A Sullivan,

Memorial University of Newfoundland,

St Johns NL, Canada
_ 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Sense and Reference: Philosophical Aspects

The Origins and Central Core of the Sense/Reference Distinction
In his earliest works (e.g., Frege [1879]), Frege espoused a referentialist approach to language,
according to which the meaning of an expression is whatever it is to which the expression
refers. The referentialist picture is simple and compelling: singular terms suchas Nancy mean
objects, general terms such as doctor mean sets or properties, and the meaning of a sentence
such as Nancy is a doctor is the fact or state of affairs that the sentence is about.
Informative identity statements i.e., true but nontrivial statements of the form a b
shattered this picture for Frege. His classic example is (1) Hesperus is Phosphorus.
According to the lore, the Evening Star (the brightest heavenly body visible in the evening at
certain times of the year) was baptized Hesperus, whereas the Morning Star (the brightest
body in the dawn sky at certain times) was baptized Phosphorus. With the growth of
astronomical knowledge, it turns out that Hesperus is Phosphorus, and what is more it is not a
star at all but the planet Venus. The problem is to account for the difference between the
meanings of (1) and (2) Hesperus is Hesperus.
As (1) and (2) are constructed from co-referential parts, the referentialist approach seems to be
committed to the view that they say exactly the same thing. However, according to Frege, there
are substantive differences here: a a and a b are obviously statements of differing
cognitive value; a a holds a priori . . . while statements of the form a b often contain very
valuable extensions of our knowledge and cannot always be established a priori (1892: 175).
Because referentialism cannot account for this evident fact about meaning, it is untenable, and
a new view is wanted.
Freges problem, then, is this: insofar as the function of a term is just to single out its referent,
there is no way to distinguish the meanings of co-referential terms, and so no way to distinguish
the propositions expressed by sentences that differ only in the interchange of co-referential
terms. Freges solution is that the semantic contribution of a term encompasses more than just
its referent. Sense is the name for the dimension along which the semantic contributions of coreferential terms can differ. Every term is associated with a sense, and the sense specifies the
condition for being the terms referent. Co-referential expressions can have distinct senses, and
expressions need not have an actual concrete referent to have a sense.
The distinction between sense and reference is clearly illustrated in the case of a definite
description, such as the tallest woman in Mongolia or the architect who designed this building.
The sense is the identifying condition expressed by the term. It is that which must be grasped in
order to understand the expression, and it is accessible to any competent speaker, regardless of
whether they have been to Mongolia or seen this building. The referent is the individual that
satisfies the condition that the sense specifies. Frege (1892) characterizes the sense as the
mode of presentation of the referent. There are multiple ways of describing and conveying
information about one and the same referent; and to each of these ways corresponds a distinct
sense.
Freges distinction generalizes well beyond cases like (1) and (2) it is not limited to identity
statements, or to singular terms. For example, (3) and (4) might differ in meaning, and (5) and
(6) in truthvalue, despite differing only in the interchange of co-referential terms:
(3) Hesperus is visible in the evening.
(4) Phosphorus is visible in the evening.
(5) The ancient Babylonians believed that Hesperus is visible in the evening.
(6) The ancient Babylonians believed that Phosphorus is visible in the evening.
Some related points are illustrated by sentences such as:
(7) Pegasus does not exist.

Such negative existential statements with nondenoting names in the subject-position pose
problems for referentialism, as (7) is clearly meaningful despite the fact that its subjectexpression does not refer to any actual thing. Furthermore, the same points apply to general
terms. For example, to be a renate, one must have kidneys, whereas to be a cordate, one must
have a heart. All and only renates are cordates, so the terms are co-referential; nonetheless,
they clearly differ in meaning, and so are subject to the phenomena illustrated by (1)(6). There
are also non-denoting general terms the term phlogiston, for instance, was introduced to
name a substance given off in the process of fire. With the growth of knowledge, it turns out that
there is no such thing, and so (8) poses problems for referentialism similar to those posed by
(7):
(8) Phlogiston does not exist.
Frege concludes that, in general, the semantic contribution of an expression is not simply its
referent. Instead, every significant linguistic expression has associated with it a sense that
determines its referent. So, Freges distinction amounts to a fully general approach to language
that posits an intermediate layer of sense between words and referents.
More on Freges Distinction
Freges approach to the word-referent relation is a classic instance of what is called mediated
or indirect reference reference is indirect because there is a sense mediating the link
between a term and its referent. The characteristic virtue of the indirect reference approach is
that it affords a clear semantic distinction between co-referential expressions. The distinction
between sense and reference is a distinction between what we say and what we say it about.
The sense of an expression is its contribution to the content of the thought or proposition
expressed by uses of sentences in which it figures; the referent of an expression is its
contribution to the truth-value of this thought or proposition. To illustrate, when enjoying a work
of fiction, we are only engaged at the level of sense The thought [expressed by a sentence in
the Odyssey] remains the same whether Odysseus has a reference or not (1892: 180).
However, if we are interested in whether a thought is true, then we become engaged at the level
of reference. The question of truth would cause us to abandon aesthetic delight for an attitude
of scientific investigation. . . . It is the striving for truth that drives us always to advance from the
sense to the reference (1892: 180). At the limiting case of a complete sentence, Frege takes its
sense to be a thought or proposition, and its referent to be a truth-value (see Frege [1891, 1892]
for further explanation).
Freges individuates senses in terms of cognitive significance. Two statements differ in cognitive
significance if it is possible for a competent speaker to take contrastive attitudes toward them
(i.e., to believe that one is true while disbelieving, or withholding judgment concerning, the
second). According to Frege, pairs such as (1)(2) and (3)(4) differ in cognitive significance. If
two statements that differ only in the interchange of co-referential terms differ in cognitive
significance, this proves that the terms differ in sense. Consider again (3)(6). Even though (3)
and (4) differ in cognitive significance, they are nonetheless truth-conditionally equivalent,
because they are built from co-referential parts. How then can (5) and (6) differ in truth-value, if
truth-conditions are solely a matter of referents, not senses? Here Frege (1892) argues that in
certain contexts (such as inside the scope of A believes that . . .) the referent of an expression
is its customary sense. (5) and (6) assert relations between agents and thoughts, not between
agents and truth-values. They attribute distinct thoughts to the Babylonians, and thus can differ
in truth-value.
Sense is that which links belief, meaning, and rational action. One might, for instance, believe
that Hesperus is populated by an advanced and benevolent race and desire above all else to
visit them, but still turn down a free trip to Phosphorus and not be in the least bit irrational as
long as one does not believe that Hesperus is Phosphorus. Thus, senses are integral to the task
of explaining and predicting rational action. Relatedly, merely identifying the referents of the
expressions uttered is not sufficient for understanding what a speaker has said, on a Fregean
view. (For instance, if one says Hesperus is Phosphorus, to report or translate this utterance as
saying that Hesperus is Hesperus is clearly unsatisfactory, even though it preserves truthconditions.) To understand what has been expressed, one also needs to bear in mind the
speakers perspective on those referents.

Subsequent History, and Criticisms

Freges distinction between sense and reference has had enormous impact on the subsequent
development of the philosophy of language. Starting with Russell (1905), and continuing
through seminal work by Davidson (1967), Kripke (1972), Putnam (1975), and Kaplan (1977),
theorists begin their constructive projects by situating their theories in relation to Freges.
Furthermore, the influence of Freges distinction is far from exclusively negative. There is a rich
tradition, running through such influential theorists as Carnap (1947), Church (1951), and
Montague (1974), which follows Freges indirect reference approach in assigning two such
semantic entities to every significant linguistic expression. Down this path, Freges distinction
had a direct influence on the development of more or less every single branch of intensional
logic and semantics.
More generally, Freges distinction is now pervasive throughout philosophy, a part of the canon.
Whether the topic be ontology, minds, or morals, in any case in which it is important to bear in
mind subtle distinctions between conceptual conditions and that which satisfies those
conditions, one is likely to encounter the sense/reference distinction. (This is clearly illustrated in
recent philosophy of mind, in which finessing the distinction between the sense and the
reference of psychological [qualitative, phenomenal] terms is interestingly, and tellingly a
core part of the arguments of both dualists [cf. Chalmers (1996)] and the physicalists who
oppose them [cf. Papineau (2002)].)
There are, however, many critical questions raised by Freges distinction between sense and
reference. For one thing, positing senses gives rise to difficult metaphysical questions, such as:
What, exactly, are senses? Frege (1892, 1918) gives arguments about what senses are not
because co-referential expressions can differ in sense, senses are not of the physical realm;
since distinct mental states can have exactly the same sense, senses are not private mental
entities. However, as for what senses are, exactly, Frege (1918) just offers a vague metaphor:
senses exist in some third realm, distinct from the physical and mental realms. Understandably,
many find this third realm talk to be beyond belief. At best, it is in need of significant
clarification.
Some of the most influential objections to Freges distinction were raised in the 1970s led by
Donnellan (1970), Kripke (1972), Putnam (1975), and Kaplan (1977). One way to put their basic
thrust is this: two central constraints on senses are that they be answerable to concerns of
cognitive significance and that they be objective; however, there is something subjective, or
speaker-relative, about cognitive significance. (For example, two competent speakers could
disagree as to whether it is significant or trivial to be told that Homer is the author of the
Odyssey; and it is not evident that there are any objective grounds that would conclusively
resolve such a dispute.) Thus, these two constraints pull in opposite directions, and it is not
clear that any one thing can satisfy them both. More generally, the aforementioned articles give
reasons to be skeptical as to whether expressions have one determinate objective sense, and,
even if so, reasons to be skeptical as to whether this sense determines reference.
Led by Dummett (1981), Evans (1982), and McDowell (1986), neo-Fregeans have sought to
defend refined interpretations of Freges doctrines from some of these objections. (One of the
core ideas is that many criticisms of Freges views can be met if senses are conceived as
object-dependent and so rigid, in Kripkes [1972] terminology.) In the other direction, original
criticisms of Freges approach continue to surface. (For an important example, see Schiffers
[1992] argument that nothing can satisfy the demands that Frege places on the notion of
sense) In any case, it is evident that Freges problem does pose a challenge to many views of
meaning and reference, and that there is some aspect of meaning, distinct from reference, that
is essential to understanding rational thought and intentional action. Exactly what Freges
problem shows, or exactly how to characterize the latter aspect of meaning,
though, are complex matters that remain controversial.
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