Center for International Trade and Security

Nonproliferation, Demilitarization and Arms Control

Vol. 3/4, No. 4/1

Fall 1997/Winter 1998

IN THIS ISSUE
CHALLENGES OF MISSILE PROLIFERATION
The Threat Of Cruise Missile Proliferation Requires Urgent Coordinated Actions
by Gennady Khromov ............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 3
The Pitfalls Of Rogue Country Analysis
by Seth J. Axelrod .................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 6

RUSSIA SIGNS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Destruction Of Chemical Weapons In Russia Is An International Challenge
by Sergei Kortunov and Sergei Vikulov ............................................................................................................................................................................... 11
Destruction Of Russias CW Stockpile: A Progress Report On International Assistance
by Benjamin C. Garrett ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 14
On The Ratification Of The Convention On The Prohibition Of Development, Production, Stockpiling And Use Of Chemical
Weapons And On Their Destruction
Federal Law of the Russian Federation ................................................................................................................................................................................. 15

EXPORT CONTROLS IN THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA

An Introduction To Chinas Export Control System
by Fu Cong .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 17
Play By International Rules: The Development Of Chinas Nuclear Export Controls
by Richard Weixing Hu ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 19
U.S., China And Nonproliferation: Potential Steps Forward
by Bates Gill ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 27
Regulations Of The Peoples Republic Of China On the Control of Nuclear Exports .......................................................................................... 32
Commentary by Richard T. Cupitt .................................................................................................................................................................................... 34

EXPORT CONTROLS IN NEW INDEPENDENT STATES

Belarus Export Control Developments And Participation In Multilateral Nonproliferation Regimes
by Andrei Makavchik .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 35
Export Control System In The Republic Of Georgia
by David Bakradze and Mamuka Kudava ........................................................................................................................................................................... 37

FEATURE
The Desirability Of International Sanctions Against False Allegations Of Use Of Biological Weapons
by Milton Leitenberg ............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 39

DOCUMENTS
Procedures For Controlling Exports, Import And Transit Of Goods Which Can Be Used In Manufacturing Chemical, Bacteriological (Biological) And Toxin Weapons
Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine ...................................................................................................................................................................... 46
On Measures To Enhance State Control Over Foreign Trade Activity In The Sphere Of Military And Technical Cooperation
Between The Russian Federation And Foreign States
Decree of the President of the Russian Federation ................................................................................................................................................................ 51
Procedures For Controlling The Exports To Iraq Of Dual-use Goods And Technologies, And Other Items Subject To International Permanent Monitoring And Control Mechanisms
Edict of the RF Government ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 53
Secretary Cohen Releases a New DOD Report On Proliferation ............................................................................................................................ 57
Press-Release Of The RF Ministry Of Atomic Energy ............................................................................................................................................... 57
About the Contributors .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 59

BOOKNOTES
Nuclear Proliferation: Danger And Prevention.
by Fangfang Gao .................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 60
Russias Missile Power: The Past And The Future
by Dmitriy Nikonov ............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 61

NEWS FROM THE CENTER

Briefing for the State Duma in Moscow ....................................................................................................................................................................... 62
Workshop on Conventional Weapons Transfers in Moscow .................................................................................................................................... 62
NIS Research Group Meets in Kiev .............................................................................................................................................................................. 63
Symposium on China in Athens, GA ............................................................................................................................................................................ 63
Workshop in Tokyo .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 64
Delta Funds International Prize at the University of Georgia .................................................................................................................................. 64
Visitors to the Center ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 65
Center Researchers in India ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 65
An Upcoming Book .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 65

Vol. 3/4, No. 4/1

6
THE PITFALLS OF ROGUE COUNTRY ANALYSIS1
by Seth J. Axelrod

nalysts, according to one former

provider of intelligence, must clearly
distinguish between fact, inference, and
judgement. 2 Variations on this sentiment can be
found throughout the published literature on
Intelligence Community (IC) trade craft. Indeed, the
consensus of opinion has it that the analytical
soundness of any assessment, whether produced for
consumers of intelligence or the public at large, relies
on this simple injunction.3 Yet, as a general rule of
thumb, the more complex and controversial an issue,
the greater the difficulty in maintaining analytical
rigor. Nowhere is this more clearly evident than in
the development of analyses on rogue country
ballistic missile programs.
The debate generated by the findings of National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 95-19, Emerging Missile
Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years,
demonstrated vividly how significant weaknesses
and deficiencies in analytical approach may result in
- at a minimum - sloppy analysis, and - at a
maximum - controversial and, perhaps, seemingly
politicized assessments.4 By contrast, the analysis of
a nongovernmental research institution was held up
as a model assessment. According to one observer,
on point after point, the Institute for Foreign Policy
Analysis (IFPA) study, Exploring U.S. Missile Defense
Requirements in 2010, compared to NIE 95-19, makes
a compelling case for arriving at a virtually opposite
set of conclusions.5
The lack of an unambiguous appreciation of the
ballistic missile threat, as evidenced by contrasting the
two assessments mentioned above, and an analysis
of others,6 illustrates the emergence of - what Alvin
and Heidi Toffler have termed - a kind of
informational big bang: To whit, the establishment
of a third wave competitor or rival store next door
to the spy shop. 7 This rival store, while not
providing everything needed by a government or its
military, can provide a vast amount, often faster and
cheaper. In essence, it is increasingly taking on the task
of preforming a free and publicly available Team B
assessment.8 This fact was not lost on the Heritage
Foundation which refers to its Missile Defense Study
Team as Team B, nor has it been lost on the IFPA
which clearly states that its work is designed to assist
members of the policy community....9 Nor are the
services these store next door shops provide lost
on consumers of intelligence. Rep. Curt Weldon,
Chairman of the House Research and Development
Subcommittee, noted with some distress that if one
relied only on NIE 95-19 for an assessment of the
future ICBM threat, you would not even know that
the views contained in the IFPA study existed.10
Vol. 3/4, No. 4/1

However, unlike the Intelligence Community (IC),

whose methods and analytical approaches are, for
good reason, the subject of severe scrutiny and debate,
no such corresponding debate has emerged regarding
how this rival store next door conducts its analysis,
handles and weighs its evidence, or presents its
findings. 11 More precisely, the methodology and
analytical approaches of citizen- analysts require
equal scrutiny if, in fact, we are to consider them
providers of credible views, and intend to
counterpoise them, as Rep. Weldon and others have
suggested, against the views expressed by the IC.
Indeed, a review of methodology is all that more
imperative considering the increasing feedback loop
between official intelligence assessments/reports and
the work of outside analysts. While the outside analyst
has always relied to some degree on official reports,
testimony, and other evidence made available for
public consumption, increasingly the IC is making
more and more use of public domain information,
including that produced by citizen-analysts. It is
clear, according to the Commission on the Roles and
Missions of the US Intelligence Community, that
open sources do provide a substantial share of the
information used in intelligence analysis....its use in
intelligence analysis can only grow.12
In an effort to broaden the discussion on
methodological considerations beyond the IC, to
include the growing body of nongovernmental
analysts, this article provides a summary of seven
inter-related analytical prescriptives, considerations
and admonitions. Many of these considerations were
addressed by the Government Accounting Office
(GAO), the Independent Gates Panel, and others in
the course of debate on the findings of NIE 95-19.13
These are equally applicable to the outside analyst and
the news media. However, for those outside the realm
of officialdom, who rely on public domain sources
(e.g., official statements and assessments, journal and
news reports, and other types of openly available
information), the difficulties of developing good
analysis are multiplied exponentially and, in many
ways, go beyond the analytical prerequisites of
producing good intelligence assessments. For this
reason, additional admonitions beyond those offered
by the GAO are also offered.
It should be observed that this list is by no means
exhaustive; nevertheless, it is instructive for what it
says in terms of handling and weighing the available
public domain literature, and in attempting to develop
credible, analytically consistent, assessments of third
world ballistic missile programs. Furthermore, while
many of these considerations were derived from
examinations of analyses on ballistic missile
programs, their application to the analysis of other
weapons development programs may also prove
beneficial.

7
Information Gaps: First and foremost, there is a
need to note explicitly information gaps, and when
such gaps can have significant consequences for the
issues under consideration.14 Primarily, this caution
speaks to the degree of transparency of the targets
being examined. So-called rogue country programs
are typically shrouded in secrecy, and are by their very
nature designed to avoid detection and observation.
This fact is often overlooked in many analyses; is
hidden behind assumptions and judgements which are
often presented and/or mistaken as fact and; its
understatement may create the impression that more
is known than is actually the case. Indeed, in a rare
admission of the problems pervading analysis of
rogue country programs, Aaron Karp notes in the
introduction to his own work:
The greatest shortcoming....is perhaps the
weakness of the data upon which it
relies...little is know about regional
programmessometimes only general
characteristics such as the approximate age
of a programme and range of a missile. In
some cases not even the names of the missile
are known.15
In many instances this information gap extends
well beyond specific knowledge of a particular missile
system to include the whole range of inputs required
to pursue a missile program, e.g., defense facilities,
program management, etc. The significance of this
consideration can not be overstated, particularly as it
informs and feeds into many of the admonitions and
considerations discussed below. For the analyst, this
is a case in which highlighting what is not known may
be as informative to an intended audience as
emphasizing what is known
Circular Verification: Closely related to the
issue of information gaps, is the problem of circular
verification. This relates to the phenomenon of
unconfirmed sources confirming unconfirmed
sources - an occurrence that happens quite often
within the nonproliferation literature and news
media. This snow-balling effect generates an
enormous volume of reportage and, whether rightly
or wrongly, may lend an unjustified air of artificial
legitimacy to the original reporting. The effect of
circular verification is that unconfirmed reporting
in many instances becomes part of conventional
wisdom, serving to fill in information gaps that would
otherwise be left blank.
This is not to suggest that the information
contained in such reports is necessarily inaccurate.
Often times, if reports are traced back to their original
source, it is clear that the analyst/reporter has
caveated the information. Nevertheless, the dangers
inherent in circular verification are readily
apparent. Above all, it holds the potential for
poisoning the information well; recirculating

information which may be less than accurate. The

attraction of such information for the analyst is also
readily apparent: the desire to fill in information gaps
with hard-to-come-by news of a rogue countrys
weapons program may outweigh the requirements of
analytical rigor. In consequence, various types of
information, e.g., the name of a foreign missile system,
the identification of production or research facilities,
the number and type of foreign technical advisors
assisting in a weapons program, etc., are often picked
up and reported by others as fact. In turn, this may
contribute to thoughtlessly simplistic speculation
and generalization or corrupt threat assessments.
It is for this very reason that the validation of such
open source materials was considered one of several
problems of its use within the intelligence and policy
making community by the Commission on Roles and
Capabilities.16
The phenomena of circular verification
illustrates how pieces of information may find their
way into conventional wisdom. Furthermore, it
illustrates how the shear repeated volume of reportage
may create the illusion that more may be happening
than is otherwise the case. The caution for analysts is
to take care in what is presented as fact and to be alert
to the possibility of exaggeration and unsupported
speculation.
Manipulation/Politicization: A third admonition
is the possibility that official reports and statements
regarding ballistic missile proliferation may be skewed
or manipulated for reasons of foreign or defense
policy, or for some other reason dictated by political
necessity. Obviously this would be a highly cynical
way of viewing public domain evidence. Nevertheless,
one need only look at the political controversy
generated by NIE 95-19 to see that the possibility may
exist.17 Indeed, this would not be the first time that
intelligence agencies have been charged with
cooking intelligence reports or creating Paper
Tigers. The issue was raised not too long ago
regarding military assessments of the former Soviet
Union.
Two noted analysts of Third World ballistic missile
proliferation, Eric Arnett and Aaron Karp, have
suggested one possible motivation for the
manipulation of official reports and statements. Both
have cautioned, for example, that Israeli and US
defense officials have been eager to identify projects
to develop medium and long range missiles with
ranges greater than 1,000 km - such as those now
believed to be under development in North Korea and
Iran - to justify ABM type systems with much greater
capabilities than the Patriot system. 18 It is not
difficult to discern where other possible motivations
e.g., preserving or improving relations with China,
Russia or other countries, could feed into and inform
the outcome of official estimates or reports. The U.S.
Fall 1997/Winter 1998

8
Defense Departments (DoD) recently released report,
Proliferation: Threat and Response, offers another
possible example where such considerations may
have tempered the assessment of government
analysts. Despite over a year of high profile
intelligence leaks, congressional hearings and news
reports, all indicating that the pace and progress of
Irans medium and long range missile programs have
quickened due to Russian assistance, the Pentagon
merely identified the North Korean medium range No
Dong and Taepo Dong 1 and 2 as Potential Missile
Delivery Systems for Iran, with North Korea being
the Potential Source of assistance in their
development.19
This consideration extends also to the treatment
of reports and materials produced by various interest
groups, e.g., political action committees, lobby
organizations, exile groups and others, where there
may be a definite and perceptible bias in the
information they present. Is this admonition enough
to discount such reporting? Not necessarily, however,
it is enough to give the analyst pause to view such
reporting with a more circumspect eye and to look at
the broader policy context and international
framework within which particular ballistic missile
developments occur.
Quantification: GAO has observed that the use
of unquantifiable words or phrases such as unlikely,
likely, probably, normally, sometimes, some
leakage, and feasible, but unlikely may all
contribute to misperceptions and obscure the certainty
level associated with key judgements. This is
particularly so regarding official assessments, such as
NIEs, where such language is not of much help to
someone trying to make an important decision, and
in which different people can have radically differing
interpretations from the same words.20 Once again,
the significance of this consideration and its potential
implications for policy can not be overstated, and can
be easily seen by contrasting one of the key
judgements of NIE 95-19 with subsequent missile
developments.
In congressional testimony on NIE 95-19, Richard
Cooper, Chairman of the National Intelligence
Council, stated: we are likely to detect any indigenous
program to develop a long-range ballistic missile
many years before deployment even allowing for the
acquisition of some foreign technology by countries
of interest.21 Yet, recent intelligence leaks and other
reporting suggests that Iran, with foreign assistance, is
now within two years of a 1,500 km ballistic missile
system. The most recent and glaring demonstration
of the failure to observe this admonition can be found
in the Defense Departments recent report
Proliferation: Threat and Response which notes, for
example, it is likely Russian technological support or
training will continue to find its way to such countries,
Vol. 3/4, No. 4/1

sometimes without necessarily gaining Moscows

approval.22
This same problem is evident in the work of
analysts operating outside official frameworks. Di
Hua, among others, has observed: Perceptions by
their very nature are subjective, even when described
by independent researchers striving to be impartial.
This subjectivity means that threat perceptions can
be manipulated or misrepresented, sometimes quite
cynically.23 Clearly, quantification is no easy task,
especially as it relates to so murky a problem as the
analysis of rogue country proliferation programs,
where many of the inputs may be far from
quantifiable. Nevertheless, certain aspects of such
programs, e.g., aerospace learning curves, R&D cycles
and other aspects of ballistic missile development
which are known and can be extrapolated upon from
past experience, may lend themselves to some degree
of quantification and analytical rigor. At the very
minimum, the GAOs key conclusion regarding NIEs
may be equally applied to the outside analyst:
quantify the certainty level of...judgements by using
percentages or bettors odds, where feasible, and
avoid overstating the certainty of judgements,
particularly in light of information gaps.24
Linchpin Assumptions: The published IC
literature notes that analysts should identify explicitly
assumptions and judgements, as distinct from facts.
Critical or linchpin assumptions, are defined by
CIA as analysts debatable premises that hold the
argument together and warrant the validity of
judgements. 25 Ideally, this prescriptive should be
observed by both the intelligence analyst and the
independent analyst. However, more often than not,
distinguishing between assumptions, judgements and
facts can prove problematic. This was certainly found
to be the case with NIE 95-19.26 Moreover, developing
defensible premises supported by fact has proven
equally difficult. Fact based evidence of procurement
or technical assistance, for example, does not
necessarily support an assumption that it will
translate quickly or effectively into operational
capabilities. Nor does it necessarily support an
assumption or judgement of secret, malign intent on
the part of a particular country or countries. This is
especially relevant as it pertains to countries
identified as rogue. In this vain, Richard Cuppitt has
observed:
Most policy-makers in the United States
accept evidence, such as Iranian purchasing
activities, that indicates these states are
attempting to acquire WMD and pose a
military threat to their neighbors. Concerns
within the U.S. government, however, about
the degree of threat...have proven less than
convincing to other governments.27
Along similar lines, Eric Arnett has observed,

9
procurement decisions (to the extent that they are
decisions at all) are often affected more strongly by
other factors... such as domestic political
circumstances, financial resources, industrial
infrastructure, existing technological conditions and
a host of other possible inputs.28 Here, the admonition
to the analyst is two fold. First, the identification of
multiple factors, as Arnett and others have suggested,
may better enable the formulation of better and more
supportable assumptions regarding the nature and
intent of a country in pursuing a particular weapons
program. Second, analysts should be cognizant of the
fact that alterations in any one particular factor, e.g.,
a countrys leadership, program management,
weapons development strategy, cancellation of
contracts, etc., may impact on assumptions regarding
intent. Indeed, there is a small body of anecdotal
evidence within the nonproliferation literature to
indicate that such alterations have in fact impacted
upon the direction of a countrys weapons
development programs and the threat they may
represent29 .
Alternative Scenarios: Following from the later
point: Both the GAO and outside analysts have
recognized the need for the development and
exploration of alternative futures: less likely (but
not impossible scenarios that would dramatically
change the estimate if they occurred).30 While the
nature and types of scenarios developed by NIEs are
classified and prevent any substantive comment, this
is one area in which those operating in the store next
store have begun to give considerable thought.Karp
notes, in previous studies there has been a tendency
to go directly to the question of how to deal with the
problem [of proliferation], overlooking the more
fundamental problem of understanding the political
and technological forces that make missile
proliferation possible to begin with.31 One benefit
of moving beyond the traditional approach, and into
the development of multifactoral scenario develoment
is that it enables, as Arnett et al. note, ...a better
judgement of how the responsible organizations
within states convert a variety of inputs into relevant
outputmilitary capacity.32 An additional benefit
of scenario development is that it helps establish an
independent basis for evaluating the implications of
proliferation in general and the efforts of specific
countries to master proliferation technologies.
Clearly, modeling and scenario development is an
area of growing interest and one that proliferation
analysts can build upon.
Technology Scenarios: Closely related to the
previous point, is the issue of technology scenarios. It
has long been recognized within the nonproliferation
literature that there is more than one route to the
development of a weapon of mass destruction. Fears
that civilian space launch programs may serve as

precursors to the development of long rang ballistic

missiles is but one example. Yet the development of
technology scenarios, even less likely ones, have been
noticeably lacking within the nonproliferation
literature. The debates, surrounding the findings of
NIE 95-19, elevated this analytical deficiency to a new
level, with the Gates Panel observing: This estimate
fails to ask a critical question: What if our potential
adversaries pursue approaches, technical or
otherwise, unexpected by the intelligence community?
The consequences of being wrong on this issue are very
high.33
There is a world of difference between what is
required technically for a crude terror weapon and
what is required for a weapon that is militarily useful.
This simple fact is, again, often overlooked or
understated in governmental and nongovernmental
assessments, and particularly in media reporting,
where there are often implicit assumptions made
regarding the speed or quality of weapons
development programs. In the case of media
reporting there is an obvious need to question whether
what is reported makes credible sense in terms of
what is known of the technology and techniques of
missile manufacturing. Here, perhaps, more than in
the case of other analytical admonitions offered above,
there is reason to take a closer look at what is being
said about weapons development efforts.
Here the imperatives for analysts, both official and
citizen, are substantial. First, the work of analysts is
better served by an understanding of the technology
and techniques of weapons development than not.
Second, there is a clear need to study carefully the
possibility of technically feasible threats, not only
threats for which we actually see nations conducting
tests and assembling components.
Conclusions: While those charged with providing
the government with good and accurate analysis are,
at least in theory, tasked with maintaining the highest
standards of objectivity in an effort to provide toughminded evaluation of information, description of
sources, and explicit defense of their judgements,
those outside officialdom should equally take stock,
in as much as their analysis and reporting contribute
toward the formation of public opinion and influence
the decision-making process. This is all the more
necessary if, as the Commission On the Roles and
Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community notes,
openly available sources are increasingly becoming a
substantial share of intelligence analysis. For these
reasons, nongovernmental analysts should be looking
for ways in which to increase the level of analytical
rigor in their work.
Endnotes:
1
For the purposes of this article, the debate as to
what constitutes a rogue country is bypassed.
Fall 1997/Winter 1998

10
References to rogue countries are based on the general
consensus in the U.S. that North Korea, Libya, Iraq,
and Iran fall within this category. For a discussion on
what constitutes a rogue see: Richard T. Cupitt,
ViewPoint: Target Rogue Behavior, Not Rogue
States, The Non proliferation Review, Vol. 3, No. 2,
Winter 1996, pp. 46-54
2
Former CIA Director Robert Gates cited in a letter
from Rep. Curt Weldon, Chairman, Research and
Development Subcommittee to Gates, January 17,
1997; The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis,
Exploring U.S. Missile Defense Requirements in 2010:
What are the Policy and Technology Challenges?
(Washington, D.C., April 1997).
3
For a general overview of this literature see:
Foreign Missile Threats: Analytical Soundness of Certain
National Intelligence Estimates (GAO/NSIAD-96-225,
August 30, 1996). Hereafter, GAO/NSIAD-96-225.
4
The Presidents summary of NIE 95-19 can be
obtained at http//www.fas.org.spp/starwars/
offdocs/nie9519.htm
5
Opening Statement of Rep. Curt Weldon,
Chairman, Research and Development Subcommittee,
Hearing on North Korean and Iranian, and
Worldwide Missile Threats, May 7, 1997.
6
See, for example: The Cato Institute, Countdown
to Disaster: The Threat of Ballistic Missile Proliferation,
Foreign Policy Briefing No. 10, (Washington, D.C.,
July 1991); The Heritage Foundation, Defending
America: Americas Vulnerability to Ballistic Missiles,
(Washington, D.C., March 1996 and 1997 update),
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat
and Response (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1996 and 1997). Additional studies are listed
in GAO/NSIAD-96-225, pp. 10-13.
7
Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War (New
York: Warner Books, 1993), p. 189.
8
The concept of a Team B first arose in 1975
following growing concerns expressed by experts
outside the U.S. government that the official
assessment of the Soviet Unions military build-up
was significantly understated. Then-CIA director
George Bush arranged to have the CIAs estimates
formally second guessed by a Team B which
proceeded to produce a much different evaluation of
the Soviet threat. On the need for Team B assessments
see: Frank J. Gaffney, Director, Center for Security
Policy, testimony before the House National Security
Committee, The Ballistic missile Threat to the U.S. and
Its Allies, February 28, 1996.
9
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, op. cit. note
2, p. iv.
10
Opening Statement of Rep. Curt Weldon, op. cit.
note 5.
11
One notable exception to this is Eric Arnett, ed.
Military Capacity and the Risk of War: China, India,
Pakistan and Iran (New York: Oxford University Press,
Vol. 3/4, No. 4/1

SIPRI, 1997).
12
Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the
US Intelligence Community, Preparing for the 21st
Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence, Chapter 8
Improving Intelligence Analysis, obtained online at:
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/report.htm
13
Congress directed the Director of the CIA to
review the underlying assumptions and conclusions
of NIE 95-19. The legislation required that this review
be carried out by an independent, non-governmental
panel of individuals. Former Director of the CIA
Robert Gates was named chair of this Panel. The
report of the Gate panel can be located at http//
www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/oca961908.htm .
Others formally commenting on NIE 95-19 before the
House or Senate include: Former CIA Director
Woolsey, former Presidential Science Advisor
William R. Graham, and Director of the Center for
Security Studies Frank J. Gaffney.
14
GAO/NSIAD-96-225, p. 8
15
Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The
Politics and Technics, Sipri (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996), pp. 6-7.
16
Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the
US Intelligence Community, op. cit. note 12.
17
Certain members of Congress implied that the
IC analysts views had been influenced by policymakers or individual policy preferences. See: Bill
Gertz, Panel Wrong to Deny Politics in Missile Study,
Weldon Says Republican Wants Criticism of
Defective Defense Study, The Washington Times,
January 23, 1997, p. A7.
18
Authors communication with Arnett; Aaron
Karp, The New Politics of Missile Proliferation,
Arms Control Today, October 1996, p. 10.
19
The section on Iran in Proliferation: Threat and
Response can be located online at: http//
www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/toc.html
20
GAO/NSIAD-96-225, p. 4
21
Richard N. Cooper, Chairman, National
Intelligence Council, testimony before the House
National Security Committee, Emerging Missile Threat
to North America During the Next 15 Years, February
28, 1996.
22
The section on Russia can be located online at:
http//www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/toc.html
23
Hua Di, Threat Perception and Military
Planning in China: Domestic Instability and the
Importance of Prestige, in Arnett, op. cit, note 11, p.
25.
24
GAO/NSIAD-96-225, p. 1.
25
Ibid., p. 5.
26
Ibid., pp. 5-6.
27
Cupitt, ViewPoint: Target Rogue Behavior, Not
Rogue States, p. 47.
28
Arnett, Military Capacity and the Risk of War, p.
10. Karp develops a similar theme in his work.

11
29

For useful examples see Karp, Ballistic Missile

Proliferation: The Politics and Technics, pp. 80 and 86.
30
The GAOs review of NIE 95-19 notes that it
did not account for alternative economic and political
futures...[but] did address some less likely
technical options, including the characteristics and
implications of a potential ICBM program of one
country. GAO/NSIAD-96-225, p. 7.
31
Karp, p. 2
32
Arnett, p. 8.
33
op cit., note 13; also see the statesments by
William R. Graham and Frank F . Gaffney to the
House National Security Committee, February 28,
1996.

Russia Signs
Chemical Weapons Convention
DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN
RUSSIA IS AN INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGE
by Sergei Kortunov and Sergei Vikulov

he Convention on the Prohibition of the

Development, Production, Stockpiling, and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their
Destruction (CWC) was ratified by the State Duma of
the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation
October 31, 1997. Several days later, the Federation
Council adopted a similarly positive resolution. On
the same day Russian president Boris Yeltsin signed
the Law on Ratification.
A serious challenge by the opponents of
ratification has been overcome. At the end of the 20th
century, filled with wars, which claimed tens of
millions of lives, asserting the necessity to preserve,
and, therefore, to use CW is immoral. But there still
remain advocates of CW as the most cost-effective
means to eliminate the enemy. They are in various
ways opposed to the ratification of the convention,
and there was, and continues to be, a discussion with
them on that issue.
Among the most active opponents of ratification
were the Duma members Colonel General Albert
Makashov, a former Commander of the Privolzhski
Military district (where significant quantities of CW
are stored), and Deputy Stepan Sulakshin from Tomsk
Oblast. In his address at the seminar Military
Doctrine and the Concept of Military Development
in Russia: Experience, Theory and Practice on April
3, 1997, Gen. Makashov said that if we ratify the
Convention as it stands now, we will be economically
bankrupt. We used to be driven bankrupt by the arms
race, now by the disarmament race. No way!
Gen. Makashov underestimated American

cunning: only three weeks after his speech the United

States ratified the Convention. The second argument
of Makashov and Sulakshin that there is not enough
money for CW destruction is not very convincing
either, because the unratified Convention would not
bring revenues, and the longer the weapons remain,
the more dangerous they become. Besides, failure to
ratify the Convention would drastically reduce our
chances to continue to receive assistance from abroad,
which, although not very large, is still very useful.
For a little over six months, parliamentary
hearings have featured speeches proclaiming that
ratification of the Convention would not meet
Russias interests, that there are threats from the
outside which must be countered by CW. Conditions
for ratification have been voiced: assistance based on
the agreements, financial guarantees from the Russian
budget, information about facilities to be destroyed,
cost of destruction and control measures. A number
of deputies made demands, which, although
manageable, require time; and time is a scarce
commodity. Failure to ratify the Convention would
have had very undesirable implications for Russia: key
positions in the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) would have been
assigned to representatives of other countries;
obtaining financial assistance for the destruction of
CW would have become virtually impossible; and
sanctions from various international, including trade,
organizations, would have been quite probable. All
this was clearly stated in the letter from OBCW
Director General Jose M. Bustini to the Duma Speaker
Gennady Seleznev of September 29, 1997. Thus, the
future of CW is definitely determined: the stockpiles
must be destroyed and the threat to population
eliminated.
In the meantime, the environmental situation in
Russia has become alarming because of excess
chemicals (e.g., CW agents, fuel components,
radioactive waste), and a number of other factors.
Among them, but not limited to, are military-related
factors, such as nuclear explosions (almost 2,000),
accidents and catastrophes on nuclear submarines
and industrial sites on the Techa River near
Chelyabinsk, at Chernobyl, at Tomsk-7, the dumping
of radioactive waste and CW agents (in Baltic Sea,
e.g.), falling of used booster rocket segments and
subsequent contamination of the area with remaining
heptil, unused fuel released by aircraft during
emergency landings, ammunition explosions at
warehouses the list can continue.
The scale of environmentally hazardous activities
is illustrated by the following data: Russia produces 7
billion tons of waste annually; the amount of toxic and
hazardous waste containing mercury, chromium and
other substances, reaches 1.6 billion tons. To diminish
the damage (such as done by the Chernobyl and Urals
Fall 1997/Winter 1998