Maoist Butchers of Dantewada

April 6, 2010 will be saddest day in the history of our police force, CRPF to
be more specific. 75 jawans laid down their precious lives in the forests of
Dantewada in Chattisgarh fighting the dreaded Maoists. It was
unprecedented and completely unexpected in spite of the fact that the forces
were not very familiar with the terrain of the guerrilla warfare. I am sure
there would be full enquiry into the incident and truth would come out
regarding the details of the incident.

This is not the time for finger pointing and yet a rewinding of events would
definitely be necessary for complete analysis for avoiding future casualty in
the bitter battles that lay ahead. I am sure the central & state governments
and top DG level officers would take the stock and take necessary measures
to equip our forces adequately. Nevertheless, a common man like me, not
any expert in war fares, would definitely reflect on the basics.

Strategic Review:

There are three major questions which come to my mind for stock taking.

First is that why there is still no suo motu announcement of a

comprehensive and pre-emptive package for tribal areas and the Maoist belts
so that the basic issues get addressed for welfare of the tribes coupled with
development of the areas. Offer for talks has been announced but there is no
response from the Maoists.

Second question is about the political patronage extended to the Maoists by

some parties which is encouraging them. There must be broad political
consensus for unified approach to resolve this problem.

The third question is about rear guard actions and security of the formation
itself while camping in the jungles. What about the intelligence inputs and
connectivity with the command? What was the strategy for self defense if
any?

One gets a feeling that there has been inadequacy in strategic planning,
gathering & monitoring of intelligence inputs and operational quick footed
rapid action preparedness in totally alien jungles. One does not have to be
right or wrong in retrospect but some elementary questions need to be
answered. We have shown restraint in using air force and other military
wings as the war is with our own citizens and dissatisfied groups. While
politically that is right, no doubt, nothing stopped us from picking the
strategic brains of military planners who are well trained in warfare
techniques.

Our police forces have shown in Punjab that, given the leadership and
resources, they could root out terrorism and therefore one must hold them in
high esteem for their competence. Similar approach, training and
commitment to succeed are required to tackle the Maoists.

The Maoists have modernized themselves from the bow & arrows of early
sixties to fairly modern equipment as is obvious from news reports coming
out. Our police force is possibly not fully modernized to tackle modern day
form of terrorism, be it internal or external. In what way the Maoists have
been different in the end results than terrorists of Indian Mujahideens funded
from overseas and manned by Indian personnel? Maoists have also been
getting overseas support. So while political sensitivities of using military or
air force has to be kept in mind, I think the Maoists have pushed too far for
soft approach any more. While we may accuse them of “cowardice”, they
may be thinking the same way about ability of our establishment to take
action against them.

Redefining National Security:

Our police forces are trained more in peace keeping, law & order operations
and not in warfare except round the street corners. On 26/11, we had to fly in
NSG commandos though police force held on bravely. In last ten years the
words “national security” have been redefined completely. In future
there may not be any conventional wars. “Internalizing” the external
security threats to a nation is the name of the game. That is what
Pakistan is doing to us. Supporters of Maoists are also in the same
league. Let us change the gears please.

Pragmatic Approach:

In what way the Maoists are any different than the terrorists entering
Kashmir Valley except their nationality? Why the police force is not
adequate in Kashmir to tackle the militants, needing army to be in
command? It is obvious that certain skills and experience which is called for
handling the job is not adequately available with the police force. That is the
reason why army is deployed in Kashmir Valley.

It is time that we take pragmatic steps to enlist the behind-the-scene support

of the army for strategic inputs and techniques. Don’t we induct army, navy
& air force for rescue operations, air dropping food and airlifting people
stuck on the roof tops when the rivers are flooded? Don’t our politicians go
around in helicopters to survey the flooded areas? So why are we shy,
Mr.Home Minister, to provide air cover to our police force? What if an
aircraft will warn Maoists of presence of police force? Let them know that
police force is after them. Let them run for life or the negotiating table.

We don’t have to use Bofors guns and stealth bombers against the Maoists
but we can provide adequate strategic inputs, warfare training, safety and
logistic support to the police force to bridge the gaps. Or else it may be the
case of a bridge too far!

Vijay M. Deshpande
Corporate Advisor,
Strategic Management Initiative,
Pune

April 9, 2010

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