JIMENEZ V CANIZARES

FACTS:
1. Plaintiff Joel Jimenez filed a complaint praying of a decree annulling his marriage with
Remedios Canizares.
2. He claimed that the orifice of her genitals was too small to allow the penetration of a
male organ or penis for copulation.
3. He also claimed that the condition of her genitals existed at the time of marriage and
continues to exist.
4. The wife was summoned and served with a copy of the complaint but she did not file
an answer.
5. The court entered an order requiring defendant to submit to a physical examination by
a competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation.
6. Defendant did not submit herself to the examination and the court entered a decree
annulling the marriage.
7. The City Attorney filed a Motion for Reconsideration, among the grounds that the
defendants impotency has not been satisfactorily established as required by law; that she
had not been physically examined because she refused to be examined.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony
of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife is impotent.
HELD:
The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved to exist by
indubitable evidence to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the
marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was
expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage
he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been
satisfactorily established because from the commencement of the proceedings until the
entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein.
Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on
her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence
could not arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful
and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by
competent authority.
A physical examination in this case is not self-incriminating. She is not charged with any
offense . She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself.
Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in
favor of potency. The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable
of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together
as husband and wife.

RECTO V HARDEN
100 Phil 427
FACTS:
Recto and Harden entered into a contract for professional services wherein the latter
engaged the services of the former as her counsel against her husband for a claim in their
conjugal property. Mr. Harden previously filed for divorce against the Mrs. The Court
awarded Mrs. Harden an amount totaling to almost 4 million pesos plus litis expensae.
Subsequently however, Mrs. Harden ordered her counsel to vacate all orders and
judgments rendered therein, and abandon and nullify all her claims to the conjugal
partnership existing between her and Mr. Harden. Later, she entered into an amicable
settlement with Mr. Harden agreeing to a share of a lesser amount.
Appellee counsel for Mrs. Harden alleged that the purpose of the said instruments,
executed by Mr. and Mrs. Harden, was to defeat the claim of the former for attorneys
fees, for which reason, he prayed that the court grant him the necessary fees.
Appellants assail the contract for professional services as void, mainly, upon the grounds
that:
1.that Mrs. Harden cannot bind the conjugal partnership without her husbands consent; c
2.that Article 1491 of the Civil Code of the Philippines in effect prohibits contingent fees;
c
3.that the contract in question has for its purpose to secure a decree of divorce, allegedly
in violation of Articles 1305, 1352 and 1409 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;
4.that the terms of said contract are harsh, inequitable and oppressive.
ISSUES AND HELD:
The first objection has no foundation in fact, for the contract in dispute does not seek to
bind the conjugal partnership. By virtue of said contract, Mrs. Harden merely bound
herself or assumed the personal obligation to pay, by way of contingent fees, 20%
of her share in said partnership. The contract neither gives, nor purports to give, to the
Appellee any right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her aforesaid share. The amount
thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said fees.
For the same reason, the second objection is, likewise, untenable. Moreover, it has
already been held that contingent fees are not prohibited in the Philippines and are
impliedly sanctioned by our Cannons (No. 13) of Professional Ethics. (see, also, Ulanday
vs. Manila Railroad Co., 45 Phil., 540, 554.) Such is, likewise, the rule in the United
States (Legal Ethics by Henry S. Drinker, p. 176).
in the United States, the great weight of authority recognizes the validity of contracts for
contingent fees, provided such contracts are not in contravention of public policy, and it
is only when the attorney has taken an unfair or unreasonable advantage of his client that

such a claim is condemned. (See 5 Am. Jur. 359 et seq; Ballentine, Law Dictionary, 2nd
ed., p. 276.)
The third objection is not borne out, either by the language of the contract between them,
or by the intent of the parties thereto. Its purpose was not to secure a divorce, or to
facilitate or promote the procurement of a divorce. It merely sought to protect the interest
of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership, during the pendency of a divorce suit she
intended to file in the United States. What is more, inasmuch as Mr. and Mrs. Harden are
admittedly citizens of the United States, their status and the dissolution thereof are
governed pursuant to Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain (which was in force in the
Philippines at the time of the execution of the contract in question) and Article 15 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines by the laws of the United States, which sanction divorce.
In short, the contract of services, between Mrs. Harden and herein Appellee, is not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
It is a basic principle that status, once established by the personal law of the party, is
given universal recognition. Therefore, aliens can sue and be sued in our courts subject to
Philippine procedural law even on matters relating to their status and capacity. However,
the law to be applied by Philippine courts in determining their capacity and status is their
personal law.
The last objection is based upon principles of equity, but, pursuant thereto, one who seeks
equity must come with clean hands (Bastida, et al., vs. Dy Buncio & Co., 93 Phil., 195;
30 C.J. S. 475), and Appellants have not done so, for the circumstances surrounding the
case show, to our satisfaction, that their aforementioned agreements, ostensibly for the
settlement of the differences between husband and wife, were made for the purpose of
circumventing or defeating the rights of herein Appellee, under his above-quoted contract
of services with Mrs. Harden.

BARNUEVO V. FUSTER
29 PHIL 606
FACTS:
Gabriel and Constanza were married in Spain. Thereafter, Gabriel went to the Philippines,
settled, and acquired real and personal properties. Constanza later followed. A few years
however, both parties executed a contract for their separation wherein the wife returned to
Spain and has agreed to be supported by the husband to be paid in Madrid, Spain.
Eventually, the wife instituted a petition for divorce here in the Philippines against the
husband. The husband opposed the petition on the grounds that: a.neither the trial court
nor any other court in the Philippine Islands has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint, because, as to the allowance for support, since neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant are residents of Manila, or of any other place in the Philippine Islands, the
agreement upon the subject was neither celebrated, nor was it to be fulfilled, in the
Philippine Islands; b.and as to the divorce, because the action therefore ought to be tried
by the ecclesiastical courts.
In deciding the case, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila held itself to have
jurisdiction, decreed the suspension of life in common between the plaintiff and
defendant;
ISSUE:
Do Philippine Courts have jurisdiction over the petition for divorce?
What law should apply in construing the term pesetas?
HELD:
The lower court did not commit this error attributed to him. The defendant had not
proved that he had elsewhere a legal domicile other than that which he manifestly had in
the Philippines during the seventeen years preceding the date of the complaint. On the
contrary, it plainly appears, without proof to the contrary, that during this not
inconsiderable period, extending from the year 1892 until a month prior to the arrival of
his wife in the Philippines in March, 1909, he had constantly resided in the said Islands,
had kept open house, and had acquired in the city of Manila quite a little real property
which is now the object of the division of the conjugal society.
It has been established that defendant is domiciled in the Philippines.
Defendant, although a Spanish subject, was a resident of these Islands. Article 26 of the
Civil Code that he cites itself provides that "Spaniards who change their domicile to a
foreign country, where they may be considered as natives without other conditions than
that of residents therein, shall be required, in order to preserve the Spanish nationality, to
state that such is their wish before the Spanish diplomatic or consular agent, who must
record them in the registry of Spanish residents, as well as their spouses, should they be
married, and any children they may have." From this provision, which is the exclusive
and irrefutable law governing the defendant, we are to conclude that the domicile of the

defendant and the plaintiff is fully proven, irrespective of the Treaty of Paris.
Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure leaves to the election of the plaintiff the
bringing of a personal action like the one at bar either in the place where the defendant
may reside or be found, or in that where the plaintiff resides.
As held by the Husband:
That by the express provision of article 80 of the Civil Code of Spain, "jurisdiction in
actions for divorce and nullification of canonical marriages lies with ecclesiastical
courts," while that of civil tribunals is limited to civil marriages; that this being so, the
action for divorce brought by the plaintiff in the cause does not fall within the jurisdiction
of the civil courts, according to his own law of persons, because these courts ought to
apply the Spanish law in accordance with the said article 9 of the Civil Cod of Spain, and
this Spanish law grants the jurisdiction over the present cause to the ecclesiastical courts,
in the place of which no tribunal of these Islands can subrogate itself.
However, husband was unable to prove by any law or legal doctrine whatever that the
personal statute of a foreigner carries with it, to whether he transfers his domicile, the
authority established by the law of his nation to decree his divorce, which was what he
had to demonstrate.
As the Court upheld:
"The jurisdiction of courts and other questions relating to procedure are considered to be
of a public nature and consequently are generally submitted to the territorial principle. . . .
All persons that have to demand justice in a case in which foreigners intervene, since they
can gain nothing by a simple declaration, should endeavor to apply to the tribunales of
the state which have coercive means (property situated in the territory) to enforce any
decision they may render. Otherwise, one would expose himself in the suit to making
useless expenditures which, although he won his case, would not contribute to secure his
rights because of the court's lack of means to enforce them." (Torres Campos, "Elementos
de Derecho International Privado," p. 108.)
The provisions of article 80 of the Civil Law of Spain is only binding within the
dominions of Spain. It does not accompany the persons of the Spanish subject wherever
he may go. He could not successfully invoke it if he resided in Japan, in China, in
Hongkong or in any other territory not subject to the dominion of Spain. Foreign
Catholics domiciled in Spain, subject to the ecclesiastical courts in actions for divorce
according to the said article 80 of the Civil Code, could not allege lack of jurisdiction by
invoking, as the law of their personal statute, a law of their nation which gives
jurisdiction in such a case to territorial courts, or to a certain court within or without the
territory of their nation.
(Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34, and Ibaez vs. Ortiz, 5 Phil. Rep., 325).
In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila did not

lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for, although Spanish Catholic subjects,
they were residents of this city and had their domicile herein.
The Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands have the power and jurisdiction to
try actions for divorce. That of the city of Manila did not lack jurisdiction by reason of
the subject matter of the litigation.
With respect to their property regime, the Foral Law presented by the husband in an
affidavit, with which conjugal partnership is known to be inexistent, cannot apply since
this affidavit was never presented in proof, was never received by the trial judge, and
cannot seriously be considered as an effort to establish the law of a foreign jurisdiction.
Sections 300, 301 and 302 of the Code of Civil Procedure, now in force in these islands,
indicate the method by which the law of a foreign country may be proved. The Court
maintains that the affidavit of a person not versed in the law, which was never submitted
as proof, never received by the trial court, and which has never been subjected to any
cross-examination, is not a means of proving a foreign law on which the defendant relies.
Thus, since no proof has been submitted to this effect, all the property of the marriage,
says article 1407 of the Civil Code, shall be considered as conjugal property until it is
proven that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
ON PLAINTIFFS APPEAL
The court did not commit it in applying the rule contained in article 1287 of the Civil
Code. "The usages or customs of the country shall be taken into consideration in
interpreting ambiguity in contracts. . . ." If in the contract the word " pesetas," not being
specific, was ambiguous, then it was in harmony with this precept to interpret it as being
the peseta then in use or current when and where the agreement was made, Mexican
being then the usual and current money in the Philippines.

QUITA V. PADLAN
GR NO. 124371, DECEMBER 22, 1998
FACTS:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18
May 1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their
relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. and obtained a final judgment of divorce. She married thrice thereafter.
On 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. Respondent Blandina Padlan claiming to be the
surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and
Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the
petition. Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased
Arturo, also intervened.
The court held that no dispute exists as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit
from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by
him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan;
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner could inherit as the surviving spouse of Arturo?
HELD:
Case remanded subject to determination of petitioners citizenship. However, Private
respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo
were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was
subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning
under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that
can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.
Case remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings since the trial court was not
able to completely ascertain petitioners citizenship. The trial court must have overlooked
the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the
time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well
lose her right to inherit from Arturo.

LLORENTE V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines.
Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where
through naturalization, he became a US Citizen. Upon his visit to his wife, he discovered
that she was living with his brother and a child was born. The child was registered as
illegitimate but the name of the father was left blank. Llorente filed a divorce in
California in which Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively
participated in the proceedings, which later on became final. He married Alicia and they
lived together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last will and testament
stating that all his properties will be given to his second marriage. He filed a petition of
probate that made or appointed Alicia his special administrator of his estate. Before the
proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration over
Llorentes estate. The trial granted the letter and denied the motion for reconsideration.
An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed and modified the judgment
of the Trial Court that she be declared co-owner of whatever properties, she and the
deceased, may have acquired in their 25 years of cohabitation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not national law shall apply?
RULING:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article
16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such
law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of
the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It
can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a
resident. Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called
for or required by New York State law.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (emphasis ours)
Likewise, Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula.
Such was also the situation when he married Alicia and executed his will. As stated in
Article 15 of the civil code, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided that they are
valid in their National Law. Thus the divorce obtained by Llorente is valid because the

law that governs him is not Philippine Law but his National Law since the divorce was
contracted after he became an American citizen. Furthermore, his National Law allowed
divorce.
The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of
Lorenzo Llorentes will and determination of the parties successional rights allowing
proof of foreign law.

GOITIA VS. CAMPOS RUEDA

FACTS:
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and
immediately thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they
lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents.
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff,
demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that
the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any
act other than legal and valid cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had
continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd and indecorous demands on his
wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff
exasperated the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict
injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff
was unable by any means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and
cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge
in the home of her parents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not that the wife may claim for support against her husband outside of their
conjugal abode?
HELD:
Marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it is something more than a
mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not
upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes
those rights, duties, and obligations. Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of
which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relation for life and the parties
cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they may make .The
reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law
determines from time to time, and none other. When the legal existence of the parties is
merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the state or
government upon principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the
parties. And when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance
intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community,
relief in some way should be obtainable. With these principles to guide us, we will
inquire into the status of the law touching and governing the question under
consideration.
The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his
wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the
contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the
enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not
permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection
in the parental home. A judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable either

as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a
judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the
sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and
the purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and
indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree
for separate support is not an impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is
regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling
a weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means of
preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any respect
whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of
a feme sole.
Where the wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal abode by her husband without fault
on her part, may maintain an action against the husband for separate maintenance when
she has no other remedy, notwithstanding the provisions of article 149 of the Civil Code
giving the person who is obliged to furnish support the option to satisfy it either by
paying a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the one having
the right to the same.

WONG WOO YIU VS. VIVO

FACTS:
The Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding petitioner to be legally
married to Perfecto Blas and admitting her into the country as a non-quota immigrant.
This decision was affirmed by the Board of Commissioners of which petitioner was duly
informed in a letter sent on the same date by the Secretary of the Board. However, the
same Board of Commissioners, but composed entirely of a new set of members, rendered
a new decision reversing that of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 and ordering
petitioner to be excluded from the country. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial
requesting an opportunity to clarify certain points taken in the decision, but the same was
denied for lack of merit. Whereupon, petitioner initiated the instant petition for
mandamus with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Manila which
incidentally was considered by it as a petition for certiorari.
Petitioner declared that she came to the Philippines in 1961 for the first time to join her
husband Perfecto Blas to whom she was married in Chingkang, China ;that they had
several children all of whom are not in the Philippines; that their marriage was celebrated
by one Chua Tio, a village leader; that on June 28, 1961 the Board of Special Inquiry No.
3 rendered a decision finding, among others, that petitioner is legally married to Perfecto
Blas, a Filipino Citizen, and admitted her into the country as a non-quota immigrant; that
this decision was affirmed by the Board of Commissioners of which petitioner was duly
notified by the Secretary of said Board in a letter dated July 12, 1961; that in a motu
proprio decision rendered by the Board of Commissioners composed of a new set of
members the latter found that petitioner's claim that she is the lawful wife of Perfecto
Blas was without basis in evidence as it was "bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife
relationship"; that said Board further held that, it appearing that in the entry proceedings
of Perfecto Blas had on January 23, 1947 he declared that he first visited China in 1935
and married petitioner in 1936, it could not possibly sustain her claim that she married
Perfecto Blas in 1929; that in an affidavit dated August 9, 1962 Perfecto Blas claimed
that he went to China in 1929, 1935 and 1941, although in his re-entry declaration he
admitted that he first went to China in 1935, then in 1937, then in 1939, and lastly in
1941; and that Perfecto Blas in the same affidavit likewise claimed that he first went to
China when he was merely four years old so that computed from his date of birth in 1908
it must have been in 1912.
In view of the discrepancies found in the statements made by petitioner and her alleged
husband Perfecto Blas in the several investigations conducted by the immigration
authorities concerning their alleged marriage before a village leader in China in 1929,
coupled with the fact that the only basis in support of petitioner's claim that she is the
lawful wife of Perfecto Blas is "a mass of oral and documentary evidence bereft of
substantial proof of husband-wife relationship," the Board of Commissioners motu
proprio reviewed the record concerning the admission of petitioner into the country
resulting in its finding that she was improperly admitted.

ISSUE:
Whether or not that the marriage is valid?
HELD:
There is no documentary evidence to support the alleged marriage of petitioner to
Perfecto Blas but the record is punctured with so many inconsistencies which cannot but
lead one to doubt their veracity concerning the pretended marriage in China in 1929. This
claim cannot also be entertained under our law on family relations. Thus, Article 15 of
our new Civil Code provides that laws relating to family rights or to the status of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad, and it is wellknown that in 1929 in order that a marriage celebrated in the Philippines may be valid it
must be solemnized either by a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court, a justice
of the peace, or a priest or minister of the gospel of any denomination duly registered in
the Philippine Library and Museum (Public Act 3412, Section 2). Even if we assume,
therefore, that the marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas before a village leader is valid
in China, the same is not one of those authorized in our country.
A marriage contracted outside of the Philippines which is valid under the law of the
country in which it was celebrated is also valid in the Philippines. But no validity can be
given to this contention because no proof was presented relative to the law of marriage in
China. Such being the case, we should apply the general rule that in the absence of proof
of the law of a foreign country it should be presumed that it is the same as our own. Since
our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the officers mentioned
therein, and a village leader is not one of them, it is clear that petitioner's marriage, even
if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.

ADONG VS. CHAONG SENG GEE

FACTS:
Cheong Boo, a native of China died in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands on August 5, 1919
and left property worth nearly P100,000 which is now being claimed by two parties - (1)
Cheong Seng Gee who alleged that he was a legitimate child by marriage contracted by
Cheong Boo with Tan Bit in China in 1985, and (2) Mora Adong who alleged that she had
been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands and had two
daughters with the deceased namely Payang and Rosalia. The conflicting claims to
Cheong Boos estate were ventilated in the lower court that ruled that Cheong Seng Gee
failed to sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage through a mere letter testifying that
Cheong Boo and Tan Bit married each other but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been
admitted to the Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the estate
as a natural child. With reference to the allegations of Mora Adong and her daughters, the
trial court reached the conclusion that the marriage between Adong and Cheong Boo had
been adequately proved but that under the laws of the Philippine Islands it could not be
held to be a lawful marriage and thus the daughter Payang and Rosalia would inherit as
natural children. The lower court believes that Mohammedan marriages are not valid
under the Philippine Islands laws this as an Imam as a solemnizing officer and under
Quaranic laws.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Chinese marriage between Cheong Boo and Tan Dit is valid ?
Whether or not the Mohammedan marriage between Cheong Boo and Mora Adong is
valid?
RULING:
The Supreme Court found the (1) Chinese marriage not proved and Chinaman Cheong
Seng Gee has only the rights of a natural child while (2) it found the Mohammedan
marriage to be proved and to be valid, thus giving to the widow Mora Adong and the
legitimate children Payang and Rosalia the rights accruing to them under the law.
(FOR STATCON) The Supreme Court held that marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a
civil contract but it is a new relation, an instruction in the maintenance of which the
public is deeply interested. The presumption as to marriage is that every intendment of
the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of counter-presumption or evidence special to
the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and
if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living
in the constant violation of decency of the law. As to retroactive force, marriage laws is in
the nature of a curative provision intended to safeguard society by legalizing prior
marriages. Public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard
acts intended to invalidate marriages. This as for public policy, the courts can properly
incline the scales of their decision in favor of that solution which will most effectively
promote the public policy. That is the true construction which will best carry legislative
intention into effect.

(FOR PERSONS) Sec. IV of the Marriage law provides that all marriages contracted
outside the islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same
were contracted, are valid in these islands. To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant
to this comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before the courts ofthe Islands the
existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the
alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. A Philippine marriage followed by 23
years of uninterrupted marital life, should not be impugned and discredited, after the
death of the husband through an alleged prior Chinese marriage, save upon proof so
clear, strong and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of such
impediment. A marriage alleged to have been contracted in China and proven mainly by
a so-called matrimonial letter held not to be valid in the Philippines.