actor, in m ore (~ r le ss 'a-fict io nal' films in which the la tt er is
represented .as ,1\1 actor, not a charact er, but is sti ll offered the reby as a

I ~-5.tl

I M AGES

PSYCHOANALYSIS : 155

hu man bein g (as a percei ved hum an b eing ) and thus allows id entifi cation .
How ever thi s fact or (even add ed to the previous one and thu s co ver ing a
very large number of film s) cann ot suffice . It only d eSignat es secondar y
identificati on in cer tain of it s forms (seconda ry in th e cinemat ic proce;~
itsel f, since in any other se nse all identi fication exce p t th at of th e m irror
can be regarded as seco nda ry ) .
An insufficient explanation, and for two reasons, the first of wh ich is only
th e in termitten t, anecdotal an d sup er ficial co nseq uence of th e second (bdt
for th at reason more visible, and th at is why I call it the first) . Th e cinema
deviates from th e theatre on an important point that has often been
em phasised: it often presents us w i th long sequences that can (lite rally) be
called ' inhuman' - the famili ar the m e of cinematic 'cos mo morphism ,
developed by many film theo r ists - seq uences in which o nly inanimate
objec ts, land scapes , etc . app ear and w hich for minutes at a tim e offer no
human form for sp ec tator id entificati on : yet the latter must be suppo sed to
r em ain intact in its deep structure, since at such moments th e film works just
as well as it docs at others, an d wh ol e films (geographical documentaries,
for exam ple) unfold intelligibly in such co nditio ns.The second , more r adical
reaso n is that ide nti fication w ith the human form app earing on th e scree n,
even when it occur s, sti ll tells u s no thi ng abo u t the place the spectator's ego
in the inaugu ra ti on of th e signifier. As 1 have just pointed out, thi s ego is
already formed . But since it ex ist s, th e qu esti on arises precisely of where It is
during th e proj ection of th e film (the true primary identificati on , that of the
m ir ro r, fo r ms th e ego, but all oth e r identifications presuppose , on the
contrary, th at it has been form ed and can be 'ex changed' for the obje ct or
the fellow subje ct). Thus w hen r ' rec og nise ' my like on th e scree n, and even
more when I do not reco gnise it , where am I? Where is that someone who
is capable of self-recogn itio n wh en need be ?

?I

It is not eno ugh to answer that th e cinem a, like ever)' so cial practice,
demands that the psychi cal app ar atu s o f its participants be fully co nsti tuted,
an d that the qu estion is thus the concern of general psychoanalyt ic th eory
and not th at of th e cin ema prop er. For my where 15 it ? does no t claim t o go
so far, o r m ore pr ecisel y tr ies to go slightl y further: it is a qu estio n of the
pomt o ccupied by thi s alre ady constit uted ego , occupied during th e cinema
show ing and not in soci al life in gener al .

T he spe ct at or is absent fro m th e scree n; contr ar y to the child in th e mirror,

he cannot iden tify w ith himself as an objec t , but only with object s which arc
t he re w ithout him . In thi s sens e the scr een is not a mirror. Th e p erceived ,
thi s tim e , is e ntirely on th e side of th e object, and there is no longe;r ao)'
eq uivale nt of th e own image, of th at unique mix of perceived and subje ct (of
other and I) which was precisel y t he figure ne cessary to disen gage th e one
fro m the other. At t he cin em a, it is always the ot her who is on th e scr een; as
for me, r am th ere to look at him . 1 take no part in the perceived , on t he
co ntrary, I am all-p erccrvinq. All-per ceiving as one says al1-pow c:r ful (t his is
th e fam ous gi ft of ' ubiq uit y" the m m ma kes its spect ato r); all-p ercei ving,

tOO, because I am entirely on th e side of the p erceiVing instance: abse nt from

the scree n , but certainly present in the auditorium, a great eye and ear
without wh ich the perceived wo uld have no one to perceive it , th e instance,
in other words , which consu tutes th e cine ma sign ifier (it is ] who make th e
fil m). If th e m ost extravagant specta cle s and sounds or the most unlikely
combinatio n of th em, the com b inatio n furthest removed from any real
experience, do not prevent the cons titution of meaning (and to begin with
do not aswnish th e spectator, do not r eally aston ish him , not intell ectually:
he simply judges th e film as strange ), th at is because he kn ow s he is at th e
cinema.
In the cinem a th e subj ect's knowledge takes a very precise form without which
no film would be po ssible . This knowl edge is dual (but unique). 1 kn ow I
am per ceiving so mething imaginary (and th at is why its absurdities , e ven if
they are ex trem e , do no t ser iously disturb me), and I know that it is I wh o
am per cei ving it. This seco nd knowled ge divides in turn: I know th at I am
really perceiving, th at my sense organs are physically affect ed , th at I am not
phantasising , that the fourth wall of th e auditor ium (the screen) is really
differ ent from the other three, th at there is a projector facing it (am i thu s
it is not I w ho am proj ecting , or at least not all alone), and 1 also kn ow that
it is I who am perceiving all thi s, th at this perceived-imaginar y m at eri al is
deposited in me as if on a sec ond screen , that it is in me that it forms
up into an organised seq ue nce, that th erefo re I am myself the place where
this rea lly per ceived im aginary accede s to the sym bolic by its in auguration
as th e Signifier of a ce r tain type of in stitutionalised soci al activit)' called the
, .
,
cincm a ,

In oth er wo rd s, the spectator ldent ifi es wit h hlmse!f, w ith him self as a pure act
of perception (as wakefuln ess, alertness) ; as th e condition of possibility of
the per ceived and hen ce as a kind of transcendental subject , w hich co mes
before every there lS.

A strange mirror, th en , very like that of chi ldhood . Very like [.. . ] because
during th e show ing we are, like the child , in a sub -m oto r and hyp er
percep tive state ; b ecause , like the child again , we are prey to the im agin ar y,
t~ e doub le , and are so paradoxically through a re al perceptio n . Very
dIfferent , because this m irror return s u s every thi ng but oursel ves, b ecau se
we are wholly outs ide it , whereas th e child is both in it and in fro nt of it. As
~n arrangem ent (and in a very topogr aphi cal sense of the word), th e cinema
i s m ore in volved on the flank of th e sym bolic, and hence of sec on dar in ess,
th an is th e m irror of childhood.

NOTES
1. 'Lc temps logique et I' asserti on de cer titude ant icip ee " Ecrus, pp . 197-- 21 3.
2. 'T he Ego and th e I<.! ' (vol. XIX) pp. 26 and 30 (on 'de sexualised social
Sentim ent '); see also (on th e subj ect o f paranoia) ' O n Narci ssism : an
Introd uctio n ' (vo l, XIV) pp. 95-6, 101 -..2 .

10 $: IMAGES

7:3

WOMAN AS IMAGE (MAN AS

BEARER OF THE LOOK)
LAURA MULVEY
In a world ordered by sexual imbalance, pleasure in looking has been split
between active / male and passive!female . The determining male gaze
projects its fantasy onto the female figure, which is styled accordingly. In
their traditional exhibitionist role women are Simultaneously looked at and
displayed, with their appearance coded for strong visual and erotic impact
so that they can be said to connote to-be-loohed-at-ness.

[ ... ]
[In mainstream narrative fllm] the woman displayed has functioned on two
levels: as erotic object for the characters within the screen story, and as
erotic object for the spectator within the auditorium, with a shifting tension
between the looks on either side of the screen . For instance, the device of
the show-girl allows the two looks to be unified technically without any
apparent break in the diegesis. A woman performs within the narrative; the
gaze of the spectator and that of the male characters in the film are neatly
combined without breaking narrative verisimilitude. For a moment the
sexual impact of the performing woman takes the film into a no man's land
outside its own time and space. Thus Marilyn Monroe 's first appearance in
The RIver if No Return and Lauren Bacall's songs in To Have and Have Not.
Similarly, conventional dose-ups of legs (Dietrich, for instance) or a face
(Garbo) integrate in to the narrative a different mode of eroticism. 0 ne part
of a fragmented body destroys the Renaissance space, the illusion of depth
demanded by the narrative; it gives flatness, the quality of a cut-out or icon,
rather than verisimilitude, to the screen.
An active / passive heterosexual division of labour has Similarly controlled
narrative structure. According to the principles of the ruling ideology, and
the psychical structures that back it up, the male figure cannot bear the
burden of sexual objectification. Man is reluctant to gaze at his exhibitionist
Iikc. Hence the split between spectacle and narrative supports the man's
role as the active one of advanCing the story, making things happen. The m~n
controls the film fantasy and also emerges as the representative of power I~
a further sense: as the bearer of the look of the spectator, transferring it
behind the screen to neutralise the extra diegetic tendencies represented by
woman as spectacle. This is made through the processes set in motion by
structuring the film around a main controlling figure with whom the
spectator can identify. As the spectator identifies with the main male
protagonist, he projects his look onto that of his like , his screen surrogate,
so that the power of the male protagonist as he controls events coincides
with the active power of the erotic loo k, both giving J satisfying sense of
Laur-a Mulvev, fro m VHual oJ) ~l Och er Pleasvv es- London: Mac(mlbn, 19 8 9 , pp . ) 9- ? 6 . '!::; Laura .\1 ulvcJ.
R eproduced \\ rth per-mis sion of ehc pllbhsb~T and author

PSYCHOANALYSIS : 15 7

omnipotence . A mal e movie star 's glamorous character istics are thus not
thos': or the erotic object o f the gaze , but those of the more perfect, more
compl et e, more powerful ideal ego con ceived in the original moment of
recognition in front of the mirror. The character in the stor y can make thi ngs
happen and control events b e~ter than the subject/ spectator, ju st as the
image in the mirror was more m control of motor co-ordination.
In contrast to woman as icon, the active male figure (the ego ideal of the
identification process) demands a three-dimensional space corresponding to
that of the mirror recognition, in which the alienated subject internalised his
0""11 representation of his imaginary existence. He is a flgure in a landscape.
Here the fun ctio n of film is to reproduce as accurately as possible the
so-called natural conditions of human perception. Camera technology (as
exemplified by deep focus in particular) and camera movements
(dete rmined by the action of the protagonist) , combined with invisible
editing (dem anded by realism), all tend to blur the limits of screen space.
The male protagonist is free to command the stage, a stage of spatial illusion
in which he articulates the look and creates the action.

[.. . ]
[... In] psychoanalytic terms, the female figure poses a deeper problem.
She also connotes something that the look continually circles around but
disavows: her lack of a penis, implying a threat of castration and hence
unpleasure. Ultimately, the meaning of woman is sexual difference, the
Visually ascertainable absence of the penis , the material evidence on which
is based the castration complex essential for the organisation of entrance
to the symbolic order and the law of the father. Thus the woman as icon,
displayed for the gaze and enjoyment of men, the active controllers of
the look , always threatens to evoke the anxiety it originally Signified. The
male unconscious has two avenues of escape from this castration anxiety:
preoccupation with the re-enactment of the original trauma (investigating
the woman, demystifying her mystery), counterbalanced by the devaluation,
pUnishment or saving of the guilty object (an avenue typified by the
,concer ns of the film nair); or else complete disavowal of castration by the
" U~st i tution of fetish object or turning the represented figure itself into
a letish so that it becomes reassuring rather than dangerous (hence over
valuation, the cult of the female star).
This second avenue, fetishistic scopophilia, builds up the physical beauty of the
object, transforming it into something satisfying in itself. The first avenue,
voyeurism, on the contrary, has associations with sadism: pleasure lies in
ascertaining guilt (immediately associated with castration) , asserting coniTal
and subjugating the guilty person through punishment or forgiveness. This
sadistic side fits in well with narrative. Sadism demands a story, depends on
making something happen, forcing a change in another person, a battle of will
and strength, victory! defeat, all occurring in a linear time with a beginning
and an end . fetishistic scopophilia, on the other hand, CJn exist outside linear
tim e as the erotic instinct is focused on the look alone - l- .. J

' ~) 6 :

PS Y C HOA N AL Y S IS : 1:::', )

IMAGES

Sternberg once said he would welcome his films being proje ct ed up side-down
so that sto ry and characte r involvement would not interfer e with the spectator 's
undiluted appreciation of the screen image. (... 1 Sternberg, produces the
ultim ate fetish, taking it to the point where the powerful look of the male
protagoni st (characte ristic of traditional narrative film ) is bro ken in favour of the
image in direct erotic rapport with the spectator.The beauty of the woman as
object and the screen space coalesce; she is no longer the bearer of guilt but a
perfect product, whose body, stylised and fragmented by close-up s, is the
content of the film and the direct recipient of the spectator's look.
[ ... ]

In Hitchcock, by con tr ast, th e male hero does see precisely what the
audi en ce see s. However, although fascination with an im age through
scopophilic e ro tic ism can be the sub ject of the film , it is th e role o f the her o
to por tray the con tradictions and tension s ex p erienced by the spectator. In
Vertigo in particular, but also in Mamie and RearH'ind ow, the look is central to
the plot, oscillatin g between voyeurism and fetishistic fascination. [. . . J His
her oes are exemplary of th e symboli c order and th e law - a p oliceman
( Verti80), a dominant mal e p ossessing money and power (MaTlne) .- but
th eir erotic dr ives lead them into compromised situations. Th e power to
subject another person to th e will sadistically or to th e gaze voyeuristicallv
is tur ned onto th e woman as th e object of b oth . {.. .] Hit chcock 's skilful use
of iden tificati on pr ocesses an d liberal use of su bjective camera from the
point o f view of the male protagonist draw the spectators de eply into his
position, making th em share his uneasy gaze. The spect ator is absorbed into
a voyeuristi c situatio n within th e scr ee n scene and diegesis, whic h parodies
his ow n in th e cine ma.
In an analysis of Rear Window, Douchet tak es the mm as a metaphor for the
cinema. Jeffries is the audience , the events in the apartment block opp osite
correspond to th e screen . As he watches, an ero tic dim ension is added to his
look , a central image to the dram a. His gir lfrie nd Lisa had been of little sexual
interest to him, more or less a dr ag, so long as she remained on the spectator
side. When she crosses the barrier between his room and the block opposite,
th eir rel ationship is reb orn erotically. He does not mer ely watch her through
his lens , as a distant meaningful image, he also sees her as a guilty intruder
exposed by a danger ous man thre aten ing her with puni shment, and thus
finally giving him the opportunity to save her. Lisa's exhibitionism has already
be en established by her obsessive interest in dress and style, in bein g a p assive
image of visual p erfection; Jeffri es' voyeurism and acti vity have also been
establi shed through his work as a photo -jo urnalist , a maker of stories and
captor of images. However, his enforced inact ivity, binding him to his scat as
a spectator, puts him squarely in the fantasy positi on of the cinema audience
><

[. .. Th e] voycuri~'lic -;;copophi]jc look .that b a cr ucial par t of traditional filmic

ple asure: can itself be broken down .T here arc three different look s associated
with cinem a : that of the camera as It reco rd s the pro-BIrnie event , that of the

allt bence

as it watc hes the final product, and that of th e characters at each oth er
within the screen illusion. The conventions of narrative film denv the nrst two
and subordin ate them to the third , the conscious aim being always to eliminate
inlTUsive camera pr esence and pr event a distancing awareness in the audience.
Without these two absences (the mater ial ex iste nce of the recordin g process,
the cr itical reading of the spec tator) , fictional drama canno t achieve reality,
obviousness and truth. Nevertheless, the str ucture of lookin g in narrative
fiction film contains a contradiction in its own premises: the female image as
a castration threat constantly endangers the unit y of the diegesis and bursts
tbrough the world of illusion as an intrusive, static, one- dime nsiona l fetish.
Thus the two looks mat er ially present in time and space are obsessively
subordinated to th e neurotic needs of th e male ego. Th e came ra becomes th e
mechanism for prodUcing an illusion of Renaissance space, Howmg movem ents
compatible with the human eye, an ideol ogy of rep resen tation that revolves
<lroWld the perception of the subject ; the camera's look is disavowed in ord er
to create a convincing world in wh ich the spectator's surrogate can perform
with vcri sirni litude. Simultan eou sly, the look of the aud ience is deni ed
an intrins ic force : as soon as fetishi sti c representation of the female image
threatens to break the spell of illusion, and the erotic image on the screen
appears directly (without mediation) to the spectator, the fact of fetishisati on,
concealing as it does castration fear, freezes th e look , fixates the spectator and
preven ts him from achieving any distance from the image in front of him.
This com plex int er act ion of looks is specific to film. The first blow against the
monolithic accumulation of traditional fllm conventions (already un dertaken
by radical film -m akers) is to free the look of th e camera into it s mat er iality in
tim e and space and the look of the audience int o dialectics and passionate
detachment .There is no do ubt that thi s destroys th e satisfaction, pleasure and
priVilege of the 'invisible guest ' , and highlights the way film has dep ended on
voyeur istic acti ve I passive mechanisms. Wo me n , whose image has continually
been stolen and used for this end, cannot view th e de cline of the traditio nal
film form with anythi ng much more than sentimental regret.

CINDY SHERMAN'S UNTITLED

FILM STILLS
JOAN COPJC
In th ese photographs [Untitled Film Stills , produced bet wee n 1977 and
] 9 80], Sherman masquerades in a wardrobe t o match th e various
background settings she h as d esigned to evoke some Holl ywood period ,
gen re, or dir ectori al style . In an ear ly article, Judith W illiam so n put her

jo an Cop tcc., From JIR.:JfJIW: "fll..:T(;; ~( .\:0 Ilorn(Ui': Etlncs O{)d .'-,'C J!dw)(Jtu;m. C<lln h ;,"Ldg( ~ , .\o1A: M n Prr.:. ~:-i , 2002. pp , 67 ,
7 ::') " 7 } 79 - 80 . C Dp)'r lgh t 1j 2002 1\1 'b';!J(, :hu s(:( t ~ (ns fH lJl," <>f' ~~ ,. c h l1 o logy. R eproduced w lth rwr m l ss lon .

t
:

l(;O: l M A G E S

finger on what wou ld beco me in subsequen t criticism the cent ral issue of
th e ph otogr aphs: ' W hat comes out of the imagi ned nar ratives is, specifically,
femininity. It is no t just a range of feminine expressions that are shown but
the process of th e "feminin e" as an effect, something acted up on .' 1 The
passivity of the femin ine refers to the fact th at in th e cult ur e evoked by the
p h ot og raph .~ woman is not allowed to b ecom e th e ' beare r of the loo k ,' but
is conde mned to be it s obj ect. She is for ced to see herself - more so than
men - in the im ages culture produces o f her. She mu st compose her self in
their terms , compose herself for th e gaze they pr esuppo se.
Accord ingly, Sher man 's photog raphs art' almos t always re ad as images of
wom en att empting to see them selves in a num ber of cult ur ally approved
form s, as women atte mpti ng to adapt themselves to stereotypes . These arc
wom en who ",'ant to be loved . Some time s a critical effor t is made to
p ull these wom en away from the image that informs her self-presentation
by drawing atte ntio n to th e photograph 's exposure of its own 'con
structedn ess.' Ideology may construct the woman but th e photograp h or critic
can deconstr uct the ide ology. Anothe r strategy poin ts out that the aspirations
of these women are tripped up by th e bodies that st rive after th em . The
photographs open a gap b etween the ideal images the wo men emul ate and the
no ncom pliant fact o f what th ey co rporea lly are, their re al bodily
circums tances: this one's arms are a hit heavy, her ankl es too thick, that one 's
tawdry dress ill-fits the romantic scenario she is fanticizing Th e body of the
woman is always in these readings ' finite ' in the cult ural theory sense of that
term , in th e first case because it, like the photograph, is Simply constructe d,
a Simple realization of co nditions exis ting elsewhere . In the second, the body
is doubl y finite, a mer e object ex posed to the look of the spectator or any
diegeti cally conce ivable passe r-by and a Simple opacity resisting the wom an's
hop eful look, an iner t unyielding to her idealizing demand.
I arg ue , however, th at one can loc ate in th e Llnu tled Film Su lls a gap between
the women and th eir im mediate sur roundings 'w ithout giving in to th e pre
emptive narrativizati on of th at gap th at gene rally follo ws . Th e rus h to
narr ati vize , to compose the backgro und story th at land ed these wo me n in
tile p laces where th ey now fin d th em selves, is problem atic on a numb er of
counts . Fir st , linking woman to her concrete m ilieu , this readin g su 'ategy
proceeds as if each ph otog raph co ntained a d!Derent woman ; that is, it fully
diegcti dzes each woman . It asks us to foe LIS on th e r elations tha t bind the
particul ar situation to th e particular woman containe d in it, without
recognizing th at the very process of constructing this narrative produces ~e
particulari t y it finds, or to say it better, reduces wha t it finds to p art i c ul a nt~ .
No, there are not several different wo men in th ese photographs, th ere IS
only on e , the same woman , Cindy Sherm an, who appears over and oV,er
again , and on e of th e profound questio ns posed by the photographs .. ' ' HoW
can som eone be the same if all her app earances ar e differe nt ?' .- is slighted
if we do not pri vilege in our analysis the fact that it is she who reapp earS
again and aQ
ain in her photographs
. Th is is the qu estion raised by~ fem inine
b

bein g as such , hy femi ninity, w hich is, to rci nvoko Badiou 's term, ' multiple
being ' or mult iple app eari1Jo s! masqueradings. T he im plication here is not that

P S YC H O A N ALYS IS : ' 6

the masquerade of femininity is only a sem blance th at hides a being which is

beneath, but th at semblance o r appearance is what fe min ine being is. On th e
other hand , however, the fact that She rman is the subject of all her im ages,
that she has cons ist ently chosen t o place her self on display in them , has
hardly gon e unn oticed . In fact , her supposed narcissism is a constan t of th e
critical lit er ature. Th e problem is that the notion of narcissism sustaining this
evaluation is so thi n that it seems to require r epeating ju st to create an ech o:
sher ma n so loves being loo ked at that she her self takes pleasure in loo king
only at herself. Moreover, the issue of Sherman's narcissism is never
int~gr a te d into the analysis of the relation of th e women (who remain
pluralized) to th eir surroundings in th e photogr aph s, except to suggest that
'the)': loa , no ur ish themselves on the meager diet of th eir ow n self-r egard.
The second m ajor difficu lty with th e narrative - and (it mu st be said)
psyehoJoBi'Ling .- read ing o f th e photographs is a corollary of th e first : it dr ains
from the woman 's face all ex pression but that which is able to feed th e
narratiYc. It is not th at a ce rta in determinate am bigUity of expreSSion , a
hoveri ng b etween fear and d efian ce , for exam p le, or longin g and
resignation, has escaped th ese read ings. But it is always assumed that the
SItuation imprints Itse!f, how ever ambiguously, on the woman's }Gee. She is
stamped by her sett ing.

\ ...]
Basically 1 am arguing that the images of Cindy Sh er man's face functio n as
dose-ups in th e Untitled Film Stills even before th ey actually becom e
close-ups, in th e purely te chnical sense, in She r man 's later work. In clud ed ,
then, in the vari ou s di ege tic spaces of this pho tog raphic ser ies, th e face o f
Sherman does n ot belo ng to them .
The face of Sher man, in short, docs not play the ordin ary role of the face, which
[.. .J displays the features of the individual's pomcu]an9' as it is defined
differentially, thr ough one's relations to other people and objects, or to a
situation; the face relates the person to its milieu. In the dose-up, however, the
nor mal role of the face is suspended ; it no longer individuates the person, but
serves, on the contrary, to de-individuate or impersonalize her. The dose-up
discloses a depredication of the subject , an em ptying out of per sonality.

[.. .J
This antinornic rel ati on bet wee n th e space of the dose -up and th e diegeti c
space of th e film is ec hoe d in Lacarr's account of th e antinomic rel ation
h:twee n th e gaze and the re presented space . Th.e antinomy defines th e
dIfference between two levels of representation : t he level of enunciat ion ,
tnarked by the appearance of the gaze, and th e level of the statement or
represen te d space. Th at is, a sur plus object appears in the field whil e
announ cing itself as not part of the represented , as bein g of a different order
thm the one in which it shows itself. Lacan Jinks th e man ner of identi fying
this sp lit be t ween enunciation and statement, gaze and re presen t ation , to
l) ( ;s cJ.rt e~ 's pr oc edure of radical doubt , in which the enti re content of" th e
rcpn :scnt cd is effectively negated b )' being thrown into quest ion. At the end

(? ;~ :

I MAGES

PSYCHOANALYS I S ; 16 3

FIGURE 7.3

FIGURE 7.2

Cindy Sherman, Untitled Film Still # 2 (1977).

Courtesy of Metro Pictures.

of thi s procedure, however, something is left stan ding , so me thi ng r esists the
erosion by doubt : the cogito or the instance of enun ciat io n. Th e fact th at it
escapes th e annihilating gesture that demolishes all el se is proof th at the
cogito is not identical to the rep resent ed or th ought .
Th e t heory of thi s split se ts a trap, howev er, w hich the Untitled FIlm Stills will
help us evade. [. . . J [LJet us consider a reading of th e photographs ob viousl),
suggested by this argument. One can detect in th e face of Sher m an a cert ain
distractcdness, as though she were lost in reveri e and thu s not actuall)'
pr esent to her cur rent situation , in some way untouched by it. The sa le
figur e in all the photographs, th e lonely on e in eac h, she int eracts with no
on e and is absorbed in no acti vi ty but that of her silent mu sings. Th e [. . .)
m uch re m ar ked solitude of women who want no th ing more th an a room of
th eir ow n, even th e alreadv me ntion ed rol e as ' ironists of co m munity,' all
leap to mind in support or'this reauing , g iving it r esonance and cred ibility.
Th e only difficulty is that the photogr aph s themselves do not yiel d to it.
Th ey resist, we might say, the ana logica l im p ulse to attrihute to wo man the
same char ming Inecccssibllity one finds in sm all children, cats , an d large
b easts of pre)'. For, the loo k of rev~,rie o n thc face of th e woma n in these
pho tographs .... a familiar' tapas of paint ing and film alike (t hink of the
co untless images you have seen of wom en peeri ng dreamily out of wind owS

Cindy Sherman , Untitled Film Still # 35 (1979).

Courtesy of Metro Pictures.

or simply o ut of fram e) - do es n ot lift her fro m the space that sur roun ds
her. Why ? Becau se she happens to b e represented in th e very sort of
imagined elsewhere, the cinema tic or scr een space , we imagin e her to be
fantasizing, th e melodr amatic spaces of 'fema le fantasy.' It is as if these
photo graphs were endorsing th e th esis of film theorist s regarding th e
closeness of the WOman to the scree n image . Inseparable from th e image,
~rom app earance , wo man is th eorized as incapabl e of distancing herself from
i t , of occupying a positi on beyon d . She remains instead immersed in th e
World of appea rances . But where film theorists condemned this th eoretical
and cin em ati c conflation of the woman with the image, th e Untuled Film
Stills do es not. It acce pts th at th ere is 'no exit ' for woman from the level of
appearance, that 'womanliness' lS always but masquerade.
[ )

.. .

The dose-up or face of the woman do es not transport her, we noted, o ut of

the space in which she finds her self, despit e the dreaminess of her expression .
Her blank or objectl ess look of longing, directed o ut of fram e, is filled by th e
scenes that surround her. Blocking or flJling the blankness of th e woman's
look, the photographs shift attention away from an imagined elsew here onto
the object the)' actua lly l cp re~ ent . W hat is that object? Film, cinema,
represent ed in a series of scenes that reproduce a var iety of periods anc! styles.
( he Unt itled Film Stills re present film as an ob ject of am orous fascination .

13"' : I M A G E S

What prevents the love of cinema from being a banal subject for a series of
photographs is the series' brilliant demonstration of the truth of Freud 's thesis
that love, any love, is always and fundamentally narcis sistic. Again: when OUe
loves something, one loves something in it that is more than itself, its
non identity to itself. But a new point can now be made, one that was only
inadequately expressed before. To say that what we love in the object is
something more than that object is not to say only that we love that rea] point
in the object from where it can cease being what it was to become something
different from itself, but also that what we Jove in the object is ourselves. [ .. . J
When Lacan mak es the claim that in love there are not two ones, but a One
and an Other, or One plus a, we mu st und erstand th e One to be not the
lover, but the beloved object. This is at least the . .,vay Freud's theory of
narcissism demands we und erstand Lacari 's stat eme nt. Th e lover, on'the
contrary, is locatable only in the obje ct a, the partial object or indivisible
remainder of the act of love. Indivisible (because irreducible to spatio
temporal coordinates) and the product of no division, part of no whole. We
should not be surprised, then, to find the face of Cindy Sherman returning
consistently as close-up (in Deleuzes sense) or as object a in all her
photographs, the perennial residue ()fher love for the cinematic-photographic
image. \Ve should r ath er take to heart the lesson her photographs teach us:
genuine love is never selfless - nor, for that matter, is sublimation. This lesson
is the very opposite of a cynici sm.

NOTE
1. Judith Williamson , "Images of '\Voman ' - the Photographs of Cindy Sherman,"
in Screen, vol. 24 , no. 6 (Nove-Dec. 198 3), p. 104, Despit e my contrary views,
still a very useful essay.

~5.
@

TWO KINDS OF ATTENTION

ANTON ~HRENZWEIG

The conscious gestalt compulsion m akes us bisect th e visual field into

significant 'figure ' and insignificant'grOlmd' .Yet bisecting the picture plane
into Significant and insignifi cant areas is preci sely what the artist cannot
afford to do. Onlv a bad artist will concen tra te his attention exclusivelYon
the large-scale composition and treat less articulate form elements' like
t extures or th e scribbles of artistic 'handwriting' as d ecorative additions that
have no structural significan ce. A true artist will agree with the
psychoanalyst that nothing can be deemed insignificant or accidental in a
product ofthe human spirit and that - at least on an unconscious level - the
usual evaluation has to be re vclsc<L Supe rficially insignificant or accid ental

Anton Eh rc;nz w(~ ig . from Th~ /i; e!d;:-() Unl et C!f .1rt . Londo n: W(~id enfd d & N ico l ~o n.) a divisi on o fTh e Orion
P ub J i~h j n~ G rou p, 1967.pp. 2 1 - ) , 10 1. R(:pn~[hK'( :d \.... rth pcrrmssio n

PSYCHOANALYSIS : 16 S

looking detail may well carry the most important unconscious symbolism .
Indeed the great emo tional power of spontaneous handwriting testifies to its
hidden me aning and symbolism [. . . J. A great work of painting stripped of
its original brush work by a bad restorer will lose almost all of its substance.
111ere 'was little point in restoring Leonardo 's Last Supper.
[ .. . J

Paul Klee 1 spoke of two kinds of attention practised by the artist. The normal
type of att c~tion focuses on th~ positive fl~e which a line encloses, or else _
with an effort - on the negatlve shape which the gure cuts out from the
ground. Klee speaks of the endo topic (inside) are a and the exotopic (outside)
area of the picture plane. He says that the artist can either emphasize the
boundary contrast produced by the bisection of the picture plane; in which case
he will keep his attention on o ne (endo topic or exotopic) side of the line he
draws; or else he can scatt er his attention and watch the simultaneous shaping
of inside and outside areas On either side of the line, a feat which the gestalt
psychologists 'would conside r impossible. According to the gestalt th eory, we
have to make a choic e; we can choose either to see the figure; then the shape
of the around becomes invisible, or else - with an effort - to scrutinize the
negative shape cut from the gmund; then the original figure disappears from
view. We can neve r see both at the same time. [... ] Somehow - as Paul Klee
postulates - a good arti st mu st be able to hold the entire picture plane in a
Single undivided focus. He will, as he draws a Single line , automatically give
aesthetic shape to the negative which his line cuts out from the ground.
[... J

A flexible scattering of attention comes quite easily to the artist, if only

because of his need for holding all elem ents of the picture in a single undivided
act of att ention. He cann o t afford the fatal bisection into Hgure and grollild
imposed by the conscious gestalt principle. How often have we not observed
how an artist suddenly stops in his tracks without apparent rea son, steps back
from his canvas and looks at it with a curiously vacant stare? Wh at happ en s is
that the conscious gestalt is prevented from crystallizing Nothing seems to
corne into his mind. Perhaps one or another detail lights up for a moment only
to sink back into the emptiness. During this absence of mind an unconscious
s~:an ni ng seems to go on. Suddenly as from nowhere some offending detail
h:therto ignored will come into view, rt had somehow upset the balance of the
plctur c, but had gone undetect ed .With relief the painter will end his apparent
~nactjvity. He returns to his canvas and carries out the necessary retouching.
lhi s 'full' emptiness of unconscious scann ing occ-urs in many other examples
of creative work . Paul Klee 's scattered attention that can attend to figur e and
grOund on both sides of a line is of this kind. As far as consciousness is
~ohc ::rned ) it is empty. For the gestalt p rinciple ruling conscious perception
cannot r elinqUish its h old o n the figure .
.
The 'full ' emptiness of attcntjo~ also exists in hearing. Paul Klee himself
makes the link between painting and music . He calls his dispersed attentio n
that can attend to the entire picture plan e ' m ulti -dim ensional' (this
eXpression hapJ>ih: stresses its irrational structure) and AJ.:io...:.uoLvDboniLG
C_'

i G 6 :IMAGES

Th is to o is a goo d name . Polyph onic hearing also ove rcome s the consc ious
division between figure and ground . In mu sic th e figure is represented by
th e melody standi ng out against an indis tinct ground of the harmonic
accompaniment . Musicians ar e loath to call the p olyphonic strands of a
well -con struct ed har mo nic progression a m ere accompaniment . Often the
ac companying voices form parallel m el od ic ph rase s e xp ressive in
th em selves. Yet the usual description fits th e ordinary naive way of enj oying
mu sic well enough . Moreover, it corresponds to the d em ands of th e gestalt
principle which exa lts the melody as th e figu re to whi ch th e accom paniment
ser ves as a background . In our memory a piece of music is remembered only
as the sound of a mel ody. But as we have come to appreciate, ar tistic
perception is neither ordinary , nor is it bound to th e narrow limits of
everyday attention , nor confi ned to its pr ecise fo cus which can onl y atten d
t o a single melody at a time . T he musician like the painter has to train
him self to scatter his atte ntion over the en tire m usical str ucture so that he'
can gr asp the polyphonic fabric hidden in the accompaniment.

I ) This total integration can only be controlled by the empty stare of

uncon sciou s scanning which alo ne is capable of overcoming the fragmentation
in art's surface structure. Th e relative smalln ess of micro-elements defies
con scious ar ticulation ; so do the macro-elements of ar t owing to th ~i~
excessive breadth. Thi s applies for inst ance to the macro-structu re of a
symphony as distin ct from its single m oveme nts. The much-vaunted grasp of a
symphony's total structure is well beyond the capacities even of many
well -mown conductors. Most are content to shape their phrases only in the ir
imme diate context and this pr ocedure emphasizes the fragmentation of the
whole. O n the surface the overall structure of a sonata or symphony seems to
go out of its way to evade a total grasp. The single movements are tightly
organized and form good gestalt str uctures in themselves. These are then
sharply contrasted in rhythm , harmony and for m. More than ever an
undifferentiated em pty stare is needed to tran scend such shar p divisions and
forge the total work int o a Single indivisible wh ole. It seems that art, almost
perversely, creates tasks that cannot he mastered by our normal faculties.
Chaos is precari ously near.
We arrive back at our central problem, the role which th e un con scious plays in
controlling the vast substructure of art. Its contribution app ears chaot ic and
altogeth er acc-idental, but only as long as we rely on the gesta lt-bound
discipline of consciou s perception . In spit e of the caution built int o ~e
foundation s of psycho -analytic thinking , which makes it beware of superfiCIal
imp ressions of chaos and accidental ity, psycho-analyti c aesthe tics have so far
falter ed and succumbed to the chaoti c impression which the substructure of art
so seductively presents. Once we have over come the de cepti on , the em inently
constructive ro le of the pr imar y process in ar t can no longer be ignored.

NOTE
Footnot e removed.

1.

P A R T TH R EE

IMA G E CULTURE

IMAGES AND WORDS

INTRODUCTION
8: I
8:2

The Roots of Poetry

Ernest Fenol/osa
Icon and Image

Paul Ricoeur

8:3

Thi s is Not a Pipe

8:4

The Despoti c Eye and its Shadow: M edi a Im age in the Age of Literacy

8:5

Michel Foucauft
Robert D. Romanyshyn
Images, Audiences, and Read ings

Kevin DeLuca

A key issue in the emerging field of image.. studies is the fraught and com plex
relation betw een images and wor ds, as indicated by a journa l dedicated to
the topic, Word (~ Image. Visual images and wo rds might be considered
simply as different ki nds of signs used to communicate and to represent. In
this case, some tool s of signification seem better at some pur poses-than at
others, as in the adage 'a pictu re paints a thousand word s'. The making,
perception and interpreting of visual and verbal signs might be thought to
involve different facult ies and cogn itive functions (Zeki, 12.5). In art history,
for example, there has been a heated debate about w hether semiotics is an
appropriate method for interpreting visual images (Bal. S.4 ; Manghani ,
2003}. Efforts to cl assify wor ds and images, language and pictures, as
different kinds of signification tend to break down. Words and language may
be spoken or w ritten, heard or seen, so some wo rds are visual as well as
verbal, Jacques Derrida (1976) takes spoken language to depend on writing
and 'other forms of graphic marki ng. The grow ing interest in .serniotics (se~
Section 5, Semio tics) amongst artists led toa direct fusion between words
and images, photography and narratives (see Berger, 9.7; Burgin, 1986;
Lomax, 2000).
Writ ing is generall y regarded as fo rmal and conv entional significati on of the
sounds of language. In the classical understanding , the w ritten sign points
beyond itself to the referent or thing . The conventio nal lin k between sign and
referent was disrupted by the structuralist linguist Ferdinand de Saussure
(5.1, see also introduction to Section 5.. Semiotics) who argued for the
arbitrariness of the sign. But Ernest Fenol losa (8.1) upheld the idea, contra ry
to most other scholars of Chinese language, that the Chinese written
character remains an ideogram, an actual pic ture of its referent. Hi s op inion
prov(,d influential among early twe ntieth-ce ntury imagist poets, such as Ezra
Pound, who defined an image as 'that w hich presents an intellectual and
emotional complex in an instant of tim e' (1935: 4). The imagi sts sought to
Convey through poetry the vividn ess that Fenollosa found in Chinese script.
If. the imagists were interested in the poetic funct ion of metaphor, Pau l
~ I coeur (B.2) analysed metaphor as the process through w hich lingui stic
Imaginatio n creates and recreates meaning. In the book from which this
extr~ct is taken, Ricoeur works from a rhetori cal analysis of the word,
through a semantic analysis of the sentence, to a phenomenological,
hermeneutic analysis of discourse. Significantly, the semantic analysis of
metaphor finds its limi t w hen it comes up against imagery, w hich Ricoeur
ch.aracterises as non-verbal and quasi-visual. Yet, in a way that brings to
mInd both Kant's role of the imagination in co nstructing schema (2.1) and
the lilt er Wittgcnstein's conception at language (1 958), Ricoeur claims that

IMAGE S

the poetic image is at the heart of human lan guage and being. It will not then
be surp ri sing to find that m etaph or is centra l, rather than incidental, to
phi losop hical di sco urse (Le Doeuff, 9.4).
;'vl etap hori ca l language, or verba l images, are.often con sidered to be images
o nly in 'so me exten ded, f igurative, or im pro pe r' sense of t he ter m, bu t that
assumes we al ready know :vhi ch are th e p.ror er, li teral i.mages and that tl1'ey
represent transparent ly (Mitchel l, 13. 1). Srmrlarly, nothing should be -taken
fo r granted in the relati o nsh ips between w ords and im ages: 'The history of
cu lture is in part the story of a protracted struggle for dominance between
pic to rial and I inguist ic signs' (M itch el L 1986: 43). Scho larship can estaBlish
historicall y and con text ually w hat is at stake in various contests betw een
w o rds and images, but any particu lar theory about the pro per relation
between words and images is likel y to serve certa in pow ers and interests.
Thu s, Lessing's (2. 2) insistence on the d istinct form al natures of poetry and
painting turns out to be also an ideologica l oppositio n to the ad ulteratior, of
political and social d ist inct ions of gender and nationality (Mitchel l, 1986:

109).
Similar ideological stakes and value judgements are at work in th e selections
in this sectio n. Foucaul t (8.3) engaged with Magritte's paint ings that
exp licitly explore the relation between words and th ings. For Foucault,
Magritte's calligrams, in which both w ord s and im ages sign.ify objects,
d isturb 'all the traditional bound? of language and image ' (Fo uca ult, 1983:
22). Magritte demonstrates vi sually a critique of language tha t Foucault
develops histor ical ly, po int in g to the absent fo undatio n of language that is
unable to represent thi ngs thr ough words, just as the pictu re is not ide ntical
w ith its object. M agritte's un ravelled ca lligra ms are transgressive mo ments
fo r Fouca ult , which expos e the lim its of the rule s of rep resentat io n at work
in successive epistemes. or systems of knowledge, that c haracte rise different
epochs. Such mo ments, when ' the rel ation of language to painting is ...
infini te' (Fou cault, 19 73: g), exemplify for Fou cault the ref lexive, critical
ethos of modern ity that reveals th e contingency of all 'order s of things'
(Si mo ns, 2000) .
For Robert Romanyshyn (8 .4), wh at is at stake between book consciousness
and contemporary media i mage co nsciousness, ep itomised by telev ision, is
also an epo chal difference betw een modernity and po stmodern ity. Walter
Benjamin cla imed that, 'Duri ng lon g periods of hi story, the mode of human
sense perce ption ch anges with hum anity 's enti re mod e of existence' (1968:
22 2). Romanyshyn similarl y holds that human consci ousness changes
accord ing to the media in wh ich w e are immersed (see also Debray, 1 3 .~).
Critics of co ntemporary i mage cu lture such as Ne il Postman (l .98 6) re m~m
attuned to a modern ist, typographi c culture that is bou nd up With Cartesian
m ind- body dua lism , objectivism and individualism (1.12 , 1.13) as w ell ~s
vi sual conventions of lin ear perspective (Pa nofsky, 1997). In Roma nyshyn s
vi ew, suc h critic s ove rlook the po tenti al of televis ual conscio usness to
access the paradox of metaphor (Ricoeur, 8.2) and th e un conscious of ~ reafTl.
states (Freud,' 2 .8; Ehrenzweig. 7.5), whi ch can address the pathologies ot
mod ern consciousness .
Kevin D elu ca (8.5 ) also sees more critica l potent ial in co ntemporary ima%e
cult ure than ideo logy critique and its liberal co unterparts allow for (Boorstlrl,
1(92 ). Chall enging Debord's iconocla sm (3.2 ), he writes: ' Critique th rough
spectacl e, not critique versus spectacle' (Del uc a, 19 9 9 : 22 ). His work is an

INTR ODUC T ION

example of a cont.emporary emphasis on the visua l aspects of rhetoric

(Hariman an d Lucaite s, 2001; see also Kress and Van Leeuwe n, .5 .5) which
are generally ove rl ooked in mode ls t hat focu s on its verb al aspec ts. At the
sa me time, Del uca also chall e.nges )Urgen Habermas' (1989) inf luent ial,
normative con cept of the pu bli c sphere as a space in which pol iti cs is
conducted as d iscur sive argumentation . Instead, he focuses on activi st
polities as 'i magefare' w aged on 'the public screen ' (Del uca and Peebles,

2002).

REFERENCES

Benjamin, W. (196 8) llu min stio ns, tr. H. Zo hn. New York: Schocken Books.
Boor5tin, D. (1992) The Image. New York: Vintage Books.

Burgin, V. (1986) The End of Art Theory: Criticism and Postmodernity. London:

Macmillan.

Delu ca, K. (1999) Image Politics: The New Rhetoric 01 Environmen tal Activism .
New York: Guilford Press.

Dal.uca, K. and Peebles, J. (2002) 'From public sphere to public screen: democracy,

activism, and the "vio lence" of Seattle', Critical Studies in M edia Comm unicatio n, 19

(2): 125-5 1.

Derrida, j. (1976) O f Crammatology, tr. G. Co Spivak. Baltimore, MD :Johns Hopkins

University Press.

Foucault, M. (1973) Th e O rder of Things, tr, unidentified col lect ive . New York: Vintage

Books.

Foucault, M . (1983) This Is Not a Pioe, . j. Harkness. Berkeley, CA:University of

California Press.

Habermas, [. (1989) The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, tr. T. Burger.

Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hariman, R. and Lucaites, J. (200 1) 'Visual rhetoric. photojournalism .and democratic

public culture', Rhetoric Review, 20 :.37- 42 .

Lomax, Y. (2000) Writing the Image: An Ad venture with Theory and Art London:

LB. Tauris.

Manghani, S. (2003) 'Adventures in subsem ioti cs: towards a new "object" and writing

of visual culture', Culture, Theory and Criti que, 44 (1): 23 ':"3 6;

Mitchell, w.J.T. (1986) IcoM/ogy: Image, Text, Ideology . Chicago: University of

Chicago Press.

Panofsky, E. (1997) Perspe ctive as Symbolic Form , tr, C. Wood. New York: Zone Books.

Postman, N. (1986) A musing O urselves to Death. New York: Penguin.

Pound, E. (1935) 'A retrospect', in T.S. Eliot (ed.), Literary Essays of Ezra Pound.

~ ew York: New Direction s. pp. 3-14.

SImons, l. (2000) 'Modernist misapprehensions of Foucault's aesthetics', Cultural

Va lues, 4 (l ): 40 - 57 .

Wittgenstein, L. (1958) Pbdosopbtcet tove stigsiions, tr. G.E.M. Anscombe. New York:

Macmillan.
.

, 7 2 : IMA G ES
I MAGES AND WORDS: f 73

:I

THE ROOTS OF POETRY

his action was directed. In speech we split up the rapid continuity of this
action and of its picture into its three essential parts or joints in the right
order, and say;

ERNEST FENOLLOSA

In what sense can verse, written in terms or visible hieroglyphics , be

reckoned true poetry? It might seem tha t poetry, which like music is a time
art , weal'ing its unities out of successive impressions of sound , could with
difficulty assimilate a verbal m edium consisting largely of semi -pictorial
app eals to the eye.

.Man seeshorse

it is clear that these three join ts, or words, are only three phonetic symbols,
which stand for the three terms of a natural process. But we could quite as
easily denote thes e three st ages of our thought by symbols equally arbitrary,
II'hlCil had n o basis in sound; for example, by three Chinese cha racte rs :

Contrast, for example, Gray 's line :

The curfew tolls the knell of partmg day

with the Ch inese line:

JtI
J,f "o n

Rays

~lt
Like

JJt

Pure

Alan
Sn ow

Sees

,~

Horse

If we all knew what di vision of this mental horse-picture each of these signs
stood for, we coul d commun icate conti nuous thought to o ne another as
easily by drawing th em as by speaking words. We habitually em ploy the
visible language of gesture in much thi s same manner.

Unl ess the sound of the latter be given, what have they in common? It is not
eno ugh to adduce that each contains a certain body or prosaic meaning; for
the qu estion is, how can the Chin ese line imply, as jOrm, the very element
th at distinguishes poetry from pr ose?

But Chinese notation is something much more than arbitrary symbol s. It is

based upon a vivid shorthand pictUJ'e of the operations of nature. In the algebraiC
figure and in the spoken word there is no natural connection between thing and
sign: all depends upon sheer convention. But the Chinese method follows
natural suggestion. First stands the man on his two legs. Second, his eye moves
through space: a bold figure represented by running legs under an eye, a
modified picture of an eye, a modified picture of running legs, but unforgettable
once you have seen it. Third stands the horse on his four legs.

On second glance, it is seen that the Ch inese words, though visible, occur
in just as ne cessary an order as th e ph oneti c sym bols of Gray. All that po etic
form requires is a regular and flexible sequence, as plastic as thought itself.
Th e characters may be seen and read, Silent ly by the eye, one after the
other :
Moon rays l ih pure snow,

The thought-picture is not only called up by these signs as well as by words, but
f~r more vividly and concretely. Legs belong to all three characters: they are
alive. The group holds something of the quality of a continuous mOlring picture.

Perhaps we do not always sufficiently consider th at thought is succes sive,

not through some accident or weakness of our subje ctive operations but
becaus e th e operations of nature arc successive, Th e transferences of for ce
from agent to object, 'which con stitute natural phenomena, occupy time,
Th erefore, a re production of th em in imagination requires th e game
temporal orde r. L

The untruth of a painting or a photograph is that, in spite of it s

concreteness, it drops th e elem ent of natural succession.
Contrast the Laocoon stat ue with Browning's lines:
'f sp r~n8 to the surrup, and j on>, ,mri he

Suppose that we look out of a window and watch a man . Suddenly he turns

his head and actively fixes his att ention upon something. We look ourselves
and see that his vision has been focused upol1 a horse .We saw, first, the man
before he acted; second, while he acted ; third, the object toward which

lind int o the midntght '''0 !Julloped o nrM <r , '

lirn cst Ponollosn, fr o rn The Clnnc..~-=lrn!~ .:n Ch~If(..crsr W " Gl ....,.h dwmj~ t P(J ~( r/ , ud. L:" Ta Pou nd San Fran cisc o :

Ci ty Li ght., Boob , 19.16, 1'1', 6 10.

JL

..-..

One superiority of verbal poctry as an art rests in its getting b~ck to the
fundamental reality of lime. Chines e p oetry has the unique ad vantage of
cornhin ing both elem ents. It sp eaks at once 'with the vividn ess of painting ,
and with the mobility of sounds, It is, in some sense, more objective than

17 4- :IIv1AGES

IM AGES AND WORDS : , 75

e ith er, more dramatic. In reading Chin ese we do no t seem to be juggling

mental counters, but t o be watchi ng things wo rk out thei r own fate.
Leaving for a mom ent the form of the sent ence, let us look more closely at this
quality of vivi dness in the structu re of detached Chinese word s. Th e earli~r
forms of these characters wer e pictor ial, and their hold upon the imagination is
little shaken, even in later conventional modific ations . It is not so well known
perhaps, that the great number of these ideographic roots carry in them a verbal
idea if action. It might be thought that a picture is naturally the picture of a thing,
and that therefore the root ideas of Chinese are what grammar calls nouns.
But examination shows that a large number of the prim itive Chinese characters,
even the so-called radicals, are shor thand pictures of actions or processes.
For example, the ideograph meaning 'to speak' is a mouth with two words
and a flame com ing ou 1 of it [. .. J (vide Figure 8. 1 [... ]) . But this concrete
verb quality, both in nature and in th e Chin ese signs , b ecom es far more
striking and poetic when we pass fro m such sim ple, orig inal pictures to
compounds. In this process of com pounding, two things added together do
not produce a third thing but sugges t som e fundamental relation b etween

1*.

i@J

VJ
1;

-4'"

~~

1j(

:tJi

..

A true no un, an isolate d thing, do es n ot exis t in nature . Things are only

the ter minal points, or ra ther th e meeti ng points, of actions, cross
sections cut th rough acti ons, snapshots. Neither can a pure verb, an
ab ~tra ct motion, be po ssible in nature. The eye sees noun and verb as
one: thin gs in motion, motio n in things, and so th e Chinese conception
tends to repr esent them .2

NOTES
1. Footnote removed.
2. Dog ottenJing man = dogs him ["ide Figure 8.1 , col. 3].

ICON AND IMAGE

PAUL R,COUR

FIGURE 8.1
No te on Figure 8.1 ,
COlUMN

...

them. For examp le, the ideograph for a 'messma te' is a man and a fire ( I'i de
Figure 8. 1, co l. 2).

1. Man + fire
messmate .
2. Water + revolv e within
a circle eddy.
3. Hand + fire fire
that can be take n in the
hand cinder, ashes .
4. Sun above line of
horizon d awn .
5. Earth (sign not very

wen drawn - left lower

stroke should be at
bottom) + th e
for egoin g level p lain,
w ide horizon .
6. One who b inds three
planes: heaven, ear th and
man ruler, to r u le.

~
4 . Man +3 dog (dog
CO LU MN

beside man )

Is a psycho linguistics of im agin ati ve illusi on possible? If [. . . J sem antics goes

no further than th e verbal aspects of im agin ation , could psyc ho linguisti cs
perhaps cross over thi s lin e and join the prop erl y sensual aspect of th e image
to a sem anti c th eory of metapho r?

[...J
The fundamental qu estion posed by th e introducti on o f image or im agery
(Heste r ! uses th e two terms int erchangeably) into a th eory of m etaphor
concer ns th e status of a sensible, thus no n -ver bal , factor inside a semantic
theory. Th e d ifficulty is am plified by the fact tha t im age, as op posed to
perception , canno t b e related to any 'p ublic ' realit ies, and see ms to
reintroduce th e sor t of 'pr ivate' mental experience condemne d by
Wittgenstein , Hester 's chosen master. So the probl em is t o bring to light
a liaison between sense and sensa that can be recon ciled with semantic
theory.

/'\. first trait of the iconicity of meaning seems to facilitate thi s acco rd . Images
eVoked or aroused in this way are no t the (fr ee ' images that a Simple
a~s()ciation of ideas would join to meaning. Rath er, to return to an
:xpression of Richards in Th e Prin ciples ef Literary Criticism ), th ey are 'tied'
~rnagc,s, that is, connected to po etic diction . In contrast to mere association ,
1l:rmi d t), involves m eaning controlling imagery. ]0 other words, this is
Imagery in volved in language itsel f; it is part of th e game of language itself. 3

= dog lying

at man 's feet or crawling

to ma n's fcet; hence, to

lie down.

P~'U ) Rtcoeu r, from

pt:r rni ~"'l i o n _

The Rule

r!.f Jll.:wpnor. London : RC1ur.1 t,.Ogl:, 19 77 , PI'. 207- 14 . Reproduced with

' 7 (S : I M A G E S

I M AGES AN D WORDS : 17 7

It see ms to m e th at thi s notion of im ager y tied by m ean ing is in accord with

Kant 's idea th at th e sch ema is a method for co nst r ucting ima ges . Th e verbal
icon in Hester 's sense is also a m eth od fo r co nstr ucting images. Th e poet , in
effec t , is th at ar tisan who sustains and sha pes imager y using no m eans other
than lan guage .

It is true th at th e transfer fro m Wi ttgenst eIn ':\ analysis to m et aph or

illtToduces an important change. In th e case of the ambiguo us flgure , th er e
is a Gestalt (B) that allows a figu re A o r ano the r figur e C to be see n . Thus th e
problem is, given B, to co nstr uct A or C. In the case of m et aphor, A and C
aTE' given in read ing - they are the tenor and vehicle. What must b e
constructed is the common ele me n t B, th e Gerra]t, namely, the point of view
in which A and C are sim ilar,

Do es this co n ce pt of 'tied' image ent ir ely escap e th e objecti on of

psychologism? Th at can be doubted . Th e ma nn er of H ester's detail ed
explanat ion of the fusion of sens e and sensa , even wh e n understood as tied
image s ra ther than as r eal sounds, leaves th e sensible m oment very mUch
outsid e th e ve rbal m om ent . [... J All th ese ex plana tio ns r ema in more
p sych ological th an sem an tic .

Th e fact or of 's eeing as' is ex p osed through th e act of rea ding, even to the
extent that th is is 'the mode in which such im agery is re alized" . Th e 's eeing
as' is th e po siti ve link between vehi cle an d ten or. In poetic metaph or, the
metaphorical veh icle is as th e te nor - from on e poin t of view, n ot fr om all
po ints of view. To exp licat e a metaphor is to enumerate all the appropriate
senses in w hich th e vehicle is 'seen as' the te no r. Th e '~eei ng as' is the
intuitive r elationship that make s the sense and im age hol d toge th er.

\Vhatev er the case with thi s r ever sal, 'seeing as' pr offers the m issing link in
the chain of explanation . 'Seeing as' is the sensible asp ect of poetic langu age.
Half thought , half exper ience , 'seeing as' is th e intuitive rel ation ship that
holds sense and image toge th er. How ? Essenti ally thro ugh its selec tive
characte r : ' Seema as is an int uitive experience-act by whic]: one selects from the
ql1asi-,w sory m al'S .::F im agery one has on readm g metaphor th e relevant aspects r:f
such Imagery' .8 Thi s definiti on co ntains th e essentia l points. 'Seeing as' is an
exper ience and an act at one and the same tim e. O n th e one hand, th e m ass
ofi mag es is beyon d all voluntary control; the im age ari ses , occurs , and ther e
is no rul e to be learned for ' having im ages.' One sees, or on e do es not see.
The intuitive ta lent for ' see ing as' 9 canno t be t aught; at most , it can be
assisted , as w hen one is help ed to see th e ra bbit 's eye in the ambi guous
figu re . O n t he o th er hand, ' ~ e e ing as' is an act. To under stand is to do
something. As we said earlier, the im age is not free h ut tied ; an d , in effect ,
'see ing as' ord ers the flux and gover ns icon ic deployment . In thi s way, th e
exper ie nce -act o f '~e ~~ i ng as ' ensure s th at imagery is implicat ed in
metaphori cal signification : 'T he same imagery whi ch occurs also means ' . 10

Wit h Wi ttgen stei n, S the '"ee ing as' concerns neither metaph or' nor even
im agin ation , at least in its relationship to language . Co nsidering ambiguous
figures (like the one that can be seen as a du ck or a rab bit ), Wittgenstcin
rem arks that it is one thing to say 'I see thi s .. .' and another to say '1 see this
as . . .' ; and he adds : 'seeing it as' . . .' is 'havin g this im age.' Th e l i~k betw een
's eeing as' and im agini ng appear:, more cl earl y wh en we go to the
imperative mood , wher e, for exam ple, on e mi ght say ' Imagi ne th is,' ' Now,
see th e figure as thi s.' Will thi s be rega rded as a qu estion of interpretat ion?
No, says Wittgenst ein , bec ause to interpret is to fo r m a hyp othesis which
o ne can ver ify. Th ere is no hyp othesis here, no r any verification ; one says.
qui t e directly, 'It's a rabbi t .' Th e 'see ing as ,' therefore , is h alf thought and hall
experien ce . And is t his not the same sor t of mixture th at th e iconicitv of
m eaning pr esen t si"

Thus, the 'seeing as' activate d in reading ensur es the joining of ver bal meanin g
with imagistic fulln ess. And this conjunction is no longer some thing outside
language, since it can be reflected as a relationship . 'Seeing as' contains a
ground, a foundation , that is, precisely, resemblance - no longer the
resem blance between two ideas, but th at very resem blance the 'seeing as'
establishes. Hester claim s emphatically that sim ilarity is what results from th e
experience-act of 'seeing a".' 'S eeill8 as' defines the resemblance, and not th e
reverse. Thi s priority of ,seeing as' over the resemblance relationship is proper
to the langu age-game in which meanin g fun ction s in an iconic manner. That is
Why the 'seeing as' can succeed or fail. It can fail as in forced metaphors,
because th ev; arc inconsisten t or for tu itous, or on th e contrary,
, as in banal and
commonplace m etaph ors; and succeed , as in th ose that fashion the surprise of
disco\'ery.

Follow ing Virgil C. Aldrich, 7 H ester proposes to have th e 'seeing as' and ~he
imaging fun ct ion of langu age in poetry clar ify each o the r. T he 'seeing a~ of
W ittgen stein lends itsel f to this transpo sitio n because of its imaginati"c s~de :
con vers elv, as Aldrich puts it, th inking in poetry is a pic tu re -th inking. Now
this ' pict o rial ' capacity of lang uage consists a,lso in 's ee ing an aspect.' In th e
case of me ta phor, to depict tim e in terms of th e: chara cter istic,; of"a hegga r
is to see tim e a, a beggat, T his is wh at we do w hen we rea d th e m etaphor ;
to read is to establish a t'c!ationship such that X is like Y in so m e senses , but
no t in all.

Th u:<, 'seeing as ' quite pr ecisely plays the ro le of th e sch ema that unites th e
empty co ncept a m i th e blin d impression; thanks to its characte r as half

T he most satisfying ex planation, an d in any case th e only one th at can be

reconciled w ith sema nt ic the or y, is the on e tha t H est er links to the notion
of 'seeing as' (whi ch is vVittgensteini an in orig in) . ThIS theme constitutes
Hester 's poslt il'e coiu ribuu on to the tcontc theory

if metaphor.

Wh at is 'seeing as' ?

tho ught and ha lf ex pe r ience, it join s the light of sense with the fullness of
the image . In this way, th e non -verb al and the ver bal are firm ly united at th e
Core of th e image-jng functio n of language .
BeSides this role of bridging the verbal and the quasi-visual, 'seeing as' ensures
a.nother mediative ser vice. Sema nt ic th eory, as 'WC remember, pu ts the acce nt on
the tensio n bet ween the terms of th e sta teme nt, a tension g ro un ded in
contradiction at the liter al leve l. In the case of banal, even dead , metaphor, the
......

I MAGES AND WORDS : 179

173; I MAGES

tension with th e body of our knowledge disappears. [... [In living metaphor, on
the other hand, this tension is essential. When Hopkins says 'Oh! The mind has
mountains,' the reader knows that, literally, the mind does not have mountains;
the literal is not accompanies th e m etaphorical is. [... J Now, a theory of fusion
of sense and the sensible, adopted prior to the rev ision proposed by H ester,
appears to be incompatible with this char act er istic , of tension between
metaphorical meaning and literal meaning. On the other hand , once it is re
interpreted on the basis of 'se eing as,' the th eory of fusion is perfectly compatible
with interaction and tension theory. 'Seeing X as Y' encompasses 'X is nor Y' ;
seeing time as a beggar is, precisely, to know also that time is not a beggar .The
borders of meaning are tran sgressed but not abolished . Barfield" pictures
metaphor well as 'a deliberate yoking of unlikes by an individual artificer.' Hester
therefore is justified in saying that' seeing as' permits harmonization of a tension
theory and a fusion theory. 1should personally go further; I should say that fusion
of sense and the imaginary, which is characteristic of'iconized meaning,' is the
necessary counterpart of a theory of interaction.
Metaphorical meaning, as we saw, is not the enigma itself, the semantic clash
pure and simple, but the solution of the enigma, the inauguration of th e new
semantic pertinence. In this connection , the interaction desijmates only the
diaphora, the epiphora properly sp eaking is som ething else. It cannot take
place without fusion, without intuitive passage . The secret of epiph ora then
appears truly to reside in the iconic nature of intuitive passage. Metaphorical
meaning as such feed s on th e density of imagery rei eased by the po em .

If this is how things r eally stand, th en 'se eing as' deSignates the non-verbal
m ediation of the m etaphorical stateme nt . With this acknowledgment,
sem antics finds its fronti er; and , in so doing, it accom plishes its task.
If semantics meets its limit here, a phenomenolo8.J rif lmagll1atlon, like that of
Gaston Bachelard, \ 2 could perhaps take over from psycholinguistics and
extend its functioning to realms where the verbal is vassal to the non-verbal.
Yet it is still the semantics of the poetic verb that is to be heard in thes e
depths. Bachelard has taught us that the image is not a residue of impression,
but an aura surrounding speech: 'Th e poetic image places us at the origin of
the speaking being' .\3 The poem gives birth to the image; the poetic imag e
'becomes a new being in our language, expressing us by making us what it
expresses; in other wo rds , it is at on ce a b ecoming of expression, and a
be coming of our being. H ere expression created being ... one would not be
able to mediate in a zon e that preced ed languag e .' 14
If th en th e phenomenology of imagination does extend b eyond
psvcholinjruistics and even beyond the d escription of 'seei ng-a s,' thi.s is
because it follows th e path of th e 'reverberation'I " of the poetic im age mto
the depths of existence. The poetic im age beco m es 'a source of psychiC
activit v.' What was ' a new being in language' bec om es an ' incr ement to
consci~usness,' or better, a 'growth of heing.' 16 Even in ~ psych() logical
poetic:",' even in ' re ver ies on rev erie,' psvchi sm co ntinues to he direct ed by
the po etic verb. And so, one m ust attest: 'Yes, words do really dream.' 17

NOTES
1. MaTCUs B. Hester The Meaning c:fPoetic Metaphor. The Hague: Mouton, 1967.
2, Jvor A. Richards Principles 1'LireraC)' Criua sm. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1925 ,
pp. 118-19.
3. Footnote removed .
4. The ,!leaning ,?!Poetn c Metaphor, 21.
S. Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosoplucal ltwesupauons. Trans . G.E.M . Anscomb e.
Oxford : Blackwell, 1953, 37th edition 1968, II, xi.
6. Footnote removed.
7. Virgil C. Aldrich 'Image-Mongering and Image-Management,' Phllosophy and
Phenomenological Research 23 (Septe mber 1962) and ' Pictorial Meaning, Picture
Thinking and Wittgenstein's Theory of Aspects' Mind 67 (January 1958),
pp. 75--6.
8. The Meaning c:fPoetlc Metaphor, 180 .
9. The Meaning c:fPoetlc Metaphor, 182.
10, The MeavinB q/'Poetic Metaphor , 188.
11. Owen Barfield Poetic Dimon: A Srudy In Meaning. Quoted in Hester Poetic

Metaphor New York: IvicGTaw Hill, 1928 , 2nd edition, 1964,27.

12. Gaston Bachelard The Poetics 1'SpClce trans. Maria Jolas. Boston, MA: Beacon,

1969, introduction xi-xxxv; and The Poetics rif Reverie trans, Daniel Russell.

New York: Orion, 1969, introduction 1-26 .

J 3. The Poetics c:fSpace xix.

14. Ibid. [. .oJ

IS. The term and theme are taken from Eugene Minkowski Ihs une Cosmoloqic:

Fra8ments ptulosophiques, Chapter 9. Paris: Aubier, 1936 .

16. Bachelard Poetics ?fReverie 3- 6 .

17. Ibid. 18.

THIS 15 NOT A PIPE

MICHEL rOUCAUL T

The first version, that of 1926 I believe: a carefully drawn pipe, and
~nderneath it (handwritten in a steady, painstaking, artificial script, a script
from the convent, like that found heading the notebooks of schoolboys, or
on a blackboard after an object lesson' ) , thi s note: 'This is not a pipe .'
The other version - the last, I assume - can be found in Aube al'Antipodes. 2
The same pipe, same statem ent, same handwriting. But instead of being
jux tap osed in a neutral , limitless, unspecified space , the text and the figure
arc set within a frame. The fram e itself is pl aced upon an easel, and the latter
in turn upon the clearly visible slats of th e floor. Above everything, a pipe
exactly like the one in th e picture, but much lar ger.
Niichd Pouca ult , fro m Tbss JS :VOl a Pipe . Ber keley, CA: Univer sity of Ca lifornta Press , 19S2 t pp. t 5- 17 .
$ ~ '~9 . 53-4. Co p}'r ighl ;; 198 3, Th e Rcg.c;n Lo;,: of the U niversity of Ca lifornia. Reprod uced by pe r m issio n
of The R t:g cn l 'S of th ~~ Llnivct-sity o f Ca lifornia .

I S O : IMAGES

I M A G E S AND WORDS : lSI

'Do not look overhead fo r a tru e pip e .That is a pipe dream . It is the draw ing
within the painti ng, fir mly and r igorou sly outlin ed , that must be accepted as
a mani fest truth .'
( . . .]

FIGURE 8.2
Les Deux Mysteres, 1966 (oil on panel)
by Rene Magntte. Source: Private
Collection/Jam es Goodman Gallery,
New YorkfThe Bridgeman Art Library
DACS London .

About even this ambiguity, howe ve r, I am am biguous. Or rather what app ears to
me vcry dubi ous is the sim ple op position between the higher pipe 's dislocated
huoyancy and the stability of the lower one. Looking a bit more closely, we easily
discern that the feet of the easel, suppor ting the frame where the canvas is held
and wher e th e drawin g is lodged -- these feet, resting upon a floor mad e safe and
visible by its 0\\71 coarseness , are in fact beveled . They touch only by three tiny
points , robbing the ensem ble, itself s0x.newhat ponder ous, of all stability. An
impending fall? The collapse of easel, fram e, canvas or panel, drawing, text?
Splinter ed wood, fragm ented shapes, letter s scattered on e from another until
words can perhaps no longer be reconstituted? AU this litt er on the ground ,
while above, th e large pip e without measure or reference point will linger in its
inaccessible, balloon -like immobility?

*
Th e first version disconc er ts us by its very Sim plicity. Th e secon d m ultiplies
inte ntional am biguities before our eyes . Standing upright agains t the easel
and resting on wooden p egs, the fram e ind icates th at this is an artist's
pain tin g : a finished work, exhibited and bearing for an eventual viewe r the
statement that comments upo n or e xplains it. And yet thi s n aive handwriting,
neither precise ly the work's title nor on e of it s pictor ial elements; the
ab sence of any other trace of the artist's presen ce ; the rou ghn ess of the
ensemble; th e wid e slats of th e floor -- everything suggests a blackboard in a
classroo m . Perhaps a sw ipe of the ra g will soon eras e the dravving and the
text . Perha ps it w ill erase only one or the other, in o rde r to cor rect the
'erro r ' (d raw ing something that will tr uly not be a p ipe, or else w riting a
se nte nce affir mi ng that this indeed is a pipe). A tem po rary slip (a
' m is-w r iting' sugges ting a misunderstanding) th at one gesture will dissipate
in white du st ?

But thi s is still only the lea st of the ambiguities; here are so m e others. There
are two pip es. O r rather must we not say, two drawings of the same pip e?
O r yet a pip e and the drawing of that pip e, or ye t again two drawings each
representin g a different pipe? Or two drawings, on e r epresenting a pipe and
the o th er no t, or two more dr aw ings yet , of which n either the on e no r the
other are or rep resent pipes? Or yet again, a drawing representing not a pipe
at all but another drawing, itself representing a pip e so wel l that I m ust ask
myself. To wh at do es the sentence written in the painting relat e? 'Sec these
lin es assem bl.ed on t~e ~lac.kboan l - ~'a inl! do they resemble, w ith out the
least digrcsstOn o r in fide lity, what I~ <hspl?cd abov~ th em. Make no
mistake:
... , t he p i!)c. is. overhead
- , not Ifl this c h i khsh scrawl .
Yet pe rhaps the sentence refers precisely to the disp ro portionate , floating ,
;, I.... L.ou--...i n1...lp...noliion.o~faD.tasy of,i;l"Qjo.c..I:hcn ~uld ,b:>.v.a ,tf>. ,,_d,

The ex t eriority of writ ten and figurative de me nts , so ob vious in Magritte,

is sym b olized by th e non-r elation - or in any case by the very complex and
problematic relation - between the painting and its title . T his gulf, which
pre vents us from being both th e r eade r and the viewer at the same tim e ,
brings th e image into abr upt relief above th e horizontal line of words. 'The
titles arc chosen in such a way as to keep anyone from assign ing my paintings
to the familiar r egion that habitu al th ought app eals to in order to e~ ca p e
perplexity.' A little like the anonymou~ hand that designated the pipe by th e
statem ent , 'This is not a pipe,' Magritte names his p aintings in ord er to focus
attention upo n th e very act of naming. And yet in this split and drifting
space , stra nge b onds are knit , there o ccur intrusions, br usqu e and
destructive invasions, avalanc hes of images into the milieu of words, an d
verba l lightning flashes th at streak: and shatter the drawings. [.. .] Magritte
secret ly mines a sp ace he se ems to main tain in the old arrangement. But he
excavates it with wo rds; And th e o ld pyramid o f perspective is no more th an
a mo lehill about to cave in.
[ .. .]

~ etween the two ex tremes , Magritte's work deploys the play of words and
~rnage s . Often invented after the fact and by other people , th e titles intrude
into the figures 'w here their applicabilit y was jf not ind icated at least
authorized in adv ance , and wh ere th ey play an ambiguous ro le: supporting
pegs and yet termit es th at gnaw and we aken. I...J
Mor eover, listen to Mag ritte : ' Bet wee n 'wo rd s a nd obj ec ts one can create
new relations and specify characteristics of language and o bjects gene raUv
'
.,
.. . ' m c s t h
"
,
19non .:d in .'
everyday h ie. " 0 r agam
: Sorneti
c name
01 an o bject takes
the place of an image. A wo rd can take the place of an objec t in r eality. An
irnao.. ,,;;on t " It e t h. nlace of a .1y.ord in a proposition.' And th... follow-in

IMAGES AND WORDS : 12 3

I e ;:; : IMAGES

state ment, conveying no contradiction but referring to the i.nextricabl e

tangle of wo rds and images and t o th e absen ce of a co m m on ground to
sustain th em : ' In a painting , words ar e of the sam e cloth as images. Rather
one sees im ages and words differently in a paintin g.' J

[ ... ]
Make no mistake : in a space where every element Seem s to obey the sole
principle of resemblance and plastic representation , linguistic signs (which
had an excluded aura, which prowled far around the image , whi ch the title's
arbitrar ine ss seem ed to have banished fo reve r) have surrept itiously
reapproach ed. Into th e so li dity of the image , into it s m eticulous
re semblance , th ey have introduced a di sorder - an order p ertaining to the
eyes alone. They have routed th e object, revealing its filmy th inn ess.
[ . . .J Magritte allows th e old space of re presentation t o rule, but only at.the
surface, no m ore th an a polished stone, bearing words and shap es: beneath,
nothing. It is a gr avestone: The incisions that drew figur es and those th at
marked letter s communicate only by void, th e non-place hidden beneath
marble solidity. I 'will note that this absence reas cends to the surface and
J
impinges upon the painting itself.

r ..

*
Separ ation bet ween linguistic signs and plastic cl em ents; eq uivalence of
re semblance and affir ma tio n. Th ese t wo principles constituted the tension
in classical painting, because th e sec ond reintrodu ced discourse (affu ma tion
exists only wher e th ere is speech) into an art fro m whi ch the linguistic
element wa s rigorously ex cluded . Hence th e fact that classical painting
spoke - and sp oke constan tly ~ while constituting itself entir ely outside
language; hence the fact th at it rested silently in a discursive space , hence the
fact that it provided , ben eath itself, a kind of common ground where it
could restore the bonds of signs and the image.
Magritte knits verbal signs and plastic elements to geth er, but w ithout refer ring
them to a prior isotopism . H e skir ts the base of affir mative discourse on which
resemblance calmly r epo ses , and he brings pure sim ilitudes and nonaffirmativ{~
verbal statements into play within th e instability of a disoriented volume and
an unmapped space . A pJ'ocess whose formulation is in some sense given by
Ceci n 'est pas une p Ipe.

1. To employ a calligram wh ere are found, simultaneou sly present and visible,
image, text, resemblance, aflirmation, and their com mon ground.

2. Then suddenly to open it up, so that the caIligram imm ediately

decomposes and disappears , leaving as a trace onl y its own absen ce .
3. To allow discour se to colla pse of it s own weight and to acquire the visible
shape of letters. Le t ters which, inso far as the v arc: drawn en ter into an
uncertain , indefinit e relation , confused w ith the drawinp it self -- but
mi n us any area to ser ve as a com m on g round .

4-. 10 allow sim ilit udes , o n th e other hand , to multiply of th emselves, to be

bo rn from thei r own vapor and to rise endlessly into an ether w here th ey
refer to nothing mo re th an them selves.
5. To verify dearly, at the end of the operation, th at the pr ecip itat e has
changed color, that it has gon e from black to white, that th e 'This is a
pipe' silently hidden in mimetic representation has be come the 'T his is
not a pipe' of circu lating similitudes.

Aday will come when, by me ans of sim ilit ude relayed ind efinitely along the
length of a ser ie s, the im age itself, along with the name it bear s, willlos-e its
identi ty. Campb ell, Cam pbe ll, Cam pbe ll, Campbell."

NOTES
I. Translator 's Note: Lecon de chases, literally ' lesson of thin gs.' An allusion to the
title of a 194-7 Magritt e canvas, as well as a 1960 film about Magritte made by Luc
de Hensch . Magritte. also wrote an essay to which he gave th e titl e.
2. Translator's Note: 'Dawn at th e Ends of the Earth,' the titl e of a book with
illustr ations by Magritte. Actually, Magritte's pipe and its wry subscript appear in
a whole series of paintings and drawings. There is also a pun on the word aube,
which can mean either 'dawn' or 'float.'
3. I cite all th ese quotations from P. Waldberg's Masri/fe .ney illustrated a series
of dr awin gs in the twelfth issue of Revolution Surrealiste.
4. Translator's Note; Foucault's reference is not to Magritte but to Andy Warhol ,
whose various ser ies of soup cans, celebrity portraits, and so on Foucault
apparently sees as undermining any sense of th e unique , indivisible identi ty of
their 'models .' [. . .]

THE DESPOTIC EYE

AND ITS SHADOW: MEDIA IMAGE
IN THE AGE OF LITERACY
ROBERT O. ROMANYSHYN
[Tlhis essay [... J is an exper iment in cult ural therapeutics whi ch begins not
with the past hut with how th e past is present in th e present as sympt om .
I...J [WJe mu st eschew th e primaril y m odern and mostly negati ve idea of
the sym ptom, an idea whic h would invite us to evaluate the sym ptom in
order to' cure ' it, that is, dismi ss it . In place of that i.dea we need to em brace
th e more difficult notion th at the symptom is a vocation, a call to list en and
give voice to what would otherwise re m ain silenced .
The exp eriment in this essav, is to dem onstrat e media irn aoe
consciousness
b '
illustrat ed her e via TV co nsc iousness, as the sym ptom ati c :nding of
Robc:rt D. Ro m anvshvn , From Modanity and the HeBcmanI ?1' VJ$lo n. ed . David Levin . Be rkel ey, CA:
Univers ity o f California Pr cas, J 993. P,' 319 - 59 . Co pyr ight 1:; 1993, T he Reg en ts of the Llruvcrs h v of
c'llifotni; . R(:p rod u ce d hy pe r-mlsaion of Th e H<:gcnt s of tJll ~ Un ive r :-oity of C alifo r-nia anrl th c aut h;r.

I t~L\

I MAGES

IM A G E S AND WORDS : 185

modernity. Such an exper im ent , however initia llv needs some justiflcatlo-,
beca use the media image industry in ge neral, and tel evision in particu lar,
seems so mueh to be an ex pression of m od ernity, and even the epitom e of
its values . [. . .] Telev ision is th e intensification of many of the values of
modernity; indeed it is the inc arnation of these valu es in th e ex treme. But
th at is pr ecisely the sense of television as sym ptom . As exaggeration and
car icature of th e values o f m odernity, it brings those values to o ur att en tion,
invit ing us no t to call th em into qu estion but to 'wonder abo ut them, perhaps
in so m e instances fo r t he first time. As sym pt om , th en , televisio n asks for a
hearing , not a judgment.
,)

,1

Th e hyp othes is of th is ex pe rimen t is th at tel evisio n is the cu ltura l

unconscious of the book. It is the other side , the shadow side , of a book
con sci ousn ess 'w h ose origins coinci de w ith m od ernit y. [.. .] [T Jhe
ocul arc entrism of m odernity the h egem ony of vision , th e installati on of
the reign of the d esp ot ic eye, is also a ver bocent rism, the consciousnes s of
t he book , and an egocentr ism, the consciou sn ess o f a separated , det ached
atom o f ind ividuali ty.

[ ... j [Tjhe sen se of modernity is presented in thi s essay as ego-ocular

verb ocentrism, It is this ges talt out of whi ch m any of th e un ques tioned
values o f m od ernity a r ise. Television as the shadow of the book makes visible
the pathology of verba-ocular-ego co nsciousness by challenging its values of
linear rationality, conte xtual coher en ce , narrative continuity, fo cused
concentration , infinite progress, individual privacy, pro duc tive efficiency,
det ached co m prehensiveness, and n eutral o bjectivity. Th e challenge, of
co ur se , is n ot for th e sake of negating th ese values . On the co ntrary, th e
challe nge is for the sake of pointing up their sym pto matic characte r, of
rem em b ering th eir ge ne sis at those cultura l-historica l moments wh en
thi ngs could have been o ther w ise. That th ese values have no t been o therwise
attests to th e fact th at th ese moments o f ge nes is wer e also mome nts of
forgetfulness , in which the se values were transform ed from per spectives
into un qu esti oned cultural co nventions, sedimente d habits o f m in d . [... ]
Th at television seem s intent upon th e des tr uction of t he verb a -oc ular -ego
values of mod erni ty invites from us not an unthinking , even self-right eous
defe nse of t hos e values, b ut an attentive resp on se to our par ticip atio n in th e
creation o f those valu es. It is not safe simply to defend th e book against
tel evision . O n th e con trar y, we need to attend to how tel evision , as the
shado w of th e book , as its sym ptom ati C' ex pressio n, calls us to becom e
responsible hy re membering what w e have m ade.
In th is essay, tel evision as symb o lic of th e ending of m od ernity is p resented
as th e sym ptomatic breakdown of modernity. [... J
T he television ex per ience can be a br eakt hrough to a p ostrnoder n style
insofar as it br eaks th e gestalt of verba-ocular- egocentri sm, and in so do ing
red efin es the ocu larc e~tri~ m of modernit y. If television is ocu lar ccntric -
and in m any wavs it is - it nevertheless revisions the eye . Th e eve of ego
co n sciou sn ess, th e cye of the reade r of th e book , ar ises within a
cu lt ur-al -Ir ist.oric al moment in w hich the ego as d isembodied spectator is
;

'

invited to kee p his or her eye , Singu lar, fixed , and distant, up on the wo rl d.
The douhle anamn esis of thi s specta tor eye ma kes th ese featu res quite clear.
The television eye, the ocu lar centrism of the tel evision ex per ience, is of a
quite di ffe rent sort. [.: .] [TJh e eye of ~ele v i si~ n co nsciousness is re-minded of
the bod y. Seduced by Im ages, a seduc t ion w hich to be sure is not w ithout it s
problem s, t he eye. of the tel evision b ody is an em otional vision , a visio n th at
is moved at a bodily leve l.
As emotional-ra tio nality, th e tel e vision body is not ver boce ntr ic. In place of
a literat e co nscious ne ss, the tel evision bod y is an im age consciousn ess.
Drawing upon psych oanalysis, th e tel evision bod y is said to be more like th e
dream b ody tha n the waki ng body. Drawing also upo n th e preliterate body
of poet ic p erformance in H om eric Greece, th e tel evision body is said to be
more akin to th is b ody of orality, w he re know ing is emoti onal ,
par tici patory, and se nsuous, rathe r than rational, detached, and logical , and
where waking an d dreaming are less d earl y distingui shed and are m ore
confused . In th ese r espect s, th e postm odernism of th e t elevision body is
presented as a po stliterate o rality, a sur real re ality in wh ich the valu es of
literac y are co nfuse d with a new, techn ologicall y p roduced orality.
Finallv, television bodv co nsc iousness can be postrnodern insofar as it is th e
decentering of th e eg~ . Just as the d ream in psychoanalysis decentered th e
ego, television can m ove the ego out of its p ri vacy and isolati on into a kind
of group - even tribal - consciousness , whe re th e tension between fusion
with the other and distan ce from th e o ther is refigu red. The figure of the
borderl ine patient is offe red as an illustration of thi s decenter ing of ego
conscious ness w hich the television ex p erie nce brings. It is suggested that
working with a borderline is m ore like w atching tel evision than it is like
reading a book . Th e symptom atic value of television , then , might very well
lie in its invit ation to w ard ano ther kind of co nscio usness now visible in o ur
culture only as th e pathology of th e borderline.

*
[TJelevision as a m edium, along with film , is an evoluti on in hum an
conScious ness, a new sty le of consciousness , th at is imprison ed in th e he ady
eye of mind. Th e probl em with television is th at we treat it like a book , that
we measure it by the book, by those patterns of co nsciousness appropriate to
the isolated ato m of individuality ensco nced within the room of ego
~Ubj cetivity. TV, however, is a challenge to ego consciousness, as much as it is
a challenge to th e politi cal coun ter part of ego co nsciousness , the individual
nation-state . I...] T V as a med ium br ings o ut such str ong cr iticism because it
I~ the h re~ kdo wn of lit erate , linear, ego consciousness, the consciousne ss of th e
book . The evolution is a revolution , akin in its impl ications to that ear lie r
transformation in Platonic tim es from mythic to liter ate consci ousn ess ,
[ ... j

[TJhe media im age poses also for the postlit cr at e m ind a challe nge to
fJescar te s's difference between waking and dreaming. [. . . J

i8 G : IMA G ES

IMAGES AND WORDS : i 8 7

The nuclear family in front of its television set is n eith er sleeping nor insane.
It is awake and it is dreaming. Television consciousness today haunts book
consciousness be cause it eclipses those boundaries between waking and
sleeping (r eason and madness; fact and fictio n) whic h ego lit erate
consciousnes s so firml y established at the foundation of modernity. In doing
so, it exposes the modern ego to a new sense of time , disrupting the familiar
pattern of narrative and replacing it with th e epis od ic pattern of the dr eam .
[ ... j IWlatching television is akin to interpreting dream s, making sense of
them, whil e dreaming. [. . . ] [Cloveraqe of th e Persi an Gulf \ Var [in 1991J is
[a good] [. . . j example, since the illusion of being informed was co ntinually
br oken . Cover age of tha t event did dem onstrate that th e accou nts of th e War
were allusions to what re maine d fru stratingly elu sive. [. .. ] [Tjh e fr us tra~ion
in this experience is built into the relation between the medium , with its
multi-perspectival, collage typ e of consciousness, and the viewer, with his
or her sti ll relatively intact lin ear perspectival consciousness.Th e frustration
belongs to the surreal quality of th e reality whi ch con -fuses or blends
together episodic and story line time . And it is gen erated by the effort to
dismiss thi s play of levels between a coll age of images and th e story line by
forcing the for me r into the latter.

[oo.J
Th e tel evision experience is a radical sep aration of body and mind. On the
on e hand, th e headless body of th e coglto see ms fused with th e em otional
app eals of the media image , m oved by th ese images with eith er judgmen t or
reflection. On the other hand, th e very absence of th ese capaciti es, so visible
in the icon ographic disp lay of th e headless body in front o f its T V, betrays a
distance bet ween th e p er son watching tele vision and his or her emotionally
infected b ody already fused with the television.

*
The kind of consciousness which characterizes the media image , television
consciousne ss for exa mple , is a br eakd own of the kind of consciou snesS
which ch aract erizes ego , lite rate conscio usness, book consciousness for
example . [... j [Bjreakdown can also be br eakthrough . [... J
Th e dream , howev er, is an invitation which asks to be played with b)' a.
wakeful consci ousne ss aware of its contin uo us and recipro cal relation of
making th e dr eam while bein g made by it. In doin g so, the dr eam infects
th e seriousness of cogito consciousness with play, even as it und ermines
th e idea of an origin outside that process which in sear ching for or igins
simultaneo usly cre ates th e origins that arc discovered . The dr eam , then,
br eaks throu gh to a consciousness 'which in its playfulness is par ticipatory,
and which in its sense of participation accepts its oxymoronic character
of created -discoveries, of ser iou s..p lay, of const ructed -origins . It breaks
thro ugh to a con sciousness which in its accep t an ce of paradox is radically
metapho r ical.'

Television consc iousnes s certainly partakes of th ese features of the dr eam. It

is no less participatory, especially at th e level of the emotional body, working
upon it in much the sam e fashion that th e dream works up on th e body. It is
also ox vrnor o nic insofar as it continuously presents us with th ose
juxtaposi tions of expe r ience - the news story followed by the comm erci al,
for example - which to the serious eye of ego, literate cons ciousness seem
only like an opposition . And it is finally radically m etaphorical insofar as it s
images, like Magritt e 's pipe , are not what they app ear to be and yet ar e. Or
at least tel evision consciousness might break through to thes e features whi ch
char acte rize mu ch of po stmodern cons ciousn ess, if its symp t omatic
character is att ended as a vocation.
To call m edia imag e con sciousne ss po stm odern is not, however, sufficiently
descriptive, for it s postrnodernism is a postliterate orality. Th e television
body, like the dr eaming bod y, is in many respects a re-presentation of th e
preliterate hody of orality, of that bod y of speaking and listening which is
always prior to th e body of the text. [.. . j It is a body which cultu rally and
historically spirals out of the body of the book, out of the literate ego, a
body which is not a repetition of preliterate or ality but a re-m embrance of
that body, a re-play of it after th e reign of the desp oti c eye. Like the bod y
of poetic performance, the t elevision body is emotional-rationality, drawn
out of itsel f and into the world aesthetically, sens ibl y, as a matter of sense.
It is also a body of gro up consciousne ss, a body already wedded via the
sensuous and even erotic experience of the image to other bod ies - a tribal
body, then , immersed in a land scape that is more mythical than it is logical,
and invited into action that is more ritual in texture than moral in outlook .
That this kind of bodily presenc e to r eality is opeD to exploitation and
manipulati on is obvious . Television has been manipulated, primarily by
submitti ng to the industry of capitalism the potential of the medium to b e
a breakthrough to another kind of experienc e. But it need n ot do so. The
Use of tel evision dur ing the Vietn am War dem on st rated its power to
de-isolate the ego of literate consciousness and to cre ate a coherent tribal
identity, held together with a powerful myth of its place in history and
prepared to act in such fashion that it s emoti on al thought , contained within
the space of dramatic ritual, was an imp ortant catalyst to stop that war.

[. 1 Th e

very sam e features of television consciousness described above

were sufficient for Plato to ban th e po et- singer fr om the poli s. Th e danger
was that in becoming enmes hed in th e poe t's so ng one woul d be diffused ,
distracted , unfo cused , and without fixed moral direction. Th e danger was
that one would become plural in place of the unified, self-contained,
self-organized, and aut on omo us individual. [. . . J

The history of the 'VVestcrn psyche show s the results of the exclusion of the
pocts fro m the po lis. [. . .'1 It is a history of a radical shift from ear to eye, and
particularly to that eye of detac hed , spectator d istance , a histor y of the
despotic eye. Media image consciousness, espeCially the television, seems to
be the shadow and the symptom of that eye, and in this respect a rctu nino o f
it . The images of tel evision are no mere spectacles. They are spoken ima~cs,

I M AGES AND WORDS ; ! ~3 9

18 2 :IMAGES

oracular insights, emotional visions. Perh aps with th e television the poetic
returns, or at least might do so. [.. .) [T]devision mig ht be the means by which
the poet is res tored to th e polis. Such a restorati on woul d bring in its wake a
r e-mem brance of the body's participation in vision, a re-minder which would
resto re a sense of limits to a vision which , detached from the body, developed
a singular, fixed devotion to the infinite, pursued in a linear, active, willful
fashion . [... ] [Cjnticisms of tel evision as fosterin g distra ction , passivity, and
the trivial might then he rcim agined . Distraction might be revalued as an
appreciation for what lies off to the side , an attention to the obligue, an
ope nness to allusion. Passivity m ight be r estored as a balance to the
hyperactivity of willful consciou sness, an antido te to the ego as will to power,
the de velopment of an attitude of receptivity. And the tri vial might be
recovered as a sensitivity for the detail, a r efound sense of the local so easily
lost sight of in the big picture achieved with distan ce. Each and all might be
resc ued from th e current negative condition assigne d to them by an ego
consciousness in its headlong pursuit of separating its vision of life from liVing.

NOTE
t . For a discussion of the metaphorical character of psychological consciousness,
see my earlier book , Psychological L!le:From Science co Metaphor (Austin: University
of Texas Press, 1982) . In that work the hidden metaphoric character of modern
scientific consciousness is indicated, suggesting that ego, literate consciousness
already harboured within itself the seed of its own symptomatic undoing.

8:5

IMAGES, AUDIENCES)
AND READINGS
KEVIN DELUCA

In studyi ng medi a that employ a mix of words and im ages, critics in rhe tor ic
and cult ura l st udies have tended to emphasize words and narrative form. A
fam ou s ex ample is Hall 's discussion ( 1973) of how word s anchor the
meanings of n ews photographs. [.. . 1 Gitlin 19 80 goes so far as to deride
television 's reputation as a visual medium and inst ead con cludes that
tel evision new s is typically an 'illustr ate d lecture ' controlled by the ver bal
n ar ra tive (1980, pr . 264-265). This is an egregious error, especially with
respect to the st udy of television , which is an imagisti c discourse dri ven by
associative logiC or what Barthe s terms ' myth' ( 1972 [. . . D.
For deca des, qu antitative m edi a research, whateve r its weakn esses, ha~
poin t ed to the d ominance of images over words, the visual over th e verbal.
Recently, Kathlee n Jamieson (1994) and Just in Lew is ( 199 1), working out
of th e traditions of rhetoric and cultur al st udies, resp ectively, have
reconfi r m ed the p ri macy of im ages in tclcvisual discourse. Their audience

research stu dies are t ellin g bec ause bo th scholars, working o ut of traditions
that value the wo rd, were surpr ised by th e p ower of images in th e sense
making pr ocess of audiences.

[... ]
l ewis's concl usions shed light on why hegem oni Cframing of the news oft en
fails to lead to closure , why, in other words, th e broadcasting of Earth
First! 's im age even ts is po litically potent in spite of the framing. First, people
forget almost everything th ey wat ch on the news ( 199 1, pp. 124-5) . [... ]
Benjamin fruitfull y suggests that distraction be considered a mode of
perception : 'Reception in a state of distraction, which is increasing noticeably
in all fields of art and is symptomatic of profound changes in apperception,
finds in the film its true means of exercise' (1968, p. 240) . Instead of being
condemn ed as the negative of concentration, di str action is an appr opriate form
of attention in a culture opera ting at the speed of technology and immer sed in
fleeting images. Lev...i s suggests that this habit of distraction is further
encouraged by the lack of classical narrative str ucture in television news.

*
The pr evious chapter offered a standard rh etorical criticism of th e ABC
News report on Ear th First!.Th at criti cism found th at while ther e were some
positive (or at least ambiguous) po r trayals of Earth First! in th e report, th e
preferred reading or dominant meaning worked to construct Earth First ! as
a terrorist orga nization that mu st be stopp ed by th e forces of law and order.
Further, thi s cons truction is typical of other representations of Earth First! in
the national pu blic sphere .Yet r adical environm en tal groups and their causes
remain popular. In th e mid st of a dou ble- barrel corporate media atroci ty
drive' on many fronts (tele vision, radio, newspapers, magazin es) and a
(orporate and cong ressional legal assault in the nam e of pro gr ess and
patriotism on environm en talists and environmental protection, m ost
~merican s (91% ) believe that protecting the environment should be a top or
Important priority (Public Agenda , 1999). [. . .J

[. ..] [AI rh etorical read ing of n ews coverage of radical environmental

Image events cued in to th e inSights of audi en ce res earch will not dismiss
~~n v i ro nmental im age events as quixotic assaults on an impervious corporate
mdustrial syste m , but will inst ead read such image events as possibly
appropriate and effecti ve tact ics in a het eroglossic publi c spher e.

*
An analysis of ABC's report on Earth First! in light of audie nce research
leads to a radicallv different reading th at poin ts to the potential rh etorical
force of the prac tice of image events. Followi ng is such a possible reading.
Conside ring the dominance of images over words, the eye over the car, the
first step is to fo cus on lmas cs to the near exclusion of words. This radi cal]

190 : IMAGES

IMAGES A ND WORDS : l S i

alters our earlier reading of the news report, for in that analysis words were
the driving force in the mutation of Earth First! from a bunch of eiVil.
disobedience protester s to a terrorist organization . Clearly, the reporter is
using words to attempt to determine the meaning of the images. This is
similar to Hall's argument regarding the use of words to determine the
meaning of photographs.The distinction I want to make here is that, yes, news
organizations attempt to construct a hegemOnic frame through the strategic
use of words to delimit possible interpretations of images , but this is only a
strategy, and one whose efficacy is thrown into doubt by audience research.

Earth First ! Sim ply does not fit th ese di scourses. These ar c powerful
discour ses that have been clearly d efined. Terrorist acts involve bombings,
maSs destruc ti on, and shattered bodies. Violations of law and order involve
violent cri mes: murder, assault, armed robbery, carja cking, kidnapping, and
rape. Tree-si tting and burying oneself in a road do not make sense within
these disco urses. Indeed , th e only likel y victims are the 'per pe trators .'
Similarl y, ecotage , w hich is never shown , do es not resonate with these
discour ses. It is diffi cult to equate putting a nail in a tree with blowing up
the \Vor ld Trade Center or a 747.

Lewis 's work sugg ests not only that we focus on images , but also that we
concentrate on action images:

Of equal significan ce, Earth First! activists do not fit the most prevalent
images of villains in either the discourses of terrorism or of law and order.
Conventionally, terrorists ar e Middle Eastern Muslims. [... ]

The powerful moment in the new s di scourse is the po r trayal of the "event" - or at least the
part of the stor y audiences per ceive as tho even t . Just as news paper r eader> will skim the
openmg para graphs for the ma in gist of the news story, so viewers wiII focus their att ention
upon It, televisu a] equival ent , The e quiva le nt mom ent, perhaps surprisingl)", docs not
app ear to be the anchor's int r oduct ion but th e flrst main action sequence in the r eport. ( 1991,
p. 149)

In the example of the ABC News story "War in the Woods ,' the first three
action sequences [... ] are of Earth First! activists performing image events:
machine- chaining, tree-sitting, and road-blocking. The images are largely
positive and are clearly of nonviolent civil disobedience. Tn addition, the
voiceover (though of secondary importance) is Simply descriptive and two
of the protesters are allowed to explain what they are doing and why. In
short, through the synecdochical tactic of image events, Earth First! is able
to present itself and its causes in an extremely favorable light during
powerful moments of the news story.
Also, importantly, the extended segment of the r epor t devoted to
constructing Earth First! as a terrorist organization is bereft of action images
of Earth First!ers performing ecotage. Indeed, in all the action images
throughout the report, the Earth First! protesters are non-violent and twice
[... ] they peacefully submit to being arrested. In fact, the only action
sequence that hints at violence is when the one-armed logger (a victim of
industrial violence) speeds toward a group of activists blocking a road and
then gets out of his pickup and angrily confronts them.
If the audience is using these action sequences to make sense of Earth First!,
what sort of sense are they likelv to make? Since these action sequences are
J
ahistoricized fragments, meaning
will depend on associations m ade Wl'th
larger social discourses, on the discourses to which viewers link these
fragments. Clearly, the reporter attempts to associate Earth Fir st! 'with
terrorism but it is an association based on inference and devoid of action
images. Still, the proffered reading of Earth First! image events in the 'War
in the Woods ' places them in a context constructed by the discourses of
terrorism and law and order. That this is a compell ing link and context for
th e audi ence is doubtful.

roO .J Sim ilarl y, in law and order dis course the monsters to be exter m in ated
arc often African-American.

!...]
Another discursive context floated in the report is that of the economic
discourse asse rting that protecting the environment cost s job s
environment versus jobs. [... J[U]rban and suburban viewers arc more likely
to understand nature not as a source of money and work but as a place to
spend money and leisure time. [... ] Put in this context, the image of a
protester buried in a road saying 'Defending what's left of the wilderness'
makes sense as a courageous act. The protester is a hero, not a nutcase or
someone costing people jobs. He is the de fender not merely of wilderness
but also of the values of a cultural formation .
The actions and images of Earth First! ar e easier to link to a discourse of
Social protest and civil d isobedience that gained prominence and respect
through the civil rights struggle and the anti-war protests of the 1960s and
1970s. The image events of the early action sequences in the report show
Earth Firstlers acting in the best tradition of civil disobedience. They are
acting peacefully while putting themselves at great personal risk in the cause
of interests that transcend narrow self-interests. Further, many of their
looks are reminiscent of th e student protesters against the Vietna~ War.

"~he tradition of protest points to one final discourse that may affect how
VIewers make sense of 'War in the "Woods.' Encapsulated discursively on
bumper stickers as [... ] a prevalent distrust of authority, of law and order,
across the political spectrum that has manifested itself in a range of acts
[. . .]. From the context of this discourse of distrusting authority, the arrests
of Earth First! activists may be read as another example of excessive gov
ernment repression (often for corporate interests at the expense of 'the
P~(;pk,' i , e. , ordinary citizens). \Vh)' .is the go~ernment arresting a bunch of
Olppies sitting in the woods (on public lands)!
Which on e of these discourses docs the aud ience usc? The only t hing that
Can be said with certainty is ' not just one.' Ind eed, probably all the se
dbcourses and more come into playas people work to make sense or the

:C::<:' : I M A G ES
image events. My purpose is not to provide th e correct alternative reading
bu t to open up th e possibilities and provide an exa m p le of what it means to
say that audi ences (we) func tio n in a het eroplossic public sphere composed
of competing discourses. [... J

NOTES
1. Footnote removed .
2. Footnote removed.

IMAGE AS THOUGHT
t4,

WOR KS C ITE D
Barthes, R. ( 1972) Myth ologies. New York: Hill and Wang.

Benjamin , W. (\968) 'The Work of Art in th e Age of Mechanical Reproduction' ,

in H. Arendt (Ed.), lllutnuiattons (pp . 217-2 52) . Ne w York : Schockcn Books,

Gitl in , T. (198 0) The Whole World is Wat ching. Berke ley and Los Angeles:

Univer sity of Californi a Press.

Hall , S. ( 1973) 'The det ermination of news photog raphs' , in S. Cohen and

J. YOLUlg (Eds.), The .il1anzifacw re rf News. London: Constable.

Jamie son , K. H . ( 199+, September 28) 'Politic al Ads) the Press, and Lessons in

Psychology ' , in The Chronicle rif HiBher Education) P: A56 .

Lewis, J. ( 199 1) The ldeoloqica! Octopus:An Exploration I!fTclevision and ItsAudience.

New York: Routledge.

Public Agend a Online (199 9 , May 25) ' Environmen t: People 's chief con cern s.'

In www, publicagenda. or g.issues

9: I

Picture Theory of Language

Ludwig Wittgenstein
Bod y Images

9:2

A ntonio Oama sio

9:3

Invol untary Memory

9:4

The Philosophica l Imaginary

9:5

Thought and Cinema: The Time-Image

9:6

The D ialectica l Image

9:7

Marcel Proust
Mich ele le Doeui!
C ilfes Oe leuze
Walter Benjamin
Ways of Rememberin g

John Berger

INT R O D U C TI O N

INTRODU C TIO N
Sin ce Aristotle's claim that the so~.l . never.thinks w ithout a mental image (1.7)
there has been an ongoi ng dispute abo ut the cur rency o f co nsciousn~ss or
the medium of th o~gh t, in part icular w hether humans think in pi ctorial
'images or language. Stephen Kosslyn (1980) and Howard Gardner (1985)
poi nt out that on the basis of a ph i losophi cal tradition cove red in Part One
of this vo lu me, the study of mental imagery w as central to early, pre
behaviourist psycholog y. ,W hen the topi c return ed to the agenda as part of
th (~ cognitive revol ution, the question was wh ether 'there were two separate
and equally valid forms of representation ' of thoughts in the mind, one
pictorial and the othe r pr opos ition al (Gardner, 198 5: 32 6). Kosslyn
subsequently cl aimed to have resolved the imagery debates by presenting
'a theory o f im agery piggybacked upon a theory of hig h level visual
perception' (1996: . 406 ). But hi s attempt to narrow images 'seen' in the
min d's eye and regarded as the 'mother of all internal representations' down
to a 'functional form' in some vi sual thought processes (1980: ,455) has not
stopped t he debate abo ut w hethe r men tal images are best thought of a,s
represent ation s or pictures - or whether any talk of images is really
necessary (.!\orty, 1980) .
Ludwig W i ttge n~te i n 's early phil osophy of language (9.1) ni c~ l y comp licates
the choice betw een thought as picture s or propositions by consldering mental
images as both . He famously later rejected hi s 'picture theory' of language
w hen he realised that the depiction of reality is 6'n ly one
many 'language
games' or functions of language (W ittgenstein, 1958). According to w.J.T.
Mitchell, he also wanted to cor rect the misreading of his 'pictures' as
'unmediatad copies' of reality, .rather than as 'arti fic ial, conventiona l sign~ ',
'very much like Peirce's icons' (5.2) that are 'not to be con fused with graphiC
images in the narrow sense' (1986: 2 1, 26). O n this account, thinking is an
activ ity of wo rking wi th verbal and pic toria l signs.

of

Neuroscie~t i st Anto nio Damasio (9.2) proposes an amb itious theory that

takes images in a broad sense to refer not only to interior representations o~

the exterior world but also to interior representations or maps of the state or
the body in relation to the enviro nment. ' Tho ught is an acceptable wo~d t~
deno te such a fl ow of images .. . images arc the cur rency of ou r mlll d
(Darnasio, 1999: 3 18, 3 19). H e seems to take us back to both Ari stotle an .
Bergson (2.7). But for Koss lyn, the a ~~e n ce, .acknow ledged by Damasio, ot
'a theory that specifies exactly how an Image r~presen !ed and proce s ~ed .. '
allows one to postu late an image fo: ~veryth mg (1980: 452 ). Accord ing t~
a neuroscientist and phil osopher pairing, M .R. Bennett and P.M .S. H a c ke~ .
'Mental images ... are a. major sourc~ of con ceptu ~ 1 co nfusion. For it I~
deeply temp ting to co ncerve of mental Images as sl?ecles of the genus imag~
(2 0 0 3 : 181 ). They woul d not even all ow mental Images to be included 1[1

I:

\JV.).T. M itchell's f amily of im ages (13. 1). No wonder that Gardner

characterises mental imagery as among the most 'vexi ng issues' of cognitive
science (1985: 339 ).
The selection from Darnasio also introduces a key problem for contemporary
neuroscience and the study of consciousness, namel y, h,ow"physi cal,
observable eve n~s i n the embodied brain are -also subj ectively ?cY,ail able fOt
reflection. One of the ways in whi ch cognitive scie ntists have trieo}O C9me
to grips with mental imagery is by considering certain types of thou ght, such
as memory. M arcel Proust (9.3) provides a wo nderf ul literary examp le of a
first-person reflection on a chi ldhood memory <is an extended.i mage, that is,
in Damasio's terms, sparked by a gustatory image charged w ith posit ive
emotion. Proust's vivid verbal representation of both his childhood and the
process of rememberin g brin g to m in d the verbal imagery and metaphoric
language discu ssed by Nietzsche (2 .6) and Ricoeur (8.2). Philosop her
Michele Lc Doeuff (9.4) argues that such imag isticJanguage is ihtrinsi and
necessary to philosophy as a specialised way of thinking an d y.'r iting . Her
view contrasts sharplywlth the early W itt genstein 's complaint that col loquial
'l anguage disguises the thought' , giving rise to philosophica l ,[l6D2~en.se, that
cap be eradicated by phil osophy as 't he logical c1arifi<;at ion, of l ho iights'
(1 922 : 4.002 , 34.1-12), That is t he self-understanding of much analytical
philosophy.
Gilles Deleuze (9.5) co nceives of phil osophy asa specialis ed pract ice of
working w ith concepts that arise frg m other practi ces, such as cin ema. In the
first.ofhis two-volurne.study on cinem a, Deleuze focused on the nature of
film as mov ing images, a medium that brought together ' movement, as
physical reality in the external world, and the im age, as psych ic reali ty in
consciousness', a combination that Bergson (2.7) had contemplated (1992 :
xiv). Fol lowi ng Peirce (5.2), Deleuz e classified movement-images according
to th ree for ms, cajegorisl ng ti me-i mages simil arly i n his second " vo lume.
':ere 'Deleuze explores how certain post-wa r ci nema "t~sP.P Q:9 s, to the
disj uncture between situation and action, 'a sQ!lt tering ofth'esen~o ry-motor
schema' (Deleuze, 1992 : IX). Cin ema not onl y 'i mplies the~pass a ge of time
t~rou~h movement , but 'almost allow s us to perceive t i m~', thw ugh differ,ynt
time-Images (Aumont, 1997: 130). Rather than ph il osop hy provi ding the
IO~ica l concepts to think abou t ci nema, the visual practice of cinernaf and
~hllosophy are 'intercut' together into a new assemblage in w hich -concepts.
like sound and co lour 'are the images of thought' (Dcle uze, 1992 : xi; see
also Barthes (5,3) and Eisenstein (10.2)).
Walter Benj amin's (9.6) difficult notion of the dia lectic image also concerns
how a practic e gives rise to di fferent ways of thin ki ng about time by means
01 an image, bu t hi s practice is w riti ng in mo ntage. Rather than' leavin g a
~et~ od to emul ate, Benjamin 's un fini shed Arcades project (1999 ) offer s an
IIlsp!ratio n for others to devise their ow n app roach (Buck-M orss, 1989). He
attempts to refashion the iconocl astic mod e of M arxist hi storica l material ism
( se~ the intro duction to Section 3, Ideolo gy Critique) by presenting histor y as
an Image that j uxtaposes past and present and in w hich the contradic tions
~f capitali sm, the simultaneity of progress and catastrophe, appear in a flash,
!Ike Proust's mom ent of awakeni ng (9.3).
john Berger (9.7) ho lds, in contrast to Benjamin, that histor ical me aning
makes sense of the capitalist present throu gh .narrative. ~Ii~ famous analysis
of advertisin g images fo ll ow s the model of Ideology critique by exposing
the 'fal se standar d' of desire generated by what Benjami n call ed the

IMAG E S

I MAG E A S T HO U G H T : 19 7

'p hantasmagoria' of co nsumer images (Berger, 19 72: 154; Benjamin, 1999,

8). Berger' understands the significance of photographs for personal
especially family memori es, proposing that such images can be invested With
a critical co nscious ness that is not un like Benj ami n's not ion. Berger
consider s each im age to be 'man-made' in that it 'is a sight w hich has been
recreated or reproduced; . "' detached from th e place and time in which it
fi rst made its appearance (19 72: 9-10). To raise con sciousness of a better
future, he suggests that photographs should be attached to co ntexts that
connect personal memories to social experiences, recent examples of which
mi ght be the wo rk of W. G. Sebald (1998) and Stephen Pol iakoff (2004).

PICTURE THEORY OF LANGUAGE

and

REFERENCES
J. (1997) The Image, tr. C. Pajackowska. London: British Film Institute.

Benjamin, W. (1 999) The Arcades Proj ect, tr. H. Ei land and K. McLaughlin.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bennett, M.R. and Hacker, P.M.S. (2003) PMosoph ical Foundations of Neuro science.

Oxfo rd: Blackwel l.

Berger, J. (1972) Ways of Seeing. London: Penguin..

Aum ent,

Buck-Morss, S. {1 98 9) The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjam in and the Arcades

Project. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

D arnasio, A. [199 9} The Feeling of What Happens: Body, Emotion and the Making of

Consciousness. l.ondon: Heinemann.

Deleuze, G. (1992) Cinema 1: The Movement-lmege, tr. H. Tomlinson and

B. Habberjam. London: Athlone Press.

Gardner, H. (1985) The Mind's New Science: A I-listor y of the Cogniti ve Revolution.

New York: Basic Books.

Kosslyn . S.M. (1980) Image and Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Kosslyn, S.M. (199 6) Image and Brain : The Resolution of the Imagery Debate.

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Mitchell, VV.j.T. (1986) lconology : Image, Text, Ideology. Chicago: University of

Chicago Press .

PoHakoii, S. CW04) Shooting the Past (DVD). London: BSC Worldwide Ltd.

Rorty, R. (1980) Philosophy and the M irror of Natu re. Oxford: Blackwell.

Sebald, W .G . (199 8) Rings of Sa/urn, tr, M. Hulse. London: Harvill Press.

Willgenstein, L. (1922 ) Trectstus togico-Pbiiosophicus, tr. C.K. Ogden. London:

Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Wittgenstein, L. (1958) Phi!osophical ln vestigations, tr, G.E.M. Anscombe. New York:

Macmillan.

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN

T he worl d is everythi ng that is the case.

J.1

The world is th e totalit y

or[act s, not of t hings .

[ . .. 1

1.13

The facts in logical space arc the wo rl d.

t.2

The wor ld divides in to facts.

[...]

2.1

V-/e make to ours el yes pict ures o f fact s.

2.11

Th e picture presents the facts in log ical space, the existence and
non-existence of atom ic facts.

2.12

The picture is a m odel of reality.

[... J

2.141

Th e picture is a fact .

[...]
2.151 1

Thus the picture is link ed with reality ; it reaches up to it.

2.1512

It is like a sca le applied to realit y.

... ]

2. 16

In order to be a p ictu re a fact m ust have some thing in common

w ith what it pic t ures .

2.16 1

In the pic tur e and the pictur ed th ere must be something

iden tical in order that the one can b e a picture of the other at

all.
2.17

What the pi ctu re m us t have in co m mon w ith reality in ord er to

be able to rep resen t it after its manner - r ightly or falsely - is its

form of rep resentation .
[...]
2.18

What every picture , of whatever for m, must have in common with

reality in order to be able to represent it at all rightly or falsely
- is the log ical form , that is, th e form of reality.

[... j

2.19

The logical pictur e can depict the world .

[... 1
2.201

The pict ure de picts rea lity b;' rep re sent ing a possibility 01' th e
existence and non -ex iste nce of atom ic fact s.
'

f...]
I.IJ d\\ig \Vlt t gc.n s t(.~in . from 1icJ(f('11W Lot!l co.- Phi J()i.('/phlcUI.

Pp. 29 'i."}

R--..l...-"I h" ou -,-mi'll ...i cm...

1 -~ . 06 . 1.00(-10": Ruutledge- & .Kcg~n

Paul , 19 2 2 ..

9: I

! ' ''.

; IMA GES

IMAGE AS THOUGHT: 19 9

2.2 1

Th e picture agrees with reality or not; it is right or wrong, true Or

false .

2.2 22

In the agreement or disagreement of it s sense 'with reality, it s truth

or falsity consists.

4.015

Th e possibilit y of sim iles, of all th e imagery of our language, rests

on th e logiC of representation.

In order to discover whether th e picture is tru e or false we lUUst

compare it with reality.

4-.01 6

In order to und erstand th e esse nce of the proposition , conside r

hiero glyphic writing, which pictures the facts it describes.

2 .22 3

To all of th em th e logical struc ture is common.

[. ,o j

[ ... ]

And from it came the alphabet with out the essence of th e

representation being lost .

Th e logi cal picture of the fact s is the thought.

I.. -l
3.01

[. .. J
3.03

[... J

The totality of true thoughts is a picture o f the world.

4.031 2

Th e possibil ity of propositions is based upon the principle of th e

representation of obje cts by signs (.. . J

We cannot think anything unlogical, for otherwise we should have

to think wliogically.

4.06

Propositions can be true or false only by being pictures of the reality.

3.032

To present in language anything which 'contradicts logic' is [... 1

im possible [. .. ].

3.1

In the proposition the thought is expresse d perceptibly through the

sen ses.

3 . 11

We use the sensibly perceptibl e sign (sound or written sign, etc.) of

the proposition as a projection of th e possible state of affairs (.. . j.

3 . 12

The sign through 'which we ex press th e thought

propositi anal sign [... ].

3. 14

[. .. ] Th e propositional sign is a fact.

call the

[ .. .]
3.3 22

[... 1the sign is arbitrary [... )

Thought is the significant proposition.

4 .001

The totality of propositions is th e language .

{... J
4 .0 1

Th e proposition is a picture of realit y.

Th e proposition is a model of th e reality as we think it is.

4.011

At the first glance the proposition - say as it stands printed on

paper - do es not seem to b e a picture of the reality of which it
treats . But nor does the musical score appe ar at first Sight to be a
picture of a musical piece; nor do es our phonetic spe lling (letters)
see m to be a picture of our spo ken language. And yet ~ese
sym bolisms prove to be pictures - even in th e or dinary sense of the
word - of what they r epresent.

I.. j
4.01+

The gramophon e reco rd, th e musical tho ught , the score, the waves
of sound , all stand to one ano ther in that picto r ial internal relation,
which holds b etween language and the world .

BODY IMAGES
ANTONIO OAMAS/O

[... In b rie f, my ] th eoreti cal acco un t speci fies th e Following:

That th e body (the body-prop er ) and the b rain form an integrated
organism and interact fully and mutually via chemical and neural
pathways.
That brain acthi ty is aimed primarily at assisting with the regulation of
the organism 's life processes both by coordinating internal body-proper
operations, and by coordina ting the interactions between the organism as
a whol e and th e phy sical and social aspects of the environment .
That brain activ ity is aimed primarily at sur vival with well-being; a brain
equippe d for such a primar y aim can engage in anything else secondarily
from writing poetry to designin g spaceships .
That in co mplex organi sm s such as ours , th e brain 's regulatory
operations depend on the cre ation and manipulation of men tal images
~i deas or thoughts) in th e pro cess we call mind.
Fhat the ability to per ceive objects and events, exte rn al to the organism
or int ernal to it, requires images. Examples of images related to the
exterior include visual , auditory, tactil e, olfactory, and gustatory images.
Pain and nausea are exa mples of images of the interior. The execution of
both autom atic and deliberated re sponses r equires ima ges. Th e
~rit ic ipation and planning of future re spo nses also require imag es.
Fhat the cr itical inte rface between body-prop er act ivities and the m ental
pat terns we call images consists of spe cific brain reg ions ,employing
r r('''n l.t"Jo j'JlltJJor ,Sp i nc.-.d h)' Ant onio Damasro. Londo n : Hcr vfll
pl" r rnl~S I(m o f T he R;)ncJ om Ho use Group Ltd .

Prl~ :<; :" ) )'{)0 1. pp.

jq + . S . Rt:pr m t(:d b,\'

IMAGE AS T HOU G H T : ,,? C i

<? O O : IMAG ES

circuits of neurons to con str uc t continual, dynamic neur al patterns

co rres po nding to different activit ies in the no;l)' - in effect , m apping
those act ivitics as they occur.
That th e ma pping is not necessar ily a passive pro cess. The structures in
which th e ma ps are formed have thei r ow n sayan t he ma pping and are
influenced by other brain str uctures .
J

Beca use the mind ari ses in a br ain that is integ ral to th e organism , the m ind
is par t of that wel l-wove n appara tus . In o ther words , body, brain , and m ind
are manifestations of a Sing le organi sm. Although we can dissect them under
the m icroscope for scient ific pu rp oses, the y are in effec t insepa rable under
normal op erating circ umstan ces .

*
Fro m my perspective the brain produces two k inds of im age s of the body.
Th e first I call rmQ8esj rom rhe.Jlesh. It compri ses images of th e body's interior,
drawn, for exam ple , fro m the sketc hy neural patterns that ma p the
structure an d state of visce ra suc h as the heart , the gu t, and the muscles,
alon g with the state of nu merous che mica l paramete rs in th e organism's
interior.
Th e seco nd kind of body image concerns particular parts of the body, such as
the re tin a in th e back of th e eye and the coc hlea in th e inner ear. ] call these
imaqes]rom special senso/)' probes. Th ey are images based on th e sta te of activity
in those particular body par ts when the y are modifi ed by objects that
physically impi nge upon those d evi ces from outside the body. Th at physical
impingement takes many forms. In th e case of th e retina and coc hlea,
resp ectively, the objects perturb the patt erns oflight and so und wave s, and the
altered pa ttern is captured in the sensory devices. In the case of touch , the
actual mechan ical contact of an object against the body boundary will change
the activit)' of nerve endings distributed in th e boundary itself - the skin.
Shape and texture inlages are derivatives of th is process.
T he ra nge of body changes that can be ma pped in the brain is very wide. It
includes the m icroscop ic changes that oc cur at the level of ch emical and
electrical phenomena (for exa m ple, in th e specialized cells of the r etina that
respo nd to patterns of ph otons carried in ligh t rays ) . It also includes
macroscopic changes that can b e seen by th e naked eye (a limb m oving) or
sensed at the tip of a tlnger (a bump in the skin) .
In eit he r body image, from the flesh or fro m th e special senso ry probes, the
me chanism of prod uction is the same. Fir st , the activ ity in body structureS
resu lts in mom enta ry structura l body cha nges . Seco nd, the brai n constructs
ma p.s of those bo dy cha nges in a num ber of app ro priate r eg ions with ~c
heIp of che mica l signa ls co nveyed in th e blood stream, and electr ochernJ ca1
signa ls conveyed in ner ve pilthwa,;'s, Finally, th e ne ural m ap~ becom e me nta l
imag es .
ln the t'il-st kind of body images, the images from th e flesh, the changes
occur all over our interio.r landscape and arc Signaled to the body-sensing

regions of the central nervous syst em by chem ical molecules and ner ve
activity. In the second kind of body imag e , th e im ages fro m special se nsory
prob6 , the chan~es o~cur withi n highly specialized body pa.rts suc h as. the
retin a. The resultmg SIgnals are rel ayed by neuronal connections to region s
dedi cate d to m appin g the stat e of that sp ecialized b ody receptor. The regi on s
arc made of co llectio ns of n euro ns who se state of acti vity or inactivity fo r m s
a patter n tha t can be conceived as a ma p or representation of whatever event
caused the activity to occur at a givcn time in a ce rtain group of n euron s and
no t in another. In the case of the retina, for example , th ose vision-re lated
structures include th e geniculate nu cle us (par t of th e th alam us) , th e
super ior co llicu lus (par t of the brain stem), and the visual co r t ices (pa r t of
the cerebral hemi sph eres) .The list of specialized par ts of th e body in clu des:
the coch lea in the inne r ear (related t o sound ); the semicircular cana ls of the
vestihule , also within the inner ear, where the vestibular n erv e begins (the
vestihule is rel ated to the m apping o f th e body 's position in space; ou r sense
of balance depends on it) : th e olfactory ner ve endings in the nasal m ucosae
(for the sense of smell) ; th e gustatory pa pillae in the bac k o f t he tongue (for
taste) ; an d the ne rve endings di st ributed in th e superficial layer s of the skin
(lor tou ch ) .
I believ e that the foundational images in th e stream of m ind are images of
some kind of bod y event, whether the event happ en s in the depth of the
body or in some specialized sensory device near its pe ri phery. Th e basis for
tho se foundat ional im ages is a collection of bra in maps, that is, a collec tion
of patterns of n euron activity and inac tivity (n eur al patter ns, for short) in a
varie ty of sensory regi on s. Thos e brain maps represe nt , co m prehensively,
the struct ur e and sta te of the body at any g iven time . SOIDe map.s rel ate to
the wo rld within, the organism 's interior. O the r m aps relate to the wor ld
Outside , th e physical wo rld of objects that interact w it h the organism at
spec ific regi on s of its shel l. In eith er case, w hat ends up hein g mapped in th e
sensory regions o f the br ain and what emerges in th e m ind, in th e fo rm of
an idea, co rres ponds to som e str ucture of the body, in a pa rticular state and
set of circ umstances.'

*
It is impor tan t that r qualify these state m ents, especial lv th e last . There is a
major gap in our cu rrent un d e rst an d in g of how neur al patterns becom e
mental images. The presence in the brain of dynamic neural pattern s (o r
maps) relat ed to an object or event is a necessary but no t sufficient basis
to expl ain th e mental ima ges of the said object or even t . 'vVe can describ e
neu ral pa tte r ns - w it h the tools of ne w'oanato my, ne urophysiology, and
neuroc hemistry - and we can describe im ages w ith the too ls of
introspection . H ow we get fro m the forme r to th e latter is kn own only in
pan , alt hough th e curren t ignor ance ne ith er contrad icts the assumption that
images ar c biological pr oces ses nor den ies t h eir ph ysicality. Man y recen t
studies o n the ne ur obi o logy of conscio u sness addre-ss this issue. Most
Co ns c iOllSnCs.~ studies arc actually centered on this issue of the making of the
mind , the part of the co nscio usness puzzle that. co nsists of having the brain

;:: 0 2 : IMAGES

make im ages that are synchro nized and edited into what J have called the
' movie-in-th e-brain .' But th ose studies do not pro vide an answer to the
puzzle yet, and J wish to mak e d ear that I am not pr oviding an answer either.
[ 1 At th e level of systems, J can explain the process up to th e organization
of neural patterns on the basis of whi ch m ental im ages will ar ise. But I fall
shor t of suggesti ng, Jet alone explaini ng, how th e last ste ps of the
im age-m aking process are carried ou t ."

NOTES
J . Footnote removed.
2. Footnote rem oved.

83

INVOLUNTARY MEMORY
MARCEL PROUST

For many year s already, ever ything about Com bray that was not the theatre
and dr ama of my bedtime had ceased to exist for me, when on e day in winter,
as ] came hom e, my mother, seeing that I was cold, suggested that, contrary
to my habit , J have a littl e tea. I refused at first and then , I do not know why,
changed my mind. She sent for one of those squat , plump cakes called petites
madeleines that look as thou gh th ey have been mould ed in the g rooved valve
of a scallop -shell. And soon, m echanically, opp ressed by the gloomy day and
th e pro sped of a sad future, I carried to my lips a spoonful of the tea in which
I had let soften a piece of madeleine. But at th e very instant when the
mouthful of tea mixed with cake-cr um bs tou ched my palate, J quivered ,
atte ntive to the extraordinary thing that was happening in me . A delicious
pleasure had invaded me , isolated m e, witho ut my having any notion as to its
cause. It had immediately mad e the vicissitu des of life unimportant to me, its
disasters innocuous , its brevity illusory, acting in the same way that love acts,
by filling me with a pre cious essence : or rather this essence was not in me, it
was me . I had ceased to feel I was mediocre, cont ingen t , mortal. W here
co uld it have come to m e from - this powerful joy? I sensed that it was
connecte d to the taste of the te a and the cake, but that it went infinitely far
beyond it , could not be of th e same nature. 'W here did it come from ?What
did it mean? How could J ~'asp it ? I drink a second mo uthful, in which r find
nothin g more than in the first , a third that gives me a littl e less than the
second . It is t ime for me to stop, th e virtue of th e drink seems to ~c
d imini shing. It is dear that the truth I am seeking is not in the drin k, but In
me. Th e dr ink has awoken it in me, but does not know that truth , and cannot
do m ore than rep eat indefinitely, 'w ith less and less force, this same testimony
whi ch r do not know how to int erpret: and which I want at least to be able to
f ro m In Scorch I>J Lost limel ~~Jlumc J ~ Th.:rJ,.:~,.1J)' Swut'm 's hy .\ 1.uccl Proust . tr an l'l latcd with an Int ro d uct ion
and No tes h)" J.vd ia Da ...' is. (Lond on : Alk..: n Lln{~. The Peng uin Press, 20( 2 ). Tra nsh tio n and .cd lt r)t ia l mat wr
copy right ~;. J.yrha 'J .v". ?Om .

IMAGE AS THOUGHT : 2 0 3

ask of it again and find again , intact , available to me, soon, for a decisive
clarification . I pu t down the cup and turn to my mind . It is up to my mind t o
And the t ru th. But how? What grave un certainty, whene ver th e mind feels
overtaken by itself; when it, the seeker, is also the obscure country wh ere it
must seek and wher e all its baggage will be nothing to it. Seek? Not only that:
create . It is face to face with some thin g that doe s not yet exist and th at only
it can accomplish, then br ing int o its light.
And I begin asking myself again what it co uld be, this unknown state whi ch
brought with it no logical pro of, but only the evidence of its felicity, its reality,
and in who se pr esence the other states of consciou sness faded away. I want to
try to make it reappear. I go back in my thoughts to the moment when 1 took
the first spoonful of tea . I fmd the same state, without any new clarity, I ask
my mind to make ano ther effort, to bring back once more th e sensatio n th at
is slipping away. And, so that nothin g may break the thrust with which it will
try to grasp it again, I re move every ob stacle, ever y foreign idea , I protect my
ears and my attention from the noises in the next room. But feeling my mind
grow tired with out succee ding, I now force it to accept the very distra ction ]
was denying it, to think of something else , to recuperate before a supreme
attempt. Then for a second time I create an empty space before it, [ confront
it again with the still rec ent taste of th at first mouthful and I feel some thing
quiver in me, shift, try to rise, something that seems to have been unanchored
at a great depth ; I do not know what it is, but it comes up slowly; I feel the
resistance and I hear th e murmur of the distances tr aver sed .
Undoubtedl y what is flutterin g th is way deep inside me must be the image ,
the visual mem or y whi ch is attached to this taste and is trying to follow it
to me. But it is str ugg ling t oo far away, too confusedly; I can just barely
perceive the neutral glimmer in which is blended the elu sive eddying of
stirred- up colours; but I cannot distinguish th e form , cann ot ask it , as the
one possibl e interp reter, to tr ansl ate for me the evide nce of it s
contempor ary, its insepar able companion , th e taste, ask it to tell m e wh at
particular circumstance is involved, what period of the past.
Will it r each th e surface of my limpi d consciousness -- this memor y, thi s old
mome nt which th e attraction of an ide n tical moment has come so far to
summ on, to move , to raise up from my very depths? I don't kn ow. Now J no
longer feel anythi ng, it has stoppe d, gone back down perhaps; who know s if
It will ever rise up from its darkness again7Ten ti me s I must be gin again, lean
d ?\~n toward s it. And each ti me , the timidity that deters us fro m ever y
dIfhcult task, fro m every important piece of work, has counsell ed me to
leave it, to drink my te a and think only about my worries of today, my
desires for tom orrow, which may be pond ere d painlessly.

A:ld suddenly the memory appeared. That tast~ was the taste of the littl e piece
maddeine which on Sunday mor mngs at Combrav (because that day r did
hot go out before it was time for Mass) , when I went to say good morning to
her in her bedroom, my Aunt Leonie would give me after dipping it in her
infusion of tea 0 1' lime -blossom. The Sight of the little madeleine had not
recalled anythin g to me before [ tasted it; perhaps because I had often seen
OJ

. h ) ,~

I MAGES

them since, without eating them , on the pastry -cooks' shelves, and their
image had therefor e left tho se days of Combray and atta ched itself to others
mor~ rec ent ; perhaps b~cau s e, ~f these rec~ll e ct i ons abandoned so long
outside my m emo ry, nothing survived, everyth mg had come apar t; the fonns
and the form, too , of the liale shell made of cake, so fatly sensual \vithin its
severe and pious pleating - had been destroyed, or, still half asleep, had lost
th e for ce of expamion that wou ld have allowed them to rejoin 111"
consciousness. But, when nothing subsists of an old past, after the death
people, after the destruction of things, alone , frailer bu t more endu ring, m Ot e
imma terial, more per sistent , more faithful, smell and taste still remain for a
long time , like souls, rem embering, waitin g, hoping, on the ruin of all the
rest , bearing without gh'ing \vay, on their almost impalpable drop let , the
imm ense edifice of m emo ry.

;r

And as soon as Thad recognized the taste of the piece of madeleine dipped in
lime-blossom tea th at my aun t used to give me (though I did not yet know
and had to put off to much later discovering why this mem or y made me so
happy) , imme diately, the old gre y house on the str ee t , wh ere her bedroom
was, came like a stage- set to attach itself to th e little wing op eni ng on to the
gar-den that had been built for my parents behind it (that trun cated section
whi ch was all I had seen before then ); and with th e hou se the town , from
morning to night and in all weath ers , the Sq uare, wher e they sent me before
lunc h, the' streets where I went to do erra nds, the paths we too k if
the weathe r was fine . And as in that game in which the Japanese amuse
themselves by tilling a porcelain ho wl with water and stee ping in it little
pieces of paper until then indistinct , which, th e mom ent th ey are immersed
in it, stre tch and shape themselves, colour and differ entiate , become flowers,
houses, hum an figur es, firm and recognizable , so now all the flower s in our
garden and in M. Swann's park , and the water-lilies on the Vivonnc , and the.
good pe ople of the village and their little dwellings and the churc h and all at
Cambra)' and its sur ro und ings, all of this whi ch is assuming form and
substance, emerged , town and gardens alike, from my cup o f tea.

9:4

TH E PHILOSOPHICAL IMAG INARY

M,CHELE LE OOE U F F
Wh eth er on e looks for a characterization of phil osophical discourse
to Plato , to Hegel or to Bremer, one always meet s with a refer ence to the
ration al, th e concept , the argued , th e logical, th e abstract . Even whe n a
cer tain coyness leads some aut horities to pretend that they do not know
what philosoph y is, no agn osticism remains about what philo sophy is not.
Philosophy is not a story, not a pictorial description , no t a work of pure
Plate 1 (Fig ure 5.3)
Michele Lc Do cuff, fr<>m TJu PJ'i l050ph ical h ll ds i nary . t r, Colin G o rd on . Londo n : At hlont Pr-e...:-.~ 1989,
pp _ 1-1 9. H(:print ed hy lw r m issio n of'Thc Co ntin u um In ter-nat ional Pu blishing Gro up and Stanfo rd
U nh""' rsity P n .:s.'i.

I M A G E AS THOUGHT : 205

liter atu re. Philosophi cal discourse is ins crib ed and declares its stat us as
philosoph y through .a break with myth , fable, th e poetic, the domain of th e
iJllage . Hegel says, In effect, that the form of thought is th e sole for m of
philoso phy, aft er first remarking that 'opposit ion and str uggle b et~'een
philoso phy and so- called popular no tions conve yed through myth ology IS an
old phe no menon .'l It is, indeed , a ve,y old com m onplace to associate
philosophy with a cer tain 1080S th ought of as defining itself through
opposition to other type s of discourse .

If, however, on e goes looking for this philosophy in the tex ts whi ch ate

_..

"

~.

"";;;;'

Plate 4 (Figure 11 2)

. .J

meant to embody it, the least that can be said is that it is not to be found
there in a pure state .We shall also find stat ues th at breath e the scent o f roses,
comedies, tragedies, architects, foundati ons, dwellings, doors and window s,
sand, navigator s, various mu sical instrumen ts, islands, clo cks, ho rses,
donkeys and even a lion , r epresen tatives of eve ry craft and trade , scenes of
sea and storm , forests and trees : in short , a who le pi ctor ial world suffic ient
to decorate even th e dryest ' History of Philosophy' .
But only to decorate, no thing more. If someone set out to write a history of
philosophical imagery, would such a stu dy ever be as much an accepted par t of
the historiography of philosophy as histories of philosophi cal concepts ,
procedure s or systems ? If one fur ther argued that existing histories of
philosophy arc at the very least incomplete, not to say mutilating, in th at they
never present us with any individual philosoph er's image -album , would such a
reproach be deemed worthy of ser ious consideration ?Th e image s that appear
in theoretical texts are normally viewed as extri nsic to the theoretical work, so
that to interest oneself in them seem s like a merely anecdotal approa ch to
philosophy.

[ ..1Philosop hy has always arrogated to itself the d ght or task of speaking

about itself, or having a discourse about its own discour se and it s (legitimate
or oth er) mod es, wri ting a commentar y on its own texts. 2 This m etadiscour se
regularly affirm s th e non-phil osophical chara cter of th ought in images. But
this attempted excl usion always fails, for ' in fact, Socrates talks about laden
a~s es, blacksmiths, cobbl ers, tanners.r' Variou s strategies have been pursued to
e.xor cize this inner scandal. One of them consists in pro jectin g the shamefu l
SIde of philosophy on to an Other. This denegation (in which th e \Nr iting
subject disavows what he himsel f writes) is simp le in its mechani sm and
\'~ riable in its forms. In rough terms on e can say that the occurrence of a
dISCourse in images can be despatched either upstream or downstream .
The upstream hypothesis is the resur gence of a prim itive soul, of archaic or
Infantil e thought , of an un educated or ineducable part of th e m ind .
Paradigms of thi s projected Other are the child (in that we have all been
one, before becoming ... a man l), nu rsery sto r ies, th e people (ir rational by
nature), old wives' tales , folkl ore, etc . As Co uturat puts it ;" we ro ck th e
child wh o is still within us, even in the philosoph er ; and as this child is non e
othe r tha n th e irrational part of the soul whi ch Plato compares to the
common crowd , myth s will always ser ve ' to enc hant what th ere is of th e
common people in us' . [. .. ]

I MAGE AS THOUGHT: 207

Z, 0 6 : IMAGES

In the downstream variant of the idea, recourse (he re termed didactic Or

pedagogic) to imagery is seen more in terms of an adaptation to the intended
recipi ent of a discourse. Imagery speaks dir ectly, with intuitive clarity, to a
destin ed interlocutor who is still uncultivated by concepts and ignorant of
philosophy, or at any rate of this philosophy. The image is a gangway, a
mediation between two theoretical situations: the speaker's and the recipient's.
Here th en are two possible alibiS, two in fact diametrically OppOSite
conceptions of the meaning within theoretical texts of thought in images,
which nevertheless lead to the same result . Eith er one maximizes the
image 's heterogeneity [... J or one absorbs the image co mple tely into the
conceptualized problematic, its meaning being considered as congr uent
with the theoretical results which it simply translates or illustrat es. A dross
coming from elsewhere, or a duplicate, serviceabl e to the reader's deficient
culture yet dispensable, if philosophers 'were left fr ee to sp eak only to other
philosophers! In each case there is a common failure of recognition: whe ther
the image is seen as radically heterogeneous to, or completely isomorphous
with, the corpus of concepts it translates into the Other's language, the
status of an element within philosophical work is denied it. It is not part of
the enterprise . [.. . ]

*
let us StTCSS once more that imagery and knowledge form, dialectically, a
common system. Between these two terms there is a play of feedba cks which
maintains the particular regim e of the discursive formation. Philosophical texts
offer images through which sub jecti vity can be structured and given a marking
which is that of the corpo rate body. In turn, the affectivity which is thus
moulded sustains the effor t of philosophi c production and the system of
presuppositions which govern the distinction between the thinkable and the
unthinkable for a con sciousness attached to settled loves. But since the
relationship between the content of these two modes of writing is always
marked by negativity, there can be no question of reducing one term 10 the
other. Philosophical work is not the mechanical prolongation of fantasy - nor
vice versa. [. ..] The idea of a dialectical solidarity between reverie and
theoretical work mu st , in my view, necessarily lead to a study of the
particularism of a social minority and its problematic encounter with other
thought and oth er discourses - and also to an appreciation of the tension
betwe en what one would like to believe, what it is necessary to think and what
it is possible to give lOgical form.Th ere is no closure of discourse, discouisc only
ever being a co mpromise - 01 bricolage - between what it is legitimate to ~ay,
what on e would like to contend or argu e, and what o ne is forced to recognIze.

THOUGHT AND CINEMA:

THE TIME-IMAGE
GILLES OELE:UZE

Over several centuries , from the Greeks to Kant , a revolution took pla ce in
philmophy ; th e subordin ati on of tim e to movement was reversed, tim e
cease~ to be the m easurement of normal movem ent, it increasingly appears
for itself and created paradoxical movem ents.Tim e is out of joint : Hamlet's
words signify that tim e is no longer subordinated to movement , hut rather
movement to ti me. It cou ld be said that, in its own sphe re , cinem a has
repeated th e same experience, the same r eversal , in more fast -moving
circumstan ces. Th e movement-image of the so-called classical cinema gave
way, in th e post war period, to a direct time-image. Such a general idea must
of course be qu alified, corrected, adapted to concrete examples.
\Vhy is the Second World War taken as a break? The fact is that, in Europe,
the post-war period has greatly increased the situ ations which we no longer
mow how to r eact to , in spaces which we no lon ger kn ow how to describe.
These were 'a ny spaces whatever' , deserted but inh abited , disused
warehouse s, waste gro u nd, cities in the COu rse of demolition or
reconstr uction . And in these any-spaces-what ever a new race of cha racters
was stirring, kind of m utant : they saw rather than acte d, th ey were seers.
Hence Rosselini 's great trio, Europe 5 I , Stromboli, Germany Year 0: a child in
the destroyed city, a foreign woman on the island , a bourgeOi S woman wh o
starts to ' see ' what is aro und her. Situations would be extre mes , or, on the
contr ary, th ose of everyday banality, or both at once: what tends to collapse ,
or at least lose its position , is the sensory-motor schema whi ch constituted
the acti on-im age of th e old cinema. And thanks to this loo sening of the
sensory -m ot or linkage , it is time, 'a little time in the pure st ate' , which rises
up to the surfa ce of th e screen. Time ceases to be derived from the
movem ent, it appears in itself and itself gives rise to ji:Jlse. movements. Hence
the importance of f alse cOlltinuity in modern cinema : the images are no
longer link ed by rational cuts and continuity, but ar e relinked by means of
false continuity and irrational cuts. Even the body is no longer exactly what
moves; subject of movement or the instr ument of act ion , it becomes rather
the. developer [rtheJateur] of time , it shows time through its ti redness and
\Valtmgs (An tonio ni).
It is not qu ite right to say that the cin ematographic image is in the pr esent.
:Vha~ is in th e pr esent is what th e image 'rep rese nts ', but no t th e image
Itself, whic h, in cinema as in painting, is never to b e confused with wh at it
reprcse n ~s . The image itself is. the system of th e relationships between its

[. .. ]

NOTES
1. Hegel, Lectures on th e.[>hilos0l'hy of Hi story, Introduct ion.
2. Footnote re moved.
3. Plato, Sympw ium 22 1e .
4. Revue de iWCw physiq ue et. de illomle, July 189 6 , Supplement , p, 16 .

: "/I"I !Jrti'a 2..l1l <i'Tu ne-Image, h)' Gilles Del cuz c, tr. Hu gh Tom linso n an d Rober-t G oleta . Lo ndon : At hlo nc Press;

-98y. Pp - xi-cd ii, 2 76-~ O . Tran slation (~"Th c At hlon c Press, 19S9 - Orig in all.r pu bli ~h (~d in Fran ce as

:-I ~~ "l"Ja 2, I' lnwJJ c - '[tmp ~ .:~ / Lux Ed itio ns. de Mtnui t, 1985 . Rc pr-in tc d by p (Al-mi:-i:-;io n of The Con tinu um

~ O t l' Jnat inn~1 Puhhs hing Group and

'rot: Llniver sit j' or Mi nnc,~ta P re -.;

v ,

g e

ecc e: I MAGES

I M A GE A S THOUGHT : 2 0 9

elements , that is, a set of relatio nships of time from w hich th e var iable
p resent only flow s. It is in this sense , I thin k, tha t Tarkovsky challenges
the distinction between montage an d sho t when he defines cine ma by the
'press ure of time ' in the shot. W hat is specific to the im age , as soon as it is
crca ti ve, is to make perceptible, to m ake visible, r elati onship s of ti me whicK
canno t be seen in the represented object an d do not allow' the m selves to
be reduced to the present. Take, for example, a d epth of field in Well es, a
tracking shot, in Visconti: we. ar: plung.ed i n ~? time I r.ath er than crossing
space. Sandra s car, at the begmnlng ofVisconti s film , IS already moving in
tim e, and Welles's characters occupy a giant-sized pla ce in time rather than
cha ng ing place in space.
Thi s is to say that thc time-image has nothing to with a flashb ack, or even
with a r ecollection. Recollection is on ly a former present , whil st the
characters who have lost th eir m em orie s in m odern cinema lit erally sink
back into th e past , or emerge fr om it, to ma ke visible wh at is co ncealed even
from recoll ecti on . Flashb ack is only a sign post, an d, wh en it is used by great
authors , it is there only to show much m ore com plex tem pora l str uctures
(for exam ple, in Mankiew icz, ' forking' time : recapturing th e m omen t when
time could have take n a d iffer ent co urse ... ) In any case, w hat we call
t emporal structure, or direct time-im age , clea rly go es beyond th e purely
em pi r ical succession of time - past -present -future. It is, for ex am ple, a
coexistence of distinct durations , or of levels of durati on ; a single event can
bel ong to several levels: the sheets of past coexist in a non-chrono logical
order. We see this in W ell es with hi s p owerful intuition of the ear th, the n in
Resnais with his ch ar act ers who return fr om th e land of the dead .
There are yet more temporal structures: [my ... ] wh ol e aim . .. is t o release
those that the cinematographic image has be en able to gra sp and reveal , and
which can echo the teachings of scie nce, what th e other ar ts can uncover for
us, or what philosophy makes understandable for us, eac h in their respective
ways. It is foolish to talk about th e d eath of cinem a bec aus e cinema is still at
th e: beginning of its investigations: making visible the se relationships of time
which can only appear in a creati on of the image. It is not cinema whICh
n eed s television - whose image remains so regrettably in th e present Wlless
it is enriched bv the ar t of cinem a. T he rela tions and disjunctions between
visua l and sou~d, between w hat is seen and what is said, r evit al ize the
problem and endow cine ma wi th n ew powers for capturin g time in the
imag e. (.. .]

*
The so-calle d classical ima ge had to be co nside red o n two axes. These twa
axes w ere th e co-ordinates of th e brain : on the o ne hand, th e im ages were
linked or exte nded accord ing to laws of association , of con tinu ity,
resem blance, con tras t, or opposit ion; on the o ther hand, associated images
we re internalized in a whole as concep t (integra tion) , w hich was in
tu r n continually ex ternal ized in asso ciable or extendable im ages
(differentiation ) . This is why the whole r em ained open and changing, at the
sam e time as a set of image s was always taken from a lar ger set . This was the

doubl e asp ect o f the m ovement-image, definin g th e out-of-field : in the first

place it w.as in touch with an ext~r ~or, in th~ second pla~ e it e~pre s ~ed a
whole w hich changes. M ovement 10 Its ext ension was the Immediate given ,
and the who le which changes, th at is, ti me, w as indir ect or m ediate
repr esen tation . But th ere w as a con tin ua l circ ula tion of the two her e,
internalizati on in th e w hole, ex ter nalizat ion in the image, circle or sp ira l
which constituted fo r cinema , no less th an for philosophy, the model of th e
Tru e as t otalization. This m odel inspire d th e noosigns of the classical image,
and th er e wer e necessaril y t wo ki nds of noosign.l In the first kind, th e
images were link ed by rati onal cut s, and formed under this condition an
extendabl e world ; between two im ages or sequences of images, the limit as
interval is included as the end of the one or as the beginning of the other, as
the last ima ge of the fir st sequence or as the first of the second . The other
kind of noosign mar ked the integrati on of th e sequ ences into a 'whol e (self
awaren ess as the internal represe ntation), but also the differentiation of th e
whole into exten ded se'l uences (be lief in th e external wo rld ). And, fro m
one to the other, the w hole was co nsta n tly changi ng at the same tim e as the
images were moving. Tim e as m easure of m ovement thus en sured a ge ner al
system of commensurab ility, in thi s double for m of the interval and th e
who le. T his was th e sple ndo ur o f th e classical image .
Th e m od ern image initiat es th e reign of ,in comrnen surables' or irrat ional
cuts : this is to say th at th e cut n o longer for m s part of one or th e o ther
image , of one or the other se quence tha t it separates and divided . It is on thi s
conchtion tha t the succession or sequ ence bec om es a series [... ]The inte rval
is set free, the in terst ice becomes irreducible and stands on its own. The fir st
conse quence is that images are no longer linked by rational cuts, but are
reiinked on to irrati onal cuts. [... ] By relinkage must be understood , not a
secon d linkage which would com e and add itself on, but a mode of origin al
and specific linkage, or r ath er a specific connection between th e de-linked
images. There are DO longer groun ds for talking about a real or possible
extension capable of cons titu ti ng an external world: we have ceas ed to
believe in it , and th e im age is cut off from the external world . But th e
Intern alizat ion or in tegrat ion of sel f-aw areness in a whole has no less
disappeared : th e re linkage takes pla ce through a parcelling, whether it is a
matte r of the co ns tr uction of ser ies in Godard, or of the transformati on of
sheets in Resnai s (relinked par celings) . This is why thought , as power w hich
has not always ex isted, is b orn fr om an outside more dist ant th an any
exter na l world, and, as power whic h d oes not yet exist, co nfr onts an insid e ,
an unthinkable or unthough t, dee pe r than any internal world . In th e second
pla<.: c, th ere is no lon ger anv m ovem ent of internalization or ex ter nalizati on
int egrati on or di ffcr elltiati~n , but a confro n ta tio n of an outside and an inside
ind ependen t of dist ance , this thought outsid e itse lf and thi s un -thought
With in thoug ht . [. .. ] T he brain has lo st its Eucl ide an co -ordinates, and no w
em.its other signs. The direc t tim e-im age effec tively has as noos!gm the
Irrational cut be t:>vecn non-linked (hu t always r elin kcd j im ages, and the
absol ut e con tact be tween non- to talizablc, asymmetrical outs i"~ and inside.
\Ye mo ve w ith ease from one to the other, bec ause the outside and th e inside

2 10 ; I M A G E S

are the two sides of the limit as irrational cut, and because the latter, no
longer forming part of any sequence, itself appears as an autonomous
outside which necessarily provides itself with an inside.
The limit or interstice, the irrational cut, pass especially between the visual
image and the sound image . This implies several novelties or changes. The
sound must itself become image instead of being a component of the visual
image; the creation of a sound framing is thus necessary, so that the cut
passes between the two framings, sound and visual; hence even if the out
of-field survives in fact [enJai(], it must lose all power by right [de drOit]
because the visual image ceases to extend beyond its own frame, in order to
enter into a specific relation 'with the sound image which is itself framed
(the interstice between the two framings replaces the out-of-field); the
voice -off must also disappear, because there is no more out-of-field to
inhabit, but two heautonomous' images to be confronted, that of voices and
those of views, each in itself, each for itself and in its frame . [... ] And vet
there is a relation between them , a free indirect or incommensurable
relation, for incommensurability denotes a new relation not an absence.
[ ... J This will be the contact independent of distance, between an outside
where the spee ch-act ris es, and an inside where the event is buried in the
ground; a com pleme ntarity of the sound image, the speech-act as creative
story-telling, and the visual image, stratigraphic or archaeological bUl:Ying.
And the irrational cut between the two, which forms the non-totalizable
relation, the broken ring of their junction, the asymmetrical faces of their
contact. Thi s is a perpetual relinkage. Speech re aches its own limit 'which
separates it from the visual ; but the visual reach es its own limit which
separates it from so und . [.. .] These new signs are lecto signs, 4 which show
the final aspect of the direct time-image, the common limit: the visual image
become stratigraphie is for its part all the more readable in that the speech
act becomes an autonomous creator. I...] From classical to modern cinema,
from the movement-image to the time-image, what changes are not only the
chronosigns, S but the noosigns and lcctoslgns, haVing said that it is always
possible to multiply the passages from one regime to the other, just as to
accentuate their irreducible differences .
[... ] For many people, philosophy is something which is not 'made', but is
pre-existent, ready-made in a prefabricated sky. However, philosophical
theory is itself a practice, just as much as its object. It is no more abstract
than its object. lt is a practice of concepts , and it must be judged in the light
of the other practices with which it interferes. A theory of cinema is ~ot
'about' cinema, but about the concepts that cinema gives rise to and whIch
are themselves related to other concepts corresponding to other practices,
the practice of concept.~ in general having no privilege over others, any more
than one object has over others . It is at the level of the interference of many
practices that things happen, beings, images, concepts, all kinds of events.
The theory of cinema docs not bear o.? th ~ cinema, but on the concepts of
cinema, which arc no less practical, effective OJ" existent than cinema itself.
The great ('inem a authors arc lib: the great painters or musicians: it is they

IMAGE AS THOUGHT:21 1

who talk best about what they do. But, in talking, they become something
else, they become philosophers or theoreticians- even Hawks who wanted
no theories, even Godard when he pretends to distrust them. Cinema's
concepts are not given in cinema. And yet they are cinema's concepts, not
theories about cinema. So there is always a time, midday-midnight, when
we must no longer ask ourselves: 'What is cinema?' but 'What is
philosophy?' Cinema itself is a new practice of images and signs, 'whose
theory philosophy must produce as conceptual practice . For no technical
determination, whether applied (psychoanalysis, linguistics) or reflexive, is
sufficient to constitute the concepts of cinema itself.

NOTES
1. Editors' Note: Deleuze refers to Sandra ~f a ThousandDelights (1965).
2. [From the translators' glossary:] NOOSIGN: an image which goes beyond
itsdf towards something which can only be thought .
3. Editors' Note: Heautonomy, a term used by Kant, means disjunctive Synthesis,
or the paradoxical conjoining of actively differentiating elements into a transfer
mational synthetic whole.
4. [From the translators ' glossary:] LECTOSIGN: a visual image which must be
'read' as much as seen.
5. [From the translators' glossary:] CHRONOSIGN (point and sheet): an image
where time ceases to be subordinate to movement and appears for itself.

THE DIALECTICAL IMAGE

WAL TR BENJAMIN

Mem Flu8el is: zum Schwun8 herert,

lch kehne oem zuruck,

Derm blelb ich auch ,"bonchoe Zeit,

feb b,iue wem8 Gfuck.
- Gerhard Scholern,

'Gruss vom Angelus'

A Klee painting named 'Angelus Novus' shows an angel looking as though

he is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His
eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread . This is how one
pictures the angel of history. His face is turned towards the past . Where we

O pening par~gr..),ph from "Theses on t~ I (: PhJla:-:.oph)"of Hlstor-v", ]1(). rx in ll h JtMt;ad ollS. N(":\,>,York:

S(~h() ck.:.:n Books, 1968. ThE..: rC;n1;:i ':n,kr fr-om The "1rcadL! ~ rm]~ Cl . :-onvolun. ''0,' ' . 'Th c Theor v of Knov,,Jc:-dgc
l
lb\.:' 0 fJ' of Progress', trans. Hovva rd Eiland and Ke ....in Mt 'L::tug,hitn , pr o+:; 6,461 ,t 62- 3, 4-6 4 ) 4 7 6 ,
Carnbrid g(:, MA: Belknap Pn.'.":=' of l-Iar vard Unt'.:~~nLt) Pn.:ss , :~ .~ 199<) by th,~. Prc~ :-:.i dcm 3.11<1 Fe llows

or

liar varc] Coll ~g.:..':,

9~

IMAGE AS THOUGHT : 2: 3

212 : 1MAGES

perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which ke ep s pili ng

wreckage up on wreckage and huds it in front of his feet. The angel 'w ould
like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But
a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such
violence that th e angel can no longer close them . This storm irresistiblv
propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile ~f
debris before him gwws skyward. This storm is what we call progress.

*
In the fields with which we are concerned, knowledge comes only in
lightning flashes . The text is the long roll of thunder that follows.

[Nl,l]

bllrsting point with time. (This point of explosion, and nothing else, is the
death of th e intent io, which thus coincides with the birth of authentic historical
tim e, the time of truth. ) It is not that what is past casts its light on what is
present, or what is present its light on what is past; rather, image is that
wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a
conste])ation . In other words: image is dialectics at a standstill. For while the
reJaLion of the present to the past is purely temporal, the relation of
what-has-been to the now is diale ctical: not temporal in nature but figural
<bildlich>. Only dialectical images are gcnuinely histori cal - that is, not
archaic images. The image that is read - which is to say, the image in the now
of its reCOgnizability - bears to the highest degree the imprint of the perilous
criti cal moment on which all reading is founded .

[N3,11

*
A central problem of historical materialism that ought to be seen in the end:
Must the Marxist und er standing of history ne cessarily be acquired at the
expense of the perceptibility of history? Or : in what 'way is it possible to
cojoin a heightened graphicness <Anscbautichkeu> to the realization of the
Marxist method? The first stage in this undertaking will he to carryover the
principle of montage into history. That is, to assemble large-scale
constructions out of the sm allest and precisely cut co mpon ents. Indeed, to
discover in the analysis of the small, individual m oment the crystal of the
total event. And , therefore, to break with vulgar historical materialism. To
grasp the constru ction of history as su ch. In the structure of the
com m en tar y. [] Refuse of history []

[N2,6]

*
It's not that what is past casts its light 011 what is present, or what is present
its light on what is past; rather, image is that wherein what has been comes
together in a flash with the now to form a con stellation. In other words,
image is dialectics at a standstill. For while th e relation of the present to the
past is a purely temporal, continuous one, the relation of what-has-been to
the now is dialecti cal: is not progression but image , suddenly emergent.
Only dialectical images are genuine images (th at is, not archaic); and the
place where one encounters them is language. [I Awakening []

[N2a,3]
What distinguishes images from the "essences" of phenomenology is their
historical index. (H eidegger seeks in vain to rescue history for phenomenology
abstractly through "historicity.") These images are to be thought of entirely
apart from the categories of the "human sciences", from so-called habitu S,
from style, and the like. For the histor ical index of the images not on ly says
that they belong to a pal-ticular time; it says, above all, that they attain to
leg ibility only at a particul ar time. AmI, indeed, thi s acceding "to legibility"
con stitutes a specific critical point in the movem ent. at their interior. Every
present day is determined by the images that arc synchronic with it: each
"now" is the now of a par tic ular rccogni7.ahility. In it, truth is charceci to the

*
Is awakening perhaps the synthesis of dream consciousness (as thesis) and
waking consciousness (as antithcsisj r Then the moment of awak ening would
be identical with the "now of re cognizability," in which things put on their
true -- surrealist - face. Thus, in Proust , the importance of staking an entir e
life on life 's supremely dialectical point of rupture: awakening. Proust
beg ins with an evocation of the space of so me one waking up .

[N3a,3]
In th e dialectical image, what has been w ith in a particular epoch is alw ays,
simu ltan eouslv, "w hat has been from tim e immemorial." As such, however,
it is manifest, 'on each occasion, only to a quite specific epoch - namely, the
one in which humanity, rubbing its eyes, recognizes just this particular
dream image as such. It is at this moment that the historian takes up, with
regard to that image, the task of dream int erpretation.

(N4 ,1]

*
To thinking belongs the movement as wel! as the arrest of thoughts. Where
thinkmg comes to a stan dstill in a constellation saturated with ten sion s
there th e dialectical image appears. It is the caesura in the mo vement of
thought. Its position is naturally not an arbitrary one. It is to be found, in a
word, where the tension between dialectical opposites is greatest. Hence,
the object constructed in the materialist presentation of history is itself the
dialectical image . The latter is identical with th e historical object; it just ifies
its violent expulsion from the continuum of historical process.
(N10a,3]

*
[.. . ] History decays in to

irnagc.~ ,

n o t into stories (. .. ,]

[N 11,4]

i? , <1 : I MAGES

:7

WAYS OF REMEMBERING
JOHN BERGER
[TJhere are t wo dist inct uses of photography: the pri vate and th e public. The
private , that is to say the photographs on e has of the people on e loves, one's
friends, th e class on e was in at scho ol, etc. ; in pri vate use a ph otograph is
read in a cont ex t whi ch is still co ntin uou s with that from whi ch it was taken .
Take a photograph of your Mother. Th ere 's still that pri sing away of an
instant . But th er e rem ains a conti nuity b etween you and your ex perience
and your Mother. Th e pr ivat e cont ext cre ates a continuity w hic h is par allel
to the cont inuity from which th e ph otograph was or iginally taken.
Pri vat e photographs ar e nearly always of something which yo u have kn own .
By contras t publi c pho tog raph s ar e usually imag es of th e unknown or, at
best, they are images of things whi ch are known onl y th rou gh othe r
ph otograph s. The public ph oto graph has been severed from life when it was
tak en, and it rem ain s, as an isol ated image, separate from yOill ex p er ience.
The public photograph is like th e m emory of a total stranger, a total stra nger
wh o has sho uted ' Look' at the event recorded.
Th ere is some thi ng abo ut every photograph which is intimate. It' s bound to
be so because it goes in , it isolates and it frames .You are always in a situation
of intimacy towards w hat has been photogra phed. Th at is anothe r reason
why J talk abo ut m em ory. At the same time be cau se th e public photograph
is divorced fro m all fir st -hand expe r ience, it represents th e m emor y of a
total st ranger. Who is this str anger ? One could answer that it is all the
photographers. Yet the photograph ers ar e only the agents of thi s me mor y.
They do no t construct the syste m .
Th ere is a cartoon that Daumier m ade of Nadar in a balloon over Pari s. His
hat is blowing off in the wind , and he has this very large clumsy camera with
w hich he is ph oto graphing the wh ole of Pari s below, This cartoon offers us
a clue. Perh aps th e eye of the total stranger is the eye of God , but the cye of
a totally sec ular ised, totally estrang ed God. A God of nothingness.
The faculty of memory allows us t o preserve certain events from obli vion.
Because of their expe r ience of thi s faculty, women and m en in n early all
cultures have assumed that there was somewhere an all-seeing eye . They
accredite d thi s eye to sp ir its, ances tors, Gods or a single God . Such an
all-seeing eye recorded all e vents , and th e idea of this eye was co nnec ted
with th e idea of ju stice, to be rem embered was to be red eemed ; to be
forgotten was to be conde mned . Th e all-seeing eye saw in order to ju dge.
The all-seeing eye recorded all events and in th at re cording was implicit a
kind of judgem ent.

Rep rod uce-cl fro m Tlu: Cmnl:f (/K'()f A: r:S.~ 'B .; C()n~ a( ()nJ .l f lXI M tJlj In Pho[("fVVphj'. l:d . J..~ .';i."iKol Evans Lo ndon .
()~i.l: )) PfL :SS: . 1997, pro 44 7 Reproduccd by p crmi saion of H.l v t:r ~ ()nlm / i ~.l;ld or.<l Publlshcrs.

H.l v ~ ~ r ~

I MAGE AS THO U G H T : ,2 , :':;

Ninet eenth-century cap italism elide d th e judgement of God into th e

judgem ent of history.Todav we live in a cult ur e which denies histor y, which
(; ut~ itself off from history, a cultur e of pure oppo r tunism . So we have the
systematic u se of photog raphs, used as an all-see ing eye, recording events .
But thi s all-seeing eye judges nothing : it uses nei the r the judgement of
history, nor the judgement of God , it is totally without jud gem ent. It is an

eye whIch records in order toforget.

Is an alte rnative use o f photography conceivable? Is it possibl e to use
photograph y addressing such a u se to the hop e of an alte rnative future ?
The im mediat e answer t o that is yes. You can use pho tography in all kinds of
agitp rop ways, you can mak e propaganda with photograph s - you can make
anti-capitalist propaganda, anti -imperialist propaganda . I wouldn't den y the
usefuln ess of thi s, but at th e same time I think th e answe r is incomplete. It' s
like tak ing a cannon and turning it round and fir ing it in the opposite
direction . You haven 't actually changed th e pr acti ce , you 've Sim ply changed
the aim .
How is it possible to use photography so that it doesn 't fun ction like the eye
of a totall y estranged God? We have to go back to th e distin ction I mad e
betw een th e pri vate and public uses of phot ography. In the pri vat e use of
photograph y, the ph otog raph does not le nd itself to any use, it does no t
becom e a complete ly value -free object becau se th e use reconstitut es th e
continuity from w hich it was ta ken . Maybe o ne has to co nside r how th e
private use o f photograph y co uld be extended, cou ld be en large d so that it
might cease to be private and become publi c.

[.. .1If the camera is n ot to be used as if it were the eye of a totally estranged
God, we can say that ph otography awa its a world historical consciou sness
which has yet to be achi eved . It awai ts a social memory which will transcend
the distinction between publ ic and priv at e.
How in practice can we use photographs, so that , e ven th ough we are using
them publicly, th ey are repl aced in a context which is co mpara ble to that of
priv ate photographs? [.. . J
Th e problem is to construct a context for a photograph , to construct it with
words, to constru ct it with other ph otograph s, to constr uct it by its pla ce in
an ong Oing text of ph otograph s and images. How ? No rma lly ph otographs
are used in a very unilinear way - th cv are used t o illustrate an argument
or to demonstra(e a th ou ght whi ch go~s like this:
'

.....

",...

Ver y frequently also U1CY. are ~s~d tautologically so th at th e photograph

merel y repeats what is bemg said JD wor ds. Mem ory is not unilincar at all.
Memory works radially, th at is to say.with an en ormous num ber of
associations all leadi ng to the same event . The diagram is like th is:

2 16 : IMAGES

~I/

/I\'

If we want to put a photograph back into the contex t of expe r ience , social
ex perience, social m emory, we have to respec,'t the laws of me mo ry. vVe have
to situate th e printed photogr aph so that it acquir es som ething of the
sur pr ising conclusiveness of that which was and is. Th ere are a few gr eat
photogr aphs which pr acti cally achieve thi s by th em selves. Any photog raph
may becom e such a 'Now ' if an adequate context is create d for it. In general
the bet ter the photograph, the fuller the co ntex t which can be created.
[ ... ]

Such a context replaces the photograph in tim e - not its own original
time for that is imp ossible - but in narrated tim e. Narrated time becomes
historic tim e whe n it is assum ed by social mem or y and social action. The
constr ucted narrat ed tim e need s to re spect the pro cess of m emory which it
hopes to stimulate.
There is never a Single approa ch to something remembered. The remembered
is no t like a terminus at the end of a line. Numer ous approaches or stimuli
converge upon it and lead to it. Words, comparisons, signs need to create a
cont ext for a printed photograph in a comparable way: that is to say, they must
mark and leave open diverse approaches. A radial system has to be constr ucted
aro und the photograph so that it may be seen in terms whi ch are
simultaneously per sonal, political, economic, dram atic, everyday and historic .

~l;}

FABRICATION

10: I

Takin g a Line for a W alk

Paul Klee

10:2

On Montage and the Filmic Fourth D imension

Sergei Eisenstein

10:3

Electroni c Tool s
William J. Mitch el!

10:4

Camera Lucida
David H ackn ey

10:5

Images Scatter into Data, D ata Gather into Images

Peter Celison

I N T R O D UCTION

INTRODUCTION

I'
I

The notion of image studies suggests a practice of analysing and interpreting

images, understanding their significance and their place in historical,

cultural, pol itical and economic environments . Yet, an equally important

aspect of image studies is the practical matter of making and manipulating

images. Different processes, materials and forms define diffe rent image

types, while cultural practices in one field, such as scientific exper.l rnen.,

tation. can influence image-making practices in another (Gombrkh,' 4':2).

For the painter, the process of making an image is usually consider-eo a
creative experimentation 'or study of forms and quali ties as they attest t o
various figurative or abstract concerns. For a radiologist, how ever, im,age
production is about securing a precise form of visual knowledge. Yet, in both
cases the results can lead to complex and beautiful images, whichjnight
equally be at home on a gallery wall . Similarly, ~ wide variety of m~ierials
and equipment are used in image making. Both the film-maker and aWo
physicist, for example, need to use increasingly sophistica ted visual
technologies in order to carry out their work. In onecase this might be t o
create a Virtual environment in wh ich to stage a science-fiction .drama, or in
another, to visualise far-flung dimensions .of our universe,wh i ~h normall y
remain invisible to the naked eye.
'

There is a clear danger - especially in trw confines of a book -such ~"s th}s
for image studies to further institutionalise a distance between image maKing
and image analysis. "Art historian James Elkins'-(2003: 157-9) urges us-toflnd
ways 'of bringi ng image-making into the classroorn s- not ju st in theory, but
in actual practice'. Furthermore, he makes the point that the making of
images (from drawing and painting to video editing) ought to 15e practised in
the same seminar rooms where historical and interpretativ e work takes
place. Otherwise, there will always remain a gulf f~etwe~n making . and
thinking about images; at worst, '[image] theory will be able to consolldate
the notion that study is sufficient to the understanding of images, and
independent of actual making' (Elkir.ts, 2003 : 159). TIl is-section has b e~n
devised not to fill the gulf, but to bridge it in part f~y focusing on the ways III
which the processes, techniques and materials oflmage making impact n o~
only on the appreciation and interpretation of images, but on the range at
image-making practices.
In the first twoentries, lrnage-practitioners write about their own art forms ~s
a way of both exploring their practi:=e. as wel] as seeking .-. in a qu ite didact ~c
manner - to shape our understanding of new conceptual and aesthetic
boundaries. Paul Klee (10.1 j vividly demonstrates the productive tension
between thinking about and doing art. Klee begins with nothing but the
point of his pencil and a need to set it in .moti?n. Klee is perhaps most well
known for how he turns nascent formati ons Into whole new vocabu laries

his app~oach r~s~moling bo~h the 'aut9matic w riting' of the Surrealists and
abstractl?n. HIS idea that lines andc olours have an energy or charge is
evi?ent I~ t~e abstract wor~ "he ~~ sp i red , such as Bridget Riley's black and
whIte paintings that use stnct geometric forms in tessellating patterns to
create the optical ill usion of'movement. She understands Klee's method 'not
[as] an end, but the . beg!.~ n i ng . Exery",pqinter starts.with elements - lines,
colours, forms - which are;:esserlti ClI!Y'qbstract in relation to the pictorial
experience that can be created w ith them' (Riley in Kudielka, 2002: 15), This
attention to lin es, colours, form s ancl'even apparently randorn'm arks informs
not only art practice but also ap preciatio n, and also needs to be extended to
non-art images, inciuding,Jar example; scientific and informational images
(see Bal, 5.4; Elkins, 1999 ):
.
The Soviet constructivi st film-maker Sergei Eisenstein (1 0.2) -: w()rking
around the same time as, Klee - appears to have held a similar belie f4i n the
'charged' materiality of his medi ~! m . E ist,ns_t~ln sought to fa sJliJ:~t~ or
'can struct' intellectual e n ga gem ent (~n or in order to t ell-stories !?'ut ~() cq~vey
abstract, political, ideas. The f0l!n~_at ~o r1a l principle of his worb is.cmonl a.ge/
the breaking up of 're ~ljJy' (i11 its- fiJ hl ~d -elements), to be recomposea ;f9 r
new psychological effect . an (L.1 9_~at i a:na J synthesis., F9J ~ i sen~~ in _ Jlj ~e
Benjamin, 9,6), montage meant njor~ than' th~ mere editi ng of op,eshpf with
another, Instead, his method 'w(js to.break-up reality into'usable:bl cJCksKpr
units, equivalent to ,the palette> of the musician's harmonic scale, " He
acknowledged the existence of.a domin arit meaning (such as n a rr~tive), I;u!
urged the tllm-maker to work 'w ith the O~ertoDe s as much as th dominant
in order to create toe equivalent ofthe " impressionism" of Debussy or
Scriab in' (Andrew; 1976: 59). Eisenstein iclehHfles film's o,w n specific
aesthetic, ,.which he called it~ 'fiLrlJ ic' f oLJrth dim ension, ori thls sj on
dominant level of meaning (see 'Barthes-S .S). Aswith K lee, form and)process
appear to matter more than sontent.
The remaining three entries cons;e[n the histaricis ing of images and i.mage
making (see also Crary? 12.1). "Wi l l i ~un" J. Mit~heW (1 0.3) focuses J)"th,e
technology of image making and the effect of new digital 'm ethods <;>n:bmh
th~ n~iture o~,it1Jages a(l~ ,~ktm~p-",rJ;!.l(ltionr~) ps to. images'.Th~ . 'p i~~ l.~ .a,:s" \~~.
buildll}g blo ck of .all. digItal Imagrng; like Saussure's slglllfler (5.1);:;) las
meaning not because it correspo nds -visually to ' a reality that has ;been
filtered into data, but in relation rto the othenpixels. Though-p ixels are not
themselves signs, like Bal's (5.4 ) subsemlotic elements, they contribute to th'e
overall meaning. The virtuality ofthe digital image-enables.ao expansion-o f
human relations with images, from looking to active interaction. Mi tchell's
tone emphasises the possibilities of digital images that bring to mind both
Marshall McLuhan's (1964) optimistic notion of media as ~extens i on s of
humankind, and critiques of McLuhan's technological utopianism that
emphasise the constraints of media and image forms on human relations
lBaudrillard, 1988). This raises the question of a possible overlap between
technophobia and iconophobia, and 'technophilia and iconophilia (see the
Introduction to Section 1).

~enowned contemporary artist David l-lockney (10.4) provides an

Interesting, controversial example of the appl ication of specialist knowledge
~o art history, as well :Jas an apprecianon of how technologies shape the
fabrication and appreciation at Images (lhde, 6.5: see also Section 12, Vision
and Visuality). He cl a i r~s that the .Old Masters relied on contemporary
Optical devices to achieve the Visual accuracy, but also occasional

IMA G ES

distortions, of their masterpieces. Susan Sontag is reported to have responded

by saying: 'If David Hackney 's thesis is corre ct, it would be a bit like fi nding
out that all the great lovers of history have been using Viagra' (Los A ngeles
Times, 03.12.01, p. Ali- At stake is the idea that the appreciation of great
paint ings must somehow .depend on the 'true' ability of artists to produce
them without technical mediation, whi ch leads us to question how we
appreciate figurative art since the invention of photography and new digital
technologies.
'
Peter Galison (10.5) charts the oscillation between iconoclasm and
iconophilia of attitudes towards imaging in astro- and microph ysics.
Returning to a scene set by Plato (104), Galison reviews debates about
whether the nature of scientific knowledge is essentially imagistic and
pictori al or abstract and logical. His sense that the debate cannot sjmply be
settled but shouId be understood in i IS different contexts resonates.. with
Mitchell 's view (1986), SCience images do not simply present non-visUaLaata
visually for convenience or pleasure, as images not only represent but also
constitute scientific knowledge that can then be translated back Il1 t()f,pata.
The making of science images is also the making of scientific k n ow ledg~ (see
also Kress and van Leeuwen, 5.5).

FABRICAT IO N : 22 i

TAKING A LINE FOR A WALK

PAUL KLEE

An active line on a walk, moving freely, without goal. A walk for a walk 's
sake. The mobility agent is a point, shifting its position forward (Figure 10.1) :

FIGURE 10.1

The same line, accompani ed hy compl ementary forms (Figures 10.2

and 10.3):

REFERENCES
Andre w, J.D. (1976) The Majo r Film Theories: An In trodu ction . Lon don: OXford
University Press.
Baudrilla rd, J. i1988) 'The masses: t he implosion of the social in the med ia', in
M . .Poster (ed.), Jean B8uclril/iii d: Selected Writings. Cambrid ge: Polity Press. pp. 20 7- 19.

Elkins, j. (1999 ) The D omain of Images, Ithaca, NY: Cornell U niversity Press.

Elkins, J. (2003) Visual Scudies: !\ Skep tical Introduction. New York: Routledge.

Kudielka, R. (2002) Psu! Klee : The Netureo! Creation - Works 1914""i 940: Lonaon:

.
.

Haywood Gall ery and Lund Humphries.

M cLuh an, M . (1964) Understsn ciing Media. London : Routledge & Ki?g<l,fl Paul.

Mitchell , W .J.T. (19B6) Icanalogy: Image; Tei i; tdeology. Chicago: U nive rsity of

Chicago Press.

FIGURE 10.2

FIGURE 10.3

The same line, cir cumscribing j tsdf (Figur e 10.4):

FIGURE 10.4
Two secondary lines , moving around an imaginary main line (Figure 10.5):

F IGURE 10.5
I" ul Kloc . fro m Ped'lJi!1Jj<al Sk<uhboo" 1.""<.1,,,,: Foh ~T & 1'01,..r, J 9>~ . pp , \ 6 2 1, Rep r-inted bl . l!rmi~ i~n

10

c:2 2 : I M A G E S

FABR ICATION: 2

An a ctive line , lim ited in it s movements by fixed poin ts (Figure 10. 6):

passive lines whi ch are th e result of an act ivation of plane s (line

progr ession ) (Figure 10.8) :

~1

;:~3

I---~,.

----...

FIGURE 10.6

A m edial lin e w hich is both : point progression and planar effect

(Figure 10 .7):

/;.

r'
FIGURE 10.8

Passive angu lar lines and passive cir cular lines b ecom e active as planar

cons tit ucnts.

Thre e conjugations :

~
L = area
point progression

FIGURE 10.7

In th e pro cess of being crea ted , these figur es have linear cha racte r; but once
co m pleted, this linearity is replaced by plan arity.

(0~S\'-l0
Gq>
a.
r i'tctive

plan a\. ~

FIG U R E 10.9

Semantic explanation of th e terms active, medial, and passive:

ac tive: I feU (the ma n fel ls a tr ee with his ax).

media l: I fall (the tree falls und er the ax st ro ke of th e man).

passive : I am being fell ed (t he tree lies fe lle d) .

medial
area

FABRICATION : 2 2 5

2 2.< : iMAGES

ON MONTAGE AND THE FILMiC

FOURTH DIMENSION

"

SERGEI EISENSTEIN

Orthodox montage is m ontage on the dominant , i.e. the com bin ati on of
shots according to their dominating indications. Montage according to
tempo. Montage according to the chief tendency within the frame. Montage
according to the length (continuance) of the shots, and so on. This is
montage according to the foreground.
The dominating indi cations of two shots side by side produces one or
another conflicting interrelation, r esulting in on e or another expressive
effect (I am speaking here of a purely montage effect) .
This circumstance embraces all intensity levels of montage juxtaposition
all imp ulses:

What takes place in acoustics, and particularly in the case of instrumental

music, fully corresponds with this.

As for th e dominant itself, to regard it as something independent, absolute

and invariably stable is out of the question. There are te chnical means of
treating th e shot so th at its dominant may he made more or less specific , but
in no case absolute.

There, along with the vibration of a basic dominant tone, comes a whole
series of sim ilar vibrations , which are calle d overtones and und ertone s. Their
impacts again st each other, their impacts with the basic tone, and so on,
envelop the basic tone in a whole host of second ary vibrations. If in acoustics
these collateral vibrations become merely 'disturbing' elements, these same
vibrations in music ~- in composition, become one of the most significant
means for affect by the exper im enta l com p osers of our century, such as
Debussy and Scriabin.

[ ... ]

I]

From a co mplete opposition of the dominants, i.e. , a sharply contrasting COn

struction, to a scarcely noticeable 'modulation' from shot to shot; all cases of
conflict must therefore include cases of a complete absence of conflict.

If w e have even a sequen ce of montage pieces:

A gray old man ,

A gray old woman,

A white horse,

A snow-covered roof,
we ar e still far from certain whether this sequence is working towards a
dominating indication of 'old age ' or of ' whiteness.'
Such a sequence of shots might proceed for some time before we finally discover
that guiding-shot which immediately 'christens ' the whole sequence in one
'direction ' or another. That is why it is advisable to place this identifying shot as
ne ar as possible to the beginning of the sequ ence (in an 'orthodox'
construction). Sometimes it even becomes necessary to do this with a sub-titIe.

( ... ]
In di stinction from orthodox montage according to particular dominan ts, Old
and New l was edited differently. In plac e of an 'aristocracy' of individualistic
dominants we brought a method of ' dem ocratic' equality of rights for all
provocations, OT stim uli, reganlingthem as a summary, as a complex .
Excer pt from FIl m Form ; l:u a'is in Film Theory hy Serg ei Erxc ns .tein , Eng lish tran.'d3.tion bv Jav I.<,'.Y(h. London:
Den nis D obson . 1963. Pl' . 64-.7 1. Copyr ight (c' 194 9 by Harco urt, Inc ., and n, nc,,"e,{ I 977b;' j, y Ley,l" ,
_

The point is that the dominant (With all these recognized limitations on its
relativity) appears to be, although the most powerful, far from the only
stimulus of the sho t . For example : thc sex appeal of a beautiful American
heroine-star is attended by many stimuli: of texture - from the material of
her gow n ; of light - from the balanced and emphatic lighting of her figure;
of racial - national (positive for an American audience: 'a native American
type ,' or negati ve; 'c o lo nizer-o ppressor' - for a Negro or Chinese
audience) ; of SOCial-class, etc. (all brought together in an ir on-bound unit)'
of its refl ex-physiological essence) . In a word , the central stimulus (let it
be, for instance , sexual as in our example) is attended alw ays by a whole
complex of secondary, or th e phv siological process of a highly nervous
activity.

--'nt..llw-..-""iuit>n.ol..u....J)JltWh"'

The montage of Old and New is constructed with this method . This montage
is built, not on particular dominants, but takes as its guide the total
stim ulati o n through all stimuli. That is th e or iginal montage complex within
the shot , ari sing from the collision and combinati on of the in dividual stimuli
inherent in it .
These stimuli are heterogeneous as regards their 'exter nal natures,' but th eir
refl ex -physiol ogical ess en ce binds them toge ther in an iron unity.
Physiological in so far as they ar e 'psychic' in per ception, this is merely the
phySiological process of a hiaher nervous a ctil'i 0'.
In this way, behind the general indication of the shot, the physiological
ary of it s vibrations as a whole, as a com p lex unity of the manifestations
of all its stimuli, is present. Thi s is the pe culiar :feelins' ef th e shot, produced
by the sho t as a whole .
SUrnm

[... J Th e b asic indication of the shot can be taken as the final summary
of its effect on the cortex of the brain as a whole, irrespective of the paths

by which the accum ulate d stim uli have h een hrought together. Thus
the 9ualit y of the totals can . be pl a ~ ed sid e by side in an y conflicting
Combination, thereby re vealmg entirely n ew po.ssibiliti es of montage
sol U tiori s ,
A.s we have seen, in the power of the vcr y genet ics of these methods, th ey
be attended by an extraordinary phy sioloq ical quality. As in that music

rnUst

.2'."6 : I M AGES

FABR ICATION : 2 2

w hich builds it s wo rks on a two- fold use of overton es. No t the classicisn, of
Beeth oven , but the pnysiolo8 ical qualuv of Debu ssy and Scr iabin .

J could no t fit the com bination of its pieces into anyone of th e orthodox

T he e xtraordinary physiological quality in the affect of Old and Nell' has been
rem arked by many of it s spect ators . Th e explanation for this is th at Old and
New is thefirs tJ ilm edited on the principle if the visual overtone. T his method of
montage can be interestingly verified.

categor ies, wi thin which one can app ly one's pu re ex per ience . On th e table,
deprived of motion , th e reason s for their choice seem completely
incomprehensi ble . Th e cr ite r ia for their assem bly appe ar to be outsid e
formally normal cinematographic cr ite ria .

If in the gleam ing classical distances of th e cinematogra phy of th e futu re,

ove r ton al montage will ce r tainly be used , sim ulta ne ously with montage
acco rding to the dominant indication , so as always at first the new m ethod
will assert itself in a ques tio n shar pened in principle . O ver ton a] m ontage in
its first steps has had to take a lin e in sharp opposition to the dominant.

And here is observed on e further cur ious parallel bet ween the visual and th e
musical overtone: It cannot b e traced in the static frame, just as it cannot b e
traced in th e musical score. Both emerge as genuine values onl y in th e
dynam ics of the musical o r cinem atographic process.

T he re are many instances, it is true - and in Old and New, too - where
'sy nthetic' co m binatio ns of t onal and overto nal montage may alrea dy be
found. For exam p le, in Old and New, the climax of th e religi OU S proces
sion (to pr ay for relief from the drought), and th e sequence of the
grassho pper and the mmving-machine, ar e edited Visually according to sound
associations, with an ex p ress dev elopment wh ich exis ts already in their
spatial 'si milarity.'
Of p articul ar method ological interest , of course, are constr uc t io ns th at are
w holly a-d ommant; In these the dominant app ear s in the form of a pure ly
phY Siological f ormulation if the task. For exam p le, th e montage of the
beginning of the religiOUS procession is according to ' deg ree s of heat
satur ation ' in the individual shots, or th e beginning of th e state-farm
seguence is according to a line o f 'carnivorousness.' Co nditions outside
Cinema tog raphic discipline provide the most un exp ect ed physiol ogical
indicatio ns among materials that are logically (both form ally and natu rally)
absolutely neut ral in th eir rel ations to each o ther.
Th ere are innumerable cases of montage joinings in this film th at ma ke open
mocker y of orth odox, scholastic montage accor ding to the domi nant. The
easiest way to demon st rate thi s is to ex amine the film on th e cutti ng table.
On ly th en ca n one see clearly the pe rfectly ' im p ossible' m ontage joinin gs in
which Old and New abounds , Thi s will also demon strate tIle extr eme
Simplicity of its metrics, of its 'dim ensions.'
Enti re large sections of certain sequences arc mad e up of pieces p er fectly
uniform in length or of absolutely primitively rep eat ed short pie ces. The
who le in trica te rhythmi c and sensua l nu anc e schem e of th e combined
pieces is co nd uct ed almost ex clusively according to a line of wo rk on the
'p sycho- physiological' vibr ations of each pie ce .
It was on th e cutting table that I detected the shar ply de fined sco pe of the
particul ar m ontage of Old arid New. Th is was whe n th e film had to be
co ndensed and sho rtened. Th e 'c rea tive ecstasy ' atten ding th e assembly and
mo ntage - th e ' creative ecstasy ' of 'hearing and feeling ' the sho ts - all this
was a lready in th e past. /\ hbn~viati on s and cut s req uire no inspirat ion, only
technique and skill.

And the r e, exa mining th e seque nce of th e religious procession on th e tabl e,

o verlo na) conflicts, fo re seen

but unwr itten in the score, cannot emerge

without th e dialectic pr ocess of the passage of the film through the
proj ecti on apparatus , or th at of the perfor m anc e by a symp hony orchestra.
The visu al overtone is proved to be an actual piece, an actual element of
a fourth dim ension!
[.,oj

For the musical over to ne (a throb) it is not strictly fitting to say: ' I hear.' Nor
for the visu al overtone: ' I see .' For both , a new uniform formula mu st ente r
our vocabular v:
'I feel .'
I

NOTE
1. Editor 's Not e : Old and New is the title for the 1930 release in the United States
of America of the film otherwise known as the The General Line, Feaepansuaa
JllJHIlSl aka Orapoe II BOBoe , 1929).

ELECTRONIC TOOLS
WILLIAM J. MITCHELL
Tools are made to acco m plish our pu rp oses, and in this sense they represent
desires and int ention s. We make our tool s and our tools make us: by taking
up particular tools we accede to desires and we manifest intentions.
Specifically, th e tools and m edia of tr aditional photography - cam er as,
lenses, tripods , filter s, film of various kinds , flashguns, studio lights ,
enlarg ers, darkroom chemicals, densitometer s, and so on - represent the
desi.re to register and reproduce fr agments of visual reality according to strict
Conve ntio ns of perspectival consistency, tonal fideli ty, acuity in rendition of
deta il, and temporal unity. Th ey characte rize a way in which we have wanted
to see th e world , and in the worl d since 1839 th ey have played a crucial r ole
in the creation of colle cti ve mem or y and the formation of belief. [. . . J
0

\ ViJli31n ] . Mitchell. From The ft.::w nj t8urcJ H),e. VUII(J I Trulh m elll! POJt-l'h or.o8TaphJC Era. Ca.mbrid g e, M :\ :
MIT Press . 199 2, pr , 59 - 60 .62, 6 &- 9, 78 - HO . Cop yrig ht (<j 199 2 M" scachusct ts lnsut ute ..,r T"chn" I" gy.

10

F ABR ICATION :

22~)

NoW, after 150 years, we are faced with a discontinuity, a sudden and decisive
ruptuTe. The technology of digit al image production , manipulatio n, and
distribution represents a new configuration of int enti on . It focuses a powerful
(though frequ ently am bivalent and resiste d) desire to dismantle the rigiditi es of
photographic seeing and to exte nd visual discours e beyond the depicti vc
conventions and pr esum ed certitudes of the photographi c record . Paintin g has
alviays done tins , of course , but it has come to occupy vcry different territory:
the digilal image challenges the photograph on its home gro lll1d.

*
UsuaJly, digit al images are cap tured thr ough transduction of radiant ene rgy
into patterns of el ectric cur r ent rath er th an th rough chem ical action , but in
most cases th e cap tur e pr ocesses are Similarly hr ief and automatic. Two steps
are comb ined in any digital image-capture pro cedure . First , intensities in
the scen e o r so urce im age to be capt ure d m ust be samp led at grid location s.
Second , eac h sam ple intensity mu st be conver te d to an int eger value in
some finit e range process kn own as quantizatIOll . [ . . . JThi s two-stage process
of con verting scene data nea r sam ple poi nts into pixel values is known
technically as filtering. An im press ion ist painter lo olcing at a scene and
converting it to discrete bru sh strokes and a digital image-capture device are
both app lying sa m plin g and filt er ing st r ategies . But , w h ere as th e
impression ist p aint er p er for m s sam pling an d filt er ing m anually,
subjectively, and probably rather inc onsisten tly, th e digit al device sam ples
and filters mechanically, objectively, and cons istently.

*
The pix el value s that constit ute a digital im age can be conceived of in tw o
comp leme ntary ways: in rel atio n to th e display or pr int that an arti st
produces and in relation to the scene depicted by th.at displ ay or p rint. 1 In
relation to th e disp lay or prin t , a pixel value spe cifies a sm all co lo ured ce ll
on the picture surface - a discrete signifying mark: th e density of pixels on
the picture surface determi nes capacity to rep rod uce fine d etail. In relation
to the record ed sce ne , a pixel value is a sam ple in tim e and space of light
intensities pr ojected onto the pict ur e p lane - a discrete datum: the sp atial
frequency and int ensity resolution of sam ples taken fro m a scen e det ermine
:he fid elity of th e dig ital record. If the sam pling gri d is too coarse, or if
Intensity differ ences ar e no t discriminated pr ecisely enough , fine detail wil l
be irretrievably lost . [, .. J

[... J
FI G U R E 10.10

Varying the spat ial and ton al resolution

01 an image. Cour tesy of Will iam J.

Mitchell, from The Reconfigured Eye,

MIT Press, 19 92 p. 68.

How ma ny pixels, and how many int ensity values, ar e ne cessar y to

comm un ir.ate a monochrome image satisfactorily? Clearly thi s depend s to a
large extent O J) the com plex ity of th e ~rnagc , but Figure 10 .1 0 begi ns t o
suggcst or der s' of m agnitud e. A portraIt wa s scann ed at high spat ial and
to nal resolution , th en processed to red uce both kind s of r eso lution. [. .. )
The high est -resolution version is at the top left of the image array.

FA SR ICAT I O N : 23 l

,230 : I M A G E S

Spatial re solution halves at each f O\V, and tonal resolution halves at each
column, so that th e image with the least amo unt of information is at the
bottom r ight . Increased tonal re solution can compe nsate for poor spatial
r esolution and vice -ve rs a. Even ver y low -resoluti on ver sions are
recognizable , but high er-r esolution versions tell us more, so there is usually
motivation to encode images at the highest r esolution possible subject to
constrain ts on storage, transmission, and pr oc essing capacity.2 [ ]
Squint your eyes at th ese images. You will find that th e hard edges of
individual pixel s disappear and that th e images of low spatial resolution
sudd enly look mu ch more lifelike. Surprisingly, there is act ually a person
lur king behin d th e pixels. (Technically, squinting am ounts to application of
a low -pass filter to remove d istractin g fin e detail and leave th e broad
distr ibuti on of tones int act . Painters have long known thi s trick .)

( ...]
Notice how pixels work as signifiers . A single pixel , taken in isolatio n,
de picts n othing in particular - merely 'light thing ' or' dark thing.' But when
a pixel is seen in co ntext with other pixels , which narrow th e range of likely
interpretati ons, th en it s significance becom es mor e preci se : it might dep ict
th e gleam of an eye or the twinkling of a star in the h eavens, Where th ere
are many pixels, th ey all create detailed co ntexts for each othe r, so that each
on e is read as a dep iction of something quite specific. If a pixel , taken in
co ntext, has a value that cannot b e int erpret ed in this way, then it is usually
see n as visual 'n oise ' and ignored.
Usually we try to pr odu ce im ages tha t are of sufficie nt resoluti on to r ender
th e ind ividu al p ixels impe rcept ible, bu t seeing pixels is not necessarily a bad
thing. Prominent pixels call attention to the process by whi ch a digital
image is act ually pu t to gether ... and thi s m ay be an imp or tant part of an
image's poin t : th e visible p ixe ls cr eate tension s b et ween actu al sur face and
illusory pictorial space , and between m arking proce ss and th e object of
depiction.

j -j

FIGURE 10.1 I
Interpretation of the raster grid: sketches from Paul Klee's
Notebooks. Above Paul Klee, Farbtafel (auf maiorem
GraUl . 1930, 83 (Colour table (in grey major));
37.7 x 30.4cm. Zentrum Paul Klee, Bern. DACS London.
Below PKS PN30 M60 /101 recto, Paul Klee. Specielle
Ordnung, Bleistift aut Papier; 33 x 2 1 em. Zentrum Paul
Klee, Bern. DACS, London.

.::t ' L~r

'J ..)l _ ~

.,
.;.,.,.

*
Th e basic principle underl ying all display and printing techniques for digital
images is nicely illustrated by the sto ry of how the first Mar iner IV images of
Mars we re produced. Th e spacecr aft transmitted back arra ys of integers,
whic h we re sto re d on magnetic tap e. Th ese numbers were the n printed
out, and scientists at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory coloure d over the m,
according to a spe cified colour -coding scheme, with crayons . Th ey would
perh aps have been sur pr ised to know that th ey were employing a technique
develop ed by Paul Klee (Figure 10. 1). j Tod ay we use computer-controlled
display an d printing de\'iccs to perfor m this interpretation task autornatically
and usually at very high speeel .

I.. ]

Many digita l images , however, are never printed but appear only as transient
Screen displays. In other words they are replayed from digit al data - using a
personal compute r or a specialized player such as Kod ak 's Photo CD
exactly as mu sical performances on digital compact disc are r eplayed .When
used in this way, digital image files are more closely analogou s to recordings
than to n egatives or pdnting plates. Th ey represent the latest stage in th e
long evolution ary de velop m ent of i ~ag es as obj ects into images as
per for mances - a transition away from images realized as du r able ,
individuallY valuable, physically ro oted artefacts (fr escoes, mosaics, and
rnura ls through portable c~ sd . paint ing ~. and inexpe nsive pr int s, to
completely ephe me ral film pro ject ion s and vide o display.s.

~ .... -+, ~

FA B RIC ATION : 233

2 :3 2 : IMAGES

But the now-familiar display screen is still a flat picture plane , still a tiny,
glowing window through whic h we can tak e a Cycl op ean peek at another
wo rld. In the late 19 60 s th e co m p uter-g rap hics pioneer Ivan E.
Sutherland realized that el ectronic displays do not have to take the
et ymological implication of 'perspective' - viewing as 'seeing through' -_
quite so literally : th ey can dispen se with the h ounding fram e, break open
the plane , an d allow redirection of the gaze . Sutherl and designed a
co m ple te ly new kind of display [... J. [His] prot otype used mechanical
link ages to se nse the viewer's location and direction of gaze,
head-mounted, m iniature cathode ray tube displays to place images on
the viewer's retinas, and a powerful (for the time) com puter t o sy nthe ~ze
stereo pairs of perspective images at a sufficiently rapid rate to r espond
to th e viewer's m ovements w itho ut perceptible lag. It was cr ude and
cum bersome , but it open ed up th e possibility of breaking through the
pi cture plane into a three -dimensional 'vir tual reality.' Subsequent
re sear ch has explored ultrasound and other non -mechanical position
sens ing techniques and has so ught to miniaturize head-mounted displ ays
still further; by th e 1990s the possibility of laser mi cr oscann ers that
painted images dir ectly on the retina was re ceivin g ser ious attention ."
Vast in creases in available computing power have brought the simulation
of co m plex , detailed three -dimensional worlds within reach. The
embryon ic technology of virtual re alitv promi ses architects th e possib ility
o f \~a lki ng through ge omet r ic ally modell ed proposed hUilding: ,
astron omers th e possibility of flying through ra da r-s canned planetary
lan dscapes, and surgeons the possibi lity of seeing 'th r ough th e skin ' by
sup erimposing on patients' bodies three-dimensional display s ge ner ated
from ultrasound or MRI scanner dat a.
Oli ver Wend ell Holmes called the Daguerreotype 'a mirror with a m em ory" :
you can think of a digital-imaging or computer-graphics system as a memory
with a display. By selecting from among available display and printing processes
and by controlling th eir parameters, you can externally reflect the contents of
an internally stored array of intensity values in a m ultitu de of diffe r en~j'
rendered and vari ou slv inflected wavs. There is , then, a fundamental change m
our relationship to im ~ges. You are not limited just to looking at digital images:
you can actively inhabit and closely interact with th em.

NOTES
I . Footno te remov ed .
2 . Footnote remov ed .

3. Footnote removed.
4 . Footnote removed .
S. Oliver Wen del l Holm e s, 'The Stereoscop e and th e Stereograph,' Atlan tic Monthly

Uune 1859) .

CAMERA LUCIDA
DAVIO HaCKNEY

The camera lucida is not easy to use . Basically, it is a p rism on a stick that
creates the illusion of an image of what ever is in fron t of it on a piece of
pape r below. Thi s image is not real -- it is not actually on th e paper, it only
seems to b e ther e. When you look through the prism fro m a single p oint you
can see the person or object s in front and the paper below at th e sam e time.
If you 're llsing th e camera lucida to draw, you can also see your hand and
pencil making marks on the pap er. But only you, sitting in the ri ght po sition,
can see th ese things, no one el se can .

*
In early 19 9 1 I m ade a drawing using a camera lu cida . It was an experiment,
based on a hunch that Ingres, in th e first decades of th e nineteenth century,
may have occasionally used thi s little optical device , the n ne wly inven ted.
[vIy curiosity had been arouse d when I we nt to an exh ibition of his portraits
at Londo n's National Gallery and w as str uck by how sm all the drawings
were, vet so uncannily 'accur ate '. I know how diffi cult it is to achieve such
pre cision , and wonde~e<l how he had don e it. [ . .. ]
At first , I found the came r a lucida ver y difficult t o u se. It do esn 't project
a real image of th e subjec t, but an illusion of o ne in the eye. 'When you
move your head everythi ng moves with it, an d th e artist mu st lear n to
m ake ver y quick no tations to fix th e position of th e eyes, nose and mouth
to capture 'a likeness' . It is concentrated work. I per severed and continued
to use the method for th e re st of th e year - learning all the tim e . I began
to take more car e w ith lighting th e subjec t, noti cing how a goo d light
makes a big differ ence when using optics , just like with photography.
I also saw how much care other ar tists - Car avaggio and Velazqu ez, for
example - had taken in lighting their subjects, and how deep their shadows
were. Optics need strong lighting, and stro ng lighting cre ates deep shadows.
I was intrigued and began to scrutini ze paintings very carefully.
Like most painters , I im agin e, wh en I look at paintings I am as interested in
'how ' it w as painted as ' what ' it is saying or 'why' it was painted (these
qu esti ons are, of course, related). H aving struggled to use optics myself, I
found I w as now looking at pictures in a new way. r co uld identify optical
characteristic s and , to my surprise, 1 could see them in th e work of oth er
artists - and as far back as the 1430s, it see m ed ! 1 think it is onl y in th e late
twentieth centur y that thi s has beco me visible. New t echnology, m ainl y the
computer , was ne ed ed to sec it. Com puter s have allowed ch eaper and
higher-quality colour printing, lead ing to a great improvement in th e last
fifh~en years in the sta ndard of art boo ks (even twenty years ago , most w ere
still in black and white) . And n ow w ith colo ur p hotocopi ers and desktop
printers anyone can pr oduce cheap but good reprodUCti ons at horne, and so
place wor ks tha t wer c preViou sly sep arated by hundreds or th ou san ds of
SC{;{CI K.n owJedse l Lo ndon. Them es & }Iu d ~..on . 2001, pp. 12 -.17 , 6 6 - 7 .

I0

F IGU RE 10.12
Giotlo di Bondone, Upper Basilic a of San
Francesco (det ail), 1300. Wall fre sco, San
Francesco. Assist. Photograph: Scala.

FIGU R E J 0.13
Unknown Austrian artist, Rudolf IV of
Aus tria (det ail), c. 1365 . Oil on canvas.
Source: B ridgeman Art Library.

miles side by side . Th is is what I did in my studio, and it allowed m e to see

the whole swee p of it all. It was on ly by putting pictures together in this way
that I began to notice things; and I'm sure th ese things could have onl y bee n
seen by an artist, a mark-maker, who is not as far from practice, or from
science, as an ar t historian. [. . . 1

I discussed my obse rva t ions with frie.nds, and was in tr oduced to Mar tin
Kem p, professor of ar t hist or y at Oxford Univ ersity and an authority on
Leonardo and the links between art and scien ce . From the star t , he
e ncouraged my curiosity and supp or te d my hypotheses, albeit with
reservation s. Others, tho ugh , we re horrified at m y suggest ions. Th eir main
complaint was that for an artist to use optical aids wo uld be 'c heat ing '; that
somehow I was at tacking th e idea of inn ate ar tistic genius. Le t me say here
th at optics do not make marks, on ly the ar tist's hand can do that, and it
requires great skill. And optics don't make draw ing any easier either, far
fro m it - I know I'v e used th em . But to an artist six hundred veal's ago
op tica l pr ojection's would have demonstrated a new vivid way of l~oking at
and representing the material world . Optics woul d have gi ven ar tist s a new
t ool with which to make i m agc ~ that were more immediate, and m ore
powerful . To ~ uggcst that artists usee] op tica l devices, as I am doing here,

FIG URE 10 .14

Masolino da Pamcale, Healing of the
Lame Man and Raising of Tabitha
(detail), C. 1425 . Wall Fresco, Santa
Mana de! Carmine, Branc acci Chap el.
Photograph : Scala.

FI GURE 10 , 15
Robert Campin, A Man (detail), c.1430 .
Oil and egg tempera on oak . National
Gallery, London.

is not to Uiminis h th eir achievement s. For me, it ma kes them all th e mo re

astounding.
[.. .J

In Februar y 2000, with th e help of my assistants [O' .J, 1 sta r ted to pin up
colour ph otocopies of paintings on th e wan of my studio in Cal ifornia . I saw
this as a way I cou ld get an overview of the histo ry ofWestcrn art, and as an
aid to the selec tion of pictures for th e book. By the time we had finished,
the wall was seventy fee t long an d covered five hundre d year s mo r e or less
chron olog ically, with northern Europe at the top and southern Europ e at
the bottom .
As we began to put the pages of the book togeth er, w e were also

expe rimenting with different combina tions of mirror s and lenses to see if we

could re-create th e ways in which Ren aissance ar tists might have used th em .

t he proj ections we m ade delight ed everyo ne who came to th e studi o , even

those with a camera in their hands.The effects seemed amazin g, becau se they

Were unelectronic. The images v,:e projected were d ear, in colour and they

moved. It becam e ob vious that few people know m uch about optics, even

photogl-aph er s. In n1 edi~val Europe, proje:ted . ' app~r i t i on s ' would be

regarded as magical; as 1 tound out , peop le still think this today.

2 ~:;G :

IM A GE S

FA S R I C A T I O N : 2 3 7

[ . . .j
It is perfectly clear that so me artists used optics directly and o the rs did
not, although afte r 1500 almost all seem to have been influenced by the
tonalities, shading and colou rs foun d in the optical pr ojection . Brueghel,
Bosch, Grunewald imm ediately come to min d as artists who were not
involved in th e dir ect use of optics. But they would have see n paintings and
dr awings m ade with them, and maybe even some pr ojections th emselves
(to see optical projections is to use them) ; and as appr entices they probablv
copied works with optical effects. r mu st repeat th at op tics do not mak~
marks, they cannot mak e paintin gs. Paintings and drawings are ma de by the
hand. All ] am saying her e is that, long before the seventeenth century,
when th er e is evidence Vermeer was using a camera obscura, ar tists had a
to ol and that they used it :in ways previou sly unknown to ar t histor y.

*
Finding evide nce of the use of op tics in northern Euro pe in th e late fifteenth
cen tury mad e me look more closely at early Flemish painting. On my wall
a sudden, dramatic change stoo d out. Here are fou r portraits paint ed
130 years apart , Figur es 10.1 2..10.1 5. C iottos of 1300 ce r tainly has an
in teresting ex pression in th e face. Sixty-five year s lat er an unk now n ar tist
makes a portrait o r Rudolf IV of Austria - like Gio tto's, it is aw kwa rd. By
1425, in Italy, Masolino has more o rde r in th e face ; th e tu rban seems
to follow
form of the head and looks as th ou gh it fits prop erl y. But
ju st five years later, in Fland ers, so mething happ en s. Robert Ca mpi n's face
looks startlingly ' m odern ' ; it co uld be someone from to day. There is clear
lighting - noti ce the shadow und er the nose - sugges ting a stro ng source of
light ; the folds in th e turban ar en 't awkward; th e man 's small double chin is
seen clear ly, and the m outh and eyes ar c far more relat ed , giving an intensity
to his appearance. Thi s p ainting has a t otally different ' look' .

th;

10:5

IMAGES SCATTER INTO DATA, DATA

GATHER INTO IMAGES
PETER GAL/SON

Stepping back from th e specific sciences, a pow erful th em e running through

th em comes int o view, one central to th e arguments and evidence th ey
pr oduce. In hrutally short form, it is this: ' We mu st have im ages; we cannot
have images:
We must have scie ntific image ~ because only images can teach us. Only
pictures can develop within us the intui tion needed to proceed fur the r
rl r" l publtshcd III l cono(h sh ' Tlt!.Ytm d lh~ ImrJf/e JV.:m in >n(;" r)f~ , RdltJwn , and A r ! ) Brun o ( ..<lU JO..1r Mill Peter
""'(,,'il.u') ( ( d~ ) . Kar-l.r.r- uh u: Z KM/ C:f:fJt c: r for Ar-t and Mc.di ", /Carn ~ l,i (lgc. M A: '("he MlT Pr ess, 2()!)2.
pp . '=\00 - 2 ~ . Rep rod uced hy pc r m 1S :<il o l':._

wwa rds abstracti on . Wc are human , and as such , we depe nd on spe cificity
and materialit y to learn and und erstand . Pictures, sometim es alone, oft en in
sequen ces, are ste pping stones along the path towards th e real knowledge
that intuition suppo rts . (... J [B]eyond p edagogy or even epistemology,
images get at th e peculiar - th e unique - featu res of nat ure in a way that a
calculati on or verbal description can ne ve r do. By mimicking nature, an
image, even if not in every respect, cap tu res a ri chn ess of relations in a way
that a logica l train of pro positi ons n ever can. Pictures are not ju st
scaffolding , they are the gleaming edifices of truth itself th at we hop e to
reveal. So goes th e b rief fo r the scie ntific image : pictures are pedagog ically,
epistemically, and metaphysically inalienable from the goal of science itself .
And yet: we cannot have images beca use imag es deceive . Pictures create
ar tifactual ex pectat ions, th ey incline us to reason on false premises. We are
human , and as such are easily led astray hy th e sire n call of m aterial
specificity. Logic , n ot im ager y, is the acid test of tr uth that strips away th e
shoddy infer ences that acco m pany th e m is-s eeing eye . Ab stracti on ,
rigorous abstrac tio n, is exactly that whic h does not depend on pictures.
[.. .JTraining , discover y, and tr uth are all dependen t only on unambiguous
propositi on s and their logical arrangement . So the scientific iconoclast
anno unces: In the end, th e truths of the world will be g iven to us by the
relentless application o f logic tie d strategically to ex pe rime nt; truth is
somet hing wider and deeper tha n the pictorial im ag ination can ever hop e
to encom pass.
For th e last hundred an d fifty years, an d perhaps even longer, the sciences
have b een caught in this endless str uggle. In my field of scie nce studies,
before th e 1970s , there was a tendency to dismiss the pictorial, to
de-emphaSize th e rol e of th e pic to ria l in the development and present
conduct of scie nce. Th en came a rever sal : widespread acclimation to the
idea that science was oven ....heJmingly abo ut the visual. Pictures, taken to he
both more local and mo re con tingent th an prop o sitions, entered as exhibit
A in th e case against scie nce -as-algor ithm . Trying to settle this battle
bet ween th e picture -local and the pr op osition -univer sal strikes m e as a
losing bet . My goa l inst ead is nei ther to bury the scientific imag e n or to
sanctify it, but rather to explore the ways in whi ch the scien ces find
themsel ves locked in a w hirling em brace of iconoclasm and iconophilia.

*
Amon g th e astro physicists who we re inclin ed to credit the visual with
real we ight is Mar gar et Ge ller. She, as mu ch as anyone, has used images
to back a cr ucial claim abo ut the physical uni verse . To Widespread
aston ishment, she and her co lleag ues sh ower] that galaxies seem to be
clustere d as if on the surface of soap bubb les. But coming to and
Sustaining that con clusion relied i~ the first instance on picturing \vhat was
happen ino deep in the univer se, followed hy non-vis ual statistical stu dies ,
more picturing. ReC(~~izing a pa tter~ was O DC thing. Bringing the
followed
broade r community of astr()p hY51CISC~ along r equired a contin Uing alte rnation

by

2 38 : I M A G E S

between imaging and more formal analyses; 'Image s: Geller says, 'are not
sufficient in themselves.'

[ ... ]
It is worth following the sequence of transformations that lay behind the
production of a computer-generated video image that so strikingly showed
the flat clustering of galaxies. Geller and her colleagues b egan with the
galaxy catalogs that had been made from the Palomar Sky Surv ey by the
famously irascible Caltech astronomer Fritz Zwicky. Each glass plat e
covere d 36 deg r ees of the northern sky; from catalogs and plate s the
astronom er s knew where in the sky to look for each of the galax ies in their
stu dy.
With tho se celestial latitud e and longitude po sition s in hand, Geller and her
coll eagues could then direct th e tele scop e to the right portion of th e sky,
technicians did the observing and took the data . With those data in hand,
Geller and her co-workers then used the red-shift to figur e out how far away
particular galaxie s were from earth (Hubble 's law). (... J By moving from
th e Palomar Survey and ZWicky's catalog to the spectrum and then through
Hubble 's law and the theory of the expanding universe, Gell er 's group could
plot a three-dimensional map of the gala.,des' positions. It is th ese data that
th ey th en plotted and inserted into the computer to produce a video clip of
a 'walk ' through the galaXies.
The astr onom ers found two remarkable features: first , that the distributi on
of galaxies was not even approximately smooth throughout space. Instead,
th e galaxies concentrat ed as if on the surfa ces of vast bubbles. Said another
way, th ere were vast voids in space in which hardly a galaxy was to be found.
Secon d, Geller's group found what they calledThe GreatWall , a fantastically
large and flattened cluster of galaXies exhibiting a filamentary internal
str ucture - spanning a billion-light year swath across th e sky with a
wafer -thin width of (onl y) twenty million light yean;, It was as if you
expe cted a population of miniature galaxies to be scattere d even ly through
a four-foot cube , but instead found the collection held in strands within a
region the shape of a sheet of plywood one inch thick and four feet on a side.
Picturing m attered. To follow the lay of the gala.,,,ies it was not en ough to
have two-dimensional photographs of galaxies, cr ucial th ough th ey wcr~ .
Nor were the catalogued coordinates of th ose plates sufflcient. Nor were (in
and of th emsel ves) the various spectra. Even the th ousand t hre e
dim ensional coordinates derived by way of Hubble 's Law did not yet reveal
th e patteTil. Re-visualization - first by plotting on pap er and then by
compute r - initially forced the clustering to stan d out. Th en a back and
forth between visualizable evidence and stati stical analysis : new data meant
new possibilities for rendering the information visually striking, and at the
same tim e made p ossible the comp utatio n of n ew kind s of statistical,
non -visualizable, correlations. By the tim e Geller and he r collaborators
pr oduced the com puter sim ulatio n of a walk through the galaxies, and

FABRICATION : 2 3 9

accompanied it by mathematical cor relations, th e oscillation between the

human eye and th e statistica l calculation m ade th e effect as striking and as
evident as the nose on you r face . New th eories b egan vying for the honor of
explain ing thi s n ew map of spa ce. Image to data to image to data to image
to theory.
At the heart of e xperimental microphysics lies a not unrelated tension
between picture and proposition ; on one side th e desire to image the
microworld ; and on th e other th e equally powerful longing to escape the
image . Decorating th e cover of textbooks and imprinted into our cultural
imagination are th e wispy tra cks o f cloud c ham ber s, nuclear emulsions, and
bubbl e chambe rs . Th e cloud cha mber, th at prototype of all other
visuali zati on ma chines in mi crophysic s, emerg ed from Victorian
technologies that aim ed to re produce nature in miniature. Here 'was th e
world In dtro, one that displ ayed miniature storms, table-top volcanoes,
room-si7.ed glaciers. At first, C.T.R. Wilson , the inventor of the cloud
chamber, had just thi s in mind: a chambe r (that is a controlled space or
room) in whi ch he could manufacture clouds, fog, rain . Into the series
camera lucida, camer a obscura, du st cham ber - came the cloud chamber,
the cam era n ebulosa. 1
On ce Wil son foun d that he could produce tr acks (lon g trailing clouds) that
followed the trajector y of charged particles, physicists began to assemble a
new kin d of t echn ology, one organized to sor t ph enomena. This
classificat ory m echani sm r elied on a centur ies-old tradition of medical
atlases: aclases of skulls , atlases of hand s, atlases of X-rays. In these
compendia th e budding phy sician woul d , in th e Simples t case, find 'normal'
anatomy. The idea was that by looking at th ese images, organs, bones, or
microscope slides would stand out if they were different, that is if they were
pathological. For th e physicist the cloud chamber atlas functioned Similarly :
if the imag e found depa rted dramatically from the normal, then pay
attention. But while deviation from th e normal marked the 'pathological'
for the physician, deviation from th e normal Signaled ' discover y' to th e
physicist.
Other image-m aking devices soon followed. Nucl ear emulsions were Simply
sheets of film that particles would traverse leaving tracks to be developed .
Bubble chamber s wer e gre at vats of liquid hydrogen or other liquids th at
Would boil along th e tra cks of passing particles. As th e technologies of image
production shift ed , mu ch carried forward into th e analysis of images.
But almost at on ce, in ever y one of these n ew laboratories, the images
themselves begin to dissolve, morphing into other form s. A flash of light and
three cam eras would capture a complex tra il of bubbles in stereo reli ef.
Then a scanner proj ected the pict ure s one by one onto a table, where she
(almost inevitablv she during th e 1950s and 19 60 s) clicked a mouse-like
devic e to enter space c uor dinates. Digitized, the infor mat ion flow~d into a
computer which th en cru nc hed the data into idealized mathematical curv es;

2"C< I MAGES

from those curves the computer spat out punch cards with the particles'
identities and properties . At first by hand and later by com put er, the morass
of numbers could finally he reassembled into new images: bar graphs or the
so-called D alitz plots where an entire picture would be reduced to a single
black dot. The physi cists could then ask ; Did the dots duster? Did the bar
graph show one peak or perhaps two? An invisible physical process made
bubbling tracks, tracks to numbers, numbers back to pictures. Those
pictures in turn could themselves be analyzed back into numbers.

[... J
Even within the image tradition, the pi cture was always on the verge of
being resorbed by the computer, snatched from human eyes and transmuted
back into the whirl of numbers. As these new imaging technologies of
physics rose to prominence, other competing machines offered data without
any pictorial product. Pictures, some physicists lamented , had something
nineteenth century about them. Couldn't devices be built that took the
world directly to the computer, that fully by-passed the millions of pictures
spewing out of cloud and bubble chambers? Geiger counters could click, for
example, when a particle passed - sending an electrical pulse to a counter.
Spark chambers flashed when particles traversed them, 'w ir e chambers
became sensitive enough to pick up even the tiny amounts ofionized gas left
in the wake of a passing particle. With the he lp or a computer, machinery
could use time and space measurements to reconstruct the event. These
were technologies that, in the first instance, produced not images but
statistical data, though statistical data quickly converted back into images.

l ..1
Image experiments served wonderfully to track individual events; logiC
experiments often had the edge in treating aggregates. Individual events for
some physicists carried persuasive force precisely because they could 'see'
into the whole of the process, as if, some said, they could peer directly into
the submicroscopic world. They hated not knowing what went on between
the counters, resisted the indirect, in ferential process of statistical
reasoning. The 'logicians' by contrast claimed that arguments by solid
statistics stood on vastly firmer ground. 'Anything can happen once,' they
grumbled . Science, the anti-imagers asserted, lies in the ability to
manipulate and control phenomena , in the behavior of the many, not in the
comportment of the few. Science, the image-defenders retorted, lies in the
receptive, objective, singular medium of film.
In many 'Nays, this image /logic split highlights, in the laboratory itself, the
gulf between the desperate search for the individual image and the equally
insistent attempt to avoid reliance on anything pictorial. Epistemically, this
is an argwnent repeated over and over, in field after field. Doctors (and now
the courts) slam into each other as they m easure case studies versUS
epistemological studies. Geology had its era of qualitat ive studies against
quantitative ones , seismology oPI:0s ed to morphology. In the post- World
War II ycal-s, astronomers often felt that they had to evalua te claims froIll

FABRIC ATION .

ra dio astr on om y again st the established knowledge of opti cal astronomy.

Do you trust the X -ray or the steth oscope r Would you put your money on
th e morphology of open faces of ro ck s or seism ol ogical data? Bit by bit over
th e last rew de cade s there ha s been a remarkable transformation in all
the se binaries. In each instance the image follow er s found themselves
man ipulating data banks, and the numerical-logicians found themselves
gaZing into the face of a picture.

NOTE
1. Footn ote removed.

"

VISUAL CULTURE

I N TR OJ~tU TrO N

II:I

The Medium is the Message

Mar shal! McLuhan

II :2

The Image of the City

Kevin Lynch

II

:3

The Image-Wo rld

Susan Sontag

II

:4

The Philosopher as Andy Warhol

Arthur Danto

II :5

Symbol, Idol and Murti: Hindu God-Images and the

Politics of Mediation
Gregor y Price Grieve

II :6

The United Colors of D iversity

Celia Lury

I J:7

The Unbearable Lightnes s of Sight

Meiling Cheng

Since the m i dc 1 ~9~qs ;, tli~r~ , ~~s been dr~ T?t'ic grow~h i n ~s<;ho l arsri p ?pqut
vi sual Culture:d ri p'a1'tdhi ~ ~-aevg(opmenhi s " a spc<; ialisatiq,n w itbin. . Biitish
cu ltural s tua i ~?i e mR l1a5 jsi n~f the ", anthropq logical:'i:ih d'soci9'logiceJ
dimensions of-the visual... . ln America, the: fiel d. has,:oeen: spmeWhat less
concerned w ithideologica! analvsts'andso cla] actiont !?ei l}g ~ni 6 re haunted
by art history, aild ' m op~:ti ri. debt.to , Ro l a'~d Barthes and Writer ~ el) j a mi t'!'
(El ki ns, .2003: 2). Notableexceptions to that tendency I nclude Del.uca's (8.5)
work on visual , political rhetoric .and 'M itcnell's (1991) : . prag rrFit i c; d~:;
disciplinary accountofithe fi eld. ICis riotoriouslydifficult'to defi l1e'v isuii l
culture, not least bec ause' of, its i rlterd i sci p l i n~ ry app roach a l)d,~ia:n ge of
interests across all manner of visual objects, histories, theqdes,and p r~c!iCes ~
The relationship between visualcu ltureand aJl: ~ istoJy ,h as perh<:ips bee}i;t he
most content ious (see introduction to Section4 ), Nevertheless, visual culture
studies has gained recognition' both"'wi thi h different d iscipl i nes knd~aJ i:a
subject-area in its own ri g ~t, evidenced by the deyeJopment 6fi~p ~cific ~tydy
programmes and nU,Ter,ous primers on the subject ((ti"ery and Fuery,.} OQ;3;
Howells, 2 003 ; M irzoeff, 1 99~ ; Rose; 7001; Sturker .a n,d ( art,wright,' 200F .
The most recent a"nd p rominent trend " i~visuahcultu rJ st~di~s Iiasbeen ta
focus on ,co ntemporary (tra n s'nat io na l) cu ltu,re ~as a'0predominantly ' visual
experience (/Y\ irzoeff, 1999; Robins, 19 96)."' \ljsu_~ r culture isalso s on~c e ived
as its own interdisciplinary, 'networked' object, one 'tha.t b ejongs to no ?n ~'
(Ba], 2003:;'7); It has been defined as an interpretative
emphasising a
visual subject an d the various 'interactidns,.6f'visual phe nornena (Mi rzoeff,
1998). Irit Rogoff (1998 : 15) considers visual culffir e as 'a ~fi e l d of vision
version Sf Derri da's concept of ditierence' - v isual mode of intertexuality.
Cheng (11,7) ill ustrates such a post-structuralist approach to visual.cu lture,
by both expla ining the pertinence of ' contemporary visual culture for.
poli tical crit ique and presenting an image of a new form of criticism. Visual
culture has renewed interest in.the visual, allowi ng for the prescience and
'intelligence' of the visual (Stafford, 13.3; see also Section 13), Rather than
replic ating current writings on visual culture, which are widely available in
anthologies (see Evans and Hall , 1999; Mirzoeff, 1998), the selections here
also include precursors to contemporary visual culture studies. The social
and cultural construction of vision is covered in the next -section,
McLuhan 's (11.1 ) famous dictum that 'the medium is the messaae' is
encapsulated by his acc<?unt of th~ significance of the electric light-Light
does not tell us somethmg speci fic, but rather as 'a medium without a
message', it enables all manner of activities ~o t~ke place, from brain surgery
to night enterta i n m en~s . ~oweve~, electrlr; IIg.ht generally escapes our
attention as <!. communlCatl?n medlul1} because It has no 'content" leaving
no trace of ifs own. Crary \12. J) reminds us that as modern observers we

'tactic,

I MA G ES

INTRODUCTIO N

have been trained to assume that ou r cu ltural live s 'w i ll alwa ys leave vi sible
tracks', whereas other, often less distingu ishable, 'g rayer practices and
discourses' are equally imp or tant.
lynch (1 1:2) provides anothe r account of how a new technological base - in
th is case the design and engineering of the cityscape - has impacted upon
(visual) culture. The 'consci ous remolding' of city spaces has: only been
made possible relatively recentl y, giving rise to a new 'problem of
environmental imageability'. We have the means at our disposal not on ly fo
respond to images of the city, but also tomake them in a fashion which"suit);
us. ~is concept ~f 'i~l ageabijility' identifies a complex, multi-s en ~ory
experi ence, reflecting In part Merleau-Ponty's (6.2 ) p.henonemooogica!
account of vision r as echoed in numerous writings of the ffaneuror dty
stroller (Benjamin, 1999; Cl eber, 1999). In contrast to c1 ~ustroph9b i c;
dsytopian portraits of the c ity - "evident, for example, in fj lrns from
Metropolis to Bladerunner - Lynch presents a complex view of the .ity2for
practical consideration , his ori ginal audience having been urban p.l ~mn"'e rs,
engi neers and archite cts.
Sontag (11.3 ) argues that ph otography transformed tw entiet h-century
expectations of reali tY, in that photographic images, as copies of first h'l l1ld
experiences, bec ame ' indispensable to the health of the eco nomy, the
stability of the polity, and the pursuit of pri vate happi ness' . Her account
both nl~ rad.Y
brings to the fore the double-edged property of the image,
and ant idote, provok ing both iconophobia and icon op hil ia (see the
introductions to Sections 1 and 3). Sontag readil y accepts the significa nce of
our 'image-world,' al1d the importance of vi sual culture, clo sing w ith the
provocative idea that we must allow for 'an ecology not onl y of real th ings
but of images as w ell'.

as

Danto (11.4) neatly presents the parado x of Andy Warho l's pop art, br inging
into focus the high/low cultu re problematic consti tutive of mu ch of cu ltural
studies. More particularly, he argues that W arhol offer.ed a form of visual
philosophy (see also Section 9), that is not art ic ulated through reasoned
argument, but instead embod ied as a way of art, or rather a way of living.
Warhol 't ransfor med his life into the im age of an artist's li fe' and
demonstrated how the signs and images of cultural life are-our reality.-not a
product of it. Warhol is an ' utterl y pu bl ic artist' , drawing upon an im mediate.
shared culture and also re-valuing (o r levelling) and im mortalisin g a host ot
cul tural artefacts and personalities, from Campbel l's soup to the Empire State
Buil ding, from Mari lyn Monroe to Chairma n Mao, allow ing everythin g to be
exchang ed on equal terms, as im ages: In contrast, jameson (1991: 9) a. rgu~s
that Warhorroregrounds postmodern commodific ation without criti cising It.
Grieve (11 .5) takes us away from W estern visual cu ltu re but is conce rned
with the limitations of Eurocentric views of relig ion -that value writing but
denigrate images, reinforcing the super-iority of holy scripture over physical
repres entation~ of divinity (see 1 ~2 , 1 . 8 , 1'. 9, 1.10 'H"l..d:Section 8 ). To unsettle
any dominant point of view, Gri eve invites us on several occasions simpi y t?
look di rectly at an image of the Indi an Stone-Go o he w rites about. H IS
ethnographiC .work 'suggests that those who wor ship god-images do not
misconstrue human relations by reifying ima ges, but construe the divi n ity of
those im ages as : an aspect of the int eraction in the web of their soci al
p ractices' {Simo ns, ;;003: 2).
As a counter-point to Gri eve's account of a ' local' visua l cu lture, Lury (11.6)
exp lains how the 'global' fashions of Benetton clothing have been marketed

successfull y using raci al imagery that transcends racial categories by

asserti ng the ubiquitous 'U nited Colo rs of Benetton'. Following fro m
anthropol ogist Marilyn Strathern' s (1"992) account of how natural, inn ate
properties combine w ith artificial cultural enhancement, Lury describes' how
race is 'created' as a second nature throu gh c ultural essentialism. In.co ntra st
to Gayatri Chakravorty Sp ivak's' (1990) concept of 'strategic essen tia llsmf in
Lury's example, instead 9 a. speci fic cultural identity being uph eld for
political reasons, .a new postmodern, consumerist identity ::::,comt!iensurate
with a d esign-led and bran d-oriented image cult ure - is simulated and sold:_
Judith Butler (1990 )"aI50 understands identity in terms ofpcrformatlv itv, but
rejects strategic essential ism.
_
..

REFERENCES ~
BaL M. (2003) 'Visual essentialism and the object of visual culture'; / o'Urna( of'visual
Culture, 2 (1 ) :' ~":3 2. .. ..' .. ~ . ..
.
~
_. - . ."':'.
Ben jarnin; W. (1999) Charles Baudelaite. London: y erso.

Butler, l. (1 990) Gender Trouble. New York:Ro utledge.

,';
Elkins, J. (2003 ) Visual Studies: A Skeptical Introduction. t':Jelil'York:'Roytledge:

Evarts, J. and Hall, S. (eds) (1999) Visual Cul ture: The Reader. London: Sage: .

Fuery, P. .and .Fuery,K. (2003) Visual Cultures arid _CrJtie.:al Th,,-or.v.J ondon:. Arh9Ad.

Glebcr, A, (1999) Th e Art of Taking a Walk: Henerie, Literature, anq(Film jn H~im<1f

Culture. Princeton, Nj: Princeton- U ~ iver sit y Press.

. .

Howells, R. (2003 ) Visual Culture: An in trod uction. Cambridge: PolityPress.

larneson , F. ( 1 9 ~11 } Posttiiodetnism, Or, The Cultural Logic of l'il.t0 9 pitalism . Durhal)l,

..'

NC: Duke University Press.

MirzoeffN . (ed.l (1998) Visual Culture Reader. London: Routledge.

Mirzoeff, N : (1999) An Introduction to Visual Culture . .London: Rou'tf~dge.

Mitchell, W.J.T. (1994) Picture Theory. Chicago: University of .~hi cago' Press.

Robins; K,,(i 996 ) Into the Image: Culture and Politics in 'the 'Field of vision . .L.0ndon:.

Routledge, , ..
, '"
, co

Rogoff, I. (199.8 ) 'Studying visua] culture', inN. ~U rzoeff (cd.}, VjSlJa./rcuItUr'2 Reader.

l ond21l:RouHe'dge. pp. 14- 26.

,,'
~.-'.>-.R () se-~ G. llO Ol } Visual.Methodologies: An Introdu ction to the /nt.eipretation'o f Visua/

., ,
zz:
. , . " , .

Materlals.t London: Sage.

Si mons, J .f20D3") " Editor's,. introduction'; Special lssueit mages-and Text, ~ CiJltu re,

TheoryandCr itique;-44 (1 ):* -4 .

"

Spivak, G.C: (1990) The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews,.Strategies, D ialogues. New

York: Routledge.

Strath~~n , M. (1 992)"R/;,producing the Future: Anthropology, Kinship end -the New

Reproductive Technologies. .l0a nch e~ter : Manchester University Press. .

Srurkon, M. and Cartwright, L. (200 1) Practices of Looking: ArrIntroduction to Visual

.,:_ ,

.0..

Culture. O xfo rd: Oxford -Un iversity Press,

24 6: IMAGES
VISUA L CULTURE : 247

I I: I

THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE

MARSHALL McLuHAN

The electric light is pure information. It is a medium without a message, as

it were, unless it is used to spell out som e verbal ad or name. This fact,
characte ristic of all media , means that th e 'content' of any m edium is always
ano ther medium. The conte nt of \",r iling is sp eech, just as the written word
is the content of print, and print is the content of the tel egraph. If it is asked ,
"What is the content of speech?,' it is necessary to say, 'It is an actual process
of thought, which is in itself nonverbal.' An abstract painting represents
dir ect manifestation of cre ative thought pr ocesses as they might appear in
com puter deSigns. What we are conside ring here, however, are the psychic
and social co nsequences of the deSigns or patterns as they am plify or
accelerate existi ng processes. For the 'message ' of any medium or technology
is the change of scale or pace or pattern that it introduces into human affairs .
The railway did not introduce movement or transportation or wheel or road
into human society, but it accele rate d and enl arged the scale of previous
human fun ctions, creating to tally new kinds of cities and new kinds of work
and leisure. This happened whether the railway functioned in a tropical or a
northern environment, and is quite independent of the freight or content of
the railway m edium.The airplane, on the other hand, by accel erating the rate
of transportati on , tends to dissolve the railway form of city, politics, and
associatio n, quite independently of what the airplane is used for.
Let us return to the electric light. Whether th e light is being used for brain
surgery or night baseball is a m atter of indifference. It could be arg ued that
these activities are in some way the 'content' of the electric light , since they
could n ot exist without the electric light . This fact merely underlines the
point that 'the medium is the message' be cause it is the m edium that shapes
and controls the scale and form of human association and act ion .The content
or uses of such media are as diverse as they are ineffectual in shaping the form
of human association . Ind eed , it is only too typical that th e 'content' of any
m edium blinds us to th e charact er of th e medium . It is only today that
industries have become awar e of th e various kinds of busines s in which they
ar e eng aged. When IBM discovered that it was not in the business of making
office equipme nt or busin ess ma chin es, but that it "vas in the business
of processing information, th en it began to navigate with clear vision . The
General Electric Com pany mak es a consid erable portion of its profits from
electric light bulbs and lighting systems. It has not yet discovere d that, quite
as much as A. T.&T., it is in the busin ess of moving information .
Th e electric light escapes attention as a comm uni cation m edium just
be cau se it has no 'content.' And this makes it an invaluable instance of how
people fail to stu dy m edia at all. For it is not till the electric light is used to
spe ll out som e br and name tha t it is noticed as a medium .Then it is not th e
Mar sha ll Mc l.uhan, from Un~l,!. r5tafJ~ lfj8 MeJia:ThG Extenskms qf Man. l o ndon : Ro utledge. 1:)9 -1, ). r.: 9.
Renrcd uccd
01 the T& F Inform. and the MIT Pr"....
PI

by~,rmi.sion

light but the 'content' (or what is really another m edium) tha~ is notice~.
Th e message of th e electric light is like the m essage of electric po wer In
industry, totally radical, pervasiva, and decentralized . For electric light and
power are sep arate from their use s, yet th ey elim inate time and sp ace factors
in human association exactly as do r adio, tele graph , telephone, and T V,
creati ng involvement in depth.

THE IMAGE OF THE CITY

KEVIN LYNCH

Looking at citi es can give a spe cial plea sure, however commonplace the
sight may be . Like a piece of arch itecture , the city is a construction in space ,
but one of vast scale , a thing p er ceived only in the co urs e of long sp ans of
tim e. City cJesign is th erefor e a temporal ar t, but it can rarely use th e
contro lled and lim ited sequenc es of other temporal arts like music. On
different occasi ons and for different people , th e sequen ces are rever sed ,
interrupted, abandoned , cut across. It is seen in all lights and all weathers.
At every instant , there is more than the eye can see, more than the ear can
hear, a setting or a view waiting to be explored . N othing is experienced by
itself, hut always in relation to its surro undings, the seque nces of events
leading up to it , the m emory of past experiences. Washington Street set in a
farmer's field might look like the shop ping street in the heart of Boston , and
yet it would seem utterly different. Every citizen has had long associations
with some part of his city, and his image is soaked in memories and meanings.
MOVing elements in a cit)', and in particular th e people and their activities, are
as important as th e station ary physical parts. V-le are not simply obs er vers of
this spectacle , but are ou rselves a part of it , on the stage with the other
participants . Most often , our perception of the city is not sustained , but rather
partial, fragme ntary, mixed with othe r concerns. N ear ly ever y sense is in
operation, and the image is the composite of them all.

I...]
An enviro nmental image may be analyzed into three com ponents: identity,
structure, and meaning. It is useful to abstract these for analysis, if it is
rem emb ered that in reality they always appear together. A workable im age
requires first th e identification of an object, which implies its distin ction from
other things, its recognition as a separable entity.This is called iden tity, not in
the sense of equality with some thing else, but with the meaning of individuality
or oneness. Second , the image must include the spatial or pattern relation of
the object to the obser ver and to other objects. Finally, this object must have
SOme mean ing for the obs e: ,:er, whethe r practical or emotional. Meaning is
also a relatiofi, but quit e a different one from spatial or pattern relati on .

Kevin Lync h , fro m rh~ lmc.'fjc

rh ~ Cit.-'r', C ;unbrh i~ l;. J\1.t\: 1\1lT Pr uss J 96U

196 0 hy" n u.- Massachu set ts I n."ti t u tl :

and
PI" 1 2,) H_ Js. CQp)Tlght
dlow!>. of Harv ar d CQIlc:ge.

n f Tt~ (:hno ltlg)'

th l,.~ P n ~ s LCh:= nt~ ;o.~ d f~~.

~~)

II

2~8 :

IMAGES

[ .. . ]

VISUAL CU L TU RE: 24 ';

Finally, when they could tread the maze without error, the whole system
~eemed to have become one localitv. ' [.. .]

Thi s lead s to the definition of what might be called imo gcabj]jty: that guality
in a physical object which giYes it a high probability of evoking a strong
image in any given observer. It is that shape, color, or arrangement which
facilitates the making of vividly identified, powerfully st r uctured , highly
useful mental images of the environment. It might also be call ed legibIlity, or
perhaps visibility in a heightened sense, where objects are not only able to be
seen, but are presented sharply and intensely to the senses .

Shipton's account of the reconnaissance for the ascent of Everest offers a

dramatic case of such learning. Approaching Everest from a new direction,
Shipton immediately recognized th e main peaks and saddles that he knew
[rom the north side. But the Sherpa guide accompanying him, to whom both
sides were long familiar, had never realized that these were th e same
features, and he greeted the revelation with surprise and delight. J

[ .. . j

[ ... ]

A highly imageable (apparent, legible, or visible) city in this peculiar sense

would seem well formed, distinct , remarkable; it would invite the eye and
th e ear to greater attention and participation, The sensuous grasp upon such
surroundings would not merely be Simplified, but also extended and
deepened. Such a city would be one that could be apprehended oyer time ~s
a pattern of high continuity with many distinctive parts clearly
interconnected. The perceptive and familiar observer could absorb new
sensuous impacts without disruption of his basic image, and each new
impact would touch upon many previous elements. He would be well
oriented, and he could move easily, He would be highl y aware of his
environment. The city of Venice might he an example of such a highly
imageable environment. In the United States, one is tempted to cite parts of
Manhattan, San Francisco, Boston, or perhaps the lake front of Chicago,

In our vast metropolitan areas [... ], like the Sherpa, we sec only the sides of
Everest and not the mountain. To extend and deepen our perception of the
environment would be to continue a long biological and cultural
development whi ch has gone from the contact senses to the distant senses
and from the distant senses to symbolic comm un icat ions. Our thesis is that
we are now able to develop our image of the environment by op eration on
the external physical shape as well as by an internal learning process.
Indeed, the complexity of our environment now compels us to do so. [... ]

These are characterizations that flo"v from our definitions. The concept of
imageabil ity does not necessarily connote something fixed, limited, precise,
unified , or regularly ordered, although it may sometim es have these qualities.
Nor doe s it mean apparent at a glance, obvious, patent, Or plain. The total
envir onme nt to he patterned is highly complex, while the obvious image is
soon boring, and can point to only a few features of the living world.

[ ... ]
Since image development is a two-way process between observer and
observed, it is possible to ~lTengthen the image either by symbolic devices, by
the retraining of the perceiver, or by reshaping one's surroundings. You can
provide the viewer with a symbolic diagram of how the world fits together: a
map or a set of written instructions. As long as he can fit reality to the
diagram, he has a clue to the relatedness of things. You can even install a
machine for giving directions, as has recently been done in New York. I While
such devices are extremely useful for providing condensed data on
interconnections, they are also precarious, since orientation fails if th e device
is lost, and the device itself must constantly be referred and fitted to reality.
[ ... j
You may also train the observer. f ~r();vn remarks that a maz e through which
su b je cts were asked to move blindfolded seemed to them at first. to be one
unbroken .p ro blc m , On repetition, part~ of the pattern, particularly th e
beginning and cncl, became Iamiliar and assumed the character of localities.

Primitive man was forced to improve his environmental image by adapting

his perception to th e given land scape . He could effect minor changes in his
em-ironment with cairns, beacons , or tree blazes , but substantial
modifi cations for visual clarity or visual interconnection were confined to
house sites or re ligious enclosures. Only powerful civilizations can begin to
act on their total environment at a significant scale. The con scious remolding
of the large-scale physical environment has been possible only recently, and
so the problem of environmental imageability is a new one.

NOTES
1. NewYork Times, April 30, 1957, article on theDirectomat .'

2_Brown, Warner, 'Spatial Integrations in a Human Maze,' Umversity <j Ca110mw

PublJCQtJOn5 in Psychology, Vol. \~ No.5, 1932, pp. 123-1 34-.

3. Shipton, Eric Earle, The Mount Everest Reconnaissance Expedition, London,

Hodder and Stoughton, 1952.

THE IMAGE-WORLD
SUSAN SONTAG

Reality bas always been interpreted through the reports given by images;
and philosophers since Plato have tried to loosen our dependence on images
by evoking the standard of an image-free way of apprehending the real. But
when, in the mid-nineteenth century, th e standard fmally seemed attainable,
h- o m o PhOlcaropny by SUS,l.r'J Sunt,, { l. ()m~~~n ~ :1.lIc I1.1....an, 197X) London h:nguin , 197 7 , pp 15)-6,
L(,O-l, 1n3 .5) 167 "), 178 80 . C.op}-right s; .~ w; ..sn S~l nt ~g. 1<) 7 )., 1974, 197'1 . Rl:Pl-.-..d w:,;(:d b~, p.. .Tml~~I (}O
i ...f 1\ . ng u lO Boob. Ltd Jm l }'(;I
CT e r , SU .)U~ and Ctroux , ; .I .( , .

2~~O : I M A G E S

the retreat of old r eligi ou s and politic al illu sions before th e adva nce of
humani sti c and scie nti fic thinking did not - as an ticipated - create mass
d efection s t o th e real. On the contrar y, the new age of unbeli ef
strengthened the alleg ianc e to images. The cr eden ce th at co uld n o longer be
give n t o realit ies und erstood in th e.form if images was now b eing given to
realiti es un derst ood to be images, illu sions. In th e preface to th e second
ed ition ( 1843) of The Essence ?I Christiamty; Feuerb ach o bserves about' our
e ra' that it ' p refers the image to the thing, th e co py to th e o rig inal, th e
re pr esen tation to th e reality, appearance to bein g' - whi le bein g awar e of
doing just th at . And his premonitory com plaint has been transfor med in the
twentieth cen tury into a widely agreed-on diagnosis: that a society becomes
'm odern ' whe n one of its chief activities is pro duci ng and co nsum ing
images, w he n images that have extraordinary po wer s to determine ou r
dem and s up on reality and are themselves co veted substitutes for firsthand
experience becom e ind isp ensable to th e health of the economy, th e sta bility
of the p olity, and the pursuit of private happiness.

[ .. .j
Mo st co ntem po rary ex pressions of concern that an image-world is r epl acing
th e rea l o ne co nt in ue to echo , as Feuerbach did , th e Platonic depreciati on of
th e image: tr ue insofar as it r esembles so me thing rea l, sham because it is no
m ore than a resem blance. But this ven erable naive realism is som ewhat
b eside th e point in the era o f photographic images, for its blunt co ntrast
bet ween the image ('copy ') and the thing de picted (the ' original' ) - which
Plat o r epeat edl y illu strat es with the example of a pain ting - do es not fit a
pho togra ph in so sim ple a way. N either d oes th e co nt rast help in
und er standing image-m aldng at its origins , when it was a practi cal, m agical
activ ity, a mea ns of app ropriating or gaining p ower over som ething. The
further hack we go in history, as E.H. Gombrich has obs erved , th e less sharp
is th e di stin ction between images and real things; in primi ti ve societies, th e
thin g and its image were Sim ply two different, th at is, physically distin ct ,
manifestat ions of th e sam e ene rgy or spirit. Hence, th e supposed efficacy of
im ages in pro pitiatin g and gaining control over p owerful presen ces. Th ose
pow er s , those presenc es were present in them.
[... J

Th e probl em w ith Feu erbach 's contr ast of 'or iginal' w ith 'copy' is its static
definitions of r ealit y and image. It assumes that w hat is rea l persists,
un chan ged and int act, whil e only images have changed : shore d up by the
m ost tenuous claim s to cre dibility, th ey have som ehow become more
seductive. But the notion s of image and reality are co m ple me ntary. Wh en
the no tion of r eality changes, so do es that of the imag e, and vice versa . ' OUf
era ' does no t prefer im ages t o r eal thi ngs out of perver sity but partly in
res po nse to the ways in which the notion of what is re al has been
progressively complicated and weakened r]
Few people in this society share the primi tive dread of cameras tha t com es
from thinki ng of thc photograph as a material part of thernsclves . But some

VISU AL CU LTU RE : 2 5 1

trace of the magic remain s: for exa mp le, in our reluctance to t ear up or
throwaway th e photograph of a loved one, esp ecially of someone dea d or
far away. To do so is a ruthle ss gesture of rejecti on . In J ude the Obscure it is
] ude 's disco very th at Arab ella has sold th e mapl e fr am e with the photograph
of h imself in it wh ich he gave her on th eir wedding day that signifles to Jude
'the utter death of every sentiment in his w ife ' and is 'the co nclusive little
stroke to dem olish all sentiment in him .' But th e tru e modern primitivism
is not to r egard th e image as a real thing ; ph otogr aphi c images are hardly
that real. Instead , r eality has come to see m m ore and mor e like what we ar e
show n by cam era s. It is com mon now for p eople to insist about their
exp erien ce of a violent event in which they were caught up - a plane cra sh ,
a shoo t- o ut , a terrorist bombing - th at ' it see med like a movie.'This is said,
other descr iptions see m ing insufficien t , in order to ex plain how rea] it was.
Whil e m any p eopl e in non-indu str ialized countries sti ll feel apprehensive
wh en bei ng ph otographed , divining it to be som e kind of trespass, an act of
disrespect, a sublimated looting of the p er sonality or the culture, pe ople in
industrialized coun trie s seek to have their ph ot ograph s tak en - feel that they
are images , and are made r eal by ph otogr aph s.

[. .. \
Photographs are a way of impri soning r ealit y, understood as recalcitrant ,
inaccessible ; o f making it stan d still. Or they enlarge a reality that is felt to
be shr unk , hollowed out, peri shable, rem ote . One can 't possess reality, one
can po ssess (and be po ssessed by) im ages - as, acco rd ing to Proust, m ost
am bitious of voluntary prison ers, one can 't possess th e present but one can
possess th e past. Nothing cou ld be more unlike the self- sacrificial travail of
an ar tist like Proust than the effor tless ne ss o f picture-taking, which must be
th e sole activity resulting in accr edited works of art in which a single
movement, a t ouch of the finger, produ ces a co mple te work. While the
Prousti an labo r s pres uppose th at rea lity is distant, ph otography implies
inst ant acce ss to th e real. But th e r esults o f thi s practi ce o f insta nt access ar e
anoth er way of creating distan ce .To possess th e wo rld in th e form of im ages
is, pre cisely, to re -ex pe r ience th e unrealit y and rem ot eness of th e r eal .
The strategy of Proust 's real ism presumes dista nce from wh at is normally
ex perienc ed as real, the presen t , in order to reanimate what is usu ally
available only in a remote and shadowy form, th e past - which is where th e
present becom es in his sense real , th at is, some th ing that can be po ssessed.
In this effor t ph otograph s we re of no help . Whenever Proust m entions
photographs, he does so dispara gingly: as a syn onym for a shallow, too
ex clUSively visual, m ere ly voluntary relati on to the past , whose yield is
inSignifican t com par ed with th e d eep di scover ies to b e made by r esponding
to cues given by all the sense s -- th e tech niq ue he called ' involun tary
memory.' One can' t imagin e the O verture t o Swa n n 's J1~ e nding with th e
narrator's com ing acro ss a snap.shot of tb.e p arish church at Combrav an d th e
savor ing of that visual cr um b.' Instead o f ~le taste of the humble madelein e
cli pped in te a, making an ent Ire part of h IS past spring into view. But thi s is

2 ~, 2 :

IMAGES

not because a photograph cannot evoke memories (it can , depending on the
quality of the viewer rather than of the photograph) but be cause of what
Proust makes clear abo ut his own demands upon imaginatiYe re call, that it
be not just extensive and accurate but give the texture and essence of things.
And by considering photographs only so far as he could use them, as an
instrument of memory, Proust somewhat misconstrues what photographs
are: not so much an instrument of memory as an invention of it or a

rcplacernen t .
[ ... J
Photography, which has so many narcissistic uses, is also a powerful
instrument for depersonalizing our relation to the world ; and the two uses
are complementary. Like a pair of binoculars with no right or wrong end,
the cam era makes exotic things near, intimate; and familiar things small,
abstract, strange, much far ther away. It offers, in one easy, habit-forming
activity, both participation and alienation in our own lives and those of
others - allowing us to participate, while confirming alienation . War and
photography now seem inseparable , and plane crashes and other horrific
accidents always attract people with cameras. A society which makes it
norrnati ve to aspire never to experience privation, failure, misery, pain,
dread disease, and in which death itself is regarded not as natural and
inevitable but as a cruel, unmerited disaster, creates a tremendous curiosity
about these events -- a curiosity that is partly satisfied through
picture-taking. The feeling of being exempt from calamity stimulates
interest in looking at painful pictures, and looking at them suggests 'lnci
strengthens the feeling that one is exempt. Partly it is because one is 'here,'
not 'there,' and partlv it is the character of inevitabilitv that all events
acquire when they are-transmuted into images. In the real ;vorld, something
is happening and no one knows what is BoinS to happen. In the image-world,
it bas happened, and it IVJ}} forever happen in that way.
Knowing a great deal about what is in the world (art , catastrophe , the
beauties of nature) through photographic images , people are frequently
disappointed , surprised, unmoved when they see the real thing. For
photographic images tend to subtract feeling from something we experience
at first hand and the feelings they do arouse are, largely, not those we hav.e
in real life . Often something disturbs us more in photographed form than It
does when we actually experience it. In a hospital in Shanghai in 1 9 7 ~,
watching a factory worker with advanced ulcers have nine-tenths of hIS
stomach removed under acupuncture anesthesia, I managed to follow the
three-hour procedure (the first operation I'd ever observed) without
queasiness , never once feeling the need to look away. In a movie theater in
Paris a year later, the less gory operation in A.ntonioni's China documentary
Chunn Kuo made me flinch at the fir st cu t of the scalpel ancl avert my eyes
several times during the sequence. One is vulnerable to disturbing events in
the form of photooraphic
images
.in a n
way that. one is not to the rea] thins.
o
....
,
........

That vulnerab ility is part of the di s~ i n ct. i v e pa ssivity of som eon e who is a
spec tat or twice over, sp ecta tor . of events already shaped, first by th e

V iSUA L CULTURE : 2,5 3

participants and second by the image maker. for th e real operat ion I had to
ge t scr ubbed, don a surgical gown, th en stand alongsid e th e bu sy surgeons
Jn d nurs es with m y roles to play: inhibited ad ult , w ell -mannered guest,
res pectfu l witness . The movie op eration precludes not onl y this modest
participation but whateve r is active in spe ctat ors hip. In the operating room,
I am the one who changes focu s, who makes the dose -ups and the medium
~h ots . In the theater, Antonioni has already chosen what parts of the
oper ation 1 can watch; the cam er a looks for me - and obliges me to look,
leaving as my only option not to look. Further, the movie condenses
something that takes hours to a few minutes, leaving only interesting parts
presented in an interesting \vay, that is , with the intent to sti r or shock .The
dram atic is dramatized, by the didactics of layout and montage. We turn the
page in a photo-magazine, a new sequence starts in a movie, making a
contrast that is sharper than the contrast between successive events in real
time.
[ .. . J

The final reason for the need to photograph everything lies in the very logiC
of consum p tion itself. To consume means to burn, to use up - and,
therefore, to need to be replenished. As we make images and consume
them, we need still more images; and still more. But images arc not a
treasure for which the world must be ransacked; they are precisely what is
at hand wherever the eye falls . The possession of a camera can inspire
something akin to lust. And like an credible forms of lust, it cannot be
satisfied: first , because the possibilities of photography are infinite; and,
second, because the project is finally self-devouring. The attempts by
photographers to bolster up a depleted sense of reality contribute to the
depletion. Our oppressive sense of the transience of everything is more
acute since cameras gave us the means to 'fix ' the fleeting moment. 'liVe
consum e images at an ever faster rate and , as Balzac suspected cameras used
up layers of the body, images consume reality. Cameras are the antidote and
the disease, a means of appropriating reality and a means of making it
obsolete.
The powers of photography have in effect de-Platonized our understanding
of reality, making it less and less plausible to reflect upon our experience
according to the distinction between images and things, between copies and
originals. It suited Plato's derogatory attitude toward images to liken them
to shadows --- transitory, minimally informative, immaterial, impotent
co-presences of the real things which cast them. But the force of photo
graphic images comes from their being material realities in their own right ,
richly informative deposits left in the wake of whatever emitted them, potent
means for turning the tables on reality - for turning it into a shadow. Images
are more rca] than anyone could have supp osed . And just because they are an
unlimited resource, one that cannot be exh austed by co nsurner'ist 'waste,
there is all the more reason to appl y the cons ervationist r em edy. If there can
be a better way for the real w~rJd to inclu.de the one of images , it wi ll reqUire
not onlvJ of real tlungs bu t. of Images as well .
an ecolocv
bJ

':'::5 4 : I M AGES

I I:

THE PHILOSOPHER AS
ANDY WARHOL
ARTHUR OANTO

A man sees what look. like an or dinary soap-pad carton in a shop window and, needing to
ship some books, asks the shopkeeper if he can have it. The shop turns out to be an art
galler)' and the shop keeper a de aler who "")"s : 'That is a wor k of art , just now wor th thin)'
thousand dollars.'
A man sees what looks like Warhol's Brillo box in what looks like an ar t galler y, and asks
the dealer, who turns out to be a shopk eeper, how much it 15. The latt er says the man can
have it, he was going to throw It awa)' an)"',-a)', it got placed in the window temp or arily after
it was unpacked .

[ ... J

1 have oft en found myself struck by th e ir ony th at someone so outwardly

unlikely as Warh ol, who seemed to the artworld so little possessed of
int ell ectu al gifts and powers, so cool , so caught up in low cultu re '.- in
kit sch ! - sho uld in fact have disp layed phil osop hical in tuit ions qui te beyond
those of his peer s who read Kant and spo uted existe ntialism and cited
Kier kegaard and used th e heaviest, mo st highfalutin vocab ularie s. 'When I
claimed, in an essay I publi shed at the ti me of his p osth umo us retrospe ctive
exhi bition at th e Muse um of Mod ern Art, that he was the n earest to a
philosoph ical genius that twentieth-century ar t had brou gh t for th, I was
looked on with some incredulity by a good m any of my fr iends, who held
him in very low intellectual est eem . It is true that one of Warh ol 's
cont r ibut ions to cultur e was a certain look - that of th e leath er-clad , pale,
lank night-child , monosyllabic and coo l, unmoved by 'art, beauty, and
laugh ter,' to cite d e Kooning's tr in ity. But th at person a was itself one of his
works - a certain embo dim ent of 'the ar tist of mod ern time s.' He achieved
som ethi ng antipodal to th e paint-sm ear ed pr oletari an p ersona of th e Cedar
Bar : he becam e what he did.

[ . .. ]
His work and his life we re on e because he transform ed his life in to the
image of an artist's life, and was able to join th e images th at com posed the
substance of ar t. Unli ke Duchamp, Warhol sought to set up a resonance
not so mu d) betw een art and rea l objects as between art and images, it
haVing been his inSight r... ], that our signs and images are our rea lity. We
live in an atmosphere of images, and th ese defin e th e rea lity of our
existence s. Whoever and whatev er Maril yn Monroe actually was is hardly
as imp ortant as her images are in defining a cer tain female essence , whic h,

A'l'"thur C. Dante , fr o m 'T he Ph iloso ph er .as.And.yWar hol ", in Pnsl"<;ophuiny 1'11C : f:>....lctte<1 e$~OI l . lkrkc l (~)',
CA : H ruvcrsity f)fCa hfo r:'l'.<l. Pre ss) J999 ) PP.- 65 and HO -? Cop yrigh t f;; 19 9 9 . J\ rl h UJ C . Dan tu .
Rc.p ri nk rl hy per m isslo n o l the au thor ,l nd (.:rcorgl~ .'i Bor cha rd t Inc

VI SU AL CU LTU RE : 25 5

when it was vital , conde nsed men 's attitudes toward women and women 's
att itu des toward th em selves. She was her images , on screens and in
magazines , and it was in this (arm that she en te red common life. She
became part of our ow n being because she occu pied th e share d
consciousn ess of modern m en and wo men th e world around . Noth.ing
could be haul ed up out of th e depths of th e uncon sciou s that could po ssibly
have the magic and power of Marilyn.
Warh ol's ar t gave objec tivity to the common cult ura l mind. To participate in
that m ind is to know, immedi atel y, the meaning and identity of cer tain
images: to kn ow, without having to ask, who are Marilyn and Elvis, Liz and
Jackie, Camp bell 's soup and Brillo , or today, afte r Warhnl 's death, Madonna
and Bart Sim pson. To have to ask who these image s b elong to is to decl are
one's distan ce from the cult ure. Thi s made Warho l an utterly public ar tist, at
one with the culture he mad e obj ective . Th ere are conne cted with thi s two
forms of d eath - th e cessation of life and the obso lescence of one's images.
When no one r ecogni zes who a photograph is of, only then is the subj ect of
that photograph irrecover ably d ead. True fame in th e modern world is to
have one im age recognized by persons who never kn ew anything but th e
image .True immortalit y is to achieve an im age that outlasts oneself, and th at
continues to be par t of th e common mind inde finitely - like Charlie
Chaplin , or JFK , or Warhol himself. His self-por tr aits are portraits of his
image , and hen ce as much and as Iittl c him as his portrait s of Marilyn are
'rea lly' her.
~

[ ...]
Warhol invented a (arm of portraiture that henceforward specified the
way stars would ap pea r. Everyone h e portrayed became ins tantly
glam orous through b eing transformed int o th e unmistakable Warholesqu e
image : Liza Minn elli , Barbra Streisand , Alber t Einste in, Mick Jagger, Leo
Caste lli. Th e art dealer Holly Solomon commissioned her portrait and
excla imed over th e way Warhol turned her into ' this Hollywo od starlet.'
But in an odd way th ere was a certain equality in the subjects: just as th e
Coke drunk by Liz Taylor is no better th an th e one drunk by th e bum on
the corner, so Chair man Mao is no more a star than Bianca Jagger, and
th e black an d Latin o transvestites of th e print ser ies ' Ladies and
Gentlemen ' are no less - or more - glamorous t han Truman Capote or
Lana Turn er . .. or th e Death Star is no differ ent from th e human skull.
This is how on e looks in one's own fifteen minute s of world fame. ' If you
want to know all about Andy 'Warho l,' he said in an interview in 1967,
'just look at th e surface .'
Th ere is more to it than that. He: turn ed the wo rld we share in to ar t and
turned himself into part of that world, and because we are the imag~s we
hold in com mon with cveryone else, he becam e par t of us. So he might have
said: if you want to know who Andy Warho l is, look Within. 0;, for that
m att er, lo ok wi tho u t. You , 1, t he world we sh ar e arc all of a piece .

c'5 C : I M A G E S

I I:

VISUAL CULTURE : 2 S ';'

SYMBOL, IDOL AND MORTI:

HINDU GOD-IMAGES AND THE
POLITICS OF MEDIATION
GREGORY PRICE GRIEVE

When I arrived in Nepal in June 1995 to begin fieldwork, one of the first ques
tions I was asked was 'So ju st wh at is (a) god ?' It was th e ea rly afternoon . ..
and I was drinking a Cok e and 'writing down som e scratch field notes . The
questioner was one of the ubiquitous high scho ol studen ts-cum-predatory
guid es who had ju st peeled him self off a large group of tourists. After I
declined a tour, he saw me taking notes , so he sat down next to me and asked
what I was do ing. I told him 1 was in Nepal to study religion. He looked at me
askance and asked: 'So just what is (a) god?' I could not answer. I was silenced
not by a lack of con cepts, but r ather because as the school student asked the
question, he teaSingly pointed across th e square to the material god -image of
the god Bhairava (Figure 11.1) .

One of the most common religiOus practices in South Asia is darsan ; whi ch
occur s when a devotee gazes upon a material image of a god (Eck, 1996 ).
~tor and take a second look at the god-image of Bhairava, a fierce form of
Si\'a from the Nepalese city of Bhaktapur, What can you make of this image?
Bhairava is a stone god (loha(n)dy a:) - a humanly constr ucted co ncrete deity.
Loha(n)dya: literally translates from the Newar (Nepal Bhasa) as 'stone
(lobafnJ) god (dy a;)' and is th e local idiom for the pan-South Asian notion of
mOrt! . Murti> are concrete sign s of gods and can he either ani conic or iconic.
They are the ritually consecrated images at the center of the chief form of
Hindu religious practi ce, worship (puj a) .
What occurs when one looks face-to-face with Bhairava's god-image? What
can on e make of this stone god ? If you , like me, find yourself trained in and by
'Western' academic discourses or have been trained in educational systems in
other parts of the glob e ,....hich gain distinction by modeling them~e1ves on
elite occidental pedagogy, it is difficult to face up to Bhairava 's otherness. 1Thi s
god-image chall enges one's understanding. When one ga;.;cs at his three fish
like eyes (two large , one small) , sharp, fanged teeth, flaming orange-red lips
and elaborate, multicolored , snake- encrusted headdress it is hard to escape
one' s 0""11 historical, class and geographic bias. In a skewed Levinasian sense,
the 'idol 's' face resists our powers to understand (Levinas, 1969: 81). In short,
a look at Bhairava show s that there is no inn ocent ' eye' , no naive viewing. [. - ,1
Rather, all social objects ar c mediated by intervening socially grounded,
culturally generated and historically particular mechanisms. Moreover, the se
intervening mechanisms ar c not neutral, but are marbled through and through
with power relations. For instance, the Bhairava image that hangs on the wall
of my office holds a ditTerent social meaning than an image of the god In SItU.
In such a case, the imag e transforms from' god' to 'ar t' .That is, the stone-god's
III situ contextu al divine meaning is replaced with a d epoliticised aesthetic one.

*
From a scripturalist po sition , god-images are seen at b est as supplements ,

and at worst as deterrents , to a real understanding of the divi ne, Mirroring

thi s, scriptural accounts tend toward t wo mediating .strategies: symbolism

and idolatry. By mediating strategy, I m ean to gloss n o particular school,

method, or theory, but rather the wider tactics hy which god -ima ges are

'turned into' Book-knowledge.

FIGURE 11.1
God-Im age of Bhairava (By Purna Chitra kar
(1999), 22 .5 x 18Inches). Photograph:
G. Grieve. 1999 . See colour Plate 2
Gn~g{)r)' Pric e (; r[c\' f:, fro m Culcvrc, Tht:ory and CrI!!T'c. Vol. 44 , Isxu J, 2003 , Lon d on : H.ou d(.d.g l' ~

PI'_ 57 72 .

The first interpretative strategy, symbolism , er ases th e materiality of god

images by positing them as material signs of spiritual trans cendental categories.

[...1In the broadest sen se, the symbolic function has been posed as the general

function of mediation by which consciousness constructs all perception and

discours e (Cas sir er, 194-6). In the narrowest sense it means something other

than wh at is said (Ricocur, 1970: 12). Always, however, th e svmbol is a vehicle

at once universal and particul ar , M oreover, be cause sy mbols' refe ren ts ar e

often vague, the symb~l \s c:.ucial for, brin gjllg~ togc~hcr abstract scriptura l

co ncepts and concrete Signs (Fir th, 1973: 6-- 17, ) 5; Rlcocur, 1976: 53) .

Th e second mediati ng st rategy,. idol.atry, interprets con crete gods such as

Bhatrava as m ater ial objects of lr rauonal rever ence or obsessiv.e..d = ti o n

2 5 S : IM A G ES

V ISUAL CU LTU RE : 259

In the sim plest sense, an idol is an image or statue of a deity fashioned to act
as an object of worship. Yet, often such worship is perceived as imm oral
because idolatry gives the name of God to that which is not Gael. (. .. ] Yet,
because all signification is dependent on material signs, all religions must
worship matter to some extent . Accordingly, 'idolatry' is not simply the
worship of matter, but the accu sation of another's ' strange worship'
(Halbertal and Margalit, 1992). Lingering in the rhetoric of the idol is one
of the most per sistent forms of orientalism. [... In] every situation idolatry
is a strategy by which a 'community [creates] self-definition through it s idea
of what is excluded and through its notion of "th e other'" (Halbertal and
Margalit 1992 : 17, 236).
The danger with the two scr iptur al mediating strategies is 1...1that they
tend to perpetuate what Bruce Lincoln calls 'immoral discourses,' that is,
those that 'systemati cally operate to benefit the already privileged members
of society at the expense of others' ( 198 1: 11 2). For instance, rather than
being an essential obj ect, th e 'idol' is created by a constellation of discourses
that ar e link ed with the idea of misrepresentation. Similarly, the danger with
symboli sm is that the materi al god image s are hijacked to reveal a scriptural
transcendental Signified and to re inforce a dominant view of the world. In
both cases, Bhairava is defaced. He is no longer situated in his own domain
of social practices, but becomes a signifier of scriptural transcendental
categories. In shor t, both mediating strategies are hypocritical. They hide
their own agenda behind the mask of the' other ' .

*
Bhairava is neither an idol nor a symbol. He is a stone god (loha(n)dya:), a
humanly constructed material d eity which is br ought to life in a
conversation of gazes. In a stone- god the material component (signifier ) is
the dominant element .To understand how such concrete images are used to
con struct the divine, what need be atten ded to ar e the local cultural logicS
in which they are situated.

[ ... ]
Stones are constituted as stone gods (loha(n)Jya:) in two ways: descriptively,
and through ceremonies and con tinuing rituals (puj ii ) _which give th e sto ne
life VIva). Descriptively tnurtis depict the deity. As Lilabhakta Munikarmi
said , 'If you believ e in (th e god) Vishnu then you need a murtl describing
what he looks like. You kno w him th e same way you would know by seeing
your father's photograph. That he has two arms , hair and also you can see
the fashion of the time' (personal int erview, 10 Jun e 1999) . In this sen se the
carved image is seen as an aid to visualizing the god. Yet, not only are there
car ved stat ues which are not murtis, there are many ani conic stones which
are worshipped as god s. The symbolic signification is secondary to the stone
god's power (Sakli) that is cre ated by its life force Oil'a) . Murti can be both
symbolic and have 'power ' , but it is Jiva w hich tran sfor ms th e st on e (loha(n))
into a sto ne go d (Joha(T!) dy o:) . [... J Hence, WhiLe: the des cr iptive quality and

con ceptu al levels of a murti arc important, they are not the defining features.
[ . . . J This is esp ecially Sign ificant for Bhairavas, most of which ar e aniconic .
What this demonstrates is that instead of an iconic symbolic representation,
a murti 's signification comes from giving life to a stone. In fact , a murti is
'd ead' until life is put into it through ceremo nies. Thereafter the image is
not merely a symbol of that deity, but it is that deity.

... ]

[. . , One] of the ways that people in Bhaktapur indicate that they are going to
worship a god is through the notion of darsan , whi ch literally means ' to see' .
[. . .] As Damodar Gautam said: 'To go to the temple and have a face-to-face
with the god's image - that is darien ' (perso nal inter view, 21 June 1999) .
When on e goes and has a 'face-to-face ' with the god, it is not ju st that the
worshiper is seeing the god, but that the god looks back at the worshipers
(Eck , 1996: 6). [. . .] The seeing and being seen between worshiper and god,
the investing a murti with the ability to look at us in return, is a tactic for
bringing it into social relations and thus constituting its p er sonhood .
[... ] People in Bhaktapur are made. They are constituted through two main
social semiotics: rites of passage, and a n et of social relations. First, for
Newars, creating a person is not a natural process, but a ritual process. The
chief set of rituals are the ri tes of passage (samskaras}, a developmental
sequence of life star ting with writing on the infant 's tongue, going through
puberty rites, marriage, and ending with funeral ceremonies (Levy, 1990:
658 -686; Parish , 1994: 233-275). In Newar culture , the innate, unrefined
person is not viewed as sufficient for social Life. As Tejeswar Babu Gongah
once told me: 'Just as a rough rock is polished smooth, a child must be mad e
into a person by culture ' (perso nal interview, 15 Jun e 1997). The same goes
for stone gods (loho(n)dya:). [.. .]
In shor t , there is no absolute distinction between gods and people (Babb, 1975 :
52; Fuller, 1992 : 3). As a 'per son ' Bhairava both creates others, and is in turn
created by his social relation s with others. Newar society is tied together
through a complex web of giving and receiving hoth goods and favors (Lewis,
1984: 14). Newars in Bhaktapur speak of this web as a net (Parish, 1994: 130) .
For Newars , the self is not bounded, but created by a net of social relations.
[oo.J Hence, Bhairava is 'alive' Viva) because he is set in a social net vanja!) of
contingent mutual dependency in which he is tr eated as if he were a person .
Yet , in this net, Bhairava is not just any person ; he is extra-ordinary. [.. .]

'"

Take on e last loo k at Bhairava's god-image (Figure 11.1). When a statue is

given life , it is said that its eyes have been opened. And during darsan once
the image 's eyes 1Fe opcned, it gazes back at the worshipers. Up until now,
we 've been looking at the god . What happens when the stone god looks
back? In Totality and l,!j1J1l ry , Emmanuel Levinas writes th at' everything th at
cannot be reduced to an intcrhuman relati on rcprC1;cnts not the superior
form but the forever primitive form of religion' (Lcvinas 1969: 79 ) . In a

''' S C, : I M AG E S

VISUAL CUL T U R E : 2 6 '

THE UNITED COLORS OF DIVERSITY

sens e Bhairava 's goel-im age b oth sup por t s and t ransgresses Levinas'
understanding of the divine , an d at th e very least it qu alifies it .
What the god -im age qualifi es is th e scr ip tura l bi as of th e West ern
understanding of the divine. Similarly, my enco un ter with the stone god _.
ini tially humil iatin g or, at best , fr ustra ting - turned out to be se rendipitous, for
it defarnil iarized m e from the assum ption th at scripture must form the
foundation of a religiou s tr aditi on. It shovv ed that in order to properly
understand Hin du belief and pra ctice one need s an under standing of situ ated
every day practi ce, especially th e wor ship (puJa) of god -im ages (m urti ). My
encoun ter indi cates th at to understand how th e concret e go d-im age is used in
everyday Hinduism on e mu st und erstan d th at Bhairava is neith er a symbol nor
an idol, but a mUfti : a divine sign who se material component dominates. To a
worshiper of everyday Hinduism, deiti es are not only transcendental con cepts
to be im agined , th ey are tan gible practice - god s should be seen, heard,
touched, and even taste d . Yet, while the material element is crucial, for the
stone to become a stone god it mu st be situ ated in in SIt u cultural logics, that
is, the mutually continge nt net of social relations wh ich give life to the ston e.
In short, what the god-im age demonst rates is that a scriptural und erstanding of
god-images differs from an every day one, not because of the for m er 's usc of
m aterial sign s, but rathe r because the material signs are m ediated differently.

CELl A LURY
Bcn etton 's claim to ow n go odness, if yo u b elieve th eir marketing personnel,
has be en acce pte d at face valu e by all of u s: 'If you see five colours to gether
and three different faces, yo u say "that's Ben ctton . .. ," ev en if it r eally isn 't '
(Mattei , n.d.: 4) . However, it was not until 1984 that th e im agery . . . fir st
began to be used by Benetton to promote its clothing in inte rnational
adver tising campaign s; until th en , the com pany's marketing had been
pr imaril y focussed on th e representation of th e products themselves. The
press re le ase accompanyin g th e new cam paign described th e imag es as
'Groups of young people, of different r aces and sizes . . . pho tograph ed
j urnping and laughing ' (qu ote d in Back and Quaade, 1993: 67). Th ese
images ar e still 'with us, althoug h the slo gan acc om p anying th em cha nged
from ' All the Colors of th e World ' to the n ow ub iquitous 'United Co lors of
Bencuon ' in 19 85. In th ese photographs, yo ung people, som cti m es wa ving
nation al flags, or bedeck ed with national emblem s such as stars and str ipes,
ham m e r s and sickl es, w ith accen tuated , racially co de d phvsical
characte r isti cs, parad e in colourful clothes.

[ ... ]

NOTE
I . Footnote rem oved .

WORKS CITED
Babb, L 1975. The DIYlDe Hierarchy . New York: Co lum bia University Pre ss.

Cassirer, E. 1946. Langlwge and Myth. Tr anslated by Susanne K . Langer. London:

Harp er & Brother s.

Eck, D. 1996 . Darsan: Seeing The Divi ne lmaqe In India . 2nd edition , revised and

enlarged . New York: Columbia Univer sity Press.

Firth, R.W 1973. Symbols:Public and Private. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Pre~s .

Fuller, C.] . 199 2 . The Camphor Flame: Popular Hindui sm and S OCJel)' in India.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni ver sitv Pr ess.

Halb ertal, M . and A . Margalit. 1992. Idolatry. Tran slated by Naomi Gold blum .

Cambridge , MA: Harvard University Pr ess.

Levinas , E. 1969 . Totality and lrifinity . Pittsburgh : Duquesne University Pr ess.

Levy, Rob ert. 1990 . Mesocosm:Hind uism and the Orgam ;wtwD '?! a Traditional Newar

CICY in Nepal. Berkel ey, CA: University of California Press.

Lewis , Todd . 1984 . The Tuladha rs ef Kathmand u: 11 Study if Buddhist Tradn ions in a

N ewar Merchant Community . Ann Arbor, MI : Univer sity Mi crofilms Intern ational.

Lincoln, B. 1981. EmeraiGEJ from il, Chrysalis: Studies w Ritu al, of Women's

[n i tr a ti o n , C am bridge , MA : Har vard l.lnivcr sitv Pr ess.

Parish, S. 19 94 . Moral Knowing in a Hindu Sacred City. Ne w York: Colu mbia

U n ive rsitv P ress .

r.

Ricoeur, 1970 . Freud and Plnlosophy. I l rJ E~'(JY on M ed lOlin f/ . Translated by DeniS

Savage. New Haven, CT: Yale University Pr ess.

Ricoeur, P. 1976. Narration Theory. For t Wor th: Chr istian Universitv Press.

FIG U R E 11.2
Swrms uits (Senetton
brochure)!Jumper of
many colors (Senett on
brochure). Courtesy of
the Benertcn Group
SPA I Colors
magazine. See colour
Plate 4

Ce lla L Ul"\'. from Giobol Nat ure, GlobdJ Cu /w rt'. cd .. Sarah Pranklin , Celia Lury and [ack re Stacey. London :
S;'l.6C\ .2000. pp. 147- .9 . Re prod u , :~d h:., j) l: nn i>;." i o r1 (If' '')'l~l ' PLlblic.: .'t1nn:-; ;\l ~d the a uth or .

I 1:6

VISUAL CULTURE : ,,: c, }

Z~G 2. : I MAGES

Certa inly Benetton '8 adve r tising is di stinctiv e - at least in the UK - for its
use of explicitly ra cially coded models: in gem:ral, advertising continues to
be remarkably white . I In wh at ways, th ough, do Ben etton 's photogr aph ic
im ages r epresent diversity? How do these pictures mediate the relations
betw een the sp ecific and th e universal , the cultural and th e natural ? As
Back and Q uaad e observe, th e dominant theme of Beuetton 's campaign is
'the accentuation of differ en ce coupled with a sim p le st atement of
tr anscend ence and glob al uni ty ' (1993 : 68) . Appl ying the wo rk o f St uart
Hall, Back and Quaadc further argue th at this accentuation of differen ce is
ge nerated 'within a gra m m ar o f rac e :
IT]he o\"erpow~r ing re ference point in therr imagery is that race IS real. racial ar chetyp es
pr ovide the vehicle for their message, and r acial comm on sense is overbearingly present in
the United Colors' myth , such that the reality of r ace is legi timated in Ben etton 's
discourse . (1993: 79 , or iginal emphasis)

However , w hile the legitimation of race in Bcn etton's cam paigns see ms
beyond dispute, I want to sugg est tha t th e novel producti vity of these images
is missed if it is ar gued that racial difference is naturalised here , if by that
is m eant th at ra ce is presented as an unchanging and et ern al biolo gical
esse nce . ' Race ' , in th is ima gery, is not a matter of skin colo ur, of physical
char acte r istic s as th e expression of a biological or natural essence, but rather
of style , of the col our of skin, of colour itsel f as the m edium of what mi ght
b e called a second nature or, more provocatively, a cultural essentialism.
As noted abo ve , 'The id ea th at's being sold is m ainly co lour and joie de vivre
and can b e recognised as such' (Matte i, n.d .: 4-). So, for example, in
Benetton promotion al cam paigns, young people are colour-coded: they are
ju xtaposed together to bring out colour co ntr asts as in Benetton outlets, in
which stacks of jumpers ar e fold ed and piled up so as to seem as if th ey are
paint colour char ts . Th e ove ra ll e ffect of colour - not any particula r colour
but co lour as such, colour as the m edium of differen ce - is enhanc ed
through th e graduations in tone , th e suggested compatibility of hu es and
contrasts in tints creat ed by the endless repositioning of one shad e against
another. In the cr eation of this e ffect, the distinction between cloth and skin
is eschewed . In a promotional illustration for tights, for example, the viewer
is confron ted by a series of legs in profile, each slightl y different in shape
('di ffere nt r aces and sizes'), com pletely encased in multi-coloured tights.
Her e, skin colour is not simply made invisibl e but displaced an d reworked
as a styli sed act of cho ice: what colour is your skin going to be today? (The
sam e cho ice was promoted by Crayo la in th e production of 'My 'lv'orld
Colors ' , a box of sixteen crayons, suppo sedly r epresenting th e diver sity of
skin, hair and eye colo urs , fro m sep ia to raw peach , of th e pe oples of
a colouring -book wnrId .) Sim ilar ly, in t he publicity images adopted by
Benetton of wh it e an d blac k faces daubed w ith hl"ightly col oured
sun-pro t ection cre am s, th e colour of skin is made up z out to be ar tificial.
Race is not not ' real' here, but it is no longer fo un ded in biology,b ut in
culture, th at is, in cultu r e as a second nature (despite or, rath er, preciseJy

b ecause of the pl ay on th e white west ern depiction of ' pr imitive ' tribes
through the trope of face -painting). 2

In yet anoth er exam ple , two eyes, of differ ent colours, look out from a black
face. Th e face is shot in such close-up th at only the area surround ing th e eyes
is visible; th e skin appears str etched to the edges of the image such th at the
contour s of the face ar e flatt ened : it s features and outline ar e hard to make
out . Acr oss thi s canvas is written , in white cap itals, FABRICA, a word which,
while taken from th e Italian f abbrica (factory), " also draws on the idea of Andy
Warhol's New York City Fact ory of th e 1960s. It resonates with the associa tion
of fabrication for English spe akers: skin is once again represente d as cloth. The
promotional slogan 'United Colors of Benetton' is attached , as always, to the
side of the im age, as if it were a label.This is, in Marilyn Strathern's phrase,
nature 'e nter prised up' (1992): the natural, innate property and the ar tificial,
cultural enhanceme nt become one . Peru sing Benetton's fashion catalogues,
the viewer 's gaze is drawn from shad e to shade , ob eying th e textual Jaws of
Vl-Titing rather than th e realist ones of veri simili tud e, depth and figur e. Biology
is no longer a refer ent for race ; rather , race is created in the colours
constitute d in th e arbitrary relations between signifier and sign ified.

NOTES
1. Footnote remov ed .

2. Footn ot e removed .
3. Fabrica is also th e name of the arts and comm unication centre of th e
Benetton gm up.

WORKS CITED
Back, Les and Quaade, Vibeke ( 1993), 'Dr eam Utopias, Nightmare Realities :
imaging race and culture within the world of Benetton advertising' , Thud Text,

22: 65-80.

Mattei, Pran cesa (n.d. ) A Matter of Style', News:Umted Colors rif Benetton : 4 -5 .

Strathern , M. (1992) Reprodl.JCJnB the Future: AnthropoloaJ" Kinship and the New

Reproductive Technologies. Manchester : Manchester Univer sity Press.

THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS

OF SIGHT
M~fLlNG CHENG

How do feminism and visual culture inters ect? It is easier to po se an analogy

than to answer a co mplicated qu estion straight on: a set of color s is infus ed
into an Wldulating p ond, a pond of susp ended visions. The colors , viscous (in
oil-based paint) , oITer a c e rtai~ Vibrancy. to th e visions , coatin g them with
an additional te xture and seem mgly m akmg th e phantasm ati c floating sights
mOr e focused, hen ce more 'mater ialized, ' espe cially at the ea rlier moments
M~il ing Cheng from The': n mln jsm and ViJ uo/ Culture Bcader , cd , Amel i., [ones ' Londo n ."
, " out I~~tIgc 2003

'.

pp. 29--3 1. CopYrlgh t~' Mciling Che ng, reprod uced with pe nni.s ion of the .u. hor .

I 1:7

.. G "'i: I MA GE S

when th e colors are first in trod uced to the pond on e by one. Th e visions are
grad ually awash with yellow, white, pin k, gr een, red , br own , blue , purple,
black, and mu ltiple ot her colors, to th e exte nt t hat these visions ar e both
reshaped and disguised by th e colo rs and the colo rs also gen erat e th eir oWn
floating images. We see a plenitude up on ple nitu de : their intersection is
splen dor in disorientation .

HOW IS FEMINISM A SET OF COLORS?

Fem inism star ted out as a sim ple impulse : t o quest ion the patri ar chal stat us
quo that pr esupposed ge nde r in equ alit y. Th e m eth ods used by fem inists in
the 1970 s to put this redressive impulse into act io n varied . Som e challenged
th e cons training effects of gende r con ditio ning ; so me advo cate d for
women 's self-determina tion, ec ono mic independence , and political
liberation ; some att acked the hegem ony of masculocentr ic re presentations;
some assert ed the mat er iality of sex ual differen ce, while pmsuing women's
right to full cit izenshi p. Each m eth od may be likened to a pri me color, with
its unique agenda an d obj ectiv es similar to the particular dens ity and
distribution of pigm ent in each color. As a color t ends to saturate and
coor dinate the surface o f an imag e, so the set of ideological programs
assoc iated with feminism functions to orien t the words, attitudes, and
actio ns of a feminist.
These 'p rime colors,' however, soon proved inadequate matches to the
com ple xit)' of life. Wi thin fem inism , the co nfro ntat ion with gen der
o pp ression alone proved insufficien t w hen th e int erl oc king effects of race,
e th nicity, class, age, physical abilitv and sex uality were laid open and
critiqued. Th is shift to war d great er com plexity is not antithetical to the
fem inist ethos, for its inclusive tendency has prepa red most fe minis ts to
welcome th e inter subj ect ive mand at e of self-revision . All -inclusiveness,
however, has its side effec t of loose pr olifer ati on. After three d ecades'
popular dissemination of the term, feminism now becomes a m utable label
op en to m ulti ple, and ofte n contradicto ry, ce nsures and applicat ions. A
mo vement that began by exposing the specificity of variegated experiences
of subjuga t ion grows to subsume a mul tiplicit y of causes, some of which
have littl e to do with its formative, intervent ionist im pulse . Imagine mo re
and more colo rs are ad ded to th e pond in such rapid inter vals that we can
no longer discern individual patterns, and least of all evalu ate their dlscord
in abstra ction . If we, as femi nists, desir e to tell more stories abo u t the
floa ting visions in our own voices , this may be the moment th at we m ust
pause and select m ore car efully the colors on ou r palette , Limit ation offers
us th e freedom t o in ter ven e with sophisticated clarity.

HOW DO WE COMPARE VISUAL CULTURE

TO AN UNDULATING POND OF V ISIO NS?
Visual cu lture assembles di verse accesses to a phenomenal world that
sustains and envelo ps us pri rn a ri lv th rough o ur senses especia lly thro ugh our.
o p t ic al sense, which exte nds the reach of Our senso ry body. The con di tion ot

V I S U A L CULTURE : " ,- - '

senso ry extensio n is a plus, but also a necessity, as distance is prerequi site

for visio n . \ Ve ar e capable of seeing only th at whic h st ands apart from our
eyes.Th is st ate o f apartness entails that the majority of sights are foreign to,
or o th er than , o ur being. A disp ossessed endo wme nt, ou r visio n can neither
own nor transfix th e o bject of its gaze, even thou gh th e obj ect under
sury eillance m ay feel th reaten ed by th is gaze . A cer t ain liquidity distances
our act of seeing from th e seen ; we approach visible sights as if through a
wate ry screen , a pon d of vision s that ke ep undulating. Indeed , th e saying
' seeing is b elieving' com ments o n the imp ossibility, for us, of verifying a
Sigh t purely through seeing, fo r a bel ief is born / e precisely to defer th e
uncertain ty of (a) being. We bel ieve wh at we see in order not to lose (Sight
of) th at t o 'which our visual desire clings. Being unverifiable, the obj ect of
our visual desir e - as a floating sight in our optical pond - dangle s in
ind et er minacy, glowing in a surfeit of free-r anging signi fication that resist s
semantic fixity. But we enact our d esire by invest ing our belief in th e visual
object, encrypting ce r tain m eanings and proje cting th em onto th e im age to
stop its r ipp ling in to invisibility, a disappearance that would register our
inability to access th e field beyo nd visuality, Pouring colo rs onto the floatin g
visions is, then , on e way to pr e -em pt th e disappeara nce of th e visible and
th us to put in abeyance o ur mo urning for the lost Sigh t.
Like an opt ical pond t hat gat hers floating images by ra ndo m accre tio n , th e
field of visual cult ure te nds to expand in its inve ntory of study objects ,
which are , th eoreti cally, a collec tion of any visible Sight invested with a
perceive r' s de sire. Visual culture, given inh erently to multiplicity, triggers
the int er est in finding ways of co m prehe nding and deciph ering the existi ng
images manufactured by contemporary culture, The co nundr um hidden in
this scenar io is th e discr ep ancy of intentionality between the subject of
inquiry and th e inq uir ing subject : th e image seized for view, however
deliberatel y de sign ed, exis t s in a state of indifference , whereas th e viewer is
mo st likely alr eady over deter mine d by her/rus int er pr et ive desire. Perh aps
the b est we can do is to bypass th e co nun dr um by pursuing th e liberatin g
poten tial of th at discr ep ancy, recogn izing th e being of an image as
Iight /intangible and th e core of a desire as heavy I matt er -prod ucing. We
allow th e heavy t o im pinge up on the light, not to deaden th e light , but to
turn it int o a certain illuminating matter.
Heavy like a set of colors, femi nism seeks to produce significant matters that
redress the myopia of phallocen tri c culture . As feminists, we m ay r egard visual
culture as a syste m of commo dification heavily encoded with phallocentric
values, o r simply as a floati ng gallery of aggregat ing im ages phantasmatic in
their void of values. The form er requ ires our cr iti que as we chall enge the
masculinist hegemony that has processed visual representations surreptitiously
for its own perpetuation . The lat ter yields a vast producti ve space for us to
play with subversive colors , those ,that ~~ge m~er our Own narratives, allOWing
them to r adiate from the undulating VIsions In the po nd. W he n we heed the
lightne ss of sight , we gain the po tential of mak ing its lightn ess as heavy as a
commi tm ent .

VISION AND VISUALITY

IN T RO D UCTION
12: 1

Modernizing Vi sion

Jonathan Crary

12:2

The 1m/Pul se to See

12:3

lighti ng for Whiteness

Rosalind Kra uss

Richerd Oyer
Cultural Rel ativ ism and the Visual Turn

12:4

Ma rtin Jay

12 : 5

Semir Zeki

The Modularity of Vision

At a most basicrlevel we might suggest that 'vision' refers to what

physiologicall y we are capable of seeing.twhlle the relatively new term
'v lsuality' refers to how vision is socially, historically and culturally
constructed. Theterm visuality is used somewhat unevenly in visual culture
studies (seeS ectio n 11, Visual Culture) and is often interchangeable wi th the
phrase 'scopic ,r egime' - orlginall y used by Christian M etz (7.2) .in his
psychoanalytic studies of ci nemat ic experience. Martin fay (1993: 149- 20 9)
refers to scopic regimes to describe th e experiential or phenomenologica l
experience of vario us dominant and competing 'ways of seeing' that arise
through modernist art and its philosophies. N icholas M irzoeff (19 99)
frequently refers to scopic regimes in conjun cti on w ith Foucault's (1 99 1)
account of the Panopti con, so introduci ng an ex plici t notion of relational
power on visual terms. Ov erall, as Hal Foster (1988 : ix) argues, visuality is a
central co ncern for visual culture studies, w hich seeks,to soc ialise vision, 'to
indicate its part in the prod ucti on of subjectivity ... and its own pro duction
as a part of intersubjectivity' . Yet vision and visuality are not reductively
congruent, .as the two terms 'are not opposed as nature.is to culture: vision
is social and historical too, and visuality involves the body and the psyche'.
Considered together, vision and visuality lead us to comp lex iss ues of how
the visual either con firms or transcends acculturation. There 'is a need both
to historicise vision. and to locate the particular ities ofvisua] experience and
visual knowl edge, whethe r in physiologlca l or cu ltural terms.
Crary (12. 1) historicises vision in order to explore the nature and unfold ing
of hegemonies of seeing and being seen. In the extract here, he show s how
the structural and optical prin ciples of the camera obscura - whi ch from the
late 15005 through to the end of the 1700s informed t he dom inant paradigm
regarding the status and epistemo logy of vision _. are suddenly undermined
the privi leging of the human body as a visual producer. Hi s study enables,
tor example, an: understandin g of how Cartesian- perspectivalism (w hich
separates object and subject in visio n) is challenged by modernist art, as it
brings to attention the distracted viewer, the optical unconscious (Benjamin,
1992: 2 11--44) and more generally a complex embodied field of vi sio n
{Merleau-Ponty, 6.2). However, rather than work from w ithin an art historv
p~~spec t ive, which tends to assum.e 'that an observer wil l always l e av~
VISible tracks', Crary pays iltten.tl.o n to 'o ther, grayer practi ces' , the
techniques and discourses abo ut VIS ion 'whose immense legacy wil l bea ll
the industries of the image'. For C:ary the concept of visuality gives rise to a
fluid (Foucaultian) genealogy ~f Visual culture , of multiple sites of meaning
and perspective, each dependlnl$ on the c urr~n t social and cultural matrix
surrounding the vie\~~r ~nd vlew.ed. In this vein, w e mi ght consider
Hackney's ( 10 .4 ) revislomng <?f history to add to such a genealogical
account. In this
su~es t lf~9- how the camera obscura, posing an

?y

c.::e

I MAGES

I N TRODUCT IO N

alternativ e model of arti stic ski ll , undermi nes receiv ed vi ew s abou t the
techn iqu es of the 'g rand masters' of painting, wh ich subsequently im pactS
hugely on deb ates in art hi story.
Krauss (12.2) develops Cra ry's archaeological app roach and presents two
different models of vi sual ity to the dominant modernist ones. In th e fi rst caSe
she describes M ax Ernst's co ll age wo rk of a girl placed in a zootrope, w hich
she argues op ens up a surreal ist model of vis ion of dreams, evo king; a lllode
of doubl e vision of the dreamer as simultaneou sly pro tagonist w ith in a nd
viewer o utside of the ir own world. Krauss then refers to D uchamp's rotorelief
artworks, drawing on psychoanalytical co ncepts of the gestalt and the erot ic
to suggest a model of imagi ng as a beat or pul se. Her -po int is that D uchanm
sought to 'corpo realis c the visu al, restoring to th e eye (agai nst: th~
disembodied o ptica l ity of modern ist painting) the eye's condi tio n as bodfly
organ' (see Damasio, 9.2). In both cases, Krauss is keen to poi nt out-how the
artists w or ked in co nj unct io n with forms taken from mass cul ture.

as'a

Dyer (12.3) uses th e con cept of vi suality to suggest th at lig ht,

physical
property, has over many year s been treated and catego rised by med i~
profession als in such a w ay as to privi lege white peo p le. He focusesontho
aesthetic or techn ological constructio n of beauty and pleasure.infilmand
photography. And , in contrast to much c ritical, hi stori cal reflec tion on how
med ia constru ct {deceptive) im ages of the w orld (see Secti on 3, Ideo logy
Critique), Dyer is more concerned w e recognise that 'cultural media are ani }'
sometimes con cern ed w ith real itv and are at least as mu ch co ncerned-w ith
ideal s and indulgence , th at a r~ themselves soc iall y co nstr ucted ' . \ M~ ~~
important ly, he shows that whilst media technol ogies are always socia l, they,
are also instruments of technol ogy. O n the one hand, cultural histo rians can
frequently und erestimate the latter, while on th e ot her hand the more
tech nical-minded can overlook th e former. Dye r's suggestion is to bri dge the
technical and socia l.
Jay (12.4 ) counters the claim that images can never be unde rstood ?s n ~! ur~1
or analogical signs with uni versal capaciti es, pos itioning h im self again st 'the
triumph of c ultural relativism in visual terms'. He questions the iillp ulse to
bring the visual into meaning through its translation into di scour se, arguing
that the re is alw ays an 'excess' of th e vis ual over discourse and cul tur al
boundaries. Jay bri ngs to th e-fore the potenti al-for vi sion to transcend 'local"
visual ities, to offer modes of knowl edge and com mun ication that are mOle
d irectl y sensed than di scu rsive o nes. Hi s argumen t can be seen. to
supplem ent his the sis .in Downcast Eyes (1 993 ), whi ch offe rs an extensive
study of th e pr ivileging of vision in W estern philosophy and soc ial theory.
More specifical ly, however, in demons trati ng tha t th e 'concept of totality In
French cri tica l theory is frequently ac co mpanied by scepticis m abo ut the
possibilities of a total ising gaze, lay argues that twentieth-century French
tho ught has made a sustai ned attack on visio n to for m a tradit ion he labels
as 'antiocularcentric' disc ou rse. Ag ains t w hich, he suggests w e need to place
mo re emphasis on the expe rie nce of vis io n in order to open up interreli3:ted
Questions abou t natura l vi sual ability, vision and herm eneutICS,
phen om enologi cal percept ion, scopi c regim es and th e relationship of vision
to the Enl ightenment.
Jay's argu ment against c~ lt~~~ 1 relat ivi sm c~ n tx:rl.ain ly ~e developed and
opened up to further y osslb dltlcs wh en considered rn relat io n to recent ","ork
in neuroscience, w hich seeks to understand how the sense data of th e VIsual
fiel d beco mes visi on for us. Sem ir Zeki 's (12.5) research suggests that w hile

vi sio n seeks ou t the essential characteristic s of the perceptu al fiel d, it is itself

'modul ar' , so th at d ifferent aspects of 9ur experience, suc h as moti<{.n, co lou r
and shape, are 'processed' by the brain asynchronously. This blur of senso ry
data is late r reconst ructed as a mental image by the brain's act ive processes
(see Dam asio, 9.2 ). In contrast to trad it ion al views in neuro scien ce, Zek i
(19 99 : ( 8) qu estion s wh ether 'seeing and understandi ng are separate
proce sses and suggests instead that the brain activel y seeks out know ledgei ri
the env ironment 'The brain .. . is no mere passive chronicler 01 the external
physical reality but an active . partic ipant in generating the visual- image;
acco rding to its own rule s and programs' . James Elkin s (200 3) suggests that
the p roliferation of new visual research in th e neurosc ienc es shoul d aid
theorists in develop ing mqr e nuanced view s on vision.
-i:

REFERENCES
Benjamin, W. (1992) 'The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction', in

Illuminations, tr.H, Zohn. London: Fontana Press. pp. XI 1- 14'." ",

, '

El kins, ]. (2003 ) Visual Studies: A Skepticel lnuoduction, London: Routledge.

Foster, H. (ed.) !l988} Vision and Visuality. Seattle, WA: Bay Press.

Foucau lt, M. ( 1991) DiSCipline and Punisl: The Birth of the PriSOfJ, tr. A. Sheridan.

London: Penguin.

Jay, M. (1993 ) Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of vision in Twentieth-CenturvFrench

Thought. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Mirzoeff, N. (1999) All Introduction to Visual Culture. London: Routledge,

Zeki, S. (1999) iruier Visio n . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

'~

2 1 0 : I MAG E S

12: I

VI SIO N A N D VISUALl TY : ;27 1

MODERNIZING VISION
JONATHAN CRARY

optical principles of the camer a ob scura coalesced int o a dominant paradigm

through whi ch was describ ed th e sta tus and po ssibil ities of an obs er ver.
[.. .j

It is interesting that so many attempts to theori ze vision and visualitv are

we dded to models that emphasize a con tinu ou s and over arc hing Wester n
visual traditi on . Obviously at times it is strategica lly n ecessar y to map out
and pose the o utlines of a dominant 'Weste rn speculative or sco pic tradition
of vision th at is continuo us or in some sense e ffect ive, for instance, from
Plato to th e pr esent, or from th e Quattrocen to into the twentieth ce ntu ry
or to when ever. My concer n is not so mu ch to argue against these mod cl ~:
which have th eir own usefuln ess, but rather to insist th er e are some
important disco n t in uit ies th at suc h hegemonic constr uction s have
preve nted from coming into view. The spe cific account that interests me
here, one that has become almost ubiquitous an d continues to be developed
in a var iety of for m s, is that the emergen ce of photography and cinema in
the nineteenth centur y is a fulfilment of a long unfolding of technological
and / or ideological development in the West in which th e cam er a obscura
evolves into the photographic camera. Implied is th at at eac h step in this
evolu ti on the same essen tial presuppositions about an observer 's relation to
the wo rld are in place. [... j
Th ese models of con tinu ity are used in th e ser vice of bo th , for lack of better
ter ms, the rig ht and the left . On the one hand are th ose w ho pose an
account of eve r- increasing progress toward veri similitude in re presentation,
in which Renai ssance per spective and photogr aphy are part of th e same
gu est for a fully objecti ve eq uivalent of ' natural visio n' . On the other are
th ose who see, for example, the camera obscu ra and cinema as bound up in
a sing le enduring appar atus of p ower, elaborated over several ce ntur ies, that
contin ues to define and regulate the status of an observer.

*
For at least two thousand years it has heen know n th at , wh en light passes
through a small hole into a dark, enclosed int erior, an inverted image will
app ear on th e wa]] opposi te the hole . [... j
But it is cr ucia l to make a d ist inction between the em pir ical fact tha t an
im age can be produced in this way (some thing that co ntinues to be as tru e
now as it was in antiquity ) and the cam er a obscura as a socially constructed
artefact. Fo r th e cam era ob scura was not sim ply an inert and neut ral piece
of eq Uipm ent or a set of techn ical pr emises to be tinkered up on and
improved over th e years ; rather, it "vas embedded in a m uch larger and
denser organ i;f..ation of knowledge and of the observing sub ject. If we want
t o be hist ori cal abou t it, we mus t re cogn ize ho w fo r nearly two hund red
years, fro m the lat e 1SOOs to th e end of the 1700s, the st ructur al and
Pro m Vi5Jon rJ" d Vi nwl u.,p , ed. fl.l l J :O$[ (~(. S (~ .1 tt h: . WI\ ~ B;,\y Pre s... , 19SH, pp. /.~ - +4 .

W hat is striking is the suddenness and th orou ghn ess with which this
[)aradigm co llapses in the ear ly nineteenth ce ntury and gives way to a
diverse set of fundamen tally different mod els of human vision. 1 want to
discuss one cr uc ial dimension o f this shift, the insertion of a new t erm in to
disco urses and practices of vision : the h urn an body, a term whose exclusio n
was on e of the foundations of classical theor ies of vision and optics [. . . j.
O ne of th e most telling signs of th e new ce ntrality of the body in vision is
Goeth e 's Th COl)' if Colours, publ ished in 1810 [.. . J.I This is a work crucial not
for its po lem ic with Newton over th e composition of light but for its
ar ticulation of a model of subjective vision in whi ch the body is introduced
in all it s physiological density as the gr oun d on whi ch vision is possible . In
Goeth e we find an image of a newly pr oductiv e obse rver whose body has a
range of capa cit ies to generate visual expe rience ; it is a question of visual
exper ience that doe s not re fer or cor re spon d to anything external to the
observ ing subject. Go ethe is concern ed mai nly with the exper ie nces
associated with th e r etinal afterimage and it s chro matic transformations. But
he is only the first o f many re sea rcher s w ho become preoccupied with the
after image in the 18 20 s and 1830s throu ghou t Europe. Their collect ive
study defined how vision was an irreducible amalgam of physiol ogical
processes and exter nal stimulation , and dr amatized th e productive r ole
played by the body in vision .

[.. .J
[.. .T jhe privil eging of the body as a visual pr oducer began to collapse the
distinction between inner and outer upon whi ch the camera obscura
depended. Once the objects of vision ar e coextensive with one's own body,
vision b ecomes dislocated and depositioned onto a Single immanent plane.
[. . .S[ubjective vision is found to be distinctly tempor al > an unfolding of
processes within the body, thus undoing no tion s of a direct cor responden ce
between pe rception and obj ect . By th e 182Os, then , 'we effectively have a
model of autonomous vision.
The subjecti ve vision that endowed th e observer with a new perceptual
autonomy and pr oducti vity was sim ultaneo usly the res ult of the observer
having been mad e int o a subj ect of new kn ow ledge, of ne w techniques of
power, And the terrain on whi ch these two interrelated observers emerg ed
in th e nin eteenth. ce ntury was the science of phYSiology. From 1820 through
the 184;Os it was very unlike the special ized science that it later became; it had
then no for ma l institutional ident ity and came into bein g as the accum ulated
wor k of disconn ect ed individuals from di ver se br anch es of learning. In
com mon wa s the excitement and won der ment at the bodv, which now
appear ed like a ne w continent to he malJpcd , explored, and mastered, with
new recesses all d me chan isms unc O\:,crcd for the fi r st tim e. But the real
im por tance of phys iology lay in the fact tha t it became the arena for new

VI SI ON A N D VI S UA Ll TY : 2"73

2 > 2 :1MAG ES

typ es of epistem ological reflection that depended on new knowledge about

the eye and processes of vision. Physiology at this mome nt of th e nineteenth
century is one of thos e scie nces that stand for the r upture that Fouca ult poses
between th e eighteenth and nineteenth ce nturies , in w hich man e merges as
a be ing in whom the transcendent is ma ppe d onto the cmpi rical .t

[...!
[O ne} dim ension of th e collec tive achievement of ph ysiolog y in th e first
half of the nineteenth ce nt ury was the gradual parcelizati on and division of
the body into increaSingly separate and specific systems and fun ctions.
Especially im portant we re the localization of brain and ner ve func tions, and
the disti nction between sensory ner ves and motor nerves. l...1All of this
pro du ced a new 'truth ' abo ut th e body which some have linked t o the
so -called 'separatio n of the senses' in the nine t een th ce ntur y, and to the idea
that the specia lization of labour was hom ologous to a specializatio n of sight
and of a heightened autono mous vision [... j . I be lieve, how ever, that such a
homology doesn 't ta ke account of how tho roughly vision was reconceived
in the earl ier nineteenth century. It still see ms to pose obs e rvation as the act
of a un ified subject looking out ont o a wo rl d that is th e ob ject of his or her
sight , on ly that, because th e objects of the world have beco me reified and
com modified , vision in a sense becomes con sciou s of it sel f as sheer looking
But in th e first maj or scientific th eori zation of th e separ ati on of th e senses,
there is a much more decisive break with the classical observer ; and wh at is
at sta ke is not Sim ply the heightening or isolating of th e o ptical but rather a
not ion of an obse rve r for w hom vision is conce ived 'withou t any necessary
co nnec tio n to the act oflook ing at all. The wo rk in qu estion is dIe research
of the German physiologist Joh ann es Mull er, the Single most important
theorist of vision in the first half of the nin et eenth century. j In his study of
the physio logy of the senses, Mull er makes a compre hensive statem ent on
th e subdivision and spe cializatio n of th e huma n senso ry apparatus; his fame
was du e to his th eorizati on of that specialization : th e so-ca lle d ' doctri ne of
specific ner ve energies' .
[ ... j
T he th eor v wa s base d On the discove ry that the n erves of the differe nt senses
were phy~iolog j cally dist inct . It asserted quite Simp ly - and this is "'I/hat
marks its ep iste mological scandal - that a uniform cause (e.g., electricity)
wou ld generate u tterly d ifferent sensations from one kind of ner ve to
anot he r. Electricity applie d to the optic ner ve produces the ex perience of
light , app lied to th e skin th e sensation of touch . Co nvers ely, Muller shows
that a variety of differen t causes wi ll produ ce the sam e sensation in a given
sensory ner ve ; in other words, he describ es a fundamentally arb itra ry
relation between stim ulus and sensation . h is a desc riptio n of a hod)' with an
inn ate capaci ty, one might even say a transcend ent al fac ult.y, to mispcrccjW , of
an eve th at render s differen ces equivalent.
J

[ ...]

Sight her e has been separate d and specialized certain ly, but it no longer
resembles any classical mod els. The theory of specific n er ve energie s
presents the outlines of a visual mod erni ty in which th e 'referen tial illusion '
is unsparingly laid ba re . Th e very absence of referentia litv is th e ground on
whi ch new instrumental t echniqu es will cons tr uct for an observer a new
'real ' worl d . It is a qu estion of a per cei ver w hose very emp ir ical nat ure
render s ident ities un stabl e and mobile , and for w hom sensa tio ns are
interc hangea ble. And remem ber, this is rou ghly 1830. In effect , th e doctrine
of speci fic nerve en ergies r edefines vision as a capacity for bein g affec ted by
sensa tions that have no necessar y link to a refer en t , thu s th reatening any
coherent system of m eaning. l...] [WJh at was at stake and seemed so
threate ning was not just a new for m of ep istem ological scepti cism abo ut the
unreliability of the senses but a positive reorganizati on o f per cep tio n and it s
obje cts.T he issu e was no t ju st how does on e kn ow wha t is r eal, but that new
forms of th e real were b eing fabricated and a new truth abo u t th e capaci ties
of a human subject was being ar ticulated in t hese ter m s.
>:<

Th e co llapse of th e came ra obscura as a model for th e stat us of an observer

was par t of a m u ch larger pro cess of mod e r nization , e ven as t he camer a
obscura itself was an elem ent of an earlier modernity. By the ear ly t 80 0s ,
however, th e rigidity of th e came r a obscura, it s lin ear optical system, its
fixed po sitions , its cat ego r ical distin cti on between inside and outside , its
ident ification of perception and object , wer e all too inflexible and un wi eld y
for the needs of th e new centu ry. A more mobile, usable, and produc tive
observer was ne eded in bo th discourse and practice - to b e ade quate to new
uses of the body and to a vast proliferation of eq ually mo bile and
exc hangeable signs and images. Mod ernizatio n entailed a decodi ng and
detcrr' itori alization of visio n.
What I've been trying to do is give some sense of how radical was th e
n :configtrratioll of vision by 1840 . [... 1A new type of observer was fo r med
then , and not one th at we can see ftgured in paintings or prints. We 've been
train ed to assume that an observer will always leave visible tr acks, that is, will
be identifiable in ter ms of image s. But here it's a question of an observer wh o
takes shape in othe r, grayer pr acti ces and discourses, and wh ose immen se
legacy will be all the ind ustries of the image and the sp ectacle in the twentie th
centu ry. Th e body which had been a neutral or invisible ter m in vision now
was the thic kness from which know ledge of vision was derived .Thi s opacity
or carnal density of the obser ver loomed so suddenly into view that its full
consequences and effects could not he immediately rea lized . But it was this
ongOing ar ticulation of \' i ~j ~n as nonveridical, as lod ged in the body, that was
a condi tion ifpossibJ1Jt)' both for the ar tistic expe rim entation of moder nism and
for new forms of d()m ina~on, fix wh at Foucau lt calls the 'tecHnology of
individu als "." Inseparable from the techno logies of dominat ion and of the
spectacle in the late r nineteenth and twentieth centuries were: or co urse film
and photography. Paradoxically, the increasing hegemony of these two

E! 74: I M AGES

V ISIO N AND V ISUALlTY: 2 7 ,;;)

techniques helped re cre ate the myths that vision was incorporeal, veridical,
and 'realistic' . But if cinem a and photography seemed to reincarna te the
camera obscura, it was only as a mi rage of a tran sparen t set of relati on s that
mode rnity had already over thr own .

NOTES
1. Footnote removed .
2. Michel Foucault, The Order rif ThIngs (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971),
pp. 318- 320.
3. Footnote removed .
4 . Michel Foucault, Discipline aru! Punisn:The Bu th of the Pnson, trans. Alan Sheridan
(New York: Vintage Books, 1975), p. 225 .

THE 1M/PULSE TO SEE

ROSALIND KRAUSS

[.. .In] th e centra l image of h is 1930 collage novel, A Little Girl Dreams oj
Taking the l~i I , Max Ern st places his heroine at the ce nte r of an en closure,
which she calls a dovecot but which we re cogni ze as the drum of a zootrope,
he not onl y presents us with a model of visuality d ifferent fro m that of
mod ernism 's, but associate s that model quit e dir ectly with an optical device
which was generated from and spo ke to an ex perience of p opular cu lture .
As was th e case in many of the components of his collage novels - thi s one
as wel l as La Femme 100 Tetes - th e underlying elem ent of th e zootrope
structur ing this im age was taken from the pages of th e late nin eteenth
century magazine of popular science called La Nature.
Devoted to b ringin g its audi ence news of the latest ex ploits of techn ology
in a whole vari et y of field s including en gineering, m edicine, anthropology,

geo logy, La Nature was par ticularl y obsessed with optical de vices - th e fruit
of re cent psycho-phy siolo gical research . Inevit ably, in the se pages, th e
devices imp ortant to this research we re lifted from th e neutral confines of
the labo r atory, to be incorporated int o th e conditions of publi c sp ectacle , as
the stereoscopic slide was visualized , for instan ce, in terms of a kind of
scenic projection (the static fore r un ner of th e 3-0 movie) , or th e limited ,
intimate, per sonal viewing -space of the praxinoscop c was enlarged and
distan ced to fill th e screen on an opp osite wall.

As Jonathan Crary has pointed out in his 0 ,.,11 discussion s of the archaeology
of these optical devices, the obvious driv e dem on strated here towards the
con ditions of modern cine matic pr ojection should not blind us to the
particular experienc e these illustrati ons still make available, an exp eri ence
that not onl y conjur es up the effects of a g iven illusion but also exposes to
vie w the means of th is illusion's prod uction. I So that the acknowl edgem ent
that go es on in these pages is that the spectator will occupy two places
Simultaneously. On e is the imaginary identifi cation or closure with the illusion
- as we see, as if they were unmediated , the cow grazing against the
hallucin ator)" d epth of the ste reoscopically distanced stream , or the bobbing
gestures of feeding geese. The second position is a connection to the op tical
machin e in qu estion , an insistent reminder of its presence, of its mechanism ,
of its form of constituting piecem eal th e only seemingly unified spectacle.This
double effect , of bo th haVing the ex perien ce and watching oneself have it from
outside, characterized the late nineteenth-century fascination with the
spectacl e in which ther e was pr odu ced a sense of be ing captured not so much
bv the visual itself as bv what one could call th e visuality-effect .
~

Now thi s double vant age, occupi ed by th ese early viewers of proto
cin em ati c d evices, was particul arl y inter esting for Ern st 's purposes
inasmuch as the m odel of vision he was intent on explOri ng was th e
pe culiarly medi ated p erceptual field o f the dr eam . That exper ience of the
dr eam er as sp ectator or witness to t he scene of th e dream as a stage on
whic h he him self or she herself is acti ng, so that the dreamer is

F IGURE 12 .1
Ma x Ernst. A LiWe Girl Dreams of Taking the
Veil, 1930 . @ DACS , London.
H.os:,lirHl Krau ss. [r -om

VISion am ,rS.cuallf) "1 d .

Hal t; ,..tc r. Sea ttl e . V'l A: Bay Pn.: ~:', 1YSH . pp. S+-S , SS- 6 3.

FIGURE 12.2
From La Nature, 1888 .

VISION AND VISUALITY:27 7

'27 6: IMAGES

simultaneously protagonist within and viewer outside the screen of his or

her own visi on, is the strangely redoubled form of dream visuality that Ernst
wants to exploit. And so it is to a sensation of being both inside and outside
the zootrope that Ernst appeals in this image.
From outside the revolving drum, peering through the slits as they pass
rhythmically before our eyes, we would be presented of course with a
succession of stationary birds performing the majestic flexing of their wings in
what would appear to be the unified image of a single fow!. ' From the drum's
inside, however, the experience would be broken and multiplied, analyzed into
its discrete, serial components, the result of chronophotography's record of a
mechanical segmentation of the continuity of motion. But uniting the
experience of both inside and outside is the beat or pulse that courses through
the zootropic field, the flicker of its successive images acting as the structural
equivalent of the flapping wings of the interior illusion, the beat both
constructing the gestalt and undoing it at the sam e time - both positioning us
within the scene as its active viewer and outside it as its passive \\' itncss,
In a certain way we could think of Ernst's image as configuring within the
specific ~pace of the dream many of the effects that Duchamp had in fact put
into place throughout his own fifteen -year-long devotion to the turning discs
of the devices he collectively called Precision Optics. There we find the same
tapping into forms of mass culture - in this case both th e revolving turntable
of the phonograph player and the flickering silen ce of early film - as we also
find an explicit reference to the nineteenth-century optics that underwrote
these forms. Further, Precision Optics bears witness to Duchamp's commitment
to the constitution of the image through the activity of a beat: here, the slow
throb of a spiral, contracting and expanding biorhythmically into a projection
forward and an extension backward. And here as well the pul se is accompanied
by what feels like a structural alteration of the image as it is consolidated only
contin ually to dissolve - the illusion of trcmbling breast giving way to that of
uterine concavity, itself then swelling into the projecting orb of a blinking eye.
Yet, to speak of metamorphosis, here, is to miss the dysmorphic condition of
this pulse, which, committed to the constant dissolution of the image, is at
work against the interests of what we could identify as form .

I have, in another contex t, sp oken about the connecti on between the pulsing
nature of the vision Duchamp constructs and the explicitly erotic theater it
stages - the sexual implications of the motions of these discs having escaped
no commentator on thi s aspect of Duchamp 's production . j I have also
de scribed what is clearl y Ducharnp's concern here to cor por ealize the
visual, restoring to the eye (against the disembodied opticality of modernist
painting) that eye's condition as bodily organ , available like any other
physical zone to the force of el"Oti dzalion . Dependent on th e connection of
th e eye to the whole ne twork of the b ody's tissue, this force well s up with in
th e densit y and thickness of th e c:arnal being, as, tied to the conditions of
ner vous life, it is by dcl)nition a function of temporalitv. For the life of
ne r vous tissue is th~ life of tim e, the alternatin g pulse of st im u lation and
ene r vat ion, th e com plex feedback relay: of rctcnsion and pretension . So
t"h':lrot- 1"h.,.

tpTriT'\r.r~l 110: IT'I;\nn ed onto the

h2Ural in rh

~n':lro1'9p-. .t:\f

nl1r.h'2'tT1n '.. ;:

FIGURE 12.3

Marcel Duchamp. Above Rotorelief No.1,

Carol/es, 1935. Below Rotorelief No.3,

Chinese Lantern, 1935. Source: Leeds City Art

Gallery/Bridgeman Art Library DACS. London .

Precision OptI CS as the specific be at of desire - of a desire that makes and loses
its object in one and the same gesture, a gesture that is co ntinually losing
what it has found because it has only found what it has already lost.

[. . .J
If the gestalt operates as a kind of absolute in the field of vision, as the
principle of concordance between difference and simultaneity - that is, the
simultaneous separation and intactness of figure and ground - the beat
could, from the point of view of a modernist logie, never be anything more
than an interloper from the domain of the temporal , the auditory, the
discursive . A function of time and of succession, this beat would be
something that modernism had solemnly legislated out of the visual domain,
asserting a separation of the senses that will always mean that the temporal
can never disrupt the visual from within, but only assault it from a position
that is necessarily outsid e , external, eccentric. Yet the power of the works
that interest me here .- in th eir cont esta tion of what modernism had
constructed as 'the visual' - is that this beat or pulse is not understood to be
st r uct urally di stinct from . vision but to be at work from deep in sid e it. And
from that place, to be .a force that i~ transgressive of th ose ver y notions of
'distinctness' UP011 which a. modernist oPt,i.~ loRic.deoends.. 1;he..heat.it.se1L.f

2 /B : I MAGES

V IS ION AND V ISUALITY : 2 7 9

is, in this sense, Hgural - but of an order of the figure that is far away from
the re alm of space that can be neatly opposed to the modality of time .

NOTES
1. Jonathan Crary, 'Techniques of the Observer,' October, no. 45 (Summer 1988).
2. Footnote removed.
3. Sec my 'The Blink of an Eye,' forthcoming in Nature, Sign. and lnstitun ons in the
Doma in 1 Discouts e, ed . Program in Critical Theory, University of California
(Irvine: University of California Press).

12

:~,

LIGHTING FOR WHITENESS

RICHARD DYER
A television company is about to shoot a panel discussion before a studio
audience. The producer, from the control room, is discussing with the
floor manager in the studio how the audience looks in his monitor. The

producer says som ething about the number of black people at the front of
the audience . 'You' re worried th ere are not too many whites obviously
there?', asks the floor manager. No , says the producer, it's nothing like
that, a mere technical matter, a question of lighting - 'it just looks a bit
down'.
Thi s exchange occurred in the preparation of a programme about the street
fighting that took place in Handsworth, Birmingham, in September 1985 ,
fighting that was largely understood to be about race and which was the
most vivid and controversial of many su eh incidents throughout Britain that
year. The exchange was recorded by th e Black Audio Film Collective and
included in their film Hands-worth Songs (1987), I which explores the cultural
construction of 'race riots'. That construction is embedded in part in the
professional common sense of media production, two items of which are
registered in this exchange.
One item [.. . j is that of 'balance' . The floor manager cann at at first
understand what the producer is getting at. Is it perhaps the racial
composition of the audience in numerical and representative terms? The
topic of the programme has been constructed as race riots, and to have
'balance' one has to think in terms of sides and ensure that equal numbers
on each side are represented . This lies behind the floor manager's remark
about there perhaps not being ' enough white people obviously there', and
the producer understands what he is getting at. However, it is not what
concerns him or us here, whereas th e seconrl notion at play in the excnange
goes straight to th e heart of the matter.

Richerd
)()2 -

.~.

L) Yl:T .

from Whsh." 1:{.:;!J),y on Ratt :.m d

Ruproducx.d h)' pe r -mrsxion ,

C U /(Lo'nJ,

r.m ~ lor. ;

R ou th~d g(:. 19 97,

pr. 8 2- 3) ::J9-90. 94 g~

For the producer it is a purely aesthetic matter. The image looks 'dO\'Vll':
dull, dingy, lacking sparkle. There is no reason to pr esume he is saying this
because he finds black people dislikeable or uninteresting, He is) in the
terms of professional common sense, right: shoot the scene in the usual way
with the usual technology with that audience and it will look 'down'. The
corollary is that if vou do it the usual wav with a white audience, it will look
'up', bright, sparkling.

*
The photographic media and, ajortion , movie lighting assume, privilege and
construct whiteness. The apparatus was developed with white people in
mind and habitual use and instruction contin ue in the same vein, so much
so that photographing non-white people is typ ically con strued as a problem.
All technologies work within material param eters that cannot be wished
away. Human skin does have different colours which r eflect light differently.
Methods of calculating this differ, but the degree of difference r egistered is
roughly the same : Millerson (1972 : 31), discu ssing colour tel evision , gives
light skin 43 per cent light reflectance and dark skin 29 per cent; Malki ewicz
(198 6: 53) states that 'a Caucasian face has about 35 percent reflectance but
a black face reflects less than 16 percent' .111is creates problems if shoo ting
vcry light and very dark people in the same frame.
{.. .J

Th e technology at one's disposal also sets limits. The chemistry of different

stocks registers shades and colours differently. Cameras offer varying
degree s of fleXibility with regard to exposure (effecting thei r ability to take
a wide lightness / darkness range). Oifferent kind s of lighting have differen t
colours and degrees of warmth, with concomitant effects on different skins .
However, what is at one's disposal is not all that could exist. Stocks, cameras
and lighting were developed taking the white face as the touchstone. The
resultant apparatus came to be seen as fixed and inevitable, existing
independently of the fact that it was humanly constructed. It may be
certainly was - true that photo and film apparatuses have seemed to work
better with light-skinned peoples, but that is because they were made that
way, not because they could be no other way.

l...]
The assumption that the normal face is a white face runs through mo st
pub] i shed advice given on photo- and cinematography. 2 This is carr ied above
all by illustrations which invariahly use a white face , ex cept on those rare
Occasions when th ey are discussing the 'problem ' of dark-skinned people.
Kodak announces on th e titl e page of its How [ 0 Take Good PIcture s ( 1984) that
it is 'The world 's b e~t- s ;:.Jling photogJ'aph y hook' , but all th e photo examples
therein imply an all -white wo.rld (with one picture of two very pink
Japam~s c wom en ); similarly, WilbJ;"d Mo'-gan's Ency clopedia of Photosraphy
(1 963), billed as 'The Complete Photographer: th e Comprehen sive G uide

V I S I O N AN D VISU ALlT Y ; 2 8 :

and Reference for All Ph otographer~ ' shows lack o f racial completene ss and
compr ehe nsiveness in its illustrative examples as well as its text I...]. Fifteen
years after John Hedgecoe 's Complete Phowaraphy Coune ( 1979) , John
Hedgecoe 's New Book if Ph oto8raphy ( 1994) is neith er any mor e complete or
ne w as far as race is conc erned (Hedge coe is both a bestseller and ProCessor
of Photogr aphic Art at the Royal Co llege of Ar t in London , in othe r words
a highly authoritative source). Even when non -white subjects are used , it is
rarely randoml y, to illustrate a general techn ical point. Th e only non-white
subject in Lucien Lore lle's The Colour Book cd Photowophy (1955) is a black
woma n in w hat is for this book a highly stylised composition (Figure 12.4).
The cap tion reads:
Special hghting ell ect s arc possible with coloure d lamps ,; and light sources included in the
pictu re. Exposure becomes more m ckj, and should be based on a meter readmg of a key
highlight such as the dress.

The photo is presented as a.n exam ple of an unu sual use of colour, to whi ch
the m od el's "colou r fulness' is unwitti ngly appropriate .Th e advice to take the
exp osure meter read ing from the dress is it self unusual: w ith white subject s,
it is the ir skin th at is determinant. [... J Som e m or e recent guid ebooks
rando mly do include non -white subjects ;' bu t even now there is no danger
of excesses of political cor rectness.
(.. .J

The whit e-centricity o f the aesthetic techn ology of the phot ogr aphic m edia
is rarely recognised, ex cept when th e to pic of photographing non-whit e
faces is addressed . Th is is habitu ally conce pt ualised in terms of non -whit e
subjects entailing a de parture from usual pr actice or constituting a pr oblem .

[... J
In Kris Malkiewicz's book Film UghtinS' based on interviews with Hollywood
cinematographers and gaITers, four of the inter viewees discuss the question of
lighting for black people (Malkiewicz, 1986: 141) .Th ey come up with a variety
of solut ions: 'taking light off the white person' if there are peopl e of different
colour in shot (john Alonzo) , putting 'some lotion on the [black person 's] skin
to create reflective quality' (Conrad Hall) , using 'an orange ught' (Michael D.
Margulies). James Plannett e is robust : 'The only thing that black people need
is more light . It is as simple as that ' . Even this formulation implies doing
something special for black people, depar ting from a white norm . Some ofthe
othe rs (lotion , orange light) imply that the 'problem ' is inherent in the
teclmology, not just its conventional use.

F IG UR E 12 . 4
Ektachrome photograph by L. Burr ows illustrating /(}I.i'
'special lighting effects: Source: L. Lore lle The CO
Book of Ph ofog m p hy (London: Foca i Press, 1955).
See col o u r Plate 3

Else wher e , Ern est Oickc: son: Spike Lee 's regul ar cinematographer,
indi cates the importance 0.1 choices made at cYcry level of light tec hnology
when filming black subjects: lightin g (usc of . w ar rn cr ' light , w ith 'bastar d

28 2 : I M AGE S

am ber ' gels, tungst en lights on dimmers 's o they [can ] be dialed down t o
warmer t emper atures' , and gold instead of silver refl ect ors), th e suhj ect
(use of reflective make-up, 'a light sheen fro m skin m oistu rizer'}, exposu rc
(basing it on 'reflected readings on Black p eople with a spot meter' ), stock
(' Eastma n Kodak 's 5247 with its tight grain and incr eased co lo r satura tion')
and development (using 'pr inting lights in the high thirties and low forties'
to ensure that ' blacks will hold up to th e release prints' ). Dickerson is
ex plaining his choices again st his observat ion that 'ma ny cinematograph ers
cite problems photographing black people because of the ne ed to use more
light on th em' (emphasis added). Mu ch of his language indi cates that he is
involved in co r recting a w hite bias in the most widely available and used
technology: lights are warmer (than an implied cold norm), th ey are dialled
down (from a usual cool er temper ature) , th ey are gold not silver, and the
stock has more colo ur saturati on . Th e whiten ess implied her e is not just a
norm (silver not gold) but also redolent of asp ect s of the conceptualisation
of whitene ss [.. . J: coldnes s an d the absence of colou I'.

.. .]

Movie lighting in effect discriminat es on the basis of race. r... Such]

discrimination has much to do with the co nce ptualisation of whiten ess.
Th ere is also a rather different level at which movie lighting 's discriminat ion
may be said to operate. What is at issue here is n ot how wh ite is shown and
see n , so much as th e assum ptions at work in the way that movie lighting
disposes pe ople in space . Movie lighting relates people to each other and to
setting according to n oti ons of the human that have historically excluded
no n- white people.
Movie lighting focuses on the individual. Each p erson has lighting tailored to
his or her pers onality (characte r, star image, act orly attributes). Each
important person, that is. At a minimum , in a cultu re in which whites are the
important people, in which those who have, rather than are, servants, occupy
centre stage, one would ex pect movie lighting to discr iminate against
no n-white peopl e in ter ms of visibility, individualisation and centra lity. I want
however to push the argument a bit further. Movie lighting valorises the
notion of the unique and special character of th e individual , of the
individuality of the indi vidual. It is at the least arguable that whit e society h: s
found it hard to see non-white people as individuals; the very notion of the
individual , of the freely developin g, auto nomous human person , is anI)'
appli cable to tho se wh o are seen to be free and au tonomous, who are not
slaves or subject peoples. Movie lighting discriminates against non -white
people because it . is used in a cinem a and a culture that find s it hard to
recognise them as appropriate subjects for such lighting, that is, as ind ividualsFurther, movie lighting hi crarchises . It ind icat es wh o is important and who
is no t . It is not ju st th at in white racist society, th ose w ho are n ot white wi ll
be lit to be at th e bo ttom of the hier ar chy, bu t that the ver y pr.ocess of
hierarcht sation is an exercise of po\ovcr. Other arid non -white societies have
hie rarchies, of cou rse; it is not innate to w hite nature . However, hierarchy,

VISION AND VISU ALlTY : 2 8 3

the aspir ation al struct ur e, is on e of the forms th at power has taken in th e era
of w hite West ern society.
Movie lighting also separate s the individual, not on ly from all other
individuals, but from her Ihis environment .The se nse o f separation from th e
enviro n me nt, of the world as the object of a disembodied human gaze and
control, runs deep in white cult ure. The pr ime reason for introducing back
lighting in film was to ensure that the figure!; we re distinguish ed from th eir
gWWld, to m ake them stand out from eac h oth er and their setting. This was
regarded as an obvious necessity, so clearly part of how to see life that it was
an unquestionable imperati ve.Yet it e xp resses a view of humanity pioneere d
by white cult ure ; it lies behind its highly successful technology and the
terrible price the env ironment n ow pays for this.
Peopl e wh o are not white can and are lit to be individualised , arranged
hier ar chically and kept separate from th eir environment. But this is only t o
indicate th e triumph of white culture and it s readiness to allow som e
peopl e in, some non-white p eople to be in thi s sense w hite . Yet not only is
th ere still a high degree of control over wh o gets let in, but , [... ] th e
te chn olog y and cultur e of light is so constr ucted as to be both fundam ental
to the construction of the human im age and yet felt to b e uniquely
appropriate to those who are white.

NOTES
1. Footnote removed.

2. Editor's Note: O r igin al note removed . Throughout his accoun t Dyer draws
upon a wide range of manuals and histor ical studi es of photography, film and
video. Space do es not permit referencing all of this material. An appendix of
this mate rial is included in Dyer 's o riginal text.
3. Footnote remov ed.

WORKS CITED
Hedgecoc, John ( 1979 ) J ohn Hedqecoe's Complete Photoaraphy Course. New York:

Simon and Schuster.

Hedgecoe, John (199+) J ohn Hedoecoe's New Book if Photography. New York :

Dorling Kinder slev,

Kodak (198+ ) H ow to Take Good Pictures . London, Collins.

Lor elle, Lucien (19 55) The Colour Book if Photoaraphy, London : Focal Press.

Malkiewicz , Kris (1986) Film Llghtm8 ' New York: Prenti ce-Hall.

Millenon, Ger ald (1 972) The Tecluuqu e if Lighting for Television and Moti on

Pict ures, London : Focal Press.

Morgan , Willard B. (cd.) ( 196 3) The Encyclopedia rf' l'howgraphy. New York :

Greystone Press.

2 [c~r : :

~4

I M AGE S

CULTURAL RELATIVISM AND

THE VISUAL TURN
MARTIN JA Y
Although vision suggcs t\ sight as a physical ope r ation, and visualit y sIght as a social fact, th~
two are not opposed 3S nat ure is t o culture: vision is socia l and hist ori cal too , and visu alitv
invo lves the body and the psych e. Yet neither are they ident ical: her e, the d ifference
between (he terms signal s a difference withi n the visual - between th e m echanisms of sight
and its histo rical techniques, between the datum of vision and its discur sive determmations
a differ ence, many dill erences, among how we see , how we are able, allowed, or mad e to
see, and haw we see this seeing or th e un seen th erein. (Foste r, 1988 : ix]

Although carefully crafted to res ist a re ductive cong ru ence between vision
and visuality on th e one hand , and nature and cult ure on th e oth er, Foster's
disti ncti on w ithi n sight raises an im portan t question th at t ou ch es on th e
main them e of thi s ar ticle : w hat is the ro le of the visua l in either con fir m ing
or transcen ding wh at has co me to be called cultural rel at ivism ?

[ ... ]
Afte r the recen t visu al turn .. . the claim th at images can be understood as
na tural or analog ical sign s wi th univers al capacitie s to co mm unicate has
almost entirely co me undon e. Mitchell , to take a salient example fr om his
influent ial co llec ti on leonology, dism issivel y calls such a no tion the 'fet ish or
id ol of Western culture' (Mitc h ell , 19 86 : 90) and in sist s that im ages be
situ ated firmly in the wo rld of co nve ntion rather than nature .W hat Norman
Bryso n has c~lled the ' discur sive' as opposed to the ' figur al' aspects of
images, by which he means their em beddedness in lan guage, has increasingly
gaine d th e upper hand in any discussion of their cultural significance.
W itness the claim of Joh n T. Kirb y ( 1996 ) th at
. . . all images have a discur sive aspect , at least insofar as we attempt to consider th em
cogn itivd y or (esp ecially) to co mmunicat e o ur cog nition to ano ther pe rso n. And to

co nsider an imag e ca gniti vely, to engage in discou rse abo ut it .. . is to textualize it . (p. 36 ;
emphasis in or iginal)

VISION A N D VISU A Ll T Y : 2 8 5

dialogu e bet wee n differe nt versions of th e wo rl d, includin g different

languages , id eol og ies, and modes of r ep resentation' (Mitche ll, 1986 : 38)
ex plicitly ad vocated by Mitc he ll in lconoloBJ? Can we argue th at visual
experience is alwa ys circumscribed by th e p rotocols of the culture out of
which it is gene ra te d, always an effec t of th e co des of that culture , and
therefore cannot provid e a means of transcending it s limits? [. . .] Is th e visual
no longer separable fro m visualit v, to r ecall Foster's terms ; is it cu lt ur ally
coded all th e way down, w ith no excess beyond w hat the cultural med iation
it self dictate s?

[ ...]
An attem pt to topple [the argument for cultural determ inism] entirely comes
from the historian of science Bruno Latour ( 1993) in his provocative little
book , We Have Never Been Modern. In additio n to questioning the boundaries
separating diffe rent cultu res, he ex te nds the skepticism t o that between the
cultural and th e natural. Arguing against th e assumption that there is a Single
natural wo rld on whi ch distin ct cultures have different per spectives, which in
our terms would be th e claim that the vision of th e natural human eye is always
filtere d through discursive screens, he notes th at th e very sepa ratio n of cultur e
(or plural cultures) from a Single nature is itse lf an historical crea tion, w hich he
cans the rise of modernity. [. .. 1W ithout falling back on a universalist noti on of
a rea l natural world , which Latour argues is always a conceit of modern
Western science claimin g to bracket its own cultural moment, he noneth eless
challenges the relativist assumptio n th at versio ns of nature are no thin g but the
conve nti onal projections of d iscrete cu ltures. What he calls th e
'hvp erincomm ens ura bility ' argument of post -moder nist s like Lyot ard is based
on a sim plistic rever sal of th e modern faith in natural univer salism . Latour's
alternative is what he dubs rela tio nal relativism , rathe r than absolute relativism,
an alternative that sees th e wo rld m ade up of hybrids, quasi-objects that include
as much as they exclude. 'How can one claim that worlds are un translatable ",
he asks, 'when >trans lation is the very soul of the pr ocess of relating? How can
one say th at wo rlds are dispersed , wh en there are hundreds of institutions that
never stop totalizing th em ?' (p . 113) .

Can we th en concl ude that along with the new fascination for visual cul ture
has com e th e tri umph of cultural relativism in visual terms, that 'ha rd,
rigo ro us relati vism that regards kn O>A'ledge as a so cial pro duct , a m atter of

Ironicallv, Latour 's argument in We Have Never Been Modem und er mines th e
function tha t vision in one of its guises plays in supporting the d iscourse of
cult ural relativism . That is, it calls in to questi on the visual me taphor of
d ifferen t perspectives on th e real world , wh ich produce different culturally
filte red wo r ldviews o r ph eno menological pro files of an objective rea l
forever beyond our p er fect understanding. For if there are hybrids p r ior to
the ver y split between cult ura l viewer and n atural viewed, the me tapho r of
per sp ecti ve is patently in adequate . You can't look , afte r all, from di fferent
ang les at an object that no lo nger exists as an external r eali ty by itsel f.
Hybrid im br ication suggests a more haptic than visual int er acti on between
subject and object - or ra the r quasi -subject and quasi-obj ect - in what
Mer leau-Ponty fam ously called the ' flesh of the world'.

Mttrtin Ja~'. fro m "Cultura l n~b t j \,j5-rn and the visua l turn", in .Journal e!fVJ.S I1<J ] Co/tu rc, 1 (3 ). 2002,
PI" 267 -78 . Sag.e Pub ltcat ton s, Rt pnxl uo ."O
. by pc rmis,:;ion of Sage P'ublk at!on :-; and the autho r,

In an even more fundam ental respect, Latour can be said to enl ist visual
ex perience against th e more radical claims of cultu ralist co nstr uct ivism. For

Or list en to John Tagg ( 1988), who clai ms, co ntra Rolan d Bar thes, that th e
evidentiary sta tus of a photograph
. . . r ests not on a natu ral or existential Iact, but on a SOCIal , sem iotic process . . what
Barthe. call. "evidential force is a complex historical outcome and is exercise d by
photographs only with ce r tain insti tu tio nal practlces and wi thin par ticular histo r ical
relations. (p. 4)

[. . .j

VISION AND VISUALlTY : <-2 8 7

2 btS : I MAG E S

what he alerts us to wi th his notion of hybridiry is the impossibility of redu cing

figurality entirely to discurs ivity, images entirely to texts , the visual to nothing
but an effect of the same co des that underlie the linguistic. That is, it is as
impossible to re duce natural visual exper ience to its cultural mediation s as it is
to disen tangle it entirely fro n1 them . We need only look as far as the silent film,
which swiftly transcended th e boundaries of th e specific culture out of which it
emerged to achieve global success, to see a clear example of the capacity of the
visual to hreak free fro m linguistic and cultural constraints. Moving images, it
was quickly apparent, didn't need dubbing or subtitles to m ove beyond CUltural
boundaries. [. . .) Equally te lling is the ability of im ages of human suffering to stir
compassion acros s cultu ral and linguistic boundaries.

[ 1

th ought; on. vision a stim ulus to their analyses (Rose, 1986 ; Brennan and Jay,
1996). That 1S, by formulating such conce pts as the mi rror stage or the chiasmic
intertwining of th e eye and the gaze, Lacan was also asking us to consider the
tr anscultmal, perhaps even un iversal, m echanisms of visual exper ience.
Whethe r or not one accepts all of his arg uments , or inclines to other schools of
psychoanalysis (or p erh aps to none at all), the recognition th at sight is entangled
with psyche suggests th e limi ts o f an excl usively culturalist approach , and with
it the relativism that follows. For even if one discerns cultural biases in psycho
logical discourse, calling into qu estion its universalist pr eten sions, th e tension
betwee n psvchic inte riority and social or cultural exterioritv is not thereby
effaced. AmI if we take seriously the idea of the figural moment in psychi c Iif~,
which Freud himself rccognrtCd in the visual re presentation of the d reamwork,

then it cannot be cul tu re all the wav down .

Th is is not to say, r hasten to add, th at im ages can once again be seen as natu ral,
unrnediated ~igns, which can she d all their cultural en coding. It is rath er that
however m uch they are filte red through such a screen, however much they are
co nnotatively deflected by th e magneti c field o f culture , they remain in excess
of it . Cultural relativism is th us not called into question by a naive retu rn to
transcendental uni ver salism in w hich all m ediation is overcome, but ra ther bv
the inability of images to be r elative to a speci fic cultu re und erstood as ~
bo undarie d and coherent w ay of life. In fact, m uc h of th e power of im ages, we
might conjecture, comes precisely from their ability to resist being entirely
subsumed under the prot ocol s of specific cultures. [. . .]

I...] As the Australian film maker and anthro po logist David MacDou gall
( 1998) has noted in his recent analysis of ethnogra phic film entitled
Transcultural Cinema, the mat er iality of im ages
. . . fails to participate in th e creation of either nar rative or symbol. Ths excess cre ates a
fundamental p' yehological disturbance io all human endeavor s to co nstr uct schem ata of the.
world. It is neverthel ess the source of muc h of' the fascination of the photog raphk media ,
and a co ntri butor to the underl ying erotics mel aesthe tics of both art and science. Bar thcs
descr ibe s
as figuration , in contr ast to representation,
it traverses the grain of
sil,'Il.ificancc . (p. 73)

au,

WORKS CITED

13rcnnan ,1. ami Jay, M . (eds) (1996) JTI .~ion in Context: Historical and Contemporary
Penpectlves on Sight. New York: Routl edge.

Foste r, H . (cd .) ( 1988) Vision andVISllality . Seattle: Bay Press.

Kirby, ).1. ( 1996 ) ' Classical Gre ek O rigi ns of Western Aesthe tic Theory', in

B. Aller t (ed .) Languages (f VisualitJ. Detr oit : Kr itik.

Latour, B. (19 93) We Have Never Been Modern .Tr. Catherine Porter. Cam bridge,

MA: Harva rd Univer sity Pr ess.

MacDo ugall, D. (1998 ) Transcultural Cinema. Ed. Lucien Taylor. Pr inceton , NJ:

Princeton University Press.

Mitchell, W.J.T. (1986) ' Nature and Co nvention: Gombrich's Illusions' , in

lcorioloqy: Image,7ext, Ideology. Chicago: Univer sit y of Chicago Pr ess.

Rose, J. ( 1986) Sexuality in the Field ifi.don. London: Verso.

Tagg, J. ( 1988) The Burden C!} Representation: Essays on PhotD8raphies and Htstoo cs.

Lon don : Macm illan Education .

lor

THE MODULARITY OF VISION '

SEfv1IR Z E K I

Film ing th e O ther thus lead s us away from a sim ple beli ef in th e p ri stine
sanctity of d ifferent cult u re s espo used by cultural relativists, for it entangl es
us in m ore complicated rel ati on s w ith the cult ures on view. ' Visual
anthropo logy', M acD ou gall (1998) writes with a nod to phe nomenolog ists
like Merleau -Ponty and Vivian Sobchac k,
' " op ens mo re d irectly onto the scnso r rum than wr itt.en tex ts and create s psychological
and som ati c fo rms or iru crsubjecti vrrv be tween \" i c\\'r~r and so cia l acto r. ln film s, we achieve
iden tification wit h et hers through. syn<:hrc>ny with th eir bod ies :n ade p ossible in larg" p.1r t
b)' vision . (1" 262)

MacDougall's evocat ion of the psychol ogical dimension of visual experience

com es from a largely phenomen ological point of view, but on e can discern
similar implications in the case of those theorists who have found Lacan's

T he majo r visual path way from th e retina to th e br ain is kn ow n as th e o ptiC

pathway. It carries Signa ls to a relatively large part of the cer ebral

hemispheres , sit uated at the back of th e brain and commonly known as the

pr im ary visual co rtex , or V1 for short. There are m any different kinds of

signals - related to co lour, lumi nance, m oti on , form , de pth and m uch else:

bes ides - th at arc trans ported to V I. In V1, ce lls that receive Signals rela ted

to the different attrib ut es of visio n are neatly grouped t ogeth er int o dil

ferent , anatomically id entifiable, compartments [... ]. Th e specialised

compartm ents of V 1 sem~ their Signals to further visua l ar eas, both directl y

an d thro ugh an intermc<!Iary area surround ing V 1 known as ar ea V2. These

Scm ir Z cki. frmn

I rl ll U

rh'l~n . ())"ford : O xford

Un iver ,\:iL:'

I'r~~ :-. :'l . 1 9 ~ 9 . pp. 59 --6H. Rep ro d u ced b)'

I 2 i 5
a

28 8 : IMAGES

V IS iON AND V ISUA LITY : 2 8 9

cells will r espond selectively to other co lours . These cells are ind ifferen t to
the dir ecti on in ...vhich the st im ulus moves, provided it is of th e r ight colour.
They are also indifferent to for m , tha t is to say they will r espond if a
stimulus of th e appro pr iate colo ur is a vert ical or horizontal bar, or if it is a
rectangle , circle, or square. [... J
[... j

. . .,'
FIGURE /2.5
A simple experiment
demonstra tes funct ional
specialisation in
the human brain. Whilst
view ing a coloured
scene , area V4 is
act ivated (lower left).
Whilst viewing a moving
scene, area V5 shows
th e activation (lower
right). Reproduced with
permission from S. Zekl,
La Recherche , 1990,
Vol 21, pp. 712- 21. See
colour Plate 5

further visual area s are located in a large expanse of cor tex that surr ounds
V I , and com mo nly referred to until recently as the 'v isual associat ion'
cortex [... j . Th ey ar e th em sel ves specialised f~r different attributes of the
visual scene, partly because of the specialise d Signals th ey receive from Vl .
y 1 th er efore acts in the office of a d ist ributor of visual signals, mu ch like a
central post office: it parc els out differen t Signals to th e different visual areas
in th e cor tex surrounding it , alt hough it is also invol ved in a significant
amo un t of elementa ry visu al processing itse lf, the res ults of whic h it
comm un icates to the visual are as surrounding it . This discrete parcellin g of
spe cific visual signal s to specific visual areas lead s, in tu rn , to a dis t i ~ct
spe cialisati on for each group of areas , depending upon the type of signab
th at th ey receive . What we call the visual brain is, therefo re , a co llecti on of
many different ar eas, of which Vl , the royal gateway from th e r etin a to the
visual areas, is tb e most prominent. [. . . J
[ .. . ]

The fun ctional specialisation that is so promi nent a feature of the visual
brain is, th en , a conse quence of the fact that the individ ual cells which make
up th e visual brain arc highly selective for th e kind of visual signal or
stimul us that they respond to . A cell might, for example, be select ive for
colour, res ponding to red but not to other colour s or to white; othe r such

Cells that ar e selective for a g iven attribute , such as form, colour or motion ,
are con centrated in spe ci fie co mpar nnen ts of V1 and in specific visual ar eas
of the sur roun ding cortex with which the specific compartment s of VI
co nnect , thus con fer r ing thei r specialisat ions on th e respective areas, and
lead ing to fun ct ion al specia lization . Based on these facts, the th eor y of
func tio nal specialisation supposes that different attributes of th e visual scene
are pr ocessed in geog raphically separate parts of the visual br ain, th at there
are different processing syste ms for differen t attributes of vision (a
processing system in cludes the specialised co m par me nt o f Y1, the
specialised area in the adjoining cortex and the connections between the
two ). [.. . J
Functional spe cialisati on is r... 1on e of th e fir st solutions that the brain has
evolved to tackle the pr oblem of acquiri ng knowledge about th e world, of
consta ncy. Th e kind of infor mation that the brain has to discard or sacrifice
in gettin g to the essence of on e at tribute , say colour, is ver y differ ent fr om
the kind of information th at it has to discard to get to the essence of another
attribute, say size; in the former it has t o disco unt th e pr eci se wavelength
composition of th e light coming fr om on e surface alone and in the latter the
viewing distance . Th e b rain has evide n tly found it operationally more
efficient to discount th ese different kind s of Signals in different areas, ones
whose entire anatomy and phYSiology are specifically tailored to the n eed s
for getting to th e esse ntia ls of particular attributes. It has, in brief, adopted
the solution of parallel processing, of processin g different attributes of th e
visual SCene sim ultaneously an d in par allel.
)

*
The demonstration that different attributes of th e visual scen e arc processed
separately does not, in itself, pr ove that the different attributes are also
perceived separately ; on the whole, visual physiologists and psychologi sts
have assumed that so me kind of int egration occurs in the brain, whereby the
results of the op eration s per formed by th e different visual pr ocessing
syste ms are brought togeth er, to give us our unitary image of the visual
world , wh ere all the attributes are see n together, in precise registration.
[. . .[There is an iro ny her e, at th e expense of the visual physiologist ; he now
seeks to under stand how th e r esul ts of th e different processing syste m s
come t ogether t o p rov i( ~C th: '"cry integrati on that inhibited him from
con sidering the com p leXity of the: task that the brain has to over come in
prov iding a visual image in th e First place.

29 0 : I M A G E S

There are several hypothetical solutions to this problem . It is plausible to

suppose, for example, that the different processing systems 'report' the
results of their operations to one or more master areas which would then
give us the integrated visual image, where all the attributes take their
correct place and are seen in precise spatio-temporal registration. But the
facts of anatomy speak against this somewhat simplistic notion, for all the
evidence suggests that there is no single area to which all the specialised
areas uniquely connect. The concept of a master area faces, in any case, ~a
severe logical and neurological problem. For the problem then becomes one
of knowing who or what is 'looking' at the image provided by the master
area . Another solution might be an interaction between the different,
functionally specialised, visual areas, which are indeed richly connected among
themselves, but how these anatomical connections lead to integration
is anyone's guess,
Perhaps the best way of approaching this problem scientifically is to begin by
asking whether there is such a precise temporal registration of the results of
the operations performed by the different processing systems. It is surprising
that the visual physiologist, having lost out when enquiring into the
complexities of the visual brain for the better part of a century, because of
the integrated visual image, should now find himselfJosing out again, because
of the very same factor, by not asking more searching questions about
integration. Let us therefore begin by asking the obvious first question: are
all the attributes of the visual scene that are processed by the different visual
areas brought into precise temporal registration, as almost all of us have too
readily assumed? Over a relatively long period of time , from one second
upwards, we do see all the attributes in precise temporal registration and this
gives us a good reason for wanting to learn how the integrated visual image
is generated. But one second (1000 milliseconds) is a very long time in neural
terms; it takes an impulse between 0.5 and I millisecond to CTOSS a synaptic
barrier (point of contact between nerve cells) and about 35 millisecon& for
the earliest visual signals to arrive in the cortex, although many reach the
cortex later, aftl"r about 70--80 milliseconds . If we look, then, into a very
brief window of time, would we find the integration which we all assume
exists?
ln fact, recent experiments that have m ea sured the r elati ve times that.it
takes to perceive colour, form and motion show that these three
att r ib ut es are not perceived at the same time , that colour is perceived
before form which is perceived before motion , the lead time of colour
over- motion being about 60-80 milliseconds . This suggests that the
perceptual systems themselves ar e functionally specialised and that
there is a temporal hierarchy in visi on, superimposed upon the
spatially, distributed parallel processing syste m s. [.. . 1 In broader terms,
th e brain docs not, over vcry brief periods of time, seem to be capable of
binding t~)gcther what happens in (.'::<11 tim e; instead it binds the results of its
own processing systems and therefore misbincls in term s of real time.

VISION AND VISUALITY : 2 9 1

O~e could o~ cou:se choose to ignore these experiments, because they deal
With such brief Windows of time and because in the longer term - by which
I mean longer than one second -. all the attributes are in fact bound together
to give us our unitary experience. But the results of these experiments give
us powerful hints about the way in which the visual brain works. They
provide compelling evidence to show that different processing systems take
different times to reach their end-points, which is the perception of the
relevant attribute. This in turn suggests that the processing systems are also
perceptual systems, thus allowing us to think of several parallel processing
perceptual systems, The results of the operations performed by the separate
processing systems are the different percepts; we can therefore speak of a
network of spatially distributed processing-perceptual systems. But there is
more than that . By definition , perception is a conscious event; we perceive
that of which we are conscious and do not perceive that of which we are not
conscious. Since we p erceive two attributes, say colour and motion, at
separate times, it follows not only that there are separate consciousnesses,
each a correlate of activity in one of the independent processing-perceptual
systems, but that these different consciousnesscs are also asynchronous with
respect to one another. We are thus led to the conclusion that it is not the
activities in the different processing-perceptual systems that have to be
bound together to give us our conscious perception of a scene, but rather
that it is the micro-consciousnesses generated by the activity of the different
processing-perceptual systems that have to be bound together to give us our
unified percept.

[..oJ
Whatever the difficulties in knowing how the final image is assembled
together in the brain, functional specialisation has many important
im plications. It has, among other things, shown us that the process of' seeing'
is far from complete at the level ofY 1, the 'cortical retina'. It has raised the
question of whether 'seeing' and 'understanding' are indeed two separate
processes, with separate seats in the cortex [... J. Perhaps most important of
all, the discovery of functional specialisation has been instrumental in
changing our minds about vision as a process, impelling us to consider it as an
active process . ' a physiological search for constants and essentials that makes
the brain independent of continual change, and the servility to it, and makes
it independent too of the single and fortuitous view, The brain, then, is no
mere passive chronicler of the external physical reality but an active
participant in generating the visual image, according to its own rules and
programs. This is the very role that artists have attributed to art, and the role
that some philosophers have wished that painting could have,

NOTE
1. Footnotes removed .

IMAGE STUDIES

INTROD U C T IO N
13: I

The Family of Im ages

W.I, T. M itcheff

13:2

Art H istory and Im ages that are Not Art

fa mes Elkins

13:3

A Cons tructivi st M anifesto

Barbara Maria Stafford

13 : 4

Im ages, Not Signs

Regis D ebray

13:5

W hat is Ico nocl ash?

Bruno Latour

In the introduction to this vo lume, we characterised image stud ies as w e

understand it .ernphaslstng both th e pert inen ce of image - stud ies to
contempo rary image culture as wel l as historical and philosophi cal
co ncepti ons of im agery, interdisci plinarity and the non-visual character of
some images. Theselections in th is sect ion are by authors w ho -have already
made significant co ntrib utio ns to the nascent in terd isc ipl i ne, br inging their
own emphases to it. In fact.. it co uld be argued that call s for the deve lopm ent
of image studies have grow n more out of a dissatisfaction with the methods
and them es of traditi onal art history and literary analysis, than w ith any real
cu ltural need outside th e di scip line itself. The three pio neers in thi s emerging
M itchell (13,1), James Elki ns (13.2) and Barbara M aria Stafford
field (13.3) - have each taken as their starting poi nts the ' inadequacy of
contemporary methodologies for deali ng with the complexities of the image.
For example, Elkins and Stafford balance their theoretical arguments ahou t
appl ying traditional art historical meth ods to more contemporary forms of
non-art images - such as visual artefacts from science - w ith the warning
that practitioners w ho fail to do so threaten to make their departmen ts
that
redundant to the educatio nal system (see also Buck-Morss, 4.4
interpretation, image studies wo uld be an attempt to update the theme s of
art history, but not its methodolog ies. O n the other hand, despite obvious
differences, these writers appear to be mo re positively united in the bel ief
that 'paying cl ose attention to the nature of images and the way that they
acqu ir e meanin g in their specific cultural settings is central to making sense
of our in creasingly vi sual wo rld . Mitchell has characterised th is state of
affairs as the pi cto rial turn: 'W hat makes for the sense of a pictorial turn .. .
is not that we have som e pow erful account of visual representation that is
dictating the terms of cultural theory, but that pic tures form a point of
peculiar fricti on and di scomfort across a broad range of intell ectual inquiry'
(Mitchell , 1994: 13). In this more positive interpretation, image studies
wou ld both appl y and update the methods of traditional art historical,
Iitcrary and phil osophi cal analysis to the artefacts of the con tempora ry visual
environm ent because current methodologies are not adequate,

w'n.

'In

Like visual culture theory, image studies sets itself against dominant linguistic
mod es of enquiry (see t,he introdu ctio n to Section 11). For example, Stafford
(1 3.3 ) complains that Visual culture programmes are 'governed by the ruling
metaphor of readin g' - p,resum.ably in their use of such methodological
techn iques as deco nstructIon, d,sc~>l J~se analysis and serniotics. cfilkins has
also argued that the. canon o~ prmClpal visual culture theorists, such as
Walter Benj amin, Michel ~ou ~a~ l t and Jacques Laca n, provides the field
wi th a 'very specifi~, very dlsclplm~ ry set of interests' that fails to do j ustice
to understanding Ima~es , o~ the~r .own terms (Elkins 200 3 : 33). By
t

-- -

- -'"

-ll wrd,srpUpa ru

in b.;ub.tb~2 nO'O 'o6 ;rn"nnn;

IMAGE S

I N T R O D U CTI O N

studies - almo st any type of graph ic mark, according to Elkins (1999) - and
in the metho ds that It applies to their analysi s. It pro vides a meta -cri tiq ue of
suggesting ways of co mp aring
the wa y that images can be understood
imag ing practices wi thin particular d isciplines. In so me respects, image
stud ies offe rs critica l framew or ks within whi ch such i nterdi sc ipl inary
research can take place.

by

Given the view that there is no cu rrent acco unt of images that do es their
varie ty justice, it is not surprising that o ne of the centra l conce rns of these
w riters has been to re-categori ze images Into different groupings that attempt
to acco unt for the ful! range of visu al and non -vi sual images. For example,
M itchell prop oses a fam ily tree of images (13.1) and Elkins a diffuse genealogy
of image types (13.2). Regis Debrays med io logi cal tables (13.4) categorise
societ ies accord ing to their materia l media tion of culture and ltssdornlnant
modes of transmission , including the relative ro le of w ords and images '(see
Section 8). Stressing the mediatory ro le of images rather than their semiotic
codes, Deb ray argues that the material, techno logical and institutional
co nd itions of mediation arc the key characteristics of any culture. While his
critiq ue of po liti cs in the current audiovisual 'rnediasphere' bears .sorne
relation to Baudrillard's (3.3), Debray approaches images with w onder ment
rather tha n ideo logical suspici on. Closely aligned to these taxonomies is an
attempt to give an incl usive accou nt of wh at types of artefacts might ge
incl uded in the 'fami ly of images' - from menta l images to graphs and charts.
111at entails look ing at d ifferent types of im ages in their orig inal setti ngs and
reading contemporary discourses about them in a way reminiscent of ' art
historical, visual connoisseurship (see the introducti on to Section 4).
In contrast to trad itional icon oclasts who denigrate the meaning of images,
these writers emphasise that images 'em body 'visual in tell igence' (Staffo rd,
13.3). Sim ilarly, Mi tc hell (13 .1) and Latour (13 .5) lo ok beyo nd the
ideo logical critique of Images to examine' what social and po litical facto rs
are at stake in th e debates that cast such artefacts as eith er true or false. What
makes im ages the site of such deb ates "hnd w hy t hey arise in particular
histo rical circumstances are central co ncerns. The point is not to stop critical
ref lect ion on images, bu t to make it more so phisticated and aware of the
positive possibilities images provide for understand ing (see also Sectio n 9).
For example, in Picture Theory (1994), M itchell describes hi s w o rk as an
attempt to unite Erwin Panofsky's iconography (4.1) With the ideological
cri tique of the French structural M arxist Louis Althusser. He says: 'The,po int
of this greeti ng ... is not simply to make iconology " ideologica lly aware" or
self-cri ti cal, but to make the ideological criti que ico no logically aware'
(1994: 30). Th is concept of a cr itica l iconology has been taken up more
recentl y by writers such as Jon Simons (200 0), Han s Beltin g (2005) and
Kev in De l.uca (8 !S ).
W hi le this in troduction has em phasised sim ilariti es between these writers,
there are.impor tant d ifferences too. Elkins and Stafford are art histo rians by
traini ng and their w ork tends to be much less politicall y motiv ated than that
of Debray, Latour and Mitchell. The for mers' sense of interd isci pl inarity has
led them to look widely for alternative visu al pract ic es and they have both
drawn extensively on images and metaphors from the emerging cogni tive
sciences, medi cin e and scientific imag ing practices (see, for example, Elkins,
1999; Staffo rd, 1993). In devi sing this Reader, we have certain lv tried to
reflect thi s broader array of image types and contexts, if o nlv to ' ; isk' wh at
Elkins (2003 : 7) describes as a kind of 'unconstricte d, unanthropo log ical

i nterest in . ~is i,o n' - an int erest that can go beyond any ' nic he in
the humanities . Ho w ever, Mitchell's con cern with what he terms a
'de-disciplinary exercise' can have the effect of th eorising the theory and/or
disci pline of images, rather than images in thems elves. It is in line with such
an app roach that we have brought togetH'er a diverse range of writings on the
ima ge, fro m the Bibl e through to the present. O ur aim is to exam ine wh at
is meant by ' images' across varying intelle ctual co ntexts, to consider
differe nces, contrasts and relations. O verall, the willingness of the writers
incl uded
thi s final sect ion to question the nature of images as images
suggests a fresh approach to image analy sis that makes th eir relation to visua l
cultur e theory a t least prob lematic. It is an app roach that w e hope invites
many new insi ghtful and construct ive coll abo ratio ns and contests.

in

REFERENCES
Belting, H. (2005) ' Image, medium, body: a new approach to iconology', Critica l
Inquir y, 31: 30 2-1 9.
Elkins, J. (1999j The D om ain of Images. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Elkins, J. (2003i Visual Studies: A Skeptical Introduction. London: Routledge.
Mitchell. \IV.J.T. l1994) Pictur6 Theor y: EssiJ. y.~ on Verbal and Visual Representation .
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Simons, ]. (20001 'Ideology, imagology, and critical thought: the impoverishment of

politics', Journal of Poiiticel kieologies, 5 (1): 8 1-103 .

Stafford, S.M. (1993) Body Criticis m: Imaging the Unseen in Enlightenme nt Art and
Medicin e. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

I MAGE STUDI ES : ;:~ S /

2 9 'S : I MAGES

THE FAMILY OF IMAGES

W.J. T. MITCHELL
There have been times when the question 'What is an image?' was a matter
of some urgency. In eighth- and ninth-century Byzantium , for instance, your
answer would have imm ediately identified you as a partisan in the struggle
between emperor and patriarch , as a radical iconoclast seeking to purify
the church of idolatry, or a con servative icon ophile see king to preserve
tr aditi onal liturgical practices, Th e conflict over the nature and use of icons,
on the surface a dispute about fine points in reli gious ritual and the meaning
of symb ols, was actuall y, as Jaro slav Pelikan poin ts out, 'a social movement in
disguise' that 'u sed doctrinal vocabulary to rationalize an essentially political
conflict.' I In mid- seventeenth-century England the connection between social
movements , political cause s, and the nature ofimagery was, by contrast, quite
undisguised. It is perhaps only a slight exaggeration to say that the English
Civil War 'was fou ght over the issue of im ages , and not just the question of
statues and other material symbols in reli giOUS ritual but less tangible matters
such as the 'idol' of monarchv and, beyond that, the 'idols of the mind' that
Reformation thin ker s sought -'to purge th emselves and oth ers , 2

in

If the stakes seem a bit lower in asking what images are today, it is not becaus e
they have lost their pow er over us , and certainlv not because their nature is
now dearly understood. It is a commonplace of ~od ern cultural critici sm that
images have a power in our world undreamed of by the ancient idolaters. And
it seems equally evident that the question of the nature of imagery has been
second only to the problem of language in the evolution of modern criticism .
If linguistics has its Saussure and Chomsky, iconology has its Panofsky and
Gornbrich. But the presence of the se great synthe sizers should n ot be taken as
a sign that the riddles orIanguage or imagery are finally about to be solved .Th e
situation is pr ecisely the revers e : language and imagery are no longer what
they pr omised to be for cr itics and philosoph ers of the Enlightenment
perfect , transparent m edia through which reality may be represented to the
understanding. For modern criticism, language and imagery have become
enigm as, problem s to be ex plained, prison -house s which lock the unde r
standing away from the world . The comm onplace of modern studies of
images , in fact, is that they must be understood as a kind of language ; instead
of providing a tran sparent window on the world, images are now regarded as
the sort of sign that pr esents a de ceptive app earance of naturalness and
transparence concealing an opaque, distorting, arbitrary mechanism of
repres entation , a process of ideological mystification .
My purpose . . . is neither to advance th e theoret ical understanding of the
image nor to add yet another critique of modern idolatry to the growing
collection of iconoclast ic: polemi cs. My aim is rather to survey some of 'what
Wittgen ste in woul d call the 'lan guage games ' th at we play with the notion of
W]. 1. ,\-1'l H:h<:ll , fr o m ' \Vh21 t. i : 3 11 Imag(-:" , in };:~~ r ) :>b;n)' : Jm':~[IC . )~-.:(, Ue~}""~JY Chicago and Lond on
Unrvcrsn v o f Ch icago Pr cs!-., 1986 . p p. 7- 14. (~ 1986 hy11J1..~ l1n j \'cJ" :'i i t ~, (Jf Ch iCAgo . Alil-ighb- r-escr-vcd.

Reproduced with pt~T mlS-'i j r m ofThe U n ivc ni ty ' of Ch~cago Press.and w.J,'r. Mitche ll.

imag es, and to suggest some questions about the historical forms of life that
sustain those games, I don 't propose, therefore, to produce a new o r better
definition of the essential nature of im ages, or even to eX31uine any specifi c
pictures or works of art. My procedure instead will be to examine some o f
the ways we use the word ' image' in a number of institution alized discourses
particularly literary criticism, art history, theology, and philosophy - and to
cr iticize the ways each of these disciplines makes use of notions of imag ery
borrowed from its neighbors. My aim is to op en up for inquiry th e w ays our
(theoreti cal' understanding of imagery grounds itsel f in social and cultural
practices, and in a history fundamental to our understanding not only of wh at
images are but of what human nature is or might be com e. Images are not just
a particular kind of sign, but something like an actor on the historical stage ,
a pr esence or character endowed with legendary status , a history that
parallels and participates in the stor ies we tell ourselves about our own
evolutio n from creatures (made in the image' of a cr eator, to creatures who
make th emselves and their wo rld in the ir ow n ima ge.

*
T"Yo things must imm ediate ly strike th e n otice o f anyone who tries to take
a gen eral view of the ph enomena called by the name of ima ger y.The first is
sim ply the wide var iety of thin gs that go by this name. 'I'Ve sp eak of pictures,
sta tues, optical illusions, m aps , diagrams, dr eams, hallucinations, spectacles,
projections, po ems, patterns, memories , and even ideas as image s, and the
sheer diversitv o f this list would seem to make any svste m atic, unified
understanding impossible . Th e second thing that mav strike us is that the
calling of all thes e things by the name of ,image ' does not necessarily mean
that they all have something in com mo n. It mi ght be b etter to begin by
thinking of images as a far-flung family whi ch has migrated in time and space
and undergone profound mutati ons in the process .
If ima ges are a family, however , it may be po ssible to cons truct some sense
of their genealogy. If \"e b egin by looking, not for some universal definition
of the term, but at those places where images have differentiated themselves
from one anothe r on the basis o f boundari es between different institutional
discour ses, we come up with a family tree something like th e following:
Image
likeness
resemblance
Similitude

~
.
GraphiC
.
pic tures
stat ues
designs

-----,--------r_

+--,

Optical

Perceptual

mirrorS

sense data
'so ecies'
appe aranc es

proje ~liOns

Mental
Verbal
dreams
metaphors
me mories de scr iptions
ideas
fanta sma ta

29<:.,0: I MAGES

Each branch of this family tree designates a type of imagery that is central
to the discourse of some intelle ctual discipline: m ental imagery belongs to
psychology and epistemology; optical imagery to physics; graphic ,
scu lpt ural, and architectural imagery to the art historian; verbal imagery to
the literary critic; perceptual images occupy a kind of border region where
physiologists , neurologists, psychologists, art historians, and students of
optics find themselves collaborating with philosophers and literary critics.
Thi s is the region o ccupied by a number of strange creatures that haunt th e
border between physical and psychological accounts of imagery: the
'sp ecies' or 's ensible forms' whi ch (according to Aristotle) emanate from
objects and imprint themselves on the wax-like receptacles of our senses
like a ~ignet ring;) th e J antasmata, whi ch are r evived versions of those
impressions called up by th e imagination in th e absence of the objects that
originally stimulated them; 'sense data' or 'percepts ' whi ch playa roughly
analogous role in mod ern psychology; and finally, those 'app earances' which
(in common parlance) intrude between o ur selves and reality, and whi ch we
so often refer to as 'images' - from the image proj ected by a skilled actor,
to those created for products and personages by exp erts in advertising and
prop agand a.

[ ... ]

[.. .] [Tjhe image is not Simply a particular kind of sign but a fundamental
principl e of what Michel Foucault would call 'the order of things.' The
image is the general notion, ramified in various specific similitudes
(convenienLia, aemul ati o, analogy, sympathy) that hold s th e world together with
'figures of knowledge ." Pr esiding over all the special cases of imagery,
therefore , I locat e a parent co nce pt , the notion of th e image 'as such,' the
phenomenon "whose appropriate institutional discourses ar e philosophy and
th eology.
Now each of these disciplines has produced a 'v ast literature on the function
of im ages in its own domain, a situatio n that t ends to intimidat e anyone
who tries to take an overview of the problem. There are encouraging
precedents in work that brings togeth er different disciplines concerned
with imagery, such as Gombrich 's studies of pictorial imagery in terms of
perception and optics , or Jean Hag strum's inquiries into th e sister arts of
poetry and painting. In general, however, accounts of anyone kind of image
tend to rel egat e the others to th e status of an unexamined 'bac kgro und ' to
the main subj ect. If there is a unified study of imag ery, a coher ent
iconology, it threatens to behave , as Panofsky warned, 'not like et hnologx
as opposed t o ethnography, but like astrology as opposed to astrography."
Discussions of poetic imag ery gen era lly rel y on a theory of th e mental
im age improvised out of th e shre ds of se ve n teenth -cen t u r y notions of the
mind; " discussion s of mental imager;' dep end in tu rn upo n rather limi t ed
acquai nt ance with g ra phiC imagery, o ften pr oceedin g on th e qu esti on abl e
assum pt ion that there arc certain kind s of im ages (phot ographs , mirror
image s) that provide a clircct , unm ecliat cd co j)} of wh at the y repre se n t;

IMAGE STUDIES

..

." '.',,

optical analys es ~f mirror images resolutely ignore th e question of what

sor t of creature IS capable of using a mirror ; and discu ssion s of gra phiC
images tend t o be insulated by th e parochialism of art history from
excessive contact with th e broader issues of theory or intellectual hist ory.
It would seem useful , therefore, to attempt an overview of the image that
scrutinizes the boundary lin es we draw between different kinds of im age s,
and criticizes the assumptions which each of these disciplines makes about
th e nature of images in n eighboring field s.
We clearly cannot talk about all these topics at on ce , so the next question is
wh ere to star t. The general rule is to b egin with the basi c , obvi ous facts and
to work from there int o th e dubious or problematic. We might sta r t , then,
by ask ing whi ch members of the famil y of images arc called by that name in
a strict, proper, or literal sense, and which kinds involve some extended ,
figurative , or improper usc of th e term . It is hanl to resist th e co nclusion
that the image 'pro per ' is the sort of thing we found on the left side of our
tree-dia gr am , th e graphiC or optical representations we see displ ayed in an
obj ective , publicly shareable space. We might want to argue about the status
of ce r tain spec ial cases and ask whether abstract, nonrepresentational
paintings, ornamental or structural designs, diagrams and graphs are
properly understood as im age s. But wh atever borderline cases we might
wish to consider, it seems fair to say that we have a rough idea about what
im ages are in th e literal sense of the word . And along with th is rough ide a
goe s a sense that other uses of the word are figurative and improper.

[. ..]
Eventually J will argue that all three of these commonplace contrasts b etween
im ages (p roper ' and their illegitimate ofJspring ar e suspect. That
is , I hope to show that, contrary to common belief, images 'proper' are
not stable, static, or permanent in any m etaphysical sense ; th ey are not
perceived in the same ''lay by viewers any more than are dream images;
and they are not ex clusively visual in any important way, but involve
multisensory apprehension and interpretation . Real, proper images have more
in common wi th their bastard children than they might like to admit. [... ]

NOTES
1. See Jaroslav Pelikan, The Chrisuan Trodiuon, 5 Vols., Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1974-1991, Vol. 2, Chap. 3, for an account of the iconoclastic
controversy in Eastern Chris tendom.
2. Footnotes removed until section break.
3. Aristotle, De Amma II. 12.424a; trans. \V.S. Hett, Cambrid ge: Harvard
University Press, 1957, p. 137 .
4. See Michel FoucaulL, The Order ?f Thwgs: An A.rchaeolo[lV r:I th e H uman SCleJJces,
New York: Rand om House, 1970, Chap. 2.
5. Erwin Pan olsky, Mcan l!lf] in the Visual Ar ts, Garden City, NY: Doubl eday, \ 95 5,
p, 32.
.
6 . Fo otnotes .re-move d to en d 01 section .

,"JO O : I MAGES

6:2

IMAGE STUDIES;30!

ART HISTORY AND IMAGES

THAT ARE NOT ART'
JAMES E:LKINS

Most images are not art. In addition to pictures made in accord 'with the
Western concept of art, there are also those made outside the West or in
defiance, ignorance, or indifference to the idea of art. In the welter of
possibilities two stand out. Non- Western images are not well described in
terms of art, and neither are medieval paintings that were made in the
absence of humanist ideas of artistic value. Together the histories of
medieval and non-Western images form the most visible alternates to the
history of art, and they attract most attention in the expanding interests of
art history. So far, it has proved useful to describe both medieval and
non-Western images using the language of art history, so that they stand
partly outside art and partly within it.
In the past few decades, art historians have become interested in a wide
variety of images that are not canonical instances of fine art, including
anti-art, 'low' art, outsider art, and postcolonial art, as well as images from
popular culture (especially television and advertising). Though such images
arc often described as alternates to art history's usual subjects, they are
closely dependent on fine-art conventions even when they are not actively
guoting or subver ting them. To discuss even the most anarchic anti-art, it is
necessary to attend closely to the corresponding practices in fine art.
Duchamp's Fountain cannot be understood apart from the kinds of sculpture
that it is not; when Alfred Stieglitz remarked that the Fountain looked like a
Buddha, he was naming one way it might be recuperated into fine-art
meanings. Postcolonial and outsider art is similarly attached to the practices
it works to avoid.
In general, art history tests its boundaries by working with popular,
medieval, and non-Western images. But the domain of images is
substantially larger. In particular there is another group of images that seems
to have neither ,eligious nor artistic purpose, and that is images principally
intended - in the dry language of communication theory - to convey
in for mation. There is no good name for such images, which incl ude graphs,
charts, maps, geometric configurations, notations, plans, official
documents, some money, bonds, patents, seals and stamps, astronomical
and astrological charts, technical and engineering drawings, scientific
images of all sorts, schemata, and pictographic or ideographic elements in
writing: in other words, the sum total of visual images, both Western and
non- Western, that are not obviously either artworks, popular images, or
religiOUS artifacts. In general, art history ha;; not studied such images, and
at first it might appear that they arc intrinsically less interesting than
jam es Elkin s :\n H i:<.:. tory ,' nd ~magc s. 'n u t ,;'n~

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paintings. They seem like half-pictures, or hobbled versions of full pictures,

bound by the necessity of performing some utilitarian function and
therefore unable to mean more freely, Their affinity with writing and
numbers seems to indicate they are incapable of the expressive eloquence
that is associated with painting and drawing, making them properly the sub
ject of disciplines such as visual communication, typography, mathematics,
archaeology, linguistics, printing, and graphic design.
Still, it is necessary to be careful in such assessments, because informational
images are arguably the majority of all images.lfpietures were to be defined
by their commonest examples, those examples 'would be pictographs, not
paintings. An image taken at random is more likely to be an ideographic script,
a petroglyph, or a stock-market chart than a painting by Degas or Rembrandt,
just as an animal is more likely to be a bacterium or a beetle than a lion or a
person. The comparison is not entirely gratuitous, and I make it to underscore
the final barriers that stand in the way of a wider understanding of images, just
as the remnants of anthropomorphism keep the public more engaged with
lions than with bacteria. Some images are closer to art, others farther away:
In my analogy, fine art, non-Western art, medieval art, outsider art, and
popular imagery might be the familiar mammals and other chordates, and
informational imagery the man)' other phyla. It is the distant phyla that are
least well knOV'Il1 and most numerous sof all.
The variety of informational images, and their universal dispersion as
opposed to the limited range of art, should give us pause. At the least it
might mean that visual expressiveness, eloquence, and complexity are not
the proprietary traits of'high' or 'low' art, and in the end it might mean that
we have reason to consider the historv of art as a branch of the historv
of images, whether those images are nominally in science, art, writing,
archaeology, or other disciplines. [... ]

*
Art history is centrally positioned in the emerging field of image studies
because it possesses the most exact and developed language for the
interpretation of pictures. Existing art-historical methods, which are
normally trained on art obje cts, can embrace images of any kind, from
graphs to ideographic writing; conversely, art-historical inquiries can be
enriched by what is happening in other disciplines. I...]

*
[... ) When art history ~ncounters nonart images, it tends to use them to
illustrate the history ol fine art. In each case, what attracts art-historical
interest and gives the images a rclativdy independent meaning is their
closeness to fine art. Th~se Image::: that have les s to do with painting and
dra'wing get less attentJOn. Th~ o.utlandi:;h distortions of many map
. ,
projecnons
..
ten d t 0 be overlooked In favor of th ose
th at rcscm bl e
projections

3 02 : IMAGES

IMAGE STUOIES : 3 0 ':'"",;

th e distan ces and angles of vision co mmo n in pamtmg, j ust as th e less

naturalisti c and intuitive aspects of compute r graphics or th e less spati ally
resolved strategies of m ed ical illu stration tend to appear less m eaningful than
th eir more pictorial instances. There are many studies of gc ndere d flgur es in
th e history of medical illu stration , fewer of pictures of bod y pa rts , and
virtually none of histological and sectional anatomies. In gene ra l, the
supp osition behind the art histo rical studies might be put like this: Som e
scientific and nonart im ages approach th e ex pre ssive values and for m s of fine
art, but m any more are encased in the technical conventions of th eir fields .
Those ima ges are a kin d of desert in w hich in te resting p ictu res are stunted
and far between . They are inhere n tly infor ma tional and without aestheti c
value, and th ey are properly co nsidered as k in to equations or spreadsheets :
They are notation s, not im ages in a deep er se nse .

*
It is important to resist this conclusio n, both for the sake of th e expanding
discipline of art history - which would otherwise find it self against an
unbreachable barrier at the 'end' of expressiveness, interest , or aes thetic
value - and also because it is d emonstrably untrue. Especially Significant in
thi s rega rd is a t ext by the sociolog ist of science Michael Lynch and the art
histo rian Sam uel Edgert on on the ways in wh ich astronomers han d le
im ages. Astronomer s routinely ma ke t wo kinds o f images: ' pre tty pictures '
for cale ndars, press rel eases, coffee-table books, and popular scien ce
m agazin es such as Scientific American; and 'scien tific' images , n ormally in
black-and -w hite, for publicati ons suc h as the j ournal ?f AsrrophysiCS. ' Pretty
p ictures ' are often given strongly chroma t ic false co lors, and initially Lynch
and Edgerton hoped to find ev ide nce that ex p res sionist painting mi ght lie
b eh ind that practice, making th e astrono m ical images interesting ex am p les
of the di ffusion of fine art . But according to their informants in th e
lab oratory, fin e art influences n either the 'scienti fic' images nor th e 'pretty
pictures.' ] Eve n though the astrono m ers might set aside time to m ake
'pre tty pi ctures,' they do not co nside r th em ser ious ly in terms of th e history
an d m eanin gs of ar t , or even intend th em to be anything m ore than eye
catching or d eco rative . On th e o th er hand , th ey ar e inten sely concerned
w ith th e ir 'scientific' images, because they w ant to make them as clear,
un ambigu ous , sim p le, g raphically elegant, and useful as possible. To th at en d
th ey use a ra nge of im age -processing tools to ' cle an up ' th e raw data
provid ed by the telescopes. [. . .J At fir st it see ms this has little to do w ith
anything th at might concern a hi story of art, but Lynch and Edg erton poi nt
out that thi s kind of care is not outs ide aes the tics. It precisely is aesthetics :
It is the original, prc-Kantian sense of aestheti cs as the 'perfec tin g of
reality ' - the very doctrine th at governe d Ren aissance painting. Eve n when
the astronomers usc false col on f or their scie nti fic images _ thev d o so in
order to m ake na tu r al forms clearer and m ore suscep tible 'to quant it ati ve
assessment . Theil" images always aim t o give w hat t he y consider to be the
most rational version of phenomena. Thi s, I think, is a fundamentally

importan t res ult, and no work on nonart im ages should proceed without
taki ng it into acc oun t. What happens in non ar t images can be just as full of
ar tistic choices, just as deeply en gaged w ith the visual, and just as
r esourceful and Visually reflective as in pa inti ng, even though it s purposes
might be entirely different. Lynch and Edge r ton agree with Leo Stein b er g,
Thomas Kuhn, and others th at not much is to be gained by com paring the
scientists' criteria of elegance , c1aritv, an d simp licity w ith ar tis tic crit eria
and th at the two sens es of images a;e wo rl ds apart - but in terms of th~
attention scien tist s lavish on cr eating, manipulating, and presenting images,
th e 'two cu ltures' are virtually indi stingui shable . 3

Wh er e im ages are the object s of such co ncer te d atte ntion , then affectiv e,
hist orical , an d social m eanings - in sho n , the pan oply of meanings th at
concern art hi story - cannot be far behind. It is cer tain ly true of th e
astronom ical im ages that Lynch and Edg erton st udie d , and it might also be
true of even more intractably 'inexpressive ' images . [... !

NOTES
1. All footno tes that do not rela te to specific texts or qu otation s have been
removed fro m this sectio n .

2. Lynch and Edger ton , 'Aesthe tics and Digital Image Processing: Representa
tio nal Craft in Conte mporary Astr onomy,' in Fyfe, G. and Law, J. (eds) ( 1998)
PIcturing Power: Visual Depiction and Social Relations, pp . 184-220 , esp. 193 . [... J
SOciological Review Monogr aph, no. 35. New York : Ro utle dge.
3. Steinberg, L. 'Art and Science: Do They Need to beYoked? Daedalus 115 , no. 1
(1986)' p. 6. [. . . J and Thomas Kuhn, 'Comment on the Relation Between Science
and Art ,' in The Essenual Tension: Selected Studies in Scient:fic Tradition and Change,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977, pp. 340-51 . r...]

A CONSTRUCTIVIST MANIFESTO'
BARBARA MARI A STAFFORD

Recent acade m ic r hetoric is saturated with terms o f r ejection, revision ,

r evolution; hu t manifestos, even of renunciati on , remain in sho r t supply.
W riting abo ut w hat is w rong in old optica l formats and new imagin g
techn olog ies is relatively ea~y. Harder is proposing mi nd -op ening analogies
betw een hi st o ri cal displays o f visual intell igen ce and co m pu ter -age
informati on viewed thro ugh the eyes. Being digital requires designing a
post-Gutenbergian const ructive model of education through vision. But I am
not convinced , with ~ichulas Negroponte, th at a hyp ermedia future entails
obliterating the past. The cr u x of the matter, I think, seems more Darwinian

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:30 4 : I MAGES

than cataclysmic. Today 's instruct ional landscape m ust inevitabl y evolve Or
die, like biological sp ecies, since its environment is being radi cally altered
by volatile visualization techn ologies. Thi s ongoing displacement of fixed ,
monochromati c type by int eractive , multidim ensional gra ph ics is a
t um ult uous process. In th e realm of the ar tificial, as in nature , ex tinction
occurs when there is no accomm odation . Imagin ative adapta ti on to th e
information sup erhighway, even the survival o f reflective co mm un ication ,
means casting off vestigial biases automatically coupling printed words t o
introspective depth and pictures to dumbing down .
The bound b ook has led a char me d exist ence since type setting "vas inven ted
in mid-filtcenth-centur y Mainz. This longevit y, no doubt partially owin g to
a Darwinian flexibility, makes m e optimistic about its mutated persistence.
Beco me more virtual informational space than stable artifact , th e traditional
volume can find ano ther life as an inter-con necti ve enviro nment . Lines of
copy inte rface with user s very differently wh en pr esented in hybrid Web
pages, and acquire unsettling mobility w hen re for m atted , ame nded , and
emended el ectronically. Th e digital imaging revoluti on is cr u cially
reconfiguring how we ex plore and co mp re hend ideas fr om urb an planning
to ph otography. Yet in sp ite of th e ar r ival of wh at I have t ermed the 'age of
oompute r ism ' - rapidl y repl acing modernism and even postmodernism - a
disto r ted hierarchy ranking the importance of reading ab ove th at of seeing
rem ains anachronisti cally in pla ce . All the while , com p ute rs are forcing th e
r ecog nition tha t texts ar e no t 'higher: du rable monum ents to civilization
com pared to ' lower,' fleeting im ages. These m arvelous m achin es may
eve ntually rid us of the uninformed assumption that sensory m essages are
incompatible with reflection .
I have se rious troubl e with the deprecating rhe tor ic that stakes out bookish
liter acy as a m or al high ground from whi ch to denounce a tainted ' society
of spectacle.' Conte m porary ico noclasm , like early mo dern versions, rests
on th e puritanical myth of ao authe ntic 01' innocen t ep istemolog ical origin .
Clinging to th e Rousseau ean fant asy of a supposedly blotless, and lar gely
im ageless, print ecology ignores not only contrary evid en ce fr om the past
bu t the r eal virtues of color ful, heterogeneous , and mutable icons, whether
on or off screen.
These essays, th en , are unfashionably po siti ve and frankl y polemi cal. Th eir
p erspective is Simultane ously pr agm atic and theoreti cal, As practic al acts of
affirm ation, th ey challenge an implacable syste m of ne gative clh lectics
arci ng from the moral denunciations of Plato to the coe rci ve ae sthetic~ of
Ado r no to the war metaphors of Foucault. In sho r t, they offer case stud ies,
stretching fr om the lens to the com puter era, pres enti ng an alt er nati ve view
of the pleasur es, beaut ies, con solations, ancl..above an, Intel ligence of Sight.
Th ey argu e that imag ing , rangin g from high art to po p ular illu sion s, r-emains
th e r iches t, most fascinating modality for c:onllgul'ing and conv eying ideas.
More broadly, they pri smatically interconnect seen and seeing withi n a
sensory we b prod uctive of cultural signification.

IMAGE STUDIES : .3 0 5

Yet it is.not eno ug~ to show the intell ectual , spiritual , and phYSical d em and s
of making, observmg, and exhibiting spatialized medi a, whether pre- or
postmodern . I want to com bat the sophi sm that images do on ly destructi ve
work within Our institutions. By engaging th e epistemologica l uncertainti es
and educa tio nal upheavals of an el ectroni c future, I seek to demonstrate the ir
capacity for good interven tion s. Further, I ask how th e practi ce of image
st udy can regain pertinen cy at a moment when the traditional visual
disciplines , like all the rest, ar e com ing un moored from th eir original
purposes. From this du al p er ception of revolution ary oppor tuni ty and
impending Armageddon, the following essays call on established and aspiring
im agists across disciplinar y boundari es to confront th e fundame ntal task of
remaking the ima ge of im ages. Freeing gr aphic express io n from an UIUlU
anced dominant discourse of cons umerism, corr upti on, deception , and
ethical failure is a challenge th at cuts acros s the ar ts, humanities and scien ces.
As manifest os o n the kn owin gn ess of visual comm un ication , from scientifi c
illustrati on to on- line in teracti vity, th ese stu dies have ano ther immedi at e
conte xt. Th ey spe cifically coun ter th e hierar chical ' lingui sti c turn ' in
cont em p or ar y thought. The to te rnizatio n ofla nguage as a godlike agency in
western cu ltu r e ha s gu aran teed th e id entification of w ri t ing with
in tellec tual potency. Ferdin and de Saussure , the early tw entieth-century
foun der of str uctur alism, strengthe ned th e b iblical coupling of meanin g
with naming by for m ulating the opposition of signifier/ signifi ed . Th ese
verbalizing b inar ies t urned noumenal and phenomenal exp er ien ce into th e
pro d uct of language. No t only temporal bu t spatial effects supposedl y
obeyed an invisible system , the controlling str ucture of an inborn ruling
ea iuue.
Forcing human cognition to become synon)'m ou s both with com puta t ional
codes or abstr use texts and with the ability to deciph er them resulted in
downgradin g senso ry awaren ess to sup erfi cial stim uli and false perceptions.
Most d am agingly, Sauss ur e 's schema em pt ied th e mi nd of its bo dy,
oblit er ating th e interdep endence of physiological func tio ns and thinking. It
is not sur pr ising that , up to now, an educatio nal eco nomy mat erially based
on language has either m ar ginalized the study of im ages, reduced it to a
subalt er n posi tion, or appr opr iated it through colonizati on, In m ost
Amer ican univer sity cur r icula , gr aphicacy rema ins subordinate to literacy.
Even so-called int erdi sciplinary 'visual cult ure ' programs are govern ed by
the r uling m et aphor of readin g. Con sequently, iconi cit y is treate d as an
infer ior part of a more ge neral sem antics.

[ ... /
I am argu ing th at we need to disestablish th e view of cognitio n as
dominantly and aggressively lingui stic. [.. .)

[ ... J
It is not har d to sc.c tha t t.he ~u~tirace ted cam paign t o es tablish th e p~im ac y
and innat en ess 01 o ur lmguJ ~t lC faculty is challenged by the materialist

3Cf3 : I M A G E S

approach to the mind. Intense debates over Darwin's theory that organisms
were born of blind chance and evolved according to the quirks of matter
have refocused attention on the origin and configuration of all species. Both
adaptationist and ultra-Darwinian investigations into human and animal
reasoning open up the que stion of the sensorium's role. The philosopher
Daniel Dennett is a spokesman for the latter camp, stating that to have
evolved a capacity for awareness, liVing creatures must have a sophisticated,
unified informational organization endowing them with cognitive capabilities.
Empirical processes like learning, in this account, are a tool by which
natural selection has created complex biological systems. This new turn in
the study of consciousness proposes that life is more than selfish genes by
bringing the formative powers of perception into productive engagement
with a no longer discrete and hierarchical organ of thought. Ul'ging
humanity to 'gro w up ,' he comments that Darwin's great legacy consists in
his distribution of design throughout nature. The lesson in this for imagists
is that, jr there is no hope of discovering an absolute trace or essential mark
in life's processes that counts more than the rest, then, similarly, we must
select, conserve, invent, and compose our artificial environment so that it
becomes humane for all.
Yet, in spite of his Darwinian conviction about the importance of deSign,
Dennett remains strangely language-centered. For him, the unfolding
stream of human consciousness occurs in a massively parallel-processing
brain, a virtual James Joycean linguistic machine. Only nov,', with the
integrative neuroscientific philosophy of Paul and Patricia Churchland, 'the
body-minded brain' of Antonio Damasio , or Owen Flanagan's insistence on
'the missing shade that is you,' is the iron grip of a univocal language-like
prototype for cognitive activity starting to erode. Understanding, imagined
as a combinatorial and synthetic physical function, has the potential for
taking into account a broad range of multisensory endeavors. This suggests
that truly enlarging the horizon of the emergent sciences of the mind
(cognitive science, neurobiology, linguistics, AI, philosophy) should entail
learning from the transactional visual arts about th e experiential structures
or thought . Ironically, the aesthetic, historical, and humanistic dimensions of
perception remain virtually absent from the new interdisciplinary matrix in
whi ch cOgnitive being is about to become embedded.
[ ... JThe much-publicized 'decade of the brain,' bridging the 1980s and 1990s,

spectacularly opened a window onto the living mind. Multidimensional

medical imaging (CT, PET, MRI) transparently displayed both the
permanent neural anatomy and the acrobatics of evanescent emotion .
Seeing neurons firing and witnessing localiz ed functions in simultaneous
performance suggest that it is more accurate to spe ak, not of separate art,
artists , or art historians, but of interconnectiye images, imaging, imagists.
[. .. ] An array of devi ces, discoveries , and practices, then , are encouraging
us to relocate nar rovd}' categor ized 'art objects' clscwbcrc, into what I

IMAGE STUDIES:307

have termed 'imaging'. In this bordcrless community without physical

territory, spatialized phenomena belong to larger constellations of events.
Creating a map of ongoing debates, organized around central issues or
substantial questions ari sing from this evolving geography, will be a major
task confronting the new imagist. Such a 'hypermediated' person will have
become a reality when we are hard-pressed to say what his or her
discipline is.
Optical technology itself is sp urr ing an integrative revolution . Yet it is
st agger ing how loath we visualists have been to transform ourselves.
'W here are our blueprints, blue-sky or reali stic, for gUiding media
conv ergence on screen? The conservatism of the supposedly new and old
art history, its secondhand reliance on 'discourse,' on recirculating other
fields' methodologies, tropes, rhetoric, has meant the loss of any
intellectual and moral leadership that we might have exerted. If we have
nothing particular to contribute to formerly linguistic fields and
professions now lllJdergoing radical visual m etamorphosis, we confirm
our irrelevance both within institutions of higher learning and in a
decentralized electronic society.
I

[... J
All told, when freed from nihilism and liberated from asymmetrical
relationships, material artifacts and graphic presentations can regain their
rightful cognitive share . In the magical era of ubiquitous computing, art
history's mission to retell the story of conventional media 'without a
consideration of their future is over. Even its disciplinary name sounds
archaic. But the efficacy of appearances - whether old or new - and the
imaginative possibilities of thinking in, through, and with them is not
anachronistic. Imaging may even begin to formulate its own questions and
confidently say something about its own ends . It might think about its elf
instead of just being thought about by others. In spite of incessant talk
concerning interdisciplinarity, something is wildly out of kilter when, at the
end of th e twentieth century, no alternative metaphor of intelligence
Counters the nin eteenth-century standard of the printed book.

NOTE
1. All footnotes removed

I MAGE STUDIES : ..309

3 0 8 : I MA G ES

13:
Table 13.1

WHAT 15 ICONOCLASH?1

IMAGES, NOT SIGNS

BRUNO LATOUR

REGIS OEBRAY

Mediological tables
WRITING
(LOGOSP HERE)

PRINTED TEXT
(GRAPHOSPHERE)

AUDIOVISUAL

(VIDEOSPHERE)

STRATEGIC MILIEU
(PROJECT ED POWER)

THE EARTH

THE SEA

SPACE

GROUP IDEAL
(AND POLIT ICS)

THE ONE
(City, Empire, Kingdom)
absoiutlsm

EVERYONE
(Nat ion, People,
State )
nationalism,
totahta rianism

EACH ONE (pop ulation, society,

world)

individualism and a nomie

CIRCLE
(Ete rnal repetiti on)
Archeocentric

LIN!:
(hlstory, Progress)
Fut uro centric

PO INT

(news, evenl)

Egocentric: cu ll of

the present

CANONICAL PHASE
OF LIFESPAN

THE ELDER

THE ADULT

THE YOUNG PERSON

PARADIGMATIC
ATIRACTION

MYTHOS
(mysteries,
dogmas, epics)

LOGOS
(utopias, syst ems,
progr ams)

IMAGO

(emotions and tantasrns)

SYMBOLIC
ORGANON

RELIGIONS
(theology)

SYSTEMS
(ideolo gies)

MODELS

SPIRITU AL CLASS
(CONTROLS
SOCIAL SACRED)

CHURCH
(prophets, clerics)
Sacrosanct:
DOGMA

INTELLEGENTSIA
secula r (protesso rs, doctors)
Sacrosanct'
KNOWLEDGE

MEDIAS (broadcasters
and produce rs)
sacrosanct:
INFORMATION

REFERENCE OF
LEGIT IMAC Y

THE DIVINE
(we must, It is sacred)

THE IDEAL
(we must, it Is true)

THE PERFORMER
(we must , for it works)

MOTIVATOR OF
OBED IENCE

FAITH
(fanaticism)

LAW
(dogmatism)

OPINION
(relativism)

REGULAR MEANS
OF INFLUENCE

PREACHING

PUBLICATION

VISIBILITY

CONTROL OF
INFORMATION

ECCLESIASTICAL,
DIRECT (over
uttsrers)

POLITICAL, INDIRECT
(over means of
sending)

ECONOMIC, INDIRECT (over

messages)

STATUS OF
INDIVIDUAL

SUBJECT
(to command)

CITIZEN
(to con vince)

CONSUMER
(to seduce)

MYTH OF
IDENTI FICATION

THE SAINT

THE HERO

TH E STAR

MOTTO OF
PERSONAL
AUTHORITY

'G OD TOLD IT
TO ME'
(true like words from
Gospel)

'I READ IT IN A BOOK'

(true like a printed word)

'I SAW IT ON TV '

(true like a live broadc ast)

REGIME OF SYMBOLIC
AUTHORITY

THE INVI SIBLE (O rigin) of

the unve nliable

THE REAOABLE
(Found at ion) or true logic

THE VISIBLE
(Event) or the plausible

UNIT OF SOCIAL
DIRECTION

THE SYMBOLIC ONE ;

the King
(dynas tic principle)

THE T HEORETICAL ONE :

the Head (ideological
principle)

THE ARITHMETICAL ONE :

the Leader (stansuca: principle ,
po lls, ratin g, au dience)

CE NTER OF
SUBJECTIVE
GRAVITY

THE SOUL
(p,:lIma)

CON SCIOUSNES S
(Animu s)

THE BOD Y
(Sensorium)

SHAPE OF TIME
(AND ITS VECTOR)

1'.. ...

.,~_

*
[Iconoclash] offers " . a meditation on the following questions:

(lconotoqy)

({egi s Debray, 'M <.~ dj () lugka ) Tabl ctoi ~ Exc....~rp t fro m Cours de ,JfJdl 0Ib[Jit G.enbul~ . in llfc:Jla /rl anYc$t().~. Lon do n and N...~ \v York ; vcr -o Ro ok.:'\.

. ..

[,,.1 Iconoclasm is when we know what is happening in the act of breaking

and what the motivations for what app ears as a dear project of de struction
are; iconocJash, on the other hand, is wh en one do es not know, on e hesitates,
one is troubled by an action for which there is no way to know, without
further inquiry, whether it is destructi ve or con stru ctive . [... ]

Why have images attracted so much hatred?

Why do they always return again, no matter how strongly one wants to
get rid of them?
VVhy have the iconoclasts' hammers always seemed to strike sideways,
destro ying so methi ng else that seems , after th e fact , to matter
immensely?
How is it possible to go beyond thi s cycle of fascination, re pulsion ,
destruction, atonement , that is generated by th e forbidden-image
worship?

*
[... ] As 1 have claimed, somewhat boldly: are we not after a re-description of
iconophilia and iconoclasm in order to produce even more uncerrain0' ab out
which kind of image worshiplimage sma shing one is faced with? How could
we neatly pull them apart? And yet it might be useful to br iefly present ...
.five types of iconoclastic gestur es . . . for no better reason than to gauge
the extent of the ambiguity triggered by the visual puzzles we have been
looking for.
The principle b ehind this admittedly rough classification is to look at

th e inn er goals of th e icon smashe rs,

the rol es they give to the destroyed images ,
the dTects this de struction has on those who cher ishe d those images,
how this reaction is interpreted by the iconoclasts,
and , finally, th e effects of destruction on the destroyer's own feelin gs.

Bruno Latour, [rum -What l :"i h...-~n () <:l ~.-;h O r rs Th cn ' a World Beyond the lm age \OVars? ' In Iconactasb- Beyond
the lmage Him; j r, Scj('f)(C, Fod lg i on ar.c1 :In, ,,: d. I ~n..m (.l Lat ou r- a n~ l Pet cr W ctbel, Cambrrdg \:,...i\1A . and Lon do n
M1T P n~:-: s : an( ~ Z KM . Cellt c r fo~ Art and ?\.~ l~dl "' . K .u hr "l~ ~: , Ge r ma n,'' 200 2, pp. 14-15 and 25- 32 .
Bru nt) J ..ilto u r. R l.,~p ro duo:..: (~d ....... J1h p c:r m l:-i:<i I<Jfi of H, ".m() Lat o ur .

I:

::-~

:0 : I MAG E S

This list is ru dimentar y but sturdy en ough, I think, to guide one th rough th e
ma ny ex amples assem ble d here.

THE 'A' PEOPLE ARE AGAINST ALL IMAGES

The fir st type - I g ive th em letters to avoid loaded terminology - is made
up of those who want to free the beli evers - th ose th ey deem to be believers _
of their fal se atta chment s to idols of all sor ts and sha pes . Idol s, th e fragm ents
of which are now lying on the ground, were nothing but obsta cles in the
path to higher virtues . They had to be destroyed. Th ey triggered too much
indignatio n and hatred in the hearts of th e co urage ous im age br eake rs.
Living with them was unbear able .
What distinguishes the As from all o ther typ es of iconoclasts is that th ey
bel ieve it is not only n ecessary but also possible to etu irely dispose of
intermediari es and to access tr uth , objectiv ity, and sanctity. Without tho se
ob stacl es, th ey think One will at last have sm oother, faster, more direct
access t o the r eal thing, which is the only object worthy of respect an d
worship. Im ages do not even provide preparation , a reflecti on , an inkling of
th e original: th ey fo rbid any access to the original. Between ima ges an d
symbols yo u have t o choose or be damned .
Type A is th us th e pure form of 'classical' iconocl asm , r ecognizable in
th e for ma list 's rej ection of imagination , dr awing, and m odel s as well as in
th e many Byzantine, Lutheran , re volutionar y movem ents of idol smas hers ,
an d th e ho rrifying 'e xcesses' of th e Cultural Revolution . Purification is th eir
goa l. The wo rld, for A peopl e , would be a mu ch better place, much clean er,
much more enligh tened , if onl y on e could ge t rid of all m edi ations and
if one could jump directly into contact with th e original, th e ideas, th e
true Go d.
O ne o f the problem s with th e As is that th ey have to believe that the othe rs
the poor guys who se cherished icon s have been accused of being impious
idols - believe naively in th em. Such an assum ption entails th at , when th e
Philist ines reac t with screams of horror to pill age and plunder, thi s does no t
sto p the As. O n the co ntrary, it proves how right th ey were. T he in tensity of
th e horro r of th e ido laters is the best proof th at th ose p oor naive believers
had in vest ed too much in those stones that are essen tial ly nothing. Ar m ed
w ith th e no tion of naive b elief, the freedom-fighters co nstantly mi sconstrue
the indign ation of those th ey scandalize for an abject attachm en t to thi ngs
they sho uld destroy even more radically.
But the deepest problem of the As, is t hat no one knows if th ey are no t Bs!

THE 'B ' PEOPLE ARE AGAINST FREEZE-FRAME.

NOT AGAINST IMAGES
Th e Bs too are ido l smas hers .They also w re ak havoc on images, br eak down
custo m s an d habits , scandalize the worsh ipp ers, and tri gger the horrifi ed
scr eams of ' Blasph c m er l, Infidcl! , Sacrilege!, Profanity!' But th e huge
difference between the As and th e Bs - . . is that the lat ter do not believe it

I M A G E STUD IES : 3 !

possi.bl e n or n~ce s s a? to get r id of images. W hat they fight is fieez e-ftaming ,

that. IS , extracting an Image out of the !low, and becoming fascinated by it ,
as if it wer e sufficien t, as if all mov ement had stopped.
What t hey are after is not a wo rld free of images, purified of all the
ob stacles, rid of all med iators, but On t he co ntrary, a 'worldJilled with active
image s, moving mediator s.
They do not w ant the image prod ucti on to stop for ever - as th e As w ill have
it - they want it to resume as fast and as fresh as po ssible.
For th em , iconophilia does no t m ean th e exclusive and obs essive attention
t o imag e , because they can stand .fi xed im ages no more than the As.
Iconophilia m eans m ovin g from o ne im age co the next . They know 'truth is
image but th er e is no image of truth.' For th em , th e onl y way to access
truth, obj ecti vity, an d sanctity is to m ove fast fr om one ima ge to another,
not to dream th e im possible d ream of ju mping to a non-exi stin g original.
Contrar y to Plat o 's r esemblance chain, th ey don't even try to mov e from th e
copy to th e prototype .Th ey are, as the old iconophilic Byzantine used to say,
' economic ' , th e wo rd meanin g at th e tim e a long and carefully m anaged
Row of images in relig ion , politics, and ar t - and n ot the sens e it now h as:
the wor ld of goods.
Whereas the As believe th at th ose who hold to images ar c iconophilic and
the courageou s m ind s 'w ho br eak away from th e fascination w ith im ages are
iconoclastic, the Bs d efin e icon ophilic as th ose who do not clin g to one im age
in particular but are able to move from one to the other . For them
iconoclast s are either thos e 'who abs ur dly want to ge t rid of all images or
th ose w ho rema in in th e fascin ated co nte m plation of one isolated image,
fre eze-framed.
Proto typical exa m ples of Bs co uld be: Jesu s chasing th e merchants out of th e
Temple , Bach shocking th e dull music out of th e Leipzig congregation 's
cars, Malevich painting th e black square t o access the cosmic for ces th at
had remained hidden in classical re pre sentative painting, the Tibetan sage
ext inguishing th e butt of a cigar ette on a Buddha's head to sho w its illu sor y
character. Th e damage done to icons is, t o th em , always a char ita ble
in juncti on to redirect: their attentio n towards othe r, new er, fresh er, mo re
sacred images: no t to do without image.
But of cou rs e m any ico noclashes com e fr om th e fact that no worshipper can
be sure when his or her preferred ico n/ ido ls wi ll be smashed to t he ground ,
or whether an A or a B does th e om ino us deed. [.. . J
Are neither th e As nor the Bs sure of how to read th e reactions of those
whose icon /idols arc h~ ing burned ? Are th ey fur io us at being without th eir
cherished idols , much like todd lers sudde nly deprived of their transiti on al
obje ct ? Ar e th ey ashamed of b c:i n~ ,falsely accused of naively beli evin g in
non- existing th ings ? Are th ~y h()rr~hc cl at be ing so forcefull y re quested to
rene w thei r adhe sion to their cheris hed tradition that they had let fall into
' 1e, f rom t h c
epute an d mere
re custo
- m? Nei th er the As. no r theBs' can' (1
c ere
(IIsr

:::~ 1 2 : I M A G E S

screeching noise m ade by thei r oppo nents, w hat sort of prophet s th ey are
themselves: are they prophets w ho claim to get r id of all im ages, or th e ones
who, 'econ om ically,' wan t to le t the cascade of images m ove again to res ume
the work of salvatio n?
But this is no t th e end of our hesitation , of our ambig uity, of our ico noclash.
As and Bs co uld, afte r all, b e sim ply Cs in disgui se .

THE 'c ' PEOPLE ARE NOT AGAINST IMAGES.

EXCEPT THOSE OF THEIR OPPONENTS
Th e Cs are also afte r debunking, disen chantm ent , idol -b reaking. Th ey to o
leave in th eir tr ail plunder, w reckage , ho r rified screams, sca ndals ,
abo mination, d esecr ati on , shame, and p rofanation of all sorts. But contrary
to the As and to th e Bs, th ey have nothing against images in ge neral: they arc
only agains t th e image to 'which their opponents elms most forcefully.
Thi s is the wel l-kn ow n m echani sm of provocati on by wh ich , in orde r to
des troy someo ne as fast and as efficie ntly as possible, it is eno ugh to attac k
what is mos t cher ished, wha t has be come the rep ository o f all the sym bo lic
tr easu res of o ne pe op le. Flag-burning, painting-slashing , hostage -taking arc
typical exa m p les. Tell m e what you hold to be most dear, and I wi ll w reck it
so as to kill you faste r. It is the mini-m ax st rategy so charac te rist ic of
te r rorist threats: the maximum dam age for the minimum investm ent. Box
cutters and plane tickets against the United Stat es of Amer ica .
Th e search for the suitable object t o attract d est ru cti on and hatred is
recip rocal: 'Before you wa nted to attack my flag, I did not kno w [ cher ished
it so mu ch , but n ow I do .' So the provocateurs and those they provoke are
playing cat and m ou se, the first looking for what trigger s indign at ion faster,
th e o thers looking eagerl y for what will tri gger their indign ation most
fiercely. During thi s sea rc h, all recognize the image in qu estion as a mer e
token; it counts for no th ing but an occasion that allows the scandal to unfol d .
If it we re not fo r th e con flict, eve ryon e in the two camps would be pe rfec t ly
happy to confess tha t it is no t the object that is dispu t ed ; it is just a stake for
someth ing en tire ly different. So for th e Cs, the image Itse!fis not in qu estio n
at all, they have nothing against it (as the As do) or for it (as in th e case of
the Bs). The image is sim ply wor th less - worthless but at tacked, thus
defend ed , th us attacked . . .
What is so terribl e for idol smashers is that there is no way to d ecide for
goo d wheth er they are As, Bs, o r Cs, Maybe they have entirely misunderstood
th eir calling; maybe they are misco nstruing the scream s of hor-ror of th ose
th ey call Philistin es who wi tness thei r idols smashed to th e grou nd . Th ey sec
th em sel ves as prophets bu t maybe the y are m ere 'agents provocate urs.l They
see th em selves as freeing the poor wretched souls from their impr isonment
by monst ro us things, but what if they were , on the cont ra ry, scandal
mongers looking for ways to shame thei r opponents most efficiently?
[ ...]

I M A G E STUDIES : 31 3

THE ' D ' PEOPLE ARE BREAKING

IMAGES UNWITTINGLY
There is another kind of icon smasher ... , a most deviou s case , those w ho
could be called th e 'i nn ocen t vandals.' As is we ll known, vandalism is a term
of spite invented to describe those who destroy not so mu ch out of a hatred
of images but out o f ign orance , a lust for pr ofit and sheer passion and lun acy.
Of course, the label can be used to describe th e ac tion of th e As, the Bs, and
th e Cs as well. Th ey all ca n be accuse d of vanda lism by those w ho don 't
know if th ey ar e innocent believers fur iou s at bei ng accused of naivete ,
Philistin es awakene d fr om their dogmatic slee p by p rophetic calls, Or
scandal-lovers delighted at being th e butt of criticism and thus able to
dem onstrate th e strength and sel f-r ight eo usn ess of th eir indign ati on.
But the innocent vandals are diffe rent from th e normal, 'bad' vandals: they
had absolut ely no ide a that they were d est roying anything. O n the cont rary,
they were che r ishing im ages and protect ing th em fro m de struction, and yet
they are accu sed lat er of having profan ed and destroyed the m! They ar e, so
to speak, ic onoclasts in retrospect . Th e typi cal ex am ple is that of th e
restaurateu rs who are accused hy some of 'killing wi th kindness.' The field
of architecture is especially filled vvith those ' innocents' who, w hen they
build, have t o destroy, when their buil din gs are accuse d of being nothing but
vandalism .Their hear t is filled with th e love of images - so they are different
from all th e other cases - ' and yet they tri gger th e very same curses of
'p ro fanation,' 's acr ilege,' and ' desecration' as all the others .
Life is so difficul t : by restorin g wo rks of ar t, beauti fyin g cities, rebuilding
ar cheological sit es, they have des t royed them , th eir opponeD ts say, to th e
point that th ey appear as th e worst icon oclasts, or at least the most perver se
ones. [oo.J
And here again , the As as we ll as the Bs and th e Cs can be accused of being Ds,
that is, o f aiming at the wrong target, of forgetting to take into account the
side effects, the far reaching consequences of their acts of de struction. ' You
belie ve you freed people from idolatry, but you have sim ply deprived them of
the means to wo rsh ip; ' 'You believe you are a pr ophet renewing the cult of
images 'with fre sher im ages, you are nothing but a scandal-m onger thirsty for
blood ;' and similar accusations are frequently leveled in rev oluti onar), circles,
accusing one another of being constantly on the wr ong foot, of being horresco
rgerens, rea ctionary. What if we had killed the wrong people, smashed down
the wrong idols?Wor se, what if we had sacrificed idols for the cult of an even
bloodier, bigger, and more monstrous Baal?

THE ' E' PEOPLE ARE SIMPLY THE PEOPLE : THEY

MOCK ICONOCLASTS AND ICONOPHILES
To be complete, one should add t he Es who doubt the idol breakers a~ much
as the icon worshippers. T he )' are d iffid ent to any sharp distinctions between
th e two poles; they e xc, rcis~ their devast ating irony against all mediators; not
that thcv want to get ri d ol them, but because the y arc so consc ious of t.hei r
,

3 14 : IMAG ES

fragility. They love to show irreverence and disrespect, they crave jeers and
mockery, they claim an absolute right to blasphemy in a fierc e, Rabelaisian
way, th e}' show t he necessity of insolence, the im po r tance of what the
Rom ans called 'pasquinades,' which is so important for a healthy sense of
civil liber ty, the ind ispe nsable dose of what Pet er Sloterdijk has called
kynicism (by opposition to the typ ically iconoclast ic cynicism ) .

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

*
Th us, the crucial distinction we wish to draw ... is not bet ween a world of
images and a wor ld of nO-images - as the image warrio rs would have us
believe - but between the Interrupted flow of pictures and a cascade o f th em .
B)' directing . . . atten tion . . . to those cascades, we do n' t expect peace - the
hist or y of the imag e is too loaded for that - but we are gently nudging the
public to look for other properties of the image, properties that rel igious
wars have completely hidd en in the du st blown up by their man ~' fires and
furi es.

NOTE
I , All footnotes rem oved

Theodor Adorno (190 3- 69). German Professor of Soclology and Phil osophy
at the University of Frankfur t and Dir ector of the lnstitut fur Sozialforschung
in Frankfu rt. Hi s books include: Negative Dialectics (1973); Minima Mora/ia
(1974 ); and w ith Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (1972 ).
Svetl ana Alpers is an art histori an and is Professor Emerita at the U niversity
of Cali forni a at Berkeley. She co-founded the progressive art jo urnal
Representations in 1983. Her pub licatio ns incl ude: Art of Descr ibing: Du tch
Art in the Seventeenth Century (1983); and The Making of Rubens (1995).

Aristotl e (384-322 Be). A student at Plato's Academy and tutor to Alexander

the Great, Aristotle later esta bli shed his ow n research institute in Athens, the
Lyceum. One of the most influential phi losophers of all time, Aristotle's
w riting was of extraordinary range - from bio logy to metaphysics. Hi s
surviving texts include the Ethics and the Politic s.

Mieke Bar is Professor of Theory of Literature and a fo unding director of the

Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis. Among her many book s are
Reading ' Rembrandt ' : Beyond the Word-Image Opposition (1991), Double
Exposures: The Subject of Cultural Analysis (1996), Narratology: An Intro
duction to the Theory of Narrative (2 nd edi tion, 1997), and The Mottled
Screen: Reading Proust VisuaJly (1997).
Roland Barthes (1915- 80). French literary critic and one of the fou nding
figures in the theoretica l movement centred around the j ournal Te l Qu el. Hi s
books include: Mythologies (1957); Elements of Semiology (1964); 5/Z
(1974); Roland Betthes by Roland Berth es (1975); and A Lover's Discourse

(19 77).

Jean Baudrillard is one of France's most w ell -know n intellectuals and a

postmodern critic. From 196 6 to 198 7 he taught sociology at the University
of Paris X (Nanterre), His books incl ude: The System of Objects (1968);
Symbo lic Exchange and Death (197 6); Sim ulacra and Sim ulation, (1981};
and The G ulf War Did No t Take Pla ce (1995) .
Ben j amin (1 892- 194 0). Jew ish-German literary cri tic and
phi losopher. His writings co ~b in e~ ideas of Jewi sh mysticism with historical
materiali sm in a body of work ':"'hl C'h was an entirely novel co ntribution to
Marxist p hilosop h~ and <iesthet lc t.h eory.. His works translated into English
are mostly collections of e ssa~ s , Incl uding: Illuminations (1969); Charles
Baud elaire (1977); Unders tending Brecht (19 77 ); One Way Street (1 979 );
and the volumino uS The Arcades Projec t (1999 ).

W alter

NOTES ON EDITORS

Sunil Manghani is a lecturer in the School of Arts at York St John Un iversity,

w here he teaches crit ical and cu ltural theory. Hi s publicati ons appear in
Theory, Culture & Society, In visible Culture, Journal of Visual Art Practice,
and Culture, Theory and Critique. He is currently working on a book about
visual semiotics, wh ich brings together his long-term interest i n Roland
Barthes' late wr iti ngs and post-structural ist theori es of visual cu lture.
Arthur Piper teaches image stud ies and visual cult ure at the University of
N ott ing ham . Hi s doctoral research centres on connect ions betw een
neurosci ence, visual studies and phenomen ology. He is a prof essional
journ ali st and w riter.

Jon Simons is Associate Professor of Communication at Indiana Un iversity,

Bloomington. H e has authored Foucault and the Political (1995) and edited
From Kant to Levi-Strauss (2002) an d Contemporary Critical Theorists (2004).

INDEX

Abraham 2 1

Bcn ctton 2+4--5, 261-3

Idol shop 24-5

abstr act art g9

BCr1j>rmn,Walter 100 , 170 , 189, 19 5- 6 ,

2 11- 13,24-3

Abu Ghraih pi crures 6

Bennett, "l ,R. 194--5

actions, Lessing 48

Ador no.Tbeodor 22, 63-4 . 66-9 , 74

B~rge r,

ad\'w i sing 2

Benerton 26 \ - 3

Bern al'S, Edw ar d 43

Bhairava 256-60

bodies

Bergson 54-6

u,s, ;ng 48

women 65, 79-81

bod)' [rnago, 199- 202

Boi' baud ran , Leco q de 92-3

Boorsu n , Daniel 2

Bord o, Susan 22, 65,78-81

br ain 287 -9, 290- 1

sem iotics 10 3

TOfY camp aign

7 6-~

Agripp. , Cornelius 15 1

Aldrich, Virgil C, 17&

,l legories 90

Alpers , Svetl ana 84, 94-8, 115- 16

Althusser , Louis 294

anamorphosis 150

ant hropo logical mod e I., I00

John 195--6, 214 ..16

Bcrgs<ln, Henr i 22, +4, 54-- 6 , 19S

Anto ruoo i, Miche langelo 252-3

Be rgson 5S

app e."ce.ptlOn, Kant +6-7

brand nn age 2

Ar ist ot le 22 , 194
Im ita t io n origi.rb 31-2

Brentano, Franz I25

Brown , Peter 22

thinkmg With Images 32

Brown ~ Warn er 248

illusion 29-31

lite ratu re disti nct ron 4 2

Butler , [udrth 245

Buck-Mol'S>, Susan 81-, 99-10 0

(Li t

ar t histor y 5, 82- 100 , 267

callrgrarns 170, 182

.mage "Iud,", 300-3

\i'<I. l studies 29 3

astr cp hysics 2.17- 9

camera Iucida 233-6

ca mera ob scure +9, 267-8, 270-4

atr enuon 164-6

audiences, Deluca 188--92

aur aht)

po lyp ho nic m en tio n 165- 6

to nal rcsol unc n 228,2 30

capita hsm 2 , 64

Bachel ard, Gaston 125. 178

B.ck , l.es 262

Chamb ray. Freart de 93

Cheng, Meil<ng 243 ,2 63".5

Chinese , scr-ipt 169 , 172- 5

Badio u, Alain 160

Bal, Micke 10 3, 115- 19

Balzac, Honor. de 253

Barfield , Owen 178

Barr, A Jl~,. d 8 'J

Barth cs, Roland 103, 109- 14 , 116 - 7 , 243 , 2 ~4

Baudr-illcrd , Je an 21,64-5,70 - 4

Caropm , Ro ber t 2.15--6

Ca r~ vagglO,

M. 233

Cassircr, Ernst 9 1

castr ation anxIety' I 17

cau sality 42

Cbanne. Paul 132-3

Ch urchIan d, Patr Lela 30 6

Churchland , Paul 306

cit y images 247-9

cityscape 244
Clark , T.], 84

clo ud cham be r 239

INDEX : 3 2 7

.32 6: I M AGES
c"gn.ttion 4 3

c'Ognit.iv, capacit y, Kant 4-J

collage 274
commodification . mass media 64

co mmodiues 43,63

fcushism 50- 2

[arncson 74 - 5

condensa tio n, dreams 57-8

consciousne ss 4-3

B(rgson 5;' -6

body image' 201- 2

camera onscura 49

densny, ,ign' \ 18

Derr ida, j acques 169 , 243

Descartes, Rene 22-3, 114, 185

cvrl dem on 36-7

fABRJCA 263

fabricarion 217-41

fact ual m eamn g 86 -8

Giaoom ct u , Alber to

r 33

Gilr oy, Pau l 64 , 76 -8

fal se conscio usn e ss 63

Grotto di Bondone 234, 236

Glt lm , T, IS8

lamil)' of Im'g'" 3, 5, 195, 296-9

god- Images, Hindu 256-60

fantasmara 298

Goeth e,

dialectical imag e 195, 211 -1 3

D ickerson , Er n est 28 1-2

fashion . . t:'atmg disorder s 79

Gombrich, Ern st H. 83- .4,9 1--4, 97, 250, 298

Iemmmitv, Sherm an 159-'> 0

Gon gah, Tejeswar Babu 259

JiJfiY~nCo!

fe m irus m

Goodma n, N. 11S

o puc> 37- 9

de scrtprton , Sartre 134-7

243

J.W. 27 1

di ITe ren ee , racia l 262

film 159--64

(h gLtallmag~

objec tification S0-1

Gray, T homas 172

ps jch oanalv srs 147, 156-9

Gr eenberg. Cle men t 42

vis ual cul ture 263- 5

Grieve, Grc gory Pri ce 244, 256-60

co n s trucuv ism 304

Debor d 64

clcctroruc tools 227-,2

Dufrerme 140

maki ng of 219

gr avcn images 24

fe minist cnucrsm 61-1)

Penol losa, Ern est 169, 172-5

Heber-mas, JUrgen 17 1

Hacker, P.M.S. 194-5

fens lustic sco po philia 157- 9

phenom enology 125-6

discovery, Gornbrich 9 1-4

displa cem ent, dreams 58-60

distracti on , telev ision 188-9

dommation, mal e 8 1

Romanyshyn 170

drawmg

figure /ground 143, 164

Hedgecoe, John 28 1

film

Heldegg er, Martin 125 , 128-31,212

gaze 149

m ass media 66

m ed ra Im age 183- 8

Sar tr e 1 34-7

Co ns e r vative Party, race 76-8

Klee, Paul 1+7, 165, 211-1 2, 218 19 ,

22 1-3,230

Fer nie , Enc 83

Peuerbach, LudWig Andreas 2050

c ri t ica l th eory 100

Constable, John 92

dr eam-thoughts 57-9

con strucuvism , Stafford 303-7

dr eam -wo rk , freud 56-60

mit ural relativism 286-7

four th dim cnsion 2I9, 224-7

consumerism 1

dreaming

lighti ng 281 - 3

consumption, photograp h' 253

di alectical image 212

Me lz 152- 5

Copjcc, Joan 147

televt sion IS4-6

Courbet, Gustave 94

wotro pe 268

p"'l"lly 252-3

psychoanal ysis 14 7

Cou tu rat, Louis 20S

Duch amp, Marc el 268, 276, 30 0

Sher man 159-64

Crary. Jon ath an 84 , 243-4, 267, 270-5

Dufrenn e, Mikel 126, 138-41

thou ght 195

Crayo la 262

Dyer, RIChard 268, 278-83

nmc-image 207. I 1

woman as lmag . 156-9

cr iu ca l race anal )':m 64

Flanagan , Owen 306

Hagm-um, Jean 298

Hall, Stuart 188, 26 2

hcr rnencuucs

of apprectation 147

'O entilk visuahsrn 14-2 -4

of . Usp'(;lOn 146

Hester, Mar cus B. 175, 176, 177

hidde n meam ng, t elevision 66-8

Hind u go d .images 25 6--60

histo rrcal materialism 2 12

Hitchcock, Alfred 158

Hobbes.Thomas 22-3, 34-6

Hockney , David 2 19- 20, 233 --6, 267--8

Holbe in , Hans 1.50-52

c r iuca l th eor y 99-100

Earth First! 189-9 1

cubism 89

cul tural ferishwa tion SO- 1

canng disorders 79

ponwr 244

Holm e." Oliver Wend ell 2'12

Edgerton . Samuel , 02 -3

fostel-, H,I 267

Homer 48

cultu ral form" 42

l-cu cault , Michel 84. 94,97, 170,

l-lor khcimer, Max 63 ..-4, 74

cultural relativi sm 284-7

ego , M"7 \ 54

ego-cenCr Lsrn , media image [ 84

cul ture

Ehrcnzwcig, Anton 147, 164-6

frl'c ze-fra mlng 311)-1 1

Heros at Niera 34

Bord o 79

EJaenstl'in , Serg" 109-1 1, 113- 14. 2 19, 224-7

Freu d , SIgmu nd 21,43,

Hum e, Da\id \ 26, 1 35-6, 1, 8

Buck -Mo r-e, 99-100

elect ric light 243 . 246-7

electronic.to o l. 227-32

Elkins, Jam es 4, 5.7, 10- 12, 14-.15, 17,

83,84 , 218 , 269

146-7, 1+9

Husse rl, Edm und 12.5- 6 , 138

hybrldity 28 5--6

functional specia lisatio n 289

image srudies 293 - 5, 30 0-3

non-art 126

endotopi c ar-ea ! 65

Gahson , Pet er 220, 2'>6-4 1

Gard ner, Ho ward 22 , t 94-5

Jameson 64 ,75

Visual 242-65

words TX)

culture Jnd mtr~ 63,74

Dah , Salvado r 151

Darnaslo , Antonio 22, 194-5 , 199-202, 306

Dant e , An hur 244, 254-5

da,.,6n 257, 259

Darwin , CharIea 306

Daurnicr, H. 214
de KOOnlng, Willcrn 254
Debord , Guy 22, 64 . 69 - 70 , 7> , :70

Deb ,")" R,'gis 294 , 30S

Delcuzc , (;i l,,,, 19 5 . 2 07~ 1 1

Dc t .uce, Kcv m 1 70~ J J t 8$ 9? .24.3

Dennett , Danrcl 22 , 308

179 - 8 3,267 ,298

d re am -wor k 56 60

social sen t im en t

1S.3

Engels. Frted nch 22, 43, 4-9, 63

l'ng'ncering parachgm 141

enVlron mUlt ah st.> 189- .9 1

l'plStemological theory 23

""luipm" nt, phen omenology 125 , 128- 3 1

g'<c' 6, 146, 149- 52

Deb ord 69

Ernst, lI.h" 268 ~ 2.74---<)

crot tcisrn 1S6

Ge neSIS 2+

cx c i-!a ngl=. corn rnorlttv fc nsln sm 51

Exodus 2....
~

Gestalt

gender 147

ma le 15.6, 160

Gelle r, Margaro t 237-9

G erman idl~ol ()g ,. 63

atte nti on l6 4 ~ :)

c xc topic ar-ea ~ 65

sl-icntific ....is lIa l'isrl'l 14 ~ 4

cxpn::-:.5ion:J1 mc:amng 86 - 8

VJSU.l 1ilY

277

Heros at I'/Ie...a ,3

Iconic' signs 10 2

rconoclash 309 - 14
iconoclasm 8, 2 1-3 , 42-.3, 64, 72, 170

Gahson 220

La lOU'

309 ,313- 14

vciennflc , m~g e< 237--41

Iconograph,c 117

Iconography 84 .86 ,9 1, % --7 , 133,2 94

icon olaters 72

'conn log;; 1,5 , 8 , 86-9 1, 2 ~4

rcono phrlia s , 2 1,31 1, ,13-1 4

Ga hson 220

sc rcnriflc lm~g..f.'.~ 237-41

ico rco pho hta "'. X, 2! 2
l ee , :) v 2J.. l OX, 17; .J9

INDEX :

3 2 8 : I MAGES

idcntUlcation 146

Kirby, Juho T 2S4

Klt-e, Paul 147, 165 , 21 1.- 12, 2 18- 19,

lneo grams 169

media, mar kets 74-5

me dia Image 18 3-8

Nierz..ch e, f r i.,urich 22 , 4 3

n'th . 52- 3

memory
tnvoluntary 202-4

re mernbcnng ? 14- 16

non -ar t 126

art hi.lOr) 30 1-2

Kosslyn, Ste phe n [94

La>

nooSlgn, 209 - [0

capitalist ido lat ry 63

Kr auss, Rosalmd 267- 8, 274-8

me nta l ' mage. 22--3, 126 , 136, 194-5 , 298

Hind u god- llnag~' 256 60

Kress, Gunt er 103, 119-23

Hobbes 34-6

Xrr steva, Ju ua 101, I I I

Merleau-Pont y, Maurice 126, 131-4 , 142 ,

244 ,285

ocularccntri ' 01 6

rconoclash 310-1 2

Kuhn, (n om 144 , 30 3

metapbors

optic path w.y 287- 9

1dcograph' ) 74-S

iu~ul ()gy cr itique

221 1,230

62-8 1

idols 2 1

Abraham 24-5

acti" e lin es 22 I , 1

m edial line, 222 -3

Ihde, n on 126 , 141-4

illusio n

~.t t' (J /~' (l

N1etzsche 53

m enta l image' 194-5

pictu r e th eory 194 , 197 9

1mag. stu d ies 7, 292-3 14

jmag~ - c:on S<:lou sn ~.$S

scrru ctna ; wor ds

12';

SIgnS

rm rn ests

10'>- 7

langu age games 296-7

ss

image -worl d H 9-B

lat ent messages. television

,m ageah iht y 244, 248

Latou r, Bruno 21, 142-1. 28S-6 , 3U9- 14

'mage far . 17 )

L. Doeuff, Michele 195,204 - 6

Imagmary', ph 1 I osophk~ 1204-6

le<:to<lgn s 210

JmagJnauon
Du freo ne 118-41

obj c~l;ncation SO-I

up n cs

cam era lucida 23 3-6

Ploto 79

semi oti c landsca pe 120

Metz, Chr isti an 146, 15'2-5 , 267

Michelangelo 90

Mil ler son , Gerald 279

langu age 3. 169- 70

Kant 42

P lato 29-3 1

94-8

language 169-70 , 175-8

La can, Jacqu c. 146, 149-51, \64, 287

01' immanen ce 13 \ --1i

,l!""II>OS

truth and lies 5 3

22

Desc ar tes 37 -9

Ordu)alJ roJCI.tm 112-1 3

Panofsky, Erwin 84 , 8~- 9 1, 96-7 , 294

Panopti co n 26 7

mirror; film 15 2- >. l S5

pass ivc Iincs 22)

Mi1"7oeff, Nicholas 26 7

Mitch ell,W,J,r.l, 4 , 42,1 94-, 24 3,

284-5, 293-5, 296-99

pa;;:;;:! vc S}'llthes is 138

Leonardo da Viner HI , 147, 151

lamrly o!'i m age. 3, 5,

195, 296 --9

Le:<., ing, Gotthold 42, 48 -9 , 170

iconoclasm 2 1

passi vity

gender 160

sp.,ctato" 2 \2 - 3

te lev isio n 188

Pme", Charl es Sanders 10'2-3,1 07- 9

emp irical 1m aginati on 138, 140

Levinas emmanuel 25 9- 60

ineology 63

Pelikan, Jaroslav 2%

Kant 42,45 7

L,,,,,,,,, Justin

picto rta l turn 5,8, 102,293

Mcrl cau-Ponty 137.- ';

lie" Nre rxsche 53

lifeworl d 126

Mrtc hel l, Will iam.

p" r"':pl i on

Dufrcnnc 139-40

hgh lmg

mod ernity

phc'lomcoo logy I 26

poetry 178

te mporal order I 72

1m ag mg technolog Ic, 142,

144, ';U6--7

18S- 9

J. 227 -3 2

el ectronic tool> 21 9, 227 -32

Kant 42, 46--7

Mctz 154- 5

Sartre 136--7

words )69

me dia im age 184

camera lu cide 233

v" ua)i t~ 272

" isu.l,t), 278.. 83

Ihdc 142

Lincoln, Bru ce 25 8

modcrru :dng vision 270-4

pcr speetl\' e 1S1

irnph cit kn owledge, Dufrc nne 140

Imgu is tk turn 102

unprcssio msrn 93-4

literature, ar t dlsu ncu on 42

modularity of visio n 287-9 1

montage 2 19 , 224-7

index 108- 9

Locke, John 22- 3, 39-4 0,42. 126

Mor gan , W illard 279

Phant asm cs 34-5

m dcxi cal SIg n' 10 2

mdu crlon 9 1

Lor ene, Lucan 28 I

Morn s. Robert 147

phenome no logy B, I Z4- 44

Lowenthal. Leo 67

m oll!, 90-1

phil osoplu call maginar )' 204--1i

[ng""', Jean-Aug usle -D om1mqu (, 2 33

int cnnonaht y J 2S

Lury, Celia 244-\ , 26 1- 3

Lynch , Kevin 244 , 24-7- 9

Mouucr , r. 136

movement-image 209

pho to gr aphs 250 -3

Abu Ghraih pict ures 6

lnt crnct , visual culture 100

Lynch, Michael 302-.3

M oxi e)', Keith 83-4

m terp r et ant 102, 10 7- 9

ml ert ex!ualtty 243

intnnSlc meamng 87- 8. 9 0- \

inven t ion , Go m bn ch 9 1-4

phanrasmago n a 196

Mull er , [ohann es 272

muh l-dl m cn siona l attention 16S--1i

MacO onald , SCOII 81

MacD o ugall , David 286 - 7

Mcl.uh an , Mar >I>.l1 219 , 243 ,

Mu lvey, l.au r a

I,n , 156-9

evldence 284

pri vate photographs 2 14- 1S

pu blic photograp hs 214-1S

rememhenng 2 14-16

,11(,m 256- 60

pict orial turn 5, 8 , 10 1, 293

Mag" lt e, Reo" \ 70 , 179-83, 187

Mal kiewrcz, Kr rs 279 , 28 1

Maner, E. 93

myth 'I 88

N i ct zsch e 5 2- 3

pixe ls 2 \ 9 , 228- 30

m::..rk<;ts ) medi a 74- S

~l arAj ~m . histol")' 2 ) 2

160

na tio n , and race 76 -8

na tu rahsrn 93

Negro ponr e, Nicho las 303

New ,-'Irt !li<lo r,.ns 84

Kant. Imm anuel 22, "''-- 'J, 176

~b'\.-, l l n rr da f1a.nicalc 135---6

N eWM CLJ 'WfC: 159

rep r<: ;o\~: n f. .'l tl ( Hl .~ n tl i m<)gl ~~ <:;tl()[\ 4 ; 7

:n as~ rll <:d ia

neu roscr c uc e

involun tary memo r)' 202 --4

han

,h. T'mbl , 109-\ I, r 14

[arn eson, Fredrrc 64 , 74-5,244

[ami eso n, Kathleen 188-9

Jay, Marti n 267--8, 284-7

Joh n of Dam ascus 33

t ran scend ent al :-) uh Jt:d

Kemp , Ma rti n Z':lo 4

44

24-~ -7

Marx, Kar l 2 1-2 , 4.l , 63

cam era obscu r a 4-9

com m odity fen sblsm 50 -2

plelure theo ry of langu age' 194. 197 - 9

Plannen e, Jam es 28 1

Plot<> 64 , 187, 20S , 220 , 250 . 25 3

n ;i), T C ) S~J Sm

<:o m rn()(I,ll catioll 64

rh rn a ~l (). A r\t tlnh:'1 22 ) \ 94

m",. h I I J.y <,n~c...I str u ct 'are- (,6 9

decad e of the bra]O J0 6

""Y O

sirrulc 21-2 , 26-9 , &5,78- 9

drvid ed lin e '25

illusi on 29-3 I

poet ry

medi a image 187- 8

me taphor s 176

) , 199 - ) 01',106

Ru

Ot' W '

17 5

r-oo tx 17 2- .'

:~29

I N D EX :

:3 3 0 : I M AGES

politn-s ?

l'o11oc1,., Gnsclda 84

)J"ile) , Bri~g e t 2 \ 9

Sontag, Susan 6, 220 , 244 , 249- 53

rites of p assage 25 9

sp.ce 42 ,48- 9

Pop pe r, K""J 9 1

Ro be r ts, julia 80

spatial r eso lution 228 - 30

BauJriIJard 71

P" en ogra physo-\

R odin . Augu ste 92

spec tacle, Debord 69 -70

m as.' rnccha 66, 68

pcs t -m od ermsm 285

pcsr-structurahsm U 3

Rogoff, Int 24 3

Sp i vak, G a}a tr: Chakravor 'Y' 24-5

WllJ1""tJOn , spectacle 69

Ro ma nyshyn, Rober t D, 170, 18 3- 8

Sta ffor d , Barbara M ari a 4, 5 , S4,

uti hl3.namSnl 125

Post man, N. ,J 170

Rort )', Ricbard 10 2, 194

Rosschrn, Rob er to 207

rororclrcf 268, 277

St clnberg, Leo 303

Valer)" Paul \3 \

~ tcr cot)'p c:'i ,

valu e, co mmo di ty f<:t" I-u,m 50 , 52

postmoder msm , me rna image \ 87

Po un d , [Z'" 169

powcr relatio ns,

l~ eol ogy

63

pre-conscious 126

vadis m 157

prcjcctlon , tel evrsr on 68

~.r tre , Jcan - P.u I 12("

pro pagan d a, phot ograph s 2 15

S.u"ure, Fer di n an d d e J 02- 3. 105- 7 , 169 , 305

schern a 4 2,47 , 176

protot)'pL" 31 1

Proust , Marcel 19 5 , 202--4, 212 , 25 1

psyche 146

psychcanalysis 8, 4 3, 145---{j6

Baudrlllard 71

I-reud , Slg m un tl 2\ ,43, 146--7,149

m reverse 67

p' ycholingwSlic, 175

pu blic sphere 171

133- 7, 139

atten ti o n 166

293-4,303 - 7

gender 160

Ste rn berg, 158

Van Den Borg. D. 6

Stlegli(;<, AIITen 300

Van Gogh, Vincent 125, 128- 31

Strathc rn, M an lyn 245 , 263

structu ra list sernlotics 103

vandalism 3 I 3

Vasar r, Gio rg.io 8 3

Vdaque7, D, 9+--8, 233

sc hoo l o f su sp icron 4 3-4

sci enn fic image, 220, 236 4 1, 30 2

Sur realism 42 , 100

Viernarn \ Var 187

scr ent rlic vtsualism 141-4

Sutherland, Ivan E, 232

'''''p,c drwe \ 16--7, \ 4 9- 50

se"I" c regim e 267

sco pophilia 147 , 157-9

self 146

' ymbo h c .s.igm 102

Visconti , Luclun o 208

symbolical vel ucs 9 1

,';sual cult ure 242-65 ,305

su also Cenera] ]mrodtj(,'(,ionfo r more rife.renceJ

. ymb ob 108- 9

Bar th", 110-1 1

Hindu god-images 256---{i0

quanh tllan On 229

radicals 174

scrmosls 10 2

sc mic nc landscape 103, I J 9 ,23

sem iotics 8 , 101-2 J, 169 ,0< also signs

o btuse meanin g 111-14

ob vious meanin g 111

SOCia l 103

subsc rruou c 103, 115-1 9

supr ascmiouc 103, 115-19

visual l t , 16, 102- 3, \ 69

Raph. e19 3

sensation 39-4-0

se mio tic lan dscape 122

re. ht), 24 9-50

sen- nbiht y, Kant 47

semiotics

ral] . l , mage, 24 5

Bcn cuon 26 1- 3

r;lcism 64

photographs 2 51

scxh..m 64

rea so nin g I Kant 42

sex ual cbjecn ficanon 156

referen t 169

Shapin , Steven 23

reflect ion 40, 134-7

Sherman , Gmdy 147, 159---{i4

relatio nal powe r 267

r e lati vi sm, c ult u ra l 2 84-7

Sh'pto n, Eric Earle 249

"-'gmtled 102, 106-7

slgn,r,er, 10 2- 3, 106--7

r e liabi lit y, ph en o m en o logy 129- 30

relIgIOn 2+ 5

see also idols

Hindu g()(l-images 256- 60

Heros at Nicaea 3 3

Ho m ' at Niera ,1 4

Ico no clast s 2 1

joh n o f Dam ascu s B

,imulacra 72- 3

" ,pre sent.men ! 0 2, 107- 9

reso lu tion , pixels 228

rhct or rc , t ( = h~ V1 S JOn 18 9 - 90

Rlchar ds Jvor A, 17;

Richter, Hcnrv 92

Ric.:m'ur. Pa l1l4 2~ s, If> 9 70 .175 9.2,7

-.,0

Barthcs 110--1I, 113

pixe ls 230

"gn,7 3

se c also sero .o t rcs

Bal 115-1 9

Peirce 107-- 9

~.u ssrur e 105--7

w or d. 169

snu ulaer a 6S I 70-4

S, nltr.sun, R vh cr t )47

socia l rcJ:.a l J'O

) us , com m od lrv
, fCli...hrsm ) 1

~c)( I ;:J, 1 !-cm i()t ic:!-. I O ~

Sf ) C:I ;,l!

~t:n lJ m c:nt l::; "i

v,. i f) -h i ~1()r H: <l 1 m C1lh,;l s H)(J

Venn ee r, Jan 94, 1\ 5-1 7

\1

r tual rcalu J 2 J2

(onlirusm 26 3-5

Int ern et 100

local visual culture 244

scrnan trc th eo r y 17 5- 8

hghtmg 278-83

van Le"u we n, T hee \ 0 3, 119- 23

subj ec t ivity sem iotic lan ds cap e 12 1

Q uaade , vibekc 262

and n at io n 76-8

un co nSCIOUS 43 , 146 - 7

5ub'cm lOut' 10 3, 115- 19

sup ra,em loUt 103 , 115-1 9

Sc hilder, P. 13 3

seman tic an alysis 169

race

' ~1

,), m ptoms 183

vrsual mtclllgence 294

Tagg. john 2 S4

Tarkovsky, Andrei

2 0~

tclcvlsion 63-4

vrsual tur n 284-7

visua lism , scie ntific 14- 1..'+

visuality 16, 266--9 1

audiences \ 8 ~ -9

jam eso n 75

medi a ,m.ge 183, 8

War hol , Andy 7.44 , 254 5, 26 3

multilayer<.d structure 66 --9

W illiam.; on , [udrth I 59---{j0

w hireness

278-83

W ilson , C:r.R , 239

t ex t 102

u s, 118

th ou ght, ,m'ge as 193- 216

Ar ist otle 32

Wl ttg .nstein , Lud w ig 3, 22,1 18--19 ,

17 5- 7 ,1 95 , 296

m ental lm.ge s 22

picture theory 194, \ 97 -9

scrmotics I t 8- 19

tied Im ages \76

time 42, 48-..9

women, bod ..' 79-8 1

t,m e-,m ag o 207- II

words

tr anscendental [aculty Kant 4-5-7

transcendental lm'gmatlon 138 , 140

tr an scenden tal subject 44

,m. go relation 168--92

/o.'\ agrit te 's p.inting 179-8 3

v..,'lO ng 16 9

trivu hl)', television 13 ti

tru th

Baudnll ard 7 t -2

Jvtet zs ch c

53

ph c norncoology 130- 1

Zd u , Sc mi r 26 8-9 , 287-91

Ziz e k , 'IIavo] \46-- 7

WOlrope 26 8, 274, 276

Z"icky, Fr i(z 238