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A Straussian Question to New Testament Theology

Robert C. Morgan
New Testament Studies / Volume 23 / Issue 03 / April 1977, pp 243 - 265
DOI: 10.1017/S0028688500010493, Published online: 05 February 2009

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0028688500010493

How to cite this article:
Robert C. Morgan (1977). A Straussian Question to New Testament Theology. New
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Mew Test. Stud. 23, pp. 243-265

ROBERT MORGAN

A STRAUSSIAN QUESTION TO
'NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY'
David Friedrich Strauss died on 8 February 1874. His Lebenjesu of 1835 was
said by Albert Schweitzer to be ' no mere destroyer of untenable solutions,
but also the prophet of a coming advance in knowledge',1 namely eschatology. The claims that it 'has a different significance for modern theology
from that which it had for his contemporaries ' 2 and that i t ' marked out the
ground which is now occupied by modern critical study ' 3 appear even more
true in the light of subsequent history of religions and form-critical research
than Schweitzer himself realized. But as well as marking an epoch in the
historical critical study of the New Testament, this book, and with it the fate
of its author, remains a symbol of something else: the tension between historical research and the formation of a systematic or doctrinal theological
position. Ecclesiastical authorities have in the meantime learned to live with
theological pluralism and become more tolerant, but the problem itself has
not disappeared. The investigation and development of Strauss' generally
unappreciated contribution is perhaps an appropriate centenary celebration.4
The book owed its impact and Strauss his short-term infamy and long-term
fame to the powerful blow struck for the legitimacy of a radical historical
criticism of the gospels. The critical conclusions were not particularly original
but were here made inescapable.5 The historical critical study of the New
Testament now began the period of its revolutionary impact within Christian
theology. Despite possible reservations about Strauss' mechanistic worldview6 the essential points of his critical position have become commonplace.
The supernaturalism which he considered impossible in the modern world is
no longer a presupposition which guides the historical investigation of the
gospels.7 Strauss' classification of the miracle narratives as 'myth' might
1

Von Reimarus zu Wrede (1906), E.T. by W. Montgomery, The Quest of the Historical Jesus (1910),
P- 95* Ibid.
' P. 84.
* A shortened form of this paper was read at the twenty-ninth general meeting of the S.N.T.S. in
Sigtuna on 13 August 1974.
* So F. C. Baur, Kirchengeschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts (rp. Stuttgart, 1970), pp. 379 f.;
Kritische Untersuchungen iiber die kanonischen Evangelien (1847), p. 47. Also Schweitzer, op. cit. p. 84.
* On the limitations of the principle of analogy, see W. Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology 1
(E.T. London, 1970), pp. 40-57.
' Van A. Harvey, ' D . F. Strauss' Life of Jesus Revisited', Church History xxx (1961), 191-211,
writes o f ' a common operational assumption of almost all modern critical historiography' (p. 198).
Harvey's discussion of Strauss' historical methodology is not mentioned in the treatment by Horton
Harris, David Friedrich Strauss and his Theology (Cambridge, 1973).

244

ROBERT MORGAN

appear crude in the light of subsequent anthropological studies, but it stood

the test of time well because it satisfied the demands of modern historical
consciousness better than its rivals. Supernaturalism had ignored the principles of analogy and correlation;1 and rationalism failed to respect the
authors' intentions in determining the meaning of texts. By introducing a new
concept into the discussion, the mythical solution sanctioned the rationalists'
refusal to believe that the miracles actually happened but at the same time
avoided contradicting the intentions of the authors for whom the question of
myth had not been raised.
Strauss' achievement in carrying this solution consistently through, in addition to his annihilation of the harmonizers and his rejection of Schleiermacher's preference for the Fourth Gospel as history, are so familiar as hardly
to warrant the academic reprints industry recalling his ghost.2 But now that
he is recalled Strauss should be allowed to haunt his successors at another
point. They have argued for a further 140 years about the relation of
history and theology without taking seriously his particular contribution,
even though this was more important to him than his fairly common-sense
critical judgements.
The argument of this essay is as follows.
One can draw from the Life of Jesus a theory that historical work has an
essentially negative function within the theological enterprise; and this theory
about theological method is independent of the particular results reached by
Strauss. But the theory is incompatible with a widespread view of New Testament theology which expects this historical discipline to make a more direct
and positive contribution to Christian theology. By testing it in this area one
of two things should happen: either the theory will be seen to be false, or an
argument against that widespread view of the discipline will emerge. The
latter conclusion is reached in this article, not in the hope that New Testament studies might become less theological but that the theological interpretation of the New Testament should be set free from the obligation to be simply
a historical discipline. So long as the theological interpretation of the New
Testament is done as 'New Testament theology' it suffers from the constraints
and limitations of a historical discipline.
Strauss went beyond the historian's brief in order to do theology, and whatever the quality of his product, he was right to recognize that the subjectmatter of theology demands more than ordinary historical work if it is to be
communicated. This conclusion can only be avoided if the scope of historical
1
The terminology is that of Troeltsch, but it reflects Strauss' position, and the classical formulation of the problem by Hume.
a
The first German edition was reprinted for the Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt,
1969. George Eliot's 1846 translation of the fourth (1840) edition was republished by the Scholarly
Press, Michigan, 1970, and edited by Peter C. Hodgson for the Fortress Press, Philadelphia, and
SCM Press, London, Lines of Jesus Series, 1972-3. References are to the SCM edition: The Life of

Jesus Critically Examined.

STRAUSS AND 'NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY 5

245

work is broadened to include a metaphysical view of God, man and the world
(F. C. Baur's solution) or if the theological subject-matter and task are unduly narrowed (Bultmann's solution). Those who find these moves by the undoubted masters in the discipline finally unsatisfactory will be forced back to
Strauss' theory, no matter how lamentable they consider his actual theological practice.

In the Life of Jesus Strauss separates his proposed theological reconstruction

in the concluding dissertation, 'On the dogmatic import of the life of Jesus',
from the historical critical analysis of the gospels which forms the body of the
work.1 This critical work upon which the author's claim to fame rests stands
independently of his youthful attempt ' to re-establish at the dogmatic level
what had been destroyed by historical criticism'.2
For Strauss himself it does in fact have a theological role the critical or
negative role of destroying impossible or untrue theological interpretations
of the text - such as those of supernaturalism or rationalism. This use of
historical criticism as an instrument of theological criticism has been common
since the eighteenth century and needs no defence. Theologians are bound to
criticize other theologians' interpretation of the Christian tradition (especially
such an authoritative part of it as the NT) and one natural way to do this in a
historically conscious age is to argue that they are doing violence to the
original intention of the texts to which they appeal.3 This negative use of
historical criticism in theology is not in dispute between Strauss and his successors; they have used it equally skilfully.
But Strauss' procedure suggests that this is the only use of historical work in
theology, beyond the preliminary role of clarifying the tradition. He confines
his positive work as a Christian theologian to what is virtually an appendix in
which he is no longer writing as a historian of the New Testament.4 Combined
with his implicit thesis concerning the essentially negative function of historical criticism in theology5 a claim is being mounted about what is necessary for constructive theological interpretation of the Christian tradition:
1
According to his original plan, outlined to Marklin on 6 February 1832 (reproduced by Sandberger, David Friedrich Strauss als theologischer Hegelianer (1972), pp. 192-9) what is now almost the
whole work was to constitute the second (negative critical) part and what has here shrunk to a brief
sketch the third, constructive part of his 'larger dogmatic plans' (p. 195).
a
'das kritisch Vernichtete dogmatisch weiderherzustellen' (11, 686. Cf. E.T. p. 757).
8
For discussion of this cf. my 'Expansion and Criticism in the Christian Tradition' in M. Pye and
R. Morgan (eds.), The Cardinal Meaning. Essays in Comparative Hermeneutics: Buddhism and Christianity
(The Hague, 1973), especially pp. 92101.
4
This is even clearer in Die Christliche Glaubenslehre (1840-1), which has no positive section at all,
and where destructive analysis proves that 'Die wahre Kritik des Dogma ist seine Geschichte' (rp.
Darmstadt, 1973,1, 71).
6
T h e thesis is not uncommon. On 1 January 1916 Barth wrote to Thurneysen, ' . . .ich habe
schon unter dem EinfluS Herrmanns die Kritik immer nur als ein Mittel zur Freiheit gegeniiber der
Tradition aufgefaBt, nicht aber als konstituierenden Faktor einer neuen liberalen T r a d i t i o n . . . "
(Karl Barth, Gesamtausgabe v, 1 (Zurich, 1973), p. 121).

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ROBERT MORGAN

namely, that what is required for this is more than what the historian qua
historian can provide. It is true that there is more to historical work than
criticism. Strauss was not interested in this,1 and that was his weakness as a New
Testament scholar.2 We are concerned here, however, not with his merits as a
New Testament scholar but simply with the way he separates historical and
theological work. Although he does not make it explicit, Strauss' thesis is that
the positive historical descriptive enterprise cannot deliver normative theological judgements. In the constructive part of the concluding dissertation he
therefore abandons history and writes as a religious philosopher.
As it happens, the result is grotesque. He explicates his own view of the
world and God and associates it with the Christian tradition. The artificiality
of the link was clear to Strauss' contemporaries, who rightly concluded that
his theology was very different from their own understandings of the incarnation. Quite understandably, granted the ecclesiastical connection of German
theological faculties, his prospects of an academic career were ruined.3
Strauss' 'key to the whole of Christology' referred the gospels' picture of
the God-man not to the historical Jesus but to the idea of the human race.4
The reason for this aberration is made explicit: ' the idea... is not wont to
lavish its fullness on one exemplar... '.5 Strauss was not the first idealist to
stumble at the scandal of particularity nor the last,6 but this fall constituted a
serious break with the Christian tradition.
It is, however, important not to let the clearly heterodox character of
Strauss' own theological conclusions discredit his theory or mode of procedure. We may call this the 'separation model' for theological method
because it separates historical criticism (which serves as a vehicle for theological criticism) from the theological interpretation by which the tradition is
enabled to communicate its subject-matter in a new intellectual environment.
Strauss' theory is better than his practice. His model contains a procedure for
identifying and eliminating unsatisfactory specimens of theological interpre1

In a letter to Marklin (22 June 1846) he admitted to being 'kein Historiker' and 'vom dogmatischen (resp. antidogmatischen) Interesse ausgegangen'. (E. Zeller (ed.), Ausgewdhlte Briefe
(1895), p. 183.) Similarly to L. Georgii (2 July 1841) 'Denn von dem rein historischen Interesse...
habe ich keinen Blutstropfen in mir' and (1 November 1844), 'Du bist Historiker, ich nicht'. (H.
Maier (ed.), 'Briefe von David Friedrich Strauss an L. Georgii', Universitat Tubingen Doktoren-Verzeichnis der philosophischen Fakultat tgf>5 (1912), pp. 37, 46.)
2
Correctly emphasized by F. C. Baur, Kanonische Evangelien, pp. 40-76, especially 71 f.; Kirchengeschichte, pp. 394-9.
3
Most of the furore was caused by Strauss' critical judgements. But Strauss was soon to be vindicated on this, and not even the loss of his (temporary) position as Repetent in the Stift at Tubingen
after the publication of the first half of the work was particularly serious. See Geisser, 'David Friedrich Strauss als verhinderte (Zurcher) Dogmatiker', .7%.A". LXIX (1972), 217, n. 6. More indicatively of his future chances of becoming a professor of theology, Credner proposed him for a post at
Giessen after the appearance of the first volume but changed his mind when he saw the second. Cf.
E. Barnikol 'Der Briefwechsel zwischen Strauss und Baur', Z-K-G- LXXIII (1962), 81, n. 5.
4
6
P. 780.
P. 779.
It is instructive to note how hard Baur struggles to give' the founder' of Christianity a constitutive role in his account, and thus to remain orthodox, even though the historical Jesus is scarcely
necessary for his Hegelian interpretation of classical Christian dogma.

STRAUSS AND

NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY

247

tation. Its effectiveness can be shown by applying it in criticism of his own

theological sketch.
Strauss had theological objections to the rationalists' mode of interpreting
the miracle-stories of the gospels. It failed to do justice to their religious content. But the form of his theological criticism was successfully to argue at the
historical level that it failed to do justice to the actual intentions of the
authors. His modernity is evident in the historical critical body of his work
from the way he differs from Kant 1 and allegorical interpretation2 in respecting the intentions of the evangelists.
But when in the concluding dissertation Strauss outlines his proposals for
interpreting the mythical narratives he abandons his principle of faithfulness to
the intention of the text and becomes vulnerable to the same kind of theological criticism through historical criticism with which he himself annihilated the rationalists.
The failure of Schleiermacher's ' attempt to retain in combination the ideal
in Christ with the historical'3 had been impressed upon Strauss by his teacher
F. C. Baur.4 But unlike Baur he therefore felt driven to a separation model:
'these two elements separate themselves'.5 However, instead of producing
what his own principles demanded - a form of the separation model in which
the theological interpretation remains subject to critical scrutiny by historians and satisfies the canon of modern rationality that interpretations
should not conflict with the original author's intentions - Strauss at this
point reverted to the anti-historical stance of Kant and allegorical interpretation. The only difference between his own speculative and Kant's symbolic
Christology is that for Strauss the 'idea' which is the subject of christological
predication 'has an existence in reality, not in the mind only like that of
Kant'. 6 Both authors are equally indifferent to the intentions of the biblical
authors and in consequence produced theological interpretations whose
claim to continuity with the Christian tradition failed, to satisfy the Church.
This criterion of orthodoxy or valid theological interpretation in the
Christian Church - that a new interpretation be able to claim continuity
with the tradition - is notoriously difficult to apply in marginal cases on
1

See Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793): E.T. Harper (i960), p. 3gn.
Origen was prepared to abandon the literal meaning where necessary for the sake of'a meaning
worthy of God'. DePrin. iv. 2. 9. E.T. Harper (1966), p. 287. Strauss obscures the issue by comparing
his own historical procedure in applying the category of myth to the Gospels, with the allegorizers'
theological interpretation of his material (pp. 39-92). The true parallel to the allegorizers' theological
interpretation is of course Strauss' own theological interpretation in the concluding dissertation. The
historian's' mythical mode of interpretation' merely sets the stage for this by proposing a classification
of the material which makes possible its subsequent assimilation to the Hegelian Vorstellung-BegrirT
scheme. The confusion arises from the ambiguity of the word 'interpretation' which may refer either
to the historian's general task of making the past intelligible to the present or to the theologian's
special interest in making it intelligible in such a way that contemporary Christians recognize it to be
* P. 773.
a more or less adequate expression of the faith which they hold.
4
Baur's early criticism of Schleiermacher was published in 1827 while Strauss was still his student.
See H. Liebing, 'Ferdinand Christian Baurs Kritik an Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre', ^.TA.X". LIV
6
(957). 225-43P- 773" P- 780.
2

248

ROBERT MORGAN

account of the great variety within the tradition.1 But Strauss' was not a marginal case. By making his own understanding of the world normative and
twisting the tradition until it dimly reflected this he produced a re-interpretation which any historian could judge to be in conflict with the intention of
the tradition. His appeal to this was not a serious claim to be interpreting it
or saying what it actually means, but an account of how he would have to
re-interpret it if it were to have any significance for him.2 The reason for
Strauss' re-interpretation is that like the men of the Enlightenment he knows
the truth of the matter in advance and by his re-interpretation must make the
tradition conform to this.3 When the interpreter's prior understanding is
made normative in this way, the possibility of learning from the text is precluded and no concept of revelation on a basis of the Christian tradition
possible.4
The purpose of this discussion is not to repeat that Strauss' own theological
interpretation is unsatisfactory, but to indicate that it can be shown to be unsatisfactory by the historian acting as theological critic. Strauss' theory about
theological method, his 'separation model', can therefore stand on its own
merits, independently of his actual practice, and shows itself to be effective by
the way it can be operated in criticism of this.
The theory has two aspects. It calls firstly for new theological interpretations by which Christian faith may be communicated in changing situations,
and assumes (for reasons which have still to be made plain) that these will
involve more than historical work. Secondly, it envisages historical criticism
operating negatively to disallow theological interpretations which offend
against contemporary rationality by doing violence to those parts of the
tradition to which they appeal.
The question which such a model poses to the historical critical study of the
New Testament is whether, in consequence, this discipline has not simply a
negative role in Christian theology. Apart from its preliminary service in
1
The difficulty has become more acute since historical study has shown that the New Testament
is not a doctrinal unity. If a 'canon' were required for judging interpretations it would have to be
defined more narrowly- a ' canon within the canon'. But in fact a whole variety of criteria is employed
in judging an interpretation's fidelity to the tradition. The inadequacy of any one criterion does not
mean that the enterprise is hopeless.
8
The distinction between 'meaning' and 'significance' is rightly emphasized by E. D. Hirsch,
Validity in Interpretation (Yale U.P. 1967). Hirsch presents a form of separation model in which the
interpretative 'guess what the author meant' is followed by 'a logic of validation' analogous to the
negative function of history in Strauss: 'While there is not and cannot be any method or model of
correct interpretation there can be a ruthless critical process of validation to which many skills and
many hands may contribute. Just as any individual act of interpretation comprises both a hypothetical and a critical function, so the discipline of interpretation also comprises of having ideas and
testing them. At the level of the discipline these two 'moments' or 'episodes' can be separated...'
(p. 206).
8
See p. 247, n. 1. David Pailin threatens to follow a similar path:' Authenticity in the Interpretation of Christianity', The Cardinal Meaning, op. cit. pp. 127-59.
* This is Barth's main objection to the Enlightenment thinkers. Bultmann provides a theoretical
framework in which the interpreter's prior understanding may be corrected through encounter with
the text. Whether this happens in his own practice remains a question.

STRAUSS AND 'NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY'

249

clarifying the tradition it operates negatively to disallow theological interpretations rather than positively to produce them.1
That it does operate in this negative way is not in question. The issue is
whether this is its only function, apart from preliminary clarification of what
the tradition says. Most New Testament scholars would deny this and assert
that this historical work has a positive role in theology. The point at which
this is most apparent is in the discipline called 'New Testament theology';
that is one reason for posing the Straussian question there.
'New Testament theology' refers to a historical exegetical activity. But the
phrase is used ambiguously: in a 'weak' sense to mean no more than the
history of early Christian thought;2 and in a 'strong' sense in which the word
'theology' is used more appropriately to indicate that the discipline has a
more direct theological significance, arising from the special authority accorded to the canonical documents within the Christian Church. How
exactly historical exegetical results can be invested with theological authority
is an unsettled question at the heart of theological debate about the canon.3
The simmering disagreement on this issue4 is an indication of the deep-seated
malaise within the ranks of those committed to the strong sense of ' New
Testament theology', as a discipline which combines theological interpretation with historical reconstruction.5
Unless they are prepared to argue in a biblicist way that what the historians and philologists show the New Testament authors to have said
automatically binds them theologically, it is difficult to see what positive
theological role those who accept the weak sense of the phrase see in their
work. They are content 'merely to do the historical donkey work for the
systematic theologian'.6 This is a consistent position, despite the familiar
claim that there is no such thing as a 'purely historical' study of the New
Testament. There clearly is 'purely historical' work in the sense meant by
1
Strauss' position (ironically!) recalls that of Nietzsche, who in The Use and Abuse of History (1874)
considered how history could serve and how destroy life. Both appreciated the pruning function of
the 'critical use of history', but considered history alone to be negative and destructive of life. The
question is whether historical work alone can adequately perform theology's (or art's) task of interpreting human existence.
8
William Wrede gave classic expression to this view: Uber Aufgabe und Methode der sogenannten
ncuteslamentlichen Theologie (1897), E.T. SCM Press (London, 1973).
3
Cf. E. Kasemann (ed.), Das New Testament als Kanon (Gottingen, 1970).
4
The disagreement between Barth and Bultmann on this issue is reflected in the subsequent debate. Cf. E. Kasemann, 'Konsequente Traditionsgeschichte?' Z-Th-K- txI1 ('965), I37~52.
6
Those who, like Bultmann and Kasemann, stress the theological interpretation, achieve greater
Coherence than those who, while remaining theologians, emphasize the historical character of the
enterprise. Kummel's account of the unity of the NT, which houses his own theology, sits uncomfortably upon an admirable historical presentation. See p. 259, n. 2. Conzelmann's formula for
combining the two sides ' by regarding theology not only in general terms, as the interpretation of
(the) faith made at a particular time, but in a more special sense as an exegesis of the original texts
of the faith, the oldest formulations of the creed' seems inappropriate to most of the New Testament

material. An Outline of the Theology of the New Testament (E.T. London, 1969), p. xv.
8
E. Kasemann, New Testament Questions of Today (E.T. London, 1969), p. 7, where such
' thoroughly misplaced modesty' is attacked.

250

ROBERT MORGAN

those who in the nineteenth century championed the phrase: namely, work
that is not influenced by Christian doctrinal considerations. But this historical
work is not 'theology' in the usual sense of advocating or expressing a theological position, and it would make for clarity if Wrede's demand for a
change of nomenclature were granted.1
Strauss' question is not addressed to this weak sense of the phrase. He is not
himself interested in this task of historical reconstruction,2 but his model does
in fact presuppose it: only by contrast with a more probable historical hypothesis or reconstruction can a weaker one be criticized and the theological
superstructure which stands on it be undermined. Strauss' essential point is
that the theological use of history is restricted to this critical function. That
is to say, he is not interested in developing an alternative historical construction which will carry any theological weight. He prefers to look elsewhere for
a vehicle for his own theology.3
There is no need, either, for Strauss to deny that those who engage in this
historical descriptive task must understand something of theology. Like historians of science, art and philosophy they must be familiar with their subject-matter. But the descriptive task is not (or need not be) itself'theology' in
the sense of expressing a theological position. The personal involvement of the
historian of ideas is a matter for discussion; certainly 'objectivity' in the sense
of complete absence of presuppositions is neither possible nor desirable. But
a distinction can and must be made between judgements made on a basis of
one's personal religious belief and those which can be justified in the open
forum of historical argument. However, this correct recognition of the need
for historians to be familiar with their subject-matter cannot be extended into
a rationale by which New Testament scholars can answer the question of the
relationship between history and theology in New Testament studies. This very
natural move is illegitimate. Many Christian New Testament scholars working
in theological faculties wish to claim a theological role without denying the historical character of their work. It was therefore tempting to argue that only a
believer can have a sufficiently intimate acquaintance with the subject-matter
to understand and present it historically. As a historical work done by believers
New Testament theology could therefore be said to be essentially theology.
It is true that most of the best work here has been done by believers, and
the crude polemic frequently produced when unbelievers enter the field
appears to lend support to the argument. But the assertion that unbelievers
cannot understand religion and theology well enough to write its history is
ungrounded and can be challenged by plenty of counter-evidence from
'history of religions' study. It is also potentially obscurantist, since the appeal
to faith as a presupposition for historical work can be used to hinder open
rational investigation.
1
8

8
Op. cit. E.T. p. 116.
Cf. above p. 246, nn. 1 2.
Like Nietzsche, he turned to philosophy and art for this.

STRAUSS AND

NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY'

25I

The ' weak' meaning of New Testament theology is not vulnerable to the
critique which must be brought against the strong meaning. If it will accept
its purely negative role in theology it can rest in peace, so far as our Straussian
question is concerned. It is, however, subject to other questions which should
be mentioned lest the critique of the strong meaning be misunderstood as a
plea for the weak one. The 'purely historical', theologically neutral view of
New Testament studies needs no such support. It is so well entrenched with
an inherited institutional strength that widespread doubt about its relevance
to the life of the Church is often ignored and the threat to its right to exist in
secular universities scarcely noticed.1 Theological disinterestedness was a
necessary moment in the process of liberating historical study from dogmatics,2 and the price of freedom is eternal vigilance. But the lesson has been
well learned, and in a secular situation the dangers of a theologically disinterested study of the New Testament far outweigh the threat of corruption
by doctrinal prejudices.3
It is to the credit of those who take the phrase ' New Testament theology'
in the strong sense, that they have not allowed the rising tide of historical
studies to wash them out of the theological workshop and reduce the status of
their work to that of a Hilfsdisziplin for systematic theology. They can appeal
to the history of their discipline4 in support of their instinct that it really is
theology that they are wishing to pursue.5 'New Testament theology', like the
'biblical theology' out of which it developed, has in fact generally wanted to
be in some sense Christian theology, and not merely the early history of
Christian theology. This is true of its origins in the theological critique of
Protestant orthodoxy by pietists and rationalists, and equally true of its
revival during the present century. What began in the eighteenth century as
a critical impulse from the side of and in the service of theology, soon freed
itself from its master. Historical criticism turned out to be a powerful independent force. Once unleashed it even turned on its master and destroyed
biblical theology's unitary picture of biblical doctrine.
New Testament theology as we know it today bears the marks of its emer1
Krister Stendahl has argued convincingly that biblical studies will have to be more self-consciously theological if it is to justify its separate existence in departments of religion. See P. Ramsey
and J. F. Wilson (eds.), The Study 0/Religion in Colleges and Universities (Princeton, 1970), pp. 23-39,
especially p. 28.
1
Cf. J . P. Gabler, Oratio de iusto discrimine theologiae biblicae et dogmaticae regundisque recte utriusque
Jinibus (1787). A German translation is available in O. Merk, Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments
inihrer Anfangszeit (Marburg, 1972) andG.Strecker (ed.), Das Problem da Theologie des Neuen Testaments

(Darmstadt, 1975).
8
Cf. my argument in 'The New Testament in Religious Studies', Religious Studies x (1974),
385-406.
4
Cf. especially G. Ebeling, 'What is "Biblical Theology"?', Word and Faith (London, 1963),
pp. 79-97, H. J . Kraus, Die Biblische Theologie. Ihre Geschichte und Problematik (Neukirchen, 1970) and

O. Merk, op. cit.

5
Critical scholars' sarcasm about conservative work in this field for its inadequate treatment of
the history sometimes fails to appreciate its theological aims. Beyschlag, for example, was aware of
questions for which Wrede had no ear. See my Nature of New Testament Theology, op. cit. pp. 58 f.
17
NTS x x m

252

ROBERT MORGAN

gence out of the often stormy relationship between Christian theology and
critical history. History's proper refusal to be domesticated by theology
received classic expression when Wrede changed the name of New Testament
theology (so-called) to the history of early Christian religion and theology. In
the next generation Bultmann was able to accept Wrede's historical points
and yet recover, with the help of the neo-reformation theology of the 1920s,1
the strong sense of NT theology as really theology. If this superb synthesis is
now under fire the really urgent question is what will succeed it. When the
last great synthesis of historical reconstruction and theological interpretation,
that of F. C. Baur, broke down, New Testament scholarship splintered and
retreated into historical detail work. In the classical age of New Testament
criticism2 that brought a valuable harvest of historical knowledge which
partly compensated for a day of small things in theology. In the present
situation it is hard to see that anything will compensate for a similar lack of
good theological interpretation. It is therefore a matter of some urgency that
Christian theologians whose special field is New Testament studies, and who
can no longer subscribe to the Bultmannian synthesis of historical and theological work in that particular brand of existential interpretation, should find
some other licence for developing theological interpretations of the New
Testament. The alternative is to abandon responsible talk of God altogether
in New Testament scholarship.
The purpose of this essay is to revive consideration of an older proposal for
enabling New Testament studies to talk responsibly of God. The Straussian
model points in another direction. It encourages us to go outside the limits
of historical research for material which will help us to make sense of the
theological subject-matter of the New Testament while still remaining subject
to the negative checks which historians must continue to operate.

11

Before considering the case for separating the 'theological interpretation

of the New Testament' component in New Testament theology from the
historical task of interpretation and reconstruction, it is necessary to justify
the application of Strauss' separation model in an area about which he did
not himself write.
If the theory about theological method derived from his Life of Jesus represents his considered judgement, then Strauss could not have written a New
Testament theology in the strong sense because this would involve combining
the two elements he preferred to keep separate. But the methodological
1
See especially 'Das Problem einer theologischen Exegese des neuen Testaments' (1925), reprinted in J. Moltmannn (ed.), Anfange der dialektischen Theologie n (Munich, 19672), 47-72.
2
The century from 1831 (F. C. Baur, 'Die Christuspartei in Korinth...') to 1930 may be
claimed as the period in which historical criticism made its most decisive contribution to Christian
theology.

STRAUSS AND

NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY

253

problem is similar whether one attempts to write a New Testament theology

or an account of Jesus: can or should the historical reconstruction acquire
positive theological significance? Strauss' separation model in which historical work has essentially the negative function of eliminating unsatisfactory
interpretations of the data is equally applicable in both cases. And although
Strauss did not in 1835 attempt the constructive historical task of writing a
'life of Jesus' he could have done so without offending against his own
principles. Even if ' the historians' Jesus' has a mainly negative or critical
function within theology it is still necessary for theologians to undertake the
quest of the historical Jesus (so-called) in order to defend Christianity against
its critics who claim to have entered the sanctuary and found it empty by
discovering the ' real' Jesus. But this is still a negative use of history, even
when turned against the anti-theologians. Again, all the most obvious things
which a historian might say relevant to faith and theology have a negative
rather than a positive significance. This is obviously true with respect to the
historical existence ofJesus but the same applies to many positive statements.
The fact that he was a good man who helped people does not distinguish him
from many others. Only when the reverse is asserted is Christology affected.
How far a theologian considers that historical information about Jesus
could possibly take him towards a satisfactory Christology, even if the evidence were much stronger than it is, will depend upon what he expects of a
Christology. One of Strauss' few orthodox features is that he did not consider
it possible to project an adequate theological content in the form of a historical
presentation. A great Cambridge theologian who also combined historical
exegetical expertise with a profound theological interest and insight wrote as
follows:
A mere analytic treatment of Jesus of Nazareth, difficult in any case to carry out,
would not even if successful bring us to our goal. To say that Jesus is Lord and
Christ is not and never has been simply another way of recording the direct impression of his historic personality. It is a synthetic not an analytic judgement, an
affirmation of faith about God, Man and the
world no less than an affirmation
about the historic Jesus of Nazareth himself.1
Strauss' treatment of Christology in the concluding dissertation shows that
unlike many subsequent liberals he would agree with this, even though the
conception of God, man and the world which he brought into his' synthetic
judgement' was less orthodox than Creed's. It was the theological character of
Christology which compelled him to bring more into it than the historian, be
he never so constructive, could offer. A 'life of Jesus' could never carry
sufficient theological weight. The same issue is at stake in the Straussian
question to New Testament theology. If God is the reality that determines
everything, the task of interpreting theological texts from another culture
must place a great strain on the interpreter. It may be that at the descriptive
1

Quoted by D. M. MacKinnon in a preface to the Fontana reprint of J. M. Creed, The Divinity

of Jesus Christ (1964), pp. 10 f.
17-2

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ROBERT MORGAN

level at which he is operating the historian can take the strain by applying
his normal skills. Or it may be that in this case communication will require
more than ordinary historical reconstruction. That can only be gauged by
asking how successfully the authors' understanding and sense of God is in fact
communicated in particular New Testament theologies. If there are grounds
for dissatisfaction with the products of historians at this crucial point it may
be that more attention needs to be paid to the nature of the material, in which
case historians of early Christian thought will need to pay more attention to
theologians in order to deepen their understanding of their subject-matter.
The reason for posing the question on the ground of method in New Testament theology rather than where Strauss himself posed it is in order to say to
New Testament scholarship, tua res agitur. The 'Jesus of history/Christ of
faith' debate1 can be passed down the line as essentially a question for
systematic theology. Although New Testament historical scholarship is
directly involved it is possible for the historian, like Strauss, simply to call the
tune and watch those with a care for orthodox Christology dance.2 There is
nothing about the historical investigation of the Gospels which compels New
Testament scholars to engage in Christology. The fact that many of them do

so reflects their personal commitments. The same commitments account for

the popular rationalization that there is no such thing as a ' purely historical'
study of the New Testament. Granted the openness of historical methods and
world views, that claim owes its initial plausibility more to the fragmentary
state of the evidence and uncertainty of results than to any inherent impossibility of finding a consensus about what is and what is not permitted to
historians.
In New Testament theology, on the other hand, those who play the historical tune are most likely to be drawn into the theological dance themselves. It is difficult, though not necessarily impossible, to describe how the
New Testament writers think about God in a way which bridges the cultural
gap satisfactorily, without getting caught up in a theological argument. In
practice, too, many scholars do in fact intend to do Christian theology in and
through their historical work. Despite the precedents in the history of the
discipline this conflation is open to serious objections. If these can be sustained it may be necessary to revert to Strauss' separation model. Their force
can best be made plain by considering briefly the two greatest attempts at
synthesizing historical and theological interests in a 'New Testament
theology'.
In the monumental conceptions of both Baur and Bultmann the combination depends upon either the scope of historical inquiry being broadened, or
1

The phrase itself was adumbrated by Strauss in his critique of Schleiermacher's Life of Jesus:
Der Christus des Glaubens und der Jesus der Geschichte (1865).
2
In his letter of 6 February 1832 to Marklin he wrote 'Nun ginge aber erst der Tanz los im
zweiten, kritischen Teile'. Sandberger, op. cil. p. 195. (See p. 245, n. 1.)

STRAUSS AND 'NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY*

255

the field of theological concern narrowed, until history is itself theology. The
project looks hopeful because history like theology is concerned with human
existence and theology is concerned with the meaning of history. Both Baur
and Bultmann are strongly aware of the anthropological aspect of theology1
and the theological overtones of history.2 Whether either synthesis will stand,
however, is doubtful. If they will not, and no alternative synthesis is forthcoming, it will be necessary to return to Strauss' separation model, with the
merely negative significance which this allows to history in theology.3
in

F. C. Baur acknowledged the validity of Strauss' historical criticism but

nevertheless sought to overcome this ' negative critical' standpoint by his own
constructive historical work.4 He worked to provide a positive reconstruction
of Christian history on a basis of critical evaluation of the sources. But this
historical work owed its theological significance to Baur's idealist, and from
1834 specifically Hegelian, metaphysical interpretation of history.5 In one
respect, therefore, Baur confirms Strauss' claim. His theological interpretation involves more than what many people would call history. However, it
does not involve more than what in his view was meant by historical work.
In Baur's programme a theological interpretation of the New Testament was
united to his historical reconstruction of early Christianity through the task
of writing history, and the history laid bare in this activity, being defined in
a way that coincided with his theological framework. The finite mind or
spirit of the historian was able to detect and reflect the movement of infinite
or absolute Spirit in world history. The question of history's overall meaning
received an answer in Baur's presentation. His compact unity of historical
reconstruction and theological interpretation was genuinely history and
genuinely theology.
Not even this perfect coincidence of history and theology could justify a
'New Testament theology' or theological history that stopped at the bounds
of the canon. The development continued beyond these bounds and on this
model must be included in the theological picture. Baur, the most impressive
of all exponents of ' theology through history', therefore consistently continued his histories of Church and of doctrines right up to his own day 1
Bultmann praised Baur for this (The Theology of the New Testament, 11 (E.T. London, 1955)
p. 844). Of Baur's interpretation of Pauline theology he wrote: 'diese Interpretation ist getragen von
dem WiSen darum, dass den theologischen Begriffen des Paulus, die es zu interpretieren gilt, eine
bestimmte AuffaSung vom Sein des Menschen zugrunde liegt' ('Zur Geschichte der PaulusForschung', Th.R. N.F. 1 (1929), 26-59. See p. 32).
E.g. R. Bultmann, History and Eschatology (Edinburgh, 1957).
' Barth gave sharp expression to this view in his debate with Harnack (Answer 14, Anfdnge 1, 329).
Its (temporary) attraction for Bultmann is evident in his 1924 essay on liberal and dialectical theo* See p. 246, n. 2.
logy, E.T. Faith and Understanding (London, 1969), p. 31.
6
As early as 1824, m his first major work, he was strongly influenced by Schelling, and wrote,
'Ohne Philosophic bleibt mir die Geschichte ewig todt und stumm' (Symbolik und Mythologie, 1, xi).

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ROBERT MORGAN

without ever entertaining the vain deceit that the development was then
complete. Only the demands of a university curriculum that reflected a dated
over-valuation of Scripture1 could result in a self-contained (posthumous)
Vorlesungen iiber neutestamentliche Theologie,2 though Baur's mistaken judgements

about the chronology of early Christian literature allowed him neatly to

separate the first phase of Christian history, contained in the New Testament,
from what followed without incurring the suspicion of biblicism present, for
example, in Harnack's periodization.
The difference in this use of Hegel from that of Strauss is clear. Instead of
the ready-made truth which Strauss found revealed in Hegel's Begriff and into
which the picture-language of the biblical myth (understood as Hegelian
Vorstellung) must be translated, what Baur found serviceable was a quasitheological framework within which his historical work could be understood.3
Whereas for Strauss the reconstruction of early Christian history was theologically irrelevant, Baur's vision demanded a total self-abandonment to
rigorous historical work-without its conclusions being prescribed in advance.4
But it was precisely Baur's tight-knit unity of the course of history with its
metaphysical theological interpretation which made his theology extremely
vulnerable and open to falsification through his historical picture being corrected. He was rather dismissive of those who quarrelled with matters of
detail instead of producing a counter-achievement,5 but it was this detail
work which rapidly undermined his synthesis. In doing so it provided further
evidence for Strauss' view of the negative or critical function of historical
work within theology.
It should also perhaps have thrown in doubt the attempt to provide a
rational theological interpretation of the whole course of history. But for as
long as philosophical idealism survived it seemed possible to combine this
with a more cautious biblical criticism to produce weaker forms of the model
pioneered by Hegel and adopted by Baur. The discredited Hegelian dialectic
of history was replaced by a looser belief that the total development made
sense; and the progress of the idea was sought inductively rather than
deduced, as it had been by Hegel.6
1
In a letter to Heyd, dated 10 February 1836, he agrees that 'from the time of the Reformation,
as you rightly remark, one has set Scripture in too high a place.. .' (translated by H. Harris, op. cit.
2
p. 88).
1864, rp. Darmstadt, 1973.
8
'Auch Baur verband ja spater die historische Kritik mit der Hegelschen Philosophic, aber eben
nicht mit der Unterscheidung von Vorstellung und Begriff, sondern mit dem dialektischen
Geschichtsbegriff', Sandberger, op. cit. p. 152.
4
No doubt the patterning of history which sharpened Baur's eye for contrasts and antitheses also
led him to exaggerate and oversimplify them. But his dialectical framework was itself based upon
historical analysis of the sources and so too was his positioning of each document within his oversimple framework.
6
Points of detail may be disputed,' but this is not the way to dispose of a comprehensive historical
theory. Such a theory appeals to its broad general truth...'. Paul, the Apostle of Jesus Christ, E.T.
(1876), p. 4.
6
The finest exponent of this view is undoubtedly Troeltsch, whose work was suppressed rather
than critically evaluated by the rise of'dialectical theology'.

STRAUSS AND 'NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY'

257

A less persuasive attempt to fuse theological interpretation with a small

piece of history is found in the 'life of Jesus' theology. Again, subsequent
research proved its continuing critical potency.1 In the critical wake of Wrede
and Wellhausen, Bultmann could ' calmly let the fire burn, for I see that what
is consumed is only the fanciful portraits of Life of Jesus theology ' 2 - with its
inadequate Christology. His sceptical judgements about the historicity of the
gospels are, like Strauss', entirely separable from his own theological proposals. They operate critically in Straussian fashion on theologies he wished
to negate.
But Bultmann no more than Baur is prepared to restrict the task of historical work in theology to the negative critical function. Baur had defined
historiography in a way that embraced his theological concerns and Bultmann does the same, though in a quite different way. They both built upon
the existential character of history, but instead of interpreting the whole
course of history Bultmann restricted the question of its meaning to the
historicity of the individual who is called to make decisions. This combination has its attractions. It is compatible with whatever variety of historical
traditions are contained in the New Testament and cannot easily be embarrassed by future historical research.3 Theological criticism of Bultmann
must proceed by probing piecemeal the validity of his historical interpretations of his key witnesses rather than by undermining his whole account of
the historical development.4 This attraction, however, is rather suspect. It
raises the question of how seriously the course of history is being taken here.
Is this conception not in fact as a-historical as Strauss' theology? That may
or may not be a damaging criticism of Bultmann's theology. But it certainly
undermines the claim that a real synthesis between historical reconstruction
and theological interpretation has been achieved.
Baur was able to take the developing course of history more seriously, since
world history provided the framework for his conception of revelation.
Whereas what Strauss took from Hegel was a substitute for traditional
Christian content, what Baur took was an understanding of reality within
which that content could be appropriately expressed - at least for as long as a
Hegelian metaphysics of history remained credible. That was not for long,
and Bultmann is representative of the theological reaction against locating
1
Even before the new sceptical turn within New Testament scholarship at the beginning of the
century, Martin Kahler could in 1892 use historical scepticism as an instrument of theological
criticism against the 'life ofJesus' theology.
8
Faith and Understanding (E.T., London, 1969), p. 132. The essay 'Zur Frage der Christologie' was
first published in 1927.
8
It rests on some rather precarious hypotheses about the history of the tradition, especially that
used by the fourth evangelist. But the lack of evidence makes these far more difficult to falsify than
Baur's vulnerable reconstruction.
4
This has been done most persistendy by Kasemann, who has made it very clear that his historical criticisms of Bultmann's exegesis of Paul in particular, and also of Bultmann's position on the
question of the historical Jesus, carry a theological criticism of existentialist theology's suppression of
the primacy of Christology.

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ROBERT MORGAN

revelation in history. One strength of his kerygmatic theology, which sees

revelation as an event which may occur in contemporary proclamation, is the
continuity which it can claim with such venerable strands of the Christian
tradition as Paul and Luther. On the other hand, not even affinities with Paul
and Luther are a substitute for solving the problems posed for theology by
modern awareness of history. Hegel and Baur, and later Troeltsch, were able
to take the course of world history seriously without abandoning God-talk,
but the eclipse of idealism has dated their solutions. Bultmann's synthesis is
now the best available. But it has certain weaknesses, and if these cannot be
overcome it will be necessary, regretfully, to abandon the attempt to identify
history and theology in New Testament studies and settle for Strauss'
separation model.
The legitimate impulse behind the attempt to combine history and
theology in New Testament theology was the recognition on the one hand
that the new historical disciplines could not be denied access to the New
Testament documents, and yet on the other, that the Christian Church must
continue to interpret its authoritative tradition theologically. Since both
history and theology interpret tradition, using the same methods to understand the same texts, it was natural to assume that the tasks could be conflated. But three specific weaknesses in Bultmann's undertaking indicate
where the project breaks down.
Firstly, the combination of history and theology in 'New Testament
theology' has no adequate answer to the objection pressed by Wrede that the
idea of the canon is irrelevant to the historian.1 Bultmann does justice to
Wrede's account of the demands of history by including extra-canonical
material in his reconstruction. But like other neo-Reformation theologians
he pays more attention to the New Testament canon than he can justify

rationally.2
Secondly, there is a major difference between how historians and theologians treat the tradition. This is not to be located in their methods or results
in understanding it. The professor who lectured four hours a week on historical exegesis and a fifth (in a Talari) on 'practical interpretation' brought
theological interpretation into disrepute.3 Both are concerned with the true
meaning of the text. The difference, rather, is located at the level of the
interpreters' personal motivations or attitudes towards the tradition. The
theologian is committed to a personal advocacy of whatever parts of his tradition he does not submit to theological criticism. The historian is not com1
'No New Testament writing was born with the predicate "canonical" attached...', op. cit.
E.T. pp. 70 f.
i
His brief comment in Anfange 11, 71 that the idea of the canon should preserve the contingency of
revelation is hardly sufficient. On p. 67 he even allows the theoretical possibility of interpreting
Augustine, Luther, Schleiermacher (or the Bhagavadgita) in the same way.
8
Barth was caustic about Niebergall's 'practical' interpretation of scripture. The Epistle to the
Romans (E.T., Oxford 1933), p. 9. See Faith and Understanding, p. 158 for Bultmann's view.

STRAUSS AND 'NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY 5

259

mitted to this, even if personally he finds what the tradition is saying authentic and true. His task is essentially descriptive. This difference becomes
visible at the point where a theologian finds himself compelled to exercise
theological criticism of such tradition as he cannot accept as an adequate expression of Christianity. The criterion for theological criticism is inappropriate in historical work. A historian may judge that I Cor. xv. 1-11 falls
below Paul's normal standard of theological insight and that it conflicts with
the main thrust of the apostle's theology. But the historical Sachkritik in which
he may then engage is something quite different from the theological Sachkritik with which Luther criticized James, not on a basis of James' better
thoughts but on the basis of his own understanding of Christianity, derived
from other parts of the tradition.1
At the point where interpretation becomes critical interpretation, historians and theologians can be seen to obey different rules, and the attempt to
combine their roles breaks down. The combination works for as long as the
theologian approves of the tradition he is interpreting. It provides, too, a
mode of doing theology which, because it reflects the life of the Church that
lives (in human terms) from interpreting its tradition, is of direct assistance to
the ministry of the word. But since the New Testament contains material
which must give pause to even the most catholic advocate of tota scriptura, a
complete 'theology of the New Testament' will run aground upon the
Sachkritik which Bultmann saw to be inseparable from Sachexegese.2
Thirdly, both history and theology are defined too narrowly when attention is restricted to the historical character of human existence as this is
experienced by an individual. Both history and theology have a social dimension, and theology at least must speak of the future. This is simply to repeat
the doubts already mentioned about the possibility of dealing seriously with
historical reality as we know it within the framework of an existentialist
theology. In this respect Hegel may provide a more promising starting-point
even than Luther.
1
Bultmann uses the same word Sachkritik in both contexts, claiming that it is practised by historians but also recalling Luther's theological criticism of the canon. N. A. Dahl questions the
legitimacy of Bultmann's procedure in his important review article, Th.R. N.F. xxni (1955), 21-49.
The concept is also discussed in The Nature of New Testament Theology, pp. 42-51.
8
Anfdnge 11, 53 f. In The Theology of the New Testament (E.T. 1974) Kummel offers a pragmatic
solution: 'We can expect to encounter this witness in its purest version in those forms of primitive
Christian proclamation which stand closest in point of time to the historical Christ event' where he
finds 'in spite of all the differences, a common message which can be labelled as foundational and by
which the message of the rest of the New Testament can be measured' (p. 324). But why should he
draw a line at Paul? And does he find all pre-Pauline theologies equally acceptable? It is better
frankly to involve one's own understanding of Christianity in making a theological judgement, as
implied by Luther's criterion of 'what preaches Christ' and continued in Bultmann's and Kasemann's theological interpretation and criticism.

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ROBERT MORGAN
IV

The argument so far suggests that 'New Testament theology', conceived as

simultaneously a historical and a doctrinal discipline, was the fruit of a
premature union between Christian theology and historical criticism. It
should be replaced by a Straussian separation of the two tasks. Christian
theologians, including the New Testament specialists among them, will then
be free to continue their proper task of interpreting the tradition theologically
in new situations, using whatever materials and insights further this aim.1
If the results are more startling than what is usual in the history of ideas, this
is because the subject-matter involves the author's total understanding of
reality and existence. To understand and communicate the message of a
theological text it is necessary for an interpreter to involve the horizon of his
own experience. Since not all theological interpreters have this pre-packaged
in such a firm philosophical conceptuality as Strauss, Baur and Bultmann,
their products may bear the marks of a groping and stumbling eclecticism.
Whatever his faults, Strauss did justice to the all-embracing character of
God-talk by being prepared in his interpretation of it to risk drastic innovation. He introduced as much of his knowledge of the world, encapsulated in
Hegelian philosophy, as appeared to him necessary to speak intelligibly and
credibly of the reality which determines everything. He recognized that the
great changes which have taken place in our modern understanding of the
world must be reflected in any interpretation which is to do justice to the
universal scope of the biblical witness.2
The problem is clearly an urgent one for all theologians who, like Strauss,
cannot simply accept a 'mythical' view of the world. The easy solutions and
short cuts of what a few years ago was fashionable as 'biblical theology' find
little support now amongst intellectuals.3 The problems of understanding and
1
In his preface to the English edition (1933) of The Epistle to the Romans Barth wrote about 'the
problem, "What is exegesis? " No one can, of course, bring out the meaning of a text (auslegen) without at the same time adding something to it (einlegen). Moreover, no interpreter is rid of the danger of
in fact adding more than he extracts. I neither was nor am free from this danger. And yet I should be
altogether misunderstood if my readers refused to credit me with the honesty of, at any rate, intending
to explain the text. I must assure them that, in writing this book, I felt myself bound to the actual
words of the text, and did not in any way propose to engage myself in free theologizing. It goes
without saying that my interpretation is open to criticism...' (p. ix). The continuation of this passage shows that Barth is thinking of criticism according to historical criteria which could falsify his
interpretation. He is therefore a good example of the Straussian model. And in his clearest account
of interpretation which illuminates the subject-matter of the text, the preface to the second edition,
he asks 'why parallels drawn from the ancient world - and with such parallels modern commentators
are chiefly concerned - should be of more value for an understanding of the Epistle than the situation in which we ourselves actually are, and to which we can therefore bear witness' (p. 11). He
attacks an (imaginary) commentary in which 'a maze of contemporary parallels did duty for an
explanation' of what modern interpreters find difficult, and asks whether 'such a commentary could
really be called an interpretation' (p. 12).
1
This concern has been most persistently emphasized by W. Pannenberg.
3
A useful account of this is contained in G. E. Ladd, 'The Search for Perspective', Interpretation,
xxv (1971), 41-62. This conservative movement is of course not to be confused with the far more
sophisticated search for 'biblical theology' associated with Von Rad, Kraus, Gese, Stuhlmacher and
others.

STRAUSS AND 'NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY5

261

appropriating the witness of past cultures are more generally appreciated

today. They have been much discussed within the philosophy of the social
sciences by anthropologists and historians of religion1 and it is worth asking
how much historians of early Christianity may be able to learn from that
debate, once a Straussian separation of tasks has been achieved. An obvious
gap in New Testament studies is a convincing historical treatment of how the
authors thought of God. However little the doctrine(s) of God is (are)
thematized, the importance of this basic theme of all theology cannot be
denied, and historical analysis is required. One reason for its neglect may be
that at this point the need for theological interpretation is so pressing that the
historical task is by-passed. If so, the history of early Christian religion and
theology stands to gain from the Straussian separation of tasks. Its own theme
will be more clearly defined and it will be sufficiently detached to be able to
learn from whatever a freer theological interpretation can suggest about the
character of the subject-matter. By watching theological interpreters doing
this creative and daring task of venturing to say what religious texts mean
today, sensitive historians may pick up ideas about how to evoke for their
readers an awareness of what it is all about. Their extraordinarily difficult
historical task may be illuminated by the tradition of a community whose
claims to stand in a living continuity with these texts can to some extent be
tested. For example, the claim that religious texts speak of human existence is
a hermeneutical key provided by modern theological interpretation without
which historians will make no sense of the New Testament writings. With it
they can ask how adequately the early Christians' understanding of God interpreted the experience of themselves and their world which they shared
with their contemporaries.
Both sides should gain from a Straussian separation of the two main components in 'New Testament theology'. Of course the separation is only
partial.' Reconstruction' in the history of ideas is essentially a matter of interpretation, and interpretation of texts requires whatever light reconstruction of
the history can throw upon the tradition to be interpreted.2 Further, although
theological interpretation may bring more to the texts than a historian of
ideas would bring, it cannot establish an interpretation which historians
would brand as improbable. That tribute paid to modern historical rationality means that in practice historical and theological interpretations will
1
E.g. Bryan R. Wilson (ed.), Rationality (Oxford, 1970); D. Z. Phillips (ed.), Religion and Understanding (Oxford, 1967); Robin Horton and Ruth Finnegan (eds.), Modes of Thought. Essays on
Thinking in Western and Non-Western Societies (London, 1973).

8
Bultmann rightly insists that 'Neither exists, of course, without the other, and they stand constantly in a reciprocal relation to each other' {Theology of the New Testament, 11, E.T. (1955), p. 251).
But for him 'interpretation of the New Testament writings' stands 'under the presupposition that
they have something to say to the present'. The historical task is formulated here in a way that makes
room for the theological interest. But it is equally possible to acknowledge the two sides to historical
work, interpretation of the evidence and reconstruction of that to which it refers, without making
this presupposition.

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ROBERT MORGAN
1

frequently coincide. But the theoretical separation advocated here will

free interpreters from the constraints which prevent the sober and sceptical
historian from articulating the full meaning and positive significance of
documents about which we know so little. It may also encourage Christian
theologians who specialize in NT studies toflya few kites. They will soon be
shot down if they stray beyond the limits of historical plausibility. But instead
of claiming exclusive historical rights for their interpretations of the New Testament they would say: 'This is the sense I make of this authoritative piece of
tradition. If anyone finds my interpretation implausible let him falsify it by
historical argument. That is the means by which all bold new interpretations
must be tested for their validity.'
The debate between better and worse interpretations goes on. Some interpretations of Paul take up central emphases of Pauline theology and have
more right to appeal to him than others - including possibly some others
whose individual historical exegetical judgements are more often correct.
The main lines of theological continuity, visible for example between Paul
and Luther, are the most important features of any interpretation. They are
constructed out of individual exegetical judgements, but the mosaic is far
more than the sum of the stones. The artist's arrangement is decisive. Where
the evidence is as fragmentary as in the case of the New Testament there are
various possibilities of historical reconstruction, and nobody can claim to
project more than a possible historical sketch.
On this view the historian can claim a high degree of objectivity only for an
'identikit' type of outline whose main use is in disallowing portraits that are
clearly distortions. Genuine interpretation involves drawing more lines and
adding more colours than are to be found in the evidence. One approaches
the material with a prior understanding of its subject-matter and this provides a framework for interpreting it. This may be modified or corrected or
even abandoned in favour of another in the course of correlating it with the
(always partially) perceived witness of the texts and other relevant evidence,
but the hope is that it will vindicate itself by making sense of such evidence
as we possess.
Recognition of the subjective element of construction in all interpretation
constitutes an argument for declaring one's theological interests in advance.
That will not weaken the claim to validity for one's interpretation provided
that this does not strain the evidence. It might even strengthen its claim on
the grounds that someone who stands in the same tradition might well have
a better instinct for the author's intention.
Where does this Straussian separation place New Testament scholars?
Those who specialize in philology will always command respect and can if
necessary find a home in departments of classics and oriental languages.
Historians also are equipped to survive in profane surroundings. Only theo1

As Bultmann indicated: Anfdnge der dialektischen Theologie, n, 68.

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logical interpreters have nowhere to lay their heads in universities except in

departments of theology and religious studies. If they are worth their hire and
actually throw some light on the Christian religion, their work is the best
argument for the existence of such departments.
The honour which those who wish to be simply historians can expect in
institutions of learning does not always extend outside the ivory towers. To
judge from the reception of Strauss' first volume and the experience of many
other 'consistently historical' students of the New Testament, they can expect
a frosty reception from within the Christian Church. That is consistent with
the nature of the discipline whose significance for theology and Church is
essentially negative. Franz Overbeck was prepared to accept the logic of his
position as neither more nor less than an historian. He survived the ambiguity
of his personal position in a faculty of Christian theology to become a posthumous hero of those who, after the First World War, wanted to free theology
from the Babylonian captivity of'purely historical' research.
But Overbeck's remorselessly critical attitude to theology remains that of a
(perhaps prophetic) outsider. Most Christian students of the New Testament
are committed to engaging in theological interpretation. It is important that
they resist the insidious suggestion that when they take off the historian's hat
(or stick a few theological feathers in it) they are guilty of professional misconduct. If our study of these documents remains untheological both Church
and university will lose interest. Christians will have reason to feel frustrated
that the specialists who know best the most authoritative parts of their tradition are unwilling or unable to interpret it in ways which have some relevance
to our contemporary knowledge or experience of man, the world and God.
And students in secular universities will complain that their investigation of
the New Testament is not providing the data on Christianity which they had
a right to expect from attention to that religion's scriptures.
In practical terms, New Testament specialists cannot assimilate all that is
necessary to do theological interpretation without neglecting their historical
duties, and will therefore depend largely on systematic theologians to mediate
and help interpret for them contemporary experience of reality. Systematic
theology is as much a Hilfsdisziplin for the theological interpretation of the
New Testament as historical work on the New Testament tradition is a
Hilfsdisziplin for systematic theology. It would be better to speak of a relationship in which biblical scholar and systematic theologian stimulate, provoke and finally assist each other. Gabler's 'correct distinction' between
biblical and dogmatic theology was necessary in 1787 to free the historical
study of the Bible from the distorting effects of dogmatics' interest in its
results. Even as late as 1897, Wrede could only preserve the purity of historical work by banning the church's theological interests from 'scientific
theology' (so-called). The scientific rigour of historians, especially those of
the ' history of religions' school (such as Wrede), their intellectual fathers

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(especially Baur) and sons (especially Bultmann), has given the historical
critical study of the New Testament a place of honour in the study of religion.
But Baur and Bultmann were above all constructive theologians who saw as
their goal the theological interpretation of the tradition they analysed. The
purpose of our Straussian separation of the tasks they conflated is to serve that
same end. If we lack an idealist metaphysics of history broad enough to
include a theological programme in its bosom, and are dissatisfied with a view
of theology narrow enough to be fitted into an existentialist account of historiography, we shall have to abandon the identification of history and
theology in 'New Testament theology' and feel free to develop new theological interpretations of the earliest and most valued parts of the Christian
tradition. These will be subject to the critical scrutiny of historians but will
not be restricted to what historians can produce. It is necessary to look in
whatever diverse directions fragments of meaning and truth are to be found,
and dare to involve these in creative new interpretations.1
The theological interpretation of the New Testament, or that element of
'New Testament theology' which it has been the purpose of this Straussian
question to set free from the historians' constraints while insisting it remain
subject to their checks, is the purpose, crown and climax of all specifically
Christian study of the New Testament. Those who engage in it are rightly
called theologians - Christian theologians, not' biblical theologians'; that is a
phrase loaded with misunderstandings. If the study of the New Testament is
not to become a fringe activity of only secondary interest to Christian studies
and only negative significance within the Church, New Testament scholars
need to renew their licence to interpret theologically that part of the tradition
which they know best. Since theology is too important to be left to the dogmaticians it would be disastrous for New Testament scholars to retire from
the theological workshop and be satisfied with quarrying historical material
for systematic theology to use. No doubt a division of labour is necessary, and
some will remain historians or philologists and nothing else. These are perfectly legitimate activities - if only for a gifted minority. What is not acceptable is the suggestion that historical or philological work is the only proper
business of New Testament studies. This misunderstanding has been nourished
by the fiction that ' New Testament theology' is a purely historical activity.
Only when that fiction is destroyed will theological interpretation of the New
Testament revive. Its revival ought not to detract from the dignity and
necessity of historical critical work. That also has an important theological
function, albeit of a negative kind. Its sober criticism will not only check the
bolder theological spirits. More interestingly, the examples and successes of
Strauss, Baur and Bultmann show that its strategically placed dynamite may
1

Some scrutiny of what is brought into theological interpretation for its compatibility with the
tradition remains a necessary control. It was faced by those who allowed but controlled the use of
allegorical interpretation, e.g. Aquinas, S.T. 1. 1. 10.

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even eventually dislodge those whose excessive theological conservatism1

delays the exodus towards the new theological interpretations needed by a
thinking Church in a rapidly changing world. New Testament specialists
who see their most urgent task today to be that of developing these new
theological interpretations, and who realize that this will involve being more
than historians, will look back with admiration to the classical age of historical
criticism and will insist that the great tradition be kept alive. Historical truth
is valuable for its own sake, and even where the material is too sparse to allow
more than a relative plausibility to anyone's reconstructions it is often possible
to be fairly certain that some convenient fictions are false. And what is historically false cannot be theologically true.
In real life the critical function has neither the first nor the last word, but
in a celebration of Strauss' centenary it may be allowed both. Certainly a
theology which is not critical should not build tombs for the prophets on this
particular centenary.
1
See p. 257, n. 2. In the preceding sentence Bultmann speaks of his 'conservative New Testament
colleagues.. .perpetually engaged in salvage operations'.