G.R. No.

122646 March 14, 1997

ADELIA C. MENDOZA, for herself and Administratix of the Intestate Estate of the
late NORBERTO B. MENDOZA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANGELITO C. TEH, Presiding Judge, Branch 87, RTC, Rosario, Batangas, SPS.
HERMINIO & CLARITA TAYAG @ SPS. GEORGE T. TIGLAO & CLARIZZA T. TIGLAO
and/or @ TEOFILO M. ESGUERRA, LEONOR M. ESGUERRA. LETICIA M. ESGUERRA,
JOEL M. ESGUERRA, RICARDO M. ESGUERRA, VOLTAIRE E. TAYAG, BENITO I. TAYAG,
MERLIE MALIG, ALBERTO T. TAYAG, ROSEMARIE T. TAYAG, LETICIA E. LULU and the
REGISTER OF DEED for the Province of Batangas, respondents.

FRANCISCO, J.:
On October 28, 1994, petitioner "for herself and as administratrix of the intestate estate" of
her deceased husband Norberto Mendoza filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Batangas a complaint for "reconveyance of title (involving parcels of lot in Batangas) and
damages with petition for preliminary injunction" docketed as Civil Case No. R94-009. 1
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of said complaint states:
2. That Adelia C. Mendoza likewise represents her co-plaintiff, the Intestate
Estate of the late Norberto B. Mendoza in her capacity as the surviving wife of
the deceased Norberto B. Mendoza who died on December 29, 1993;
3. That Adelia C. Mendoza should be appointed by this Honorable Court as the
judicial administratrix of her co-plaintiff for purposes of this case; 2
Private respondents filed on January 21, 1995 3 their "answer with motion to dismiss" 4 alleging
among others that the complaint states no cause of action and that petitioner's demand had
already been paid. 5 On February 17, 1995, private respondents filed another pleading entitled
"motion to dismiss" invoking, this time, lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, estoppel,
laches and prescription. In support of their argument of lack of jurisdiction, private
respondents contend that a special proceedings case for appointment of administratrix of an
estate cannot be incorporated in the ordinary action for reconveyance. In her opposition to
the motions, petitioner asserts among others, that the allegation seeking appointment as
administratrix is only an incidental matter which is not even prayed for in the complaint.
Replying to the opposition, private respondents argued that since petitioner's husband resided
in Quezon City at the time of his death, the appointment of the estate administratrix should
be filed in the RTC of that place in accordance with Section 1 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court.
Accordingly, it is their argument that the RTC of Batangas has no jurisdiction over the case.
In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, the RTC of Batangas thru respondent Judge Teh
"dismissed without prejudice" the complaint for lack of jurisdiction "on the ground that the
rules governing an ordinary civil action and a special proceeding are different." Accordingly,
the lower court found it unnecessary to discuss the other grounds raised in the motion to
dismiss. 6 Upon denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration, he filed this petition under
Rule 45 on pure questions of law. The Court thereafter gave due course to the petition.
The issue is whether or not in an action for reconveyance, an allegation seeking appointment
as administratrix of an estate, would oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over the whole case?

We rule in the negative. First, Section 19 of B.P. 129 as amended by RA 7691 provides:
Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, where the assessed value of property involved exceeds
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). . .
xxx xxx xxx
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestat . . . .
Likewise, Section 33 of the same law provides that:
Metropolitan Trial Court shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate
proceedings, testate and intestate . . . (emphasis ours).
The above law is clear. An action for reconveyance, which involves title to property
worth millions of pesos, such as the lots subject of this case, is cognizable by the RTC.
Likewise falling within its jurisdiction are actions "incapable of pecuniary estimation,"
such as the appointment of an administratrix for an estate. Even the Rules on venue of
estate proceedings (Section 1 of Rule 73 7) impliedly recognizes the jurisdiction of the
RTC over petitions for granting of letters of administration. On the other hand, probate
proceedings for the settlement of estate are within the ambit of either the RTC or MTC
depending on the net worth of the estate. By arguing that the allegation seeking such
appointment as administratrix ousted the RTC of its jurisdiction, both public and private
respondents confuse jurisdiction with venue. Section 2 of Rule 4 as revised by Circular
13-95 8 provides that actions involving title to property shall be tried in the province
where the property is located, in this case, Batangas. The mere fact that petitioner's
deceased husband resides in Quezon City at the time of his death affects only the
venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court. 9
Second, the cases cited 10 by private respondents are not at point as they involve settlement
of estate where the probate court was asked to resolve questions of ownership of certain
properties.In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation
seeking appointment as estate administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement
of estate that would have invited the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate court.
The above allegation is not even a jurisdictional fact which must be stated in an action for
reconveyance. The Court therefore, should have at least, proceeded with the reconveyance
suit rather than dismiss the entire case.
Third, jurisprudential rulings that a probate court cannot generally decide questions of
ownership or title to property 11 is not applicable in this case, because: there is no settlement
of estate involved and the RTC of Batangas was not acting as a probate court. It should be
clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere
question of procedure. 12 Moreover, the instant action for reconveyance does not even invoke

the limited jurisdiction of a probate court. 13 Considering that the RTC has jurisdiction, whether
it be on the reconveyance suit or as to the appointment of an administratrix, it was improper
for respondent judge to dismiss the whole complaint for alleged lack of jurisdiction.
Finally, judges should not dismiss with precipitate haste, complaints or petitions filed before
them, just so they can comply with their administrative duty to dispose cases within 90 days
at the expense of their judicial responsibility.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions dated June 14, 1995 and November 14, 1995 of the RTC of
Batangas are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to immediately proceed
with the disposition of the case in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 133000

October 2, 2001

PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO LETICIA DEL
ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA,
RODOLFO FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL
ROSARIO, respondent..
BUENA, J.:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for
reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement
of the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property
made by the decedent to any of the heirs?
Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the decision 1 of
public respondent Court of Appeals, the decretal portion of which declares:
"Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment appealed from is
reversed and set aside and another one entered annulling the Deed of Sale executed by
Graciano Del Rosario in favor of defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering the
Register of Deeds to Cancel TCT No. 186059 and reinstate TCT No. 107443 without
prejudice to the filing of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
Graciano Del Rosario in a proper court. No costs.
"So ordered."
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of
land with an area of 9,322 square meters located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 11889. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six
children, namely: Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an
extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and dividing
among themselves the real property subject of TCT No. 11889. Under the agreement,
Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children received 1/14 share of the said
property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was
issued in the name of Graciano and the Six children.1wphi1.nt
Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of ConsolidationSubdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights" where they subdivided among themselves
the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his
children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38
square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's name, as
covered by TCT No. 35988. Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further
subdivided into two separate lots where the first lot with a land area of 80.90 square meter
was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with a land area of 396.70 square
meters was registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot 2 to a third
person but retained ownership over the second lot. 3
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage,
Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT

No. 1860594 was issued in the latter's name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his
second wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.
In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
55, herein private respondents alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher,
through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443,
by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 1987 6 in favor
herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT no.
186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said
complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally
married to Graciano in 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a
compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner further alleged that during Graciano's lifetime,
Graciano already distributed, in advance, properties to his children, hence, herein private
respondents may not anymore claim against Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's
property.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26 January
1996 holding:8
"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia
Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence that a
separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that there has
been decreed a judicial separation of property between them, the spouses are
prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale;
"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was equally
prohibited by law under Article 133 of the New Civil Code;
"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may
however be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being
a compulsory heir of the deceased."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's decision
ratiocinating, inter alia:
"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal
distribution of the estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance /
annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only
in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person. XXX
"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as advance
inheritance. What the court should have done was merely to rule on the validity of (the)
sale and leave the issue on advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding
instituted for that purpose. XXX"
Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle through the expediency
of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and assails the appellate court's decision "for being contrary
to law and the facts of the case."
We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.

Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special
proceedings, in this wise:
"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules for
ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
"XXX
"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right or a particular fact."
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and
a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the
manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies
according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an
application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact.
Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly
so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or
motion."9
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:
"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which
are instituted and prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to
actions at law or suits in equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings
which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to some
special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without summons and
prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions. XXX
A special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent
proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending
action, by petition or motion upon notice." 10
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is
a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such
as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special
proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in
the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall
within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or
alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the
court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court
thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the
same provision11 contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction
of the estate proceedings".

Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is
devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real
property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for
reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to
thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila,
Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the
question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein
petitioner Natcher.
At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is elucidating:
"Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of a deceased, it
must first settle the estate in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose. In the
case at hand, the court a quo determined the respective legitimes of the plaintiffsappellants and assigned the subject property owned by the estate of the deceased to
defendant-appellee without observing the proper proceedings provided (for) by the
Rules of Court. From the aforecited discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an
ordinary action cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding
because it is subject to specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court a quo erred in
regarding the subject property as an advance inheritance." 12
In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs.
Borromeo13 and Mendoza vs. Teh14 that whether a particular matter should be resolved by
the Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction
or its limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure.
In essence, it is procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived". 15
Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents
inasmuch as the six children of the decedent even assailed the authority of the trail court,
acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the
decedent to petitioner.
Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing
principle that although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or
ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court
and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide
the question of ownership.16
Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:
"In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation
seeking appointment as estate administratrix which does not necessarily involve
settlement of estate that would have invited the exercise of the limited
jurisdiction of a probate court.17 (emphasis supplied)
Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory
heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first. 18 The net estate of the
decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the
value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations
subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the

legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be
ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. 19
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case,
reveals that the trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the
settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction
the non-observance of these well-entrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing
circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best
forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as well as other related matters
involving the settlement of Graciano Del Rosario's estate.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., Davide, Jr., JJ., concur

G.R. NO. 129242

January 16, 2001

PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and

ISABELITA MANALO ,petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 35),
PURITA S. JAYME, MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA M. ACUIN,
ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and IMELDA MANALO,
respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda De Manalo, et. Al.,
seeking to annul the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 affirming the Orders 3 of the
Regional Trial Court and the Resolution 4 which denied petitioner' motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts 5 are as follows:
Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on
February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children,
namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita
Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo
and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age.1wphi1.nt
At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties
located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style
Manalo's Machine Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at
NO. 45 General Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the
late Troadio Manalo, namely; Purita, Milagros, Belen Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and
Imelda filed a petition 6 with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila 7 of the judicial
settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their
brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.
On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on
February 11, 1993 and directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service by
registered mail of the said order upon the heirs named in the petition at their respective
addresses mentioned therein.
On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order
'declaring the whole world in default, except the government," and set the reception of
evidence of the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, the trial court upon motion of
set this order of general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S.
Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted then (10) days within which
to file their opposition to the petition.
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating
in the filling of an Omnibus Motion8 on July 23, 1993 seeking; (1) to seat aside and reconsider
the Order of the trial court dated July 9, 1993 which denied the motion for additional
extension of time file opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses

as grounds for dismissal of the case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the
presiding judge.
On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order 9 which resolved, thus:
A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on July 20, 1993,
only for the purpose of considering the merits thereof;
B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their affirmative
defenses as ground for the dismissal of this proceeding, said affirmative defenses being
irrelevant and immaterial to the purpose and issue of the present proceeding;
C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors;
D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge;
E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular administrator in
the intestate estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo for hearing on September 9, 1993
at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851, after the trial court in its Order 10 dated
September 15, 1993. In their petition for improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse
was included in the intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest efforts toward
compromise among members of the same family; and (5) no certification of non-forum
shopping was attached to the petition.
Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in
its Resolution11 promulgated on September 30, 1996. On May 6, 1997 the motion for
reconsideration of the said resolution was likewise dismissed. 12
The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant petition for review is whether or not
the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the respondent
trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial
settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts
toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to the
filling of the petition but that the same have failed.
Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary
civil action involving members of the same family. They point out that it contains certain
averments, which, according to them, are indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit:
X

Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of his father,
TROADIO MANALO, had not made any settlement, judicial or extra-judicial of the
properties of the deceased father TROADIO MANALO.
Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to manage and control the properties
aforementioned, without proper accounting, to his own benefit and advantage xxx.

Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the estate of the
deceased TROADIO MANALO to his own advantage and to the damage and prejudice of
the herein petitioners and their co-heirs xxx.
X

Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were compelled to
bring this suit and were forced to litigate and incur expenses and will continue to incur
expenses of not less than, P250,000.00 and engaged the services of herein counsel
committing to pay P200,000.00 as and attorney's fees plus honorarium of P2,500.00
per appearance in court xxx.13
Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16,
Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint
may be filed on the ground that a condition precedent for filling the claim has not been
complied with, that is, that the petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC.
No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made involving members
of the same family prior to the filling of the petition pursuant to Article 222 14 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines.
The instant petition is not impressed with merit.
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments15 and the character of the relief sought 16 in the complaint, or petition, as in the
case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of
Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein
petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition
contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a
deceased person such as the fat of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as
well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of
the decedent and of his residence within he country are foundation facts upon which all the
subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest. 17 The petition is SP.PROC No.
92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative
list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate
proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as
regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial
settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo, to wit;
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable Court:
a. That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to petitioner ROMEO
MANALO for the administration of the estate of the deceased TROADIO MANALO upon
the giving of a bond in such reasonable sum that this Honorable Court may fix.
b. That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO have been
inventoried and expenses and just debts, if any, have been paid and the legal heirs of
the deceased fully determined, that the said estate of TROADIO MANALO be settled and
distributed among the legal heirs all in accordance with law.

c. That the litigation expenses of these proceedings in the amount of P250,000.00 and
attorney's fees in the amount of P300,000.00 plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per
appearance in court in the hearing and trial of this case and costs of suit be taxed
solely against ANTONIO MANALO.18
Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which may be
typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage of
the said defect in the petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as observed
by the trial court, is actually an Answer containing admissions and denials, special and
affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary
damages, plus attorney's fees and costs 19 in an apparent effort to make out a case of an
ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules
of Court vis--vis, Article 222 of civil of the Civil Code.
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the
essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising
matters that as irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the
trial court, siting as a probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction 20 and cannot hear and
dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an
ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of
a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the
complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not
be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by
simple strategem.21 So it should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.
Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be
considered as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16,
Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis--vis Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would
nevertheless apply as a ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue of ule 1, Section 2 of
the Rules of Court which provides that the 'rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceedings.' Petitioners contend that the term
"proceeding" is so broad that it must necessarily include special proceedings.
The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the
provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of
the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. To wit:
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it
should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same
have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035(underscoring supplied).22
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear
from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or
other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him
for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. 23 A civil
action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the
enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. 24 Besides, an excerpt form the
Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to
make that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and
involve members of the same family, thus:

It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between
members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a
compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is
know that lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than stranger. 25
It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC.
No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was imploded therein. The
Petition for issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP.
PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the
petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. 26 the petitioners
therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fat of death of their father
and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they
can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of
the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate
court.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit, Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 109373. March 27, 1998]

PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, PAULA S. PAUG, and its officers
and members, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VITALIANO N.
NAAGAS II, as Liquidator of Pacific Banking Corporation, respondents.
[G.R. No. 112991. March 27, 1998]
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, as Liquidator of the
Pacific Banking Corporation, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE REGINO T.
VERIDIANO II, DEPUTY SHERIFF RAMON ENRIQUEZ and ANG ENG JOO, ANG KEONG LAN and E.J
ANG INTL. LTD., represented by their Attorney-in-fact, GONZALO C. SY, respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
For consideration are (1) petitioner's Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 112991 seeking
reconsideration of the Court's resolution dated October 9, 1995, which denied the
reconsideration of the decision in this case promulgated on March 20, 1995, and the
resolution of October 13, 1995 which absolved the branch clerk of court of the RTC of Manila,
Branch 31, of charges of wrongdoing; and (2) the manifestation and motions for clarification
filed by the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) concerning the request of petitioner in G.R. No.
112991 for the transfer of the funds of the Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) to its other
account in another branch of LBP and the alleged garnishment of the funds of PaBC deposited
in LBP in favor of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On March 20, 1995, the Court rendered a decision holding that a petition for liquidation under
Sec. 29 of the Central Bank Act, R.A.No. 265i[1] is a special proceeding and , therefore, the
rules prescribing a period of 30 days for appealing and requiring a record on appeal apply.
Accordingly, the appeal in G.R. No. 109373 was held to have been duly perfected but the
appeal in G.R. No. 112991 had not been perfected because of petitioner's failure to file a
record on appeal.
Petitioner in G.R. No. 112991 moved for a reconsideration of the aforesaid decision but the
Court denied his motion in its resolution of October 9, 1995 on the following grounds (1) the
clerks of the RTC and the Court of Appeals certified that no record on appeal had been filed;
(2) the branch clerk denied that the signature on the alleged copy of the record on appeal was
his; (3) counsel for private respondents and his clerk denied in their respective affidavits that
they had been served a copy of the record on appeal; (4) the identity of the person who
allegedly received the record on appeal filed in the trial court and whose initials appear on the
first page of the alleged copy of the said record had never been established; and (5) the copy
of the record on appeal allegedly filed did not bear the stamp of the RTC showing due receipt
thereof.
In the resolution of October 13, 1995, the Court held Judge Regino Veridiano II, Deputy Sheriff
Carmelo Cachero and private respondent's counsel, Atty. Marino Eslao, guilty of indirect
contempt for executing the decision of the trial court despite the temporary restraining order
issued by this Court. The Court, however, found no basis of holding branch clerk Antonio
Valencia Jr. guilty of any wrongdoing in certifying that petitioner failed to file a record on
appeal.
On November 6, 1995, petitioner then filed the Omnibus Motion in question seeking to (1)
reopen the case and/or consider the resolution of October 9, 1995 which denied his motion for
reconsideration, and (2) reconsider the October 13, 1995 resolution absolving the branch
clerk of the trial court from contempt charges.

In his omnibus motion, petitioner insists that he filed a record on appeal. As proof, he presents
a photocopy of the record on appeal allegedly received by the branch clerk of the trial court
bearing the handwritten notation "Received, 10-15-92, 3:45 PM" and the alleged initials of the
said clerk. Petitioner explains that the record on appeal does not have the RTC stamp
"Received" because the trial court does not use a stamp but receipt of pleadings is
acknowledged simply by nothing this fact by hand. Petitioner submitted certain pleadings filed
in the trial court which were acknowledged by the branch clerk in the same way he allegedly
acknowledged by the branch clerk in the same way he allegedly acknowledged receipt of
petitioner's record on appeal. These are the notice of appeal filed by petitioner on October 14,
1992 (Annex E, Omnibus Motion), Motion to Strike Out the Notice of Appeal with Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution filed by the private respondents (Annex G) and Comment filed
by another claimant (Solid Bank) dated May 26, 1995 (Annex H).
In addition, petitioner claims that the certifications by the clerks of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals that no record on appeal was filed are unreliable, that his record on appeal was
suppressed from the records of the case, and that the certification of the Court of Appeals that
no record on appeal was filed therein was to be expected because the record on appeal was
filed with the RTC and not with the Court of Appeals.
Commenting, private respondents contend that the Omnibus Motion is actually a second
motion for reconsideration which is not allowed by the rules since the issues raised therein
had been fully considered and passed upon by the Court and that there is no compelling
reason to grant the motion. They maintain that petitioner's appeal was not perfected because
of the non-filing of a record on appeal. Branch Clerk of court Antonio Valencia, on the other
hand, maintains that "no record on appeal was filed and therefore none could be found in the
expediente (records of the case)." He claims that the record on appeal allegedly filed in the
trial court could not have been unlawfully removed from the records because all pleadings
received by the court are immediately attached to the records. He denies that the signature
appearing on the alleged record on appeal was his.
Because of the serious ness of the petitioner's allegation that its record on appeal had been
suppressed, the Court on December 11, 1996, referred the question to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for investigation, report and recommendation.
On June 18, 1997, the OCA submitted its report and recommendation, the pertinent portions
of which state:ii[2]
In the formal investigation conducted (please see attached transcript) it was disclosed
that Atty. Antonio Valencia Jr. was appointed as the Clerk of Court V on June 18, 1992
and officially assumed office on July 1, 1992.
As the Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 31, it is his duty to exercise control and
supervision over the personnel of the said court; examines records of all cases filed
and calendared; issues court processes, prepares drafts of orders and other matters
which are assigned by the Judge Regino Verediano.
In their sala each personnel have their respective duties , from receipt of pleadings
that are being filed to their safekeeping. In no case is anyone allowed to interfere with
the duties of each personnel except under extreme urgency. Thus, receiving of
pleadings is normally entrusted to the receiving clerk and no one else. It is, as claimed
by Atty. Valencia, only in the absence of the said receiving clerk that other employees
are authorized to receive pleadings.
For his part, Atty. Valencia claims that he rarely receives pleadings since before it
reaches his table, the same are already duly received. Besides, it is not one of his
duties to receive pleadings.
With respect to the alleged receipt of the record on appeal by their office, specifically
to him, Atty. Valencia vehemently denied having received the same. First, because the
stroke of the alphabet indicating his initials is very different and so with the dates,
secondly, if it was actually received it could have been brought to attention of the late

Judge Verediano who thereafter would have made a notation of the same, like all other
pleadings received in their office or simply instruct the preparation of an order if
necessary and lastly, it would have been included in their court calendar as there was
a notice of hearing attached thereto.
In the court's calendar dated October 23, 1992, Sp. Proc. No. 35313 was never
scheduled for hearing. Under normal circumstances, if there was notice of hearing it
would be outrightly included in the court's calendar for October 23, 1992 as requested.
To substantiate the aforesaid allegations Atty. Valencia submitted copies of pleadings
filed relative to the subject case bearing the notation of then Judge Verediano and the
Court's calendar for October 22 and 23, 1992.
In addition, he pointed out that if the Notice of Appeal (Record on Appeal) was actually
filed in their sala, why was it raised for the first time only in PDIC's Motion for
Reconsideration. This according to him is suspicious. He even insinuated that nobody
could have done this (meaning inserted the notice of appeal [record on appeal] in their
pleadings) except the interested lawyer/s.
Moreover, Atty. Valencia vouches for the honesty and integrity of his staff, and if there
be a need for the examination of their signatures they would be very willing to go for a
specimen signature examination only to clear his/their names.
The office of the undersigned believes the claim of Atty. Valencia that no Notice of
Appeal [Record on Appeal] was filed at RTC Branch 31, Manila. As a CPA/lawyer, he was
very well aware of his duties and responsibilities as a Branch Clerk of Court. This is
evidenced by the fact that in his more than five (5) years stay as a Branch Clerk of
Court, no single administrative complaint has ever been lodged against him, be it a
harassment suit or otherwise.
Moreover, if it has been actually filed it would not have passed unnoticed by then
Judge Verediano who had to approve the same.
The undersigned is in accord with the claim of Atty. Valencia as presented by him to
Atty. Cunanan of this Office that indeed no record on appeal was filed by the counsels
of PDIC in the subject case, thus no administrative action should be taken against him.
(Memorandum dated June 5, 1997, pp. 1-2; Rollo, p. 538-539)
On July 23, 1997, after considering the report and it appearing that the investigation
conducted by the OCA was limited to hearing the evidence of the branch clerk of court and his
witnesses, the required the OCA to hear the evidence of petitioner that he had filed a record
on appeal but it was suppressed and, after considering that totality of the evidence presented,
to determine liability for any wrongful act committed, and to submit its findings and
recommendations.
On January 27, 1998, the OCA submitted its report and recommendation on the additional
investigation it conducted from which it appears that hearings were held on three dates; the
parties, through their counsel, were duly notified of the same; and that at the first scheduled
hearing on October 7, 1997, only Atty. Marino E. Eslao, counsel for private respondent,
appeared. In order to expidite the proceedings, he was allowed to present documentary
evidence without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to comment thereon. During the
hearing on November 5, 1997, the parties agreed to file position papers after the testimony of
branch clerk Atty. Valencia. On November 6, 1997, the respective testimonies of Atty. Valencia
and Atty. Pablo Romero, the sole witness for petitioner, were taken. In his report dated
December 1, 1997,iii[3] Senior Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez summarized the
evidence presented by the parties and his findings on the same, to wit:
Atty. Pablo Romero, Manager of R&L Litigation Center, PDIC testifies that he was the
one who prepared the subject Record on Appeal. He likewise confirmed the fact that
the President of the PDIC, Mr. Ernest Leung, Atty. Rosalinda Casiguran and he then
went to see Judge Veridiano and was informed by Atty. Valencia that he cannot find a
copy of the Record on Appeal which was allegedly filed. He cannot recall if Atty.

Valencia ever demanded from him a copy of said record (pp. 28-29, TSN dated
November 6, 1997). No other relevant information were given by Atty. Romero.
Atty. Antonio Valencia, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 31, Manila, was invited to
testify as to whether a Record on Appeal was actually filed before their court and the
same was duly received by him. He was examined by the parties, principally the
counsel for PDIC.
In his testimony, Atty. Valencia, reiterated his previous stand that he never saw a copy
of the Record on Appeal and he was positive that indeed there was no Record on
Appeal having been filed in his court. Counsel of PDIC however insinuated that record
on appeal might have been filed but the same was misplaced. Atty. Valencia assured
that "this is very remote". (TSN, p. 8, November 6, 1997).
He even stressed that when he was made earlier to comment on whether or not a
record on appeal was actually filed, he checked and double checked the original
records, inquired from the employees of RTC, Manila including the Judge whether they
have knowledge of any record on appeal which was filed in their sala but all answered
in the negative. (pp. 21 & 22, TSN, Nov. 6, 1997).
Moreover, he also firmly denied having received the alleged copy of the record on
appeal which was presented to him for identification during his direct testimony since
the signatures appearing therein are totally different from his actual signature (pp. 23,
TSN, November 6, 1997).
It is to be noted that the alleged duplicate original copy of the Notice of Appeal
[Record on Appeal] which is supposed to be with the counsels of PDIC was not
presented as evidence. In fact when the counsel of PDIC Atty. Romero was asked if the
PDIC employee who allegedly filed the Record on Appeal could testify he answered in
the negative and claimed that the said employee is already in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
No evidence was likewise presented to prove the same. No effort was exerted by PDIC
to prove the authenticity of the signature of Clerk of Court Valencia appearing in
PDIC's copy of the Record on Appeal.
It is also worthy to note that other than the bare testimony of Atty. Romero, no other
evidence were presented by petitioner PDIC to substantiate their claim that a Record
on Appeal was filed at the RTC of Manila and the same was duly received by Atty.
Valencia. The testimony was not even corroborated.
Be that as it may this Office still has to determine as to whether a Record on Appeal
was actually filed at the court a quo.
A review of the record impels a rejection of the petitioner's claim that a Record on
Appeal was filed.
The private respondent was able to present proof which are affirmative, unequivocal
convincing, and consistent. In fact the testimony alone of Atty. Valencia which was a
reiteration of his previous testimonies were very clear, concise, and moreover
consistent. For the record Atty. Valencia is viewed by the undersigned who personally
conducted the investigation as a plain, sincere and honest man who, not having been
shown of any reason to be bias or to favor any party, had no reason to deliberately tell
a falsehood relative to his official functions. The fact therefore that he submitted
himself to an investigatin twice and in different occassions shows his determination to
vindicate his honor by proving the integrity of the records of his office.
From all indications and as the records of the case will show NO RECORD ON APPEAL
was actually filed in the court a quo.
Apparently, RTC, Branch 31, Manila has an effective records management (system)
and it is improbable to have missed one important document (RECORD ON APPEAL). In
the absence of any convincing proof to the contrary, the regularity of official function
must be upheld.

Far from the assertions of the petitioner we conclude that there was no Record on
Appeal actually filed. (Memorandum dated December 11, 1997, pp. 3-5; Rollo, pp.
557-559)
The findings of the OCA are well taken.
In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is
given on the either side. Plaintiff must therefore establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence, i.e. evidence as a whole which is superior to that of the defendant. iv[4] In other
words, the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. v[5] In this case, petitioner, as
the party claiming affirmative relief from this Court by contending that he had filed a record
on appeal in the trial court, must discharge the burden of convincingly proving his claim. vi[6]
As found by the OCA, however, the evidence of the respondents even outweighs that of
petitioner. Private respondents presented proof which are affirmative, unequivocal,
convincing, and consistent that no record on appel had been filed. As the OCA noted,
petitioner not only failed to present the PDIC employee who allegedly filed on the record
appeal in the trial court but more importantly, he failed to prove the authenticity of the
alleged signature of Branch Clerk Antonio Valencia appearing in his copy of the record on
appeal.
The firm and consistent denial of the branch clerk that he was the one who received the
record on appeal and acknowledged its filing was disputed by petitioner. But petitioner's
witness, Atty. Romero, who allegedly prepared the said record did not file it in the trial court.
Nor did he have any personal knowledge of the actual filing of the record on appeal in the trial
court. According to Atty. Romero, the PDIC employee who allegedly filed the record on appeal
in the trial court could not testify because the said employee was already in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia. This allegation is not persuasive since no evidence was presented to prove the same. vii
[7]
Even the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner to prove the authenticity of the
signature of the branch clerk on the alleged duplicate original copy of the record on
appealviii[8] is not convincing. The signature and notation on the alleged duplicate original
copy of the record on appeal do not match the actual signature and handwriting of the branch
clerk as shown in the pleadings submitted by petitioner himself, namely, the notice of appeal
filed by petitioner (Annex E, Omnibus Motion), motion to strike out notice of appeal filed by
private respondents (Annex G) and comment filed by another claimant (Annex H). The branch
clerk's alleged signature and notation are markedly different from his signature and
handwriting appearing in the submitted documentary evidence. ix[9] For one, the branch
clerk's initial "AV" appear "HV" in the alleged duplicate original copy of the record. In addition,
numeral "5" was written with a rounded stroke instead of a sharp one. Clearly, petitioner
failed to discharge the required burden of proof. Hence, petitioner's assertion that he had filed
a record on appeal is not worthy of belief.
As regards petitioner's prayer that the Court reconsider its resolution of October 13, 1995
absolving the branch clerk of court of charges of wrongdoing, suffice it to state here that no
ground exists to impute bad faith on the part of the branch clerk. Good faith is presumed and
the complainant has the burden of proving any wrongdoing. x[10] Petitioner simply failed to
prove that the branch clerk either suppressed the record on appeal allegedly filed by
petitioner did not file the said record. The Court cannot find the branch clerk guilty of any
wrongdoing in certifying that petitioner failed to file a record on appeal in the trial court in the
face of petitioner's failure to adduce convincing proof that such a record was in fact filed
therein.
Also for consideration are two (2) manifestations and motions for clarification filed by the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). In its Manifestation/Motion dated May 20, 1996, LBP
alleges that on or about March 24, 1995, petitioner's deposit accounts in LBP were garnished
by Sheriff Carmelo Cachero in favor of private respondents pursuant to the writ of execution
issued by RTC Branch 31, Manila acting as the liquidation court; that on April 10, 1995, it
received from petitioner a copy of the April 7, 1995 order of this Court directing the parties to

maintain the status quo in the case; that on November 20, 1995, the Court issued another
resolution directing the parties to maintain the status quo until further orders; and that on
April 1, 1996, it received as request from the petitioner to transfer the garnished funds to a
different account maintained by petitioner in another branch of LBP. LBP seeks clarification
whether or not the garnishment of petitioner's deposit accounts on March 24, 1995 is null and
void considering the status quo orders issued by the Court. It further inquires whether or not it
may acquiesce to petitioner's request to transfer the garnished funds to petitioner's other
account in another branch of LBP. xi[11] In its Manifestation dated October 7, 1996, on the
other hand, LBP alleges that on September 9, 1996, it received from Sheriff Adolfo Garcia a
notice of garnishment over the same deposit accounts of petitioner implementing the writ of
execution issued also by the RTC, Branch 31, Manila, but for another claimant, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR); that on September 25, 1996, it wrote Sheriff Garcia informing him that
the accounts sought to be garnished were already garnished pursuant to the processes of the
same court for another claimant (herein private respondents); that on September 27, 1996, it
received a letter from petitioner urging it to effect the immediate release of the garnished
funds to the BIR and that on October 2, 1996, it received from Sheriff Garcia the order to
deliver to him the garnished amount of P179,971,860.13. LBP manifests that it is holding in
abeyance action on the order to Sheriff Garcia and the letter of petitioner until the incidents in
this case are finally resolved by this Court.xii[12]
These are matters largely relating to the execution of the decision of the trial court. As far as
this Court is concerned, its decision is now final and it no longer has any jurisdiction to pass
upon these incidents, not to mention the fact that the manifestation filed by LBP are in the
nature of consultation by one not a party to this case.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to DENY petitioner's Omnibus Motion for lack of merit.
The manifestations and motions dated May 20, 1996 and October 7, 1996 by the Land Bank of
the Philippines are NOTED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Melo, Puno, and Martinez, JJ., concur.

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