Art.1174.

Exceptincasesexpresslyspecifiedby
thelaw,orwhenitisotherwisedeclaredby
stipulation,orwhenthenatureoftheobligation
requirestheassumptionofrisk,nopersonshall
beresponsibleforthoseeventswhich,couldnot
beforeseen,orwhich,thoughforeseen,were
inevitable.
Elements:Theelementsofcasofortuitoare:
(1)Thecauseoftheunforeseenandunexpected
occurrence,orofthefailureofthedebtorto
complywithhisobligation,mustbeindependent
ofthehumanwill;
(2)Itmustbeimpossibletoforeseetheeventor
ifitcanbeforeseen,itmustbeimpossibleto
avoid;
(3)Theoccurrencemustbesuchastorenderit
impossibleforthedebtortofulfillhisobligation
inanormalmanner;and
(4)Theobligormustbefreefromany
participationintheaggravationoftheinjury
resultingtothecreditor.
NPCVSCA
Facts:
At the height of the typhoon Kading, a flash
flood covered the towns near the Angat Dam,
causing deaths and destructions to residents
and their properties. Respondents blamed the
tragedy to the reckless and imprudent opening
of the 3 floodgates by petitioner, without prior
warning to the residents within the vicinity of
the dam. Petitioners denied the allegations and
contended that they have kept the water at a
safe level, that the opening of floodgates was
done gradually, that it exercises diligence in the
selection of its employees, and that written
warnings were sent to the residents. It further
contended that there was no direct causal
relationship between the damage and the
alleged negligence on their part, that the
residents assumed the risk by living near the
dam, and that what happened was a fortuitous
event and are of the nature of damnum absque
injuria.

Issues:
(1) Whether the petitioner can be held liable
even though the coming of the typhoon is a
fortuitous event
(2) Whether a notice was sent to the residents
(3) Whether the damage suffered by
respondents is one of damnum absque
injuria
Held:
(1) The obligor cannot escape liability, if upon
the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of
God, a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay
or violation or contravention in any manner of
the tenor of the obligation as provided in
Article 1170 of the Civil Code which results in
loss or damage. Even if there was no
contractual relation between themselves and
private respondents, they are still liable under
the law on quasi-delict. Article 2176 of the Civil
Code explicitly provides "whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another there being
fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the
damage done." Act of God or force majeure, by
definition, are extraordinary events not
foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are
inevitable. It is therefore not enough that the
event should not have been foreseen or
anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it
must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid.
The principle embodied in the act of God
doctrine strictly requires that the act must be
occasioned solely by the violence of nature.
Human intervention is to be excluded from
creating or entering into the cause of the
mischief. When the effect is found to be in part
the result of the participation of man, whether
due to his active intervention or neglect or
failure to act, the whole occurrence is then
humanized and removed from the rules
applicable to the acts of God. In the case at bar,
although the typhoon "Kading" was an act of
God, petitioners can not escape liability
because their negligence was the proximate
cause of the loss and damage.
(2) The letter itself, addressed merely "TO ALL
CONCERNED", would not strike one to be of
serious importance, sufficient enough to set
alarm and cause people to take precautions for
their safety's sake. The notices were not
delivered, or even addressed to responsible
officials of the municipalities concerned who

could have disseminated the warning properly.

They were delivered to ordinary employees and
policemen. As it happened, the said notices do
not appear to have reached the people
concerned, which are the residents beside the
Angat River. The plaintiffs in this case
definitely did not receive any such warning.
Indeed, the methods by which the defendants
allegedly sent the notice or warning was so
ineffectual that they cannot claim, as they do in
their second assignment of error, that the
sending of said notice has absolved them from
liability.
(3) We cannot give credence to petitioners'
third assignment of error that the damage
caused by the opening of the dam was in the
nature of damnum absque injuria, which
presupposes that although there was physical
damage, there was no legal injury in view of the
fortuitous events. There is no question that
petitioners have the right, duty and obligation
to operate, maintain and preserve the facilities
of Angat Dam, but their negligence cannot be
countenanced, however noble their intention
may be. The end does not justify the means,
particularly because they could have done
otherwise than simultaneously opening the
spillways to such extent. Needless to say,
petitioners are not entitled to counterclaim.

SOUTHEASTERNCOLLEGEVSCA
Facts:
OnOctober11,1989,powerfultyphoonSaling
hitMetroManila.Buffetedbyverystrongwinds,
theroofofSoutheasternCollegesbuildingwas
partlyrippedoffandblownaway,landingonand
destroyingportionsoftheroofingofprivate
respondentsDimaanoshouse.
Privaterespondentallegedthatthedamagetotheir
houserenderedthesameuninhabitable,forcing
themtostaytemporarilyinothershouses.
Anocularinspectionofthedestroyedbuildingwas
conductedbyateamofengineersheadedbythecity
buildingofficial.Thefourthfloorofsubjectschool
buildingwasdeclaredasastructuralhazard.
Lowercourtawardeddamages.CAaffirmedbut
reduceddamages.
Issue:

WONthedamageofthePRshouseresultingfrom
theimpactofthefallingportionsoftheschool
buildingsroofrippedoffwasduetofortuitous
event?NO
Held:
Privaterespondents,inestablishingtheculpability
ofpetitioner,merelyreliedontheaforementioned
reportsubmittedbyateamwhichmadeanocular
inspectionofpetitionersschoolbuildingafterthe
typhoon.Asthetermimparts,anocularinspection
isonebymeansofactualsightorviewing.Whatis
visualtotheeyethroughisnotalwaysreflectiveof
therealcausebehind.
Petitionersobtainedapermitfromthecitybuilding
officialbeforetheconstructionofitsbuilding.
Havingobtainedbothbuildingpermitand
certificateofoccupancyisprimafacieevidenceof
theregularandproperconstructionofsubject
schoolbuilding.Whenpartofitsroofneeded
repairsofthedamageinflictedbytyphoonSaling,
thecityengineergavethegosignalforsuchrepairs
withoutanydeviationfromtheoriginaldesign.It
subsequentlyauthorizedtheuseoftheentirefourth
floorofthesamebuilding.Theseonlyprovethat
subjectbuildingsuffersfromnostructuraldefect.
Petitionerpresenteditsvicepresidentforfinance
andadministrationwhotestifiedthatanannual
maintenanceinspectionandrepairofsubjectschool
buildingwereregularlyundertaken.Petitionerwas
evenwillingtopresentitsmaintenancesupervisor
toattesttotheextentofsuchregularinspectionbut
privaterespondentsagreedtodispensewithhis
testimonyandsimplystipulatedthatitwouldbe
corroborativeofthevicepresidentsnarration.
Besides,nocomplaintregardinganydefectonthe
samestructurehaseverbeenlodgedbeforehis
officepriortotheinstitutionofthecaseatbench.It
isamatterofjudicialnoticethattyphoonsare
commonoccurrencesinthiscountry.Ifsubject
schoolbuildingsroofingwasnotfirmlyanchored
toitstrusses,obviously,itcouldnothavewithstood
longyearsandseveraltyphoonsevenstrongerthan
Saling.
Petitionerhasnotbeenshownnegligentoratfault
regardingtheconstructionandmaintenanceofits
schoolbuildinginquestionandthattyphoon
Salingwastheproximatecauseofthedamage
sufferedbyprivaterespondentshouse.

KRAMERVSCA
PRESCRIPTION
Art.1144.Thefollowingactionsmustbebrought
withintenyearsfromthetimetherightofaction
accrues:
Uponawrittencontract;
Uponanobligationcreatedbylaw;
Uponajudgment.
Art.1146.Thefollowingactionsmustbe
institutedwithinfouryears:
(1)Uponaninjurytotherightsoftheplaintiff;
(2)Uponaquasidelict;
However,whentheactionarisesfromoroutof
anyact,activity,orconductofanypublicofficer
involvingtheexerciseofpowersorauthority
arisingfromMartialLawincludingthearrest,
detentionand/ortrialoftheplaintiff,thesame
mustbebroughtwithinone(1)year.
Art.1150.Thetimeforprescriptionforallkinds
ofactions,whenthereisnospecialprovision
whichordainsotherwise,shallbecountedfrom
thedaytheymaybebrought.
Prescriptiveperiods:
4yearsforQD?1yearfordefamation
Itisclearthattheprescriptiveperiodmustbe
countedfromthetimeofthecommissionofan
actoromissionviolativeoftherightofthe
plaintiff,whichisthetimewhenthecauseof
actionarises.[Kramervs.CA(1989)]
RelationsBackDoctrine(footnote17ofAllied
Bankingcase):Thatprincipleoflawbywhichan
actdoneatonetimeisconsideredbyafictionof
lawtohavebeendoneatsomeantecedent
period.[AlliedBankingvs.CA(1989)]

The record of the case discloses that in the

early morning of April 8, 1976, the F/B
Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by the
petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta
Kramer, was navigating its way from
Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near
Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat
figured in a collision with an inter-island vessel,
the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private
respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As
a consequence of the collision, the F/B
Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch.
After the mishap, the captains of both vessels
filed their respective marine protests with the
Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast
Guard. The Board conducted an investigation
for the purpose of determining the proximate
cause of the maritime collision.
On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded
that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish
catch was attributable to the negligence of the
employees of the private respondent who were
on board the M/V Asia Philippines during the
collision. The findings made by the Board
served as the basis of a subsequent Decision
of the Commandant of the Philippine Coast
Guard dated April 29, 1982 wherein the second
mate of the M/V Asia Philippines was
suspended from pursuing his profession as a
marine officer. 1
On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a
Complaint for damages against the private
respondent before Branch 117 of the Regional
Trial Court in Pasay City. 2 The suit was
docketed as Civil Case No. 2907-P.
The private respondent filed a Motion seeking
the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of
prescription. He argued that under Article 1146
of the Civil Code, 3 the prescriptive period for
instituting a Complaint for damages arising
from a quasi-delict like a maritime collision is
four years. He maintained that the petitioners
should have filed their Complaint within four
years from the date when their cause of action
accrued, i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the
maritime collision took place, and that
accordingly, the Complaint filed on May 30,
1985 was instituted beyond the four-year
prescriptive period.
For their part, the petitioners contended that

maritime collisions have peculiarities and

characteristics which only persons with special
skill, training and experience like the members
of the Board of Marine Inquiry can properly
analyze and resolve. The petitioners argued
that the running of the prescriptive period was
tolled by the filing of the marine protest and
that their cause of action accrued only on April
29, 1982, the date when the Decision
ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the
M/V Asia Philippines had become final, and
that the four-year prescriptive period under
Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be
computed from the said date. The petitioners
concluded that inasmuch as the Complaint was
filed on May 30, 1985, the same was
seasonably filed.
In an Order dated September 25, 1986, 4 the
trial court denied the Motion filed by the private
respondent. The trial court observed that in
ascertaining negligence relating to a maritime
collision, there is a need to rely on highly
technical aspects attendant to such collision,
and that the Board of Marine Inquiry was
constituted pursuant to the Philippine Merchant
Marine Rules and Regulations, which took
effect on January 1, 1975 by virtue of Letter of
Instruction No. 208 issued on August 12, 1974
by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
precisely to answer the need. The trial court
went on to say that the four-year prescriptive
period provided in Article 1146 of the Civil
Code should begin to run only from April 29,
1982, the date when the negligence of the
crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had been
finally ascertained. The pertinent portions of
the Order of the trial court are as follows
Considering that the action concerns an
incident involving a collision at sea of two
vehicles and to determine negligence for that
incident there is an absolute need to rely on
highly technical aspects attendant to such
collisions. It is obviously to answer such a need
that the Marine Board of Inquiry (Sic) was
constituted pursuant to the Philippine Merchant
Marine Rules and Regulations which became
effective January 1, 1975 under Letter of
Instruction(s) No. 208 dated August 12, 1974.
The relevant section of that law (Art. XVI/b/
provided as follow(s):
1. Board of Marine Inquiry (BMI) Shall have
the jurisdiction to investigate marine accidents

or casualties relative to the liability of

shipowners and officers, exclusive jurisdiction
to investigate cases/complaints against the
marine officers; and to review all proceedings
or investigation conducted by the Special
Boards of Marine Inquiry.
2. Special Board of Marine Inquiry. Shall
have original jurisdiction to investigate marine
casualties and disasters which occur or are
committed within the limits of the Coast Guard
District concerned or those referred by the
Commandant.
The Court finds reason in the argument of the
plaintiff that marine incidents have those
'peculiarities which only persons of special
skill, training and exposure can rightfully
decipher and resolve on the matter of the
negligence and liabilities of parties involved
and inasmuch as the report of the Board of
Inquiry (sic) admittedly came out only on April
29, 1982, the prescriptive period provided x x x
under Art. 1146 of the Civil Code should begin
to run only from that date. The complaint was
filed with this Court on May 10, 1985, hence
the statute of limitations can not constitute a
bar to the filing of this case. 5
The private respondent elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals by way of a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition, alleging
therein that the trial court committed a grave
abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the
Complaint filed by the petitioners. The case
was assigned to the Second Division of the
appellate court and was docketed as Case No.
CA-G.R. SP No. 12032. 6
In a Decision dated November 27, 1987, 7 and
clarified in a Resolution dated January 12,
1988, 8 the Court of Appeals granted the
Petition filed by the private respondent and
ordered the trial court to dismiss the Complaint.
The pertinent portions of the Decision of the
appellate court are as follows
It is clear that the cause of action of private
respondent (the herein petitioners Ernesto
Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer) accrued from
the occurrence of the mishap because that is
the precise time when damages were inflicted
upon and sustained by the aggrieved party and
from which relief from the court is presently
sought. Private respondents should have
immediately instituted a complaint for damages
based on a quasi-delict within four years from

the said marine incident because its cause of

action had already definitely ripened at the
onset of the collision. For this reason, he (sic)
could cite the negligence on the part of the
personnel of the petitioner to exercise due care
and lack of (sic) diligence to prevent the
collision that resulted in the total loss of their x
x x boat.
We can only extend scant consideration to
respondent judge's reasoning that in view of
the nature of the marine collision that allegedly
involves highly technical aspects, the running
of the prescriptive period should only
commence from the finality of the investigation
conducted by the Marine Board of Inquiry (sic)
and the decision of the Commandant,
Philippine Coast Guard, who has original
jurisdiction over the mishap. For one, while it is
true that the findings and recommendation of
the Board and the decision of the Commandant
may be helpful to the court in ascertaining
which of the parties are at fault, still the former
(court) is not bound by said findings and
decision. Indeed, the same findings and
decision could be entirely or partially admitted,
modified, amended, or disregarded by the
court according to its lights and judicial
discretion. For another, if the accrual of a
cause of action will be made to depend on the
action to be taken by certain government
agencies, then necessarily, the tolling of the
prescriptive period would hinge upon the
discretion of such agencies. Said alternative it
is easy to foresee would be fraught with
hazards. Their investigations might be delayed
and lag and then witnesses in the meantime
might not be available or disappear, or certain
documents may no longer be available or
might be mislaid. ... 9
The petitioners filed a Motion for the
reconsideration of the said Decision but the
same was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated May 27, 1988. 10
Hence, the instant Petition wherein the
arguments raised by the petitioner before the
trial court are reiterated. 11 In addition thereto,
the petitioner contends that the Decision of the
Court of Appeals 12 The private respondent
filed its Comment on the Petition seeking
therein the dismissal of the same. 13 It is also
contended by the private respondent that the
ruling of the Court in Vasquez is not applicable

to the case at bar because the said case

involves a maritime collision attributable to a
fortuitous event. In a subsequent pleading, the
private respondent argues that the Philippine
Merchant Marine Rules and Regulations
cannot have the effect of repealing the
provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of
actions. 14
On September 19,1988, the Court resolved to
give due course to the petition. 15 After the
parties filed their respective memoranda, the
case was deemed submitted for decision.
The petition is devoid of merit. Under Article
1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a
quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4)
years. The prescriptive period begins from the
day the quasi-delict is committed. In Paulan vs.
Sarabia, 16 this Court ruled that in an action for
damages arising from the collision of two (2)
trucks, the action being based on a quasidelict, the four (4) year prescriptive period must
be counted from the day of the collision.
In Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans
Administration, 17 this Court held as followsThe right of action accrues when there exists a
cause of action, which consists of 3 elements,
namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part
of defendant to respect such right; and c) an
act or omission on the part of such defendant
violative of the right of the plaintiff ... It is only
when the last element occurs or takes place
that it can be said in law that a cause of action
has arisen ... .
From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the
prescriptive period must be counted when the
last element occurs or takes place, that is, the
time of the commission of an act or omission
violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the
time when the cause of action arises.
It is therefore clear that in this action for
damages arising from the collision of two (2)
vessels the four (4) year prescriptive period
must be counted from the day of the collision.
The aggrieved party need not wait for a
determination by an administrative body like a
Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was
caused by the fault or negligence of the other
party before he can file an action for damages.
The ruling in Vasquez does not apply in this
case. Immediately after the collision the

aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts

by alleging such negligence or fault of the
owners, agents or personnel of the other
vessel.
Thus, the respondent court correctly found that
the action of petitioner has prescribed. The
collision occurred on April 8, 1976. The
complaint for damages was filed iii court only
on May 30, 1 985, was beyond the four (4)
year prescriptive period.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No
costs.

DOUBLERECOVERY
Art.2177.Responsibilityforfaultornegligence
undertheprecedingarticleisentirelyseparate
anddistinctfromthecivilliabilityarisingfrom
negligenceunderthePenalCode.Butthe
plaintiffcannotrecoverdamagestwiceforthe
sameactoromissionofthedefendant.
Art.100,RPC.Civilliabilityofapersonguiltyof
felony.Everypersoncriminallyliablefora
felonyisalsocivillyliable.
Art.2177distinguishes2kindsofnegligence:
(1)Civiland
(2)Criminal.
Thesamenegligencecausingdamagemay
produceliabilityarisingfromcrime,iftheactor
omissionispunishedbytheRPC,ormaycreate
anactionforquasidelictundertheNCC.
Actionsavailabletovictimsofnegligence
(1)Anactiontoenforcethecivilliabilityarising
fromculpacriminalunderArt.100oftheRPC
(2)AnactionforquasidelictunderArt.2176
2194oftheNCC.
Theonlylimitationisthattheinjuredparty
cannotrecovertwiceforthesameactor
omission.

INVOLUNTARINESS
TYVSPP
Facts: Tys mother was confined in
Manila Doctor's Hospital to which a
medical bill amounting to 600,000 pesos
was made to be paid to TY, after signing
a contract of responsibility with the
hospital. Ty, issued 7 checks to cover the
said expenses, all of which were
dishonored for being drawn against a
closed a account. Manila Doctors Hospital
then instituted criminal actions against
Ty for violation of BP22.
In her defense she alleged that she
issued the checks involuntarily because
her mother threatened to commit suicide
due to the inhumane treatment she
allegedly suffered while confined in the
hospital. She further claimed that no
consideration was obtained by her
because all the checks were made as
payment to the medical bills.
the Court of Appeals rejected Tys defenses of
involuntariness in the issuance of the checks
and the hospitals knowledge of her checking
accounts lack of funds. It held that B.P. 22
makes the mere act of issuing a worthless
check punishable as a special offense, it being
a malum prohibitum. What the law punishes is
the issuance of a bouncing check and not the
purpose for which it was issued nor the terms
and conditions relating to its issuance
The law prescribes the presence of three
requisites to exempt the actor from liability
under this paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to
be avoided actually exists; (2) that the injury
feared be greater than the one done to avoid it;
(3) that there be no other practical and less
harmful means of preventing it.[
In the instant case, the evil sought to be
avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If
the evil sought to be avoided is merely
expected or anticipated or may happen in the
future, this defense is not applicable.[if !

supportFootnotes][33][endif]

Ty could have taken

advantage of an available option to avoid
committing a crime. By her own admission, she
had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of
security instead of postdated checks to secure
her obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity
to be availing, the greater injury feared should
not have been brought about by the negligence
or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of
the actor.] In this case, the issuance of the
bounced checks was brought about by Tys
own failure to pay her mothers hospital bills.
The Court also thinks it rather odd that Ty has
chosen the exempting circumstance of
uncontrollable fear and the justifying
circumstance of state of necessity to absolve
her of liability. It would not have been half as
bizarre had Ty been able to prove that the
issuance of the bounced checks was done
without her full volition. Under the
circumstances, however, it is quite clear that
neither uncontrollable fear nor avoidance of a
greater evil or injury prompted the issuance of
the bounced checks.
Parenthetically, the findings of fact in the
Decision of the trial court in the Civil Casefor
damages filed by Tys mother against the
hospital is wholly irrelevant for purposes of
disposing the case at bench. While the findings
therein may establish a claim for damages
which, we may add, need only be supported by
a preponderance of evidence, it does not
necessarily engender reasonable doubt as to
free Ty from liability

WAIVER
Art.6.Rightsmaybewaived,unlessthewaiver
iscontrarytolaw,publicorder,publicpolicy,
morals,orgoodcustomsorprejudicialtoathird
personwitharightrecognizedbylaw.
Art.1171.Responsibilityarisingfromfraudis
demandableinallobligations.Anywaiverofan
actionforfuturefraudisvoid.
GATCHALIANVSDELIM

Facts: Gatchalian boarded the respondents

Thames minibus at San Eugenio, Aringay, La
Union bound of the same province. On the
way, a snapping sound was suddenly heard at
one part of the bus and shortly thereafter, the
vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the
side of the road, went off the road and fell into
a ditch. Several passengers including the
petitioner was injured. They were taken into an
hospital for treatment. While there, private
respondents wife Adela Delim visited and paid
for the expenses, hospitalization and
transportation fees. However, before she left,
she had the injured passengers including the
petitioner sign an already prepared Joint
Affidavit constituting a waiver of any future
complaint. However, notwithstanding this
document, petitioner filed an action Ex
Contractu to recover compensatory and Actual
Damages. Private respondent denied liability
on the ground that it was an accident and the
Joint which constitutes as a waiver. The trial
court dismissed the complaint based on the
waiver and the CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not the private respondent
has successfully proved that he exercised
extraordinary diligence.
Held: The court held that they failed to prove
extraordinary diligence. After a snapping sound
was suddenly heard at one part of the bus, the
driver didnt even bother to stop and look f
anything had gone wrong with the bus. With
regard to the waiver, it must to be valid and
effective, couched in clear and unequivocal
terms which leave no doubt as to the intention
of the person to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him. In this case, such
waiver is not clear and unequivocal. When
petitioner signed the waiver, she was reeling
from the effects of the accident and while
reading the paper, she experienced dizziness
but upon seeing other passengers sign the
document, she too signed which bothering to
read to its entirety. There appears substantial
doubt whether the petitioner fully understood
the joint affidavit.

PLEASANTVILLEVSCA
Edith Robillo purchased from petitioner a
parcel of land designated as Lot 9, Phase II
and located at Taculing Road, Pleasantville
Subdivision, Bacolod City. In 1975, respondent
Eldred Jardinico bought the rights to the lot
from Robillo. At that time, Lot 9 was vacant.
Upon completing all payments, Jardinico
secured from the Register of Deeds of Bacolod
City on December 19, 1978 Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 106367 in his name. It was then
that he discovered that improvements had
been introduced on Lot 9 by respondent Wilson
Kee, who had taken possession thereof.
It appears that on March 26, 1974, Kee bought
on installment Lot 8 of the same subdivision
from C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI), the
exclusive real estate agent of petitioner. Under
the Contract to Sell on Installment, Kee could
possess the lot even before the completion of
all installment payments. On January 20, 1975,
Kee paid CTTEI the relocation fee of P50.00
and another P50.00 on January 27, 1975, for
the preparation of the lot plan. These amounts
were paid prior to Kees taking actual
possession of Lot 8. After the preparation of
the lot plan and a copy thereof given to Kee,
CTTEI through its employee, Zenaida
Octaviano, accompanied Kees wife, Donabelle
Kee, to inspect Lot 8. Unfortunately, the parcel
of land pointed by Octaviano was Lot 9.
Thereafter, Kee proceeded to construct his
residence, a store, an auto repair shop and
other improvements on the lot.
After discovering that Lot 9 was occupied by
Kee, Jardinico confronted him. The parties
tried to reach an amicable settlement, but
failed.
On January 30, 1981, Jardinicos lawyer wrote
Kee, demanding that the latter remove all
improvements and vacate Lot 9. When Kee
refused to vacate Lot 9, Jardinico filed with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3,
Bacolod City (MTCC), a complaint for
ejectment with damages against Kee.
Kee, in turn, filed a third-party complaint
against petitioner and CTTEI.
The MTCC held that the erroneous delivery of
Lot 9 to Kee was attributable to CTTEI. It
further ruled that petitioner and CTTEI could
not successfully invoke as a defense the failure

of Kee to give notice of his intention to begin

construction required under paragraph 22 of
the Contract to Sell on Installment and his
having built a sari-sari store without. the prior
approval of petitioner required under paragraph
26 of said contract, saying that the purpose of
these requirements was merely to regulate the
type of improvements to be constructed on the
lot[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif].
However, the MTCC found that petitioner had
already rescinded its contract with Kee over
Lot 8 for the latters failure to pay the
installments due, and that Kee had not
contested the rescission. The rescission was
effected in 1979, before the complaint was
instituted. The MTCC concluded that Kee no
longer had any right over the lot subject of the
contract between him and petitioner.
Consequently, Kee must pay reasonable
rentals for the use of Lot 9, and, furthermore,
he cannot claim reimbursement for the
improvements he introduced on said lot.
The MTCC thus disposed:
INVIEWOFALLTHEFOREGOING,judgment
isherebyrenderedasfollows:
1.DefendantWilsonKeeisorderedtovacatetithe
premisesofLot9,coveredbyTCTNo.106367and
toremoveallstructuresandimprovementshe
introducedthereon;
2.DefendantWilsonKeeisorderedtopaytothe
plaintiffrentalsattherateofP15.00aday
computedfromthetimethissuitwasfiledon
March12,1981untilheactuallyvacatesthe
premises.Thisamountshallbearinterests(sic)at
therateof12percent(sic)perannum.
3.ThirdPartyDefendantCT.TorresEnterprises,
Inc.andPleasantvilleSubdivisionareorderedto
paytheplaintiffjointlyandseverallythesumof
P3,000.00asattorneysfeesandP700.00ascostand
litigationexpenses.[if!supportFootnotes][4][endif]
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch
48, Bacolod City (RTC) ruled that petitioner
and CTTEI were not at fault or were not
negligent, there being no preponderant
evidence to show that they directly participated
in the delivery of Lot 9 to Kee.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
It found Kee a builder in bad faith. It further
ruled that even assuming arguendo that Kee
was acting in good faith, he was, nonetheless,
guilty of unlawfully usurping the possessory
right of Jardinico over Lot 9 from the time he

was served with notice to vacate said lot, and

thus was liable for rental.
The RTC thus disposed:
WHEREFORE,thedecisionappealedfromis
affirmedwithrespecttotheorderagainstthe
defendanttovacatethepremisesofLotNo.9
coveredbyTransferCertificateofTitleNo.T
106367ofthelandrecordsofBacolodCity;the
removalofallstructuresandimprovements
introducedthereonathisexpenseandthepayment
toplaintiff(sic)thesumofFifteen(P15.00)Pesos
adayasreasonablerentaltobecomputedfrom
January30,1981,thedateofthedemand,andnot
fromthedateofthefilingofthecomplaint,untilhe
hadvacated(sic)thepremises,withinterestthereon
at12%perannum.ThisCourtfurtherrenders
judgmentagainstthedefendanttopaytheplaintiff
thesumofThreeThousand(P3,000.00)Pesosas
attorneysfees,pluscostsoflitigation.
ThethirdpartycomplaintagainstThirdParty
DefendantsPleasantvilleDevelopmentCorporation
andC.T.TorresEnterprises,Inc.isdismissed.The
orderagainstThirdPartyDefendantstopay
attorneysfeestoplaintiffandcostsoflitigationis
reversed.[if!supportFootnotes][6][endif]
Following the denial of his motion for
reconsideration on October 20, 1986, Kee
appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which
referred the matter to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court ruled that Kee was a
builder in good faith, as he was unaware of the
mix-up when he began construction of the
improvements on Lot 8. It further ruled that the
erroneous delivery was due to the negligence
of CTTEI, and that such wrong delivery was
likewise imputable to its principal, petitioner
herein. The appellate court also ruled that the
award of rentals was without basis.
Thus, the Court of Appeals disposed:
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisGRANTED,the
appealeddecisionisREVERSED,andjudgmentis
renderedasfollows:
1. Wilson Kee is declared a builder in good
faith with respect to the improvements he
introduced on Lot 9, and is entitled to the rights
granted him under Articles 448, 546 and 548 of
the New Civil Code.
2. Third-party defendants C.T. Torres
Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville
Development Corporation are solidarily liable

under the following circumstances:

a.IfEldredJardinicodecidestoappropriatethe
improvementsand,thereafter,removethese
structures,thethirdpartydefendantsshallanswer
foralldemolitionexpensesandthevalueofthe
improvementsthusdestroyedorrendereduseless;
b.IfJardinicoprefersthatKeebuytheland,the
thirdpartydefendantsshallanswerfortheamount
representingthevalueofLot9thatKeeshouldpay
toJardinico.
3. Third-party defendants C.T. Torres
Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville
Development Corporation are ordered to pay
in solidum the amount of P3,000.00 to
Jardinico as attorneys fees, as well as litigation
expenses.
4. The award of rentals to Jardinico is
dispensed with.
Furthermore,thecaseisREMANDEDtothecourt
oforiginforthedeterminationoftheactualvalueof
theimprovementsandtheproperty(Lot9),aswell
asforfurtherproceedingsinconformitywith
Article448oftheNewCivilCode.[if!supportFootnotes][7]
[endif]

Petitioner then filed the instant petition against

Kee, Jardinico and CTTEI.
The Issues
The petition submitted the following grounds to
justify a review of the respondent Courts
Decision, as follows:
1.TheCourtofAppealshasdecidedthecaseina
wayprobablynotinaccordwithlaworthethe(sic)
applicabledecisionsoftheSupremeCourtonthird
partycomplaints,byorderingthirdpartydefendants
topaythedemolitionexpensesand/orpriceofthe
land;
2.TheCourtofAppealshassofardepartedfrom
theacceptedcourseofjudicialproceedings,by
grantingtoprivaterespondentKeetherightsofa
builderingoodfaithinexcessofwhatthelaw
provides,thusenrichingprivaterespondentKeeat
theexpenseofthepetitioner;
3.Inthelightofthesubsequenteventsor
circumstanceswhichchangedtherightsofthe
parties,itbecomesimperativetosetasideoratleast
modifythejudgmentoftheCourtofAppealsto
harmonizewithjusticeandthefacts;
4.PrivaterespondentKeeinaccordancewiththe
findingsoffactsofthelowercourtisclearlya
builderinbadfaith,havingviolatedseveral

provisionsofthecontracttoselloninstallments;
5.ThedecisionoftheCourtofAppeals,holdingthe
principal,PleasantvilleDevelopmentCorporation
(liable)fortheactsmadebytheagentinexcessof
itsauthorityisclearlyinviolationoftheprovision
ofthelaw;
6.Theawardofattorneysfeesisclearlywithout
basisandisequivalenttoputtingapremiumin(sic)
courtlitigation.
From these grounds, the issues could be restated as follows:
(1)WasKeeabuilderingoodfaith?
(2)Whatistheliability,ifany,ofpetitionerandits
agent,C.T.TorresEnterprises,Inc.?and
(3)Istheawardofattorneysfeesproper?
The First Issue: Good Faith
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals
erred in reversing the RTCs ruling that Kee
was a builder in bad faith.
Petitioner fails to persuade this Court to
abandon the findings and conclusions of the
Court of Appeals that Kee was a builder in
good faith. We agree with the following
observation of the Court of Appeals:
Therootsofthecontroversycanbetraceddirectly
totheerrorscommittedbyCTTEI,whenitpointed
thewrongpropertytoWilsonKeeandhiswife.Itis
highlyimprobablethatapurchaserofalotwould
knowinglyandwillinglybuildhisresidenceonalot
ownedbyanother,deliberatelyexposinghimself
andhisfamilytotheriskofbeingejectedfromthe
landandlosingallimprovementsthereon,notto
mentionthesocialhumiliationthatwouldfollow.
Underthecircumstances,Keehadactedinthe
mannerofaprudentmaninascertainingtheidentity
ofhisproperty.Lot8iscoveredbyTransfer
CertificateofTitleNo.T69561,whileLot9is
identifiedinTransferCertificateofTitleNo.T
106367.Hence,undertheTorrenssystemofland
registration,Keeispresumedtohaveknowledgeof
themetesandboundsofthepropertywithwhichhe
isdealing.xxx
xxx xxx xxx
ButasKeeisalaymannotversedinthetechnical
descriptionofhisproperty,hehadtofindawayto
ascertainthatwhatwasdescribedinTCTNo.
69561matchedLot8.Thus,hewenttothe
subdivisiondevelopersagentandappliedandpaid
fortherelocationofthelot,aswellasforthe
productionofalotplanbyCTTEIsgeodetic

engineer.UponKeesreceiptofthemap,hiswife
wenttothesubdivisionsiteaccompaniedby
CTTEIsemployee,Octaviano,whoauthoritatively
declaredthatthelandshewaspointingtowas
indeedLot8.Havingfullfaithandconfidencein
thereputationofCTTEI,andbecauseofthe
companyspositiveidentificationoftheproperty,
Keesawnoreasontosuspectthattherehadbeena
misdelivery.ThestepsKeehadtakentoprotecthis
interestswerereasonable.Therewasnoneedfor
himtohaveactedexabundantiacautela,suchas
beingpresentduringthegeodeticengineers
relocationsurveyorhiringanindependentgeodetic
engineertocountercheckforerrors,forthefinal
deliveryofsubdivisionlotstotheirownersispartof
theregularcourseofeverydaybusinessofCTTEI.
BecauseofCTTEIsblunder,whatKeehadhopedto
forestalldidinfacttranspire.Keeseffortsallwent
tonaught.[if!supportFootnotes][8][endif]
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder
that the land he is building on is his and his
ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. [if !
supportFootnotes][9][endif]
And as good faith is presumed,
petitioner has the burden of proving bad faith
on the part of Kee.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
At the time he built improvements on Lot 8,
Kee believed that said lot was what he bought
from petitioner. He was not aware that the lot
delivered to him was not Lot 8. Thus, Kees
good faith. Petitioner failed to prove otherwise.
To demonstrate Kees bad faith, petitioner
points to Kees violation of paragraphs 22 and
26 of the Contract of Sale on Installment.
We disagree. Such violations have no bearing
whatsoever on whether Kee was a builder in
good faith, that is, on his state of mind at the
time he built the improvements on Lot 9. These
alleged violations may give rise to petitioners
cause of action against Kee under the said
contract (contractual breach), but may not be
bases to negate the presumption that Kee was
a builder in good faith.
Petitioner also points out that, as found by the
trial court, the Contract of Sale on Installment
covering Lot 8 between it and Kee was
rescinded long before the present action was
instituted. This has no relevance on the liability
of petitioner, as such fact does not negate the
negligence of its agent in pointing out the
wrong lot to Kee. Such circumstance is
relevant only as it gives Jardinico a cause of

action for unlawful detainer against Kee.

Petitioner next contends that Kee cannot claim
that another lot was erroneously pointed out to
him because the latter agreed to the following
provision in the Contract of Sale on Installment,
to wit:
13.TheVendeeherebydeclaresthatpriortothe
executionofhiscontracthe/shehaspersonally
examinedorinspectedthepropertymadesubject
matterhereof,astoitslocation,contours,aswellas
thenaturalconditionofthelotsandfromthedate
hereofwhateverconsequentialchangethereinmade
duetoerosion,thesaidVendeeshallbearthe
expensesofthenecessaryfillings,whenthesameis
sodesiredbyhim/her.[if!supportFootnotes][11][endif]
The subject matter of this provision of the
contract is the change of the location, contour
and condition of the lot due to erosion. It
merely provides that the vendee, having
examined the property prior to the execution of
the contract, agrees to shoulder the expenses
resulting from such change.
We do not agree with the interpretation of
petitioner that Kee contracted away his right to
recover damages resulting from petitioners
negligence. Such waiver would be contrary to
public policy and cannot be allowed. Rights
may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to
law, public order, public policy, morals, or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
The Second Issue: Petitioners Liability
Kee filed a third-party complaint against
petitioner and CTTEI, which was dismissed by
the RTC after ruling that there was no evidence
from which fault or negligence on the part of
petitioner and CTTEI can be inferred. The
Court of Appeals disagreed and found CTTEI
negligent for the erroneous delivery of the lot
by Octaviano, its employee.
Petitioner does not dispute the fact that CTTEI
was its agent. But it contends that the
erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was an act
which was clearly outside the scope of its
authority, and consequently, CTTEI alone
should be liable. It asserts that while [CTTEI]
was authorized to sell the lot belonging to the
herein petitioner, it was never authorized to
deliver the wrong lot to Kee.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
Petitioners contention is without merit.
The rule is that the principal is responsible for

the acts of the agent, done within the scope of

his authority, and should bear the damage
caused to third persons.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] On
the other hand, the agent who exceeds his
authority is personally liable for the damage. [if !
supportFootnotes][15][endif]

CTTEI was acting within its authority as the

sole real estate representative of petitioner
when it made the delivery to Kee. In acting
within its scope of authority, it was, however,
negligent. It is this negligence that is the basis
of petitioners liability, as principal of CTTEI, per
Articles 1909 and 1910 of the Civil Code.
Pending resolution of the case before the Court
of Appeals, Jardinico and Kee on July 24, 1987
entered into a deed of sale, wherein the former
sold Lot 9 to Kee. Jardinico and Kee did not
inform the Court of Appeals of such deal.
The deed of sale contained the following
provision:
1.ThatCivilCaseNo.3815entitledJardinicovs.
KeewhichisnowpendingappealwiththeCourtof
Appeals,regardlessoftheoutcomeofthedecision
shallbemutuallydisregardedandshallnotbe
pursuedbythepartieshereinandshallbe
considereddismissedandwithouteffect
whatsoever;[if!supportFootnotes][16][endif]
Kee asserts though that the terms and
conditions in said deed of sale are strictly for
the parties thereto and that (t)here is no waiver
made by either of the parties in said deed of
whatever favorable judgment or award the
honorable respondent Court of Appeals may
make in their favor against herein petitioner
Pleasantville Development Corporation and/or
private respondent C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc.
[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]

Obviously, the deed of sale can have no effect

on the liability of petitioner. As we have earlier
stated, petitioners liability is grounded on the
negligence of its agent. On the other hand,
what the deed of sale regulates are the
reciprocal rights of Kee and Jardinico; it
stressed that they had reached an agreement
independent of the outcome of the case.
Petitioner further assails the following holding
of the Court of Appeals:
2.ThirdpartydefendantsC.T.TorresEnterprises,
Inc.andPleasantvilleDevelopmentCorporationare
solidarilyliableunderthefollowingcircumstances:
a.IfEldredJardinicodecidestoappropriatethe

improvementsand,thereafter,removethese
structures,thethirdpartydefendantsshallanswer
foralldemolitionexpensesandthevalueofthe
improvementsthusdestroyedorrendereduseless;
b.IfJardinicoprefersthatKeebuytheland,the
thirdpartydefendantsshallanswerfortheamount
representingthevalueofLot9thatKeeshouldpay
toJardinico.[if!supportFootnotes][18][endif]
Petitioner contends that if the above holding
would be carried out, Kee would be unjustly
enriched at its expense. In other words, Kee
would be -able to own the lot, as buyer, without
having to pay anything on it, because the
aforequoted portion of respondent Courts
Decision would require petitioner and CTTEI
jointly and solidarily to answer or reimburse
Kee there for.
We agree with petitioner.
Petitioners liability lies in the negligence of its
agent CTTEI. For such negligence, the
petitioner should be held liable for damages.
Now, the extent and/or amount of damages to
be awarded is a factual issue which should be
determined after evidence is adduced.
However, there is no showing that such
evidence was actually presented in the trial
court; hence no damages could now be
awarded.
The rights of Kee and Jardinico vis-a-vis each
other, as builder in good faith and owner in
good faith, respectively, are regulated by law
(i.e., Arts. 448, 546 and 548 of the Civil Code).
It was error for the Court of Appeals to make a
slight modification in the application of such
law, on the ground of equity. At any rate, as it
stands now, Kee and Jardinico have amicably
settled through their deed of sale their rights
and obligations with regards to Lot 9. Thus, we
delete items 2 (a) and (b) of the dispositive
portion of the Court of Appeals Decision [as
reproduced above] holding petitioner and
CTTEI solidarily liable.
The Third Issue: Attorneys Fees
The MTCC awarded Jardinico attorneys fees
and costs in the amount of P3,000.00 and
P700.00, respectively, as prayed for in his
complaint. The RTC deleted the award,
consistent with its ruling that petitioner was
without fault or negligence. The Court of
Appeals, however, reinstated the award of
attorneys fees after ruling that petitioner was

liable for its agents negligence.

The award of attorneys fees lies within the
discretion of the court and depends upon the
circumstances of each case.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
We shall not interfere with the discretion of the
Court of Appeals. Jardinico was compelled to
litigate for the protection of his interests and for
the recovery of damages sustained as a result
of the negligence of petitioners agent. [if !
supportFootnotes][20][endif]

In sum, we rule that Kee is a builder in good

faith. The disposition of the Court of Appeals
that Kee is entitled to the rights granted him
under Articles 448, 546 and 548 of the New
Civil Code is deleted, in view of the deed of
sale entered into by Kee and Jardinico, which
deed now governs the rights of Jardinico and
Kee as to each other. There is also no further
need, as ruled by the appellate Court, to
remand the case to the court of origin for
determination of the actual value of the
improvements and the property (Lot 9), as well
as for further proceedings in conformity with
Article 448 of the New Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(1) Wilson Kee is declared a builder in good
faith;
(2) Petitioner Pleasantville Development
Corporation and respondent C.T. Tones
Enterprises, Inc. are declared solidarily liable
for damages due to negligence; however, since
the amount and/or extent of such damages
was not proven during the trial, the same
cannot now be quantified and awarded;
(3) Petitioner Pleasantville Develpment
Corporation and respondent C.T. Torres
Enterprises, Inc. are ordered to pay in solidum
the amount of P3,000.00 to Jardinico as
attorneys fees, as well as litigation expenses;
and
(4) The award of rentals to Jardinico is
dispensed with.
SO ORDERED.

IMMUNITYOFPUBLICOFFICIALS
CONTRIBUTORYNEGLIGENCE

CONTRIBUTORYNEGLIGENCEConducton
thepartoftheinjuredparty,whichcontributed
asalegalcausetotheharmhehassuffered,
whichfallsbelowthestandardtowhichheis
requiredtoconformforhisownprotection.
[Valenzuelavs.CA(1996)]Contributory
negligencedoesnotdefeatanactionifitcanbe
shownthatthedefendantmight,bytheexercise
ofreasonablecareandprudence,haveavoided
theconsequencesoftheinjuredparty's
negligence.Petitionersnegligencecontributed
onlytohisowninjuryandnottotheprincipal
occurrenceitwasmerelyanelementtothe
damagecauseduponhim.
.

.
.

Notexculpatorybutresultsinreduction
ofdamages.[MHRakesvs.Atlantic
(1907)]
WHENISITABARTORECOVERY?
Onlywhentheproximatecauseisonthe
partoftheplaintiff.Wheretheplaintiff
contributestotheprincipaloccurrence,as
oneofitsdeterminingfactors,hecannot
recover.Where,inconjunctionwiththe
occurrence,hecontributesonlytohisown
injury,hemayrecovertheamountthat
thedefendantresponsiblefortheevent
shouldpayforsuchinjury,lessasum
deemedasuitableequivalentforhisown
imprudence.

Doctrineoflastclearchancedoesnotseemto
havearoletoplayinajurisdictionwherethe
commonlawconceptofcontributorynegligence
asanabsolutebartorecoverybytheplaintiff,
hasitselfbeenrejected,asithasbeenin2179of
CC.[Phoenixvs.IAC(1987)]
.

Thedoctrineoflastclearchancestates
thatwherebothpartiesarenegligentbut
thenegligentactofoneisappreciably
laterthanthatoftheother,orwhereitis
impossibletodeterminewhosefaultor
negligencecausedtheloss,theonewho
hadthelastclearopportunitytoavoidthe
lossbutfailedtodoso,ischargeablewith

theloss.Theantecedentnegligenceofthe
plaintiffdoesnotprecludehimfrom
recoveringdamagescausedbythe
superveningnegligenceofthedefendant,
whohadthelastfairchancetoprevent
the
impendingharmbytheexerciseofdue
diligence.[

PHOENIXCONSTRUCTIONVSCA
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975,
private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on
his way home from cocktails and dinner
meeting with his boss. He was proceeding
down General Lacuna Street when he saw a
Ford dump truck parked askew, partly blocking
the way of oncoming traffic, with no lights or
early warning reflector devices. The truck was
driven earlier by Armando Carbonel, a regular
driver of the petitioner company. Dionisio tried
to swerve his car to the left, but it was too late.
He suffered some physical injuries and nervous
breakdown. Dionision filed an action for
damages against Carbonel and Phoenix
Insurance. Petitioners countered the claim by
imputing the accident to respondents own
negligence in driving at high speed without
curfew pass and headlights, and while
intoxicated. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent.
Issue:
Whether the collision was brought about by the
way the truck was parked, or by respondents
own negligence
Held:
We find that private respondent Dionisio was
unable to prove possession of a valid curfew
pass during the night of the accident and that
the preponderance of evidence shows that he
did not have such a pass during that night. It is
the petitioners' contention that Dionisio
purposely shut off his headlights even before
he reached the intersection so as not to be
detected by the police in the police precinct
which he (being a resident in the area) knew
was not far away from the intersection. We
believe that the petitioners' theory is a more
credible explanation than that offered by

private respondent Dionisio, i.e., that he had

his headlights on but that, at the crucial
moment, these had in some mysterious if
convenient way malfunctioned and gone off,
although he succeeded in switching his lights
on again at "bright" split seconds before
contact with the dump truck. We do not believe
that this evidence is sufficient to show that
Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of
liquor as to constitute his driving a motor
vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence.
The conclusion we draw from the factual
circumstances outlined above is that private
respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of
the accident. He was hurrying home that night
and driving faster than he should have been.
Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or
near the intersection of General Lacuna and
General Santos Streets and thus did not see the
dump truck that was parked askew and sticking
out onto the road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First
Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court
that the legal and proximate cause of the
accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the
wrongful or negligent manner in which the
dump truck was parked in other words, the
negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The collision
of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a
natural and foreseeable consequence of the
truck driver's negligence.
The distinctions between "cause" and
"condition" which the 'petitioners would have
us adopt have already been "almost entirely
discredited. If the defendant has created only a
passive static condition which made the
damage possible, the defendant is said not to
be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is
concerned, in the sense of necessary
antecedents which have played an important
part in producing the result it is quite
impossible to distinguish between active forces
and passive situations, particularly since, as is
invariably the case, the latter are the result of
other active forces which have gone before.
Even the lapse of a considerable time during
which the "condition" remains static will not
necessarily affect liability. "Cause" and
"condition" still find occasional mention in the
decisions; but the distinction is now almost
entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity
at all, it must refer to the type of case where the

forces set in operation by the defendant have

come to rest in a position of apparent safety,
and some new force intervenes. But even in
such cases, it is not the distinction between
"cause" and "condition" which is important but
the nature of the risk and the character of the
intervening cause.
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's
negligence far from being a "passive and static
condition" was rather an indispensable and
efficient cause. The improper parking of the
dump truck created an unreasonable risk of
injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna
Street and for having so created this risk, the
truck driver must be held responsible. In our
view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in
point of time than the truck driver's negligence
and therefore closer to the accident, was not an
efficient intervening or independent cause.
The defendant cannot be relieved from liability
by the fact that the risk or a substantial and
important part of the risk, to which the
defendant has subjected the plaintiff has
indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening
forces are within the scope original risk, and
hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts
are quite generally agreed that intervening
causes which fall fairly in this category will not
supersede the defendant's responsibility. Thus,
a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces
the plaintiff to walk in a street where the
plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy
traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run
down by a car, even though the car is
negligently driven; and one who parks an
automobile on the highway without lights at
night is not relieved of responsibility when
another negligently drives into it. We hold that
private respondent Dionisio's negligence was
"only contributory," that the "immediate and
proximate cause" of the injury remained the
truck driver's "lack of due care" and that
consequently respondent Dionisio may recover
damages though such damages are subject to
mitigation by the courts.
Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer
to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The
common law notion of last clear chance
permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff
who had also been negligent provided that the
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the
casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is

difficult to see what role, if any, the common

law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a
jurisdiction where the common law concept of
contributory negligence as an absolute bar to
recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been
rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article
2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is
to determine whose negligence - the plaintiff's
or the defendant's - was the legal or proximate
cause of the injury. The relative location in the
continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the
defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only
one of the relevant factors that may be taken
into account. Of more fundamental importance
are the nature of the negligent act or omission
of each party and the character and gravity of
the risks created by such act or omission for the
rest of the community. Our law on quasi-delicts
seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living
in society and to allocate them among the
members of society. To accept the petitioners'
pro-position must tend to weaken the very
bonds of society.
We believe that the demands of substantial
justice are satisfied by allocating most of the
damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the
damages awarded by the respondent appellate
court, except the award of P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as
attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by
private respondent Dionisio; only the balance
of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners
Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity
liable therefor to the former. The award of
exemplary damages and attorney's fees and
costs shall be borne exclusively by the

petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to

reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no
sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced
award of damages made by the respondent
appellate court.

GENOBIAGONVSCA
The alleged contributory negligence of
the victim, if any, does not exonerate the
accused. "The defense of contributory
negligence does not apply in criminal
cases committed through reckless
imprudence, since one cannot allege the
negligence of another to evade the
effects of his own negligence.
Chapter VI: Intentional Torts
- There is no duty to exercise due
care or diligence.
-

Done with the intention to inflict

the damage

Abuse of Right (Article 19 CC)

Requirements:
1. There is an existing right
2. It is exercised in bad faith
3. The intention is to prejudice
another