IN RE: VICTORIO D.

LANUEVO
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975

Facts:

This is a disbarment matter with regards to Attorney Victorio Lanuevo, the Bar
Confidant for the 1971 Bar Examinations. Supreme Court received a confidential
letter that speaks of the exam notebooks of a examinee named Ramon Galang who
has been re-evaluated and re-corrected such that he hurdled the Bar Exams and
was admitted to the Bar.

Lanuevo admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E.

Galang back to the respective examiners for re-evalution or re-checking. The five
examiners admitted having re-evaluated or re-checked the notebook to him by the
Bar Confidant, stating that he has the authority to do the same and that the
examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and was on the borderline
of passing. Ramon Galang was able to pass the 1971 bar exam because of
Lanuevos move but the exam results bears that he failed in 5 subjects namely in
(Political, Civil, Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial).

Galang on the otherhand, denied of having charged of Slight Physical Injuries on

Eufrosino de Vera, a law student of MLQU.

The five examiners were led by Lanuevo to believe that it is the Bar Committees
regular activity that when an examinee has failed in one subject alone, the rest he
passed, the examiner in that subject which he flunked will review his exam
notebook.

Afterwards, Lanuevo gained possession of few properties, including that of a house

in BF Homes, which was never declared in his declaration of assets and liabilities.

Issue:

WON Lanuevo was guilty of defrauding the examiners such that Galang passed the
Bar? YES

Held:

It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent

Lanuevos well-studied and well-calculated moves in successively representing
separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee
failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To
repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the
five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects which under no
circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed
only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing.

The Bar Confidant has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or

reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark
before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. The Bar
Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot
assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners
concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than
the examiner.

AS TO GALANGS CRIM CASE: The concealment of an attorney in his application to

take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for,
an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well
settled. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who
demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound
discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which
merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law.

Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.

Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner
in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender
of his attorneys certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of
Attorneys.

DECISION: Lanuevo disbarred, Galang stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS V. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIWASA MANUFACTURING

INC. (1994) (J. NOCON) FACTS:
The case arose when the Bureau of Investments (BOI) granted the petitioners
application to amend its BOI certificate by changing the scope of its registered
product from glazed floor tiles to ceramic tiles. Eventually, Mariwasa filed an MR
of the said BOI decision. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed
an petition for review with respondent Court of Appeals pursuan to Circular 1-91. CA
temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by
its own terms twenty (20) days after its issuance, without issuing any preliminary
injunction. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order
contending that CA does not have jurisdiction over the BOI case, since the same is
exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of EO 226 (the
Omnibus Investments Code of 1987). Petitioner argued that the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules
Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the
Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's
appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein
runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226 , a substantive right which under the
constitution cannot be modified. While Mariwasa maintains that whatever
inconsistency there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on
the question of venue for appeal, has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the
Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after
E.O. 226 was enacted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case
HELD:
YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar
as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the
BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was
previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be
brought to the Court of Appeals. The substantive right to appeal from decisions or
orders of the BOI under EO 226 remains and continues to be respected. Circular I-91

simply transferred the venue of the appeals from the decisions of this agency to
respondent CA and a different period of appeal 15 days from notice (sa EO 226 30
days from receipt of decision). It did not make an incursion into the right to appeal.

IN RE CUNANAN (94 PHIL. 534)

FACTS: Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers
Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar
Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-195170%
1952 .71%
1953..72%
1954..73%
1955..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in
any subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the
grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average in
subsequent bar examinations.

ISSUE: Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING: Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being
embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar
flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent

system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing,
thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not
stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that
for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken
down was based under the following reasons:
The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from
1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to
the end of World War II;
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions
of the said candidates;
The law is an encroachment on the Courts primary prerogative to determine who
may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to
repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress
under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment
of the court on who can practice law; and
The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough
votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in
1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying
admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the
power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice
of law.

Shigenori Kuroda vs Rafael Jalandoni

83 Phil. 171 Political Law Generally Accepted Principles of International Law

Shigenori Kuroda was the highest ranking Japanese officer stationed in the Philippines
during the Japanese occupation. He was then charged before the Military Commission,
headed by Major General Rafael Jalandoni, due to the atrocities that were done against non
combatant civilians and prisoners during the war. His trial was in pursuant to Executive
Order No. 68 which established the National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and
regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals. Kuroda is questioning the legality of
the said EO arguing that the same is not provided for in the Constitution. He further
underscores the fact that the Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague Convention on the
Rules and Regulations Covering Land Warfare hence we cannot impose against him any
criminal charges because it has no laws to base on, national or international.

ISSUE: Whether or not Kuroda can be charged in Philippine courts?

HELD: Yes. EO No. 68 is constitutional hence the Philippine courts can take cognizance of
the case at bar. EO No 68 is in pursuant to the constitutional provision that states the
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. The Hague
Convention and other similar conventions whose principles are generally accepted are
hence considered as part of the law of the land.