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This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which now reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled
to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has
been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a
public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action
before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half
of the legitime of a legitimate child.
The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in
case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child
may use the surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the two children with the
prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged
before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he
wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his children's surname as
Antonio.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father
(herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate
children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says and it must
be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation.Respondents position that the court can order the minors to use his
surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use
of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the
surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.
Civil Service Commission Vs. Court Of Appeals, Dr.Dante G. Guevarra And Atty. Augustus F. Cezar, G.R.No. 176162,
October 09, 2012 (ATIENZA) F a c t s
Respondents Dante G. Guevarra (Guevarra) and AugustusF. Cezar (Cezar) were the Officer-in-Charge/President andthe Vice
President for Administration, respectively, of thePolytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP) in 2005.
On September 27, 2005, petitioner Honesto L. Cueva(Cueva), then PUP Chief Legal Counsel, filed anadministrative case against
Guevarra and Cezar for grossdishonesty, grave misconduct, falsification of officialdocuments, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of theservice, being notoriously undesirable, and for violatingSection 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713. Cueva
chargedGuevarra with falsification of a public document,specifically the Application for Bond of AccountableOfficials and
Employees of the Republic of the Philippines,in which the latter denied the existence of his pendingcriminal and administrative
cases, despite the fact thatGuevarra and Cezar have 17 cases pending before thSandiganbayan.
On March 24, 2006, the Civil Service Commission (CSC)formally charged Guevarra with Dishonesty and Cezar withConduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.Subsequently, the respondents filed their Motion forReconsideration and Motion to
Declare Absence of PrimaFacie Case. This was denied and Guevarra wassubsequently placed under preventive suspension
forninety (90) days.
Guevarra and Cezar filed a petition for
certiorari
andprohibition before the CA essentially questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC. On December 29, 2006, the CArendered its
Decision granting the petition and nullifyingand setting aside the questioned resolutions of the CSC forhaving been rendered
without jurisdiction citing EO 292(Administrative Code of 1987) which states that heads ofagencies and instrumentalities "shall
have jurisdiction toinvestigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actionagainst officers and employees under their
jurisdiction"thereby bestowing upon the Board of Regents the jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involvingdisciplinary
action against respondents Guevarra andCezar.
ISSUE:
WON the Civil Service Commission have jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
YES
According to the SC, the CSC have original jurisdictionover cases filed to it. The CSC, as the central personnelagency of the
government, has the power to discipline itsofficials and employees and to hear and decideadministrative cases instituted by or
brought before itdirectly or on appeal.
Based on the constitution, the civil service embraces allbranches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies ofthe Government,
including government-owned or controlledcorporations with original charters. By virtue of PresidentialDecree (P.D.) No. 1341,
PUP became a chartered stateuniversity, thereby making it a government-owned orcontrolled corporation with an original charter
whoseemployees are part of the Civil Service and are subject tothe provisions of E.O. No. 292
In the case of
Camacho v. Gloria,
the SC stated that underE.O. No. 292, a complaint against a state university officialmay be filed with either the university
s Board of Regents
or directly with the Civil Service Commission.
This is further emphasized on Sec. 4 of the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases stating that The Civil Service
Commission shall hear and decide administrative casesinstituted by, or br
ought before it, directly or on appeal. Also, Sec. 7 of the same rules further provides that
Headsof Departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalitiesand other instrumentalities
concurrent jurisdiction, with the Commission, over their respective
officers and employees.
These rules, according to the SC,are a reasonable interpretation of EO 292 (AdministrativeCode).
shall
have
original
This concurrent jurisdiction means that if a case is filed tothe CSC and the CSC assumes jurisdiction over the case,then it shall be
to the exclusion of other tribunals exercisingconcurrent jurisdiction (The disciplinary tribunal of PUP orits Board of regents in
this particular case). Even if theCSC delegates the investigation to other department oragency like the disciplinary tribunal, it
does not deprive theCSC of its jurisdiction. In the same way, if the Disciplinarytribunal of PUP or its Board of Regents takes
jurisdictionover the case, it shall be to the exclusion of the CSC
ISSUE:
Whether PD 1594 requires the contractor to prove that the price increase of construction
materials was due to the direct acts of the government before a price escalation is granted
in this payment dispute in a construction contract.
RATIO:
No, there was no need to prove that the price increase was due to acts of the
government. Proof of increase is sufficient to grant payment for price escalation.
The phrase was first used in RA 1595, which was amended by PD 454. The latter
amended RA 1595 by supplying the meaning of the phrase direct acts of the
government and expressly including the increase of prices of gasoline within the
coverage of that phrase.
Consequently, when PD 1594 reproduced the phrase without supplying a contrary or
different definition, the definition provided by the earlier enacted PD 454 was
deemed adopted by the later decree.
Thus, proof of an increase in fuel and cement price and a subsequent increase in the
cost of labor and relevant construction materials during the contract period are
considered a compliance with the IRR requirements for a claim for price escalation.
It was therefore wrong for PEZA to disregard PD 454 by automatically denying the
claim of Green Asia for price escalation or to require the latter to prove that the
increase in the construction cost was due to the direct acts of the government. PD
454 actually bridges the gap between PD 1594 and its IRR. PD 1594 no longer
explains the provision on price adjustment, because it is already found in PD 454 and
in older laws.
Section 1 of PD 454 provides:
(a) If during the effectivity of the contract, the
cost of labor, materials, equipment rentals
and supplies for construction should increase
or decrease due to the direct acts of the
government; and for purposes of this
Decree the increase of prices of
gasoline and other fuel oils, and of
cement shall be considered direct acts
of the Government;
Others:
The parties separately invoke PD 1594 and its IRR. A reading of their provisions,
however, leads to the conclusion that price adjustment under PD 1594 is actually
the same as price escalation under the IRR.
They have different names, but pertain to the same thing -- the adjustment of the
contract price due to certain circumstances.
At first glance, price escalation may be considered as an expansion of the concept of
price adjustment. In truth, however, the IRR did not expand anything, but merely laid
out a guideline for the computation of the adjustment or escalation of price.
The two provisions are therefore not separate and must be read together. Otherwise,
if we accept the arguments of both parties that one is invoking either PD 1594 or the
IRR, two different rights would arise therefrom, which is obviously not intended by the
law.
Price escalation, as explained in paragraph 6 of Cl 2.1 of the IRR, is meant to
compensate for changes in the prices of relevant construction necessities during the
effectivity of the contract, resulting in more than 5% increase or decrease in the unit
price of those items. It is thus the prices of the items that have actually increased
that become the basis of the computation.
In addition, the contract between PEZA and Green Asia did not incorporate provisions
prohibiting price escalation or any clause that may be interpreted as a waiver of the
price escalation.