DAVIS INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN POLICY

SPECIAL REPORT
No. 180 | January 06, 2016

Combatting the ISIS Foreign Fighter

Pipeline: A Global Approach
Edited by Lisa Curtis

Combatting the ISIS Foreign Fighter Pipeline:

A Global Approach
Edited by Lisa Curtis

SR-180


Contributors
Lisa Curtis is Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center, of the Kathryn and Shelby
Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy at The Heritage Foundation.
Luke Coffey is Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy, of the Davis Institute.
David Inserra is Policy Analyst for Homeland Security and Cybersecurity in the Allison Center.
Daniel Kochis is a Research Associate in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, of the Davis Institute.
Walter Lohman is Director of the Asian Studies Center.
Joshua Meservey is Policy Analyst for Africa and the Middle East in the Allison Center.
James Phillips is Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs in the Allison Center.
Robin Simcox is Margaret Thatcher Fellow in the Thatcher Center.

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at:

http://report.heritage.org/sr180
The Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
Washington, DC 20002
(202) 546-4400 | heritage.org
Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation
or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.


SPECIAL REPORT | NO. 180
January 6, 2016

Combatting the ISIS Foreign Fighter Pipeline:

A Global Approach
Edited by Lisa Curtis
Abstract

In just two yearsfrom fall 2013 to fall 2015ISIS established a presence in at least 19 countries. With a slick and
sophisticated Internet and social media campaign, and by capitalizing on the civil war in Syria and sectarian divisions
in Iraq, ISIS has been able to attract more than 25,000 fighters from outside the Islamic States territory to join its
ranks in Iraq and Syria. These foreign fighters include over 4,500 citizens from Western nations, including around
250 U.S. citizens who have either traveled to the Middle East to fight with extremist organizations or attempted to
do so. The civil war in Syria has been the main catalyst for young people to leave their home countries and join ISIS to
fight the regime of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. Failure of Western nations to respond to incidents like Assads
2013 chemical attack on civilians facilitated ISIS recruiting. Unexpected ISIS success in Iraq, where, in June 2014,
it captured Iraqs second-largest city, Mosul, and ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadis declaration of a caliphate that
same month, has further accelerated the flow of fighters to the region. ISISs unprecedented success in recruiting
fighters from around the world has been its ability to convince impressionable young Muslims of a civilizational
struggle between Islam and the West, making it the duty of all Muslims to join the war. In this Heritage Foundation
Special Report, a team of experts on counterterrorism, global Islamist trends, and specific regions detail a multipronged, and international, approach to cutting off the flow of foreign fighters to the Islamic State.

he Islamic States recent global terror campaign

including the October 31 downing of a Russian
passenger jet that killed 224 and the November 13
shooting attacks in Paris that killed 130 restaurant patrons and concert-goershas increased the
urgency for the U.S. to lead a global alliance to defeat
the Islamic State and its ideology.
ISIS has also been able to establish a presence in
at least 19 different countries within the past two
years, even in places where its competitor, al-Qaeda, has been operating for years.1 With a slick and
sophisticated Internet and social media presence,
and by capitalizing on the civil war in Syria and sectarian divisions in Iraq, ISIS has been able to attract
more than 25,000 fighters from outside ISISs territory to join its ranks in Iraq and Syria.

These foreign fighters include over 4,500 citizens

from Western nations, including around 250 U.S. citizens who have either traveled to the Middle East to fight
with extremist organizations or attempted to do so.2
The civil war in Syria has been the main catalyst for
young people to leave their home countries and volunteer to team up with ISIS to fight the regime of Syrian
dictator Bashar al-Assad. Failure of Western nations to
respond to incidents like Assads 2013 chemical attack
on civilians in Ghouta facilitated ISIS recruiting. Unexpected ISIS success in Iraq, where in June 2014 it captured Iraqs second-largest city, Mosul, and ISIS leader
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadis declaration of a caliphate that
same month, has further accelerated the flow of fighters to the region. Never has a conflict generated such a
large number of foreign fighters so quickly.
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ISISs unprecedented success in recruiting fighters from around the world is largely due to its ability to convince impressionable young Muslims of a
civilizational struggle between Islam and the West,
making it the duty of all Muslims to join the war.3
ISIS claims the battle is best joined in the caliphate in the areas under ISIS control in Syria and Iraq.
The caliphate, according to ISIS, is a critical step in a
chain of events leading to the apocalypse and a final
Muslim victory over the unbelievers.4
The most effective way to end the surge of foreign fighters to the region is for the U.S. and its
international partners to demonstrate that ISIS is
not invincible. Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee John McCain (RAZ) said during a recent congressional hearing that the longer
ISIL remains undefeated in Iraq and Syria, the more
potent its message is to those around the world who
may be radicalized and inspired to join the group and
spread violence and mayhem on its behalf. Journalist Graeme Wood, in his seminal March 2015 article, What ISIS Really Wants, holds that the most
important task is to deny ISIS territory, since without it, the group cannot claim to have established a
caliphate.5
Since August 2014, the U.S. has conducted over
6,900 air strikes against ISIS positions as part of
Operation Inherent Resolve. Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford reported in
mid-October that the U.S.-led coalition has helped
the Iraqis secure important advances against ISIS
in recent months. The Iraqi Army, supported by
U.S. air strikes, succeeded in recapturing the city
of Ramadi in late December. Still, there are doubts
that the Iraqi forces can maintain the momentum
on their own, and it is likely that the U.S. will have
to increase its level of military engagement in the
region for the foreseeable future.
While military success against ISIS on the ground
in Iraq and Syria is the best guarantee for stemming
the foreign fighter pipeline, the U.S. must also lead a
global approach to counter the ideology that drives
people to join ISIS, and to implement policies that
will prevent terrorist attacks in returning foreign
fighters home countries. The House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee Task Force
report on foreign fighters that was released in late
September laid out numerous recommendations for
countering terrorist travel. The report suggests that
the U.S. government do more to share information
2

on terrorist travel with international partners; to

bolster law enforcement in dealing with the growing
threat; and to enhance community awareness about
the problem of youth radicalization.6
This Heritage Foundation Special Report analyzes ISIS presence, activities, and influence in each
region of the world where it either operates directly,
or indirectly through affiliated organizations, or in
which it is actively recruiting fighters. Each regional
section provides details on ISIS operational capabilities, recruitment, links with other organizations,
competition with al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and
implications of the foreign fighter phenomenon for
the security of individual nations.

Unprecedented Number
of Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria

As of the start of 2015, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) reported that more than
20,000 foreign fighters had travelled to Syria from
over 90 countries. A report released in September by
the House Committee on Homeland Security estimated that these numbers have only grown, with
at least 25,000 foreign fighters travelling to join the
Syrian conflict, including 250 Americans.7 Most of
these fighters have joined ISIS, which provides radical and disaffected Muslims with a unique call to
action, to be part of an actual caliphate with a violent interpretation of Islamic law (sharia).8 Furthermore, ISIS has spread its message through social
media, adeptly using propaganda aimed at multiple
audiences, including references to Western popular
culture, to draw fighters from the U.S. and Europe.
A March 2015 report commissioned by the United Nations Security Council found that the number
of foreign fighters for Islamist causes worldwide
was higher than it has ever been and had soared by
71 percent between mid-2014 and March 2015. The
study concluded that Syria and Iraq, by far the biggest destinations for foreign fighters, had become a
finishing school for extremists.9
Islamist militants from around the world have
been drawn to the fighting in Iraq and Syria in much
greater numbers than they were drawn to the fighting in Afghanistan in the 1980s, to fighting in the
Balkans in the 1990s, to Afghanistan or Iraq post9/11, or to conflicts in Pakistan, Somalia, or Yemen in
recent years.10 In all of these cases, radical Islamist
ideologues appealed to Sunni Muslims to mobilize
and join a jihad (holy war) in defense of fellow Sunni


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January 6, 2016

TaBLE 1

Foreign Fighters by Country

Tunisia
Saudi Arabia
Jordan
Russia
France
Turkey
Morocco
Lebanon
Germany
United Kingdom
Egypt
Libya
Pakistan
Uzbekistan
Belgium
Turkmenistan
China*

6,000
2,275
2,000
1,700
1,550
1,400
1,200
900
700
700
600
600
500
500
380
360
300

Indonesia
Kazakhstan
United States
Austria
Bosnia
Netherlands
Tajikistan
Algeria
Malaysia
Sweden
Israel/Palestinian
Territories
Canada
Kosovo
Australia
Denmark
Yemen

300
250
250
229
200
190
190
170
154
150
150
130
125
120
115
110

* Figure according to party-run media reports

Note: This table only includes countries with 100 foreign
fighters or more.
Source: Heritage Foundation research based on reports from
the Committee on Homeland Security, https://homeland.house.
gov (accessed December 10, 2015); The Soufan Group, Foreign
Fighters December 2015, http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/
uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf (accessed
December 15, 2015); and various media reports.
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Muslims who were allegedly threatened by nonMuslims or by secular dictatorships.

In Syria, the Assad regime is perceived to be vulnerable on both scores: It is a secular dictatorship
imbued with the pan-Arab socialist ideology of the
Baath (Renaissance) Party, and it is dominated by
Alawites, a religious minority regarded as apostates by hard-core Sunni Islamists.11 The Iraqi government is dominated by Shiite political leaders,
who are considered heretics aligned with Iran by
their Sunni enemies.
While most of the foreign fighters are joining ISIS,
some have gravitated toward rival Islamist extremist groups fighting in Syria, including Jabhat al-Nusra (the Victory Front), al-Qaedas official branch in
Syria. Al-Nusra has an estimated 5,000 members

to 6,000 members and has emerged as one of the

top two or three rebel groups fighting Syrias Assad
dictatorship.12 About 30 percent of al-Nusras fighters are foreign volunteers, according to its leader,
Abu Muhammad al-Julani.13 Al-Julani, a lieutenant of then-Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) leader Baghdadi, established al-Nusra as an AQI offshoot in late
2011. Al-Nusra has since adopted a more pragmatic
course than its parent organization, and has cooperated with moderate Syrian rebel groups against the
Assad regime, as well as against ISIS.
When Baghdadi unilaterally proclaimed the
merger of AQI and al-Nusra in April 2013 to form
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, Julani rejected
the merger and renewed his pledge to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Since then, the two groups
have clashed repeatedly, causing an estimated 3,000
deaths as of March 2014.14
Al-Nusra has focused its attention on overthrowing the Syrian regime, and has not emphasized its
hostility toward the United States, although that is
almost certainly a tacticalnot a strategicdecision,
and is sure to change if it consolidates power within Syria. As an al-Qaeda affiliate, al-Nusra released
a propaganda video in June 2015 glorifying past alQaeda attacks against the United States. Of even
greater concern is the case of Abdirahman Sheik
Mohamud, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Ohio who
trained with al-Nusra or ISIS in Syria in the spring
of 2014 and was suspected of planning an attack on a
U.S. military base in Texas upon return.15
Al-Nusra also poses a potential threat because
of its recruitment of a growing number of foreign
Islamist militants, including from Europe and the
United States. According to U.S. officials, al-Nusra
has worked closely with the Khorasan group, a cadre
of experienced al-Qaeda operatives dispatched to
Syria by al-Qaeda leader al-Zawahiri to organize
terror attacks against Western targets.16 At least
one American citizen, Moner Mohammad Abusalha,
conducted a suicide truck bombing for al-Nusra in
northern Syria on May 25, 2014, the first reported
suicide attack by a fighter from America in Syria.17
Foreign fighters also have joined the war in Syria
to fight on behalf of the Assad regime. Iran has
deployed up to 2,000 Revolutionary Guards to fight
alongside, train, and support regime forces, as well
as several thousand Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon and Iranian-trained Shiite militia fighters from
Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.18
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COMBATTING THE ISIS FOREIGN FIGHTER PIPELINE:
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MAP 1

ISIS Global Presence

Countries where ISIS holds territory

Countries where local groups

have pledged allegiance to ISIS

LEBANON
JORDAN

MOROCCO
ALGERIA

LIBYA

NIGER

TURKEY

EGYPT

CHAD

Countries from where large numbers of

ISIS supporters have been arrested

SYRIA

IRAQ

AFGHANISTAN

SAUDI
ARABIA

PAKISTAN

BANGLADESH

YEMEN

NIGERIA
CAMEROON

INDONESIA

Note: Presence is defined as ISIS holding territory; local groups having either pledged allegiance or
actively cooperated with ISIS; or large numbers of ISIS supporters having been arrested.
Sources: Heritage Foundation research and various media reports.

ISIS Recruitment:
The Caliphates Siren Call

ISIS is currently focused on establishing a revolutionary Islamic stronghold in Iraq and Syria, but
ultimately seeks to overthrow every government in
the region and drive Western influence out of the
Middle East, allowing the group to become the nucleus of a global Islamic empire. Baghdadi represents a
new generation of al-Qaeda leadership that bristles
at criticism of its extreme brutality from old guard
leaders, like al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Ladens successor. After declaring a caliphate in June 2014, Baghdadi renamed himself Caliph Ibrahim, signaling his
determination to become recognized not only as the
true successor to bin Laden, but more important, as
the successor of the prophet Mohammed. This claim
has been ridiculed by various Islamic scholars and
religious leaders and rejected by many rival Islamist
extremist groups. But it adds a dangerous new
dimension to the appeal of the Islamic State that is
being amplified by a sophisticated propaganda apparatus that spews high-quality media content on a
4

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variety of social media that appeal to far too many

young Muslims.
ISIS claims that true Islam is being practiced in
its caliphate, the expansion of which will restore
Muslim dignity and stature lost to the West. In the
caliphate, according to ISIS propaganda, a Muslim
can live out his faith in a committed Muslim community that offers camaraderie and identity. Working to expand the state, whether as fighters, mothers birthing the next generation of militants, or civil
servants keeping the bureaucracy running, offers a
sense of purpose and a cause greater than oneself.
ISIS recruiters know their target audience and
understand how to appeal to potential recruits
through a broad spectrum of social media. The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) interviewed former
foreign fighters for Islamist extremist groups. The
ISD found three major motivations for joining: (1)
reacting to a perceived injustice or persecution, (2)
loneliness and search for identity, and (3) seeking
purpose and meaning, a search for something bigger
than oneself.19


SPECIAL REPORT | NO. 180
January 6, 2016

There is no single explanation for what drives a

person to embrace extremism, as the process is driven by a complex mix of triggering events and personal and environmental factors. Former CIA case
officer Patrick Skinner maintains that those fighting
for ISIS can be subdivided into three main categories: the Psychopaths, the Pious, and the Pragmatists.20 Foreign fighters tend to fall into either the
Psychopaths or Pious. The Pragmatists are generally
Syrians or Iraqis who have joined the fight on behalf
of ISIS for non-ideological reasons, such as collecting a paycheck, advancing tribal interests, or fighting common enemies, such as in the case of Iraqi
Baathists and members of Saddam Husseins military and security organizations.
Some Western recruits fall into the category of
Psychopath. They are seeking adventure and violence, and they usually have little to no military
experience. Often they are used for violent propaganda and suicide missions. The Pious are drawn to
join ISIS for religious reasons. These fighters believe
they are fulfilling a religious obligation by undertaking a hijra (a religious migration) to the self-proclaimed caliphate.
ISIS calculates that the release of propaganda videos of the grisly executions of innocents will intimidate the terrorist groups enemies, inspire its followers, and incite further attacks against the enemies of
ISIS. The spectacle of ritual killing is meant to dramatize the power of the movement and the helplessness of its victims, thereby encouraging fanaticism
among its followers. The slickly packaged propaganda seeks to stimulate and galvanize members of the
movement, spur potential recruits to join in the carnage, and incite additional attacks.
By displaying young Muslim militants brazenly
taunting a superpower, it advertises an intoxicating blend of religious fanaticism and revolutionary
violence that attracts impressionable young people.
In the Middle East, the ruthless employment of violence often is taken as a sign of strength that should
be emulated.
When recruiting Western fighters, ISIS often looks
for recent converts or those with little knowledge of
Islam.21 As many as one in six fighters from Europe is
a convert to Islam; many are looking for answers to
the basic questions of life and find purpose in the mission of ISIS.22 Mubin Shaik, a former Taliban recruiter who is now a national security operative in Canada,
told the International Business Times that Islamist

recruiters target people who have little knowledge of

Islam; [p]eople who were converts, because converts
would probably have problems with their parents at
home, so they were more likely to stay in our company.23 Sometimes the initial contact these targeted recruits have is from recruiters who hang around
classes for converts at their local mosques to radicalize them.24 ISIS recruiters have become increasingly
skilled in using social media, and often use Western
foreign fighters to recruit other Westerners.25 The age
of most Western foreign fighters ranges from 18 to
29.26 These are people who have grown up in the age of
social media. ISIS recruiters use Twitter, Instagram,
Facebook, Tumblr,27 and Ask.fm to spread propaganda, romanticize the Islamic State, and answer questions and build relationships with curious potential
recruits.28
There is a vetting process that includes progressive indoctrination to bring foreigners into the
Islamic State. After an individual is identified as
interested in joining ISIS, an interview is set up via
Skype or local contact.29 The interview is used to
determine the legitimacy of the persons interest.
The vetting process includes finding a mentor for
potential recruits, either online or in person, who
serves as a guide while screening the recruit. The
recruiter inculcates the narrative of being a part of
the brotherhood, a community of friends and likeminded individuals working toward a larger goal.30
The recruit then transitions to becoming a foreign
fighter as his recruiter/mentor helps him to travel to
Syria or Iraq to join with the group.
The United States. The majority of foreign
fighters in ISIS come from Arab nations, particularly Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco,
Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Yemen. But the fact that
more than 4,500 of ISIS fighters come from Western
countries, including 250 from the U.S., has raised
alarm about threats they pose to the U.S. homeland.
Armed with a U.S. passport and radical, violent ideologies, these individuals could return to strike inside
the U.S. Furthermore, because these individuals are
often radicalized here in the U.S., it is possible that
some will forgo travel to Syria and Iraq and instead
carry out terrorist attacks inside the U.S.
ISIS has already inspired several attacks in the
U.S. The most notable was the recent shootings in
San Bernardino, California, carried out by Syed
Farook and Tashfeen Malik that killed 14. The investigations into the attacks so far show that Farook
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COMBATTING THE ISIS FOREIGN FIGHTER PIPELINE:
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and Malik had been radicalized for some time and

seem to have been inspired by ISIS ideology. In addition to the San Bernardino attacks, the U.S. has
faced 11 other terror plots that were inspired by
ISISs ideology and message, such as Zale Thompsons hatchet attack on New York City police officers
in October 2014.31 On May 3, 2015, there was a foiled
attack by two Islamist extremists who were fatally
shot by police before they could commit mass murder in Garland, Texas.32 Another case is that of Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud, a naturalized U.S. citizen
born in Somalia, who travelled to Syria in 2014 and
trained with al-Nusra or ISIS before being ordered
to return to the U.S. to engage in terrorism.33 He was
arrested before he could attack a military base in
Texas.34 Those who have joined ISIS or other terrorist groups, have been trained and seen combat, only
to return to the U.S. with that training and those
connections to terrorist groups, are a serious threat
to the U.S. homeland. While some may return to the
U.S. because they have grown disenchanted with the
cause, the violence, or with the living conditions, any
returnee should be viewed as a high risk unless it is
conclusively determined that the returnee could be
an asset in de-radicalizing others.35
FBI Director James Comey has stated that tracking Americans who have returned from Syria is one
of the FBIs top counterterrorism priorities.36 Comey
revealed that the FBI is investigating suspected ISIS
supporters in all 50 states.37 In 2014, then-Attorney
General Eric Holder urged his international counterparts to block the flow of thousands of foreign
fighters to Syria, which he termed a cradle of violent extremism. Speaking at a conference in Norway Holder had declared:
We have a mutual and compelling interest in
developing shared strategies for confronting
the influx of U.S.- and European-born violent
extremists into Syria. And because our citizens
can freely travel, visa free, from the U.S. to Norway and other European statesand vice versa
the problem of fighters in Syria returning home
to any of our countries is a problem for all of our
countries.38

Europe. Europeans have constituted a significant source of foreign fighters for ISIS. Because of
their tremendous propaganda value, European citizens are highly sought after and the target of major
6

recruitment operations by ISIS. Western foreign

fighters create a shock factor for a Western audience in a way not possible by a local fighter. Westerners are jarred when they witness someone, like
Mohammed Emwazi, also known as Jihadi John,
with a British accent decapitating journalists and aid
workers. (A U.S. Army spokesman reported that U.S.
officials were reasonably certain that Jihadi John
was killed in a U.S. drone strike in mid-November.)
Europe has a significant, and ongoing, problem
with homegrown radicalization. For example, in the
U.K., 69 percent of Islamist-related offenses committed between 1999 and 2010 were carried out by British nationals.39 The comparable figure in the United
States between 1997 and 2011 was 54 percent.40
This problem has only been heightened with the
rise of ISIS. An analysis of all ISIS plots in the West
(directed or inspired by the group) from the declaration of its caliphate to August 2015, shows that
66 percent of plotters were living in the very country they were aiming to attack.41 The two large plots
over which ISIS has had operational controlthe
Verviers, Belgium, cell disrupted in January 2015
and the Paris atrocities of November 2015relied
overwhelmingly on operatives who were citizens of
those countries.
This demonstrates that Europes problem goes
beyond an inability to adequately integrate new
immigrants, as many radicalized individuals are
second-generation or even third-generation Muslims born in Europe. The proliferation of social
media and message boards has given ISIS access to
marginalized or disgruntled European youth, who
are more susceptible to targeted and slick recruitment tactics.
Socioeconomic factors, often named as a source
of radicalization, do not explain the radicalization of Muslims in Europe. In the U.K., 42 percent
of Islamist-related offenses were perpetrated by
employed individuals or full-time students. Almost
one-third had attended college. Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab, for example, the Nigerian student
who tried to blow up an airplane flying from the
U.K. to the U.S. with explosives in his underwear on
Christmas Day 2009, was the wealthy son of a banker and had graduated from the prestigious University College London.42 Radicalization of well-off Muslims in Europe should not be surprising, as Osama
bin Laden himself, as well as certain 9/11 hijackers,
came from wealthy families in their home countries.


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January 6, 2016

There are an estimated 3,500 foreigners from

Europe currently fighting for ISIS; this number
more than doubles when including fighters from the
North Caucasus in southern Russia.43 And, not just
men are following the call of ISIS: Dozens of young
women have travelled to Syria and Iraq to marry
fighters. In Belgium and now France, these fighters have returned to Europe to plan attacks. Most
notably, the November 13 terrorist attacks in Paris
were planned and executed in part by ISIS fighters
returning to Europe from Syria.
Almost every European country has been an origin of fighters for ISIS. However, the Nordic region,
the Caucasus, the Balkans, and Western Europe are
worth examining in detail, as the bulk of Europes
foreign fighters come from these four regions.
1. The Nordic Countries. The Nordic countries
have recently undergone swift demographic changes and have struggled to assimilate new immigrants,
some of whom have been susceptible to radicalization. Sweden has taken in large numbers of refugees from the Middle East, up to 190,000 in 2015
alone, second only to Germany, which will accept
more than 1 million asylum seekers, mostly young
Muslim males, in 2015.44 Sweden has also taken in a
large number of Somali and Iraqi refugees over the
past two decades. Unemployment is rampant among
many of these migrant communities. For example,
over half of foreign-born residents in Sweden are
unemployed.45
Denmark has tightened its asylum laws, and instituted a temporary residence permit for asylum seekers from countries embroiled in civil war.46 However,
the Nordic regions interconnectedness means that
new measures to curb asylum seekers in one country may not be effective. For instance, citizenship
agreements between Nordic nations allow refugees
who obtain Swedish citizenship to move to Denmark
without a Danish resident permit.47
Denmark has some of the highest per capita rates
of citizens traveling to Syria and Iraq to fight with ISIS
in all of Western Europe.48 Danish security services
estimate that about 115 Muslims with Danish citizenship have traveled to Iraq and Syria to wage jihad, and
note that the numbers could be higher.49 Danish security forces assess the domestic terror threat as stemming mainly from individuals and small groups that
already have a militant Islamist outlook, and are then
inspired by ISIS to act, like the lone wolf perpetrator of the Copenhagen attack.50 In February 2015, a

22-year-old Danish citizen who had sworn allegiance

to ISIS leader al-Baghdadi attacked a synagogue and
a caf in Copenhagen killing two before being fatally
shot after opening fire on police.51
The other Nordic nations also face the threat
of returning fighters. Approximately 300 Swedes
have traveled to Iraq and Syria for jihad, with 80
believed to have returned to Sweden.52 In addition,
70 Norwegians are believed to have traveled to the
region to fight, with 20 having returned to Norway.
While Finland does not have as many citizens traveling to fight in Iraq and Syria, at least 60 Finnish
passport holders are estimated to be fighting with
the Islamic State. In December 2014, four Somalis
living in Finland were convicted of financing terrorist acts, with one also convicted of recruitment
to commit terrorism and planning to commit terrorist acts. It was the first terrorism trial in the
countrys history.
2. The Caucasus. The Caucasus can be divided
into two unique geographical areas separated by a
major mountain range bearing the same name. For
the purposes of this Special Report, the North Caucasus encompasses the Russian areas of Dagestan,
Chechnya, and Ingushetia; and the South Caucasus
encompasses Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.
The Islamist insurgency in the North Caucasus
threatens to turn the region into a haven for international terrorism and to destabilize the entire area,
which is a critical hub of oil and gas pipelines located
at Europes doorstep. Neither Russias excessive use
of military force nor its massive economic aid to the
region appear to have helped quell the threat of terrorism. Some estimates claim there are as many as
3,000 Chechens fighting for the Islamic State.53
The South Caucasus has been a culturally, economically, and militarily important regional crossroads for centuries. While this strategic location has
sometimes provided benefits, in the case of the rise
of ISIS, it clearly is a liability. This is because the
South Caucasus is increasingly becoming a recruiting ground and transit route for fighters heading
to Syria.
The number of Georgians fighting for the Islamic
State is around 100,54 while the number of Azerbaijani fighters is between 200 and 300, including Azerbaijani wrestling champion, Rashad Bakhshaliyev,
who was killed fighting for the Islamic State in 2014.55
Visa-free travel, cheap transit costs, and shared
land borders between Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Tur7


COMBATTING THE ISIS FOREIGN FIGHTER PIPELINE:
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key make getting to Iraq and Syria relatively easy.

Georgia, which borders Chechnya and Dagestan,
two extremist hotbeds in southern Russia, serves as
a major transit country for fighters headed to Syria
and Iraq. Georgia also has a land border with Turkey,
another major transit country for fighters entering
Iraq and Syria.
Perhaps the most well-known Islamic State fighter from the Caucasus is Tarkhan Batirashvili, who
goes by the nom de guerre Abu Omar al-Shishani
Omar the Chechen. After a stint in the Georgian
army he now serves as an Islamic State senior commander with authority over Aleppo, Raqqa, Latakia, and northern Idlib provinces in Syria.56 His fair
skin and red beard have become a regular feature in
Islamic State propaganda products.
3. The Balkans. The Balkans have long served as
Europes tinder box. Although security in the region
has improved dramatically since the 1990s, sectarian divisions remain and are exacerbated by sluggish
economies, high unemployment rates, and endemic
political corruption.
The region has not yet suffered an attack by the
Islamic State, but has served as a fertile recruiting ground for the group. High unemployment and
stagnant economies have added to the social pressures in the Balkans. Islamic State recruiters have
taken advantage of the fact that many men feel
marginalized from mainstream society and see
few options for the future. There are several hundred fighters from the Balkans fighting in Iraq and
Syria.57 These foreign fighters have even formed a
Balkans Battalion for the Islamic State. The bulk
of the fighters have come from Kosovo, but others can be traced back to Albania, Bosnia, and the
Republic of Macedonia.
The region is important for the Islamic State
for reasons beyond recruitment. The Balkans are
becoming an important transit route for the Islamic
State, allowing fighters to travel between Western
Europe and the Middle East. This is especially true
for Greece and Croatia with their long coastlines.
There is concern that, if the current trajectory continues, ISIS could use the Balkans to plan and launch
attacks across the rest of Europe.
4. Western Europe. Western Europe is also a
major recruiting ground for ISIS. As a consequence,
the region has also been the location of multiple terrorist attacks. One study showed a total of 13 ISIS
or ISIS-inspired plots in Western Europe between
8

July 2014 and August 2015.58 This number has now

increased following the spate of attacks across
France in November 2015.
France alone has an estimated 1,550 citizens
or residents involved in some form with terrorist
groups in Iraq and Syria, 800 of whom have traveled
to the region.59 As many as 650 Belgian, 550 German,
700 British, and 100 Dutch citizens have traveled to
fight in Iraq and Syria. This is in addition to smaller
numbers of fighters from Austria, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland.60
One of the key vulnerabilities of Western Europe
derives from the free movement of persons within
the EUs open-borders Schengen zone. Inside the
Schengen zone, the EU forbids systematic checks of
EU citizens against various law enforcement databases.61 Furthermore, no uniform EU air-passenger-screening system exists. This is particularly
problematic as potential foreign fighters traveling to
Iraq and Syria frequently travel to Greece (which is
within the Schengen zone) or Bulgaria before crossing the land border into Turkey. The same ease of
crossing borders inside the Schengen zone applies to
foreign fighters who return to Europe.
Immigration and Assimilation Challenges. A
study by the Centre for Hizmet Studies found that
the radicalization of Western European citizens
occurs most often when Islamist extremists take
advantage of certain conditions, including an identity crisis; perceived grievances; a sense of helplessness; or a sense of alienation from, or stigmatization
by, broader society.62
Instead of seeking long-term solutions to controversial issues like immigration and assimilation, many
European countries have focused solely on legislative
responses. An anti-terrorism law passed prior to the
Charlie Hebdo terrorist attack in January 2015 allows
France to seize the passports of citizens suspected of
trying to leave the country to engage in terrorist activity.63 Additionally, the French parliament is expected
to pass a bill that will increase the power of the government to surveil suspected terrorists. The Georgian
government has responded to the foreign fighter problem by also proposing legislation making it a criminal act to join or support terrorist groups. Denmark
enacted a law in 2015 under which Danish citizens suspected of planning to travel to Iraq and Syria to fight
alongside ISIS can have their passports confiscated
and be banned from travel outside the country.64 Norway passed a statute in 2013, criminalizing preparato-


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ry acts of terrorism. Sweden has proposed legislation

that would put in place passport restrictions against
Swedes looking to fight with ISIS.
The U.K. faces a massive problem from homegrown terrorism. MI5, the domestic security agency, is now thought to be monitoring 3,000 terror
suspects (up from 2,000 monitored in 2007).65 The
U.K. has struggled to deal with the radicalization
of Muslim youth for decades. British Muslims travelled to fight in Bosnia in the early 1990s. One British Muslim is believed to have carried out a suicide
bombing in Afghanistan as early as 1996,66 and it
has been estimated that between 1997 and 2000,
another 200 were killed fighting in Kashmir, Chechnya, and Afghanistan.67 Authorities did little to stop
recruitment, fundraising, or the preaching of jihad
in radical mosques. For example, the Finsbury Park
Mosque in London became a European hub for helping aspiring jihadists either receive terrorist training or engaging in jihad abroad.
British authorities started to take the problem
more seriously after 9/11. This led to the arrest in
March 2004, and subsequent convictions, of members of a British cell planning to detonate fertilizer
bombs, as well as the arrest in August 2004 of alQaeda operative Dhiren Barot. As successful as U.K.
security agencies and police have been in thwarting
terrorist attacks, they were ultimately unable to prevent the suicide attacks on London public transportation in July 2005, which killed 52, or the murder of
Drummer Lee Rigby by Islamist extremists in South
London in May 2013.
The Conservative government in the U.K. has
been aware of the ongoing problems posed by radicalization. In 2011, in its first term in office, David
Camerons government revised the previous governments Prevent counter-extremism program,
indicating that it was flawed in serious ways. For
instance, the Conservative government pointed out
that a portion of the funding for Prevent programs
ended up in the hands of organizations espousing
extremist ideologies. The Prevent program thus, in
effect, supported the very organizations it was created to stop.
In this reformulated Prevent, the government
also provided a definition for the type of extremism
it was combating: vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the
rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect
and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also

include in our definition of extremism calls for the

death of members of our armed forces.68
The government has also now provided a definition of British values in an attempt to undercut the
extremist narrative and strengthen national cohesion. It defined these values as a belief in democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual
respect and tolerance for those with different faiths
and beliefs.69
The governments battles on this front do not just
pertain to the violent extremism espoused by ISIS or
al-Qaeda, but also soft Islamist entry into the public sphere. For example, in 2014, the Trojan Horse
scandal revealed that Islamists were taking over local
school governing bodies (particularly in Birmingham, West Midlands) in order to enforce the teaching
of hardline, intolerant Islamic views in the classroom.
In late October 2015, Prime Minister David
Cameron announced new proposals to counter
extremism and the radicalization of British youth.
The new measures aim to curb the flow of foreign
fighters from the U.K. to the Middle East by allowing parents to revoke their childrens passport if
they suspect that they are interested in travelling to the Middle East to fight with ISIS. The new
plan also includes steps to prevent radical material
from being posted online, and to bar anyone who
expresses support for terrorism or extremism from
working with children. Calling the struggle against
Islamist extremism one of the great struggles of
his generation, Cameron also re-emphasized the
importance of promoting national values like tolerance of different faiths.70
Camerons statements provoked criticism by
some Muslim organizations, who claimed that they
contained undertones of McCarthyism. Cameron defended his position by posting on his Facebook page: While Islamist extremists in no way
represent the true spirit of Islam, we cannot ignore
the fact that they attempt to justify their views and
actions through Islamic scripture and theology.71
Africa. Africa has had a foreign fighter problem
for decades. Long before ISIS was spawned, North
African militants flocked to Afghanistan to join the
anti-Soviet mujahideen; a number of them returned
to their native countries to found terrorist groups
that still exist today. More recently, documents captured in Iraq in 2007 showed that 40 percent of foreign fighters who joined al-Qaeda in Iraq in a oneyear period were North African.72
9


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The problem has worsened since the rise of ISIS.

Citizens of as many as 13 African countries have
joined the group and other Middle East terror organizations, such as Jabhat al-Nusra.73 One African
country, Tunisia, is the worlds largest exporter of
fighters to ISIS. Most of the fighters hail from the
Arab countries of North Africa, though Nigeria
recently claimed it had stopped 24,000 people from
leaving the country, some of whom were allegedly
bound for terrorist organizations.74
The environments in the countries of North Africa heighten the appeal of ISISs message. All five have
relatively high youth unemployment, which scholars
have found has a strong association with terrorism
in Europe.75 In 2013, the world youth unemployment
rate was about 14 percent, while North African rates
ranged from 18.5 percent (Morocco) to 51 percent
(Libya).76 Most foreign ISIS recruits are between 18
years and 29 years old.77
Corruption remains widespread as well. Tunisia has the best score for North African countries
in Transparency Internationals 2014 Corruption
Perceptions Index, but receives only a 40 of 100, with
100 being the best possible score. Libya has the worst
regional score, at 18.78 More broadly, Muslim-majority countries around the world, including in North
Africa, fare poorly in many human development categories; for frustrated North Africans with few prospects, the solutions ISIS claims it has for the troubles of the Muslim world can be compelling.79
The failure of the Arab Spring has added to the
disillusionment of North Africans. As the revolutions began to sweep through the region in 2010, they
ignited hope that, after decades of seemingly indissoluble autocratic misrule, a better life was within
the grasp of millions who had known little of it.
Those hopes remain largely unrealized, however.
An autocrat whose policies resemble those of former
president Hosni Mubarak, toppled during the Arab
Spring, is in power in Egypt. The revolution largely
bypassed Algeria, and its president won a fourth term
in 2014 in tarnished elections.80 Libya has collapsed
into a virtual failed state. Moroccans enjoy more freedoms than most of their regional brethren, but no
sweeping democratic advances are likely in the country. Tunisia has made the greatest democratic strides
since 2010, yet they are fragile and reversible.
Tunisias laudable progress in human rights and
democracy inadvertently deepened its radicalization problem. Hundreds of Islamists imprisoned
10

by former President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali were

released after the 2011 revolution, and some Tunisian fighters took advantage of the newly open environment to return from abroad. One of the released
prisoners, Seifallah ben Hassine, went on to found
the terrorist group Ansar al-Sharia that courted
support in poorer communities in Tunisia.81
North Africa is also overwhelmingly Sunni, and
has experienced an upsurge of Sunnis subscribing to Salafism, a Sunni sect. Salafists believe that
teachings derived from revelations after the time of
Mohammed and of his immediate coterie are heretical aberrations from pure Islam.82 Adherents of a
fanatical subset of Salafism, Salafi-Jihadism, believe
they are divinely mandated to impose on the world
their narrowly conceived version of Islam. ISIS is
staunchly Salafi-Jihad, as are most other contemporary Islamist terrorist organizations.
Not all Salafists are interested in establishing a
caliphate ruled by Islamic lawin fact, there are quietist Salafist factions that abjure all political activity.
But as Salafism has grown in North Africa,83 so, too,
has Salafi-Jihadism,84 widening the pool of people
disposed to ISISs worldview.
Yet none of these phenomena fully explain Islamic radicalization. The majority of Muslims, including
from impoverished and repressed countries, repudiate extremist Islam. Tunisia is North Africas leastcorrupt and highest-ranked country in the U.N.
Human Development Index, yet exports the most
militants to ISIS. Morocco has the lowest youth
unemployment rate and sends the second-most
fighters to ISIS.85
The complexity of the phenomenon partly
explains why it has been so difficult for the countries of North Africa, and throughout the world, to
stem the rising tide of radicalization. The Moroccan government has perhaps the most comprehensive program in the region, earning praise from the
U.S. State Department. The Moroccans have constructed a multi-pronged approach that includes
counter-radicalization initiatives, such as religious
and political reforms, and deradicalization measures, such as outreach to radicalized prisoners
and reintegration of reformed Islamists into society.86 Algeria and Tunisia also have committed to
approaches that incorporate security measures and
initiatives to address the ideological and environmental aspects of the problem.87 Egypt has taken
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approach, while the Libyan government is virtually

nonexistent and lacks the capacity to combat ISISs
influence inside its borders.
South Asia. ISIS is seeking to make inroads into
South Asia, but its efforts have so far met with only
limited success.88 ISIS has sought to gain the allegiance of various terrorist groups in the region and
in January announced the formation of the Khorasan group. Khorasan is an Islamic historical term
used to describe the area encompassed by Afghanistan, parts of Pakistan, and parts of other countries bordering Afghanistan. According to the Hadith (sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad),
South-Central Asia maintains a key role in establishing a global caliphate. The Hadith contains references to the Ghazwa-e-Hind (Battle of India), where
the final battle between Muslims and non-Muslims
before the end times will supposedly take place. One
Hadith further says that an army with black flags
will emerge from Khorasan to help the Mahdi (the
prophesied redeemer of Islam) establish his caliphate at Mecca.89
So far, only a handful of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leaders and a few disgruntled Afghan
Taliban leaders have pledged their allegiance to
ISIS leader Baghdadi. The announcement in late
July 2015 that Taliban leader Mullah Omar died
two years before could prompt further defections to
ISIS. In fact, in early August, the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan (IMU), which operates mainly in
northern Afghanistan, announced its allegiance to
ISIS and accused the Taliban of lying about the circumstances surrounding Mullah Omars death. The
Pakistan-based anti-Shia sectarian outfit Jundullah
also reportedly pledged support to ISIS.
The limited appeal of ISIS in South Asia is most
likely due to the well-established roots of al-Qaeda in
the region and al-Qaedas ability to maintain the loyalty of the various South Asian terrorist organizations.
Al-Qaeda leader al-Zawahiri has carefully nurtured
the groups relationship with the Afghan Taliban, and
publicly pledged his allegiance to Mullah Omars successor, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, in August.
The number of fighters that have traveled from
South Asia to fight with ISIS in Iraq and Syria also
is relatively low. The International Centre for the
Study of Radicalization estimates that only around
50 fighters have traveled from Afghanistan, 500
from Pakistan, and merely a handful from India and
Bangladesh.90

Even though ISISs attempts to establish a foothold in Afghanistan have thus far been limited, its
activities are complicating the militant landscape
and contributing to overall instability. For example,
ISIS claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing
outside a bank in Jalalabad on April 18, 2015, that
killed 35 people. There have been sporadic reports
of clashes between ISIS militants and the Taliban
in eastern and southern Afghanistan, and a former
Taliban leader, Mullah Abdul Rauf, who pledged
allegiance to ISIS earlier in the year, was killed in a
drone strike in Afghanistan in February 2015.
On July 7, a U.S. drone strike in the eastern Afghan
province of Nangahar killed more than two dozen
ISIS fighters, including Shahidullah Shahid, former
spokesman for the Pakistani Taliban, who defected
to ISIS ranks in 2014.91 In congressional testimony
in 2015, Commander of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan
General John Campbell said the presence of ISIS in
Afghanistan largely consisted of rebranding of a few
marginalized Taliban members.
The Afghan Taliban view ISIS as a direct competitor, vying for financial resources, recruits, and
ideological influence. This competition was evident in a letter sent by the Taliban to ISIS leader alBaghdadi in mid-June, urging the group not to take
actions that could lead to division of the Mujahideens command. An Afghan Taliban commander
told the Western media in May that elements of
ISIS had started recruiting in the country and were
moving in groups of a few dozen, conducting military exercises.92 He said that Taliban commanders
are aware that their fighters are impressed with
the territorial gains that ISIS has made in Iraq
and Syria.
Zawahiri has sought to strengthen relations with
Pakistan-based terrorist groups and make inroads
with the Muslim populations in other parts of South
Asia to help fend off ISIS encroachment.93 In September 2014, Zawahiri made a video announcement
launching an al-Qaeda wing in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS).94 In the video, Zawahiri assures Muslims in India, Bangladesh, and Burma that the organization did not forget you and that they are doing
what they can to rescue you from injustice, oppression, persecution, and suffering.
With the worlds largest Muslim-minority population (around 176 million), Indias strong democratic foundations, which include a secular constitution
guaranteeing the rights of religious minorities, have
11


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helped to limit proliferation of radical Islamist ideologies in the country. In September, more than 1,000
Indian Muslim clerics ratified a religious edict condemning ISIS and calling its actions un-Islamic.
Despite a general lack of interest so far from the
Indian Muslim community in joining ISIS, Indian leaders must remain on guard. In June, Indian
authorities arrested Mehdi Masroor Biswas, who was
operating a pro-ISIS Twitter handle while working
with a multinational company in Bengaluru, Indias
high-tech hub. Mehdi was charged with allowing his
account to serve as a meeting place for ISIS supporters and facilitating contact between top ISIS leaders.
There are reportedly 10 members of the Indian Mujahideen (IM) indigenous terrorist group that have travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight with ISIS; however, the
IM, as a group, has not sworn allegiance to Baghdadi.95
Likewise, Bangladesh was founded on principles of
secularism and pluralism, and most Bangladeshis value
Bengali culture as part of their core identity, which
has contributed to a traditionally tolerant society that
eschews extremist ideologies. Still, a series of recent
attacks in Bangladesh claimed by ISIS have raised fears
that the group is developing a presence inside the country. On September 28, 2015, an Italian aid worker was
gunned down while jogging in the streets of Dhaka. ISIS
claimed responsibility for the attack, although the Bangladeshi government has denied that ISIS was involved.
Five days later, masked gunmen riding on a motorbike
killed a Japanese agricultural worker in northern Bangladesh. The attacks follow the murders of five secular
bloggers since the beginning of the year and have raised
alarm among the Western expatriate community in
Bangladesh.96
A bomb attack in late October in Dhaka during
a procession commemorating the Shia holiday of
Ashura was also claimed by ISIS, raising the prospect that ISIS operatives may be linking up with
indigenous Bangladeshi terrorist groups. This was
the first sectarian attack in the country, marking a possible major departure for the trajectory of
Islamist violence in the country.
The Bangladeshi authorities arrested several
members of Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh
(JMB) in 2015 for making or attempting to make
contact with ISIS. JMB is the Bangladeshi extremist group responsible for a series of bombings
throughout the country in 2005. The previous government executed several of JMBs leaders but the
group was never fully eradicated. It is possible that
12

an indigenous Bangladeshi terrorist group like the

JMB is working either directly or indirectly with
ISIS operatives.
In another sign of its growing interest in Bangladesh, ISIS recently published a five-page article titled,
The Revival of Jihad in Bengal, in its flagship magazine Dabiq, which warned of further attacks against
Westerners in Bangladesh.
Western Pacific Region. East Asia is home to
the worlds largest Muslim-majority country, Indonesia, as well as one of its most economically developed, Malaysia. Combined, they represent 95 percent of Asias Muslim population.97 In Southeast
Asia, specifically, it is these two countries that are
most susceptible to the ISIS foreign fighter phenomenon. Several other countries in the region with significant Muslim minorities, the Philippines, Thailand, and Burma, for example, pose less of a direct
problem.98 China has a relatively difficult-to-discern
challenge in its west, and Australia, surprisingly,
given its small Muslim minority, also faces a significant problem with foreign fighters.
Violent Islamists have been at work in Indonesia
throughout its existence as an independent nation,
from the Darul Islam (DI) movement and the secessionist Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) through the
foreign fighter phenomenon around the Soviet war
in Afghanistan to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the
groups that have splintered off from it.
Abu Bakar Baasyir, the founder of JI, Indonesias most effective terrorist organization of the past
decade, comes from a DI background. He has now
pledged allegiance to the claimed ISIS caliphate and
encouraged his followers to do the same. JI, from
which Baasyir ultimately broke, has been in decline
for many years as a result of an effective government crackdown. It is now opposed to ISISs flavor
of radicalism, in deference to al-Nusras, but groups
that have emerged from it, including Baasyirs own,
Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) and Mujahideen
Indonesia Timor (MIT), have also pledged allegiance
to ISIS. The head of MIT, Abu Warda Santoso, is the
most high profile of Indonesias ISIS advocates. His
group is very small30 membersbut it controls
symbolically important territory in a very remote
area of Indonesia, on Sulawesi Island. Much more
significant in terms of real influence in Indonesia is
Aman Abdurrahman, who serves as a central figure
in connecting the dozen or so organizations aligned
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January 6, 2016

Over the decades, one factor that has helped

Indonesian authorities contain Islamist violence
is the communal nature of the movement, that is,
geographic, ethnic, and family ties among the foot
soldiers. In addition to infiltrating these networks,
however, ISIS is using modern media to overcome
communal constraints. It is thereby appealing to a
broader cross-section of Indonesian100 society than
previous groups, and is gaining influence with people with no previous ties to violent extremism.101
In another departure from most indigenous
Indonesian Islamist movements, ISIS represents a
direct threat to Indonesias sovereignty. Indonesia
has been an independent nation for fewer than 70
years. Its political leadership and people are highly
protective of the countrys sovereignty. Allegiance
to ISIS means allegiance to a foreign power with
the trappings of a state, territory, and government.
This is new, and it has made Indonesian authorities
particularly vigilant about stamping it out,102 to a
much greater degree than previous terrorist organizations. The horrific violence that characterizes
ISIS has also had an impact on Indonesias leadership. In 2014, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono called the Islamic States violence
shocking and embarrassing and humiliating
to Islam.103
In terms of numbers, estimates vary, but by one
authoritative account, only about 159 Indonesians
have gone to fight in Syria and Iraq, not including
families and charity workers. Eleven of these fighters are confirmed dead, though there are estimates
of higher casualty rates, while 11 have returned to
Indonesia.104 Other authoritative estimates put the
number between 250 and 300.105 Not all of these fighters are going to Iraq and Syria to serve ISIS. Many are
joining up with al-Nusra, which taps into a different,
smaller range of organizations in Indonesia.
There also is an historical JI connection in Malaysia. Baasyir co-founded the organization there while
in exile from Indonesia in 1993. Similar to Indonesia,
ISIS in Malaysia has tapped into JIs organizational
structure and draws recruits already organized into
cells.106 Also like in Indonesia, but to a much greater
extent,107 ISIS is using Internet and social media to
reach beyond these traditional sources for recruits.
There are between 67 and 154 Malaysian fighters
in Syria and Iraq. Of these, counterterrorism officials have confirmed 11 Malaysians have been killed,
including six suicide bombers.108 Multiple reports

indicate that these low numbers are largely attributable to the efforts of the government to restrict travel.
Indonesians and Malaysians speak close variants of the same language. ISIS has sought to both
take advantage of this and overcome the obstacle of
the recruits near-illiteracy in Arabic by establishing Katibah Nusantara, an ISIS Southeast Asian
unit, and schools for the children of recruits.109 Of
course, this accommodation would also help ISIS
build capacity to reach out to potential new recruits
in the region.
Australian authorities recently estimated that
approximately 120 Australians are currently fighting or are engaged with terrorist groups in Syria
and Iraq.110Australia has some history with foreign
fighters; approximately 30 fighters went to Afghanistan and Pakistan between 1990 and 2010.111 In addition, over the past decade or so, a handful of Australians have traveled to Lebanon to fight in the civil
war there. This raises concern that Australian foreign fighters will take advantage of the links they
already have to Lebanon to enter Syria, thus opening an alternative transit route to the SyrianTurkish border.112 Another unique concern for Australia
regarding ISIS is the emergence of an Australian
convert, Musa Certanonio, as one of the most popular preachers and recruiters for ISIS globally.113
With regard to China, assessing the foreign fighter phenomenon is made difficult by the context of
Chinas concern over separatism in its west, namely
its oppressive policies there regarding the Muslim
Uighur minority and reliance on state propaganda
organs, rather than independent outlets, to disseminate information on the threat from the region.
Party-run sources in China have put the number
of Uighur fighters going to fight in Syria and Iraq at
300 or more. This number almost certainly is too
high. Independent estimates put it at between 20 and
30.114 Common linguistic and cultural connections
to Turkey mean that Uighurs fleeing Chinese repression often go to Turkey and stay there, rather than
travelling on to Syria. Chinese interest in combatting separatism in its Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous
Region province colors any assessment or assertions
Beijing makes about connections between ISIS and
what has been called the East Turkestan Islamic
Movement (ETIM).
In July 2014, Baghdadi singled China out for
revenge, saying, Muslim rights are forcibly seized in
China, India, and Palestine, and telling the Uighurs:
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Your brothers all over the world are waiting for your
rescue, and are anticipating your brigades. Chinese
media coverage of the speech pointed out that China
was first on the list and displayed a map showing territory ISIS planned to take in the next five years, including a significant portion of Xinjiang.115 The speech may
have served as a wake-up call for Beijing, but it also
presented an opportunity to legitimize the states
own unique concerns regarding its Uighur minority.

U.S. Tools to Stop Foreign Fighters

Given the growing number of foreign fighters, a brief

analysis of U.S. intelligence and travel systems, as well
as efforts to counter violent Islamist extremism, should
be considered, as such tools constitute the primary
ways the U.S. can combat the foreign fighter problem.
Intelligence. The U.S. has significant intelligence
capabilities for tracking suspected terrorists. While
this Special Report cannot do justice to adequately
describe all those capabilities, the primary forms
of intelligence in this area are signals intelligence
(SIGINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT). Under
SIGINT, the U.S. seeks to access or trace the electronic
communications of known or suspected international terrorists. Different programs are bound by different rules, especially in terms of who is targeted. For
example, one of the programs authorized by section
702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
allows the National Security Agency (NSA) to collect communications from non-U.S. persons who are
believed to be engaged in terrorist activity or otherwise
have pertinent foreign intelligence information.116
In the summer of 2015, Congress passed, and the
President signed into law, the USA Freedom Act.The
act banned180 days after the act became lawthe
NSA from bulk collection of metadata telephone
records, which it had been doing under Section 215 of
FISA and court orders from the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC). The act now requires the
government to request call-detail records on a specific selection term that identifies a person, account,
address, or personal device from the FISC. The act
requires the government to adopt minimization procedures of all call-detail records determined not to
be foreign intelligence information. Under the nowexpired Section 215, phone companies had been
required to give the NSA metadata of all phone calls,
to include the date and time of call, but not the contents of the conversations. The USA Freedom Act
also prohibits the use, in court proceedings, of infor14

mation obtained under the FISA Section 702 programoverseas surveillance of foreign citizens.
On the other hand, HUMINT sources gather
intelligence based on individuals access to sensitive information. Outside the United States, the CIA
and Defense Intelligence Agency gather intelligence
from individuals within or connected to some element of a terrorist organization or a nation state.
Domestically, the FBI often receives reporting from
informants on individuals who may be engaging in
various aspects of terrorist activities. Indeed, the
House Committee on Homeland Security recently
found that more than 75 percent of foreign fighter
arrests involved reports from human sources.117 Of
course, the U.S. also receives a great deal of intelligence from American friends and allies. Through
the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), for instance, participant countries are required to provide the U.S.
with information on known and suspected terrorists, serious criminals, and lost and stolen passports.
Multiple intelligence agencies as well as state and
local law enforcement also monitor social media
to detect individuals who may be looking to act on
a violent ideology, a form of intelligence that may
more aptly be described as open source intelligence
(OSINT).118 Indeed, there is a growing capability in
the cyber domain that enables tracking the activities of known or suspected terrorists. This type of
collection is governed by many of the same rules
applicable to the collection of signals intelligence
described above.119
These tools, however, face an intelligence budget that has fallen significantly over the past several
years. In fiscal year (FY) 2010, the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the Military Intelligence
Program (MIP) were appropriated a cumulative total
of $80.1 billion. In FY 2013 and FY 2014, U.S. intelligence received just under $68 billion.120 U.S. intelligence programs have also faced greater restrictions,
such as the changes exemplified by the USA Freedom Act, which curtailed the effective use of the section 215 program. Director of National Intelligence
James Clapper stated that in terms of both direct
compromises that have been made and conscious
decisions weve made to throttle backthe damaging impact theyve had in terms of foreign relationships, not to mention domestic partnerships. You
overlay that with the budget cuts weve incurred
three solid years of cutting intelligenceand the
bottom line isaccepting more risk.121 Such reali-


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ties paint a picture of grave concern for how well the

American intelligence community can continue to
provide political decision makers, the military, and
law enforcement communities with the information
needed to prevent terror attacks on U.S. soil.
Travel. Intelligence is what allows the FBI, the
nations primary domestic counter-terrorism organization, to investigate individuals whom it suspects of seeking to travel abroad to fight for a radical
Islamist group or engage in terrorism here at home.
The intelligence community provides a wide array
of information that makes its way into one of several
U.S. databases. The Terrorist Identities Datamart
Environment (TIDE) is the U.S. Governments central repository of information on international terrorist identities.122 The FBI combines information
from TIDE with its intelligence on domestic terrorism to compile the Terrorists Screening Database
(TSDB), the central U.S. terrorism watch list that is
then used to populate other sub-databases and watch
lists that are used to prevent travel, or to at least
notify authorities when an individual is travelling.
For example, the Transportation Security Administrations Secure Flight and No Fly and Selectee Lists,
and the Customs and Border Protections TECS and
Advance Passenger Information System, as well as
other systems, derive their information from the
TSDB and are used to prevent suspicious individuals
from boarding flights, require additional screening,
and alert officials to the attempted travel.123
The VWP, which allows travelers from 38 trusted
nations to visit the U.S. without a visa for up to 90 days,
is part of the solution. To join the VWP, member countries must share additional intelligence on known and
suspected terrorists, serious criminals, and lost and
stolen passports, which improves the U.S.s ability to
stop terrorist travel. The VWP also screens applicants
through various government databases and watch
lists, which, when combined with other programs
mentioned above, ensures that individuals coming
to the U.S. do not pose a threat. While Congress is
worried that European citizens who became foreign
fighters in Syria may abuse the VWP to attack the U.S.,
the reality is that the U.S. gains valuable intelligence
through the VWP process that it otherwise may not
receive. Indeed, the U.S. should consider judiciously
expanding the VWP to other trusted countries, such
as Poland, as that will improve U.S. intelligence and
allow Washington to focus finite consular resources
on higher-risk countries and individuals.124

Ultimately, the failure to identify foreign fighters and self-radicalized terrorists springs from the
lack of intelligence linking the individual to a violent,
Islamist ideology. While improvements in the traveler
screening systems could certainly be made to better
detect and prevent prospective foreign fighters from
travelling, the reality is that many succeed in making
it to the Middle East because the U.S. does not have
sufficient, actionable intelligence to justify preventing
an individual from travelling. The House Committee
on Homeland Security estimated that only about 15
percent of foreign fighters from the U.S. are stopped
from reaching the conflict zone by U.S. law enforcement. Without credible intelligence of an individuals
radicalization and signs of planning to act on that radical ideology, a flight to or through Turkey for vacation
is often indistinguishable from a trip to join ISIS.
Countering Violent Extremism. As a supplement to intelligence and traditional counterterrorism tools, Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)
programs are aimed at preventing and reversing
the radicalization of individuals to violent ideologies. CVE efforts must be driven primarily by local
governments, the private sector, and civil society in
order to address the specific local circumstances and
environment, to be viewed as authentic and authoritative, and to be correctly focused. Only local partners can know what their community needs and how
to correctly prevent radicalizing individuals from
acting on a radical ideology. For example, a University of Southern California study prepared for the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on CVE
efforts in MinneapolisSt. Paul challenged common assumptions. Those who were recruited to join
al-Shabaab from the Somali community were not
necessarily poor or unsuccessful. Moreover, recruitment in this community, though supported by social
media, depended largely on face-to-face interaction.
Such unique features can only be noted by each local
community and are key to successful CVE programs.
Currently, the U.S. has a CVE strategy, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in
the United States, which wisely identified local law
enforcement and community organizations as key
to stopping radicalization.125 In December 2011, the
White House followed up with its plan to implement
that strategy, assigning responsibilities to a variety
of federal agencies, with DHS leading or collaborating with others to reach most objectives, but also
assigning many tasks to the FBI and the Depart15


COMBATTING THE ISIS FOREIGN FIGHTER PIPELINE:
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ment of Justice.126 However, this strategy has fallen

short, lacking meaningful attention and resources.

Policy Recommendations

Rolling backand defeatingISIS requires a

global approach in which the U.S. leads a multipronged, multi-nation effort that seeks to deny ISIS
the ability to hold territory; disrupts its recruitment
of foreign fighters; and counters its destructive ideology. The U.S. must:
Deny Territorial Gains. One part of the solution must be military. The Islamic State derives
much of its cachet and legitimacy from its success.
The groups glossy magazine, Dabiq, frequently
trumpets ISIS victories as a sign of Allahs favor, and
even has a recurring feature titled, In the Words of
the Enemy, which consists of quotations by senior
Western officials lamenting ISIS gains. Driving ISIS
from its conquered territories will undermine the
groups legitimacy in the eyes of aspiring jihadists,
thereby hurting its ability to recruit.
Continue to Focus on High-Value Targets
(HVT). ISIS is stocked with experienced and ruthless military leaders, who must continue to be targeted via drone strikes (providing there are no ground
forces capable of carrying out the attack). Baghdadi is a clear high-priority target. However, drone
strikes alone will not achieve victory over ISIS. They
must be accompanied by a political, military, and
ideological plan for resolving the Syria/Iraq crisis.
Shut Down the Foreign Fighter Pipeline. The
key to shutting down the flow of foreign fighters is
intelligence. The U.S. and its allies must work together to identify those individuals who intend to act on
the violent Islamist ideology. This requires hard intelligence work and even closer coordination between
countries to identify suspicious travel. This includes
pushing allies to take greater intelligence and security
measures that reflect the global nature of the threat.
The U.S. should make greater use of state and local law
enforcement, both as intelligence sources and as intelligence users. When debating intelligence funding and
resources, Congress should consider the critical role
that intelligence plays in thwarting terrorist activity.
Counter Islamist Ideology. The other important task is to defeat the ideology of Islamist extremism. Only Muslims have the knowledge and credibility within their communities to lead this fight.
Moroccos program of training foreign imams in
the countrys Maliki school of Islam has potential,
16

though the countrys continuing radicalization problem shows there is still a long way to go. Egypt has
made the most high-profile attempt to fight extremist ideology. In response to calls for reform by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Egypts Ministry
of Education is removing radical texts from the curriculum of the network of schools it operates, including al-Azhar University, perhaps the Muslim worlds
most respected center of learning.127
Yet censorship is a simplistic and likely counterproductive approach, as scholars have pointed out.128
One of ISISs central conceits is that it is the only
practitioner of unadulterated Islam. To illustrate its
purity, the group applies a literalist interpretation of,
or unearths obscure injunctions from, Islamic texts,
and fastidiously and ostentatiously implements
them. Censoring problematic texts is only another
opportunity for ISIS to highlight and apply them,
as it has done in stomach-churning fashion with
texts that support slavery, thereby bolstering one
of its primary claims to legitimacy. It would be better to present these texts and then teach a moderate
interpretation of them, similar to how some leading
Islamic scholars have debunked ISISs theological
claims point by point.129
Nor is it likely that state-led reform efforts will
work. The ideological battle revolves around convincing Muslims of which interpretation of Islam is
correct, and anything that suggests that reforms are
driven by something other than the search for Islamic
truth will delegitimize them. Government-led efforts
can too easily be dismissed as politically motivated. Associating the reform movement with leaders
like Sisi, whose increasingly authoritarian regime
has brutalized many Egyptians, similarly taints the
reform process. It would be far better to quietly, and
with extreme care, support an organic reform movement that is recognized as a good-faith effort to elucidate moderate interpretations of Islamic texts.
An important way of undermining ISIS credibility and ideology is to amplify the stories of ISIS defectors. Most of the defectors have complained about
the brutality that ISIS uses against fellow Sunnis,
or have expressed their disillusionment with the
factional infighting among the different extremist groups and the ISIS leaderships obsession with
weeding out spies and traitors. While those who
fought for ISIS should face the legal consequences,
they should also be encouraged to tell their stories of
disappointment and disillusionment.


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Approaches in Specific Regions

nn

The Middle East

nn

nn

nn

Expand military action against ISIS. The

White House should end its timidity and micromanaging of the war against ISIS and allow the
Pentagon to mount a more robust military campaign, with much more intensive air strikes,
expanded deployments of special operations forces, and the deployment of U.S. advisers embedded
with the Iraqi army, Kurdish militias, and Sunni
Arab militias operating much closer to the battlefront. The sooner the Islamic States control of
territory is destroyed, the more its ideology is discredited and the sooner the flow of foreign fighters can be reduced. NATO allies may be willing to
increase their military efforts due to the November 2015 Paris terrorist attacksbut that will not
happen without U.S. leadership.
Stem flow of fighters into Syria and Iraq.
Washington needs to do a better job of cutting
off the flow of foreign fighters by working closely
with U.S. allies, especially Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and NATO members. The U.S. should help
Turkey increase the security of its border with
Syria, especially the areas controlled by the
Islamic State. The U.S. should promote greater intelligence sharing on the Islamic State, its
recruitment activities, and the movement of new
recruits to Iraq and Syria. In particular, Western, Arab, and Turkish intelligence agencies that
have infiltrated the group with their own spies
should share information useful for disrupting
the recruitment, mobilization, and training of
potential ISIS militants.
Press Saudi Arabia to stop exporting Salafist ideology. The Saudi religious establishment
promotes a Wahhabi Islamic doctrine that inculcates hatred of other religious groups, including
Christians, Jews, and non-Sunni Islamic sects.
This intolerant Sunni chauvinism leaves young
Saudis open to the hostile ideological propaganda
disseminated by ISIS and al-Qaeda. Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf states also need to do
more to halt the funding of ISIS and al-Qaeda by
Islamic charities and Islamist networks in their
own countries.

Encourage emergence of more inclusive governments in Syria and Iraq. ISIS flourished by
tapping in to the fears of Sunni Arabs repressed
by predominantly non-Sunni regimes in Damascus and Baghdad. Many Sunni Syrians and Iraqis
were not attracted to the harsh Islamist ideology
promulgated by ISIS, but supported it as a lesser
evil, compared to the Alawite-dominated regime
in Damascus or the Shiite-dominated regime
in Baghdad. The U.S. and its allies need to press
for the departure of Bashar al-Assad from Syria
and the replacement of his regime with a coalition government that reflects the interests of all
Syrians. Washington also needs to increase pressure on the Iraqi government to reach out to Iraqi
Sunni Arabs and Kurds, offer them greater autonomy and guarantee them a fair share of Iraqs oil
wealth. Only then will they be willing to fight in a
united front against ISIS.
Europe

nn

nn

nn

Increase intelligence sharing. The U.S. and the

U.K. have one of the closest intelligence-sharing
arrangements in the world. The U.S. also closely
shares intelligence with the other members of
NATO. However, many countries in the Balkans,
South Caucasus, and Nordic region play a role in
countering foreign fighter recruitment and transit but are not in NATO. The U.S. must ensure
that information-sharing and intelligence-sharing arrangements are in place with these nonNATO countries.
Press Europeans to share the military burden. France has carried out airstrikes against
ISIS in Syria; and following a recent vote in the
House of Commons, Americas closest ally, the
United Kingdom, has also now done so. (The
U.K.s previous military strategy of only bombing ISIS targets in Iraq made little sense, especially considering that ISISs center of gravity is
in Raqqa, Syria). The U.K. must now encourage
other European nations to provide greater assistance in the military response to ISISincluding
attacking its territory in Syria.
Strengthen and expand the Visa Waiver Program. The VWP is a valuable tool supporting U.S.
national security. Before joining the VWP, U.S.
17


COMBATTING THE ISIS FOREIGN FIGHTER PIPELINE:
A GLOBAL APPROACH

allies and partners must first meet strict security and immigration requirements. The VWP
allows residents of member countries to visit the
U.S. without a visa for up to 90 days in exchange
for security-cooperation and information-sharing
arrangements and reciprocal travel privileges for
U.S. residents. Under the VWP, countries share
more information with the U.S. and increase their
airport security for flights departing for American
destinations. Congress and the Administration
should continually seek to improve and oversee the
information-sharing relationships that the U.S. has
with other countries through the VWP to ensure
that the U.S. receives as much relevant information as possible. Given the many benefits of the
VWP, the U.S. should examine how to judiciously
increase VWP membership to allies like Poland.
nn

nn

South Asia
nn

Address assimilation problems. Prime Minister Camerons recent announcement of new plans
to counter extremism are welcome and should be
implemented. Other European countries also need
to address issues of assimilation and integration.
Africa

nn

nn

18

Expand support for democracy. Democracies are not immune to radicalization, but the
ability to freely exercise ones rights can ameliorate an environment conducive to radicalization.
The United States has recently de-emphasized
democracy promotion in the Middle East and
North Africa.130 It should reverse course and reinvigorate its commitment to fostering freer societies with a particular focus on buttressing civil
societycritical to a thriving democracythat is
often seen as a threat in the more authoritarian
countries of North Africa.
Increase regional cooperation. ISIS recruitment in North Africa is a regional problem requiring a regional response. Terrorists can too easily slip across the porous borders in the Maghreb,
and the region is so vast that only by cooperating
can countries hope to begin disrupting the foreign fighter pipeline. The relationship that Tunisia and Algeria have developed around border
security is a good model for the entire region,131
but will require Morocco and Algeria, in particular, to patch up their contentious relationship.

Address the Libya crisis. The ongoing dismemberment of Libya is destabilizing North Africa,
the Middle East, and areas beyond. There are now
thousands of ISIS fighters carving out a stronghold in the country. ISIS is also using its Libyan
bases to train foreign fighters who then travel to
Syria.132 The United States should rally concerned
European countries, and allies in Africa and the
Middle East, to create a strategy for bringing a
measure of stability to Libya if it wishes to curb
the foreign fighter phenomenon.

nn

nn

Exploit the rivalry between al-Qaeda and ISIS.

With 9,800 U.S. troops still deployed in Afghanistan, where the al-Qaeda-supported Taliban and
ISIS have fought pitched battles against each
other, the U.S. is well-placed to exploit the rivalry
between the two organizations. The U.S. can also
work closely with Pakistan to jointly counter ISIS
in the region. Although Pakistan has been unreliable when it comes to fighting Islamist groups that
help it deny India regional influence, the Pakistanis are almost certainly worried about ISIS gaining
ground in the region. Al-Qaeda currently holds
ideological sway with most Pakistan-based terrorist groups, but ISISs powerful narrative could
potentially take hold in the future, posing an existential threat to Pakistan.
Emphasize communal harmony in India. The
Muslim minority community in India regularly participates in elections and freely practices
Islam under the protection of a secular constitution that respects the rights of religious minorities. Recent incidents of communal violence and
a general sense that the current Bharatiya Janata
Party government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi is pushing a Hindu-centric agenda,
however, are causing unease among pockets of
Indias Muslim population. Restoring communal harmony and acknowledging the important
contributions of Islam in Indias history will help
deny ISIS fertile recruiting ground.
Pay more attention to Bangladesh. ISISs
claims of responsibility for the recent assassinations of two international aid workers and the
bombing of a procession commemorating the


SPECIAL REPORT | NO. 180
January 6, 2016

Shia holiday of Ashura have raised concern that

ISIS may be gaining ground in the third-largest
Muslim-majority nation. The U.S. must support
the Bangladeshi authorities in dealing with the
potential ISIS threat and insist on fully transparent and joint investigations of recent attacks to
determine any potential global linkages. Washington must also take a more assertive role in
encouraging political dialogue between the ruling party and opposition since the current political deadlock is opening the door for Islamist
extremists to gain more recruits and influence.
Western Pacific Region
nn

nn

Help Indonesia to improve its National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT). As detailed by

Australian National University scholar Dr. Greg
Fealy in his report for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Indonesian and
Malaysian Support for the Islamic State, the
BNPT has been disappointing. The U.S. could
help lift the quality of its work by helping with
analysis of terrorist ideological and organization trends, better prison de-radicalization programsand more sophisticated anti-terrorism
campaigns.133
Promote religious liberty more vigorously in
Indonesia and Malaysia. The above referenced
report to USAID also cites the widely documented slide in religious tolerance in both countries
over many years. Religious intolerance is fertile
ground for extremism. Greater extremism means
a larger pool for foreign fighter recruits.

nn

nn

Support liberty-minded networks. The

Administration and Congress should support
counter-extremism programs by building and
strengthening liberty-minded Muslim networks,
media, and school curriculums, like those of the
LibForAll Foundation, that are working actively
to attack Islamism at its ideological roots.134
Plan for success in Syria and Iraq. The next
iteration of the foreign fighter problem in the
region will be a product of defeating ISIS in
Syria and Iraq. The fighters there now, particularly those committed to building and defending
the Islamic State, will be heading home once the
organization is defeated in the Middle East. Like
returnees from Afghanistan in the 1990s, the
problem these trained terrorists present to all
concerned in the region will have lasting impact.
Governments should expand current intelligence
and law enforcement cooperation now, with an
eye to preventing this development.

Conclusion

The U.S. must lead a multi-pronged global effort

to defeat ISIS. This will necessarily involve denying ISIS territory, disrupting its recruitment efforts,
and uprooting its destructive ideology through carefully tailored regional strategies carried out with
local partners. Without U.S. leadership in the fight,
ISIS will continue to make territorial gains throughout the Middle East, Africa, and South Asiaraising
the specter of terrorist attacks across the globe.

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Endnotes:
1.

Presence in a country is defined as ISIS holding territory; local groups having either pledged allegiance or actively cooperated with ISIS; or
large numbers of ISIS supporters having been arrested. The countries with an ISIS presence: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Cameroon,
Chad, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and Yemen.

2.

Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel, U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee,
September 2015, https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf (accessed December 8, 2015).

3.

Dabiq: The Return of the Khilafah, Vol. 1 (JuneJuly 2014),

http://media.clarionproject.org/files/09-2014/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-Issue-1-the-return-of-khilafah.pdf (accessed October 28, 2015).

4.

Graeme Wood, What ISIS Really Wants, The Atlantic, March, 2015,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/ (accessed October 28, 2015).

5. Ibid.
6.

Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel.

7. Ibid.
8.

After the death of Islams prophet Mohammad, the Muslim world was ruled by a series of caliphates until the last caliphate was dissolved by
Kemal Ataturk after the dissolution of the Turkish Empire following World War I. The Islamic State offers a return to the days when Islam was
ascendant and strong and sharia was theonlylaw of the land. Its leader, the self-proclaimed caliph and thus successor to Mohammad,
al-Baghdadi, has claimed that all Muslims in the world must pledge their fealty to ISIS. While this call may seem of little importance to
Westerners, the establishment of a caliphate with sharia law has been a long-term goal of Islamists, who consider it to be a momentous
event. Indeed, al-Qaeda sought a caliphate but was unable to conquer territory on which to establish it. Elliot Friedland, Islamic State Selling
Message with Glossy English Magazine, The Clarion Project, August 4, 2014,
http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/islamic-state-selling-message-glossy-english-magazine (accessed October 29, 2015).

9.

UN Says 25,000 Foreign Fighters Joined Islamist Militants, BBC News, April 2, 2015,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32156541 (accessed December 2, 2015).

10. Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Countering Violent Islamist Extremism: The Urgent Threat of Foreign
Fighters and Homegrown Terror, hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, February 11, 2015,
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20150211/102901/HHRG-114-HM00-Wstate-RasmussenN-20150211.pdf
(accessed December 2, 2015).
11. Founded in the ninth century, Alawites are part of a religious group that follow the Twelver school of Shia Islam. They represent around 12
percent of the Syrian population, and constitute a significant minority in Turkey and northern Lebanon.
12. Brian Michael Jenkins, The Dynamics of Syrias Civil War, RAND Corporation, 2014,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE115/RAND_PE115.pdf (accessed December 2, 2015).
13. Alessandria Masi, Jabhat Al-Nusra Leader Interview: No Solution to ISIS, Al Qaeda Tension in Syria, Americans Joined Nusra Front,
International Business Times, June 3, 2015,
http://www.ibtimes.com/jabhat-al-nusra-leader-interview-no-solution-isis-al-qaeda-tension-syria-americans-1951584
(accessed December 8, 2015).
14. Associated Press, ISIL Says It Faces War with Nusra in Syria, Al Jazeera, March 8, 2014,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/03/isil-says-it-faces-war-with-nusra-syria-20143719484991740.html
(accessed December 8, 2015).
15. Raya Jalabi, Ohio Man Charged with Providing Support to al-Qaida Affiliate in Syria, The Guardian, April 16, 2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/16/ohio-man-charged-supprting-al-qaida-affiliate-syria (accessed December 3, 2015).
16. James Phillips, The Rise of Al-Qaedas Khorasan Group: What it Means for U.S. National Security, Heritage Foundation Issue Brief
No. 4281, October 6, 2014,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/10/the-rise-of-al-qaedas-khorasan-group-what-it-means-for-us-national-security.
17. Adam Goldman, Greg Miller, and Nicole Rodriquez, American Who Killed Himself in Syria Suicide Attack Was from South Florida,
The Washington Post, May 31, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/american-who-killed-himself-in-syria-suicideattack-was-from-south-florida-official-says/2014/05/30/03869b6e-e7f4-11e3-a86b-362fd5443d19_story.html (accessed December 8, 2015).
18. Michael Eisenstadt, Irans Military Intervention in Syria: Long-Term Implications, The Washington Institute Policy Watch No. 2505,
October 15, 2015, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-military-intervention-in-syria-long-term-implications
(accessed December 3, 2015).
19. Tufyal Choudhury, Stepping Out: Supporting Exit Strategies from Violence and Extremism, Institute for Strategic Dialogue,
November, 2009, http://www.strategicdialogue.org/ISD%20Network%20of%20Former%20Extremists%20Feasibility%20AssessmentNov%202009-FINAL.pdf (accessed December 3, 2015).
20. Graeme Wood, The Three Types of People Who Fight for ISIS, The New Republic, September 11, 2014,
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/119395/isiss-three-types-fighters (accessed December 3, 2015).
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21. Alessandria Masi, ISIS Recruiting Westerners: How the Islamic State Goes After Non-Muslims and Recent Converts in the West,
International Business Times, September 8, 2014, http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-recruiting-westerners-how-islamic-state-goes-after-nonmuslims-recent-converts-west-1680076 (accessed November 12, 2015).
22. Anthony Faiola and Souad Mekhennet, Europes Converts to Islam Hearing the Call to Jihad, The Washington Post, May 7, 2015,
http://www.pressreader.com/usa/the-washington-post1047/20150507/281500749815960/TextView (accessed November 12, 2015).
23. Masi, ISIS Recruiting Westerners, p. 1.
24. Faiola and Mekhennet, Europes Converts to Islam Hearing the Call to Jihad, p. 2.
25. Ibid.
26. Rachel Briggs Obe and Tanya Silverman, Western Foreign Fighters Innovations in Responding to the Threat, Institute for Strategic Dialogue,
2014, p. 12, http://www.strategicdialogue.org/ISDJ2784_Western_foreign_fighters_V7_WEB.pdf (accessed November 12, 2015).
27. Patrick Kingsley, Who Is Behind Isiss Terrifying Online Propaganda Operation? The Guardian, June 23, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/23/who-behind-isis-propaganda-operation-iraq (accessed November 12, 2015).
28. Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro, Be Afraid. Be A Little Afraid: The Threat of Terrorism from Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq,
Foreign Policy at Brookings Policy Paper No. 34, November 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/11/
western-foreign-fighters-in-syria-and-iraq-byman-shapiro/be-afraid--web.pdf (accessed November 12, 2015).
29. Masi, ISIS Recruiting Westerners.
30. Ibid.
31. David Inserra, An Interactive Timeline of 73 Terror Plots Since 9/11, The Daily Signal, September 10, 2015,
http://dailysignal.com/2015/09/10/a-timeline-of-73-islamist-terror-plots-since-911/.
32. Jamie Dettmer, ISIS Claims First Attack Inside America, The Daily Beast, May 5, 2015,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/05/05/isis-claims-attack-in-texas.html (accessed December 4, 2015).
33. David Inserra and James Phillips, 67 Islamist Terrorist Plots Since 9/11: Spike in Plots Inspired by Terrorist Groups, Unrest in Middle East,
Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4392, April 22, 2015, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/04/67-islamist-terrorist-plotssince-911-spike-in-plots-inspired-by-terrorist-groups-unrest-in-middle-east.
34. Ibid.
35. Byman and Shapiro, Be Afraid. Be a Little Afraid.
36. Eric Schmitt and Ben Hubbard, Suicide Bomber in Syria Was U.S. Citizen, Officials Say, The New York Times, May 28, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/world/middleeast/us-citizen-in-suicide-act-in-syria-officials-say.html (accessed December 4, 2015).
37. Jesse Byrnes, FBI Investigating ISIS Suspects in All 50 States, The Hill, February 25, 2015,
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/233832-fbi-investigating-isis-suspects-in-all-50-states (accessed December 4, 2015).
38. Sari Horwitz, Eric Holder Urges European Countries to Help Stop Flow of Radicals to Syria, The Washington Post, July 8, 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/eric-holder-urges-european-states-to-help-stop-flow-of-radicals-tosyria/2014/07/08/b50d01ae-0692-11e4-8a6a-19355c7e870a_story.html (accessed December 4, 2015).
39. Robin Simcox et al., Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections, The Henry Jackson Society, 2nd ed., 2011,
http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/cms/harriercollectionitems/Islamist+Terrorism+2011+Preview.pdf (accessed December 4, 2015).
40. Robin Simcox and Emily Dyer, Al-Qaeda in the United States: A Complete Analysis of Terrorism Offenses, The Henry Jackson Society, 2013,
http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Al-Qaeda-in-the-USAbridged-version-LOWRES-Final.pdf
(accessed December 4, 2015).
41. Robin Simcox, We Will Conquer Your Rome: A Study of Islamic State Terror Plots in the West, The Henry Jackson Society, 2015,
http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/ISIS-brochure-Web.pdf (accessed December 4, 2015).
42. Simcox et al., Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections.
43. Islamic State Crisis: 3,000 European Jihadists Join Fight, BBC, September 26, 2014,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29372494 (accessed May 18, 2015).
44. Daniel Dickson and Johan Ahlander, Soaring Asylum Numbers Force Sweden to Cut Costs, Borrow More, Reuters, October 22, 2015,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/22/us-europe-migrants-sweden-forecast-idUSKCN0SG0I220151022 (accessed October 27, 2015).
45. Ibid.
46. Denmark Tightens Asylum Laws Citing Syrian Influx, The Local (Denmark), September 19, 2014,
http://www.thelocal.dk/20140919/denmark-tightens-asylum-laws-citing-syrian-influx (accessed May 18, 2015).
47. UN Calls on Denmark to Take More Refugees, The Local (Denmark), February 4, 2015,
http://www.thelocal.dk/20150204/un-calls-on-denmark-to-take-refugees (accessed May 18, 2015).

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48. Peter R. Neumann, Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s,
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, January 26, 2015,
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49. Assessment of the Terror Threat to Denmark, Center for Terror Analysis, March 19, 2015, p. 4,
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50. Ibid.
51. Andrew Higgins and Melissa Eddy, Terror Attacks by a Native Son Rock Denmark, The New York Times, February 15, 2015,
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52. Alistair Scrutton, Unholy Alliance of Islamists Threatens Sweden: Spy Chief, Reuters, March 27, 2015,
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53. Mairbek Vatchagaev, FSB Director Says Islamic State Fighters Include 1,700 Russian Citizens, Eurasia Daily Monitor,
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54. Georgian Militant Fighting with IS Reported Killed in Kobani, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 8, 2014,
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55. Why Did an Azerbaijani Wrestling Champion Join (and Die for) IS? Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 17, 2015,
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56. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, The Syrian Rebel Groups Pulling in Foreign Fighters, BBC, December 24, 2013,
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57. Timothy Holman, Foreign Fighters from the Western Balkans Fighting in Syria, Combating Terrorism Center CTC Sentinel, June 30, 2014,
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58. Simcox, We Will Conquer Your Rome.
59. French Jihadists Carrying Out Suicide Bombings in Syria and Iraq, France24, April 14, 2015,
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60. Byman and Shapiro, Be Afraid. Be A Little Afraid.
61. Dave Keating, EU Leaders to Call for Revision of Schengen Border Code, Politico, February 12, 2015,
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62. Ozcan Keles and Ismail Mesut Sezgin, A Hizmet Approach to Rooting out Violent Extremism, Centre for Hizmet Studies, 2015.
63. Alissa J. Rubin and Aurelien Breeden, France Seizes 6 Passports Under Antiterrorism Law, The New York Times, February 23, 2015,
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64. Police Seize Passport from Foreign Fighter, The Local (Denmark), April 10, 2015,
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65. Sean ONeill, 3,000 Terror Suspects Plotting to Attack UK, The Times, September 18, 2015,
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66. Simcox et al., Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections.
67. Family in Fear as Son Joins Terrorists, The Times, January 22, 2000.
68. Government of the United Kingdom, Prevent Strategy, June 2011,
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70. Stephen Castle, Britain Announces New Strategy to Prevent Radicalization of Young Muslims, The New York Times, October, 19, 2015,
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71. Jacob Bojesson, Mosques May Be Closed to Prevent Extremism in the UK, The Daily Caller News Foundation, October, 19, 2015,
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72. Richard A. Oppel Jr., Foreign Fighters in Iraq Are Tied to Allies of U.S., The New York Times, November 22, 2007,
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73. Richard Barrett, Foreign Fighters in Syria, The Soufan Group, June 2014,
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74. Nigeria Blocks Recruitment by Islamic State Militants, BBC, August 11, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33860824
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75. The Institute for Economics and Peace, 2012 Global Terrorism Index,
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82. Peter Beaumont and Patrick Kingsley, Violent Tide of Salafism Threatens the Arab Spring, The Guardian, February 9, 2013,
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84. Seth G. Jones, A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qaida and Other Salafi Jihadists, RAND Corporation, 2014,
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88. Thomas F. Lynch III, The Impact of ISIS on Global Salafism and South Asian Jihad, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 19
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89. Husain Haqqani, Prophecy and the Jihad in the Indian Subcontinent, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 18 (May 2015), p. 6.
90. Neumann, Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000.
91. Sudarsan Raghavan and Tim Craig, Drone Strikes Kill Key Islamic State Figures in Afghanistan, The Washington Post, July 10, 2015.
92. Emma Graham-Harrison, Taliban Fears Over Young Recruits Attracted to ISIS in Afghanistan, The Guardian, May 7, 2015,
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93. Haqqani, Prophecy and the Jihad in the Indian Subcontinent, p. 11.
94. Lisa Curtis, Al-Qaeda Announces New Affiliate in South Asia, The Daily Signal, September 4, 2015,
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95. Vikram Rajakumar, The Changing Jihadist Threat in India: Indian Mujahideens ISIS Link, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
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96. Lisa Curtis, Rising Terrorist Threat in Bangladesh Needs US Attention, The Daily Signal, October 9, 2015,
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97. U.S. Agency for International Development, Indonesian and Malaysian Support for the Islamic State, September 18, 2015.
98. Sidney Jones, ISIS in Southeast Asia: Problems Now and Later, discussion at The Brookings Institution Center for East Asia Policy Studies,
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99. USAID, Indonesian and Malaysian Support for the Islamic State.
100. Zachary Abuza, Joining the New Caravan: ISIS and the Regeneration of Terrorism in Southeast Asia, Strategic Studies Institute, June 25, 2015,
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101. Joseph Chinyong Liow, IS Activity in Southeast Asia, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Commentary No. 156, July 24, 2015,
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102. Jones, ISIS in Southeast Asia.
103. Indonesia President Says Islamic State Embarrassing Muslims, The Jakarta Post, August 21, 2014,
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104. Abuza, Joining the New Caravan.
105. USAID, Indonesian and Malaysian Support for the Islamic State.
106. Andrin Raj, Militant Islam in Malaysia: Synergy Between Regional and Global Jihadi Groups, Middle East Institute, January 16, 2015,
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107. USAID, Indonesian and Malaysian Support for the Islamic State.
108. Ibid., and Abuza, Joining the New Caravan.
109. Joseph Chinyong Liow, The Patterns and Portents of ISIS Activity in South-East Asia, The Straits Times, July 23, 2015,
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110. Hearing, Estimates, Proof Committee Hansard, Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Senate Commonwealth of Australia,
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112. Ibid.
113. Joseph A. Carter, Shiraz Maher, and Peter R. Neumann, #Greenbirds: Measuring Importance and Influence in Syrian Foreign Fighter Networks,
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, April 2014, http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/ICSRReport-Greenbirds-Measuring-Importance-and-Infleunce-in-Syrian-Foreign-Fighter-Networks.pdf (accessed November 25, 2015), and Abuza,
Joining the New Caravan.
114. Zammit, Australian Foreign Fighters.
115. Gary Sands, China and the ISIS Threat, The Diplomat, September 26, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/china-and-the-isis-threat/
(accessed November 25, 2015).
116. U.S. National Security Agency, NSAs Implementation of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Section 702, NSA Director of Civil Liberties
and Privacy Office Report, April 16, 2014, https://www.nsa.gov/civil_liberties/_files/nsa_report_on_section_702_program.pdf
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117. Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel, p. 17.
118. Jason Koebler, FBI Wants to Monitor Social Media for Emerging Threats, U.S. News & World Report, January 27, 2012,
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(accessed October 29, 2015); What the FBI Wants in a Social Media Monitoring App, NPR, January 30, 2012,
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(accessed October 29, 2015); Robert D. Stuart, Social Media: Establishing Criteria for Law Enforcement Use, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,
February 5, 2013, https://leb.fbi.gov/2013/february/social-media-establishing-criteria-for-law-enforcement-use
(accessed October 29, 2015); James Kosur, The FBI Wants Twitter to Become a Better Terrorist Fighter, Business 2 Community, August 1, 2015,
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119. Cyber intelligence could be classified as a form of SIGINT, but it might also be viewed as a unique combination of SIGINT, OSINT, and
HUMINT techniques that requires a separate designation, such as CYBINT.
120. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, U.S. Intelligence Community Budget, 20062016,
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122. National Counterterrorism Center, Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), August 1, 2014,
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123. Timothy J. Healy, Sharing and Analyzing Information to Prevent Terrorism, testimony before the Judiciary Committee, U.S. House of
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Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, September 18, 2014,
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124. David Inserra, The Visa Waiver Program: Congress Should Strengthen a Crucial Security Tool, Heritage Foundation Issue Brief
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125. The White House, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, August 2011,
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