This article was downloaded by: [Adelphi University]

On: 19 August 2014, At: 23:59

Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer
House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal

for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rnpa20

Freudian Science of Consciousness: Then and Now:

Commentary by David Livingstone Smith (Biddeford,
ME)
David Livingstone Smith

University of New England, Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Eleven Hills
Beach Road, Biddeford, ME 04005, e-mail:
Published online: 09 Jan 2014.

To cite this article: David Livingstone Smith (2000) Freudian Science of Consciousness: Then and Now: Commentary by
David Livingstone Smith (Biddeford, ME), Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and the
Neurosciences, 2:1, 38-45, DOI: 10.1080/15294145.2000.10773281
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2000.10773281

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the Content) contained
in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no
representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of
the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,
and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied
upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall
not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other
liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or
arising out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic
reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any
form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://
www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

David Livingstone Smith

38

Downloaded by [Adelphi University] at 23:59 19 August 2014

Freudian Science of Consciousness: Then and Now:

Commentary by David Livingstone Smith (Biddeford, ME)

On October 20, 1909, Surgeon Major-General Edwin

Hollerung, a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic
Society, gave a presentation to the Society on the neurophysiological basis of mind. In his response, Freud
said that he appreciated and admired Hollerung for
"wor king on problems that may be on the agenda a
century after us" (Nunberg and Federn, 1962, p. 280).
Nearly a century has now elapsed since Hollerung's
presentation, and Freud has been proven right: the
problem of the neurophysiology of mind is now
squarely on the scientific agenda. It was Freud's cherished hope that his psychological research would one
day be placed on a sound neuroscientific footing.
Francis Crick and Christof Koch have now
pointed out that Sigmund Freud was one of the first
neuroscientific investigators to postulate the existence
of consciousness-specific neurones, a hypothesis that
enjoys their scientific support. Freud's notion of a consciousness module is only one of several fundamental
points of contact between his theory of consciousness
and the theory proposed by Crick and Koch (and Ray
Jackendoff, whose ideas they endorse in large measure). In the present paper I will enlarge upon these
aspects of Freud's work, making reference to relevant
contemporary contributions to cognitive science
where this is germane, and I will go on to specify
some of the mechanical properties that Freud tentatively attributed to the consciousness-generating neurones and the information impinging upon them. I will
confine myself to the model presented in Freud's
"Project for a Scientific Psychology" (1895) and will,
for the purpose of this discussion, ignore later theoretical innovations (e.g., the revisions represented in
Freud's letter to Fleiss of January 1, 1896).

Freud's Neuropsychology in Context

In the closing decades of the nineteenth century the
philosopher Franz Brentano argued that the property
of intentionality is the distinguishing mark of the menDavid Livingstone Smith, Ph.D., is Visiting Professor in the Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences at the University of New England
and is a practicing psychotherapist.
Acknowledgements. I would like to thank Benjamin Yuri Smith,
Chandler Rose, and Dr. Mark Solms for their helpful suggestions.

tal. Brentano used intentionality in a technical philosophical sense, different from ordinary usage when we
say that we intend to do something. An intentional
state is a content-bearing or representational state: intentional states are about something. Like most philosophers of his day, Brentano did not believe that mental
states could be unconscious. He thus held that all intentional states are conscious.
Although Brentano was well aware of the existence of apparently unconscious mental states, he denied that these states were truly mental. He believed
that they were merely neurophysiological, without any
mental characteristics. These neurophysiological
states were regarded as nothing more than dispositions
for truly mental (conscious) states. This dispositionalist theory was widely held by late nineteenth-century
psychologists, psychiatrists, and neuroscientists. Gustav Fechner, creator of the science of psychophysics,
summed up the dispositionalist position as follows:
"Sensations, ideas, have, of course, ceased actually to
exist in the state of unconsciousness, insofar as we
consider them apart from their substructure. Nevertheless something persists within us, i.e., the psychophysical activity of which they are a function, and which
makes possible the reappearance of sensation, etc."
(Fechner, cited in Brentano, 1874, p. 104).
Freud studied philosophy with Brentano at the
University of Vienna. Later, as an aphasiologist, he
came under the influence of the British neuroscientist
John Hughlings Jackson, who was also a dispositionalist. Freud's monograph On Aphasia (1891) proposed
a dispositionalist theory of unconscious mental events.
In a discussion of the neurophysiological modifications presumed to correlate with latent memories,
Freud remarked that: "It is highly doubtful whether
there is anything psychical that corresponds to this
modification either. Our consciousness shows nothing
of a sort to justify, from the psychical point of view,
the name of a 'latent memory image.' But whenever
the same state of the cortex is provoked again, the
psychical aspect comes into being once more as a mnemonic image" (p. 55; emphasis added).
He continued to entertain the dispositionalist theory as late as 1894 (Freud, 1894), but by the spring
of 1895, Freud's clinical experiences as a psychotherapist impelled him to reexamine the question of uncon-

Downloaded by [Adelphi University] at 23:59 19 August 2014

Commentary on the Unconscious Homunculus

scious mental states: "Are we to suppose that we are

really dealing with thoughts which never came about,
which merely had a possibility of existing ... ? It is
clearly impossible to say anything about this until we
have arrived at a thorough clarification of our basic
psychological views, especially on the nature of consciousness" (1895, p. 300).
Freud's "thorough clarification" was issued in
the "Project for a Scientific Psychology" (Freud,
1895), a document setting out a sophisticated and admittedly speculative neuroscientific model of the human mind. Although Freud eventually abandoned the
"Project," and only a portion of the manuscript has
survived, it is clear that it was the seedbed for much
of his later work (Kanzer, 1973).

Freud's Theory of Consciousness

Freud's theory of consciousness is central to the model
of mind presented in the "Project" and much of his
later metapsychological theorizing. There is a sense in
which Freud's better-known theories of the unconscious and of repression cannot be fully understood
outside of the context of his theory of consciousness,
and yet scant attention has been paid to it in the psychoanalytic literature (Natsoulas, 1984, 1985,
1989a,b, 1991, 1992, is a notable exception). In light
of the remarkable extent to which Freud's theory coheres with contemporary developments in consciousness studies and cognitive science, reconsideration of
it may pay dividends not just to psychoanalysts, but
to all researchers striving to arrive at a scientific understanding of consciousness.
One of the most striking features of the "Project"
is its rejection of the legacy of Cartesian dualism and
introspectionism that had dominated the European
conception of the mind for over 200 years (Smith,
1999). As conceived within the Cartesian framework,
mind is something radically separate from body and
is constituted from an immaterial substance. Furthermore, the mind is described as being transparent to
itself, i.e., as incorrigibly aware of its own contents.
Freud's view expressed in the "Project" (and in all
of his later writings) is radically different. He describes the mind in materialistic and naturalistic terms:
the "mental apparatus" is none other than the nervous
system. Introspection is said to provide "neither complete nor trustworthy" (1895, p. 308) knowledge of
the neurophysiological processes that instantiate mental states. The mind is a neurophysiological system

39

completely determined by the laws of physics and is

to be studied like other natural things (1895).
Working in the late nineteenth century, when
neuroscience was in its infancy, Freud had little or no
knowledge of many features of the nervous system
about which there is detailed and impressive knowledge today. For example, he knew nothing about the
biophysics of the synapse and neural membrane, interneuronal interactions, enzyme-gene interactions,
and the physiology of the organelles. In addition to
these yawning gaps in the scientific knowledge available to him, there are numerous features of Freud's
theory that reflect nineteenth-century misconceptions
of the nervous system. Perhaps the most glaring of
these scientific shortcomings is his description of the
physical basis of neural activity. At the time when
Freud wrote the "Project" electrophysiology was still
a young discipline and it was not yet understood that
neural action potentials propagate by means of local
depolarization. Freud described activation vectors in
terms of passage of a moving quantity of energy (Qp,)
through the brain (McCulloch and Pitts [1943] did not
introduce the information-processing approach to neural activity until several years after Freud's death).
Although Freud and his contemporaries had only a
very sketchy understanding of the physiological details of neural activity, and made a number of mistaken
assumptions and conjectures about them, these shortcomings do not have deep consequences for the status
of Freud's model understood in purely functional
terms.
Freud makes a fundamental distinction between
perception and memory. Memory must involve some
"traces" or alterations caused by the passage of information through the central nervous system. Perception, on the other hand, requires neurons that return to
their initial state once information has passed through
them, so as to be ready for fresh perceptual events.
Freud accordingly hypothesized the existence of two
neural systems, cI> and $, corresponding to them. The
cI> system is an input system transmitting information
received by the sense organs. The passage of information through cI> leaves no lasting modifications, insuring that the perceptual apparatus is always ready to
receive fresh input.
Memories are laid down in the $ system so, unlike the cI> neurones, the $ neurones must in some way
be altered by the passage of information through them.
But how? Freud believed that "memory traces" are
modifications of neural firing thresholds, modifications brought about by the passage of excitation along
neural vectors. Freud was one of several researchers

Downloaded by [Adelphi University] at 23:59 19 August 2014

40

(which included William James [1892] and Freud's

friend Siegmund Exner [1894]) who wrote about the
mechanism of "Hebbian learning" more than half a
century prior to the publication of Hebb' s classic The
Organisation of Behaviour (1949). Invoking both Hebbian and non-Hebbian mechanisms, Freud described
mental representations as the products of learning and
identical to "facilitated" trajectories through the
brain. "Thoughts and psychical structures in general
must never be regarded as localised in organic elements of the nervous system but rather, as one might
say, between them, where resistances and facilitations
[Bahnungen] provide the corresponding correlates.
Everything that can be an object of our internal perception is virtual" (Freud, 1900, p. 611).
Freud's approach to the computational activity of
the brain is now called connectionism. Contemporary
connectionists trace their pedigree back to the work
of Donald Hebb, and to Karl Lashley before him.
However, as Glymour (1991) has pointed out, this scientific lineage is more accurately traced back to the
neuropsychologists of the late nineteenth century, including Helmholz, Exner, and Freud. According to
Glymour "Freud himself anticipated both the views
of Lashley and Hebb, and presented them in detail
that is more congruent to current thinking" (p. 59).
Freud stated in the "Project" that sensory information received by <p passes into \jI, where it is cognitively processed and recorded in memory. It is only
after the input is processed by \jI that it may emerge
into consciousness as a perception. Information from
the internal world consisting of those physiological
states that we experience as feelings is also gathered
by \jI, and passes from there into consciousness.
Scientific and philosophical discussions of consciousness are frequently bedevilled by semantic ambiguity. Block (1995b) addressed this problem by
drawing a fundamental distinction between "access
consciousness" and "phenomenal consciousness."
Access consciousness is purely informational or functional: an access-conscious content is a mental representation available to participate in action, speech, or
rational thought. Phenomenal consciousness, on the
other hand, is simply experience "distinct from any
cognitive, intentional or functional property" (Block,
1995b, p. 230). Flanagan (1992) uses the terms informational sensitivity and experiential sensitivity in
much the same way. In Freudian terminology, access
consciousness is a function of the \jI system, whereas
phenomenal consciousness is not.
When Freud spoke of consciousness he meant
phenomenal consciousness. Freudian consciousness is

David Livingstone Smith

qualitative experience, a position later advocated by
Jackendoff (1987), Baars (1988), and Flanagan
(1992). In the contemporary literature these qualitative
dimensions of mind are referred to by the Latin term
qualia. Qualia, or "psychical qualities," include "the
ways it feels to see, hear and smell, the way it feels
to have a pain; more generally, what it's like to have
mental states" (Block, 1995a, p. 514). Freud held that
qualia are intrinsically sensory, and that only sensations are directly conscious.
Freud identified consciousness with a third neurophysiological system, the 0> system. The 0> system receives information both from \jI, which, as we have
seen, receives information both from the external
world (through <p) and from the organism itself.
Freud's theory is therefore in agreement with Crick
and Koch when they describe consciousness as "probably caused by the activity of a small fraction of all
the neurons in the brain, located strategically between
the outer and inner worlds." Information proliferating
from <p to 0> results in conscious perception. Information proliferating from \jI to 0> brings about an awareness of internal mental representations (thoughts) and
affects. Affects are essentially states of physiological
arousal, and do not, therefore, pose a major explanatory problem for Freud's theory of consciousness.
Thought-consciousness is more problematic, for if
consciousness is built exclusively from qualia, and
qualia are purely sensory, how do the nonsensory cognitive representations in \jI become quality-laden conscious experiences in 0>1
Freud's proposed solution was an ingenious one.
He held that the human brain thinks by manipulating
a propositionally ordered neural code, a position nowadays called "sententialism" (Fodor, 1975, 1987;
Field, 1978; Maloney, 1989). Freud did not hold that
this lingua mentis is a silent, internal version of the
thinker's spoken language. Rather, like the contemporary psychologist-philosopher Jerry Fodor (1975), he
claimed that the unconscious language of thought is
distinct from and prior to spoken language, although
unlike Fodor, he held that expressions in neural code
are realized in a connectionist rather than a classical
computational architecture. t::homsky (1986), too, distinguishes between E-Ianguage (external language)
and I-language (internal language). Freud's source for
this idea was apparently the linguist Berthold De1brock (Greenberg, 1997).
In order for unconscious, qualityless thoughts to
"become" conscious, the thoughts must find some
form of qualitative, sensory expression. In other
words, mental representations in \jI must somehow ride

41

Downloaded by [Adelphi University] at 23:59 19 August 2014

Commentary on the Unconscious Homunculus

piggyback on information traveling from <I> to wand

thereby "be reinforced by new qualities" (Freud,
1915, p. 202). One way that this might occur is through
the evocation of sensory representations. For instance,
one could become conscious of the idea "dog" by
evoking a mental image of a dog. But this picturelike
method of becoming conscious has severe limitations.
It can represent concrete particulars, but is able to
represent neither abstractions nor logical relations. To
perform the latter requires a propositionally ordered
system of symbols possessing both semantic and material (sensory) properties that can be indexed to the
brain's own propositional code. Freud believed that
languages are just such symbol systems. Language is
richly symbolic and propositionally ordered. It is also
richly sensory, possessing auditory, visual and kinesthetic dimensions. It also includes expressions for abstractions and relations. As Jackendoff (1996a) puts
it: "Language is the modality of consciousness in
which the abstract and relational elements of thought
are available as separate units" (p. 18). In order for a
thought to become conscious it must therefore activate
a mental representation of a corresponding sentence.
Freud suggested in the "Project" that thoughts must
activate verbal motor representations in order to produce conscious effects (in later writings he would
speak more generally of "verbal presentations." For
an interesting discussion of this issue see Herzog
[1991]). These motor representations do not have to
be awakened to the extent of producing speech, although we sometimes do "think aloud." The motor
speech representations must be activated only to a degree sufficient to produce feedback to w. Freud's is
therefore a kinesthetic theory of conscious thought. In
emphasizing the role of kinetic qualia in the production of conscious mental events Freud anticipated features of the behaviorist theory of thought as subvocal
speech (Lashley, 1923), as well as contemporary proprioceptive theories of consciousness (e.g., SheetsJohnstone, 1998).
In Freud's model, there are no direct pathways
for the transfer of thought-representations from'" to
w: the transfer must be mediated by <1>. Freud's formulation of this problem and its solution are reminiscent
of a suggestion mooted by Daniel Dennett (1991).
Dennett envisages our hominid ancestors using a form
of verbal autostimulation to become conscious of otherwise inaccessible information.
Suppose ... that although the right information is already in the brain, it is in the hands of the wrong
specialist; the subsystem in the brain that needs the

information cannot obtain it directly from the specialist-because evolution has simply not got around to
providing such a "wire." Provoking the specialist to
"broadcast" the information into the environment,
however, and then relying on an existing pair of ears
(and an auditory system) to pick it up, would be a
way of building a "virtual wire" between the relevant
subsystems [pp. 195-196].
Manifest verbal autostimulation may have later
become transformed into subvocal autostimulation.
This silent process would maintain the loop of selfstimulation, but jettison the peripheral vocalisation
and audition portions of the process.... The private
talking-to-oneself behaviour might well not be the
best imaginable way of amending the existing functional architecture of one's brain.... It would be slow
and laborious, compared to the swift unconscious
cognitive processes it was based on, because it had to
make use of large tracts of nervous system "designed
for other purposes" [po 197].

As we shall see, Freud believed that this roundabout method of expression is required because the
brain operates with two distinct coding systems. In
order for an intentional content-a thought or memory-to be conscious it needs to be recoded as sensory information.
Freud believed that thinking occurs outside consciousness in system "'. He also believed that, strictly
speaking, thought never becomes conscious. What we
loosely refer to as a thought's "becoming conscious"
is more accurately described as a thought producing
conscious effects. Representations do not move from
'" to w, they cause effects in w. Freud's striking claim
that "mental processes are in themselves unconscious" (1915, p. 171) anticipated Lashley's (1956)
identical claim by 60 years. Jackendoff, too, asserts
that "thought is never conscious" (p. 7). A further
implication of this position underscored in Jackendoff's "Unconscious Information in Language and
Psychodynamics" (1996b) is that there is no such
thing as conscious thinking. So-called conscious mental processes are actually conscious representations of
unconscious information structures. Although events
in w supervene upon events in '" it is only a subset of
the unconscious mental processes that are represented
by modifications in consciousness.
For Freud, thought-consciousness is a phonological-level phenomenon, suspended between acoustic
representations on one side and representations of
ideas on the other. As he describes it in the "Project,"

42
unconscious thoughts activate acoustic "sound-images" that in turn activate motor "word-images"
(verbal procedural memories) that produce conscious
effects. These sensory "indications of speech-discharge ... put thought-processes on a level with perceptual processes" (1895, p. 366). For lackendoff
(1987, 1996a), too, conscious thinking is a phonetic
phenomenon occurring between acoustic input and
conceptual content.

Downloaded by [Adelphi University] at 23:59 19 August 2014

The Problem of Qualia

The problem of explaining how it is that brains generate qualia is perhaps the most vexing theoretical difficulty in the field of consciousness studies. Amongst
philosophers there is a spectrum of opinion ranging
from the claim that qualia do not exist (Dennett, 1988,
1991), through the thesis that although qualia are identical to neural states human beings will never be able
to understand the mechanism of the connection
(McGinn, 1991) to the more optimistic notion that a
complete neurophysiological explanation of qualia is
in principle within our grasp (Churchland and
Churchland, 1982). Freud does not attempt to answer
what has become known as the "hard problem" of
consciousness (Chalmers, 1995): the problem of explaining how a physical feature of the brain can be
identical to a subjective mental state. He does, however, specify four fundamental explanatory tasks that
a scientific theory of consciousness should address
(Freud, 1895):
1. It must strive to "explain ... what we are aware
of, in the most puzzling fashion, through our 'consciousness' " (p. 307).
2. It must strive to explain why consciousness is not
directly aware of its own causal basis.
3. It must strive to explain "how qualities originate"
(p.308).
4. It must strive to explain "where qualities originate" (p. 308).
With regard to the first explanatory task, Freud
(1900) unequivocally answers that consciousness is
"a sense organ for the apprehension of psychical qualities" (p. 574). In other words, all that we are ever
conscious of are patterns of sensation (qualia). This
brings us to the second problem. Freud held that consciousness does not deliver a direct perception of its
own basis simply because consciousness is restricted
to the registration of qualia, which are the output

David Livingstone Smith

rather than the causal basis of mental processing. Consciousness is, like the letter omega, at the end of the
line.
Where do qualia originate? As I have already
noted, Freud believed that they originate within the w
system. How do they originate? Freud suggests that
the "nerve ending apparatus" transduce incoming information into a neural code. Each type of sensory
receptor responds to a circumscribed spectrum of
stimulation, filtering out information external to it.
The sensory receptors function "as sieves; for they
allow the stimulus through from only certain processes
with a particular period" (1895, p. 310). The transduced stimulation is expressed as a temporal code
(Periode in Freud's German) that is expressed differentially as a deviation from the baseline oscillations
of the'" neurones. According to the "Project," then,
brains have at their disposal two distinct modes for
encoding information; the spatial code of facilitated
activation vectors which represents thoughts and
memories (including procedural memories) and the
temporal code that represents qualia. In a much later
work, Freud (1920) returned to the temporal code hypothesis suggesting that the sense receptors themselves operate intermittently rather than continuously,
taking samples of perceptual information at sufficiently rapid intervals to allow effective tracking of
events in the external world.
Freud was not alone in suggesting that temporal
features of neural activity are involved in the generation of consciousness. The American neuroscientist
A. A. Garver, who was inspired by the metaphysical
speculations of Spence (1879), suggested that neural
"oscillations" in 36 to 60 Hz range are responsible
for the spectrum of conscious experience (Giizeldere,
1995). Freud's oscillatory theory of consciousness is
distinct from that proposed by Garver in the nineteenth
century (1880). It is also distinct from the Crick-Koch
hypothesis that synchronized neural oscillations tie
disparate components of visual experience together
into a coherent conscious whole (Crick and Koch,
1990). In Freud's view, temporal features of neural
activity encode qualitative sensory information. There
is now a body of neuroscientific research that may be
reasonably interpreted to suggest that sensory information is represented by a temporal pattern code
(Mountcastle, 1967; Perkell and Bullock, 1968; Hardcastle, 1994; Cariani, 1995, 1997; Cariani and Delgutte, 1996; Rieke, Warland, de Ruyter van
Steveninck, and Bialek, 1997). Hameroff (1995) suggests that qualia may be encoded not by neural firing
frequencies, but by quantum-level phenomena, namely

Downloaded by [Adelphi University] at 23:59 19 August 2014

Commentary on the Unconscious Homunculus

specific frequencies of boson-condensed field excitation in the brain.
Freud believed that this neural code is "transmitted without inhibition ... as though it were a process
of induction" (1895, p. 31). By "induction" he apparently meant electromagnetic induction, or some other
field phenomenon allowing for propagation of the temporal code across synaptic barriers. Suggestions along
related lines have been made by Pribrahm (1971) and
Libet (1995). Freud's hypothesis might also be considered in relation to quantum theoretic hypotheses of
non-local interactions within the brain (Hameroff,
1995).
According to this model, sensory modalities are
distinguished by temporal features of the information
transduced by sensory receptors, and variations within
each modality must be assumed to correspond to precise temporal codes within the larger modal pattern.
Precise temporal spiking patterns have indeed been
observed by contemporary investigators (Emmers,
1981; Lestienne and Strehler, 1987; Abeles, Bergman,
Margalit, and Vaadia, 1993; Mountcastle, 1993; Lestienne, 1996). According to the "Project" synchronized temporal patterns are transformed into qualia by
the w system, which must therefore be assumed to
possess some kind of frequency-sensitive mechanism.
Because the temporal code propagates from neuron
to neuron by means of induction or an inductionlike
process, it passes across synapses independently of
QJL. Even in instances when the firing threshold is not
reached, and there is no transmission of QJL qualitative
information is transferred. Because the propagation of
the temporal code has no impact on the synaptic
weights of the neurones involved, "this transmission
of quality is not durable; it leaves no traces behind
and cannot be reproduced" (Freud, 1895), hence the
fugitive nature of conscious experience. The phenomenon of qualia recognition is not incompatible with
Freud's model, and requires only some neural mechanism for temporal pattern matching.
Freud's claim that qualities cannot be remembered as such is starkly counterintuitive. When I conjure up a memory of my wife, I remember her brown
eyes, her fragrance, and the softness of her skin. These
certainly appear to be qualitative memories. What
Freud may have in mind is the hypothesis that qualitative memories represent qualia rather than reproducing them. On this view I do not in any sense feel the
softness of my wife's skin when recollecting it. Instead, I am put in touch with a representation or idea
of the sensation of softness (related discussions can be
found in Dennett [1986,1991]). Freud was not entirely

43
consistent about his views on qualitative memories. In
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), for example, he
claims that memories possess little sensory quality, but
does not explain how the memory of a quality-however attenuated-can be laid down physiologically.

Conclusion
Freud's systematic theory of consciousness advanced
in his "Project for a Scientific Psychology" is in
agreement with the Crick-Koch theory in several respects, as well as anticipating the views of other contemporary researchers. Freud additionally suggested
that:
1. The brain possesses two means of encoding information. Conceptual and procedural information is
represented through the modification of synaptic
weights. Qualitative information is represented by
means of a temporal code.
2. This temporal code propagates "without inhibition," perhaps by means of electromagnetic induction, or some other field phenomenon.
3. The neurones of consciousness must be assumed
to possess special physiological properties enabling
it to recognize temporally coded information.
4. In order for an unconscious mental content to produce a conscious thought it must be re-coded in the
temporal mode.

References
Abeles, M., Bergman, R., Margalit, E., & Vaadia, E. (1993),
Spatiotemporal firing patterns in the frontal cortex of
behaving monkeys. J. Neurophysiol., 70(4):1629-1638.
Baars, B. (1988), A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness.
Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Block, N. (1995a), Qualia. In: Companion to the Philosophy
of Mind, ed. S. Guttenplan. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- - - (1995b), On a confusion about a function of consciousness. Behav. & Brain Sci., 18:228-287.
Brentano, F. (1874), Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973.
Cariani, P. (1995), As if time really mattered: Temporal
strategies for neural coding of sensory information. In:
Origins: Brain and Self-Organization, ed. K. Pribram.
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, pp. 591-598.
- - - (1997), Temporal coding of sensory information.
In: Computational Neuroscience: Trends in Research,
ed. J. M. Bower. New York: Plenum.

Downloaded by [Adelphi University] at 23:59 19 August 2014

44
- - Delgutte, B. (1996), Neural correlates of the pitch
of complex tones. I. Pitch and pitch salience. J. Neurophysiol., 76(3):1698-1716.
Chalmers, D. (1995), Facing up to the problem of consciousness. J. Consciousness Studies, 2(3):200-220.
Chomsky, N. (1986), Knowledge of Language. New
York: Praeger.
Churchland, P. M., & Churchland, P. S. (1982), Functionalism, qualia and intentionality. In: Mind, Brain and Function, ed. J. Biro & R. Shahan. Oklahoma City: University
of Oklahoma Press.
Crick, F., & Koch, C. (1990), Towards a neurobiological
theory of consciousness. Sem. Neuroscientifica,
2:263-275.
Dennett, D. C. (1986), Two approaches to mental images.
In: Brainstorms. Brighton, U.K.: Harvester.
- - - (1988), Quining qualia. In: Consciousness in Contemporary Science, ed. A. Marcel & E. Bisiach. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
- - - (1991), Consciousness Explained.
London:
Penguin.
Emmers, R. (1981), Pain: A Spike-Interval Coded Message
in the Brain. New York: Raven Press.
Exner, S. (1894), Entweif zu einer physiologischen Erkliirung der psychischen Erscheinungen (Project for a Physiological Explanation of Mental Appearances). Vienna:
Franz Deuticke.
Field, H. (1978), Mental representation. Erkenntnis,
13:9-61.
Flanagan, o. (1992), Consciousness Reconsidered. Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT.
Fodor, J. A. (1975), The Language of Thought. New York:
Thomas Y. Crowell.
- - - (1987), Psychosemantics. Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT.
Freud, s. (1887-1904), The Complete Letters of Sigmund
Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, ed. & trans. J. M. Masson.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- - (1891), On Aphasia: A Critical Study. New York:
International Universities Press, 1953.
- - - (1894), The neuropsychoses of defence. Standard
Edition, 3:41-61. London: Hogarth Press, 1962.
- - - (1895), Project for a Scientific Psychology. Standard Edition, 1:281-391. London: Hogarth Press, 1966.
- - - (1900), The Interpretation of Dreams. Standard
Edition, 4 & 5. London: Hogarth Press, 1953.
- - - (1915), The unconscious. Standard Edition,
14:159-204. London: Hogarth Press, 1957.
- - (1920), Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Standard
Edition, 18:1-64. London: Hogarth Press, 1955.
Garver, A. A. (1880), The periodic character of voluntary
nervous action. Amer. J. Sci., 3rd series, 20:189-193.
Glymour, C. (1991), Freud's androids. In: The Cambridge
Companion to Freud, ed. J. Neu. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Greenberg, V. D. (1997), Freud and His Aphasia Book.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

David Livingstone Smith

Gfizeldere, G. (1995), Problems of consciousness: A perspective on contemporary issues, current debates. J.
Consciousness Studies, 2:112-143.
Hameroff, S. (1995), Quantum coherence in microtubules:
A neural basis for emergent consciousness? J. Consciousness Studies, 1:91-118.
Hardcastle, V. G. (1994), Psychology's binding problem
and possible neurobiological solutions. J. Consciousness
Studies, 1(1):66-90.
Hebb, D. O. (1949), The Organisation of Behaviour. New
York: Wiley.
Herzog, P. (1991), Conscious and Unconscious: Freud's
Dynamic Distinction Reconsidered. Madison, CT: International Universities Press.
Jackendoff, R. (1987), Consciousness and the Computational Mind. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University
Press.
- - (1996a), How langauge helps us think. Prag. &
Cognit.,4:1-34.
- - - (1996b), Unconscious information in language and
psychodynamics. In: Languages of the Mind: Essays on
Mental Representation. Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT.
James, W. (1892), Psychology: Briefer Course. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1984.
Kanzer, M. (1973), Two prevalent misconceptions about
Freud's "Project" (1895). The Annual of Psychoanalysis, 1:88-104. New York: International Universities
Press.
Lashley, K. S. (1923), The behaviouristic interpretation of
consciousness. I. Psycholog. Revue, 30:237-272.
- - - (1956), Cerebral organization and behavior. In: The
Brain and Human Behavior, ed. H. Solomon, S. Cobb, &
W. Penfield. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins.
Lestienne, R. (1996), Determination of the precision of
spike timing in the visual cortex of anesthetized cats.
Biolog. Cybernetics, 74:55-61.
- - - Strehler, B. L. (1987), Time structure and stimulus
dependence of precise replicating patterns present in
monkey cortical neuronal spike trains. Brain Res.,
43:214-238.
Libet, B. (1995), A testable field theory of mind-brain interaction. J. Consciousness Studies, 1(1):119-126.
Maloney, J. C. (1989), The Mundane Matter of the Mental
Language. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University
Press.
McCulloch, W. S., & Pitts, W. (1943), A logical calculus
of the ideas immanent in nervous activity. Bull. Math.
Biophysics, 5:115-133.
McGinn, C. (1991), The Problem of Consciousness. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Mountcastle, V. (1993), Temporal order determinants in a
somatosthetic frequency discrimination: Sequential order coding. Ann. NY Acad. Sci., 682:151-170.
- - (1967), The problem of sensing and the neural coding of sensory events. In: The Neurosciences: A Study
Program, ed. G. C. Quarton, T. Melnechuk, & F. O.
Schmitt. New York: Rockefeller University Press.

45

Downloaded by [Adelphi University] at 23:59 19 August 2014

Commentary on the Unconscious Homunculus

Natsoulas, T. (1984), Freud and consciousness I: Intrinsic
consciousness. Psychoanal. & Contemp. Thought,
7:195-232.
- - - (1985), Freud and consciousness II: Derived consciousness. Psychoanal. & Contemp. Thought,
8:183-220.
- - - (1989a), Freud and consciousness ill: The importance of tertiary consciousness. Psychoanal. & Contemp.
Thought, 12:97-123.
- - - (1989b), Freud and consciousness. IV: A propedeutic for functions of consciousness in hypercathected
speech-imagery. Psychoanal. & Contemp. Thought,
12:619-662.
- - - (1991), Freud and consciousness V: Emotions and
feelings. Psychoanal. & Contemp. Thought, 14:69-108.
- - - (1992), Freud and consciousness VI: A present-day
perspective. Psychoanal. & Contemp. Thought,
15:305-348.
Nunberg, H., & Federn, E., Eds. (1962), Minutes of the
Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, Vol. 2. New York: International Universities Press.

Perkell, D. H., & Bullock, T. H. (1968), Neural coding.

Neurosci. Res. Prog. Bull., 6(3):221-348.
Pribrahm, K. (1971), Languages of the Brain: Experimental
Paradoxes and Principles in Neurophysiology. New
York: Brandon House.
Rieke, F., Warland, D., de Ruyter van Steveninck, R., &
Bialek, W. (1997), Spikes: Exploring the Neural Code.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Sheets-Johnstone, M. (1998), Consciousness: A natural history. J. Consciousness Studies, 5(3):260-295.
Smith, D. L. (1999), Freud's Philosophy of the Unconscious. Dordrecht, NL: Kluwer Academic.
Spence, P. (1879), Space and time considered as negations.
J. Specul. Philosophy, 13:337-346.
David Livingstone Smith
University of New England
Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences
Eleven Hills Beach Road,
Biddeford, ME 04005
e-mail: DavidISmith@dial.pipex.com

Analyzing First-Person Experience: The Value of Phenomenal Reflection in Providing Signposts for
Investigating Its Neural Correlates: Commentary by Richard Stevens (Milton Keynes, U.K.)

What I find particularly valuable about Crick and

Koch's paper is the rich and lucid discussion of issues
relating to our understanding of consciousness. Let me
take up three core issues the authors raise and then
conclude with brief comments on two others.

The Importance of Developing a Phenomenal

Description of Consciousness
While Crick and Koch may be correct that it would
be premature to advance a definition of consciousness,
I appreciate their realization of how crucial it is, in
the search for neural correlates of consciousness, to
try to be clear about what precisely constitutes phenomenal consciousness. Although, as they state, we
may all have a rough idea of what is meant by being
conscious, this is not enough for effective investigation of the topic. Too often the term consciousness
is used loosely to cover any cognitive functions of
sufficient complexity or personal significance.
Richard Stevens is Head of Psychology, The Open University, Milton
Keynes, England, UK.

How we move to a clearer and more effective

description of phenomenal consciousness is of course
problematic. This is an empirical (in the broad sense
of the term) though not a logical or philosophical problem. Finding rigorous ways of exploring and articulating what we are consciously aware of is at the heart
of the problem. I am reluctant here to use the term
introspection. Usually when philosophers talk about
introspecting, they refer to examples they derive from
thinking about experience in retrospect. Unfortunately, this is not an adequate basis for claims about
the nature of phenomenological experience and is
likely to be readily influenced by preconceptions. I
know this from my own experience. I had initially
assumed, for example, that there is a phenomenal distinctiveness between conscious experience and reflexive or self-consciousness. (Such a distinction I note is
also assumed by the authors of this paper.) However,
systematic phenomenal reflection convinced me that
there is no such distinction in the quality of phenomenal experience itself. It is a conceptual rather than
phenomenological distinction-to do with implicit
meanings (see below) attached to experiencing rather
than conscious experience itself.