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COURTS OF LAW vs COURTS OF EQUITY

ALONZO vs IAC
FACTS:
> Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a
parcel of land registered in 'the name of their deceased parents.
> Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share of the herein
petitioners by way of absolute sale. Eustaquia Padua, his sister,
sold her own share to the same vendees, in an instrument
denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale.
> Petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area
corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the
portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the
same with a fence. Their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a
semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.
> Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to redeem the
area sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed
when it appeared that he was an American citizen. However,
Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking the
same right of redemption claimed by her brother.
> Trial court dismisses the complaint on the ground that the right
had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from
notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although there was no
written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by
the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law.
ISSUE:

that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the
judge should be to discover in its provisions the in tent of the
lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in
such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for
we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we
must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular
case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation,
we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to
apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language.
What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the
will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not
unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the
literal command without regard to its cause and consequence.
The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its
construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its
spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the letter
but although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which
is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the
statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within the intent of
the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the
letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is
not within the statute unless within the intent of the
lawmakers.

by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written

proof of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious
truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus
exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear
enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified.
We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters
were actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales made
in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why
the spouses Alonzo, who were not among them, should enclose a
portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a house of strong
materials. This definitely was not the act of a temporary possessor
or a mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act of
ownership. Yet, given this unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs
saw fit to object or at least inquire, to ascertain the facts, which
were readily available. It took all of thirteen years before one of
them chose to claim the right of redemption, but then it was
already too late.

The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or

in curious conjecture, whether we are a court of law or a
court of justice. Do we apply the law even if it is unjust or
do we administer justice even against the law? Thus
queried, we do not equivocate. The answer is that we
do neither because we are a court both of law and of
justice. We apply the law with justice for that is our
mission and purpose in the scheme of our Republic.

Whether or not redemption can still be made?

RULING:
NO. It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were
unaware of the sales and that they thought, as they alleged, that
the area occupied by the petitioners had merely been mortgaged
by Celestino and Eustaquia. In the circumstances just narrated, it
was impossible for Tecla not to know that the area occupied by
the petitioners had been purchased by them from the other coheirs. Especially significant was the erection thereon of the
permanent semi-concrete structure by the petitioners' son, which
was done without objection on her part or of any of the other coheirs.
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results;
and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule

The instant case presents no such problem because the right of

redemption was invoked not days but years after the sales were
made in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed by Tecla Padua
in 1977, thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen years after
the second sale. The delay invoked by the petitioners extends to
more than a decade, assuming of course that there was a valid
notice that tolled the running of the period of redemption.
Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice
to be written, would such notice be necessary in this case?
Assuming there was a valid notice although it was not in writing.
would there be any question that the 30-day period for redemption
had expired long before the complaint was filed in 1977?
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private
respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the sales made

SALVACION vs CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHIL.

2
FACTS:
> Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured
petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his
apartment and was able to rape the child.
> After policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg
Bartelli was arrested and detained.
> Cases were filed against Greg for Serious Illegal Detention,
rape and damages with preliminary attachment but Greg escaped
from jail.
> Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on
China Banking Corporation but China Banking Corporation
invoked Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to the notice of
garnishment served on it.
> China Banking Corporation, invoked Section 113 of Central
Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits or
defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body,
whatsoever.
> Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief from this Court.

whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would

result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like
accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New
Civil Code which provides that "in case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. "Ninguno
non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro." Simply
stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of
those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement
urge of conscience.
It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of
Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by accused
Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty
at the expense of the innocent.
Call it what it may but is there no conflict of legal policy here?
Dollar against Peso? Upholding the final and executory judgment
of the lower court against the Central Bank Circular protecting the
foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a
transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and victim
of a crime? This situation calls for fairness against legal tyranny.
We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we
have served the ends of justice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Greg Bartellis dollar account is exempt
from garnishment as stated in Circular No. 960?
RULING:
NO. It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was
enacted in 1983 or at a time when the country's economy was in a
shambles; when foreign investments were minimal and
presumably, this was the reason why said statute was enacted.
But the realities of the present times show that the country has
recovered economically; and even if not, the questioned law still
denies those entitled to due process of law for being
unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law
may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the
iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such
as the case before us.
In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its
justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body

FACTS:
> Petitioner Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation (PCMC)
is a corporation registered in the Philippines engaged in the
business of manufacturing wool and yarn carpets and rugs.
Respondents were its regular and permanent employees, but
were affected by petitioners retrenchment and voluntary
retirement programs.
> As to Marcos, Ilao, and Nemis, they claimed that they were
dismissed, together with fifteen (15) other employees on the
ground of lack of market/slump in demand. PCMC, however,
claimed that they availed of the companys voluntary retirement
program and, in fact, voluntarily executed their respective Deeds
of Release, Waiver, and Quitclaim.
> Claiming that they were aggrieved by PCMCs decision to
terminate their employment, respondents filed separate
complaints for illegal dismissal against PCMC.
> PCMC, for its part, defended its decision to terminate the
services of respondents being a necessary management
prerogative. It pointed out that as an employer, it had no
obligation to keep in its employ more workers than are necessary
for the operation of his business. Thus, there was an authorized
cause for dismissal.
> Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint
for lack of merit. The LA found no flaw in respondents termination
as they voluntarily opted to retire.
> On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
sustained the LA decision.
> Still undaunted, respondents elevated the matter to the CA in a
petition for certiorari. In reversing the earlier decisions of the LA
and the NLRC, the CA refused to apply the principle of laches,
because the case was instituted prior to the expiration of the
prescriptive period set by law which is four years. It stressed that
said principle cannot be invoked earlier than the expiration of the
prescriptive period.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of laches can be applied on
this case?
RULING:

PCMC vs TAGMAYON

NO. Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect

for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been

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done earlier, thus, giving rise to a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. It
has been repeatedly held by the Court that:
x x x Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on
law. Our courts are basically courts of law not courts of equity.
Thus, laches cannot be invoked to resist the enforcement of an
existing legal right. x x x Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are
bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to
disregard them. x x x, this Court was more emphatic in upholding
the rules of procedure. We said therein:
As for equity which has been aptly described as a "justice outside
legality," this is applied only in the absence of, and never against,
statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules of
procedure. Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis. The pertinent
positive rules being present here, they should preempt and prevail
over all abstract arguments based only on equity.
Thus, where the claim was filed within the [four-year] statutory
period, recovery therefore cannot be barred by laches. Courts
should never apply the doctrine of laches earlier than the
expiration of time limited for the commencement of actions at
law."
An action for reinstatement by reason of illegal dismissal is one
based on an injury to the complainants rights which should be
brought within four years from the time of their dismissal pursuant
to Article 1146 of the Civil Code. Respondents complaint filed
almost 3 years after their alleged illegal dismissal was still well
within the prescriptive period. Laches cannot, therefore, be
invoked yet. To be sure, laches may be applied only upon the
most convincing evidence of deliberate inaction, for the rights of
laborers are protected under the social justice provisions of the
Constitution and under the Civil Code.

NOCUM vs TAN
FACTS:
> Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum,
Capt. Florendo Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, seeking moral and exemplary damages for the
alleged malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a
news article.
> ALPAP and UMALI likewise filed their joint answer, venue was
improperly laid. It appeared that the complaint failed to state the
residence of the complainant at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense and the place where the libelous article
was printed and first published.
> Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Makati issued an Order
dismissing the complaint without prejudice on the ground of
improper venue.
> Aggrieved by the dismissal of the complaint, respondent Lucio
Tan filed an Omnibus Motion seeking reconsideration of the
dismissal and admission of the amended complaint. The
amended complaint, it is alleged that This article was printed and
first published in the City of Makati and that This caricature was
printed and first published in the City of Makati.
> The lower court, after having the case dismissed for improper
venue, admitted the amended complaint and deemed set aside
the previous order of dismissal.
> Dissatisfied, petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court
of Appeals but denied the complaint for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court acquire jurisdiction over
the civil case upon the filing of the original complaint for
damages?
RULING:
YES. We rule in the affirmative.

JURISDICTION vs VENUE

It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts

alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of
action. In the case at bar, after examining the original complaint,
we find that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the
case was filed before it. From the allegations thereof, respondents
cause of action is for damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of

which is vested with the RTC. Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that it is a Court of First Instance that is specifically
designated to try a libel case.
Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. A former
colleague, the Hon. Florenz D. Regalado, differentiated
jurisdiction and venue as follows: (a) Jurisdiction is the
authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place
where the case is to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a
matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law; (c)
Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the
subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and
defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction
is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue
may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties.
In the case at bar, the additional allegations in the Amended
Complaint that the article and the caricature were printed and first
published in the City of Makati referred only to the question of
venue and not jurisdiction. These additional allegations would
neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondents
failure to include the same in the original complaint divest the
lower court of its jurisdiction over the case. Respondents failure to
allege these allegations gave the lower court the power, upon
motion by a party, to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
venue was not properly laid.
In Laquian v. Baltazar, this Court construed the term jurisdiction in
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as referring to the place
where actions for libel shall be filed or venue.
It is elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL ACTIONS
arising from libel may be waived since they do not involve a
question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather
than substantive, relating as it does to jurisdiction of the court
over the person rather than the subject matter. Venue relates to
trial and not to jurisdiction. It is a procedural, not a jurisdictional,
matter. It relates to the place of trial or geographical location in
which an action or proceeding should be brought and not to the
jurisdiction of the court. It is meant to provide convenience to the
parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates
to the place of trial. In contrast, in CRIMINAL ACTIONS, it is
fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an essential
element of jurisdiction.

ERROR OF JURISDICTION vs

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ERROR OF JUDGMENT
STEEL CORP. OF THE PHILS. Vs MAPFRE
FACTS:
> SCP is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and
distribution of cold-rolled and galvanized steel sheets and coils. It
obtained loans from several creditors and, as security, mortgaged
its assets in their favor. The creditors appointed Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI) as their trustee. SCP and BPI entered into
a Mortgage Trust Indenture (MTI) requiring SCP to insure all of its
assets until the loans are fully paid. Under the MTI, the insurance
policies were to be made payable to BPI.
> During the course of its business, SCP suffered financial
difficulties. One of the creditors, Equitable PCI Bank, Inc., now
known as Banco de Oro-EPCI, Inc., filed with the RTC a petition
to have SCP placed under corporate rehabilitation. RTC issued a
stay order to defer all claims against SCP. RTC rendered a
Decision approving the modified rehabilitation plan.
> A fire broke out at SCPs plant damaging its machineries.
Invoking its right under the MTI, BPI demanded and received from
the insurers $450,000 insurance proceeds.
> RTC issued an Order directing BPI to release the insurance
proceeds directly to the contractors and suppliers who will
undertake the repairs and replacements of the damaged
machineries.
> Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs Order. However, Amended
Decision, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and set aside the
RTCs ruling.
> A fire again broke out at SCPs plant damaging its cold rolling
mill and other machineries.
> SCP filed with the RTC a motion to direct respondent insurers to
pay insurance proceeds in the amounts of $28,000,000 property
damage and $8,000,000 business interruption.
> Respondent insurers entered a special appearance solely for
the purpose of questioning the RTCs jurisdiction over the
insurance claim.
> Respondent insurers denied liability on SCPs insurance claim.
> RTC granted SCPs motion and directed respondent insurers to
pay SCP $33,882,393 property damage and $8,000,000 business
interruption. (1 June 2011 order)
> Respondent insurers filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court raising
mainly as issue that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over SCPs
insurance claim and over respondent insurers.
> Court of Appeals declared void the RTCs 1 June 2011 Order.

> The present petition for certiorari under Rule 65, 1997Rules of
Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy, as it assails the very
jurisdiction of the trial court in granting private respondents
insurance claims which were raised through a mere "Motion to
Pay" in the rehabilitation proceedings. It is basic that a special
civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is to keep the inferior
court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
> In fine, the Court finds that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the Order dated June 1, 2011. Grave abuse of discretion
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.
> SCP filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of
Appeals denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it
entertained respondent insurers petition for certiorari filed under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and when it held that the RTC
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction?
RULING:
NO. The Court disagrees. A petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 is the proper remedy when the issue raised involves
errors of jurisdiction. On the other hand, a petition for review
under Rule 43 is the proper remedy when the issue raised
involves errors of judgment.
Proper issues that may be raised in a petition for review under
Rule43 pertain to errors of fact, law or mixed questions of fact and
law. While a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 should only limit
itself to errors of jurisdiction, that is, grave abuse of discretion
amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in

scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. x x x
Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction. It is not a
remedy to correct errors of judgment. An error of judgment is one
in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction,
and which error is reversible only by appeal. Error of jurisdiction is
one where the act complained was issued by the court without or
in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure
errors by the trial court or quasi- judicial body in its appreciation of
the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the
said findings, and its conclusions of law. As long as the court acts
within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise
of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of
judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC, acting as rehabilitation court, has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the insurance claim of SCP against
respondent insurers. SCP must file a separate action for collection
where respondent insurers can properly thresh out their defenses.
SCP cannot simply file with the RTC a motion to direct respondent
insurers to pay insurance proceeds. Section 3 of Republic Act No.
10142 states that rehabilitation proceedings are "summary and
non-adversarial" in nature. They do not include adjudication of
claims that require full trial on the merits, like SCPs insurance
claim against respondent insurers.
Said insurance claims cannot be considered as "claims" within the
jurisdiction of the trial court functioning as a rehabilitation court.
Rehabilitation courts only have limited jurisdiction over the claims
by creditors against the distressed company, not on the claims of
said distressed company against its debtors. The interim rules
define claim as referring to all claims or demands, of whatever
nature or character against a debtor or its property, whether for
money or otherwise.

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ARANETA vs COMMONWEALTH INSURANCE
FACTS:
> Defendant-appellee Commonwealth Insurance Co. is a
domestic corporation engaged in the insurance and bonding
business.
> Said corporation issued a shipments of scrap steel on said
vessel, and a surety bond, with appellants Manuel Araneta and
Jose L. Uy as principals and the corporation as surety, in favor of
the De la Rama Steamship Co., Inc., to secure the payment.
> Plaintiffs-appellants Araneta and Uy failed to pay the balance of
the freight charges due on the shipment in question, and upon
demand by the De la Rama Steamship Co., the appellee
corporation paid to it the sum of P15,000. After such payment, the
guarantors Cathay Co. and Ang Lam and Sons Co. reimbursed or
indemnified the appellee corporation the sum of P12,000, on
condition, however, that both Cathay Co. and Ang Lam and Sons
Co., would not be liable anymore for the payment of the
uncollected balance of P3,000.
> Having thus released the guarantors from the balance of its
credit of P3,000, the appellee corporation filed suit against
appellants Manuel Araneta and Jose L. Uy for the payment of the
uncollected balance of P3,000.
> CFI rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff corporation and
against defendants Araneta and Uy, ordering said defendants to
pay jointly and severally to plaintiff.
> Defendants Araneta and Uy did not appeal from this judgment
but instead filed a special civil action in the Court of Appeals for
the issuance of a writ of certiorari to annul the judgment, but said
action was, however, dismissed by the appellate court on the
ground that appeal was the proper remedy.
> The judgment, therefore, became final and executor. To restrain
the execution, defendants Araneta and Uy filed the present
complaint for injunction, but was dismissed on the ground of res
judicata, from which dismissal plaintiffs Araneta and Uy appealed
to this court.

appellee corporation the sum of P3,000, knowing that said

corporation had released appellants' co-guarantors from liability
for said amount, and under Art. 2078 of the Civil Code, a release
made by the creditor in favor of one of the guarantors, without the
consent of the others, benefits all the extent of the share of the
guarantor to whom it has been granted. This supposed error
attributed to Judge Tan is not an error of jurisdiction, but, if at all,
an error of judgement (because appellants were the principal
debtors whose obligation was guaranteed by the Commonwealth
Insurance Co., and were liable to it by virtue of its payment to the
creditor) or of such application of the law. Not being
jurisdictional, such an error, even if committed, does not
render the decision in Civil Case No. 12276 void. Where the
court has jurisdiction, over the parties and the subjectmatter, and the court commits the error of judgment in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, said errors are mere errors of
judgment, correctible and reviewable only by appeal, and if
no appeal is taken, the decision, erroneous or not, becomes
final and executory, and is valid and binding upon the
parties.
There is no question that Judge Tan had jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject-matter in Civil Case No. 12276. If
appellants had believe that his judgment therein was erroneous,
they should have sought its review by appeal. Appellants did not
appeal from the decision, hence it became final and executory,
and is now fully binding upon them. At the present stage,
therefore, it is already too late to have said judgment corrected
and modified. As the lower court correctly held, appellants'
present complaint is barred by res judicata.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal was proper?

CABILI vs BALINDONG
FACTS:
> Action for damages in Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC against
the Mindanao State University (MSU), et al., arising from a
vehicular accident that caused the death of Jesus Ledesma and
physical injuries to several others.
> RTC rendered a Decision, holding the MSU liable for damages.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the Iligan City RTC decision
and the CA decision subsequently lapsed to finality.
> RTC issued a writ of execution. The MSU, however, failed to
comply with the writ; Sheriff served a Notice of Garnishment on
the MSUs depository bank, the LBP.
> The Office of the Solicitor General opposed the motion for
execution, albeit belatedly, in behalf of MSU. The Iligan City
RTC denied the opposition in its Order. The MSU responded to
the denial by filing a petition with the Marawi City RTC, for
prohibition and mandamus with an application for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction
against the LBP and Sheriff Gaje. The petition of MSU was raffled
to the RTC, Marawi City, presided by respondent Judge.
> The respondent Judge issued a TRO.
> Sheriff Gaje moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. The respondent Judge thereafter granted the motion
and dismissed the case.
> Complainant Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili, counsel of the private
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 06-2954, filed the complaint charging
the respondent Judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave
Abuse of Authority, Abuse of Discretion, and/or Grave Misconduct
Prejudicial to the Interest of the Judicial Service for interfering with
the order of a co-equal court, the Iligan City RTC, by issuing the
TRO to enjoin Sheriff Gaje from garnishing.
> Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the respondent
Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating the
elementary rule of non-interference with the proceedings of a
court of co-equal jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge violated the
doctrine of non-interference?

RULING:
NO. Appellants base their claim of the allege nullity of
the decision of Judge Bienvenido A. Tan in Civil Case No. 12276
in that Judge Tan committed error in ordering them to pay the

DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY

DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERFERENCE or

RULING:

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YES. The Court finds the OCAs recommendation welltaken. The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the
regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary
principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by
injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of
concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought
by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the
concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the
case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its
judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its
execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance
of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection
with this judgment.
Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution
order has been issued is considered as still pending, so that all
the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the
suit. A court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent
power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its
ministerial officers and to control its own processes. To hold
otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the appropriate
forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution
proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly
administration of justice.
Jurisprudence shows that a violation of this rule warrants the
imposition of administrative sanctions. To be sure, the law and the
rules are not unaware that an issuing court may violate the law in
issuing a writ of execution and have recognized that there should
be a remedy against this violation. The remedy, however, is not
the resort to another co-equal body but to a higher court with
authority to nullify the action of the issuing court. This is precisely
the judicial power that the 1987 Constitution, under Article VIII,
Section 1, paragraph 2, speaks of and which this Court has
operationalized through a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
In the present case, the respondent Judge clearly ignored the
principle of judicial stability by issuing a TRO to temporarily
restrain Sheriff Gaje from enforcing the writ of execution issued by
a co-equal court, Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, and from
pursuing the garnishment of the amount of P2,726,189.90 from
MSUs account with the LBP, Marawi City Branch. The respondent
Judge was aware that he was acting on matters pertaining to the
execution phase of a final decision of a co-equal and coordinate
court since he even quoted MSUs allegations in his April 8, 2009
Order.

DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

BAGUNU vs AGGABAO
FACTS:
> Protest filed by the spouses Francisco Aggabao and Rosenda
Acerit (respondents) against the petitioners free patent application
over a parcel of unregistered land pending before the DENR.
> The subject land was previously owned by Marcos Binag, who
later sold it (first sale) to Felicisimo Bautista (Bautista). Bautista,
in turn, sold the subject land (second sale) to Atty. Samson Binag.
> Atty. Binag applied for a free patentover the subject land with
the Bureau of Lands (now Lands Management Bureau). Atty.
Binag sold the subject land (third sale) to the petitioner, who
substituted for Atty. Binag as the free patent applicant. The parties
deed of sale states that the land sold to the petitioner is the same
lot subject of Atty. Binags pending free patent application.
> The respondents asserted ownership over Lot 322 based on the
Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale, executed in their
favor by the heirs of one Rafael Bautista.
> The Office of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR
conducted an ocular inspection and formal investigation. The
DENR Regional Office found out that the petitioner actually
occupies and cultivates the area in dispute including the area
purchased by [the respondents].
> DENR Regional Office ruled that the petitioner wrongfully
included Lot 322 in his free patent application since this lot
belongs to the respondents.
> The petitioner moved for reconsideration.
> DENR Secretary affirmed the ruling of the DENR Regional
Office.
> The CA affirmed the ruling of the DENR Secretary. Applying the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the CA ruled that since questions
on the identity of a land require a technical determination by the
appropriate administrative body, the findings of fact of the DENR
Regional Office, as affirmed by the DENR Secretary, are entitled
to great respect, if not finality. The petitioner assails this ruling
before the Court.
> Respondents joined Atty. Binag in the civil case by filing a
complaint-in-intervention against the petitioner. The complaint-inintervention captioned the respondents causes of action as one
for Quieting of Title, Reivindicacion and Damages.
> After the CA affirmed the DENR Secretarys favorable resolution
on the respondents protest, the respondents asked the RTC to
suspend the civil case or, alternatively, to adopt the DENR
Secretarys ruling.

> The petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming the DENR
Secretarys jurisdiction to resolve the parties conflicting claims
of ownership over Lot 322.
> The petitioner faults the CA for applying the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction since the issue of who has a better right over Lot 322
does not involve the specialized technical expertise of the DENR.
On the contrary, the issue involves interpretation of contracts,
appreciation of evidence and the application of the pertinent Civil
Code provisions, which are matters within the competence of the
courts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in applying the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction?
RULING:
NO. The DENR has primary jurisdiction to resolve
conflicting claims of title over public lands.
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in applying the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, claiming that the issue (of who has a better
right over Lot 322) does not require the specialized technical
expertise of the DENR. He posits that the issue, in fact, involves
interpretation of contracts, appreciation of evidence and
application of the pertinent Civil Code provisions, which are all
within the competence of regular courts.
We disagree.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must
refrain from determining a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal
prior to its resolution by the latter, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of
the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact.
However, if the case is such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper
administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate
questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained
in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied
by the courts even though the matter is within the proper
jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.] It

7
applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and
comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been
placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in
such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of
such issues to the administrative body for its view.
The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
however, does not call for the dismissal of the case below. It
need only be suspended until after the matters within the
competence of [the Lands Management Bureau] are threshed
out and determined. Thereby, the principal purpose behind
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is salutarily served.
The resolution of conflicting claims of ownership over real
property is within the regular courts area of competence and,
concededly, this issue is judicial in character. However, regular
courts would have no power to conclusively resolve this issue of
ownership given the public character of the land, since under C.A.
No. 141, in relation to Executive Order No. 192, the disposition
and management of public lands fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, subject to review by the
DENR Secretary.

JURISDICTION BY ESTOPPEL
TIJAM vs SIBONGHANOY
FACTS:
> Barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296
known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 the spouses Serafin Tijam
and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case in the CFI against
the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to
recover from them the sum of P1,908.00. A writ of attachment was
issued against defendants' properties, but the same was soon
dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants.
> Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The writ
having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety's bond, which
the Surety filed a written opposition upon two grounds, (1) Failure
to prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon the Surety for
the payment of the amount due under the judgment. But the court
denied the motion.
> Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same
was issued without the required summary but same was denied.
> Not one of the assignment of errors raises the question of
lack of jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly.
> Surety filed a pleading MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging that
action was filed in the CFI for the recovery of the sum of
P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date the Judiciary Act of
1948, had already become effective, which placed the original
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the
value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not
exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the CFI
therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case.
> Case was forwarded to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Surety is barred by estoppel in
questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court?
RULING:
YES. It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced
by appellees in the CFI against the Sibonghanoy spouses was for
the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only an amount within
the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance
with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken
effect about a month prior to the date when the action was
commenced. True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject

matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as

the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage
of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and
circumstances of the present case We are of the opinion that
the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this
late hour for the purpose of annuling everything done in the case
with its active participation.
As already stated, the action was commenced in the CFI of Cebu
on July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety
filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the
question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.
Although the action, originally, was exclusively against the
Sibonghanoy the Surety became a quasi-party when it filed a
counter-bond for the dissolution of the writ of attachment issued
by the court of origin. Since then, it acquired certain rights and
assumed specific obligations in connection with the pending case.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in
different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of
estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of
estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier;
it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon
grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society,
the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a
question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim
to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction. In the case just cited, by way of explaining the
rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the
parties was not important in such cases because the party is
barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of
the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the
reason that such a practice can not be tolerated obviously for
reasons of public policy.

8
PNB vs IAC

PNB never raised the issue on the alleged lack of jurisdiction

of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

ATWEL vs CONCEPCION PROGRESSIVE

ASSOCIATION INC.

On this score alone, the PNB is precluded from raising for the
first time on appeal the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the
Court of Agrarian Relations over C.A.R. Case No. 494.

FACTS:

FACTS:
>
Plaintiffs-spouses Teodoro N. Florendo and Victoria B.
Florendo are the registered owners of three parcels of land.
Properties were mortgaged with the Philippine National Bank to
secure a loan obtained by the Florendos.
> Upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 27, the
property was subjected to operation land transfer of the land
reform program. This parcel of land was, therefore, redistributed
to 31 tenants.
> The Florendos, in a letter expressed their non-conformity with
the Philippine National Banks policy. The Philippine National
Bank maintained its stand and refused to approve for registration
with the Register of Deeds of Negros Oriental the "Assignment of
Rights" and the release of lot to the Land Bank.
> Trial court rendered decision that plaintiffs loan and or
indebtedness with the defendant PNB have been duly paid and
satisfied, and that plaintiffs entitled to the release of all the abovementioned collaterals held by the defendant PNB.
> Philippine National Bank filed a petition for certiorari with
preliminary prohibitory injunction to stay the execution and
enforcement of the courts decision during the pendency of the
appeal.
> Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
> The Philippine National Bank (PNB) alleges that the respondent
Court of Appeals erred in not finding that COURT OF AGRARIAN
RELATIONS IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT
MATTER OF THE CASE INSOFAR AS THE LANDS NOT
SUBJECTED TO P.D. NO. 27 ARE CONCERNED. SAID LANDS
ARE NOT COVERED BY AGRARIAN REFORM.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Agrarian Relations had
jurisdiction over CAR Case No. 494?
RULING:
YES. The issue of jurisdiction was first raised in the
Court of Appeals. In the Court of Agrarian Relations, the PNB
filed an answer setting up its special and affirmative
defenses with counterclaim. The PNB through its counsel and
representative actively participated in all the hearings. In
fact, the parties agreed upon the issues of the case and the

While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from

exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking
exception thereto, they instead invoked the very same
jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking affirmative relief
from it. What is more, they participated in the trial of the
case by cross-examining respondent Planas. Upon this
premise, petitioners cannot now be allowed belatedly to
adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of
the court to which they had submitted themselves
voluntarily.

> Emiliano Melgazo founded and organized Concepcion

Progressive Association (CPA) aimed to provide livelihood to and
generate income for his supporters.
> After his election as CPA president, Emiliano Melgazo bought a
parcel of land in behalf of the association.
> When Emiliano Melgazo died, his son, petitioner Manuel
Melgazo, succeeded him as CPA president and administrator of
the property. Petitioners Atwel and Pilpil were elected as CPA
vice-president and treasurer, respectively.
> While CPA was in the process of registering as a stock
corporation, its other elected officers and members formed their
own group and registered themselves in the SEC as officers and
members of respondent Concepcion Progressive Association, Inc.
(CPAI). Petitioners were not listed either as officers or members of
CPAI. Later, CPAI objected to petitioners' collection of rentals from
the wet market vendors.
> CPAI alleged that it was the owner of the property and
petitioners, without authority, were collecting rentals from the wet
market vendors.
> Petitioners refuted CPAI's claim saying that it was preposterous
and impossible for the latter to have acquired ownership over the
property in 1968 when it was only in 1997 that it was incorporated
and registered with the SEC.
> The court considered CPA to be one and the same as CPAI.
> Aggrieved, petitioners went to the CA and contested the
jurisdiction of the special commercial court over the case.
According to them, they were not CPAI members, hence the case
did not involve an intra-corporate dispute "between and among
members" so as to warrant the special commercial court's
jurisdiction over it. CPAI, on the other hand, argued that
petitioners were already in estoppel as they had participated
actively in the court proceedings.
> Court held that petitioners were already barred from questioning
the court's jurisdiction based on the doctrine of estoppel.
> Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration-denied by the CA.
> Petitioners argue that estoppel cannot apply because a court's
jurisdiction is conferred exclusively by the Constitution or by
law, not by the parties' agreement or by estoppel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of estoppel bar petitioners
from questioning the jurisdiction of the special commercial court?

9
RULING: NO.

REPUBLIC vs BANTIGUE POINT DEV.

Originally, Section 5 of PD 902-A conferred on the SEC original

and exclusive jurisdiction over the following controversies arising
out of intra-corporate, partnership, or association relations,
between and among stockholders, members, or associates; or
association of which they are stockholders, members, or
associates, respectively;

FACTS:

Upon the enactment of RA 8799 in 2000, the jurisdiction of the

SEC over intra-corporate controversies and other cases
enumerated in Section 5 of PD 902-A was transferred to the
courts of general jurisdiction. Under this authority, RTC, acting as
a special commercial court, deemed the mandatory injunction
case filed by CPAI an intra-corporate dispute falling under
subparagraph (2) of the aforecited provision as it involved the
officers and members thereof.
To determine whether a case involves an intra-corporate
controversy to be heard and decided by the RTC, two elements
must concur: (1) the status or relationship of the parties and; (2)
the nature of the question that is subject of their controversy.
In the case at bar, these elements are not present. The records
reveal that petitioners were never officers nor members of CPAI.
CPAI itself admitted this in its pleadings. In fact, petitioners were
the only remaining members of CPA which, obviously, was not the
CPAI that was registered in the SEC.
The operation of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction
seemingly depends on whether the lower court actually had
jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried
and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties
are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the
same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by
the consent of the parties or by estoppel." However, if the lower
court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon
a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no
jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not
be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position that
the lower court had jurisdiction.
The rule remains that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction on a
tribunal that has none over the cause of action or subject matter
of the case. Unfortunately for CPAI, no exceptional circumstance
appears in this case to warrant divergence from the rule.
Jurisdiction by estoppel is not available here.

> Respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed with

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) an application for original
registration of title over a parcel of land with a total assessed
value of 14,920 for the entire property.
> Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for
registration.
> RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio the records of the
case to the MTC, because the assessed value of the property
was allegedly less than 100,000.
> MTC entered an Order of General Default and commenced with
the reception of evidence. Among the documents presented by
respondent in support of its application are Tax Declarations, a
Deed of Absolute Sale in its favor, and a Certification from the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
of Batangas City that the lot in question is within the alienable and
disposable zone. Thereafter, it awarded the land to respondent
Corporation.
> Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic, the CA ruled that
since the former had actively participated in the proceedings
before the lower court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional
challenge therein, petitioner is thereby estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of the lower court on appeal.
> Dissatisfied with the CAs ruling, petitioner Republic filed this
instant Rule 45 Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not THE REPUBLIC CANNOT BE
ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF
THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OVER THE APPLICATION FOR
ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE EVEN FOR THE
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL?
RULING:
YES. We uphold the jurisdiction of the MTC. The
Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction in
this case.
At the outset, we rule that petitioner Republic is not estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court, even if the former
raised the jurisdictional question only on appeal. The rule is
settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings. Jurisdiction over the

subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It

cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission
of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court.
Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if
raised for the first time on appeal.
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that a party may be estopped
from raising such [jurisdictional] question if he has actively taken
part in the very proceeding which he questions, belatedly
objecting to the courts jurisdiction in the event that the judgment
or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him is based on the
doctrine of estoppel by laches. We are aware of that doctrine first
enunciated by this Court in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. In Tijam, the
party-litigant actively participated in the proceedings before the
lower court and filed pleadings therein. Only 15 years thereafter,
and after receiving an adverse Decision on the merits from the
appellate court, did the party-litigant question the lower courts
jurisdiction. Considering the unique facts in that case, we held
that estoppel by laches had already precluded the party-litigant
from raising the question of lack of jurisdiction on appeal.
In Figueroa v. People, we cautioned that Tijam must be construed
as an exception to the general rule and applied only in the most
exceptional cases whose factual milieu is similar to that in the
latter case.
The facts are starkly different in this case, making the exceptional
rule in Tijam inapplicable. Here, petitioner Republic filed its
Opposition to the application for registration when the records
were still with the RTC. At that point, petitioner could not have
questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the MTC, simply because
the case was not yet with that court. When the records were
transferred to the MTC, petitioner neither filed pleadings nor
requested affirmative relief from that court. On appeal, petitioner
immediately raised the jurisdictional question in its Brief. Clearly,
the exceptional doctrine of estoppel by laches is inapplicable to
the instant appeal.
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier;
it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned or declined to assert it. In this case,
petitioner Republic has not displayed such unreasonable failure or
neglect that would lead us to conclude that it has abandoned or
declined to assert its right to question the lower court's
jurisdiction.

10
CUDIAMAT vs BATANGAS SAVINGS
FACTS:
> Petitioner Atty. Restituto Cudiamat and his brother Perfecto
were the registered co-owners of a 320 square meter parcel of
land who resided with his wife, entrusted the custody of the title.
> Perfecto, without the knowledge and consent of Restituto,
obtained a loan from respondent Batangas Savings and Loan
Bank, Inc. (the bank). To secure the payment of the loan, Perfecto
mortgaged the property for the purpose of which he presented a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by
Restituto, with the marital consent of his wife-herein co-petitioner
Erlinda Cudiamat.
> Restituto was informed, via letter dated from the bank, that the
property was foreclosed.
> Informed the bank that he had no participation in the execution
of the mortgage and that he never authorized Perfecto for the
purpose.
> Perfecto died, Perfectos widow petitioner Corazon was being
evicted from the property, she and her co-petitioner-spouses
Restituto and Erlinda filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Balayan a complaintfor quieting of title with damages against
the bank assailing the mortgage as being null and void as they did
not authorize the encumbrance of the property.
> RTC rendered judgment, in the complaint for quieting of title, in
favor of the plaintiffs-herein petitioners. It ordered respondent
Register of Deeds of Nasugbu to cancel the encumbrance
annotated issued in the name of the bank and reinstate the former
title.
> The bank appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending, inter
alia, that the Balayan RTC had no jurisdiction over petitioners
complaint for quieting of title.
> Appellate court, ruling in favor of the bank, dismissed petitioners
complaint for quieting of title, without prejudice to the right of
petitioners to take up their claims with the Nasugbu RTC sitting as
a liquidation court.
> To the appellate court, the Balayan RTC, as a court of general
jurisdiction, should have deferred to the Nasugbu RTC which sits
as a liquidation court, given that the bank was already under
receivership when petitioners filed the complaint for quieting of
title.
> Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by
the appellate court, they filed the present petition for review on
certiorari.
> Assailing the appellate courts ruling that the Balayan RTC had
no jurisdiction over their complaint, petitioners argue that their
complaint was filed earlier than PDICs petition for assistance in
the liquidation; and that the bank is now estopped from

questioning the jurisdiction of the Balayan RTC because it actively

participated in the proceedings thereat.
ISSUE:
Whether or not estoppel bars the bank from raising the
issue of lack of jurisdiction of the Balayan RTC?
RULING:
YES. The operation of estoppel on the question
of jurisdiction seemingly depends on whether the lower court
actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the
case was tried and decided upon the theory that it
had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from
assailing such jurisdiction, for the same must exist as a matter of
law, and may not be conferred by the consent of the parties
or by estoppel. However, if the lower court had jurisdiction,
and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such,
for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who
induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to
assume an inconsistent position that the lower court
had jurisdiction.
In the present case, the Balayan RTC, sitting as a court of general
jurisdiction, had jurisdiction over the complaint for quieting of title
filed by petitioners on August 9, 1999. The Nasugbu RTC, as a
liquidation court, assumed jurisdiction over the claims against the
bank only on May 25, 2000, when PDICs petition for assistance in
the liquidation was raffled thereat and given due course.
While it is well-settled that lack of jurisdiction on the subject
matter can be raised at any time and is not lost by estoppel by
laches, the present case is an exception. To compel petitioners to
re-file and relitigate their claims before the Nasugbu RTC when
the parties had already been given the opportunity to present their
respective evidence in a full-blown trial before the Balayan RTC
which had, in fact, decided petitioners complaint (about two years
before the appellate court rendered the assailed decision) would
be an exercise in futility and would unjustly burden petitioners.

JURISDICTION OVER THE

SUBJECT MATTER
CITY OF DUMAGUETE vs PPA
FACTS:
> Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo (Remollo), filed before the
RTC an Application for Original Registration of Title over a parcel
of land with improvements.
> Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, seeking the dismissal of
LRC Case No. N-201 on the ground that the RTC lacked
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Respondent argued that
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree, refers only to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership. The subject property in LRC Case No. N-201 is not
alienable and disposable, since it is a foreshore land, as explicitly
testified to by petitioners own witness, land is not registerable.
> Petitioner claimed that the subject property was a swamp
reclaimed about 40 years ago, which it occupied openly,
continuously, exclusively, and notoriously under a bona fide claim
of ownership.
> RTC issued an Ordergranting the Motion to Dismiss of
respondent.
> In its Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioner contended that the dismissal of its
application was premature and tantamount to a denial of its right
to due process. It has yet to present evidence to prove factual
matters in support of its application, such as the subject property
already being alienable and disposable at the time it was
occupied and possessed by petitioner.
> However, after taking into consideration the Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner, the RTC issued another
Order dated December 7, 2000, setting aside its Order
dated September 7, 2000 in the interest of justice and
resolving to have a full-blown proceeding to determine factual
issues in LRC Case No. N-201.
> Respondent challenged the RTC Orders dated December 7,
2000 and February 20, 2001 for having been issued by the RTC
in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Respondent reiterated that the RTC Order
dated September 7, 2000, dismissing LRC Case No. N-201 had
already attained finality.

11
> The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, found merit in the Petition
of respondent and set aside the RTC Orders.
> Petitioner comes before us via the instant Petition for Review.

sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the

allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in setting aside the orders of
the RTC?
RULING:
YES. The grant of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court requires grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of
discretion exists where an act is performed with a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.
The Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of certiorari in
favor of respondent. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when, in its Orders dated December 7, 2000 and
February 20, 2001, it set aside the order of dismissal of LRC
Case No. N-201 and resolved to have a full-blown proceeding to
determine factual issues in said case.
Procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If
a stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than serve
the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the
latter.
The dismissal by the RTC of LRC Case No. N-201 for lack of
jurisdiction is patently erroneous.
Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined
by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's
cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which
court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on
the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The
averments in the complaint and the character of the relief

As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot

be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or
upon the motion to dismiss; for otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the
defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the
nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in
the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the
relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, created the RTC in place of the
CFI. Presently, jurisdiction over an application for land registration
remains with the RTC where the land is situated, except when
such jurisdiction is delegated by the Supreme Court to the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts under certain circumstances.
Respondent sought the dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201 on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, not because of the insufficiency of
the allegations and prayer therein, but because the evidence
presented by petitioner itself during the trial supposedly showed
that the subject property is a foreshore land, which is not
alienable and disposable.
The land registration court initially has jurisdiction over the land
applied for at the time of the filing of the application. After trial, the
court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, can determine whether the
title to the land applied for is registerable and can be confirmed. In
the event that the subject matter of the application turns out to be
inalienable public land, then it has no jurisdiction to order the
registration of the land and perforce must dismiss the application.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review of petitioner City of
Dumaguete is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated March 4,
2005 and Resolution dated June 6, 2005 of the Court Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 64379 are SET ASIDE, and the Orders dated
December 7, 2000 and February 20, 2001 of Branch 44 of the
Regional Trial Court of the City of Dumaguete in LRC Case No.
N-201 are REINSTATED. The said trial court is DIRECTED to
proceed with the hearing of LRC Case No. N-201 with dispatch.

TIMES BROADCASTING NETWORK vs CA

FACTS:
> Petitioner Times Broadcasting Network leased a portion of Hotel
Arocha in Ozamis City owned by private respondent Filomeno
Arocha. The premises were to be used by petitioner to operate a
radio station.
> Petitioner began installing its equipment and apparatus in the
leased premises. Petitioner, however, installed its radio antenna
on the third floor rooftop of the hotel, instead of the fourth floor
rooftop as stipulated in the contract.
> Private respondent, through its counsel, Ferdinand S. Reyes,
sent a letter to petitioner demanding payment of P2,500.00 as
monthly rental for the use of the third floor rooftop, since the third
floor rooftop is not covered by the lease. Petitioner refused to
pay. It claimed that the installation of its radio antenna on the third
floor rooftop was with the permission of private respondent. It also
averred that it is impossible for it to mount its antenna on the
fourth floor rooftop because it is already occupied by the hotel's
TV antenna.
> Private respondent Arocha filed before the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC) a verified complaint for ejectment with payment
of back rentals and damages against petitioner.
> Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint. It argued that the
MTCC has no jurisdiction over the case because private
respondent's cause of action is actually not for ejectment but for
specific performance, hence, for compliance with the terms of the
lease contract wherein RTC has jurisdiction.
> The MTCC denied the motion and rendered a Decision in favor
of private respondent.
> On appeal, the RTC reversed the Decision of the MTCC. It held
that the issues raised in the parties' pleadings are not the proper
subject of a summary action of forcible entry.
> Private respondent elevated the case to respondent Court of
Appeals on a Petition for Review. Respondent court reversed the
Decision of the RTC and reinstated the Decision of the MTCC.
> Petitioner filed the instant petition that the court a quo gravely
abused its discretion and seriously erred in not dismissing the
case for want of jurisdiction by the original court (MTCC) over the
nature and subject of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint is one for ejectment or
specific performance?
RULING:

12
A reading of the allegations in the complaint shows that the action
filed by private respondent was for ejectment and not for specific
performance as asserted by petitioner.
The nature of the action and the jurisdiction of courts are
determined by the allegations in the complaint. The aforequoted
complaint shows that the plaintiff (herein private respondent) is
the owner of the Hotel Arocha building in Ozamis City and that the
defendant (herein petitioner), through stealth and strategy, and
without any authority from the owner, used the third floor rooftop
of the building as mounting pad of its radio antenna.
In the case at bar, private respondent was unlawfully deprived of
the possession of the third floor rooftop of Hotel Arocha when
petitioner used it as mounting pad for its antenna. Private
respondent sought to recover physical possession thereof through
an action for ejectment filed before the MTCC. Hence, the case
properly falls within the jurisdiction of the MTCC.

LARESMA vs ABELLANA
FACTS:
> Respondent Antonio P. Abellana filed a Complaint with the RTC
against petitioner Justino Laresma, a farmer, for recovery of
possession of Lot 4-E of subdivision plan, a parcel of agricultural
land.
> Petitioner had been a lessee of a certain Socorro Chiong,
whose agricultural land adjoined his own; and that sometime in
1985, the petitioner, by means of threat, strategy, and stealth, took
possession of his property and deprived him of its
possession. The respondent prayed that, after due proceedings,
judgment be rendered in his favor, ordering the petitioner to
vacate the property and pay him actual damages.
> In his answer to the complaint, the petitioner averred that the
dispute between him and the respondent was agrarian in nature,
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR.
> The petitioner further testified that his wife was issued CLT No.
0-031817 over Lot No. 00013, the property he was cultivating.
> The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondent and
against the petitioner. The court ruled that, as evidenced by the
contract of lease executed by Praxedes Laresma and Socorro
Chiong, the petitioner was the tenant of Chiong and not of the
respondent. Thus, the court had jurisdiction over the case.
> Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DARAB has the jurisdiction over the
complaint?
RULING:
NO. The petitioner points out that the property subject of
the complaint is covered by a CLT issued by the DAR in the name
of his wife. The petitioner avers that although the complaint of the
respondent appeared to be one for the recovery of possession of
the said property (accion publiciana), by claiming that the
petitioner was the tenant of Socorro Chiong, the respondent
indirectly attacked the said CLT. Hence, the action is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform and
Adjudication Board (DARAB) under Republic Act No. 6657.
We agree with the respondent that the DARAB had no jurisdiction
over his action against the petitioner. The bone of contention of

the parties and the decisive issue in the trial court was whether
or not Lot No. 00013 covered by CLT No. 0-031817 is a portion of
Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171 under the name of the
respondent. This is the reason why the parties agreed to have Lot
No. 00013 resurveyed in relation to Lot 4-C owned by Socorro
Chiong and to Lot 4-E titled in the name of the respondent. After a
calibration of the evidence on record and the reports of Epan and
Navarro, the trial court ruled that Lot No. 00013 formed part of Lot
4-C owned by Socorro Chiong and not of Lot 4-E titled in the
name of the respondent.
We agree with the ruling of the RTC that, as gleaned from the
material averments of his complaint, the action of the respondent
against the petitioner is not an agrarian dispute within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. The well-entrenched principle
is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the
action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint
and the law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein.
In Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. Cyborg
Leasing Corporation, we ruled that the jurisdiction of the court
over the nature of the action and the subject matter thereof
cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court
or upon a motion to dismiss for, otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant. Once
jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the
litigation. We also held in Arcelona v. Court of Appeals that,
in American jurisprudence, the nullity of a decision arising from
lack of jurisdiction may be determined from the record of the case,
not necessarily from the face of the judgment only.
It must be stressed that the regular court does not lose its
jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the simple expedient of a
party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a
tenancy relationship between the parties. But it is the duty of the
court to receive evidence to determine the allegations of
tenancy. If, after hearing, tenancy had, in fact, been shown to be
the real issue, the court should dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a
tribunal are determined by the material allegations of the
complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced.
Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an
action is conferred only by law and not by the consent or waiver
upon a court which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of an action. Lack of jurisdiction of the
court over an action or the subject matter of an action cannot be
cured by the silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent

13
of the parties. If the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of an
action, it may dismiss the same ex mero motu or motu proprio. A
decision of the court without jurisdiction is null and void; hence, it
could never logically become final and executory. Such a
judgment may be attacked directly or collaterally.
However, we find and so hold that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the action of the respondent. In this case, the
respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner on May 24,
1994. Hence, the jurisdiction of the regular court over the nature
of this action is governed by Republic Act No. 7691, which took
effect on April 15, 1994. Section 3 thereof amended Section 33 of
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129.
The actions envisaged in the aforequoted provisions are accion
publiciana and reinvindicatoria. To determine which court has
jurisdiction over the action, the complaint must allege the
assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the
interest thereon. In this case, the complaint of the respondent
against the petitioner for recovery of possession of real property
(accion publiciana).
The complaint does not contain any allegation of the assessed
value of Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171. There is, thus, no
showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC had exclusive
jurisdiction over the action of the respondent. Moreover, as
gleaned from the receipt of realty tax payments issued to the
respondent, the assessed value of the property in 1993
was P8,300.00. Patently then, the Municipal Trial Court of
Aloguinsan, Cebu, and not the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City,
had exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the respondent.
Hence, all the proceedings in the RTC, including its decision, are
null and void.

FACTS:
> Private respondent Fokker Santos filed a complaint for quasidelict and damages against Jimmy T. Pinion, the driver of a truck
involved
in
a
traffic
accident,
and
against
petitioner Artemio Iniego, as owner of the said truck and
employer of Pinion.
> Private respondent filed a Motion to Declare defendant in
Default allegedly for failure of the latter to file his answer within
the final extended period. On 28 August 2002, petitioner filed a
Motion to Admit and a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the
ground, among other things, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over
the cause of action of the case.
> Public respondent Judge Guillermo G. Purganan, acting as
presiding judge of the RTC Manila, issued the assailed Omnibus
Order denying the Motion to Dismiss of the petitioner and the
Motion to Declare Defendant in Default of the private respondent.
> Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Omnibus
Order but same was denied.
> Petitioner elevated Orders of the RTC to the Court of Appeals
on petition for certiorari under Rule 65 but the petition was
DENIED DUE COURSE and dismissed for lack of merit.
> Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the
Court of Appeals. Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction on the subject
matter?
RULING:
YES. Petitioner claims that actions for damages based
on quasi-delict are actions that are capable of pecuniary
estimation; hence, the jurisdiction in such cases falls upon either
the municipal courts, or the RTC, depending on the value of the
damages claimed.
Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily actions
for the recovery of a sum of money for the damages suffered
because of the defendants alleged tortious acts, and
therefore capable of pecuniary estimation.

INIEGO vs PURGANAN

Respondent Judges observation is erroneous. It is crystal clear

from B.P.129, as amended by RA 7691, that what must be
determined to be capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation is
not the cause of action, but the subject matter of the action. A
cause of action is the delict or wrongful act or omission committed

by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the

plaintiff. On the other hand, the subject matter of the action is the
physical facts, the thing real or personal, the money, lands,
chattels, and the like, in relation to which the suit is prosecuted,
and not the delict or wrong committed by the defendant.
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery
of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in
the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than
the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought like suits to have the defendant perform his part of the
contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for
annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this court
has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the
litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance [now RTC].
Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and
effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of money for the
damages
suffered
because
of
the
defendants
alleged tortious acts. The damages claimed in such actions
represent the monetary equivalent of the injury caused to the
plaintiff by the defendant, which are thus sought to be
recovered by the plaintiff. This money claim is the principal relief
sought, and is not merely incidental or a consequence thereof. It
bears to point out that the complaint filed by private respondent
before the RTC actually bears the caption for DAMAGES.
We therefore rule that the subject matter of actions for damages
based on quasi-delict is capable of pecuniary estimation.
The amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the
RTC, since it is the claim for all kinds of damages that is the basis
of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for
damages arise from the same or from different causes of action.
Despite our concurrence in petitioners claim that actions for
damages based on quasi-delict are actions that are capable of
pecuniary estimation, we find that the total amount of damages
claimed by the private respondent nevertheless still exceeds the
jurisdictional limit of P400,000.00 and remains under the
jurisdiction of the RTC.

INSULAR SAVINGS BANK vs FAR EAST BANK

14
FACTS:
> Far East Bank and Trust Company (Respondent) filed a
complaint
against
Home
Bankers
Trust
and
Company (HBTC) with
the
Philippine
Clearing
House
Corporations (PCHC) Arbitration Committee. Respondent sought
to recover from the petitioner, the sum of P25,200,000.00
representing the total amount of the three checks drawn and
debited against its clearing account. Respondent dishonored the
checks for insufficiency of funds and returned the checks to
HBTC.
> Before the termination of the arbitration proceedings,
respondent filed another complaint but this time with the RTC for
Sum of Money and Damages with Preliminary Attachment.
> Aware of the arbitration proceedings between respondent and
petitioner, the RTC, in an Omnibus Order suspended the
proceedings in the case against all the defendants pending the
decision of the Arbitration Committee.
> PCHC Arbitration Committee rendered its decision in favor of
respondent.
> The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied by
the Arbitration Committee. Petitioner filed a petition for review in
the earlier case filed by respondent.
> Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition for Review for
Lack of Jurisdiction, which was opposed by the petitioner.
> RTC dismissed the petition for review should be filed in a
separate case.
> The RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, hence,
this petition.

action, this would have resulted in a multiplicity of suits, which is

abhorred in procedure.
Meanwhile respondent avers that the RTC correctly dismissed the
appeal from the award of private arbitrators since there is no
statutory basis for such appeal.
The Philippine Clearing House Corporation was created to
facilitate the clearing of checks of member banks. Among these
member banks exists a compromissoire, or an arbitration
agreement embedded in their contract wherein they consent that
any future dispute or controversy between its PCHC participants
involving any check would be submitted to the Arbitration
Committee for arbitration. Petitioner and respondent are members
of PCHC, thus they underwent arbitration proceedings.
As provided in the PCHC Rules, the findings of facts of the
decision or award rendered by the Arbitration Committee shall be
final and conclusive upon all the parties in said arbitration
dispute. Under Article 2044 of the New Civil Code, the validity of
any stipulation on the finality of the arbitrators award or decision is
recognized. However, where the conditions described in Articles
2038, 2039 and 2040 applicable to both compromises and
arbitrations are obtaining, the arbitrators award may be annulled
or rescinded. Consequently, the decision of the Arbitration
Committee is subject to judicial review.

RULING:

Furthermore, petitioner had several judicial remedies available at

its disposal after the Arbitration Committee denied its Motion for
Reconsideration. It may petition the proper RTC to issue an order
vacating the award on the grounds provided for under Section 24
of the Arbitration Law. Petitioner likewise has the option to file a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the
Court of Appeals on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions
of fact and law. Lastly, petitioner may file a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground that the
Arbitrator Committee acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Since this case involves acts or omissions of a quasijudicial agency, the petition should be filed in and cognizable only
by the Court of Appeals.

NO. Petitioner contends that Civil Case No. 92-145 was

merely suspended to await the outcome of the arbitration case
pending before the PCHC. Thus, any petition questioning the
decision of the Arbitration Committee must be filed in Civil Case
No. 92-145 and should not be docketed as a separate
action. Likewise, petitioner avers that had it filed a separate

In this instance, petitioner did not avail of any of the

abovementioned remedies available to it. Instead it filed a petition
for review with the RTC where Civil Case No. 92-145 is pending
pursuant to Section 13 of the PCHC Rules to sustain its
action. Clearly, it erred in the procedure it chose for judicial review
of the arbitral award.

ISSUE:
Whether or not THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN DISMISSING THE PETITION OF PETITIONER FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION ON THE GROUND THAT IT SHOULD HAVE
BEEN DOCKETED AS A SEPARATE CASE?

Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause

- the right to act in a case. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is the power to hear and determine the general class
to which the proceedings in question belong. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred by law and not by the
consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by
erroneous belief of the court that it exists.
In the instant case, petitioner and respondent have agreed that
the PCHC Rules would govern in case of controversy. However,
since the PCHC Rules came about only as a result of an
agreement between and among member banks of PCHC and not
by law, it cannot confer jurisdiction to the RTC. Thus, the portion
of the PCHC Rules granting jurisdiction to the RTC to review
arbitral awards, only on questions of law, cannot be given effect.
Consequently, the proper recourse of petitioner from the denial of
its motion for reconsideration by the Arbitration Committee is to
file either a motion to vacate the arbitral award with the RTC, a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, or a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. In the case at bar, petitioner filed a petition for
review with the RTC when the same should have been filed with
the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
the RTC of Makati did not err in dismissing the petition for review
for lack of jurisdiction but not on the ground that petitioner should
have filed a separate case from Civil Case No. 92-145 but on the
necessity of filing the correct petition in the proper court. It is
immaterial whether petitioner filed the petition for review in Civil
Case No. 92-145 as an appeal of the arbitral award or whether it
filed a separate case in the RTC, considering that the RTC will
only have jurisdiction over an arbitral award in cases of motions to
vacate the same. Otherwise, as elucidated herein, the Court of
Appeals retains jurisdiction in petitions for review or in petitions for
certiorari. Consequently, petitioners arguments, with respect to
the filing of separate action from Civil Case No. 92-145 resulting
in a multiplicity of suits, cannot be given due course.

15
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
*** Jurisdiction over The Person of the Plaintiff ***

LHUILLIER vs BRITISH AIRWAYS

FACTS:
> Petitioner Edna Diago Lhuillier filed a Complaint for damages
against respondent British Airways before the RTC. She alleged
that she took respondents flight 548 from London, United
Kingdom to Rome, Italy. Once on board, she allegedly requested
Julian Halliday (Halliday), one of the respondents flight
attendants, to assist her in placing her hand-carried luggage in
the overhead bin. However, Halliday allegedly refused to help and
assist her, and even sarcastically remarked that If I were to help
all 300 passengers in this flight, I would have a broken back!
> Upon arrival in Rome, petitioner complained to respondents
ground manager and demanded an apology. However, the latter
declared that the flight stewards were only doing their job.
> Petitioner filed the complaint for damages.
> Summons together with a copy of the complaint, was served on
the respondent through Violeta Echevarria, General Manager of
Euro-Philippine Airline Services.
> Respondent by way of special appearance through counsel,
filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over
the case and over the person of the respondent. Respondent
alleged
that
only
the
courts
of London, United
Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have jurisdiction over the complaint for
damages pursuant to the Warsaw Convention.
> Thus, since a) respondent is domiciled in London; b)
respondents principal place of business is in London; c) petitioner
bought her ticket in Italy (through Jeepney Travel S.A.S, in
Rome); and d) Rome, Italy is petitioners place of destination, then
it follows that the complaint should only be filed in the proper
courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy.
> Likewise, it was alleged that the case must be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondent because the
summons was erroneously served on Euro-Philippine Airline
Services, Inc. which is not its resident agent in the Philippines.
> RTC grant the motion to dismiss. Courts have to apply the
principles of international law, and are bound by treaty stipulations
entered into by the Philippines which form part of the law of the
land. One of this is the Warsaw Convention. Being a signatory
thereto, the Philippines adheres to its stipulations and is bound by
its provisions including the place where actions involving
damages to plaintiff is to be instituted.

> Petitioner now comes directly before us on a Petition for Review

on Certiorari on pure questions of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RESPONDENT AIR CARRIER OF
PASSENGERS, IN FILING ITS MOTION TO DISMISS BASED
ON LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
OF THE CASE AND OVER ITS PERSON MAY BE DEEMED AS
HAVING IN FACT AND IN LAW SUBMITTED ITSELF TO THE
JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT?
RULING:
NO. It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and
effect of law in this country.
Thus, when the place of departure and the place of destination in
a contract of carriage are situated within the territories of two High
Contracting Parties, said carriage is deemed an international
carriage. The High Contracting Parties referred to herein were the
signatories to the Warsaw Convention and those which
subsequently adhered to it.
In the case at bench, petitioners place of departure
was London, United Kingdom while her place of destination
was Rome, Italy. Both the United Kingdom and Italy signed and
ratified the Warsaw Convention. As such, the transport of the
petitioner is deemed to be an international carriage within the
contemplation of the Warsaw Convention.
In this case, it is not disputed that respondent is a British
corporation domiciled in London, United Kingdom with London as
its principal place of business. Hence, under the first and second
jurisdictional rules, the petitioner may bring her case before the
courts of London in the United Kingdom. In the passenger ticket
and baggage check presented by both the petitioner and
respondent, it appears that the ticket was issued
in Rome, Italy. Consequently, under the third jurisdictional rule,
the petitioner has the option to bring her case before the courts
of Rome in Italy. Finally, both the petitioner and respondent aver
that the place of destination is Rome, Italy, which is properly
designated given the routing presented in the said passenger
ticket and baggage check. Accordingly, petitioner may bring her
action before the courts of Rome, Italy. We thus find that the RTC
of Makati correctly ruled that it does not have jurisdiction over the
case filed by the petitioner.

It is thus settled that allegations of tortious conduct

committed against an airline passenger during the course of
the international carriage do not bring the case outside the
ambit of the Warsaw Convention.
Petitioner argues that respondent has effectively submitted itself
to the jurisdiction of the trial court when the latter stated in its
Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration that
Defendant [is at a loss] x x x how the plaintiff arrived at her
erroneous impression that it is/was Euro-Philippines Airlines
Services, Inc. that has been making a special appearance since
x xx British Airways x x x has been clearly specifying in all the
pleadings that it has filed with this Honorable Court that it is the
one making a special appearance.
In refuting the contention of petitioner, respondent cited La Naval
Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals where we held that even if a
party challenges the jurisdiction of the court over his person, as
by reason of absence or defective service of summons, and he
also invokes other grounds for the dismissal of the action under
Rule 16, he is not deemed to be in estoppel or to have waived his
objection to the jurisdiction over his person.
Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, together with other
grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared
voluntarily before the court. What the rule on voluntary
appearance the first sentence of the above-quoted rule means is
that the voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without
qualification, in which case he is deemed to have waived his
defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper
service of summons.
In this case, the special appearance of the counsel of
respondent in filing the Motion to Dismiss and other
pleadings before the trial court cannot be deemed to be
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the said trial
court. We hence disagree with the contention of the petitioner
and rule that there was no voluntary appearance before the trial
court that could constitute estoppel or a waiver of respondents
objection to jurisdiction over its person.

16
RAPID CITY REALTY vs VILLA

GARCIA vs SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:
> Rapid City Realty and Development Corporation filed a
complaint
for
declaration
of
nullity
of
subdivision
plans, mandamus and damages against several defendants
including Spouses Orlando and Lourdes Villa to the RTC.
> After one failed attempt at personal service of summons,
Gregorio Zapanta, court process server, resorted to substituted
service by serving summons upon respondents househelp who
did not acknowledge receipt thereof.
> Despite substituted service, respondents failed to file their
Answer, prompting petitioner to file a Motion to Declare
Defendants [respondents] in Default which the trial court granted.
> Respondents filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default. They denied
the existence of two women helpers who allegedly refused to sign
and acknowledge receipt of the summons. In any event, they
contended that assuming that the allegation were true, the
helpers had no authority to receive the documents.
> Trial court set aside the Order of Default and gave respondents
five days to file their Answer. Respondents just the same did not
file an Answer, drawing petitioner to again file a Motion to declare
them in default, which the trial court again granted.
> Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for reconsideration of the
second order declaring them in default and to vacate
proceedings, this time claiming that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons due to invalid service of summons.
> Trial court denied respondents Omnibus Motion and proceeded
to receive ex-parte evidence for petitioner.
> Respondents, via certiorari, challenged the trial courts Orders
before CA.
> Appellate court annulled the trial courts Orders declaring
respondents in default for the second time.

FACTS:

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the respondents?

> To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties in the

aggregate amount of PhP 143,052,015.29 that retired Maj. Gen.
Carlos F. Garcia, his wife, herein petitioner Clarita and their 3
children, had allegedly amassed and acquired, the Republic,
through the Office of the Ombudsman, filed with the
Sandiganbayan petition for the forfeiture of those properties.
> Was followed by the filing of another forfeiture case, this time to
recover funds and properties amounting to PhP 202,005,980.55.
> Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing of
Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the Garcias and three others with
violation of RA 7080 (plunder) under an Information which placed
the value of the property and funds plundered at PhP
303,272,005.99.
> After the filing of Forfeiture I - The corresponding summons
were issued and all served on Gen. Garcia at his place of
detention. Instead of an answer, the Garcias filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of the SBs lack of jurisdiction over separate
civil actions for forfeiture but was denied.
> With respect to Forfeiture II - the SB sheriff served the
corresponding summons. In his return, the sheriff stated giving the
copies of the summons to the OIC/Custodian of the
PNP Detention Center who in turn handed them to Gen. Garcia.
Clarita and her children, thru special appearance of counsel, filed
a motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II primarily for lack
of jurisdiction over their persons and that summons was
improperly served, but same was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SB acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of the plaintiff considering the summons against the
petitioner and her 3 sons have been ineffectively or improperly
served?
RULING:

RULING:
YES. It is settled that if there is no valid service of
summons, the court can still acquire jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant by virtue of the latters voluntary appearance.
Respondents did not, in said motion, allege that their filing thereof
was a special appearance for the purpose only to question the
jurisdiction over their persons. Clearly, they had acquiesced to the
jurisdiction of the court.

NO. SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and

that of her children due to a defective substituted service of
summons. Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure clearly provides for the requirements of a valid
substituted service of summons.
It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the
latter to be bound by its decision or orders. Valid service of
summons, by whatever mode authorized by and proper under the

Rules, is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction over

a person.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I
and II were served personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia,
who is detained at the PNP Detention Center, who acknowledged
receipt thereof by affixing his signature. It is also undisputed that
substituted service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II were
made on petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at
the PNP Detention Center. However, such substituted services of
summons were invalid for being irregular and defective.
In Manotoc v. CA, we broke down the requirements to be:
(1) Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying
on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant
cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt
service within a reasonable time. Reasonable time being so much
time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably
prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or
duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights
and possibility of loss, if any, to the other party. Moreover, we
indicated therein that the sheriff must show several attempts for
personal service of at least three (3) times on at least two (2)
different dates.
(2) Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in
the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding
the attempted personal service.
(3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and
discretion residing at defendants house or residence; or on a
competent person in charge of defendants office or regular place
of business.
From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid
substituted service of summons was made on petitioner and her
children, as the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not
comply with the first two (2) requirements mentioned above for a
valid substituted service of summons. Moreover, the third
requirement was also not strictly complied with as the substituted
service was made not at petitioners house or residence but in the
PNP Detention Center where Maj. Gen. Garcia is detained, even
if the latter is of suitable age and discretion. Hence, no valid
substituted service of summons was made.
The stringent rules on valid service of summons for the court to
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendants, however,
admits of exceptions, as when the party voluntarily submits
himself to the jurisdiction of the court by asking affirmative relief.
In the instant case, the Republic asserts that petitioner is

17
estopped from questioning improper service of summons since
the improvident service of summons in both forfeiture cases had
been cured by their (petitioner and her children) voluntary
appearance in the forfeiture cases. The Republic points to the
various pleadings filed by petitioner and her children during the
subject forfeiture hearings. We cannot subscribe to the Republics
views.

*** Jurisdiction over The Person

of the Defendant ***

Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the

jurisdiction of the court over his person, together with other
grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared
voluntarily before the court. What the rule on voluntary
appearance the first sentence of the above-quoted rule means is
that the voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without
qualification, in which case he is deemed to have waived his
defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper
service of summons.

> Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. (hereafter, simply Davao Light)
filed a verified complaint for recovery of a sum of money and
damages against Queensland Hotel, etc. and Teodorico Adarna.
The complaint contained an ex parte application for a writ of
preliminary attachment.
> Trial court issued an Order granting the ex parte application and
fixing the attachment bond, then, writ of attachment was issued.
> Summons and a copy of the complaint, as well as the writ of
attachment and a copy of the attachment bond, were served on
defendants Queensland and Adarna.
> defendants Queensland and Adarna filed a motion to discharge
the attachment for lack of jurisdiction to issue the same because
at the time the order of attachment was promulgated (May 3,
1989) and the attachment writ issued (May 11, 1989), the Trial
Court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the cause and over
the persons of the defendants.
> Trial Court issued an Order denying the motion to discharge.
> Queensland and Adarna filed a special civil action
of certiorari instituted by them in the Court of Appeals.
> The order was annulled by CA.
> Davao Light now seeks for the reversal of the order of CA.

The pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject forfeiture cases,

however, do not show that she voluntarily appeared without
qualification. Petitioner filed the following pleadings in Forfeiture
I: (a) motion to dismiss; (b) motion for reconsideration and/or to
admit answer; (c) second motion for reconsideration; (d) motion to
consolidate forfeiture case with plunder case; and (e) motion to
dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I. And in Forfeiture II: (a)
motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II; and (b) motion for
partial reconsideration.
The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to dismiss, were
filed by petitioner solely for special appearance with the purpose
of challenging the jurisdiction of the SB over her person and that
of her three children.
Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner and her three children
voluntarily appeared before the SB to cure the defective
substituted services of summons. They are, therefore, not
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the SB over their
persons nor are they deemed to have waived such defense of
lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, there being no valid substituted
services of summons made, the SB did not acquire jurisdiction
over the persons of petitioner and her children. And perforce, the
proceedings in the subject forfeiture cases, insofar as petitioner
and her three children are concerned, are null and void for lack of
jurisdiction. Thus, the order declaring them in default must be set
aside and voided insofar as petitioner and her three children are
concerned. For the forfeiture case to proceed against them, it is,
thus, imperative for the SB to serve anew summons or alias
summons on the petitioner and her three children in order to
acquire jurisdiction over their persons.

DAVAO LIGHT vs CA
FACTS:

ISSUE:
Whether or not a writ of preliminary attachment may
issue ex parte against a defendant before acquisition of
jurisdiction of the latter's person by service of summons or his
voluntary submission to the Court's authority?
RULING:
NO. It is incorrect to theorize that after an action or
proceeding has been commenced and jurisdiction over the person
of the plaintiff has been vested in the court, but before the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant (either
by service of summons or his voluntary submission to the court's
authority), nothing can be validly done by the plaintiff or the court.
It is wrong to assume that the validity of acts done during this
period should be defendant on, or held in suspension until, the

actual obtention of jurisdiction over the defendant's person.

The obtention by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is one thing; quite another is the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or over the subjectmatter or nature of the action, or the res or object hereof.
An action or proceeding is commenced by the filing of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading. By that act, the jurisdiction
of the court over the subject matter or nature of the action or
proceeding is invoked or called into activity; and it is thus that the
court acquires jurisdiction over said subject matter or nature of the
action. And it is by that self-same act of the plaintiff (or petitioner)
of filing the complaint (or other appropriate pleading) by which
he signifies his submission to the court's power and authority
that jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person. On the
other hand, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
obtained, as above stated, by the service of summons or other
coercive process upon him or by his voluntary submission to the
authority of the court.
This, too, is true with regard to the provisional remedies of
preliminary attachment, preliminary injunction, receivership or
replevin. They may be validly and properly applied for and
granted even before the defendant is summoned or is heard from.
A preliminary attachment may be defined, paraphrasing the Rules
of Court, as the provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or
other party may, at the commencement of the action or at any
time thereafter, have the property of the adverse party taken into
the custody of the court as security for the satisfaction of any
judgment that may be recovered. It is a remedy which is purely
statutory in respect of which the law requires a strict construction
of the provisions granting it. Withal no principle, statutory or
jurisprudential, prohibits its issuance by any court before
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
That separate opinion stressed that there are two (2) ways of
discharging an attachment: first, by the posting of a counterbond;
and second, by a showing of its improper or irregular issuance.
It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the
Court prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of
defendant, as above indicated issuance of summons, order of
attachment and writ of attachment (and/or appointments of
guardian ad litem, or grant of authority to the plaintiff to prosecute
the suit as a pauper litigant, or amendment of the complaint by
the plaintiff as a matter of right without leave of court and
however valid and proper they might otherwise be, these do not
and cannot bind and affect the defendant until and unless
jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained by the court,

18
either by service on him of summons or other coercive process or
his voluntary submission to the court's authority. Hence, when the
sheriff or other proper officer commences implementation of the
writ of attachment, it is essential that he serve on the defendant
not only a copy of the applicant's affidavit and attachment bond,
and of the order of attachment, as explicity required by Section 5
of Rule 57, but also the summons addressed to said defendant as
well as a copy of the complaint and order for appointment of
guardian ad litem, if any, as also explicity directed by Section 3,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Service of all such documents is
indispensable not only for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, but also upon considerations of fairness,
to apprise the defendant of the complaint against him, of the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and the grounds
therefor and thus accord him the opportunity to prevent
attachment of his property by the posting of a counterbond in an
amount equal to the plaintiff's claim in the complaint pursuant to
Section 5 (or Section 12), Rule 57, or dissolving it by causing
dismissal of the complaint itself on any of the grounds set forth in
Rule 16, or demonstrating the insufficiency of the applicant's
affidavit or bond in accordance with Section 13, Rule 57.

JURISDICTION OVER THE ISSUES

LAM vs CHUA
FACTS:
> The case commenced upon the filing of a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage by Adriana Chua against Jose Lam in the
RTC.
> Jose was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage but said incapacity was
not then apparent; such psychological incapacity of Jose became
manifest only after the celebration of the marriage when he
frequently failed to go home, indulged in womanizing and
irresponsible activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal
partnership of gains; in order to save what was left of the conjugal
properties.
> Summons was duly served on Jose Lam .Despite the lapse of
fifteen days after service of summons, no responsive pleading
was filed by him.
> In further presentation of evidence, showed that Jose had been
married twice before he married Adriana in 1984.
> Court hereby declares the marriage between petitioner Adriana
Chua and respondent Jose Lam null and void for being bigamous
by nature.
> Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof but only insofar
as the decision awarded monthly support to his son in the amount
of P20,000.00. He argued that there was already a provision for
support of the child as embodied in the decision of the Makati
RTC wherein he and Adriana agreed to contribute P250,000.00
each to a common fund for the benefit of the child.
> RTC issued an Order denying Jose Lams motion for
reconsideration.
> Jose then appealed the Pasay RTCs decision to the Court of
Appeals.
> Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming the Pasay
RTCs decision in all respects.
> Jose filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the grant of support in the order from the
RTC is within its jurisdiction to decide?

RULING:
NO. First, the only ground alleged in the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Adriana with the Pasay
RTC is the psychological incapacity of Jose without any prayer for
the support of her child. Adriana presented, formally offered her
evidence in support of the petition and submitted the case for
decision as of May 12, 1994. But on a motion to re-open filed by
her on June 23, 1994, the trial court set the case for reception of
evidence on July 6, 1994 and subsequently allowed Adriana to
present evidence of two previous marriages contracted by Jose
with other women to prove that the marriage between Adriana and
Jose was null and void for being bigamous. It is only at the July 6,
1994 hearing that respondent Adriana first claimed support for
John Paul when she testified in open court.
The petition of Adriana was, in effect, substantially changed by the
admission of the additional evidence. The ground relied on for
nullity of the marriage was changed from the psychological
incapacity of Jose to that of existence of previous marriages of
Jose with two different women with an additional claim for support
of the child. Such substantial changes were not reflected in the
petition filed with the trial court, as no formal amendment was
ever made by Adriana except the insertion of the handwritten
phrase "And for respondent to support the child of petitioner in an
amount this Honorable Court may deem just and reasonable
"found at the ultimate paragraph of the petition, as allowed by the
RTC. There is nothing on record to show that petitioner Jose was
notified of the substantial changes in the petition of Adriana.
Second, RTC did not give Jose an opportunity to be present for
the presentation of evidence by Adriana and to refute the same.
Third, the records do not show that petitioner was sent a copy of
the Order dated July 6, 1994 wherein the trial court granted the
Urgent Motion to Re-Open of respondent.
A party who has been declared in default is entitled to service of
substantially amended or supplemental pleadings. Considering
that in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage or annulment of
marriage, there can be no default pursuant to Section 6, Rule 18
of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Article 48 of the Family
Code, it is with more reason that petitioner should likewise be
entitled to notice of all proceedings.
It is also a general principle of law that a court cannot set itself in
motion, nor has it power to decide questions except as presented
by the parties in their pleadings. Anything that is decided beyond

19
them is coram non-judice and void. Therefore where a court
enters a judgment or awards relief beyond the prayer of the
complaint or the scope of its allegations the excessive relief is not
merely irregular but is void for want of jurisdiction, and is open to
collateral attack.
The appellate court also ruled that a judgment of a court upon a
subject within its general jurisdiction, but which is not brought
before it by any statement or claim of the parties, and is foreign to
the issues submitted for its determination, is a nullity.
Pursuant to the foregoing principle, it is a serious error for the trial
court to have rendered judgment on issues not presented in the
pleadings as it was beyond its jurisdiction to do so. When the trial
court rendered judgment beyond the allegations contained in the
copy of the petition served upon Jose, RTC had acted in excess
of its jurisdiction and deprived petitioner Lam of due process.
Insofar as the declaration of nullity of the marriage between
Adriana and Jose for being bigamous is concerned, the decision
rendered by the Pasay RTC could be declared as invalid for
having been issued beyond its jurisdiction. Nonetheless,
considering that Jose, did not assail the declaration of nullity of
his marriage with Adriana in his motion for reconsideration which
he filed with the Pasay RTC. In the petitions he filed in the Court
of Appeals and with us, he likewise did not raise the issue of
jurisdiction of the Pasay RTC to receive evidence and render
judgment on his previous marriages with other woman which were
not alleged in the petition filed by Adriana. Petitioner Jose is
estopped from questioning the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Adriana and therefore, the Court will not undo the
judgment of the Pasay RTC declaring the marriage of Adriana and
Jose null and void for being bigamous. It is an axiomatic rule that
while a jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, this,
however, admits of an exception where estoppel has supervened.
The trial courts action of merely ordering in open court during the
July 6, 1994 hearing that a prayer for support be written and
inserted in the petition filed by respondent Adriana does not
constitute proper amendment and notice upon petitioner Jose.
Consequently, herein petitioner Jose was deprived of due process
when the trial court proceeded to hear the case on a motion to reopen and render judgment without giving Jose the requisite notice
and the opportunity to refute the new claim against him.
Verily, the manner by which the trial court arrived at the amount of
support awarded to John Paul was whimsical, arbitrary and
without any basis.

BUCE vs CA
FACTS:
> Petitioner leased a 56-square meter parcel of land. The lease
contract was for a period of fifteen years to commence on 1 June
1979 and to end on 1 June 1994 "subject to renewal for another
ten (10) years, under the same terms and conditions." Petitioner
then constructed a building and paid the required monthly rental
of P200. Respondent demanded a gradual increase in the rental
until it reached 1000.
> Private respondents counsel wrote petitioner informing her of
the increase in the rent to P1,576.58 effective January 1992
pursuant to the provisions of the Rent Control Law. Petitioner,
however, tendered checks for only 400 each but private
respondents refused to accept the same.
> Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a
complaint for specific performance with prayer for consignation.
She prayed that private respondents be ordered to accept the
rentals in accordance with the lease contract and to respect the
lease of fifteen years, which was renewable for another ten years,
at the rate of P200 a month.
> RTC declared the lease contract automatically renewed for ten
years, reasoning that the continuous increase of rent caused "an
inevitable novation of their contract.
> Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC, and ordered
petitioner to immediately vacate the leased premises on the
ground that the contract expired on 1 June 1994 without being
renewed.
> Petitioner contends that by ordering her to vacate the premises,
the Appellate Court went beyond the bounds of its authority
because the case she filed before the RTC was for "Specific
Performance" not unlawful detainer. The power to order the
lessee to vacate the leased premises is lodged in another forum.
Additionally, private respondents did not pray for the ejectment of
petitioners from the leased premises in their Answer with
Counterclaim; well-settled is the rule that a court cannot award
relief not prayed for in the complaint or compulsory counterclaim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred and went beyond the
bounds of its authority when it order the lessee to vacate the
leased premise?
RULING:
YES. The literal meaning of the stipulations shall control
if the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the

intention of the contracting parties. However, if the terms of the

agreement are ambiguous resort is made to contract
interpretation which is the determination of the meaning attached
to written or spoken words that make the contract.
The phrase "subject to renewal for another ten (10) years" is
unclear on whether the parties contemplated an automatic
renewal or extension of the term, or just an option to renew the
contract; and if what exists is the latter, who may exercise the
same or for whose benefit it was stipulated.
In the case at bar, it was not specifically indicated who may
exercise the option to renew, neither was it stated that the option
was given for the benefit of herein petitioner. Thus, pursuant to
the Fernandez ruling and Article 1196 of the Civil Code, the period
of the lease contract is deemed to have been set for the benefit of
both parties. Renewal of the contract may be had only upon their
mutual agreement or at the will of both of them. Since the private
respondents were not amenable to a renewal, they cannot be
compelled to execute a new contract when the old contract
terminated on 1 June 1994. It is the owner-lessors prerogative to
terminate the lease at its expiration. The continuance, effectivity
and fulfillment of a contract of lease cannot be made to depend
exclusively upon the free and uncontrolled choice of the lessee
between continuing the payment of the rentals or not, completely
depriving the owner of any say in the matter.
After the lease terminated on 1 June 1994 without any agreement
for renewal being reached, petitioner became subject to ejectment
from the premises. It must be noted, however, that private
respondents did not include in their Answer with Counterclaim a
prayer for the restoration of possession of the leased premises.
Neither did they file with the proper Metropolitan Trial Court an
unlawful detainer suit against petitioner after the expiration of the
lease contact. Moreover, the issues agreed upon by the parties to
be resolved during the pre-trial were the correct interpretation of
the contract and the validity of private respondents refusal to
accept petitioners payment of P400 as monthly rental. They later
limited the issue to the first, i.e., the correct interpretation of the
contract. The issue of possession of the leased premises was not
among the issues agreed upon by the parties or threshed out
before the court a quo. Neither was it raised by private
respondents on appeal.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals went beyond the bounds of its
authority when after interpreting the questioned provision of the
lease contract in favor of the private respondents it proceeded to
order petitioner to vacate the subject premises.

JURISDICTION OF MTC

20
PANTRANCO vs STANDARD INSURANCE
FACTS:
> Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger jeepney owned by his
mother Martina Gicale, respondent herein. A passenger bus,
owned by Pantranco North Express, Inc., petitioner, driven by
Alexander Buncan, also a petitioner, hit the left rear side of the
jeepney and sped away.
> Crispin reported the incident to the Police Station and
respondent Standard Insurance. The total cost of the repair
was P21,415.00, but respondent Standard paid only P8,000.00.
Martina Gicale shouldered the balance of P13,415.00.
> Thereafter, Standard and Martina, respondents, demanded
reimbursement from petitioners Pantranco and its driver
Alexander Buncan, but they refused. This prompted respondents
to file with the RTC a complaint for sum of money.
> Both petitioners specifically denied the allegations in the
complaint and averred that it is the MTC, not the RTC, which has
jurisdiction over the case.
> The trial court rendered a Decision in favor of respondents
Standard and Martina.
> On appeal, the Court of Appeals, affirmed the trial courts ruling.
> Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

recovery in the first. Here, had respondents filed separate suits

against petitioners, the same evidence would have been
presented to sustain the same cause of action. Thus, the filing by
both respondents of the complaint with the court below is in order.
Such joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit and ensures the
convenient, speedy and orderly administration of justice.
Respondents cause of action against petitioners arose out of the
same transaction. Thus, the amount of the demand shall be the
totality of the claims.
Respondent Standards claim is P8,000.00, while that of
respondent Martina Gicale is P13,415.00, or a total
of P21,415.00. Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides that the RTC
has exclusive original jurisdiction over all other cases, in which
the demand, exclusive of interest and cost or the value of the
property in controversy, amounts to more than twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00). Clearly, it is the RTC that has jurisdiction
over the instant case. It bears emphasis that when the complaint
was filed, R.A. 7691 expanding the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan, Municipal and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts had not
yet taken effect. It became effective on April 15, 1994.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT OF THE ACTION
CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENTS RESPECTIVE CAUSE
OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONERS DID NOT ARISE OUT OF
THE SAME TRANSACTION NOR ARE THERE QUESTIONS OF
LAW AND FACTS COMMON TO BOTH PETITIONERS AND
RESPONDENTS?
RULING:
YES. In this case, there is a single transaction common
to all, that is, Pantrancos bus hitting the rear side of the jeepney.
There is also a common question of fact, that is, whether
petitioners are negligent. There being a single transaction
common to both respondents, consequently, they have the same
cause of action against petitioners.
To determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained
whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the
second cause of action would have been sufficient to authorize a

> Petitioners Cesar, Ibarra, Nestor, Lina and Prescilla, all

surnamed Hilario, filed a complaint with the RTC.
> Plaintiffs are co-owners by inheritance of a parcel of land;
defendant constructed his dwelling unit of mixed materials on the
property of the plaintiffs father without the knowledge of the herein
plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest; demands have been
made of the defendant to vacate the premises but the latter
manifested that he have (sic) asked the prior consent of their
grandmother; to reach a possible amicable settlement, the
plaintiffs brought the matter to the Lupon of Barangay Sawang, to
no avail; the unjustified refusal of the defendant to vacate the
property has caused the plaintiffs to suffer shame, humiliation,
wounded feelings, anxiety and sleepless nights.
> Petitioner prayed that order be issued for the defendant to
vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the occupied
property and that defendant be made to pay plaintiffs.
> The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action,
citing Section 33 of BP Blg. 129, as amended by Section 3(3) of
RA No. 7691. Averred that; complaint failed to state the assessed
value of the land in dispute; complaint does not sufficiently identify
and/or describe the parcel of land referred to as the subjectmatter of this action both of which are essential requisites for
determining the jurisdiction of the Court where the case is filed.
> RTC issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss, holding
that the action was incapable of pecuniary estimation, and
therefore, cognizable by the RTC as provided in Section 19(1) of
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.
> Trial court rendered judgment finding in favor of the petitioners.
> CA rendered judgment reversing the ruling of the RTC and
dismissing the complaint for want of jurisdiction.
> The CA declared that the action of the petitioners was one for
the recovery of ownership and possession of real property. Absent
any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the
property, the MTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the action,
conformably to Section 33 of R.A. No. 7691.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action
of the petitioners?

HILARIO vs SALVADOR
FACTS:

RULING:

21
YES. It bears stressing that the nature of the action and
which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same
is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the
type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect when
the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled
to some or all of the claims asserted therein. The caption of the
complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action. Nor
does the jurisdiction of the court depend upon the answer of the
defendant or agreement of the parties or to the waiver or
acquiescence of the parties.
We do not agree with the contention of the petitioners and the
ruling of the CA that the action of the petitioners in the RTC was
an accion reinvindicatoria. We find and so rule that the action of
the petitioners was an accion publiciana, or one for the recovery
of possession of the real property subject matter thereof.
An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for its object the
recovery of possession over the real property as owner. It
involves recovery of ownership and possession based on the said
ownership. On the other hand, an accion publicianais one for the
recovery of possession of the right to possess. It is also referred
to as an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after
the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty.
The action of the petitioners filed on September 3, 1996 does not
involve a claim of ownership over the property. They allege that
they are co-owners thereof, and as such, entitled to its
possession, and that the private respondent, who was the
defendant, constructed his house thereon in 1989 without their
knowledge and refused to vacate the property despite demands
for him to do so. They prayed that the private respondent vacate
the property and restore possession thereof to them.

the assessed or market value of lands. Absent any allegation in

the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot thus
be determined whether the RTC or the MTC had original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners action.
We note that during the trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence
Tax Declaration No. 8590-A, showing that the assessed value of
the property in 1991 was P5,950.00. The petitioners, however, did
not bother to adduce in evidence the tax declaration containing
the assessed value of the property when they filed their complaint
in 1996. Even assuming that the assessed value of the property in
1991 was the same in 1995 or 1996, the MTC, and not the RTC
had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners since the case
involved title to or possession of real property with an assessed
value of less than P20,000.00.
The determining jurisdictional element for the accion
reinvindicatoria is, as RA 7691 discloses, the assessed value of
the property in question. For properties in the provinces, the RTC
has jurisdiction if the assessed value exceeds P20,000, and the
MTC, if the value is P20,000 or below.
Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the
petitioners, all the proceedings therein, including the decision of
the RTC, are null and void. The complaint should perforce be
dismissed.

FACTS:
>
The heirs
of
Juan dela Cruz,
represented
by Senen dela Cruz (respondents), filed on a Complaint for
Recovery of Portion of Registered Land with Compensation and
Damages against Quinagoran (petitioner) before the RTC.
> They alleged that they are the co-owners of a parcel of land
which they inherited; petitioner started occupying a house on the
north-west portion of the property by tolerance of respondents;
they asked petitioner to remove the house as they planned to
construct a commercial building on the property; that petitioner
refused, claiming ownership over the lot; and that they
suffered damages for their failure to use the same.
Respondents prayed for the reconveyance and surrender of the
disputed land, and to be paid the amount of P5,000.00 monthly
until the property is vacated.
> Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the RTC has
no jurisdiction over the case under RANo. 7691, which expanded
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC to include all civil
actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein which does not exceedP20,000.00.
>
The RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss .
> Petitioner then went to the CA on a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking the annulment of the Orders
of the RTC.
> CA rendered the herein assailed Decision dismissing
petitioner's action and affirming in toto the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case?
RULING:

When the petitioners filed their complaint on September 3, 1996,

R.A. No. 7691 was already in effect.

NO. The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial

of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, as affirmed by the CA -- that all
cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the
regional trial courts regardless of the value of the property -- no
longer holds true. As things now stand, a distinction must be
made between those properties the assessed value of which is
below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if
within.

The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or

possession of land is now determined by the assessed value of
the said property and not the market value thereof. The assessed
value of real property is the fair market value of the real property
multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable
value. The fair market value is the price at which a property may
be sold by a seller, who is not compelled to sell, and bought by a
buyer, who is not compelled to buy.
Even a cursory reading of the complaint will show that it does not
contain an allegation stating the assessed value of the property
subject of the complaint. The court cannot take judicial notice of

QUINAGORAN vs CA

Republic Act No. 7691which amended Batas Pambansa Blg.

129 and which was already in effectwhen respondents filed their
complaint with the RTC on October 27, 1994, expressly provides:

22
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction In all civil actions which involve the title to or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the
assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00.
Metropolitan Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil
actions which involve title to, or possession of , real property, or
any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed P20,000.00.
The Court has also declared that all cases involving title to or
possession of real property with an assessed value of less
than P20,000.00 if outside Metro Manila, falls under the original
jurisdiction of the municipal trial court.
In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint
must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the
complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has
jurisdiction over the action. This is because the nature of the
action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
the same is determined by the material allegations of the
complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law
in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the
plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein.
Nowhere in said complaint was the assessed value of the subject
property ever mentioned. There is no showing on the face of the
complaint that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the action
of the respondents. Indeed, absent any allegation in the complaint
of the assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined
whether the RTC or the MTC has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the petitioner's action. The courts cannot take
judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the land.
Jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the answer of the
defendant or even upon agreement, waiver or acquiescence of
the parties. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court over the nature of
the action and the subject matter thereof cannot be made to
depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to
dismiss for, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend
almost entirely on the defendant.
Considering that the respondents failed to allege in their
complaint the assessed value of the subject property, the
RTC seriously erred in denying the motion to dismiss.
Consequently, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void, and
the CA erred in affirming the RTC.

JURISDICTION OF THE RTC

RUSSELL vs VESTIL
FACTS:
> Petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents,
denominated "DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND PARTITION,"
with the RTC, alleged that petitioners are co-owners of that parcel
of land. The land was previously owned by the spouses Casimero
Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. Upon the death of said spouses, the
property was inherited by their legal heirs, herein petitioners and
private respondents. Since then, the lot had remained undivided
until petitioners discovered a public document denominated
"DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF
A PREVIOUS ORAL AGREEMENT OF PARTITION. By virtue of
this deed, private respondents divided the property among
themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who are also entitled to
the said lot as heirs of the late spouses.
> Petitioners claimed that the document was false and perjurious
as the private respondents were not the only heirs and that no
oral partition of the property whatsoever had been made between
the heirs. The complaint prayed that the document be declared
null and void and an order be issued to partition the land among
all the heirs.
> Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint

on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the

case as the total assessed value of the subject land is
P5,000.00 which under section 33 (3) of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC.
> Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying
that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case
since the action is one which is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
> Respondent judge issued an Order granting the Motion to
Dismiss.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction
to entertain Civil Case?

which is clearly one incapable of pecuniary estimation, thus,

cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.
The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless
one incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore within the
jurisdiction of said court.
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery
of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in
instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However,
where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover
a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or
a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by
courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those
for specific performance, support, or foreclosure of mortgage or
annulment of judgment; also actions questioning the validity of a
mortgage, annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover
the price paid and for rescession, which is a counterpart of
specific performance.
The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to
declare null and void the document in which private respondents
declared themselves as the only heirs of the late spouses
Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and divided his property
among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim
to be legal heirs and entitled to the property. While the complaint
also prays for the partition of the property, this is just incidental to
the main action, which is the declaration of nullity of the document
above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought,
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the
claims asserted therein.

RULING:
YES. Petitioners maintain the view that the complaint
filed before the Regional Trial Court is for the annulment of a
document denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND
DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION,"

AMORGANDA vs CA

23
FACTS:
> Private respondents, spouses Estanislao and Clara Saycon,
leased to herein petitioners, spouses Ismael and Trinidad
Amorganda, a fishpond for a period of ten (10) years.
> The lease period was extended for two (2) years, and again
agreed to extend the lease period for another eight (8) years.
> The lessors, herein private respondents harvested bangus and
shrimps from the fishpond without the knowledge and consent of
the lessees, herein petitioners. Consequently, the petitioners filed
a criminal complaint for qualified theft against the private
respondents.
> Private respondents, allegedly with the aid of armed men,
forcibly entered the leased fishpond and prevented the petitioners
and their workers from entering the premises. As a result, the
petitioners filed a complaint against the private respondents
before the Regional Trial Court to compel the private respondents
to return the leased premises to them and for damages.
> Private respondents filed their Answer to the complaint, alleging
that the private respondent Estanislao Saycon is not the true
owner of the property which he had leased to the petitioners, but
the government of the Philippines, because it reverted to the
government after the license of Pedro Saycon, late father of
private respondents Estanislao Saycon, was cancelled and all
improvements existing in the area forfeited in favor of the
government.
> Petitioners have no right to the fishpond because their earlier
rights were lost upon the cancellation of the license of said Pedro
Saycon and the area declared open for disposition to any
interested party and qualified applicant; that the trial court has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of disputes relative to possessory
rights over the fishpond in question, which belongs to the Bureau
of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR); that the herein
petitioners failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before
resort was made to the courts; and that the petitioners have no
cause of action since the fishpond in question had been forfeited
in favor of the government and petitioners are not applicants for
permit to operate or lease the same from the government.
> Trial court granted the application for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
> private respondents filed a petition with the Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) to annul and set aside the
order of injunction on the grounds that: (1) the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the case since the complaint filed is in the nature
of recovery of possession and should have been filed in the
Municipal Court.
> Respondent appellate court issued the decision in question,
declaring null and void the order of the regional trial court, for the
reason that the complaint is one for recovery of possession over

which the regional trial court has no jurisdiction, and directing the
trial court to dismiss Civil Case.

*** An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Accordingly, it falls within the jurisdiction of the regional trial
courts, regardless of the value of the subject property. ***

ISSUE:
FACTS:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of has
jurisdiction over the case?
RULING:
YES. While the herein petitioners' complaint in the trial
court alleges that they were dispossessed of the leased fishpond
by the lessors, herein private respondents, by means of force,
stealth and intimidation, so that the complaint would appear, at
first blush, to be one for forcible entry and damages, the action
is, in reality, one for specific performance, i.e., to compel the
private respondents, as lessors, to comply with their obligations
under the lease contract and return the possession of the leased
premises to them, and for damages due to their (private
respondents') unjust occupation of the land. Such action is one
not capable of pecuniary estimation and comes within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of regional trial courts. Thus, Article
1654 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1654. The lessor is obliged:
(a) To deliver the thing which is the object of the contract in such a
condition as to render it fit for the use intended;
(2) To make on the same during the lease all the necessary
repairs in order to keep it suitable for the use it has been devoted,
unless there is a stipulation to the contrary;
(3) To maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate
enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract.
Since the present action is to compel the private respondents to
perform their part of the contract of lease "to maintain the lessee
in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire
duration of the contract," the action is within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the regional trial court.
The respondent Court of Appeals, therefore, erroneously
classified the present action as one for forcible entry and
damages which is cognizable exclusively by the municipal trial
court. Accordingly, the decision appealed from should be reversed
and set aside.

BARANGAY SAN ROQUE vs Heirs of

FRANCISCO PASTOR

> Petitioner filed before the MTC a Complaint to expropriate a

property of the respondents. The MTC dismissed the Complaint
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that "eminent
domain is an exercise of the power to take private property for
public use after payment of just compensation. In an action for
eminent domain, therefore, the principal cause of action is the
exercise of such power or right. The fact that the action also
involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent
domain is therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court and not with this Court."
> The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it,
holding that an action for eminent domain affected title to real
property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated
would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC
or the RTC. The action should have been filed before the MTC
since the value of the subject property was less than P20,000.
> The instant action for eminent domain or condemnation of real
property is a real action affecting title to or possession of real
property, hence, it is the assessed value of the property involved
which determines the jurisdiction of the court. That the right of
eminent domain or condemnation of real, property is included in a
real action affecting title to or possession of real property.
> Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to this Court, raising a
pure question of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over
cases for eminent domain or expropriation where the assessed
value of the subject property is below P20,000.00?
RULING:
RTC has jurisdiction. We agree with the petitioner that an
expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The test to
determine whether it is so was laid down by the Court in this wise:
A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that
in determining whether an action is one the subject
matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation,
this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining
the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is

24
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the
courts of first instance would depend on the amount of
the claim. However, where the basic issue is something
other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where
the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits
to have the defendant perform his part of the contract
(specific performance) and in actions for support, or for
annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this
Court has considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and are cognizable exclusively by RTC.

> Respondent Telesfora Yambao (plaintiff in civil case Court of

First Instance) filed a complaint against the petitioner Manuel
Cruz (defendant in said case), in which she prayed that the
petitioner herein be ordered to finish the construction of a house
mentioned in the complaint, or to pay her the sum of P644.31.
Within ten days from receipt of the summons, the petitioner filed a
motion for a bill of particulars, which was denied by the court.
> Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that
the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the subjectmatter of the suit inasmuch as the demand contained in the
prayer is only for P644.31, which falls under the jurisdiction of the
Justice of the Peace or the Judge of the municipal Court.
> The motion to dismiss was denied by the court.
ISSUE:

In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the

recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by
the government of its authority and right to take private property
for public use.
It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an
expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its
instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of
private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the
government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the
observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an
expropriation suit is the government's exercise of eminent
domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in
monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to determine the just
compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the
expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after
the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation.

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction on this case?

RULING:
NO. It will be noted that the demand of the complaint
filed in the Court of First Instance is for the sum of P644.31. The
alternative remedy of specific performance, which consists in
finishing the house, is capable of pecuniary estimation at the
same amount, more or less, for, otherwise, the respondent
Telesfora Yambao would not have made such alternative demand.
The case in question comes within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the municipal court or justice of the peace court.

To emphasize, the question in the present suit is whether the

government may expropriate private property under the given set
of circumstances. The government does not dispute respondents'
title to or possession of the same. Indeed, it is not a question of
who has a better title or right, for the government does not even
claim that it has a title to the property. It merely asserts its
inherent sovereign power to "appropriate and control individual
property for the public benefit, as the public necessity,
convenience or welfare may demand."

The respondent argues that the value of the house, the

construction of which has almost been completed, requiring only
the expenditure of P644.31 to complete it, according to the
allegations of the complaint, is more than P2,873.37, and that
consequently the value of the property involved is beyond the
jurisdiction of the municipal court. The jurisdiction of the
respective
courts
is
determined
by
the value of
the demand and not the value of the transaction out of which
the demand arose; that is what the law says in unmistakable
terms. The alternative prayer for specific performance is also of
the same value, for, as said above, the alternative prayers would
not have been made in the complaint if one was more valuable
than the other; hence, the specific performance alternatively
prayed for, is capable of pecuniary estimation at P644.31.

CRUZ vs TAN

LAPITAN vs SCANDIA

FACTS:

FACTS:

> Lapitan's complaint in the court below averred that he

purchased from Scandia, Inc., through its sub-dealer, one ABC
Diesel Engine, of 16 horse power, for P3,735.00, paid in cash;
that he bought the engine for running a rice and corn mill at
Ormoc City; that defendants had warranted and assured him that
all spare parts for said engine are kept in stock in their stores,
enabling him to avoid loss due to long periods of waiting, and that
defendants would replace any part of the engine that might break
within twelve months after delivery. Plaintiff further charged that
the cam rocker arm of the engine broke due to faulty material and
workmanship and it stopped functioning; that the sellers were
unable to send a replacement; that barely six days after
replacement the new part broke again due to faulty casting and
poor material, so he (Lapitan) notified the sellers and demanded
rescission of the contract of sale; that he sought return of the
price and damages but defendants did not pay. He, therefore,
prayed (1) for rescission of the contract; (2) reimbursement of the
price; (3) recovery of P4,000.00 actual damages plus P1,000.00
attorney's fees; (4) recovery of such moral and exemplary
damages as the court deems just and equitable; and (5) costs
and other proper relief.
> Scandia, Inc., moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that the total amount claimed was only P8,735.00, and was within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court.
> Court of First Instance of Cebu dismissed the action for lack of
jurisdiction.
> Lapitan appealed directly to this Court, arguing (1) that
rescission was incapable of pecuniary estimation, and (2) that as
he claimed moral and exemplary damages, besides the price of
P3,735.00, P4,000.00 actual damages, and P1,000.00 attorneys'
fees, the value of his demand exceeded the jurisdiction of the
municipal court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the MTC has the jurisdiction on this
case?
RULING:
NO. A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates
that in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery
of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in

25
the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than
the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the
contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for
annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, 1 this Court
has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the
litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.
Actions for specific performance of contracts have been expressly
pronounced to be exclusively cognizable by courts of first
instance.
Where the money claim is prayed for as an alternative relief to
specific performance, an equivalence is implied that permits the
jurisdiction to be allocated by the amount of the money claim
(Cruz vs. Tan, 87 Phil. 627). But no such equivalence can be
deduced in the case at bar, where the money award can be
considered only if the rescission is first granted.
We, therefore, rule that the subject matter of actions for rescission
of contracts are not capable of pecuniary estimation, and that the
court below erred in declining to entertain appellant's action for
lack of jurisdiction.

> Juanita Padilla (Juanita), the mother of petitioners, owned a

piece of land. After Juanitas death, petitioners, as legal heirs of
Juanita, sought to have the land partitioned. Petitioners sent word
to their eldest brother Ricardo Bahia (Ricardo) regarding their
plans for the partition of the land. Petitioners were surprised to
find out that Ricardo had declared the land for himself, prejudicing
their rights as co-heirs. It was then discovered that Juanita had
allegedly executed a notarized Affidavit of Transfer of Real
Property (Affidavit) in favor of Ricardo making him the sole owner
of the land. The records do not show that the land was registered
under the Torrens system.
> Petitioners filed an action with the RTC for recovery of
ownership, possession, partition and damages. Petitioners sought
to declare void the sale of the land by Ricardos daughters to
respondent Dominador Magdua (Dominador). The sale was made
during the lifetime of Ricardo.
> Petitioners alleged that Ricardo, through misrepresentation, had
the land transferred in his name without the consent and
knowledge of his co-heirs.
> Dominador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction since the assessed value of the land was within the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
> RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC
explained that the assessed value of the land in the amount
of P590.00 was less than the amount cognizable by the RTC to
acquire jurisdiction over the case.
> Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioners argued
that the action was not merely for recovery of ownership and
possession, partition and damages but also for annulment of deed
of sale. Since actions to annul contracts are actions beyond
pecuniary estimation, the case was well within the jurisdiction of
the RTC.
> Dominador filed another motion to dismiss on the ground of
prescription.
> RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the
case on the ground of prescription. The RTC ruled that the case
was filed only in 2001 or more than 30 years since the Affidavit
was executed in 1966. The RTC explained that while the right of
an heir to his inheritance is imprescriptible, yet when one of the
co-heirs appropriates the property as his own to the exclusion of
all other heirs, then prescription can set in.

YES. Section 3 of RA 7691 expanded the jurisdiction

of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over all civil actions which involve
title to or possession of real property, or any interest, outside
Metro Manila where the assessed value does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00).
In the present case, the records show that the assessed value of
the land was P590.00 according to the Declaration of Property as
of 23 March 2000 filed with the RTC. Based on the value alone,
being way below P20,000.00, the MTC has jurisdiction over the
case. However, petitioners argued that the action was not merely
for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages
but also for annulment of deed of sale. Since annulment of
contracts are actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, the
RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
When petitioners filed the action with the RTC they sought to
recover ownership and possession of the land by questioning (1)
the due execution and authenticity of the Affidavit executed by
Juanita in favor of Ricardo which caused Ricardo to be the sole
owner of the land to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to
be legal heirs and entitled to the land, and (2) the validity of the
deed of sale executed between Ricardos daughters and
Dominador. Since the principal action sought here is something
other than the recovery of a sum of money, the action is incapable
of pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC. Wellentrenched is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in
the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective
of whether the party is entitled to all or some of the claims
asserted.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction?

PADILLA vs MAGDUA
FACTS:

RULING:

GENESIS INVESTMENT, INC. vs HEIRS of

CEFERINO EBARASABAL

26
FACTS:
> Respondents filed against herein petitioners a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Shares,
Partition, Damages and Attorney's Fees. The Complaint was filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
> Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss contending, among others,
that the RTC has no jurisdiction to try the case on the ground that,
as the case involves title to or possession of real property or any
interest therein and since the assessed value of the subject
property does not exceed P20,000.00 (the same being only
P11,990.00), the action falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC).
> RTC granted petitioners' Motion to Dismiss.
> Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, arguing
that their complaint consists of several causes of action, including
one for annulment of documents, which is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and, as such, falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
> RTC issued an Order granting respondents' Motion for Partial
Reconsideration and reversing its earlier Order.
> Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
However, the CA dismissed the petition holding that the subject
matter of respondents' complaint is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the RTC,
considering that the main purpose in filing the action is to declare
null and void the documents assailed therein.
> Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely
erred in concluding that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction
over the instant case?
RULING:
NO. It is true that one of the causes of action of
respondents pertains to the title, possession and interest of each
of the contending parties over the contested property, the
assessed value of which falls within the jurisdiction of the MTC.
However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily
show that, based on the nature of the suit, the allegations
therein, and the reliefs prayed for, the action is within the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
As stated above, it is clear from the records that respondents'
complaint was for "Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery

of Shares, Partition, Damages and Attorney's Fees." In filing their

Complaint with the RTC, respondents sought to recover
ownership and possession of their shares in the disputed parcel
of land by questioning the due execution and validity of the Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale as well as the Memorandum
of Agreement entered into by and between some of their co-heirs
and herein petitioners. Aside from praying that the RTC render
judgment declaring as null and void the said Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement with Sale and Memorandum of Agreement,
respondents likewise sought the following: (1) nullification of the
Tax Declarations subsequently issued in the name of petitioner
Cebu Jaya Realty, Inc.; (2) partition of the property in litigation; (3)
reconveyance of their respective shares; and (3) payment of
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, plus
appearance fees.
1wphi1

Clearly, this is a case of joinder of causes of action which

comprehends more than the issue of partition of or recovery of
shares or interest over the real property in question but includes
an action for declaration of nullity of contracts and documents
which is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the principal relief sought by
petitioners is the nullification of the subject Extrajudicial
Settlement with Sale entered into by and between some of their
co-heirs and respondents, insofar as their individual shares in the
subject property are concerned. Thus, the recovery of their
undivided shares or interest over the disputed lot, which were
included in the sale, simply becomes a necessary consequence if
the above deed is nullified. Hence, since the principal action
sought in respondents Complaint is something other than the
recovery of a sum of money, the action is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and, thus, cognizable by the RTC. Well entrenched is
the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of
whether the party is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted.
Moreover, it is provided under Section 5 (c), Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court that where the causes of action are between the same
parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder
may be allowed in the RTC provided one of the causes of action
falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein.
Thus, as shown above, respondents complaint clearly falls within
the jurisdiction of the RTC.

BARANGAY PIAPI vs TALIP

FACTS:

> Petitioners filed with the said RTC a complaint for

reconveyance and damages.
> The complaint alleges that petitioners and their predecessorsin-interest have been in actual, peaceful, continuous and open
possession for more than 30 years of a parcel of land and has a
market value of P15,000.00. The same land was subdivided;
portion were constructed their barangay center, multi-purpose
gym and health center. Respondent fraudulently obtained from
the said Registry of Deeds a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in
his name.
> Instead of filing an answer, respondent moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
case considering that the assessed value of the land is only
P6,030.00 and that the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
> In their opposition to the motion to dismiss, petitioners alleged
that jurisdiction is vested in the RTC considering that the total
assessed value of the property is P41,890.00, as shown by a
Real Property Field Appraisal and Assessment Sheet.
> Trial court issued an Order dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.
> Hence, petitioners directly filed with this Court the instant
petition for review on certiorari assailing the trial courts Order
dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case?
RULING:
NO. The contention is bereft of merit. This case is
analogous to Huguete vs. Embudo. There, petitioners argued that
a complaint for annulment of a deed of sale and partition is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, and thus falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. However, we ruled that the
nature of an action is not determined by what is stated in the
caption of the complaint but by the allegations of the complaint
and the reliefs prayed for. Where the ultimate objective of the
plaintiffs, like petitioners herein, is to obtain title to real property, it
should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the
assessed value of the property subject thereof.
Indeed, basic as a hornbook principle is that the nature of an
action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of
the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.

27
It can easily be discerned that petitioners complaint involves title
to, or possession of, real property. However, they failed to allege
therein the assessed value of the subject property. Instead, what
they stated is the market value of the land at P15,000.00.
The Rule requires that the assessed value of the property, or
if there is none, the estimated value thereof, shall be alleged
by the claimant. It bears reiterating that what determines
jurisdiction is the allegations in the complaint and the reliefs
prayed for. Petitioners complaint is for reconveyance of a parcel
of land. Considering that their action involves the title to or interest
in real property, they should have alleged therein its assessed
value. However, they only specified the market value or estimated
value, which is P15,000.00. Pursuant to the provision of Section
33 (3) quoted earlier, it is the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Padada-Kiblawan, Davao del Sur, not the RTC, which has
jurisdiction over the case.

> PGTT filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a verified
complaint
against
Jovenal
Ouano
entitled
"PGTT
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION, Plaintiff, vs.
JUVENAL OUANO, Defendant," for "Recovery of Ownership and
Possession of Real Property and Damages." In its complaint,
PGTT alleged that it is the owner of Lot Nos. 1-10, Block 2 of the
Sunnymeade Crescent Subdivision, PGTT found that Ouano
uprooted the concrete monuments of the said lots, plowed them
and planted corn thereon. Despite PGTTs demand that he vacate
the lots and restore them to their original condition, Ouano
refused, claiming he is the owner and lawful possessor.
> Respectfully prayed that after due notice and hearing, judgment
be rendered ordering defendant (Jovenal Ouano) to vacate the
premises and restore the lots to their original condition; pay
plaintiff (PGTT) P100,000.00 as damages per year.
> Ouano filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that it is the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), not the RTC, which has
jurisdiction over it considering that the assessed value of the lots
involved is only P2,910, as indicated in the latest tax declaration.
> PGTT contends that the RTC has jurisdiction since the market
value of the lots is P49,760.00. Besides, the complaint is not only
an action for recovery of ownership and possession of real
property, but also for damages exceeding P100,000.00, over
which claim the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction.
> RTC denied the motion to dismiss.
> The trial court ruled it has jurisdiction over the case because "(i)t
is of judicial knowledge that the real properties situated in Cebu
City command a higher valuation than those indicated in the tax
declaration.
> Hence the present petition for certiorari filed by Ouano under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

and the payment of damages. Since the action involves

ownership and possession of real property, the jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the claim is determined by the assessed
value, not the market value, thereof, pursuant to Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691.
It is undisputed that the assessed value of the property involved,
as shown by the corresponding tax declaration, is only P2,910.00.
As such, the complaint is well within the MTCs P20,000.00
jurisdictional limit.
The finding of respondent judge that the value of the lots is higher
than that indicated in the tax declaration and that, therefore, the
RTC has jurisdiction over the case is highly speculative. It is
elementary that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value
of the property enjoys the presumption of regularity as it has been
issued by the proper government agency.
Respondent judge further held that since the complaint also seeks
the recovery of damages exceeding P100,000.00, then it is within
the competence of the RTC pursuant to Section 19 (paragraph 8)
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691.
It is applicable only to "all other cases" other than an action
involving title to, or possession of real property in which the
assessed value is the controlling factor in determining the courts
jurisdiction. Besides, the same provision explicitly excludes from
the determination of the jurisdictional amount the demand for
"interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses, and costs".
We thus find that in issuing the assailed orders denying
petitioners motion to dismiss, thus taking cognizance of the case,
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has the jurisdiction over the
case?

OUANO vs PGTT INTERNATIONAL

INVESTMENT CORPORATION

RULING:

FACTS:

NO. The complaint seeks to recover from private

respondent the ownership and possession of the lots in question

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE

PHILIPPINES, INC. vs CA

28
FACTS:
> Private respondent Manuel Dulawon filed with the Regional Trial
Court, a complaint for breach of contract of lease with damages
against petitioner Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc.
(RCPI). Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction contending that it is the Municipal Trial Court which
has jurisdiction as the complaint is basically one for collection of
unpaid rentals in the sum of P84,000.00, which does not exceed
the jurisdictional amount of P100,000.00 for Regional Trial Courts.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, as well as petitioners
motion for reconsideration. Hence, petitioner went to the Court of
Appeals on a petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:

It is settled that a breach of contract is a cause of action either for

specific performance or rescission of contracts.
Court held that actions for specific performance are incapable of
pecuniary estimation and therefore fall under the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court. Here, the averments in the complaint reveal
that the suit filed by private respondent was primarily one for
specific performance as it was aimed to enforce their three-year
lease contract which would incidentally entitle him to monetary
awards if the court should find that the subject contract of lease
was breached.
Clearly, the action for specific performance case, irrespective of
the amount of rentals and damages sought to be recovered, is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable exclusively
by the Regional Trial Court. The trial court, therefore, did not err in
denying petitioners motion to dismiss.

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction

over the complaint filed by private respondent?
RULING:
YES. In Russell, et al., v. Vestil, et al., the Court held
that in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction over
the action will depend on the amount of the claim. However,
where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover
a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or
a consequence of, the principal relief sought, the action is one
where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms
of money, which is cognizable exclusively by Regional Trial
Courts.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims
asserted therein.
In the case at bar, the allegations in the complaint plainly show
that private respondents cause of action is breach of contract.

JURISDICTION: inter-corporate
controversy

GARCIA vs EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS

FACTS:
> Atty. Virgilio R. Garcia was the Vice President and Head of
Business Support Services and Human Resource Departments of
the Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI).
> Atty. Garcia was placed under preventive suspension based on
three complaints for sexual harassment.
> In response to the complaints, the Human Resources
Department constituted a Committee on Decorum to investigate
the complaints.
> The Committee submitted a report which recommended his
dismissal.
> A complaint-affidavit for illegal dismissal with prayer for full
backwages and recovery of moral and exemplary damages was
filed by Atty. Virgilio R. Garcia against ETPI and Atty. Salvador C.
Hizon.
> Labor Arbiter Reyes found the preventive suspension and
subsequent dismissal of Atty. Garcia illegal.
> NLRC rendered its decision reversing the decision of Labor
Arbiter and dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
> The Commission ruled that the dismissal of Atty. Garcia, being
ETPIs Vice President, partook of the nature of an intra-corporate
dispute cognizable by Regional Trial Courts and not by Labor
Arbiters.
> Atty. Garcia appealed to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for
Certiorari. It prayed that the Decision of the NLRC be annulled
and set aside, and that the decision of the Labor Arbiter be
reinstated.
> The appellate court ruled that Atty. Garcia, being the Vice
President for Business Support Services and Human Resource
Departments of ETPI, was a corporate officer at the time he was
removed. Being a corporate officer, his removal was a corporate
act and/or an intra-corporate controversy, the jurisdiction of which
rested with the Securities and Exchange Commission (now with
the Regional Trial Court), and not the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC. It added that ETPI and Atty. Hizon were not estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter before the NLRC
on appeal, inasmuch as said issue was seasonably raised by
ETPI and Atty. Hizon in their reply memorandum before the Labor
Arbiter.
> Atty. Garcia is now before us via a Petition for Review.

ISSUE:

29
WHETHER OR NOT THE QUESTION OF LEGALITY
OR ILLEGALITY OF THE REMOVAL OR TERMINATION OF
EMPLOYMENT OF AN OFFICER OF A CORPORATION IS AN
INTRA-CORPORATE CONTROVERSY THAT FALLS UNDER
THE ORIGINAL EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS?
RULING:
YES. The issue raised by Atty. Garcia whether the
termination or removal of an officer of a corporation is an intracorporate controversy that falls under the original exclusive
jurisdiction of the regional trial courts is not novel. The Supreme
Court, in a long line of cases, has decreed that a corporate
officers dismissal or removal is always a corporate act and/or an
intra-corporate controversy, over which the Securities and
Exchange Commission [SEC] (now the Regional Trial Court) has
original and exclusive jurisdiction.
We have ruled that an intra-corporate controversy is one which
pertains to any of the following relationships: (1) between the
corporation, partnership or association and the public; (2)
between the corporation, partnership or association and the State
insofar as the formers franchise, permit or license to operate is
concerned; (3) between the corporation, partnership or
association and its stockholders, partners, members or officers;
and (4) among the stockholders, partners or associates
themselves. In Lozon v. National Labor Relations Commission, we
declared that Presidential Decree No. 902-A confers on the SEC
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
controversies and cases involving intra-corporate and partnership
relations between or among the corporation, officers and
stockholders and partners, including their elections or
appointments x x x.
Before a dismissal or removal could properly fall within the
jurisdiction of the SEC, it has to be first established that the
person removed or dismissed was a corporate officer. Corporate
officers in the context of Presidential Decree No. 902-A are those
officers of the corporation who are given that character by the
Corporation Code or by the corporations by-laws. There are three
specific officers whom a corporation must have under Section 25
of the Corporation Code. These are the president, secretary and
the treasurer. The number of officers is not limited to these three.
A corporation may have such other officers as may be provided
for by its by-laws like, but not limited to, the vice-president,
cashier, auditor or general manager. The number of corporate
officers is thus limited by law and by the corporations by-laws.

FACTS:
Atty. Garcia tries to deny he is an officer of ETPI. Not being a
corporate officer, he argues that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction
over the case. One of the corporate officers provided for in the bylaws of ETPI is the Vice-President. It can be gathered from Atty.
Garcias complaint-affidavit that he was Vice President for
Business Support Services and Human Resource Departments of
ETPI when his employment was terminated effective 16 April
2000. It is therefore clear from the by-laws and from Atty. Garcia
himself that he is a corporate officer. One who is included in the
by-laws of a corporation in its roster of corporate officers is an
officer of said corporation and not a mere employee. Being a
corporate officer, his removal is deemed to be an intra-corporate
dispute cognizable by the SEC and not by the Labor Arbiter.
We agree with both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals that Atty.
Garcias ouster as Vice-President, who is a corporate officer of
ETPI, partakes of the nature of an intra-corporate controversy,
jurisdiction over which is vested in the SEC (now the RTC). The
Labor Arbiter thus erred in assuming jurisdiction over the case
filed by Atty. Garcia, because he had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the controversy.

AGUIRRE vs BOCOBO

> Vitaliano filed, in his individual capacity and on behalf of FQB+7,

Inc. a Complaint4 for intra-corporate dispute against respondents
Nathaniel D. Bocobo (Nathaniel), Priscila D. Bocobo (Priscila),
and Antonio De Villa (Antonio).
> To Vitalianos knowledge, except for the death of Francisco Q.
Bocobo and Alfredo Torres, there has been no other change in the
listings of directors and subscribers in the information sheet.
> The Complaint further alleged that, Vitaliano discovered a
substantial changes in the General Information Sheet containing a
different listings of directors and subcribers, prompted Vitaliano to
write to the real Board of Directors (the directors reflected in the
Articles of Incorporation), to rectify what he perceived as
erroneous entries in the GIS, and to allow him to inspect the
corporate books and records. The real Board allegedly ignored
Vitalianos request.
> Nathaniel, in the exercise of his power as FQB+7s president,
appointed Antonio as the corporations attorney-in-fact, with power
of administration over the corporations farm in Quezon Province.
> Characterizing Nathaniels, Priscilas, and Antonios continuous
representation of the corporation as a usurpation of the
management powers and prerogatives of the real Board of
Directors, the Complaint asked for an injunction against them and
for the nullification of all their previous actions as purported
directors, including the GIS they had filed with the SEC in the
RTC.
> By failure of the respondents to attend the hearing, trial court
granted the application based on the documents and evidence
presented by Vitaliano.
> Respondents filed a motion for extension to file pleadings but
was denied, hence, they filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition to CA.
> The respondents further informed the CA that the SEC had
already revoked FQB+7s Certificate of Registration on for its
failure to comply with the SEC reportorial requirements. The CA
determined that the corporations dissolution was a conclusive
fact after petitioners Vitaliano and Fidel failed to dispute this
factual assertion.
> CA postulated that Section 122 of the Corporation Code allows
a dissolved corporation to continue as a body corporate for the
limited purpose of liquidating the corporate assets and distributing
them to its creditors, stockholders, and others in interest. It does
not allow the dissolved corporation to continue its business. That
being the state of the law, the CA determined that Vitalianos
Complaint, being geared towards the continuation of FQB+7,
Inc.s business, should be dismissed because the corporation has
lost its juridical personality.35 Moreover, the CA held that the trial

30
court does not have jurisdiction to entertain an intra-corporate
dispute when the corporation is already dissolved.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over an intracorporate dispute involving a dissolved corporation?
RULING:
YES. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by
law. R.A. No. 8799 conferred jurisdiction over intra-corporate
controversies on courts of general jurisdiction or RTCs, to be
designated by the Supreme Court. Thus, as long as the nature of
the controversy is intra-corporate, the designated RTCs have the
authority to exercise jurisdiction over such cases.

Section 145 also preserves the nature of the controversy between

the parties as an intra-corporate dispute.
The dissolution of the corporation simply prohibits it from
continuing its business. However, despite such dissolution, the
parties involved in the litigation are still corporate actors. The
dissolution does not automatically convert the parties into total
strangers or change their intra-corporate relationships. Neither
does it change or terminate existing causes of action, which arose
because of the corporate ties between the parties. Thus, a cause
of action involving an intracorporate controversy remains and
must be filed as an intra-corporate dispute despite the
subsequent dissolution of the corporation.

Thus, to be considered as an intra-corporate dispute, the case:

(a) must arise out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, and
(b) the nature of the question subject of the controversy must be
such that it is intrinsically connected with the regulation of the
corporation or the enforcement of the parties rights and
obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal
regulatory rules of the corporation. So long as these two criteria
are satisfied, the dispute is intracorporate and the RTC, acting as
a special commercial court, has jurisdiction over it.

> Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) filed cases
for determination of just compensation against respondent
Corazon M. Villegas and respondent heirs of Catalino V. Noel and
Procula P. Sy before the RTC of Dumaguete City, Branch 32,
sitting as a Special Agrarian Court for the province of Negros
Oriental. Respondent Villegas property was in Hibaiyo,
Guihulngan City, Negros Oriental, while respondent heirs land
was in Nangca, Bayawan City, Negros Oriental. These lands
happened to be outside the regular territorial jurisdiction of RTC
Branch 32 of Dumaguete City.
> RTC Branch 32 dismissed the two civil cases for lack of
jurisdiction. It ruled that, although it had been designated Special
Agrarian Court for Negros Oriental, the designation did not
expand its territorial jurisdiction to hear agrarian cases under the
territorial jurisdiction of the RTC, Branch 64 of Guihulngan City
and Branch 63 of Bayawan City respectively have jurisdiction
where respondents property can be found.
> Aggrieved, Land Bank directly filed this petitions for certiorari
before this Court, raising a purely question of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an RTC, acting as Special Agrarian
Court, has jurisdiction over just compensation cases involving
agricultural lands located outside its regular jurisdiction but within
the province where it is designated as an agrarian court under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998?

Examining the case before us in relation to these two criteria, the

Court finds and so holds that the case is essentially an intracorporate dispute. It obviously arose from the intra-corporate
relations between the parties, and the questions involved pertain
to their rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and
matters relating to the regulation of the corporation. We further
hold that the nature of the case as an intra-corporate dispute was
not affected by the subsequent dissolution of the corporation.
It bears reiterating that Section 145 of the Corporation Code
protects, among others, the rights and remedies of corporate
actors against other corporate actors. The statutory provision
assures an aggrieved party that the corporations dissolution will
not impair, much less remove, his/her rights or remedies against
the corporation, its stockholders, directors or officers. It also
states that corporate dissolution will not extinguish any liability
already incurred by the corporation, its stockholders, directors, or
officers. In short, Section 145 preserves a corporate actors cause
of action and remedy against another corporate actor. In so doing,

FACTS:

RULING:
YES. Jurisdiction is the courts authority to hear and
determine a case. The courts jurisdiction over the nature and
subject matter of an action is conferred by law. In this case, the
law that confers jurisdiction on Special Agrarian Courts
designated by the Supreme Court in every province is Republic
Act (R.A.) 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988.

LAND BANK vs VILLEGAS

LAND BANK vs HEIRS OF CATALINO V. NOEL

The law is clear. A branch of an RTC designated as a Special

Agrarian Court for a province has the original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation in that province. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,
the Supreme Court ruled that Special Agrarian Courts have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases:

31
(1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners, and (2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under
R.A. 6657.

MENDOZA vs VILLAS

By special jurisdiction, Special Agrarian Courts exercise power in

addition to or over and above the ordinary jurisdiction of the RTC,
such as taking cognizance of suits involving agricultural lands
located outside their regular territorial jurisdiction, so long as they
are within the province where they sit as Special Agrarian Courts.

> In the 2007 barangay elections, Mendoza obtained the highest

votes for the position of Punong Barangay; while respondent
Liwanag Herato obtained the highest number of votes for the
position of Barangay Kagawad.
> COMELEC proclaimed Mendoza as the duly-elected Punong
Barangay of Balatasan. Thus, the losing candidate, Pajanel, filed
a petition for quo warranto with the MTC. MTC issued a Decision
disqualifying Mendoza and declaring that Herato was entitled to
succeed him as Punong Barangay garnering the highest number
of votes as a Barangay Kagawad. Mendoza appealed the MTC
Decision to the COMELEC.
> DILG Undersecretary responded to Mendozas inquiry informing
Villas that Mendoza should occupy the post of Punong
Barangay as there was no Writ of Execution Pending Appeal of
the MTC Decision.
> Bulalacao Municipal Administrator, Edezer Aceron, by the
authority of Villas, issued a letter to respondent Marlon de Castro,
Manager of LBP, requesting that transactions entered into
by Mendoza in behalf of Barangay Bulalacao should not be
honored. In the same letter, Aceron dismissed the DILG letter
saying that it is merely advisory and not binding on the municipal
government of Bulalacao and the LBP.
> In response, de Castro issued Villas and Mendoza a
letter advising both parties that the LBP shall not honor any
transaction with regard the accounts of Barangay Balatasan.
> Petitioners filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages and
Prayer for the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, prayed
that the LBP be directed to release the funds of
Barangay Balatasan to them in order to render necessary, basic
public services to the inhabitants of the barangay.
> Villas and Herato filed a Motion to Dismiss, a copy of the
COMELEC Resolution was attached. The Resolution
disqualified Mendoza as
a
candidate
for Punong
Barangay of Barangay in the 2007barangay elections for having
already served three (3) consecutive terms for the same position.
> RTC issued the assailed order dismissing the petition on the
strength of the COMELEC Resolution disqualifying Mendoza from
running in the 2007 elections.
> From such orders the petitioners went directly to this Court.
Petitioners did not cite the rule under the Rules of Court by which
the petition was filed. If the petition is to be treated as a petition
filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petition must be
dismissed outright for having been filed prematurely.

R.A. 6657 requires the designation by the Supreme Court before

an RTC Branch can function as a Special Agrarian Court. The
Supreme Court has not designated the single sala courts of RTC,
Branch 64 of Guihulngan City and RTC, Branch 63 of Bayawan
City as Special Agrarian Courts. Consequently, they cannot hear
just compensation cases just because the lands subject of such
cases happen to be within their territorial jurisdiction.
Since RTC, Branch 32 of Dumaguete City is the designated
Special Agrarian Court for the province of Negros Oriental, it has
jurisdiction over all cases for determination of just compensation
involving agricultural lands within that province, regardless of
whether or not those properties are outside its regular territorial
jurisdiction.

DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL HEIRARCHY

FACTS:

ISSUE:

Whether or not there has been a violation in the doctrine

of hierarchy of courts?
RULING:
YES. This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional
Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to
parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor
will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also
serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for
the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level
(inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court,
and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A
direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction
to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established
policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands
upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent
further over-crowding of the Courts docket.
Under the principle of the hierarchy of courts, decisions, final
orders or resolutions of an MTC should be appealed to the RTC
exercising territorial jurisdiction over the former. On the other
hand, RTC judgments, final orders or resolutions are appealable
to the CA through either of the following: an ordinary appeal if the
case was originally decided by the RTC; or a petition for review
under Rule 42, if the case was decided under the RTC's appellate
jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, a direct recourse to this Court can be taken for a
review of the decisions, final orders or resolutions of the RTC, but
only on questions of law. Court shall exercise liberality and
consider the instant petition as one filed under Rule 45. [Republic
v. Court of Appeals], the Court noted that it has the discretion to
determine whether a petition was filed under Rule 45 or 65 of the
Rules of Court.

CREBA vs SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM

FACTS:

32
> Petitioner CREBA, a private non-stock, non-profit corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines.
> The Secretary of Agrarian Reform is named respondent as he is
the duly appointive head of the DAR whose administrative
issuances are the subject of this petition.
> DAR issued numerous amended resolutions regarding
Regulations on the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Nonagricultural Uses.
> By reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an actual slow
down of housing projects, which, in turn, aggravated the housing
shortage, unemployment and illegal squatting problems to the
substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner and its members
but more so of the whole nation.
> Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of hierarchy of courts was
followed?
RULING:
NO. Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals
and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,habeas
corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the
petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not
exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts
and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is
not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of
the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court
to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue
of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional
Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of
Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there
are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically
set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy

necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time

and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the
Courts docket.
The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition
upon the precious time of this Court; and (b) it would cause an
inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be
remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under
the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues
because this Court is not a trier of facts.
This Court thus reaffirms the judicial policy that it will not entertain
direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in
the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious
implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of
writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.
Exceptional and compelling circumstances were held present in
the following cases: (a) Chavez v. Romulo, on citizens right to
bear arms; (b) Government of [the] United States of America v.
Hon.
Purganan, on
bail
in
extradition
proceedings;
(c) Commission on Elections v. Judge Quijano-Padilla, on
government contract involving modernization and computerization
of voters registration list; (d) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon.
Sec. Zamora, on status and existence of a public office; and
(e) Hon. Fortich v. Hon. Corona, on the so-called Win-Win
Resolution of the Office of the President which modified the
approval of the conversion to agro-industrial area.
In the case at bench, petitioner failed to specifically and
sufficiently set forth special and important reasons to justify direct
recourse to this Court and why this Court should give due course
to this petition in the first instance, hereby failing to fulfill the
conditions set forth in Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor. The
present petition should have been initially filed in the Court of
Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of
courts. Failure to do so is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this
petition.
Moreover, although the instant petition is styled as a Petition
for Certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of
the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned DAR AO No.
01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88. It, thus, partakes
of the nature of a Petition for Declaratory Relief over which this
Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.

With that, this Petition must necessarily fail because this Court
does not have original jurisdiction over a Petition for Declaratory
Relief even if only questions of law are involved.
Even if the petitioner has properly observed the doctrine of judicial
hierarchy, this Petition is still dismissible.
The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction
of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is
only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The essential requisites for a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
are: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal,
board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law