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Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal

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Consilience and Rigour: Commentary by Andr Green

(Paris)
a

Andr Green
a

9 Avenue de L Observatoire, 75006 Paris, France, e-mail:

Published online: 09 Jan 2014.

To cite this article: Andr Green (1999) Consilience and Rigour: Commentary by Andr Green (Paris),
Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences, 1:1, 40-44, DOI:
10.1080/15294145.1999.10773243
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40

Andre Green

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Consilience and Rigour

Commentary by Andre Green (Paris)

A psychoanalyst, especially one who has advocated

exchanging views with neurobiologists, should rejoice
at reading a paper that recognizes the pertinence of
Freud's work in this field, that agrees on the centrality
of the pleasure-unpleasure principle, and accepts the
idea that affects are ingrained in unconscious processes. Moreover, it is a paper that adopts the fundamental distinctions between inner and outer perceptual
modalities, admits the usefulness of the idea of binding, and makes reference to id functions. It defends
the long-term influence of affectivity, and is open to
even some of Freud's most speculative views on the
relationship of affect to phylogenesis (though interpreted differently). Finally, the neurobiologist acknowledges Freud's courage in probing "into these darker
areas of the human psyche." But beyond these general
statements almost everything Freud wrote seems in
fact very doubtful in the light of neuroscience.
The psychoanalyst may also find some relief
when reading the criticisms that the neurobiologist addresses to his colleagues: They deliberately want to
underestimate the importance of affect, they are
caught in and proud of their ultrapositivistic ideology,
they are deaf to higher integrative issues, they consider
feelings as epiphenomenal flotsam, they are victims of
their own blinders, and finally they are ruled by some
unspoken prohibition on being interested in understanding the fundamental nature of affective experience. Having given such tokens of good will, Panksepp
expects his psychoanalytic partners in the dialogue to
make parallel criticisms in their own field. Isn't it interesting that his call for' 'consilience" finds its source
in E. O. Wilson, the same Wilson who is quoted (and
also criticized) for assuming that Freud's theory is
"mostly wrong"? In fact Panksepp, Wilson, Grtinbaum, like many others, have demanded that contemporary psychoanalysts test their own theories to fit
them with scientific evidence, even if they wouldn't
dream of making the same request to practitioners of
other human sciences. One can only be struck by the
fact, obvious in reading Panksepp's paper, that although scientists spend most of their time listing facts,
which obey the exigencies of scientific methodology,
Andre Green, M.D., is a Training and Supervising Psychoanalyst,
Paris Psychoanalytic Society.

when they come to theory, there is as much disagreement, controversy, and room for divergent interpretations, as between psychoanalysts. This is what
becomes apparent to me reading not only Panksepp
but also LeDoux and Damasio.
Psychoanalysts and neurobiologists differ in that
they use different methods to assemble facts, but when
they come to theories they cannot avoid disagreements
because the building of theories requires other qualities and skills than the gathering of data.
On the other hand I cannot agree that there is
one and only one method of collecting facts. To do so
would imply that facts submitted to investigations in
both fields were of the same level of complexity and
reducible to common factors. Panksepp's suggestion
of triangulating mammalian brain research, the study
of animal behavior, and the systematic analysis of human subjective experience as a "sufficiently robust
strategy to sustain a credible level of scientific progress" proposes a leveling down of knowledge about
affects. Why not the reverse? Starting from the human
subjective experience, and then seeing what can be
investigated via the two other points of view? And
how does robustness fit with falsifiability? The answer
is not very difficult to find. For many scientists, the
truth, all the truth, lies in the scientific methodology
regardless of the fact that reality is shaped by them
through the lenses of their epistemological machinery.
Almost everything else is abstraction in the worst
sense of the word.
Gerald Edelman (1992), considering the basic
hypotheses underlying the proposed theories about
consciousness from the point of view of biology, states
three assumptions: the physics assumption, the evolutionary assumption, and a third one, the qualia assumption. Panksepp also refers to qualia, but only in
the evolutionary perspective (equalia). For Edelman
qualia are experienced only by single individuals. In
spite of the fact that they are entirely subjective and
cannot be fully shared by an observer, and most of
the time are distorted in many ways, he considers that
we have to rely on them. "When for some reasons
qualia do affect interpretation, the experimental design
is modified to exclude such effects, the mind is removed from nature" (1992, p. 115). Is this a dead end
confining us to paralysis? Surely not. "But no scien-

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Commentary on Emotions: Neuro-Psychoanalytic Views

tiflc theory of whatever kind can be presented without
already assuming that observers have sensations as
well as perceptions.... As a basis for a theory of consciousness, it is sensible to assume that just as in ourselves qualia exist in other human beings whether they
are considered as scientific observers or as subjects.... We can then take human beings to be the
best canonical referent for the study of consciousness" (1992, p. 115). Edelman suggests that human
subjective reports, including qualia, actions, brain
structures, and functions can be correlated. But do
these correlations include lower mammals? Needless
to say this applies to affects even more. To conclude:
"The order of the experimental enterprise (what, according to the qualia assumption, must be based on
correlations obtained mainly on human subjects) must
therefore be exactly opposite to that of the theoretical
one, which must begin with the evolutionary precursors to humans" (Edelman, 1992, p. 116).
It is none of my business to apply these ideas
to scientists, but I feel comfortable enough about the
method of psychoanalysis, to not think in any way that
it is subordinate to the findings of experiments, which,
from a psychoanalytic point of view, are always secondary to what we learn from intersubjective relationships, because up until now no other method has
reached the same level of complexity. It is the result
of relying on observation in a setting involving two
human beings under more or less constant conditions
for a long period of time.
There are several ways to understand Freud's
texts, given that he has repeatedly asserted that the
phenomena he dealt with did' 'not belong to psychology alone; they have an organic and biological side
as well" (1940, p. 195).
However, we should recall here that he opposed
the idea of psychophysical parallelism. This conception rests on the idea that physical or somatic processes are concomitant with the psychical ones, and
that "we should necessarily have to recognize the
[physical ones] as more complete than the psychical
sequences, since some of them would have conscious
processes parallel to them but others would not"
(Freud, 1940, p. 157). On the contrary, Freud defends
the idea that psychoanalysis explains that the psychological processes concomitant to the somatic ones are
"what is truly psychical," disregarding the quality of
consciousness. Therefore we can see what problems
arise for neurobiology, when it tries to assess psychical
phenomena for which there are no equivalents in consciousness.

41

It is impossible to conceive how the findings of

neurobiology could be applied to psychic processes
that do not belong to consciousness, having in mind
the distinctions between what is unconscious and what
is not conscious. This is just to say that there are limits
to these endeavors. This should lead us to an important
conclusion: the idea of the independence of the two
disciplines and the impossibility of reducing anyone
of the two to the other.
This does not mean that no dialogue is possible.
But it should be based on the mutual communication
of information about data, conceptions, and models
born from different methodologies. It should be
strongly emphasized that such a mutual communication is no trifle. It involves mutual education about
the constraints of each method, the way in which the
practitioners of each have their minds molded by them,
and an awareness of the levels of complexity with
which each side is confronted. In the end the confrontation between different models of thinking, which
have to be put in perspective, would in itself be an
important achievement. But the hope for an integrated
knowledge has to be postponed for the time being.
There are many ways of using Freud's writings.
The first one, adopted by Solms and Nersessian, is to
recall the main lines of what he said, omitting for the
circumstances the many contradictions that we find in
them (all of which are testimonies of his difficulties
in discovering the appropriate answers to the questions he confronted). The result is sometimes an approximation of Freud's ideas. For instance Solms and
Nersessian say: "The mental apparatus as a whole
serves the biological purpose of meeting the imperative needs of the subject." There is a double confusion
here: The function of the apparatus-as Freud repeated constantly-is to keep the tensions arising in
it at the lowest possible level (principle of constancy)
or at a zero level (principle of inertia). The task of
meeting the imperative internal needs is that of the
ego. Solms and Nersessian also say that "the general
functioning of the apparatus is governed by a regulatory mechanism known as the pleasure principle." A
few lines below a quotation shows clearly that Freud
is only speaking here of the internal excitations of
pleasure-unpleasure "which prove to be almost the
only quality attaching to transposition of the energy
[in the] inside [of the] apparatus."
Another misrepresentation is to say that the
"qualitative aspect describes representational processes," which is Solms and Nersessian's idea, not
Freud's. Quality for Freud is always associated with
perception, either related to senses, or to feelings or

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42
to speech, and it necessarily belongs to the conscious
system. Unconscious representations are devoid of
any quality. Against this background, each time Solms
and Nersessian have an opportunity, they supplement
the text with references borrowed from neurobiology:
conscious registration of affects are related to the limbic corticoid tissue or modality specific and modality
nonspecific qualities to brain systems. This is a useless
distinction as modality specific refers to the sensory
system from which affect is separated. Solms and
Nersessian take all possible opportunities to "complete" Freud by neuroscience. Freud's distinction between quantitative and qualitative becomes
hypothetically in their translation neural activation
and neural connectivity. Likewise when Freud mentions the possible role of hypothetical hormones, they
turn to neuromodulators.
This attitude is consistent with the purpose of this
paper: "to clarify ... the anatomical and physiological correlates of the basic ideas and most general concepts of psychoanalysis." How can that be done?
Freud's text has its own consistency and it remains to
be proved that to stuff it with the material of neurobiology makes it better. One will observe that Panksepp
on his side does not hesitate to make statements about
drive theory, a basic and general idea for Freud. He
is probably encouraged by current views expressed in
contemporary analysis: "At present, the Freudian
drive concept obtains little value and in my estimation
should be put to rest." How can we match such advice
with Panksepp's enthusiastic usage of "id energies"?
Let us notice first that this expression is forged for the
circumstance (it is absent from the index of the Standard Edition). The id in Freudian theory is made up
of drives. So what is the explanation? The explanation
appears when Panksepp becomes more clear about his
assumption: "I believe the key issue in emotion research is the characterization of the instinctual id energies or in my preferred terminology, affect generating
'emotional command systems' that instigate and orchestrate the diverse aspects ofemotionality within the
brain" (emphasis added).
Otherwise drive refers to "various brain states
that arise directly from bodily need detectors" in
terms of generalized tension or arousal that accompanies all the various homeostatic imbalances. This leads
him to mention the actions of glutamate and GABA
and then DA, NE, 5HT, and histamine circuits. The
reference to the quest for satisfaction is lost here. Are
we really talking of the same theory?
It remains to be proved that Freud's and Panksepp's terminologies are compatible. The basic dis-

Andre Green
agreement follows in the exposition: For Panksepp the
drive concept is relegated to those' 'specific regulatory
motivational factors such as hunger, thirst, and thermoregulation where specific interoceptive detectors
have been identified in the medial strata of the diencephalon." Good will has limits. What is left of the
reference to sexuality and destructiveness? Panksepp
equates drives with purely self-preservative functions:
half of the first theory of drives, the other half being
sexuality which is omitted here. Is this the way to
answer Solms and Nersessian's question: "Does the
neuroscientific evidence suggest that affect and drive
are intimately related?"
Panksepp shows us another way of using Freud's
text. Beyond some general laudatory comments, when
examining in detail the findings of neurobiology as
granted by "causal evidence," he rejects in fact almost the whole of psychoanalytic theory. We have
already shown the ambiguity of his adoption of id
energies. After he has agreed to the pertinence of the
pleasure-unpleasure principle he questions his former
agreement; "we now have evidence for more distinct
systems in the brain than those that simply subserve
positive and negative valence; or pleasure and unpleasure. ' ,
Speaking of terminologies, the vocabulary of
neurobiologists who are supposed to be opposed to
metaphors is full of problematic expressions. What is
it to say of emotional dynamics that they "transpire"
within neural tissues? What are neurodynamic "resonances"? What are biological "values"? (A recent
term which has proved indispensable after many reductionistic attempts on the part of behavioral neurobiologists.) It compels us to understand that we need
to refer not only to localization but also to a characterization of a group of functions which includes (apart
from hunger, thirst, and thermoregulation) sexual and
consumatory behavior connected to the endocrine and
autonomic systems. "These systems evolved early to
take care of bodily functions; they are systems of the
interior" (Edelman, 1992, p. 117). We then understand the relatively closed system of affects at its basis. Is the expression "emotional and motivational
values could percolate through the neuroaxis" a simple statement or a metaphor?
In fact if such values can be hypothesized, it is
only through what Edelman calls a secondary repertoire referring to experience which intervenes without
modification of anatomical structure but is necessary
to grasp what these values refer to. The importance of
this theorization is that it opposes the cerebral trunk
(limbic system and hippocampus) as pertaining to the

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Commentary on Emotions: Neuro-Psychoanalytic Views

self to the nonself system based on thalamocortical circuits.
What does a neurobiologist mean when he speaks
of affects as an internally "generated" process? Is
he describing the neurobiological correspondent of a
psychic state or does he mean that the cause of the
affect rises spontaneously in the inner body (and if so,
under what influence)? And how do excitatory amino
acids construct "the skeletal form of every thought
and emotion"?
Are there no points of agreement at all with Panksepp? Just a few. The idea that affects are internal
processes, the opposition of free and bound energy
(though interpreted here in relation to its application
to neurobiology), the opposition between id and ego
(which refers in Panksepp' s translation to subcortical
and cortical tissues). Beyond this, all the rest should
be evaluated empirically without even questioning the
possibility of doing so. But even on the points of
agreement ambiguities remain. Is there anything in
Freud which supports the idea that unconscious processes could belong to subcortical layers? I am certain
that nothing of the kind could be sustained. Therefore,
is there any room for unconscious processes which
would not be part of the id system?
Let us turn now to Panksepp's original contributions. He emphasizes the role of subcortical structures
which he believes have undergone little change in evolution, differentiating them from higher (more recent)
structures. Isn't there a contradiction thus to recognize
the importance of evolution and then to say that: "we
have the opportunity to validate many of these findings
and conclusions derived from animal behavioral brain
research with subjective reports derived from human
research"? What about the situation where the latter
have no equivalents to the former? Another finding is
the characterization of SEEKING systems and those
that elaborate PLAY. Given the importance of play in
certain psychoanalytic theories (Winnicott), it is interesting to see it mentioned in this context. But can play
be reduced to its adaptational value without referring
to its relation to pleasure?
Certainly the boldest hypothesis of Panksepp is
the idea of a virtual body. First because of its localization in the periaqueductal gray (PAG) which is widely
connected with sensory cortices. The self is here defined by its capacity to interrelate external stimuli and
internal values with stable motor representations of
the body. Again we ask ourselves in what way such
a SELF can characterize even the most basic and elementary foundation of the human self. Isn't it only a
way of connecting it with its mammalian ancestors?

43

But what about "virtuality," which brings some sophistication into the picture? Virtuality is also invoked
by D. Stern (quoting S. Langer) on affects (1985). I
shall not miss the opportunity to recall here a quotation dating from 1900. "We can avoid any possible
abuse of this method of representation by recollecting
that ideas, thoughts and psychical structures in general
must never be regarded as localized in organic elements of the nervous system, but rather, as one might
say, between them.... Everything that can be an object of our internal perception is virtual' , (Freud,
1900, p. 611). This is extracted from Freud's The Interpretation of Dreams. To come back to Panksepp,
to defend the idea of the PAG/SELF system is a leap
into speculation which is exactly of the type of abstraction for which he demands rigorous empirical
evaluation." Isn't Panksepp's theoretical development
about consciousness moving in the same direction that
was followed in the fifties in the work of Moruzzi
and Magoun (1969) on the reticular formation? His
constant line of thinking is to emphasize the role of
the lower brain organizations (PAG), which are more
important to him that the higher ones (amygdala, hippocampus, and the rest).
On one point I agree with Panksepp: when he
emphasizes the long-term effects and modulatory influences of affects. I also agree with his insistence
on the motor organization of the brain. He might be
surprised to read here that this is probably the closest
assessment of what Freud meant by the cardinal role
he attributed to the drives (which, as he stated, are
always active).
Drives are internalized patterns of unsuccessful
attempts at motor discharge. Therefore I see no objection to relating brain organization to motor patterns
more than to sensory ones. On the other hand, my
disagreement is almost total with Panksepp's inroads
in the fields of therapy. To consider that the efficiency
of psychoanalysis is based on domination/submission
relationship is no more than saying that it rests on
suggestion, an old argument of the opponents of psychoanalysis. If psychosurgery was so wonderful, why
has it been abandoned?
Are psychiatrists so happy with their psychopharmaceutical results? One should notice that we
have used antidepressant drugs for a little less than
40 years without any progress in the understanding
of depressive affects. Finally, there is one statement
of Panksepp with which I strongly agree: the left
hemisphere, expert at emotional repression, is "a
master of confabulation and deception in its ap-

Joseph LeDoux

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44

pointed role of verbally communicating with others."

Where does that stop?
I shall now end by saying a few words on the
way I think Freud should be read. Freud has no special
right to be considered as telling the truth more than
his followers who may disagree with him. But in my
opinion, Freud has considerable theoretical consistency, stronger than any other, even if this is now put
to question. What I recommend is to study his wor k
by trying to grasp this internal consistency more than
by considering the isolated facts to which he drew
attention. This to me is true rigor, instead of hastily
trying to find impossible compromises between incompatible methods. For instance, affects in his work are
mainly considered first in relationship with representations and then in connection with instinctual impulses and the unconscious ego. As far as I know, only
Damasio seems to bother about the relationship of affects to representation.
What psychoanalysts expect from their dialogue
with neurobiologists is not an accumulation of references related to localization circuits or the effect of
chemical substances, but help in understanding the
general patterns of brain functioning. Not that it will

change so much their ways of working (i.e., analyzing)

but it may broaden their views and satisfy their curiosity, if they have any, on the topic that will always
remain of interest to them: the brain-mind problem.

References
Edelman, G. (1992), Bright Air, Brilliant Fire. New York:
Basic Books.
Freud, S. (1900), The Interpretation of Dreams. Standard
Edition, 5. London: Hogarth Press, 1953.
- - - (1940), An Outline of Psycho-Analysis. Standard
Edition, 23:139-207. London: Hogarth Press, 1964.
Moruzzi, G., & Magoun, H. (1969), Brain stem reticular
formation and activation of the EEG. Electroenceph.
Clin. Neurophysiol., 106:371-392.
Stern, D. (1985), The Interpersonal World of the Human
Infant. New York: Basic Books.
Andre Green
9 Avenue de L'Observatoire
75006 Paris
France
e-mail: andregreen@compuserve.com

Psychoanalytic Theory: Clues from the Brain

Commentary by Joseph LeDoux (New York)

Introduction
Psychoanalytic theory has influenced contemporary
Western culture in innumerable ways. Although I have
never actually tested aspects of psychoanalytic theory
in my research on emotions and the brain, "psychoanalytic-like" concepts (such as the unconscious, affect,
and emotional memory) have been key to the way I
have interpreted my research findings over the years
(LeDoux, 1996). I refer to these as "psychoanalyticlike" because I don't have a deep understanding of
psychoanalytic theory and have borrowed the concepts
more from popular culture (films, novels, and just
plain common knowledge) than from Freud's writings.
Acknowledgments: Supported by PHS Grants, MH46516, MH38773,
and MH00956, and by a grant from the W.M. Keck Foundation to
NYU.
Joseph LeDoux, Ph.D., is Professor, Center for Neural Science, New
York University.

From time to time, I've looked through books by Freud

for research inspiration, but I never found my experimental muse there. Lacking the training and context
in which to really understand Freud, I don't think I
ever got beyond the surface notions that most college
educated people are familiar with. Consequently, the
article by Solms and Nersessian has done me, and
perhaps other neuroscientists, a great service. Although I have still not found experimental inspiration
in psychoanalytic theory, I feel that I now understand
the theory of affect a little and am grateful for their
translation of the theory in terms that are intelligible
to those of us who are not trained in the area. Below,
I am going to comment on several points made by
Solms and Nersessian in order to do my own translation of some of their notions in terms related to modern work on the brain mechanisms of emotion and
cognition. I'll also comment briefly on Panksepp's
discussion of their paper.