177. Haw Tay vs.

Singayao
Facts: In a sworn Administrative Complaint filed with this Court on 4 April 1986, Mr.
Juanito L. Haw Tay charged Judge Eduardo Singayao of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14, Cotabato City, with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(Republic Act No. 3019, as amended) and with gross ignorance of the law.
The respondent Judge filed his Answer, denying the allegations of the complaint and
claiming instead that complainant had subjected him to systematic harassment. By a
Resolution dated 20 January 1987, this Court referred this matter to Associate
Justice Eduardo R. Bengzon of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and
recommendations, and at the same time, suspended respondent Judge from office
pending the investigation and until further orders from the Court.
Issues: Whether or not respondent judge is liable.
Held: Yes. The acts of respondent Judge in demanding and receiving money from a
party-litigant before his court constitute serious misconduct in office. This Court
condemns in the strongest possible terms the misconduct of respondent Judge. It is
this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct on the part of those who are charged with
the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice that so quickly and
surely corrodes the respect for law and the courts without which government cannot
continue and that tears apart the very bonds of our polity. The respondent's
ignorance of the requirements of the Rules of Court and of elementary rules of
Commercial Law, is equally conspicuous. Respondent Judge combines in himself the
twin evils of corruption and ignorance of the law and thus constitutes a deseased
member which must be decisively severed from the body of the judiciary and cast
aside.
178. Lecaroz v. Garcia
Facts: Without going through the propriety of making representations with the office
of the Mayor and/or office of the Municipal Treasurer in order that the donated
equipments (sic) can be issued for the use of his office, Judge Garcia took it upon
himself to accept delivery of the equipments (sic) from Atty. Teodulo Gabor, Jr., a
Marcopper lawyer, and placed said equipments (sic) inside his office where they are
situated up to the present.
Issue: Whether respondent judge violated the code of judicial conduct.
Held: Yes. The act of respondent Judge discloses a deficiency in the prudence,
discretion and judgment that a member of the judiciary must exercise in the
performance of his functions, if the bench is to command the respect due thereto. In
his effort to furnish and equip well his office, respondent Judge should not lose sight
of the proper judicial norm.
179. Balagot vs. Opinion
Facts: In a sworn letter complaint dated July 13, 1990, Ruben Balagot complained
against respondent Municipal Judge Emilio Opinion due to alleged frequent

postponements of the trial of Criminal Case No. 1138-85 which resulted in the
termination of the said case in July, 1986 and the rendition of judgment thereon only
on February 1, 1990.
Issue: Whether the respondent judge violated the code of judical conduct.
Held: Yes. Neither can his designation as Acting Judge of Branch 55 relieve him of his
duty to decide the case within the reglementary period considering that he was
designated only in May, 1987 or seven months after the due date of the decision on
October 21, 1986. The period within which to decide a case should be reckoned from
the date a case was submitted for decision. A delay in the transcription of
stenographic notes cannot be considered a valid reason for the delay in rendering
judgment in a case. Precisely, judges are directed to take down notes of salient
portions of the hearing and proceed in the preparation of decisions without waiting for
the transcript of stenographic notes. Furthermore, we have already ruled that with or
without the transcribed stenographic notes, the 90-day period for deciding cases
should be adhered to." Respondent Judge is found guilty of neglect of duty for
deciding the aforesaid criminal case beyond the ninety-day period as required by the
Constitution and Section 5, R.A. 296.
180. Araza v. Reyes
Facts: This administrative case arose from a letter-complaint dated July 2, 1997 filed
by Wilfredo F. Araza charging sheriffs Marlon M. Garcia and Nicolas A. Tonga with
grave misconduct, violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act, gross
ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty, grave abuse of authority, oppression,
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, gross inefficiency and
incompetence, relative to the implementation of the writ of execution in Civil Case
No. 4256 of the Municipal Trial Court, Legaspi City, entitled "Salvacion B. Araza and
Wilfredo F. Araza, plaintiffs, vs. Lilia S. Agu, defendant" for a sum of money.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is liable.
Held: District Judge Segundo M. Zosa, who investigated the case,
recommended the exoneration of respondent Judge in Charge I,
Specifications 1, 2, and 3, as well as in Charges II and III, but
recommended that respondent be reprimanded for his laxity in granting
postponements in Civil Case No. 318 which resulted in the undue delay in
the termination of said case. Manifestly, the peculiar nature of this action
of forcible entry or unlawful detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules is to
provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to
possession of property. Its purpose, regardless of the actual condition of
the title to the property, is that the party in peaceable and quiet
possession should not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. In
affording this remedy, the object of the law is to prevent breaches of the
peace and criminal disorder which would otherwise ensue if such remedy
is withdrawn because then, those who believe themselves entitled to the
possession of property would resort to force to regain its possession.
181. In re: Paulin

Facts: The Deputy Court Administrator called the Courts attention to the
decision of Honorable Judge Jose C. Paulin of the Court of First Instance of
Surigao del Norte, imposing the penalty of three (3) months and twentyeight (28) days as minimum to six (6) months as maximum, instead of
four months and one day to one year, to Primitivo Betona, convicted of
serious physical injuries punishable under article 263 (4) of the Revised
Penal Code by arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum
with a range of four months and one day to two years and four months.
The Supreme Court finding Judge Paulins knowledge of the duration and
graduation of penalties and the application of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law deficient, censured or reprimanded him.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge should be disciplined.
Held: In his explanation as to why he imposed that sentence, Judge Paulin
erroneously stated that the penalty provided by article 263(4) is arresto
mayor to prision correccional minimum with a range of "six months as
minimum to two years and four months as maximum", an error which he
repeats in his first indorsement of September 29, 1980.
182. Soriano vs. Mabbayad
Facts: Complainant Felizardo Soriano of Roxas, Isabela, in a letter dated December
20, 1970 to District Judge Guillermo Romero of Isabela, charged respondent
municipal judge Alfredo C. Mabbayad of Roxas with "grave abuse of discretion
and/or gross incompetence and inefficiency amounting to ignorance of the law." The
complainant is the brother of the deceased Pablo Soriano who was killed on or about
May 5, 1970. From the records, one Melencio Aban alias Inciong was charged with
murder for the death of Pablo Soriano in Criminal Case No. 1072 filed on May 5,
1970 with the municipal court of Roxas, Isabela.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is grossly ignorant of the law.
Held: The court ruled that a judge who resolved a motion to dismiss a criminal case
only after 18 months and who failed to file the same and serve a copy thereof on the
prosecution, or who repeatedly without reason absented himself from his station, is
unfit to continue in office for thereby he "disregards deliberately or is ignorant of the
basic fundamentals of law and justice.
183. Monsanta vs. Palarca
Facts: Upon going over the evidence presented by the Complainant and the
Respondent, the matter hinges on Surban and Lacida cases. In the Surban
case, Cornelio Surban was convicted to an imprisonment of one month
and one day and served 28 days imprisonment. In fact, this was the basis
for Cornelio Surban filing an action for damages in Court Civil Case No.
V-243 against Judge Pompeyo Palarca which was dismissed by this Court
for lack of cause of action and which dismissal was appealed to the Court
of Appeals by the complainant, Atty. Monsanto, counsel for Cornelio
Surban.

In the case of Franco Lacida, he filed his bail bond after a warrant of
arrest was issued against him and the second stage of preliminary
investigation having been waived by him, the case was remanded to
Branch V and later on was dismissed upon motion of the Prosecution as
the records will show.
The other grounds relied upon by the complainant need not be touched by
the undersigned considering that the matter seem trivial and which
redress to the Executive Judge, Judge Nathaniel Grospe, for the authority
to examine records was granted and the other with respect to the incident
between complainant and City Fiscal Jurado during the proceedings before
the Respondent.
Suffice it to say, no sufficient and/or satisfactory evidence have been
adduced by the complainant on the grounds relied upon, supra. The
undersigned is aware that the City Court of Iligan City is a very congested
Court with only one Judge Presiding and trying cases to the tune of from
three to four thousand cases to date. It was only lately that the Court
have been extended the much needed relief by the assignment of two
Municipal Judges to try cases in the City Court by the Honorable Supreme
Court. Judge Palarca, the respondent, have been in the service for more
than 25 years as City Judge of Iligan City and have previously served as
Assistant City Fiscal in Davao City.
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned hereby recommend the
exoneration of the respondent, Judge Pompeyo Palarca, of the
administrative charges filed against him by the complainant, Atty. Stephen
Monsanto."cralaw virtua1aw library
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is liable.
Held: Yes. Respondent Judges attempt to defend himself on the ground
that he was not aware of Republic Act 5465; that he had not memorized
the Revised Penal Code; that the accused in the more than thirty (30)
cases cited by complainant had already served their corresponding
sentences; that said accused were duly represented by counsel; that the
accused and their counsel should have appealed the erroneous decisions
or could have filed habeas corpus proceedings but did not do so, are, to
say the least, irresponsible, unsatisfactory and ridiculous. Given the above
poor and puerile protestation, it confounds this Court to note and
understand how respondent Judge could have served twenty-four (24)
years as City Judge of Iligan City and preside over the lives and liberties,
the fortunes and properties of party litigants coming to his court.
184. Anguluan vs. Taguba
Facts: In a joint affidavit subscribed and sworn to at Tuguegarao. Cagayan on
September 10, 1976, Hermogenes Anguluan and Angel Anguluan charged the
respondent Municipal Judge Henry C. Taguba of Rizal, Cagayan with (1) conniving
with Mayor Venture Baloran of Rizal, Cagayan in the filing of "an imaginary,
fabricated, baseless and unfounded criminal case of Qualified Trespass" against the
complainant Hermogenes Anguluan and other persons as a consequence of which

the persons charged were imprisoned for three (3) days at the municipal jail of Rizal
on August 3, 4 and 5, 1976, and (2) advising the complainants and Aleco Anguluan,
Diosdado Gundan and Jose de la Cruz, to sign an affidavit in the presence of Mayor
Baloran on August 12, 1976 without allowing them to read the affidavit wherein the
affiants admitted having entered upon "the area presently occupied and belonging to
VENTURA B. BALORAN, a resident of Barrio Cambabangan, Rizal, Cagayan."
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge violated the code of judicial conduct.
Held: Yes. The respondent judge was either ignorant of his duty or he was impelled
by an ulterior motive. And finally, the respondent judge admitted that he did not
explain the affidavit to the affiants before he administered the oath. His excuse that
he could not read without his eyeglasses asinine to say the least. Although the
complainants have asked for the withdrawal of this complaint, the Court cannot
overlook the anomalous acts of the respondent judge. The actuations of the
respondent judge seriously affected the public interest inasmuch as they involve the
administration of justice. It is for this reason that the motion to withdraw the complaint
filed by the complainants will not justify the dismissal of this administrative case
against the respondent. As stated by the Supreme Court in Vasquez versus Malvar.
Furthermore, to condition administrative actions upon the will of every complainant,
who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act, is to strip this Court of
its supervisory power to discipline erring members of the Judiciary."
Under the established facts and circumstances, the respondent judge should be
imposed a penalty of suspension from office without pay for three months.
185. Esplayos vs. Lee
Facts: In a verified letter-complaint dated March 7, 1977, complainant Artemio
Espayos charged Honorable Adelardo Lee, then municipal judge of Magallanes,
Sorsogon for (1) conduct unbecoming a judge. and (2) partiality in the administration
of justice, alleging that on January 17, 1977 one Prodencio Pareja threw a piece of
stone at the said complainant hitting him at the right side of his nose and as a
consequence thereof the station commander of the Magallanes police department
filed with the Municipal Court of Magallanes, a criminal complaint for less serious
physical injuries, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2044; that the complainant brought
the complaint to the respondent judge's house, where he has an office as a municipal
judge, for his signature; that he informed the judge that his injury is more serious than
it appears and demonstrating to him by smoking and blowing out the smoke through
his nose with the result that smoke came only through his right nose indicating that
his left nose was closed.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent should be disciplined.
Held: Yes. It was improper and unethical to suggest to Pareja what he should do at
the arraignment. That impropriety generated the suspicion that the respondent was in
collusion with the accused. It is the sort of misbehavior which would be resented by
the offended party and would make him surmise that the sentence meted to the
accused was fixed or is what is known in the vernacular as lutong macao. "A judge's
official conduct should be free from impropriety and the appearance of impropriety."
186. Lapena vs. Marcos

Facts: Complainant Estanislao G. Lapena, Jr. charges Judge Martonino R. Marcos of

the Municipal Circuit Court of Gerona and Ramos, Tarlac, and Atty. Crisostomo T.
Roque, Clerk of Court, CAR, Malolos, Bulacan, with dishonesty, breach of trust and
gross misconduct, and prays for their dismissal from the service as public officials of
the government and disbarment as attorneys. It appears from the records that
complainant Estanislao Lapena, Jr. and respondent Judge Martonino Marcos and
Clerk of Court Crisostomo Roque were all former members of the Board of Directors
of Tarlac Electric Cooperative, Inc. TARELCO Complainant was the General Manager
and ex-oficio member of the Board of Directors in 1977. He was dismissed from the
service of TARELCO on July 18, 1978. Respondent Judge, on the other hand, was
one of the incorporators when the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws were duly
registered with the Office of the National Electrification Administration on January 24,
1975 and was also elected Secretary. On May 29, 1976, he was elected President of
the Board and on July 1, 1977, he was re-elected member thereof for another year
ending July 1, 1978. The other respondent, Atty. Crisostomo Roque, became a
member of the Board of Directors on July 2, 1977.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge should be disciplined.
Held: Yes. The demands of public service also justify that the authority of the
municipal judge acting as notary public ex oficioshould not be limited to notarizing
documents connected only with the exercise of their official duties. They should be
allowed to act and perform any service within the competency of a notary public. In
our rural areas and communities, there are few regular notaries and they do not keep
regular office hours. It would be more convenient and less expensive for the public,
especially the common people, to have ready access to the municipal judge at his
official station instead of travelling to the provincial capital or to the big towns where
most lawyers practice as regular notaries. The Notarial Law as contained in the
Revised Administrative Code, Sections 231 to 252 and Sections 2632-2633 and the
Rules of Court, Rule 141, Sections 6(h) and 9, require that "(o)fficers acting as
notaries public ex oficio shall charge for their services the fees prescribed by law and
account therefor as for Government funds."
187. Abadilla vs. Tabiliran Jr.
Facts: In her verified complaint, complainant Abadilla, in respect to the charge of
gross immorality on the part of the respondent, contends that respondent had
scandalously and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Q. Baybayan during the
existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Adding ignominy to an
ignominious situation, respondent allegedly shamefacedly contracted marriage with
the said Priscilla Baybayan on May 23, 1986. Complainant claims that this was a
bigamous union because of the fact that the respondent was then still very much
married to Teresita Banzuela. Furthermore, respondent falsely represented himself
as "single" in the marriage contract (Exh. "A") and dispensed with the requirements
of a marriage contract by invoking cohabitation with Baybayan for five years. Of
persuasive effect on the charge of immorality is the fact that, earlier, respondent's
wife filed a complaint in the case entitled, Teresita B. Tabiliran vs. Atty. Jose C.
Tabiliran, Jr., 115 SCRA 451. Respondent stood charged therein for abandoning the
family home and living with a certain Leonora Pillarion with whom he had a son. In
respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims that respondent
caused to be registered as "legitimate".
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge violated the code of judicial ethics.

Held: Yes. By committing the immorality in question, respondent violated the trust
reposed on his high office and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals and strict
standards of morality required of the law profession. (Respondent's failure to properly
account and turn over the fees collected by him as Ex-Officio notary to the municipal
government as required by law raises the presumption that he had put such fund to
his personal use. With respect to the charge that respondent prepared an Affidavit of
Desistance in a rape case filed before his sala for which he collected the amount of
P500.00 from the complainant therein, respondent merely denied the said imputation
but failed to offer any evidence to support such denial. Denial, if unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence which
deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v.
Amaguin, 229 SCRA 166). It is unfortunate that respondent had failed to adhere to,
and let this remind him once again of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit:
Canon 2 A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities.