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European View

DOI 10.1007/s12290-014-0332-4
ARTICLE

Time for member stateled strategic


partnerships
Timothy Stafford

Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies 2014

Abstract Europe needs to revise its focus on partnerships in the wake of the
political turmoil in Ukraine and the end of combat operations in Afghanistan.
Doing so will require a root and branch review of existing approaches alongside
internal European debates. In particular, Europe needs to prepare itself for an era
in which its key partners will be non-European states. By renewing and
strengthening ties with long-standing, enthusiastic, necessary and unavoidable
partners, Europe can maintain peace and security within its theatre. However,
Europe will be most successful in this regard if it devolves responsibility for key
strategic partnerships to individual member states.
Keywords

Europe  Partnerships  Defence  Security  European Union  NATO

Introduction
In the two decades since the Cold War, Europe has proven remarkably active in
its pursuit of external partnerships. Association Agreements emerged as the
primary means by which to prepare Central and Eastern European countries for
EU membership. Likewise, NATO expanded to absorb the countries of the former
Eastern Bloc, as well as the Baltic states, themselves former Soviet republics.
Following such formal enlargement, Europe continued its efforts, establishing
The author writes in an individual capacity, and his comments should not be seen as reflecting the
institutional position of any organisation.
T. Stafford (&)
61 Whitehall, London SW1A 2ET, UK
e-mail: TimothyS@rusi.org

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formal mechanisms to govern its ties with non-members in peripheral regions.


Through its Neighbourhood Policy, the Barcelona process and the Eastern
Partnership, the EU moved to foster a more favourable regional environment.
Such moves built upon NATOs initiation of the Partnership for Peace
programme, which established associate member status for non-NATO members. This move was of particular relevance after 2001, as it provided a structure
which enabled these states to participate in NATO operations in Afghanistan.
Collectively, these efforts were indicative of a buoyant self-confidence and of
evidence that policymakers were succeeding in their efforts to construct a
Europe, whole free and at peace (Washington Post 2012). Not only would the
Cold Warera divisions within Europe be eliminated, but so too would the threat
of external challenges, something which the Soviet Union had embodied before
the end of the Cold War.

From confidence to nervousness


Europe now finds itself at a very different juncture. Efforts to consolidate Central
and Eastern Europe into the broader European construct have proved largely
successful. Accordingly, the focal point of the EUs outreach efforts has shifted to
areas that are in many ways less Europeanwhere support for integration into
European political structures is partial, qualified and less intense. By definition,
the prospects for success in these regions are less promising. This has been seen
most vividly in Ukraine, where the EUs efforts to secure an Association
Agreement with the country not only prompted an aggressive reaction from
Russia, but vehement opposition from Ukrainians in the east of the country, who
consider alignment with Moscow to offer greater benefits than alignment with
Brussels. At the same time, the glue that has bound together many NATO
partnershipsnamely the 13-year mission to Afghanistanis drawing to a close.
As a result, many have begun to question the basis upon which future NATOpartner relations will rest.
These developments demand root and branch reassessments of Europes
strategic partnerships. What are such partnerships for? Who should these
partners be? How should these partnerships be pursued? Does the EU need to
empower the Common Foreign and Security Policy through an expanded
External Action Service and the centralisation of foreign policy decision-making
in Brussels, similar to the manner in which it has acquired control of member
states fiscal policies? Or, given diminished support for centralisation, can the EU
as an institution do more with less, by establishing priorities that the member
states implement themselves?
These ought to be key questions for current officials. Unfortunately, the
Europe of today is ill-equipped to address these particular challenges. At an
individual level, incoming EU commissionersas well as incoming NATO
Secretary General Jens Stoltenbergwill spend their first few months in office
getting up to speed with their existing briefs. Accordingly, there is a danger that
the inertia this causes will result in a postponement of the kind of reassessment

European View
that is required. More importantly, Europe as a whole is beset by an array of
economic challenges that are draining attention away from a much-needed
focus on neighbourhood and partnership issues. The crisis in the eurozone has
divided prospering countries in northern Europe from their struggling southern
counterparts. Indeed, the gulf is so great that some have spoken openly of their
desire for greater economic problems in Germany so as to restore unity on key
economic issues (Niblett 2014). For a continent that prides itself on harmonisation the resolution of such divisions must be prioritised. As a result, the focus
on internal European problems is likely to crowd out any focus on how Europe
approaches its immediate neighbourhood, not to mention the wider world.
Allowing internal problems to become the focus for Europe would be a
tremendous mistake. Only by addressing risks and challenges beyond its borders
can Europe maintain the long-term peace and harmony it has sought to
cultivate. Underlying this reality is the unavoidable fact that Europe remains on
the frontline of most major global security challenges: lawlessness and
extremism in North Africa and the Sahel, geopolitical polarisation in Ukraine,
and terrorism emanating from the Middle East. Speaking off the record, one
American official recently noted that these security challenges are likely to hit
Europe first, the United States second, and Asia third. Europe, therefore, has no
choice but to look out as well as in. This, though, will require long-standing
habits to be set aside. For the last two decades, the focus of most European
nations foreign policies has been on resolving outstanding divisions within the
European theatre. Those days are now past. To succeed in the next two decades,
Europe will need to shift its focus from regional issues to global ones.
How best to undertake this shift? While there is a natural temptation to
centralise in the face of any new challenge, the counter-intuitive approach is
more appropriate. Europe will enjoy the most success if it restricts itself to
identifying general continental objectives, whilst letting individual member
states take the lead in establishing partnerships that are of critical importance to
them. This approach would enable each country to utilise its comparative
advantage, whilst still working towards an overall goal that benefits Europe as a
whole. The best way to do this would be to conceptualise European partnerships
as falling within one of four categories: relations with long-standing partners,
relations with enthusiastic partners, relations with necessary partners and
relations with unavoidable partners.

Long-standing partners
Primarily, Europe must strive to consolidate and maintain ties with its longstanding partners, above all, the US. This ought to be a straightforward task. The
US remains bound to Europepolitically, militarily, culturally and institutionally.
For all the nervous talk of the US pivot towards Asia that has swept through
European capitals in recent years, senior American officials have repeatedly
offered reassurances that Europe remains the partner of first resort (Bumiller
and Erlanger 2012), and partner of choice for military operations and diplomacy

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around the world (Bumiller and Erlanger 2012). That is not to say that caution
must not be taken to preserve the health of the relationship. To maintain
harmonious ties, European nations must take into account the exasperation that
lies behind the USs repeated insistence that they spend more on defence
capabilities. Likewise, European states would be well advised to temper
excessive criticism of American intelligence gathering efforts (Gude et al.
2014), given the activities that European member states also undertake in this
area (Sharkov 2014). Nevertheless, this years developments in Ukraine have
brought the US and Europe even closer together, suggesting that the
fundamental commonalities that underpin the transatlantic partnership remain
strong.
How then, can relations best be maintained? Here, Europe can succeed by
devolving responsibilityalbeit informallyto a state that enjoys historically
close ties with the US. For instance, no other country in Europe enjoys the same
reception, regard and trust in Washington that are afforded to the UK. A
common history, language and outlook bind the two nations together in a
special relationship in a way that no EU regulation or initiative could replicate.
Therefore, it makes sense to give primary responsibility for managing the EUs
relationship with the US to the UK. This might prove anathema in countries such
as France and Germany, which regard themselves as having comparable
international standing by virtue of their membership of the UN Security Council
and G8. However, there are tremendous benefits to empowering the UK with a
semi-formal role as the EUs primary liaison with Washington. First, it would
strengthen the EUs ability to introduce its priorities into the American discourse,
whether they be demands for more assertive action on climate change, greater
stabilisation of the American financial sector or better resourcing of US aid
commitments. The UK is well suited to acting as the EUs voice in this regard.
Second, recognising the UKs unique advantages would go some way to quelling
the sharp rise in Euroscepticism that has brought London to the brink of EU
withdrawal, with British Prime Minister David Cameron pledging a referendum
on membership should the Conservative Party win next years parliamentary
elections.
How would such an arrangement work in practice? Primarily members of the
External Action Service could be brought into the British embassy, providing a
strong European dimension to the UKs bilateral relationship. Equally, EU issues
and priorities would form part of the agenda at UKUS summits. Likewise, UK
personnel could be given the leadership role in all legal or political negotiations
between the EU and the US, be they over the provision of passenger data to
airlines, trade negotiations or agreeing joint positions ahead of G20 summit
meetings.

Enthusiastic partners
A difficult balance must be established with those countries that want to be part
of the broader European construct but remain partially locked within Russias

European View
sphere of influence. Here, the future of Ukraine poses the most vexing question.
That there is a greater desire within Ukraine for partnership with Europe than
with Russia is indisputable, and Europe should not permit Russia a veto over the
countrys future alignment. At the same time, Europe must not make the mistake
of believing that the future orientation of Ukraine can be decided upon a
majoritarian basis, or that integrating states that Russia sees as falling within its
sphere of influence can be done without cost (Harding 2014).
In this instance, European governments have been overly simplistic in their
posture, assuming that the only criterion to be applied vis-a-vis partnerships is
whether the country in question seeks a closer relationship. A much broader
awareness, which takes into account the environment in which that state sits, is
desperately required. For this reason, in its dealings with Ukraineand other
countries along Russias bordersEuropean policymakers should heed Henry
Kissingers advice (2014), and never subordinate the strategic element in their
considerations.
Establishing a stronger partnership with Ukraine will require more than
ratification of the Association Agreement signed with Kiev. The leading failure of
European states in recent years has not been their inability to present an
attractive vision to Kiev, but their inability to persuade Moscow that including
Ukraine within Europes political family poses no direct threat to Russia. The
successful management of Ukraines place within Europe will therefore require
an enormous effort to reassure interlocutors. Such an effort cannot simply come
in the form of affirmations of goodwill, but rather from tangible moves, such as
the removal of the sanctions applied this summer. It is therefore disappointing
that European states are reducing their level of engagement at a time when an
increase is needed. Europe must also take steps to ensure that enthusiasm for
integration does not get out of hand. There can be no doubting that Kievs
heavy-handed approach to militants in its eastern territory has damaged
Europes relations with Russia more than was necessary (USA Today 2014). Thus
the essence of strategic partnerships requires that more should be done to avert
actions that are likely to destabilise EastWest ties.
How can this be achieved in practice? Again, the EU should move to work
through its member states, rather than seek to manage the outstanding issues
from Brussels. For instance, Finland has a wealth of experience of managing
relations with Russia from its time as a neighbour of the former Soviet Union.
Likewise, Norway has made great progress towards establishing better relations
with Russia, due both to its shared border and to common interest in
cooperating in the Arctic Ocean. Both countries should be invited to lead talks
on behalf of the high representativeinvolving Ukraine and Russia, so that
some progress can be made towards defusing tensions through the provision of
best practice. Such talks should also receive regular input from the Baltic States,
Poland and other former Eastern Bloc states. Devolving responsibility for Eastern
Partnership states to those states that have the greatest tradition of engaging in
diplomacy with Russia would make Europes involvement in its eastern
neighbourhood less cumbersome, whilst minimising any loss of expertise.

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Necessary partners
Perhaps the most important of all in the long term will be Europes relations with
necessary partners. This criteria should be seen to encompass those states with
whom Europe does not necessarily share values or geography, but whose
interests overlap. The states of North Africa fit into this dynamic. None hold any
hope of becoming EU or NATO members. However, all have an essential role to
play if Europes security is to be preserved. As noted, tensions and volatility
along the coast of the Mediterranean will only exacerbate large-scale immigration, leaving France, Italy and other European nations open to significant
political pressures (Traynor and Hooper 2011). The damage such developments
could cause is significant, especially if such states feel that their priorities are not
being adequately considered in Brussels. Thus it is vital that more be done to
strengthen efforts to bring state-building expertise and prosperity to North
Africa, under the guise of the Union for the Mediterranean. Here, primary
responsibility should be given to states that have the biggest stake in the
prosperity and success of North Africa. For instance, EU-wide decisions about
investment and aid should be devolved to Italy, France and other southern
European nations that have close relations with the governments and peoples of
North Africa. These states have consistently warned that Europe has failed to
focus its attention on Mediterranean issues. Devolving responsibility to them to
take the lead on Europes behalf would give them a chance to show what can be
achieved.
In addition, Europe should seek out partners which could contribute to its
security in particular ways. For instance, Israel has emerged as a world leader in
science and technology, and, specifically, mechanisms to resolve cyber insecurities. Greater cooperation on these issues would be well warranted. As a
developed region which lacks the degree of coordination that could be brought
to bear by a single country, it is essential that Europe remains ahead of the
curve in its acquisition of cyber defences. Countries with particular knowledge in
this area, such as Estonia, should be employed to lead the outreach.

Unavoidable partners
Lastly, Europe must engage those states with which partnership, even of the
informal kind, is unavoidable. Here, China will pose the biggest challenge to
Europe in the coming decades. Not only does the health of the Chinese
economy now in part underpin the prosperity of the Western world, but Chinas
place within the world must be carefully managed in order to ensure that its rise
is accommodated without an aggressive attempt to revise the rules of the
game. Here Europes role is somewhat limited, for direct EUChina relations are
significantly underdeveloped. However, it should be noted that Germany is
ideally placed to lead the EUs efforts to engage China. Both are economic giants
at the heart of their regions. Both are nations that rely heavily on exporting to
ensure their continued growth. Above all, both are nations that are rising

European View
relative to the states they surround, both in terms of political influence and
economic prosperity. They are therefore natural partners to think through the
challenges of managing turbulent regional relations and international trade
imbalances. Accordingly, Berlin should be given responsibility for leading the
EUs efforts to forge closer and more meaningful ties with China.

Conclusion
By splitting the EUs relations with the world into separate parts, and devolving
responsibility to the states that enjoy a comparative advantage, Europe would
make use of the various advantages afforded it by its extensive membership.
Such a measure might result in a substantial weakening of the office of the high
representative, which would need to be downgraded in status to a coordinating
role. However, such a move would be best in the long run, as it would empower
the states that are best placed to lead its engagement with the wider world.
Europe has come a long way in the last 20 years, and most of the goals it set for
itself at the end of the Cold War have been achieved. However, it would be a
tremendous mistake to conclude that the policies that have served Europe well
will continue to serve it well in the future.

References
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Times, 4 February. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/world/europe/panetta-clinton-troopseurope.html?_r=0. Accessed 21 October 2014.
Gude, H., Schindler, J., & Schmid, F. (2014). Merkels mobile: Germany launches investigation into NSA
spying. Spiegel Online, 4 June. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/germany-expectedto-open-investigation-into-nsa-spying-on-merkel-a-973326.html. Accessed 21 October 2014.
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Traynor, I., & Hooper, J. (2011). France and Italy in call to close EU borders in wake of Arab protests.
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Washington Post. (2012). RNC 2012: Condoleezza Rice delivers speech to Republican National
Convention in Tampa. 29 August. http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/rnc-2012-cond
oleezza-rice-delivers-speech-to-republican-national-convention-in-tampa-full-text/2012/08/29/3
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Timothy Stafford is a Research Analyst with the Royal United Services
Institute, a foreign and defence think tank based in London.

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