CALUB V. CA, GR No.

115634, April 27, 2000

Replevin cannot be issued to recover a property lawfully taken by
virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law. A
replevin case against the State, without its consent, cannot prosper.
FACTS:
Petitioner from DENR apprehended two vehicles carrying illegally
sourced lumber and thereafter confiscated them. The owners of the
vehicles filed an action for replevin to recover the vehicles. They won in the
trial court on the ground that petitioner did not act in accordance with the
law. So petitioner appeals on the ground that the replevin in this case is a
suit against the State and is therefore valid.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not a replevin may be instituted for recovery of
property under custodia legis.
2) Whether or not replevin in this case is a suit against the State.

RULING:
1) No, replevin cannot be issued to recover a property lawfully taken
by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law.
2) Yes, this suit is not valid because the State may not be sued
without its consent or when the public official acted in bad faith in the
discharge of his duties. It has been established that the DENR acted within
its authority. Hence, its action is the action of the State.

G.R. NO. 108619 JULY 31, 1997

EPIFANIO LALICAN, PETITIONER, VS. HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA,
PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC BRANCH 52, PUERTO PRINCESA CITY AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
The petitioners were apprehended on the Sitio Cadiz, Barangay
Bacungan Puerto Princesa for violating Section 68 of PD No. 705 or known
as The Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines. There were 1, 800 board
feet of lumber loaded in two (2) passenger jeeps in different sizes and
dimension that were confiscated. On August 9, 1991, all the accused were
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Petioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information filed against
them contenting that, Section 68 of PD 705 does not include lumber
because the wording of the law categorically specify timber to be collected
as to constitute the violation on the said law. He further contends that, the
law is vague because it does specify the authority or legal documents
required by existing forest law and regulation. The prosecution opposed the
motion to quash on the ground that it is not the courts to determine the
wisdom of the law or to set the policy as rest by the legislature. He further
asserts that the word timber should include lumber which is a product or
derivative of a timber. The position of the prosecution could result to the
circumvention
of the law, for one could stealthily cut a timber and process it to become a
lumber. On September 24, 1991, the lower court construed the
interpretation of the law against the State thus the motion was granted.
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration on the order
underscoring the fact that the accused presented Private Land Timber
Permit No. 030140 dated February 10, 1991 which had expired; that while
the certificate of origin indicated Brgy. Sta. Cruz, the product actually came
from Sitio Cadiz, and that the two jeeps bearing the product were not
equipped with certificates of transport agreement. Added to this was the
fact that, if the product were indeed lumber, then the accused could have
presented a certificate of lumber origin, lumber sale invoices in case of
sale, tally sheets and delivery receipts for transportation from one point to
another. The motion was approved thus this case.
ISSUE:
Whether the term lumber is included in the concept of timber in order
to constitute an offense as stated in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705
(The Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines).

RULING:
No, the Court ruled that, the word lumber includes timber. The
primary reason why the law was enacted is to secure and maximize the
use of the natural resources; the non inclusion of lumber on the law may
give rise for the circumvention of law.
Section 68 of the said law punishes these acts namely (a) the cutting,
gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products from the
places therein mentioned without any authority; or (b) possession of timber
or other forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations. Be that as it may, the legislative intent
to include possession of lumber in Sec. 68 is clearly gleaned from the
expressed reasons for enacting the law which, under Executive Order No.
277. To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec. 68
would certainly emasculate the law itself. A law should not be so construed
as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted
as to afford an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create an
inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the law. After all, the phrase
"forest products" is broad enough to encompass lumbers which, to
reiterate, is manufactured timber. Hence, to mention lumber in Sec. 68
would merely result in tautology.

G.R. NO. 131270 MARCH 17, 2000

PERFECTO PALLADA, PETITIONER, VS . PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
FACTS:
Sometime in the latter part of 1992, DENR received a reports that
illegally cut lumber were delivered in the warehouse of Valencia Golden
Harvest Corporation in Valencia Bukidnon. DENR officers in collaboration
of PNP raided the companys warehouse and found a large stockpile of
lumber in varying sizes cut by a chainsaw. As proof that the company had
acquired the lumber by purchase, petitioner produced two receipts issued
by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard of Maramag, Bukidnon, dated March 6 and 17,
1992. The DENR officers did not, however, give credit to the receipt
considering that R. L. Rivero Lumberyard's permit to operate had long been
suspended. What is more, the pieces of lumber were cut by chain saw and
thus could not have come from a licensed sawmill operator.
On February 23, 1993, petitioner, as general manager, together with Noel
Sy, as assistant operations manager, and Francisco Tankiko, as president
of the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, and Isaias Valdehueza, were
charged with violation of section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended. During
the trial, the accused presented documents that the lumber are legally
obtained. This may include the certificate of origin. However, the court
found out that Pallada was guilty of the violation of PD 705 and the rest of
the accused were acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence. The case was
appealed to the CA and rendered a decision affirming the decision of the
lower court, thus this case was elevated.
ISSUE:
Whether a separate certificates of origin is used for lumber and
timber.
RULING:
Yes, there should be a separate Certificate of origin. The trial court
acted correctly in not giving credence to the Certificates of Timber Origin
presented by petitioner since the lumber held by the company should be
covered by Certificates of Lumber Origin. For indeed, as BFD Circular No.
10-83 states in pertinent parts: In order to provide an effective mechanism
to pinpoint accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and
to have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof, the attached
Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . which form[s] part of this circular [is]
hereby adopted as accountable forms for official use by authorized BFD
officers . . . .
5. Lumber . . . transported/shipped without the necessary Certificate of
Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . as herein required shall be considered as

proceeding from illegal sources and as such, shall be subject to

confiscation and disposition in accordance with LOI 1020 and BFD
implementing guidelines.
The irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which they are
found not only questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the trial court in
giving no credence to the same. The presence of such glaring irregularities
negates the presumption that the CTOs were regularly executed by the
DENR officials concerned.

G.R. NO. 136142 OCTOBER 24, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALFONSO
DATOR ET.AL ,
ACCUSED- APPELANT
FACTS:
Pator Teala and his co accused Alfonso Dator and Benito Genol were
charged with the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.
705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code. The accused while
transporting pieces of lumber bound to Maasin Souther Leyte, they were
apprehended by the police officer and seized pieces of lumber. As a result
SPO1 Bacala issued a seizure receipt covering the fifty-one (51) pieces of
confiscated Dita and Antipolo lumber and one (1) unit of Isuzu cargo truck
with Plate No. HAF 628. The confiscated pieces of lumber and the cargo
truck were turned over to SPO3 Daniel Lasala, PNP Property Custodian of
Maasin, Southern Leyte who, in turn, officially transferred custody of the
same to the CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte. The accused Telan alleged
that the pieces of lumber were cut from the track of land belonging to his
mother in San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte which he intended to use in
the renovation of his house in Barangay Abgao of the same municipality.
He further contends that he secured verbal permission to Boy Leonor an
officer-in -charge of the DENR.
The lower courts found out that the accused is guilty in violation of PD 705
sentencing the accused to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties provided by law, which is two (2)
degrees higher than PRISION MAYOR maximum, the authorized penalty
similar to Qualified Theft, and to pay the costs. Thus, this case was
elevated to the court.
ISSUE:
Whether the penalty imposed to Telan the accused is correct in
violation of PD 705.
RULING:
No, in the case at bench, the confiscated fifty-one (51) pieces of
assorted Dita and Antipolo lumber were classified by the CENRO officials
as soft, and therefore not premium quality lumber. It may be noted that the
said pieces of lumber were cut by the appellant, a mere janitor in a public
hospital, from the land owned by his mother, not for commercial purposes
but to be utilized in the renovation of his house. It does not appear that
appellant Telen had been convicted nor was he an accused in any other
pending criminal case involving violation of any of the provisions of the
Revised Forestry Code (P.D. No. 705, as amended). In view of the
attendant circumstances of this case, and in the interest of justice, the

basis for the penalty to be imposed on the appellant should be the

minimum amount under Article 309 paragraph (6) of the Revised Penal
Code which carries the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods for simple theft.Considering that the crime of violation of
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is punished as
qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to the
said decree, the imposable penalty on the appellant shall be increased by
two degrees, that is, from arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods to prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed on the appellant
should be six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor.

G.R. NO. 161798 OCTOBER 20, 2004

PICOP RESOURCES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. AUGUSTUS L.
CALO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RESPONDENT
FACTS:
Petitioner PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) owns and operates a
multi-billion peso pulp and paper manufacturing facility in Bislig City,
Agusan del Norte. It holds government-issued Pulpwood and Timber
License Agreement (PTLA) No. 47 and Integrated Forest Management
Agreement (IFMA) No. 35 which gave petitioner the exclusive right to comanage and develop with the State almost 130,000 hectares of forest land
within the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve. The Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), through its officers, rendered
three Memoranda, dated August 22, 1997, February 16, 2001 and April 6,
2001 designating the petitioner as DENR depository and custodian for
apprehended forest products and conveyances within its concession. On
May 25, 2001, the Office of the CENRO-Bislig and petitioner entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) containing "Procedural Guidelines in
the Conduct of Verification of Private Tree Plantation." The MOA provided,
among others, that field validation/verification of applications for Certificates
of Private Tree Ownership (CTPOs) shall be conducted jointly by the
DENR, the local government unit concerned, and petitioner. Pursuant to
these Memoranda, petitioners security personnel were deputized as DENR
officers to apprehend and seize the tools, equipment and conveyance used
in the commission of illegal logging and the forest products removed and
possessed by the offenders. In the course of the enforcement of the
aforesaid Memoranda, petitioner PICOP, through its security personnel,
had on numerous occasions apprehended within its concession and tree
plantation area. These illegally cut forest products and conveyances were
kept in PICOPs impounding area. A class suit was initiated among the
members of UFAB asking for preliminary mandatory Injunction. They
further asked for the declaration of the memoranda null and void and
sought to restrain the DENR and those who are participants from enforcing
the said memoranda. The RTC ordered Elias R. Seraspio, Jr. to recall,
withdraw and abrogate the enforcement of the assailed Memorandum
dated February 16, 2001 and to refrain and desist from implementation.
Petitioner was also ordered to release the confiscated falcata logs and
vehicles to the owners thereof, or to the CENRO-Bislig or the Office of the
Government Prosecution-Surigao del Sur, where the administrative and
criminal proceedings were ongoing.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has the right to retain the seized confiscated
products by the virtue of MOA regarding the Procedural Guidelines in the
Conduct of Verification of Private Tree Plantation.

RULING:
Petitioner had no right or interest to protect in the confiscated forest
products and conveyances. Petitioners compound was used only as a
depository for the confiscated logs and conveyances by virtue of the
Memorandum. While it claimed that some of the confiscated forest products
may have come from its concession area, petitioner admitted that the
ownership of the confiscated products was still to be determined in the
cases pending either at the CENRO-Bislig or at the Office of the
Government Prosecution- Surigao del Sur. Hence, petitioners interest in
the confiscated forest products was merely contingent and cannot be
material as contemplated under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. Petitioner contends that private respondents intrusion was
in violation of petitioners PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. These license
agreements gave petitioner the exclusive right to co-manage and develop
forest lands, and recognized petitioner as owner of the trees and other
products in the concession area. In filing this petition, petitioner is merely
defending its subsisting proprietary interest pursuant to these license
agreements. It is clear that petitioner has no material interest to protect in
the confiscated forest products and conveyances. It has no subsisting
proprietary interest, as borne out by its licensing agreements, which need
to be protected by annulling the writ of injunction issued by the trial court.
Petitioner also cannot claim the right to retain custody of the apprehended
logs and conveyances by virtue of its being designated a depository of the
DENR pursuant to the assailed Memoranda. As such depository, petitioner
merely holds the confiscated products and conveyances in custody for the
DENR while the administrative or criminal proceedings regarding said
products are pending.

G.R. No. 79538. October 18, 1990

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS
DEVELOPMENT
AND REALTY CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS:
On October 12, 1965, petitioner entered into a timber license
agreement with the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was issued an
exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited
species within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of
54,920 hectares located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva
Vizcaya from
October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990. However, on August 18, 1983, the
Director of the Bureau of Forest Development (Bureau), Director Edmundo
Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations in
Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging
concession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to
presidential instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of
Natural Resources Teodoro Pena. Subsequently, petitioners timber license
agreement was cancelled. He sent a letter addressed to then President
Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the Bureau's directive,
citing in support thereof its contributions to forest conservation and alleging
that it was not given the opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of
its logging operations, but no favorable action was taken on his letter;
Barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half of the area formerly
covered by petitioners TLA was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development
and Realty Corporation under a new TLA which was set to expire on July
31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas
Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or license. The latter
entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed
President Ferdinand Marcos. Soon after the change of government in
February 1986, petitioner sent a letter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office
of the President, and another letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto
Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the
reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was cancelled in
August 1983 during the Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of TLA
No. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks Development and Realty
Corporation without public bidding and in violation of forestry laws, rules
and regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take
possession of all logs found in the concession area. However, petitioner's
request was denied. Petitioner moved for reconsideration reiterating,

among others, its request that the timber license agreement issued to
private respondent be declared null and void. The MNR however denied
this motion. Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR
to the Office of the President. The Office of the President, acting through
then Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, denied petitioner's
appeal for lack of merit. Petitioner filed with the Court a petition for
certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction,
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has the right to seek the nullification of the
Bureau orders cancelling his timber license agreement and the granting of
TLA to private respondent, which were issued way back in 1983 and 1984,
respectively.
RULING:
No. The failure of petitioner to file the petition for certiorari within a
reasonable period of time renders the petitioner susceptible to the adverse
legal consequences of laches. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled thereto has either abandoned it of declined to assert it. The
rule is that unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to
enforce an alleged right may, depending upon the circumstances, be
destructive of the right itself. Verily, the laws did these who are vigilant, not
those who sleep upon their rights. In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at
least three years before it finally filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984.
Considering that petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction, was not
deprived of the opportunity to seek relief from the courts which were
normally operating at the time, its delay constitutes unreasonable and
inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari
requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie. There is a more significant
factor which bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner
and against public respondents herein. A long line of cases establish the
basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed
to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and
training of such agencies. More so where, as in the present case, the
interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public
at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. For this
Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the
government in determining the appropriate actions to be taken to preserve
and manage natural resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy
the privilege of utilizing these resources. Timber licenses, permits and

license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State

regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely
evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not
vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when
national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within
the purview of the due process of law clause.

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed
OPOSA,
minors, and represented by their parents petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as
the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
and THE
HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
FACTS:
This case is unique in that it is a class suit brought by 44 children,
through their parents, claiming that they bring the case in the name of their
generation as well as those generations yet unborn. Aiming to stop
deforestation, it was filed against the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources seeking to have him cancel all the
timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist
from accepting and approving more timber license agreements. The
children invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to
protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. The petitioners
claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to stop
issuing them was "contrary to the highest law of humankind-- the natural
law and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation."
The case was dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on nonimpairment of contracts, so it was brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether children have the legal standing to file the case?
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the
children had the legal standing to file the case based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility. Their right to a healthy environment
carried with it an obligation to preserve that environment for the succeeding
generations. In this, the Court recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of
future generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-impairment of
contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power of the state in
the interest of public welfare.

G.R. No. 120365 December 17, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILSON B. QUE,
accused appellant
FACTS:
Provincial Task Force got wind that a that a ten-wheeler truck bearing
plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through
Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information, members of the PTF went on
patrol
several times within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City.
On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and
SPO1 Elmer Patoc went on patrol around the area. At about1:00 in the
morning, they posted themselves at the corner of General Segundo Avenue
and Rizal Street. Thirty minutes later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck with
plate number PAD-548 pass by. They followed the truck and apprehended
it at the Marcos Bridge.On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged
before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag with violation of Section 68 of P.D.
705as amended by E.O. 277. The Information alleged that, on or about the
8th day of March, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then
the owner of an I(s)uzu Ten Wheeler Truck bearing Plate No. PAD-548, with
intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
possession, control and custody 258 pieces of various sizes of Forest
Products Chain saw lumber (Species of Tanguile) with a total volume of
3,729.3 bd. ft. or equivalent to 8.79 cubic meters valued in the total amount
of P93,232.50 atP25.00/bd. ft., necessary permit, license or authority to do
so from the
proper authorities Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He
claimed that he acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a legal
source. During the trial, he presented the private land timber permits
(PLTP) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) to Enrica Cayosa and Elpidio Sabal The PLTP authorizes its holder
to cut, gather and dispose timber from the forest area covered by the
permit. He alleged that the tanguile lumber came from the forest area
covered by the PLTPs of Cayosa and Sabal and that they were given to
him by Cayosa and Sabal as payment for his hauling services.
ISSUE:
Whether the appellants activities consist an offense

RULING:
Yes, Possession of the lumber without the necessary permit is a
violation of the RFC. When the police apprehended Que, he failed to
present documentary evidence to prove that he has the permit to possess
and transport the lumber. All he had was the permit for the coconut slabs.
He even concealed the lumber so as to avoid it from being seen upon first
inspection of the load. Under the circumstances, there is no doubt that the
accused was aware that he needed documents to possess and transport
the lumber, but could not secure one and therefore, concealed such by
placing it in such a manner that it could not be seen by merely looking at
the cargo. There are 2 ways of violating Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry
Code:
a. by cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products
without licence and
b. by possessing timber or other forest products without required legal
documents. In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of
said acts. However, in the second offense, mere possession without proper
documentation consummates the crime.

GR NO. 152989. SEPTEMBER 4, 2002

ROLDAN, JR. PETITIONER V. HON, MADRONA ET.AL. RESPONDENTS
FACTS:
On August 9, 2001, petitioner applied for a Private Land Timber
Permit (PLTP) from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
for him to cut some trees for a proposed road and poultry farm in his
property. He also paid all the fees required by the various government
agencies. While waiting for the permit to be issued, petitioner was allegedly
informed by some employees from the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) that he could proceed with the cutting of trees
even though his application was still awaiting approval. Consequently,
petitioner proceeded with the cutting of trees and bulldozing of the
roadway. He used the cut logs as materials to build his chicken cages.
About three weeks later, representatives of the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources and personnel from the Intelligence Service, Armed
Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) of Tacloban City raided petitioners place,
allegedly without a search warrant. An inventory of the cut trees was
conducted there were 872 pieces of sawn lumber/flitches (8,506 board feet)
and three felled timber logs with a total market value of P235,454.68 at
P27.00 per board foot.
ISSUE:
a. Whether a person who cuts trees for his own use within his property
without the necessary permit from the DENR and without transporting the
same outside said property, be criminally charged for violating PD 705?
b. Whether the owner of a private property is administratively liable under
Section 14 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-21 despite the fact that
he did not transport the logs out of his property and used them for his own
agricultural purposes.
RULING:
a. Yes, Under Section 68, PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, it is clear
that the violators of the said law are not declared as being guilty of qualified

theft. As to the assertion that his penalty for cutting trees in his own land
should not be equated with that for qualified theft, suffice it to say that the
judiciary is never concerned with the wisdom of the law. Whether or not the
legislature was correct in imposing on violators of PD 705 a penalty equal
to that imposable on those guilty of qualified theft is a question beyond the
power of the Court to resolve. It is a settled rule that the fundamental duty
of the Court is to apply the law regardless of who may be affected, even if
the law is harsh -dura lex sed lex
Section 14 of Administrative Order No. 2000-21, the Revised Guidelines in
the Issuance of Private Land Timber Permit/Special Private Land Timber
Permit, provides:
SEC. 14. Penal Provisions. - Any log/timber or finished-wood
products covered by these regulations which are transported without the
prescribed documents shall be considered illegal and, therefore, subject to
confiscation in favor of the government and shall be disposed in
accordance with laws, rules and regulations governing the matter.
b. No, The rule is clear. The aforementioned administrative order
considers the mere act of transporting any wood product or timber without
the prescribed documents as an offense which is subject to the penalties
provided for by law.

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND

NATURAL RESOURCES VS MAYOR JOSE YAP
These are two consolidated cases.
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al filed for declaratory relief to have a
judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes
for the land theyve been occupying in Boracay. Yap et al alleged
that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on
their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they
themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in
Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They
declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that
Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed
part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not
available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code. Since Boracay Island had not
been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had
cannot ripen into ownership. RTC Ruled in favor of Yap et al. The OSG
appealed.
G.R. No. 173775
During the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, in May 2006, then
President
Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
1064
classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved
forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100
(628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each
side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and

which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection
purposes.
Subsequently, Dr. Orlando Sacay, and other Boracay landowners in
Boracay filed with the Supreme Court (SC) an original petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They
alleged that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over
portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their
respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested
billions of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally
renowned first class resorts on their lots.
The OSG again opposed Sacays petition. The OSG argued that Sacay et
al do not have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island.
Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD
No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are
inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect
title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority
to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands.
There is a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for
disposition.
ISSUES:
Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any
legal obstacle for Yap et al and Sacay et al, and all those similarly situated,
to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.
RULING:
Yes. The SC ruled against Yap et al and Sacay et al. The Regalian
Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands that have not
been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong
to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required.
In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, there must be
a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes. In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented. The
records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of
Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a
government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent
such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the
submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to

disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification

cannot be assumed.
Also, private claimants also contend that their continued possession of
portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under
Act No. 926 ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Private
claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a
presumption that the land is alienable. It is plain error for petitioners
to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No.
926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights
over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites for
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141,
namely:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under
a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12,
1945; and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to
prove the first element of possession. The SC noted that the earliest of the
tax declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993.
Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince
this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced on
June 12, 1945.
Yap et al and Sacay et al insist that they have a vested right in Boracay,
having been in possession of the island for a long time. They have invested
millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their
continued possession and investments give them a vested right which
cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private
claimants do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do
these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are presently
occupying. The SC is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the
evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence
stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of
title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued
possession and considerable investment in the island.

CHU VS TAMIN,AM NO. RTJ-03-1786 AUGUST 28,2003

BON VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ,GR NO. 152160, JANUARY

13,2004