VILLEGAS V.

HIU CHONG

FACTS
Section 1 of Ordinance no. 6537 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any position,
business or occupation, whether permanent, temporary, or casual without first securing an employment permit from
the Mayor of Manila with a P50 permit, except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign
countries, in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and
those working in their respective households, and members, of religious orders or congregations, sect or
denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.
Private respondentHiuShong Tsai PaoHo who was employed in Manila filed a petition restraining the order to stop the
enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537, and declaring the ordinances judgment null and void.
He said that as a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful occupation, since
imposing a fixed P50 employment permit is out of the proportion of the registration cost. Further, it is arbitrary,
oppressive and unreasonable being applied only to aliens who are deprived of their rights to liberty, and property;
hence violates the due process and equal protection clauses.
The respondent judge rendered judgment declaring the said ordinance null and void; hence contested by Mayor
Villegas in his instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent judge committed a serious and patent error of law in ruling that Ordinance No. 6537
violated the due process and equal protection clause of the constitution

RULING:
No.
The ordinance in question violated the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at
will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood.
While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is
admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood.
The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and
citizens.
KWONG SING VS. CITY OF MANILA [41 Phil 103; G.R. No. 15972; 11 Oct 1920]
Friday,
January
30,
2009
Posted
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

by Coffeeholic

Writes

Facts: Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general and the same interest, filed a
complaint for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of enforcing Ordinance No. 532 by the
city of Manila. Ordinance No. 532 requires that the receipt be in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed showing
the kind and number of articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments. The permanent
injunction was denied by the trial court. The appellants claim is that Ordinance No. 532 savors of class legislation;
putting in mind that they are Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates between persons in similar circumstances;
and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights. They also contest that the enforcement of the
legislation is an act beyond the scope of their police power. In view of the foregoing, this is an appeal with the
Supreme
Court.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond the scope of police power
(2) Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that infringes property rights.

Held: Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible under the police power. The police
power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section 2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744, authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila, with the
approval
of
the
mayor
of
the
city:
(l)

To

regulate

and

fix

the

amount

of

the

license fees for

the

following:

xxxx

xxxxxlaundries

xxxx.

(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city
and
its
inhabitants.
The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid disputes between laundrymen and their
patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to decipher Chinese characters from being defrauded.
(Considering that in the year 1920s, people of Manila are more familiar with Spanish and maybe English.)
In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the ordinance invades no fundamental right, and
impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an attempt is not made to violate personal property
rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public laundries
without distinction, whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without
exception, and each every one of them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. The obvious objection for
the implementation of the ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code. Although, an additional
burden will be imposed on the business and occupation affected by the ordinance such as that of the appellant by
learning even a few words in Spanish or English, but mostly Arabic numbers in order to properly issue a receipt, it
seems that the same burdens are cast upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of person or property are subjected to
restraint, and even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance, this is not sufficient ground
for failing to uphold the power of the legislative body. The very foundation of the police power is the control of private
interests
for the
public welfare.
Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a preliminary injunction is denied, with
costs against the appellants.
Yu Cong Eng
FACTS
The petitioners are Chinese merchants claiming to represent themselves and all other persons similarly situated and
affected, particularly twelve thousand Chinese merchants.
The allegations of the petition center on the unconstitutionality of Act No. 2972
Act No. 2972. AN ACT TO PROVIDE IN WHAT LANGUAGE ACCOUNT BOOKS SHALL BE KEPT, AND TO ESTABLISH
PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATION.
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, company, partnership or corporation engaged in commerce,
industry or any other activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with existing law,
to keep its account books in any language other than English, Spanish or any local dialect.
SEC. 2. Any person violating the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more
than ten thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than two years or both.
On March 2, 1923, the agents of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, in the exercise of their legitimate functions, inspected
the books of account of the Chinese merchant Yu Cong Eng. Upon finding that said books were not kept in accordance
with their understanding of the provisions of Act No. 2972, they took possession of the merchant's books and referred
the matter to the city fiscal of Manila for appropriate action.
The city fiscal, considering that Yu Cong Eng had committed a violation of the law, on March 7, 1923, caused an
information to be filed, subscribed, and sworn to before Judge of First Instance Concepcion. This information alleged in
substance that the accused merchant had kept his books of account "only in Chinese, instead of keeping or causing
them to be kept in English, Spanish, or any local dialect, thus rendering it difficult for the agents and authorized
representatives of the Government of the Philippine Islands and of the City of Manila, to examine and inspect the
aforementioned books of account, thereby preventing and hindering the investigation and determination of all the
amount that said accused was, is, or will be under obligation to pay for licenses, permits, and taxes." A warrant of
arrest was issued by the Judge of First Instance before whom the information was filed, and in compliance therewith,
the accused merchant, now become the instant petitioner, was arrested.

ISSUE:
WON Act No. 2972 is constitutional
HELD:
The Chinese petitioners are accorded treaty rights of the most favored nation. Their constitutional rights are those
accorded all aliens, which means that the life, liberty, or property of these persons cannot be taken without due
process of law, and that they are entitled to the equal protection of the laws, without regard to their race. Act No. 2972
is a fiscal measure which seeks to prohibit not only the Chinese, but all merchants of whatever nationality from making
entries in the books of account or forms subject to inspection for taxation purposes in any other language than either
the English or Spanish language or a local dialect. The law only intended to require the keeping of such books as were
necessary in order to facilitate governmental inspection for tax purposes. The Chinese will not be singled out as a
special subject for discriminating and hostile legislation since there are other aliens doing business in the Philippines.
There will be no arbitrary deprivation of liberty or arbitrary spoliation of property. There will be no unjust and illegal
discrimination between persons in similar circumstances. The law will prove oppressive to the extent that all tax laws
are oppressive, but not oppressive to the extent of confiscation. Act No. 2972 as meaning that any person, company,
partnership, or corporation, engaged in commerce, industry, or any other activity for the purpose of profit in the
Philippine Islands, shall keep its account books, consisting of sales books and other records and returns required for
taxation purposes by regulations of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, in effect when this action was begun in English,
Spanish, or a local dialect, is thus valid and constitutional.
Ichong vs Hernandez
FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are
not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the peoples economic life.
a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly
owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade
aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business, unless their
licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten
years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term.
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.
provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the laws on nationalization,
economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry.
provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or
branches of retail business
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships affected by the Act,
filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:
it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due
process
the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
the Act violates international and treaty obligations
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.

HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws.
There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the
legislative classification adopted.

RATIO:

The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike.

The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of
police power.

Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the retail trade. It is this
domination and control that is the legislatures target in the enactment of the Act.

The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien
is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his
living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or
emergency.

While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the country, the alien may become
the potential enemy of the State.

The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit.
Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on the
nations economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.
VINTA MARITIME CO., INC. and ELKANO SHIP MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and LEONIDES C. BASCONCILLO, respondents.

FACTS:
LeonidesBasconsillo, private respondent, filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
IPOEA) for illegal dismissal against Vinta Maritime Co. Inc. and Elkano Ship Management, Inc. petitioners alleged that
Leonides was dismissed for his gross negligence and incompetent performance as chief engineer of the M/V Boracay.
The POEA ruled that private respondent was illegally dismissed. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the POEA. Likewise, the
NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondent is illegally dismissed.
Held:
The absence of a valid cause for termination in this case is apparent. For an employees dismissal to be valid, (1) the
dismissal must be for a valid cause and (2) the employee must be afforded due process. Petitioners allege that
private respondent was dismissed because of his incompetence, enumerating incidents in proof thereof. However, this
is contradicted by private respondents seamans book which states that his discharge was due to an emergency
leave. Moreover, his alleged incompetence is belied by the remarks made by petitioners in the same book that private
respondents services were highly recommended and that his conduct and ability were rated very good .
Petitioners allegation that such remark and ratings were given to private respondent as an accommodation for future
employment fails to persuade. The Court cannot consent to such an accommodation, even if the allegation were true,
as it is a blatant misrepresentation. It cannot exculpate petitioners based on such misrepresentation. When petitioners
issued the accommodation, they must have known its possible repercussions.

Due process, the second element for a valid dismissal, requires notice and hearing.Before the employee can be
dismissed under Art. 282, the Code requires the service of a written notice containing a statement of the cause/s of
termination and giving said employee ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. A notice of termination in
writing is further required if the employees dismissal is decided upon. The employer must furnish the worker with two
written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of
the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought and (2) subsequent notice which informs the
employee of the employers decision to dismiss. The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential
elements of due process, and neither of these elements can be eliminated without running afoul of the constitutional
guaranty.
Illegally dismissed workers are entitled to the payment of their salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of their
employment where the employment is for a definite period. Conformably, the administrator and the NLRC properly
awarded private respondent salaries for the period of the effectivity of his contract.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. The challenged decision and resolution are affirmed.

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,

vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC
NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY,
respondents.
______________________________________________________________________
STATES INHERENT POLICE POWER AND DUE PROCESS
FACTS:
On 1980, President Ferdinand E. Marcos amended Executive Order No. 626 such that henceforth, no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to
confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions
as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fir, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving
farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
On January 13, 1984, Ynot (petitioner) had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they
were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for violation of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The petitioner sued for recovery and the Regional Trial Court in Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin (an action or a writ
issued to recover an item of personal property wrongfully taken) upon petitioners filing of a supersedeas bond
(defendants bond that suspends the authority of a trial court to issue an execution on a judgment that has been
appealed) of P12,000. The RTC sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be
produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive
order for lack of authority and presumed validity.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which upheld the trial court so the petitioner
has come to the Supreme Court to petittion for review on certiorari (judicial review).

ISSUE:

WON Executive Order No. 626-A is constitutional?

WON police power is properly enforced?
According to Petitioner, he said that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes ouright confiscation
of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid
beacuse it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as
guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as
constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.
RULING:
NO, the executive orders defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which
was carried out fortright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to
be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
The supreme court finds the measure an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law, and worse, is unduly oppressive. Due
process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the
guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein
who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we
hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
The court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional
questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolvingthe same whenever warranted, subject only to review by
the highest tribunal.
Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner.
No costs.
JAVIER VS COMELEC
Due Process impartial and competent court
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan in May 1984 in
Antique. During election, Javier complained of massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering
and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the
armed men of Pacificador. COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd Division
of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but
to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division
ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case
before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside
as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably
made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner.
Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also,
the proclamation was made by only the 2 ndDivision but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC
en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the
petition close it being moot and academic by virtue of Javiers death.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gens tenor. The SC has repeatedly and consistently
demanded the cold neutrality of an impartial judge as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that
requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be
sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge,
otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his
judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the
rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court
already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the
litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not
orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a
prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the
evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

Paderanga vs. Azura

Re: Impartial and Competent Court

FACTS

Paderanga, mayor of Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental, petitioned that Judge Azura should inhibit himself from
deciding on pending cases brought before him on the grounds that (1) they have lost confidence in him, (2)
that he entertained tax suits against the city and had issued TROs on the sales of properties when it is clearly
provided for by law (Sec 74 PD 464) that the remedy to stop auction is to pay tax, and (3) that Judge Azura is
biased, oppressive and abusive in his power.

Respondent Judge denied the Petition for Inhibition on the ground that loss of trust and confidence by
petitioner in his neutrality is unfounded, notwithstanding the administrative charges filed against him, and that
the plea for inhibition was prompted more because the "City Attorney (petitioner's counsel) appears to have
persisted in his grotesque arguments and haughty conduct in his subsequent pleadings which already
constitute direct contempt for which he may be cognizant of his inevitable punishment, and for which reason
he now entertains the resultant fears from his own indiscretions, to appear before this presiding judge.

ISSUE
WON Judge Azura should inhibit himself from the trial.

HELD

As decided in the Pimentel Case (21 SCRA 160), All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good
occasion as any to draw attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to
try and decide fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties. A judge
may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might
be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances
reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should
exercise his discretion in a way that the peoples faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. . .

The reminder is also apropos that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of
doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge.

Respondent Judge is hereby ordered to inhibit himself from hearing the cases enumerated in paragraph 4 of
the Petition involving the City of Gingoog or its officials, including petitioner. The venue of said cases is hereby
transferred to Cagayan de Oro City each to be assigned by raffle to the Regional Trial Courts thereat.
SO ORDERED.

Filemon David vs Judge Gregorio Aquilizan et al

Due Process Hearing
CASE DIGEST

David has a large parcel of land in Polomolok, Cotabato. He let Felomeno Jugar and Ricardo Jugar tend and caretake
separate portions of his land in 1971. The land is estimated to be yielding 60-70 cavans of corn cobs an dthe share
agreed upon is 50-50. In 1973, David withdrew the land from the brothers and has not allowed them to go back there.
The brothers prayed for reinstatement but David refused to do so. David denied that the borthers were his tenants. He
said that Ricardo was his tractor driver before but he resigned to take care of his dad and to work for DOLE.
Fewlomeno on the other hand surrendered the portion of the land he was tending to continue his faith healing. J
Aquilizan handled the case filed by the brothers against David and after three months he rendered a decision in favor
of the brothers without any hearing. David averred he was denied due process. J Aquilizan admitted that there was
indeed no hearing conducted but he said the decision has already become final and executory as the period for appeal
has already lapsed.

ISSUE: Whether or not David is entitled to an appeal.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of David. A decision rendered without a hearing is null and void and may be attacked
directly or collaterally. The decision is null and void for want of due process. And it has been held that a final and
executory judgment may be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation when the judgment is void for lack of
due process of law. In legal contemplation, it is as if no judgment has been rendered at all.

DEVELOPMENT
BANK
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
LOURDES GASPAR BAUTISTA, THE DIRECTOR OF THE LANDS and THE NATIONAL TREASURER OF THE
PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees.
Jesus
A.
Avancea
for
plaintiff-appellant.
Lourdes
Gaspar
Bautista
in
her
own
behalf
as
defendant-appellee.
Assistant Solicitor General Antonio Torres, Solicitor Francisco J. Bautista and Special Attorney Daniel G. Florida for
defendants-appelles Director of Lands, et al.
FERNANDO, J.:
The question this appeal from a judgment of a lower court presents is one that possesses both novelty and
significance. It is this: What is the right, if any, of a creditor which previously satisfied its claim by foreclosing
extrajudicially on a mortgage executed by the debtor, whose title was thereafter nullified in a judicial proceeding
where she was not brought in as a party?

As creditor, the Development Bank of the Philippines now appellant, filed a complaint against one of its debtors,
Lourdes Gaspar Bautista, now appellee, for the recovery of a sum of money representing the unpaid mortgage
indebtedness, which previously had been wiped out with the creditor bank acquiring the title of the mortgaged
property in an extrajudicial sale. Thereafter, the title was nullified in a judicial proceeding, the land in question being
adjudged as belonging to another claimant, without, however, such debtor, as above noted, having been cited to
appear in such court action.
The Development Bank was unsuccessful, the lower court being of the view that with the due process requirement
thus flagrantly disregarded, since she was not a party in such action where her title was set aside, such a judgment
could in no wise be binding on her and be the source of a claim by the appellant bank. The complaint was thus
dismissed by the lower court, then presided by Judge, now Justice, Magno Gatmaitan of the Court of Appeals. Hence,
this appeal by appellant bank.
Such dismissal is in accordance with law. There is no occasion for us to repudiate the lower court.
From the very statement of facts in the brief for appellant bank, the following appears: "On or before May 31, 1949,
the defendant-appellee, Lourdes Gaspar Bautista, who shall hereafter be referred to as Bautista, applied to the
Government for the sale favor of a parcel of land with an area of 12 has., 44 ares, and 22 centares, located at Bo.
Barbara, San Jose, Nueva Ecija. After proper investigation, Sales Patent no. V-132 covering said property was issued in
her favor on June 1, 1949 (Exh. A-1) by the Director of Lands. Sales Patent No. V-132 was registered in the office of the
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496 on June 3, 1949 (Exh. A), as a result of which
Original Certificate of Title No. P-389 was issued in her favor." 1
How the loan was contracted by now appellee Bautista was therein set forth. Thus: "On July 16, 1949, Bautista applied
for a loan with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor in interest of the plaintiff-appellee
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), offering as security the parcel of land covered by O.C.T. No. P-389. Aside
from her certificate of title, Bautista also submitted to the RFC other documents to show her ownership and possession
of the land in question, namely, Tax Declaration No. 5153 (Exh. A-4) in her name and the blueprint plan of the land. On
the basis of the documents mentioned and the appraisal of the property by its appraiser, the RFC approved a loan of
P4,000.00 in favor of Bautista. On July 16, 1949, Bautista executed the mortgage contract over the property covered
by O.C.T. No. P-389 and the promissory note for P4,000.00 in favor of RFC (Exhs. C and C-1), after which the proceeds
of the loan were released."2
The satisfaction of the mortgage debt with the acquisition of the title to such property by appellant Bank, by virtue of
an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, and such title losing its validity in view of a court proceeding, where however,
appellee Bautista, was not made a party, was next taken up in the brief of plaintiff-appellant. Thus: "Bautista failed to
pay the amortization on the loan so that the RFC took steps to foreclose the mortgage extra-judicially under Act 3135,
as amended. In the ensuing auction sale conducted by the sheriff of Nueva Ecija on June 27, 1951, the RFC acquired
the mortgaged property as the highest bidder (Exh. D). On the date of the sale, the total obligation of Bautista with the
RFC was P4,858.48 (Exh. I). On July 21, 1952, upon failure of Bautista to redeem the property within the one (1) year
period as provided bylaw, plaintiff-appellant RFC consolidated its ownership thereon (Exhs. E and E-I). On July 26,
1952, the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija cancelled O.C.T. No. P-389 and replaced it with T.C.T. No. NT-12108 in the
name of the RFC (Exhs. F and F-1). On or about this time, however, an action (Civil Case No. 870) was filed by Rufino
Ramos and Juan Ramos in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija against the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the RFC (as successor in interest of Bautista) claiming ownership of the land in question and seeking
the annulment of T.C.T. No. 2336 in the name of the Government, O.C.T. No. P-389 in the name of Bautista and T.C.TG.
No. NT-12108 in the name of the RFC. A decision thereon was rendered on June 27, 1955 (Exhs. G, G-1, and G-3)
whereby the aformentioned certificates of title were declared null and void." 3
Why the complaint had to be dismissed was explained thus in the decision now on appeal: "The Court after examining
the proofs, is constrained to sustain her on that; it will really appear that she had never been placed within the
jurisdiction of the Nueva Ecija Court; as the action there was one to annual the title, it was an action strictly in
personam, if that was the case as it was, the judgment there could not in any way bind Lourdes who had not acquired
in said decision in any way for what only happened is that as to the mortgage, the Bank foreclosed, and then sold unto
Conrada and when the title had been annulled, the Bank reimbursed Conrada; stated otherwise, the annulment of
Lourdes' title was a proceeding ex parte as far as she was concerned and could not bind her at all; and her mortgage
was foreclosed an the Bank realized on it, when the Bank afterwards acquiesced in the annulment of the title and took

it upon itself to reimburse Conrada, the Bank was acting on its own peril because it could not have by that, bound
Lourdes at all."4
As stated at the outset, the decision must be affirmed. The fundamental due process requirement having been
disregarded, appellee Bautista could not in any wise be made to suffer, whether directly or indirectly, from the effects
of such decision. After appellant bank had acquired her title by such extrajudicial foreclosure sale and thus, through its
own act, seen to it that her obligation had been satisfied, it could not thereafter, seek to revive the same on the
allegation that the title in question was subsequently annulled, considering that she was not made a party on the
occasion of such nullification.
If it were otherwise, then the cardinal requirement that no party should be made to suffer in person or property without
being given a hearing would be brushed aside. The doctrine consistently adhered to by this Court whenever such a
question arises in a series of decisions is that a denial of due process suffices to cast on the official act taken by
whatever branch of the government the impress of nullity. 5
A recent decision, Macabingkil v. Yatco,6 possesses relevance. "A 1957 decision, Cruzcosa v. Concepcion, is even more
illuminating in so far as the availability of the remedy sought is concerned. In the language of this Court, speaking
through Justice J.B.L. Reyes: 'The petition is clearly meritorious. Petitioners were conclusively found by the Court of
Appeals to be co-owners of the building in question. Having an interest therein, they should have been made parties to
the ejectment proceedings to give them a chance to protect their rights: and not having been made parties thereto,
they are not bound and can not be affected by the judgment rendered therein against their co-owner Catalino
Cruzcosa. Jr. ....' Two due process cases deal specifically with a writ of execution that could not validly be enforced
against a party who was not given his day in court, Sicat v. Reyes, and Hamoy v. Batingoplo. According to the former:
'The above agreement, which served as basis for the ejectment of Alipio Sicat, cannot be binding and conclusive upon
the latter, who is not a party to the case. Indeed, that order, as well as the writ of execution, cannot legally be
enforced against Alipio Sicat for the simple reason that he was not given his day in court.' From the latter: 'The issue
raised in the motion of Rangar is not involved in the appeal for it concerns a right which he claims over the property
which has not so far been litigated for the reason that he was not made a party to the case either as plaintiff for a
defendant. He only came to know of the litigation when he was forced out of the property by the sheriff, and so he filed
the present motion to be heard and prove his title to the property. This he has the right to do as the most expeditious
manner to protect his interest instead of filing a separate action which generally is long, tedious and protracted.'"
Reinforcement to the above conclusion comes from a codal provision. According to the Civil Code: 7 "The vendor shall
not be obliged to make good the proper warranty, unless he is summoned in the suit for eviction at the instance of the
vendee. "While not directly in point, the principle on which the above requirement is based sustains the decision of the
lower court. In effect, appellant bank would hold appellee Bautista liable for the warranty on her title, its annullment
having the same effect as that of an eviction. In such a case, it is wisely provided by the Civil Code that appellee
Bautista, as vendor, should have been summoned and given the opportunity to defend herself. In view of her being
denied her day in court, it would to be respected, that she is not "obliged to made good the proper warranty."
In the suit before the lower court, the Director of Lands and the National Treasurer of the Philippines were likewise
made defendants by appellant bank because of its belief that if no right existed as against appellee Bautista, recovery
could be had from the Assurance Fund. Such a belief finds no support in the applicable, law, which allows recovery only
upon a showing that there be no negligence on the part of the party sustaining any loss or damage or being deprived
of any land or interest therein by the operation of the Land Registration Act. 8This certainly is not the case here,
plaintiff-appellant being solely responsible for the light in which it now finds itself. Accordingly, the Director of Lands
and the National Treasurer of the Philippines are likewise exempt from any liability.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the Development Bank of the Philippines.
Lorenzana v. Cayetano
Due Process Hearing
Lorenzana was renting a parcel of land from the Manila Railroad Company (later from the Bureau of Lands). She later
purchased the land (San Lazaro Estate). She had the property be rented to tenants occupying stalls. Due to
nonpayment of rents, she filed 12 ejectment cases against her tenant. On the other hand, Cayetano was an occupant
of a parcel of land adjacent to that of Lorenzanas land. Cayetano was renting the same from the Bureau of Lands. The

lower court granted Lorenzanas ejectment cases. Lorenzana then secured a writ of execution to forcibly eject her
tenants but she included to eject Cayetanos property. Cayetano was not a party to the ejectment cases so she prayed
for the lower court that her property be not touched. The lower court denied Cayetanos petition. The CA, upon appeal,
favored Cayetano. Lorenzana averred that Cayetano is now a party to the ejectment cases as she already brought
herself to the Courts jurisdiction by virtue of her appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cayetanos right to due process has been violated.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Cayetano and has affirmed the CA. It must be noted that respondent was not a party to
any of the 12 ejectment cases wherein the writs of demolition had been issued; she did not make her appearance in
and during the pendency of these ejectment cases. Cayetano only went to court to protect her property from
demolition after the judgment in the ejectment cases had become final and executory. Hence, with respect to the
judgment in said ejectment cases, Cayetano remains a third person to such judgment, which does not bind her; nor
can its writ of execution be informed against her since she was not afforded her day in court in said ejectment cases.

People vs. Beriales

[No. L-39962 April 7, 1976]
Judicial Due Process: Notice and Hearing
Facts:
Ricardo Beriales, BenedictoCustodio and PablitoCustodio were convicted of the crime of murder by CFI of
Leyte. They have allegedly murdered one Saturnina Gonzales Porcadilla on September 14, 1974. Upon the
hearing, appellants counsel moved for a reinvestigation of the case which was granted. Trial court postponed
hearing until December 17 and 18, 1974. The fiscal filed a motion to defer the hearing until such time as the
reinvestigation shall have terminated. The trial court, however, motuproprio cancelled the Dec. 17 & 18
hearing and reset the arraignment and trial to December 10 and 11, 1974. At the December 10 hearing,
counsel of appellants manifested to the court that the city fiscal had set the reinvestigation on December 12,
1974 and had already sent subpoenas to the witnesses. The court nevertheless proceeded to hearing the next
day, December 11. Upon appellants counsels insistence, the court relying on constitutional mandate of the
right to a speedy trial, re-scheduled the hearing to December 13.
On the day of the trial, counsel asked to the court to wait for the City Fiscal to appear since the Fiscal might be
able to report on the reinvestigation. However, the court insisted on arraigning the appellants. Appelants
refused to give a plea because they are waiting for the fiscal, the trial court entered a plea of Not Guilty for
each of them. Appellants counsel manifested that they could not go to trial without the City Fiscal. For the
same reason, counsel refused to cross-examine the witnesses presented. Counsel reiterated that they do not
agree with the trial when defense was called to present evidence. Trial court considered the case to be
submitted for decision and announced promulgation of the decision on December 17.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the trial court should hold the trial until after there investigation
(2) Whether or not appellants were denied due process
(3) Whether or not the fiscal should be present during proceedings
Held:
(1) After the trial court granted the appellants motion for reinvestigation, it became incumbent upon the court
to hold in abeyance the arraignment and trial of the case until the City Fiscal shall have conducted and made
his report on the result of such reinvestigation.
(2) When the trial court ignored the appellants manifestations objecting to the arraignment and trial of the
case, it committed a serious irregularity which nullifies the proceedings because such procedure is repugnant
to the due process clause of the Constitution.
(3) Although fiscal turns over active conduct of trial to private prosecutor, he should be present during the
proceedings. While there is nothing in the rule of practice and procedure in criminal cases which denies the
right of the fiscal to turn over the active conduct of the trial to a private prosecutor, nevertheless, his duty to
direct and control the prosecution of criminal cases requires that he must be present during the proceeding.
DISPOSITION:

The decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the trial court for another
arraignment and trial.
Republic v Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 155832)
FACTS:
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Commissioner Daza gave written authority to two lawyers to
sequester any property, documents, money, and other assets in Leyte belonging to Imelda Marcos. A sequestration
order was issued against the Olot Resthouse in Tolosa, Leyte. Imelda Marcos filed a motion to quash claiming that such
order was void for failing to observe Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations. The Rules required the signatures of at
least 2 PCGG Commissioners.
The Republic opposed claiming that Imelda is estopped from questioning the sequestration since by her acts ( such as
seeking permission from the PCGG to repair the resthouse and entertain guests), she had conceded to the validity of
the sequestration. The Republic also claims that Imelda failed to exhaust administrative remedies by first seeking its
lifting as provided in the Rules; that the rule requiring the two signatures did not yet exist when the Olot Resthouse
was sequestered; and that she intended to delay proceedings by filing the motion to quash.

Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash and ruled that the sequestration order was void because it was signed
not
by
the
2
commissioners
but
by
2
agents.
Hence
the
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether

or

not

the

sequestration

order

is

valid.

HELD:
No. The Order is not valid. Under Sec. 26, Art 18 of the Constitution, a sequestration order may be issued upon a
showing of a prima facie case that the properties are ill-gotten wealth. When the court nullifies an Order, the court
does
not
substitute
its
judgment
for
that
of
the
PCGG.

In the case, the PCGG did not make a prior determination of the existence of the prima facie case. The Republic
presented no evidence to the Sandiganbayan. Nor did the Republic demonstrate that the the 2 PCGG representatives
were given the quasi-judicial authority to receive and consider evidence that would warrant a prima facie finding. The
Republic's evidence does not show how the Marcoses' acquired the property, what makes it ill-gotten wealth,and
how
Ferdinand
Marcos
intervened
in
its
acquisition.

As regards the issue on estoppel, a void order produces no effect and cannot be validated under the doctine of
estoppel. The Court cannot accept the view that Imelda should have first sought the lifiting of the sequestration order.
Being
void,
the
Sandiganbayan
has
the
power
to
strike
it
down
on
sight.
*Decision of Sandiganbayan affirmed and orders the annotation of lis pendens on the title of the Olot Resthouse with
respect to the claim of the Republic in another civil case.

PEDRO CALANO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
PEDRO CRUZ, respondent-appellee.
J. R. Nuguid for appellant.
Emilio A. Gangcayco for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
For purposes of the present appeal the following facts, not disputed, may be briefly stated. As a result of the 1951
elections respondent Pedro Cruz was proclaimed a councilor-elect in the municipality of Orion, Bataan, by the Municipal
Board of Canvasser. Petitioner Pedro Calano filed a complaint or petition for quo warranto under section 173 of the
Revised election code (Republic Act No. 180), contesting the right of Cruz to the office on the ground that Cruz was not

eligible for the office of municipal councilor. In his prayer petitioner besides asking for other remedies which in law and
equity he is entitled to, asked that after declaring null and void the proclamation made by the Municipal Board of
Canvasser in November, 1951, to the effect that Cruz was councilor-elect, he (Calano) be declared the councilor
elected in respondent's place.
Acting upon a motion to dismiss the petition, the Court of First Instance of Bataan issued the order of December 27,
1951, dismissing the petition for quo warranto on the ground that it was filed out of time, and also because petitioner
had no legal capacity to sue as contended by respondent. On appeal to this Court by petitioner from the order of
dismissal, in a decision promulgated on may 7, 1952, we held that the petition was filed within the period prescribed
by law; and that although the petition might be regarded as somewhat defective for failure to state a sufficient cause
of action, said question was not raised in the motion to dismiss because the ground relied upon, namely, that
petitioner had no legal capacity to sue, did not refer to the failure to state a sufficient cause of action but rather to
minority, insanity, coverture, lack of juridical personality, or nay other disqualification of a party. As a result, the order
of dismissal was reversed and the case was remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.
Upon the return of the case to the trial court, respondent again moved for dismissal on the ground that the petition
failed to state a sufficient cause of action, presumably relying upon the observation made by us in our decision.
Further elaborating on our observation that the petition did not state a sufficient cause of action, we said that
paragraphs 3 and 8 of the petition which reads thus
8. Que el recurrente tenia y tiene derecho a ocupar el cargo de concejal de Orion, Bataan, si no habia sido
proclamado electo concejal de Orion, Bataan, al aqui recurrido.
3. Que el recurrente era candidato a concejal del municipio de Orion, Bataan con el certificado de candidatura
dedidamente presentado, y registrado asi como tambien fue votado y elegido para dicho cargo, en la eleccion
del 13 de noviembre de 1951. (Emphasis supplied)
were conclusions of law and not statement of facts.
The trial court sustained the second motion to dismiss in its order of September 30, 1952, on the ground that the
petition failed to state a sufficient cause of action. Again petitioner has appealed from that order to this court.
Appellant urges that the trial court erred not only in not holding that the motion to dismiss was filed out of time but
also in declaring that the complaint failed to state a sufficient cause of action. In answer respondent-appellee contends
that the appeal should not have been given due course by the trial court because under the law there is no appeal
from a decision of a court of First Instance in protests against the eligibility or election of a municipal councilor, the
appeal being limited to election contests involving the offices of Provincial governor, Members of the Provincial Board,
City Councilors and City Mayors, this under section 178 of the Revised Election Code.
In the past we had occasion to rule upon a similar point of law. In the case of Marquez vs. Prodigalidad, 46 Off. Gaz.,
Supp. No. 11, p. 204, we held that section 178 of the Revised election code limiting appeals from decisions of Courts of
First Instance in election contests over the offices of Provincial Governor, members of the Provincial Board, City
Councilors and City Mayors, did not intend to prohibit or prevent the appeal to the Supreme Court in protests involving
purely questions of law, that is to say, that protests involving other officers such as municipal councilor may be
appealed provided that only legal questions are involved in the appeal. Consequently, the appeal in the present case
involving as it does purely questions of law is proper.
Going to the question of sufficiency of cause of action, it should be stated that our observation when the case came up
for the first time on appeal was neither meant nor intended as a rule or doctrine. We were merely considering the main
prayer contained in appellant's petition, namely, that he be declared councilor-elect in the place of the respondentappellee. In other words, we only observed that petitioner could not properly ask for his proclamation as councilorelect without alleging and stating not mere conclusions of law but facts showing that he had the right and was entitled
to the granting of his main prayer.
Considering the subject of cause of action in its entirety, it will be noticed that section 173 of the Revised Election
Code provides that when a person who is not eligible is elected, any registered candidate for the same office like the
petitioner-appellant in this case, may contest his right to the office by filing a petition for quo warranto. To legalize the
contest this section just mentioned does not require that the contestant prove that he is entitled to the office. In the

case Llamoso vs. Ferrer, 47 Off. Gaz., No. 2, p. 727, wherein petitioner Llamoso who claimed to have received the next
highest number of votes for the post of Mayor, contested the right of respondent Ferrer to the office for which he was
proclaimed elected, on the ground of ineligibility, we held that section 173 of the Revised election Code while providing
that any registered candidate may contest the right of one elected to any provincial or municipal office on the ground
of ineligibility, it does not provide that if the contestee is later declared ineligible, the contestant will be proclaimed
elected. In other words, in that case, we practically declared that under section 173, any registered candidate may file
a petition for quo warranto on the ground of ineligibility, and that would constitute a sufficient cause of action. It is not
necessary for the contestant to claim that if the contestee is declared ineligible, he (contestant) be declared entitled to
the office. As a matter of fact, in case ofLlamoso vs. Ferrer, we declared the office vacant.
In view of the foregoing, the failure of Calano to allege that he is entitled to the office of councilor now occupied by the
respondent Cruz does not effect the sufficiency of his cause of action. Reversing the order of dismissal, the case is
hereby remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.
LETICIA
DIONA,
represented
by
her
Attorney-in-Fact,
MARCELINA
DIONA, Petitioner,
vs.
ROMEO A. BALANGUE, SONNY A. BALANGUE, REYNALDO A. BALANGUE, and ESTEBAN A. BALANGUE,
JR., Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The great of a relief neither sought by the party in whose favor it was given not supported by the evidence presented
violates the opposing partys right to due process and may be declared void ab initio in a proper proceeding.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assails the November 24, 2005 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) issued in
G.R. SP No. 85541 which granted the Petition for Annulment of Judgment 3 filed by the respondents seeking to nullify
that portion of the October 17, 2000 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, Valenzuela City awarding
petitioner 5% monthly interest rate for the principal amount of the loan respondent obtained from her.
This Petition likewise assails the CAs June 26, 2006 Resolution 5 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
The facts of this case are simple and undisputed.
On March 2, 1991, respondents obtained a loan of P45,000.00 from petitioner payable in six months and secured by a
Real Estate Mortgage6 over their 202-square meter property located in Marulas, Valenzuela and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-12296. 7 When the debt became due, respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand.
Thus, on September 17, 1999, petitioner filed with the RTC a Complaint 8 praying that respondents be ordered:
(a) To pay petitioner the principal obligation of P45,000.00, with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum,
from 02 March 1991 until the full obligation is paid.
(b) To pay petitioner actual damages as may be proven during the trial but shall in no case be less
thanP10,000.00; P25,000.00 by way of attorneys fee, plus P2,000.00 per hearing as appearance fee.
(c) To issue a decree of foreclosure for the sale at public auction of the aforementioned parcel of land, and for
the disposition of the proceeds thereof in accordance with law, upon failure of the respondents to fully pay
petitioner within the period set by law the sums set forth in this complaint.
(d) Costs of this suit.
Other reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for. 9 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondents were served with summons thru respondent Sonny A. Balangue (Sonny). On October 15, 1999, with the
assistance of Atty. Arthur C. Coroza (Atty. Coroza) of the Public Attorneys Office, they filed a Motion to Extend Period to
Answer. Despite the requested extension, however, respondents failed to file any responsive pleadings. Thus, upon
motion of the petitioner, the RTC declared them in default and allowed petitioner to present her evidence ex parte. 10
Ruling of the RTC sought to be annulled.
In a Decision11 dated October 17, 2000, the RTC granted petitioners Complaint. The dispositive portion of said Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, ordering the respondents to pay the petitioner as
follows:
a) the sum of FORTY FIVE THOUSAND (P45,000.00) PESOS, representing the unpaid principal loan obligation
plus interest at 5% per month [sic] reckoned from March 2, 1991, until the same is fully paid;
b) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees plus cost of suit;
c) in the event the [respondents] fail to satisfy the aforesaid obligation, an order of foreclosure shall be issued
accordingly for the sale at public auction of the subject property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. V12296 and the improvements thereon for the satisfaction of the petitioners claim.
SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, 13 alleging that respondents did not interpose a timely appeal
despite receipt by their former counsel of the RTCs Decision on November 13, 2000. Before it could be resolved,
however, respondents filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment 14 dated January 26, 2001, claiming that not all of them
were duly served with summons. According to the other respondents, they had no knowledge of the case because their
co-respondent Sonny did not inform them about it. They prayed that the RTCs October 17, 2000 Decision be set aside
and a new trial be conducted.
But on March 16, 2001, the RTC ordered 15 the issuance of a Writ of Execution to implement its October 17, 2000
Decision. However, since the writ could not be satisfied, petitioner moved for the public auction of the mortgaged
property,16 which the RTC granted.17 In an auction sale conducted on November 7, 2001, petitioner was the only bidder
in the amount of P420,000.00. Thus, a Certificate of Sale 18 was issued in her favor and accordingly annotated at the
back of TCT No. V-12296.
Respondents then filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale 19 dated December 17,
2001, claiming that the parties did not agree in writing on any rate of interest and that petitioner merely sought for a
12% per annum interest in her Complaint. Surprisingly, the RTC awarded 5% monthly interest (or 60% per annum)
from March 2, 1991 until full payment. Resultantly, their indebtedness inclusive of the exorbitant interest from March
2, 1991 to May 22, 2001 ballooned from P124,400.00 to P652,000.00.
In an Order20 dated May 7, 2002, the RTC granted respondents motion and accordingly modified the interest rate
awarded from 5% monthly to 12% per annum. Then on August 2, 2002, respondents filed a Motion for Leave To
Deposit/Consign Judgment Obligation21 in the total amount of P126,650.00.22
Displeased with the RTCs May 7, 2002 Order, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a Petition for
Certiorari23 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On August 5, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision 24 declaring that the RTC
exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding the 5% monthly interest but at the same time pronouncing that the RTC gravely
abused its discretion in subsequently reducing the rate of interest to 12% per annum. In so ruling, the CA ratiocinated:
Indeed, We are convinced that the Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction when it granted 5% monthly interest instead of
the 12% per annum prayed for in the complaint. However, the proper remedy is not to amend the judgment but to
declare that portion as a nullity. Void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of
any right nor the creator of any obligation (Leonor vs. CA, 256 SCRA 69). No legal rights can emanate from a resolution
that is null and void (Fortich vs. Corona, 312 SCRA 751).

From the foregoing, the remedy of the respondents is to have the Court declare the portion of the judgment providing
for a higher interest than that prayed for as null and void for want of or in excess of jurisdiction. A void judgment never
acquire[s] finality and any action to declare its nullity does not prescribe (Heirs of Mayor Nemencio Galvez vs. CA, 255
SCRA 672).
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition having merit, is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE. Resultantly, the
challenged May 7, 2002 and September 5, 2000 orders of Public Respondent Court are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. No costs.
SO ORDERED.25 (Emphases in the original; italics supplied.)
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
Taking their cue from the Decision of the CA in the special civil action for certiorari, respondents filed with the same
court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment and Execution Sale with Damages. 26 They contended that the portion of the
RTC Decision granting petitioner 5% monthly interest rate is in gross violation of Section 3(d) of Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court and of their right to due process. According to respondents, the loan did not carry any interest as it was the
verbal agreement of the parties that in lieu thereof petitioners family can continue occupying respondents residential
building located in Marulas, Valenzuela for free until said loan is fully paid.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Initially, the CA denied due course to the Petition. 27 Upon respondents motion, however, it reinstated and granted the
Petition. In setting aside portions of the RTCs October 17, 2000 Decision, the CA ruled that aside from being
unconscionably excessive, the monthly interest rate of 5% was not agreed upon by the parties and that petitioners
Complaint clearly sought only the legal rate of 12% per annum. Following the mandate of Section 3(d) of Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court, the CA concluded that the awarded rate of interest is void for being in excess of the relief sought in the
Complaint. It ruled thus:
WHEREFORE, respondents motion for reconsideration is GRANTED and our resolution dated October 13, 2004 is,
accordingly, REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered ordering the ANNULMENT OF:
(a) public respondents impugned October 17, 2000 judgment, insofar as it awarded 5% monthly interest in
favor of petitioner; and
(b) all proceedings relative to the sale at public auction of the property titled in respondents names under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-12296 of the Valenzuela registry.
The judgment debt adjudicated in public respondents impugned October 17, 2000 judgment is, likewise, ordered
RECOMPUTED at the rate of 12% per annum from March 2, 1991. No costs.
SO ORDERED.28 (Emphases in the original.)
Petitioner sought reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its June 26, 2006 Resolution. 29
Issues
Hence, this Petition anchored on the following grounds:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT GRANTED
RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A SUBSTITUTE OR ALTERNATIVE REMEDY OF A
LOST APPEAL.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR AND MISAPPREHENSION OF
LAW AND THE FACTS WHEN IT GRANTED RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT OF THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF VALENZUELA, BRANCH 75 DATED OCTOBER 17, 2000 IN CIVIL

CASE NO. 241-V-99, DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID DECISION HAS BECOME FINAL AND ALREADY EXECUTED
CONTRARY TO THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT. 30
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner claims that the CA erred in partially annulling the RTCs October 17, 2000 Decision. She contends that a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be availed of only when the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the claimant. In the present case,
however, respondents had all the opportunity to question the October 17, 2000 Decision of the RTC, but because of
their own inaction or negligence they failed to avail of the remedies sanctioned by the rules. Instead, they contented
themselves with the filing of a Motion to Set Aside Judgment and then a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and to Set
Aside Execution Sale.
Petitioner likewise argues that for a Rule 47 petition to prosper, the same must either be based on extrinsic fraud or
lack of jurisdiction. However, the allegations in respondents Rule 47 petition do not constitute extrinsic fraud because
they simply pass the blame to the negligence of their former counsel. In addition, it is too late for respondents to pass
the buck to their erstwhile counsel considering that when they filed their Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To
Set Aside Execution Sale they were already assisted by their new lawyer, Atty. Reynaldo A. Ruiz, who did not also avail
of the remedies of new trial, appeal, etc. As to the ground of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner posits that there is no
reason to doubt that the RTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and over the persons of the
respondents.
While conceding that the RTC patently made a mistake in awarding 5% monthly interest, petitioner nonetheless
invokes the doctrine of immutability of final judgment and contends that the RTC Decision can no longer be corrected
or modified since it had long become final and executory. She likewise points out that respondents received a copy of
said Decision on November 13, 2000 but did nothing to correct the same. They did not even question the award of 5%
monthly interest when they filed their Motion to Set Aside Judgment which they anchored on the sole ground of the
RTCs lack of jurisdiction over the persons of some of the respondents.
Respondents Arguments
Respondents do not contest the existence of their obligation and the principal amount thereof. They only seek
quittance from the 5% monthly interest or 60% per annum imposed by the RTC. Respondents contend that Section
(3)d of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is clear that when the defendant is declared in default, the court cannot grant a
relief more than what is being prayed for in the Complaint. A judgment which transgresses said rule, according to the
respondents, is void for having been issued without jurisdiction and for being violative of due process of law.
Respondents maintain that it was through no fault of their own, but through the gross negligence of their former
counsel, Atty. Coroza, that the remedies of new trial, appeal or petition for relief from judgment were lost. They allege
that after filing a Motion to Extend Period to Answer, Atty. Coroza did not file any pleading resulting to their being
declared in default. While the said lawyer filed on their behalf a Motion to Set Aside Judgment dated January 26, 2001,
he however took no steps to appeal from the Decision of the RTC, thereby allowing said judgment to lapse into finality.
Citing Legarda v. Court of Appeals, 31 respondents aver that clients are not always bound by the actions of their
counsel, as in the present case where the clients are to lose their property due to the gross negligence of their
counsel.
With regard to petitioners invocation of immutability of judgment, respondents argue that said doctrine applies only to
valid and not to void judgments.
Our Ruling
The petition must fail.
We agree with respondents that the award of 5% monthly interest violated their right to due process and, hence, the
same may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47; an exception to the final judgment rule; grounds therefor.

A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional
circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a
remedy which was lost due to the partys own neglect in promptly availing of the same. "The underlying reason is
traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation must
end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of justice that once a
judgment has become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to rest." 32
While under Section 2, Rule 4733 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to
annul a judgment.34 In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals,35 this Court declared that a final and executory judgment may still
be set aside if, upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without
jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law.
Grant of 5% monthly interest is way beyond the 12% per annum interest sought in the Complaint and smacks of
violation of due process.
It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the
party. They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof. Due process
considerations require that judgments must conform to and be supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in
court. In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Teston, 36 this Court expounded that:
Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief
sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the
proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure
of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.
Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the right to due process of a defendant who was declared in
default than of a defendant who participated in trial. For instance, amendment to conform to the evidence presented
during trial is allowed the parties under the Rules. 37 But the same is not feasible when the defendant is declared in
default because Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court comes into play and limits the relief that may be granted by
the courts to what has been prayed for in the Complaint. It provides:
(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. A judgment rendered against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be
different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages.
The raison dtre in limiting the extent of relief that may be granted is that it cannot be presumed that the defendant
would not file an Answer and allow himself to be declared in default had he known that the plaintiff will be accorded a
relief greater than or different in kind from that sought in the Complaint. 38 No doubt, the reason behind Section 3(d),
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is to safeguard defendants right to due process against unforeseen and arbitrarily issued
judgment. This, to the mind of this Court, is akin to the very essence of due process. It embodies "the sporting idea of
fair play"39 and forbids the grant of relief on matters where the defendant was not given the opportunity to be heard
thereon.
In the case at bench, the award of 5% monthly interest rate is not supported both by the allegations in the pleadings
and the evidence on record. The Real Estate Mortgage 40 executed by the parties does not include any provision on
interest. When petitioner filed her Complaint before the RTC, she alleged that respondents borrowed from her "the sum
of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P45,000.00), with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum" 41 and sought
payment thereof. She did not allege or pray for the disputed 5% monthly interest. Neither did she present evidence nor
testified thereon. Clearly, the RTCs award of 5% monthly interest or 60% per annum lacks basis and disregards due
process. It violated the due process requirement because respondents were not informed of the possibility that the RTC
may award 5% monthly interest. They were deprived of reasonable opportunity to refute and present controverting
evidence as they were made to believe that the complainant petitioner was seeking for what she merely stated in her
Complaint.
Neither can the grant of the 5% monthly interest be considered subsumed by petitioners general prayer for "other
reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the premises x x x." 42 To repeat, the courts grant of relief is limited only
to what has been prayed for in the Complaint or related thereto, supported by evidence, and covered by the partys

cause of action.43 Besides, even assuming that the awarded 5% monthly or 60% per annum interest was properly
alleged and proven during trial, the same remains unconscionably excessive and ought to be equitably reduced in
accordance with applicable jurisprudence. In Bulos, Jr. v. Yasuma, 44 this Court held:
In the case of Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, citing the cases of Medel v. Court of Appeals, Garcia v. Court of Appeals,
Spouses Bautista v. Pilar Development Corporation and the recent case of Spouses Solangon v. Salazar, this Court
considered the 3% interest per month or 36% interest per annum as excessive and unconscionable. Thereby, the
Court, in the said case, equitably reduced the rate of interest to 1% interest per month or 12% interest per annum.
(Citations omitted)
It is understandable for the respondents not to contest the default order for, as alleged in their Comment, "it is not
their intention to impugn or run away from their just and valid obligation." 45 Nonetheless, their waiver to present
evidence should never be construed as waiver to contest patently erroneous award which already transgresses their
right to due process, as well as applicable jurisprudence.
Respondents former counsel was grossly negligent in handling the case of his clients; respondents did not lose
ordinary remedies of new trial, petition for relief, etc. through their own fault.
Ordinarily, the mistake, negligence or lack of competence of counsel binds the client. 1wphi1 This is based on the rule
that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his
client. A recognized exception to the rule is when the lawyers were grossly negligent in their duty to maintain their
clients cause and such amounted to a deprivation of their clients property without due process of law. 46 In which case,
the courts must step in and accord relief to a client who suffered thereby. 47
The manifest indifference of respondents former counsel in handling the cause of his client was already present even
from the beginning. It should be recalled that after filing in behalf of his clients a Motion to Extend Period to Answer,
said counsel allowed the requested extension to pass without filing an Answer, which resulted to respondents being
declared in default. His negligence was aggravated by the fact that he did not question the awarded 5% monthly
interest despite receipt of the RTC Decision on November 13, 2000. 48 A simple reading of the dispositive portion of the
RTC Decision readily reveals that it awarded exorbitant and unconscionable rate of interest. Its difference from what is
being prayed for by the petitioner in her Complaint is so blatant and very patent. It also defies elementary
jurisprudence on legal rate of interests. Had the counsel carefully read the judgment it would have caught his attention
and compelled him to take the necessary steps to protect the interest of his client. But he did not. Instead, he filed in
behalf of his clients a Motion to Set Aside Judgment 49 dated January 26, 2001 based on the sole ground of lack of
jurisdiction, oblivious to the fact that the erroneous award of 5% monthly interest would result to his clients
deprivation of property without due process of law. Worse, he even allowed the RTC Decision to become final by not
perfecting an appeal. Neither did he file a petition for relief therefrom. It was only a year later that the patently
erroneous award of 5% monthly interest was brought to the attention of the RTC when respondents, thru their new
counsel, filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale. Even the RTC candidly admitted
that it "made a glaring mistake in directing the defendants to pay interest on the principal loan at 5% per month which
is very different from what was prayed for by the plaintiff." 50
"A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his
client except in accordance with the law." 51 Judging from how respondents former counsel handled the cause of his
clients, there is no doubt that he was grossly negligent in protecting their rights, to the extent that they were deprived
of their property without due process of law.
In fine, respondents did not lose the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other remedies through their
own fault. It can only be attributed to the gross negligence of their erstwhile counsel which prevented them from
pursuing such remedies. We cannot also blame respondents for relying too much on their former counsel. Clients have
reasonable expectations that their lawyer would amply protect their interest during the trial of the case. 52 Here,
"respondents are plain and ordinary people x x x who are totally ignorant of the intricacies and technicalities of law
and legal procedures. Being so, they completely relied upon and trusted their former counsel to appropriately act as
their interest may lawfully warrant and require."53

As a final word, it is worth noting that respondents principal obligation was only P45,000.00. Due to their former
counsels gross negligence in handling their cause, coupled with the RTCs erroneous, baseless, and illegal award of 5%
monthly interest, they now stand to lose their property and still owe petitioner a large amount of money. As aptly
observed by the CA:
x x x If the impugned judgment is not, therefore, rightfully nullified, petitioners will not only end up losing their
property but will additionally owe private respondent the sum of P232,000.00 plus the legal interest said balance had,
in the meantime, earned. As a court of justice and equity, we cannot, in good conscience, allow this unconscionable
situation to prevail.54
Indeed, this Court is appalled by petitioners invocation of the doctrine of immutability of judgment. Petitioner does not
contest as she even admits that the RTC made a glaring mistake in awarding 5% monthly interest. 55Amazingly, she
wants to benefit from such erroneous award. This Court cannot allow this injustice to happen.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed November 24, 2005 and June 26, 2006 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85541 are AFFIRMED.
ANG TIBAY V CIR
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged
shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc.
(NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while
no members of the rival labor union (National Workers Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company
dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to the
Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court
agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.
HELD: Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they attached
to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise
of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained
records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already
existing).
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must
also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative bodies, due process can be
complied with by observing the following:
(1)
The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof.
(2)
Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish
the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3)
While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4)
Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be substantial.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.

(5)
The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected.
(6)
The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of
the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7)
The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR. NO. L-49711 November 7, 1979
2nd Division Aquino

FACTS:

Zambales Chromite Mining Corp., Inc. (ZCM, Inc.) sought to be declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors
of 69 mining claims in Zambales. ZCM filed their claims with then Director of Mines Benjamin Gozon. ZCM, Inc., were
asserting their claim against the mining claims of Martinez and Pabilona. Director Gozon decided in favor of Martinez
and Pabilona and dismissed the claims of ZCM, Inc., ruling that ZCM, Inc. did not discover any mineral nor located any
mining claims in accordance with law. ZCM appealed the decision before the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources. During the pendency of the appeal, Director gozon was appointed Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources. Gozon in his capacity as Secretary affirmed his decision as Director of Mines and dismissed the appeal of
ZCM, Inc.
ZCM then appealed before the CFI of Zambales. The CFI affirmed the decision of Gozon.

RULING OF CFI:
The disqualification of a judge to review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court) does not
apply to administrative bodies; that there is no provision in the Mining Law, disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources from deciding an appeal from a case which he had decided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza
is not a ground for disqualification. ZCM appealed the case to the CA.

RULING OF CA:
CA after realizing that Gozon cannot affirm his own decision remanded the case to the Minister of Natural
Resources.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Gozon can review and validly affirm his earlier decision w/o disturbing due process?

HELD:
Secretary Gozon cannot review his decision as Director of Mines. A Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines is a mockery of administrative justice.

RATIO:
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce the reviewing
officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different
view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view;
inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of
the case.

ANZALDO VS CLAVE
Due Process Administrative Due Process
Dr Anzaldo, 55, had been working in the National Institute of Science and Technology for 28 years. She was holding the
position Scientist Research Associate IV when she was appointed as Science Research Supervisor II. Her appointment
was approved by the CSC in 1978. The position was previously held by Dr Kintanar who recommended Dr Venzon to his
position. Dr Venzon contested the position. Dr Afable, the one who appointed Anzaldo, averred that Anzaldos
appointment was approved by the NIST evaluation Committee which gave 88 points to Anzalado and 66 points to
Venzon. The issue was elevated to the Office of the president by Venzon. Clave was then the Presidential Executive
Assistant. Pursuant to PD 807 or the Civil Service Decree, Clave referred the issue to the CSC. Clave was also holding
the chairmanship of the CSC. Clave issued Res 1178 appointing Venzon to the contested position. After the denial of
her motion for the reconsideration of that resolution, or on January 5, 1980, Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the
President of the Philippines. Since Clave was holding the office of PEA he just affirmed his decision as the CSC
chairman.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is due process in the case at bar.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Anzaldo. When PEA Clave said in his decision that he was inclined to concur in the
recommendation of the Civil Service Commission, what he meant was that he was concurring with Chairman Claves
recommendation: he was concurring with himself. It is evident that Anzaldo was denied due process of law when
Presidential Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of (himself) Chairman Clave of the Civil
Service Commission. Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Anzaldo that PEA Clave should
decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the CSC, as to who between Anzaldo and Venzon should be
appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the Philippines.

TOPIC: Administrative Due Process - review of the decision by the same officer who rendered it previously in a
different capacity
C19 - Better Buildings v. NLRC, GR 109714, December 15, 1997
Facts: Halim Ysmael and Eliseo Feliciano, sales manager and chief supervisor respectively of the petitioner herein
were illegally dismissed. A memo was sent then and there informing the two employees of their immediate
termination. Unable to accept their termination, the two filed a complaint against BBI for illegal termination. The labor
arbiter issued a decision in favor of the two employees directing BBI to reinstate them, award backwages and damages
for the illegal termination. The decision was also affirmed by NLRC except minimizing the damages. Petitioner, not
satisfied with the decision, has filed the instant petition for certiorari alleging that the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it rendered the decision of March 3, 1989 and the resolution
of December 11, 1992. Ysmael entered into a compromise agreement with the petitioner, thus removing him from the
case. The resolution will therefore only affect Feliciano.

Issue: Whether or not BBI illegally dismissed Feliciano.

Held: The petitioner contends that Feliciano was dismissed for breach of trust and confidence as the latter has
engaged in the same line of business as that of the petitioner, and even getting the latters clients, and employing
BBIs former employees. In termination of employment cases, we have consistently held that two requisites must
concur to constitute a valid dismissal: (a) the dismissal must be for any of the causes expressed in Art. 282 of the
Labor Code, and (b) the employee must be accorded due process, the elements of which are the opportunity to be
heard and defend himself. First, on the substantive aspect, petitioner contends that private respondent was dismissed
from his employment for engaging in business in direct competition with its line of service. Hence, said conduct
constitutes a willful breach of trust which is justifiable cause for termination of employment.
We sustain BBI.
Deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that an employer can terminate the services of an employee
only for valid and just causes which must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. The employer has the
burden of proving that the dismissal was indeed for a valid and just cause
In this jurisdiction, we have consistently ruled that in terminating an employee, it is essential that the twin
requirements of notice and hearing must be observed. The written notice apprises the employee of the particular acts
or omissions for which his dismissal is sought and at the same informs the employee concerned of the employers
decision to dismiss him.
In the case at bar, the record is bereft of any showing that private respondent was given notice of the charge against
him. Nor was he ever given the opportunity under the circumstances to answer the charge; his termination was quick,
swift and sudden.
Evidently, the decision to dismiss respondent was merely based on the fact that petitioner was already convinced at
the time that the private respondents were engaged in disloyal acts. As regards the procedural aspect, the failure to
observe the twin requirements of notice and hearing taints the dismissal with illegality. He was dismissed for a just
cause but, the manner of terminating his employment was done in complete disregard of the necessary procedural
safeguards. A mans job being a property right duly protected by our laws, for depriving private respondent the right to
defend himself, petitioner is liable for damages.
ANTONIO CARAG vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 147590

April 2, 2007

FACTS: National Federation of Labor Unions and Mariveles Apparel Corporation Labor Union (collectively,
complainants), on behalf of all of Mariveles Apparel Corporations rank and file employees, filed a complaint against
MAC for illegal dismissal brought about by its illegal closure of business. In their position paper dated 3 January 1994,
NAFLU and MACLU moved to implead Atty. Antonio Carag and Armando David, being owners of the MAC Corporation, to
guarantee the satisfaction of any judgment award on the basis of Article 212(c) of the Philippine Labor Code. Atty.
Joshua Pastores, as counsel for respondents, submitted a position paper dated 21 February 1994 and stated that
complainants should not have impleaded Carag and David because MAC is actually owned by a consortium of banks.
Carag and David own shares in MAC only to qualify them to serve as MAC's officers. Without any further proceedings,
Arbiter Ortiguerra rendered her Decision dated 17 June 1994 granting the motion to implead Carag and David. In the
same Decision, Arbiter Ortiguerra declared Carag and David solidarily liable with MAC ruling that corporate officers
who dismissed employees in bad faith or wantonly violate labor standard laws or when the company had already
ceased operations and there is no way by which a judgment in favor of employees could be satisfied, corporate officers
can be held jointly and severally liable with the company. Carag, through a separate counsel, filed an appeal dated 30
August 1994 before the NLRC. He also filed a motion to reduce bond. In a Resolution promulgated on 5 January 1995,
the NLRC Third Division denied the motion to reduce bond. The NLRC stated that to grant a reduction of bond on the
ground that the appeal is meritorious would be tantamount to ruling on the merits of the appeal. On February 13,
1995, Carag filed his petition for certiorari before CA. The CA affirmed the decision of Arbiter Ortiguerra and the
resolution of NLRC. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not Antonio Carag shall be held personally liable for the payment of illegally dismissed employees.
RULING: Section 31 makes a director personally liable for corporate debts if he wilfully and knowingly votes for or
assents to patently unlawful acts of the corporation. Section 31 also makes a director personally liable if he is guilty of
gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation.

Complainants did not allege in their complaint that Carag wilfully and knowingly voted for or assented to any patently
unlawful act of MAC. Complainants did not present any evidence showing that Carag wilfully and knowingly voted for
or assented to any patently unlawful act of MAC. Neither did Arbiter Ortiguerra make any finding to this effect in her
Decision.
Complainants did not also allege that Carag is guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of MAC.
Complainants did not present any evidence showing that Carag is guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing
the affairs of MAC. Neither did Arbiter Ortiguerra make any finding to this effect in her Decision.
After stating what she believed is the law on the matter, Arbiter Ortiguerra stopped there and did not make any finding
that Carag is guilty of bad faith or of wanton violation of labor standard laws. Arbiter Ortiguerra did not specify what
act of bad faith Carag committed, or what particular labor standard laws he violated.
To hold a director personally liable for debts of the corporation, and thus pierce the veil of corporate fiction, the bad
faith or wrongdoing of the director must be established clearly and convincingly. Bad faith is never presumed. Bad faith
does not connote bad judgment or negligence. Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose. Bad faith means breach of a
known duty through some ill motive or interest. Bad faith partakes of the nature of fraud. Neither does bad faith arise
automatically just because a corporation fails to comply with the notice requirement of labor laws on company closure
or dismissal of employees. The failure to give notice is not an unlawful act because the law does not define such failure
as unlawful. Such failure to give notice is a violation of procedural due process but does not amount to an unlawful or
criminal act. Such procedural defect is called illegal dismissal because it fails to comply with mandatory procedural
requirements, but it is not illegal in the sense that it constitutes an unlawful or criminal act.
For a wrongdoing to make a director personally liable for debts of the corporation, the wrongdoing approved or
assented to by the director must be a patently unlawful act. Mere failure to comply with the notice requirement of
labor laws on company closure or dismissal of employees does not amount to a patently unlawful act. Patently
unlawful acts are those declared unlawful by law which imposes penalties for commission of such unlawful acts. There
must be a law declaring the act unlawful and penalizing the act.
In this case, Article 283 of the Labor Code, requiring a one-month prior notice to employees and the Department of
Labor and Employment before any permanent closure of a company, does not state that non-compliance with the
notice is an unlawful act punishable under the Code. There is no provision in any other Article of the Labor Code
declaring failure to give such notice an unlawful act and providing for its penalty. Complainants did not allege or prove,
and Arbiter Ortiguerra did not make any finding, that Carag approved or assented to any patently unlawful act to
which the law attaches a penalty for its commission. On this score alone, Carag cannot be held personally liable for the
separation pay of complainants.
QUINTO v. COMELEC (December 1, 2009 Decision)
FACTS
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners, who held appointive positions in government and who
intended to run in the 2010 elections, assailed Section 4(a) of COMELECs Resolution No. 8678,* which deemed
appointed officials automatically (ipso facto) resigned from office upon the filing of their Certificate of Candidacy (CoC).
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is a reproduction of the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section
13 of Republic Act No. 9369.** The proviso was lifted from Section 66 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.*** Petitioners
averred that they should not be deemed ipso facto resigned from their government offices when they file their CoCs,
because at such time they are not yet treated by law as candidates. They should be considered resigned from their
respective offices only at the start of the campaign period when they are, by law, already considered as candidates.
(Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 provides that any person filing his certificate
of candidacy within the period set by COMELEC shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign
period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.) Petitioners further averred that the assailed provision is
discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Representing the COMELEC, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the petition was premature and petitioners had no legal standing since they
were not yet affected by the assailed provision, not having as yet filed their CoCs. The OSG also argued that
petitioners could not avail the remedy of certiorari since what they were questioning was an issuance of the COMELEC
made in the exercise of its rule-making power. The OSG further averred that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its
discretion in phrasing Section 4(a) of its Resolution No. 8678 since it merely copied what was in the law. The OSG,
however, agreed that there is no basis to consider appointive officials as ipso facto resigned upon filing their CoCs
because they are not yet considered as candidates at that time.
ISSUE

Whether or not Section 4(a) of COMELECs Resolution No. 8678 and the laws upon which it was based (second proviso
in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369 and Section 66 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) are
unconstitutional (with regard to equal protection)
HELD
The second provision in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 were declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of the
equal protection clause and for being overbroad. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto
resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants,
specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is
substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not
justify such differential treatment. There are 4 requisites for a valid classification that will justify differential treatment
between classes: (a) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (b) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(c) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (d) It must apply equally to all members of the class. The
differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane
to the purposes of the law. (W)hether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be
prevented by the measure remain. An appointive official could wield the same dangerous and coercive influence on
the electorate as the elective official. Both may be motivated by political considerations rather than the publics
welfare, use their governmental positions to promote their candidacies, or neglect their duties to attend to their
campaign. There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective
ones. The challenged provision is also overbroad because: (a) It pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts
without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not (It would be absurd to consider a
utility worker in the government as ipso facto resigned once he files his CoC; it is unimaginable how he can use his
position in the government to wield influence in the political world.); and (b) It is directed to the activity of seeking any
and all public offices, whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal
or barangay level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on
such a sweeping scale
On their Legal Standing: While petitioners are not yet candidates, they have the legal standing to raise the
constitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified voters. A restriction on candidacy, such as the challenged
provisions, affects the rights of voters to choose their public officials. Both candidates and voters may question
challenge, on grounds of equal protection, the assailed provisions, on grounds of equal protection,
because of its impact on voting rights. At any rate, the Supreme Court has relaxed the stringent direct injury test
and has observed a liberal policy allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civil organizations to prosecute
actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.
QUINTO v. COMELEC (February 22, 2010 Resolution)
*Same Facts
ISSUE
Whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause
HELD
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs,
but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates
against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions
and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional
norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated
differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and substantial
distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those

prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equala two-wheeled vehicle is less stable
and more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirementif it is not
germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the
problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would be
regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations
imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding
appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote ones
candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at
promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of
official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also
justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in
neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to
their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally
rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane
to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be
prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that
matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in
the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare
development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices,
there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present
state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position
during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the
inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by
a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The classification
simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the
second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal
protection clause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13
of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities herein
abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a
monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade
Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then
petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP
which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese
businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should
be given equal opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all
between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause does not
demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies
alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall
within such class and those who do not.
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute
must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained
away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his
market stalls in the Pasay city market.

VICTORINO VS ELIZALDE
Benjamin Victoriano, an Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) member, has been an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory (ERF) since
1958. He was also a member of the EPWU (Elizalde Rope Workers Union). Under the collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) between ERF and EPWU, a close shop agreement is being enforced which means that employment in the factory
relies on the membership in the EPWU; that in order to retain employment in the said factory one must be a member
of the said Union. In 1962, Victoriano tendered his resignation from EPWU claiming that as per RA 3350 he is an
exemption to the close shop agreement by virtue of his being a member of the INC because apparently in the INC, one
is forbidden from being a member of any labor union. It was only in 1974 that his resignation from the Union was acted
upon by EPWU which notified ERF about it. ERF then moved to terminate Victoriano due to his non-membership from
the EPWU. EPWU and ERF reiterated that he is not exempt from the close shop agreement because RA 3350, which
provides that close shop agreements shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization, is unconstitutional and that said law violates the EPWUs and ERFs
legal/contractual rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As such, an INC member may refuse to join a
labor union and despite the fact that there is a close shop agreement in the factory where he was employed, his
employment could not be validly terminated for his non-membership in the majority therein. Further, the right to join a
union includes the right not to join a union. The law is not unconstitutional. It recognizes both the rights of unions and
employers to enforce terms of contracts and at the same time it recognizes the workers right to join or not to join
union. RA 3550 recognizes as well the primacy of a constitutional right over a contractual right.

BIRAOGO VS. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION G.R. NO. 192935

FACTS

This is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo), in his capacity as a citizen and
taxpayer, assailing Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010"
for violating Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution;
On May 10, 2010, Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III was elected President of the Philippines. Often repeated during
his campaign for the presidency was the uncompromising slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap."
Barely a month after his assumption to office, and intended as fulfillment of his campaign promise, President
Aquino, on July 30, 2010, issued Executive Order No. 1 creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.
Without delay, petitioners Biraogo and Congressmen Lagman, Albano, Datumanong, and Fua filed their
respective petitions decrying the constitutionality of the Truth Commission, primarily, for being a usurpation by
the President of the legislative power to create a public office.
Expectedly, in its Memorandum, the OSG traverses the contention of petitioners and upholds the
constitutionality of E.O. No. 1 arguing that petitioners have not and will not suffer direct personal injury with
the issuance of executive order no. 1. Petitioners do not have legal standing to assail the constitutionality of
executive order no. 1.

ISSUES
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create
and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ; and
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause
RULING
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as
members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office
confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in
their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind,
infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct
injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is governed
by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest. Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing
an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled
to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the
securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that
the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents.
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are
not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious
need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can
be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws
of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is
no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify
the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided
for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be
allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative
function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for
the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs power
to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression
of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals
in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four

requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is
not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own.
Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all
past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to
the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINIONS OF NACHURA, J.
He agrees with the ponencia that, given the liberal approach in David v. Arroyo and subsequent cases, petitioners have
locus standi to raise the question of constitutionality of the Truth Commissions creation. He also concurs with Justice
Mendozas conclusion that the Truth Commission will not supplant the Office of the Ombudsman or the DOJ, nor
impermissibly encroach upon the latters exercise of constitutional and statutory powers.
He also agrees with the ponencia that the President of the Philippines can create an ad hoc investigative body. But
more than that, he believes that, necessarily implied from the Presidents power of control over all executive
departments and his constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws, as well as his statutory authority under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the President may create a public office.
However, he finds himself unable to concur with Justice Mendozas considered opinion that E.O. No. 1 breaches the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
Petitioner Members of the House of Representatives are not proper parties to challenge the constitutionality of E.O.
No. 1 on equal protection grounds. Petitioner Members of the House of Representatives cannot take up the lance for
the previous administration. Under all three levels of scrutiny earlier discussed, they are precluded from raising the
equal protection of the laws challenge. The perceptive notation by my esteemed colleague, Justice Carpio Morales, in
her dissent, comes to life when she observes that petitioner Members of the House of Representatives cannot
vicariously invoke violation of equal protection of the laws. Even assuming E.O. No. 1 does draw a classification, much
less an unreasonable one, petitioner Members of the House of Representatives, as well as petitioner Biraogo, are not
covered by the supposed arbitrary and unreasonable classification.
If we applied both intermediate and strict scrutiny, the nakedness of petitioners arguments are revealed because they
do not claim violation of any of their fundamental rights, nor do they cry discrimination based on race, gender and
illegitimacy. Petitioners equal protection clause challenge likewise dissolves when calibrated against the purpose of
E.O. No. 1 and its supposed classification of the administration which the Truth Commission is tasked to investigate.
Nowhere in the pleadings of petitioners and their claim of violation of separation of powers and usurpation of
legislative power by the executive is it established how such violation or usurpation translates to violation by E.O. No.
1 of the equal protection of the laws. Thus, no reason exists for the majority to sustain the challenge of equal
protection if none of the petitioners belong to the class, claimed by the majority to be, discriminated against.
He submits for the dismissal of the petition.
DISSENTING OPINION OF CARPIO-MORALES, J.
Louis Biraogo, does not raise the issue of equal protection. His Memorandum mentions nothing about equal
protection clause. While the ponencia "finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance," not even his successful invocation of transcendental importance can push the Court into
resolving an issue which he never raised in his petition. On the foregoing score alone, the ponencia should not have
dealt with the issue of equal protection. Such barriers notwithstanding, the claim of breach of the equal protection
clause fails to hurdle the higher barrier of merit.

DUMLAO vs. COMELEC

This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners, in their own
behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.
FACTS:

The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his
certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980.
Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his
oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a
taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.

Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as
discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said
Section 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and
disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the
elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement
benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 65 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for
the same elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the
classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation."

Dumlaos colleague Igot and Salapat, assailed the same law for the prohibition for candidacy of a person who
was convicted of a crime given that there was a judgment for conviction and the prima facie nature of filing
charges for the commission of such crimes.

Dumlao also question the accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1)Art. XIIC of the Constitution, which
provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination."

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have standing.
2. Whether or not the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null and void for being violative of
the Constitution.
HELD:
Petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities, hence, traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution. For one, there
is a misjoinder of parties and actions. Petitioner Dumlao's interest is alien to that of petitioners Igot and Salapantan

Petitioner Dumlao does not join petitioners Igot and Salapantan in the burden of their complaint, nor do the latter join
Dumlao in his. The respectively contest completely different statutory provisions.
1. No. Petitioner Dumlao has joined this suit in his individual capacity as a candidate. The action of petitioners
Igot and Salapantan is more in the nature of a taxpayer's suit.
For another, there are standards that have to be followed inthe exercise of the function of judicial review, namely (a)
the existence of an appropriate case:, (b) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional
question: (c) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity and (d) the necessity that the
constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. It may be conceded that the third requisite has
been complied with, which is, that the parties have raised the issue of constitutionality early enough in their pleadings.

2.

a.

Dumlao has not yet been affected by the statute. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been
filed before the COMELEC. There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is
being asked to review on Certiorari. His is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue.

b.

No one has yet been affected by the operation of the statutes. No one has sustained direct injury as a
result of the enforcement. In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing,
not in their Petition, that Igot is said to be a candidate for Councilor. They have no personal nor substantial
interest at stake. In the absence of any litigate interest, they can claim no locus standi in seeking judicial
redress.

d.

They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the issue of
constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require that this suit be dismissed.

The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is not contrary to equal protection. The constitutional guarantee of
equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification.

If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently
from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently
from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger
ages are not so compulsorily retirable.

The requirement to retire government employees at 65 may or may not be a reasonable classification. Young blood
can be encouraged to come in to politics. But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official who has already
retired, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office, as provided for in the challenged provision.
The need for new blood assumes relevance.
The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired
employee has already declared himself tired an unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a
change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the
application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit
such denial.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is
a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable
classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging to the same class. The purpose of
the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in question being pursuant
to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is
marred by theoretical inconsistencies.
Regarding Igot's petition, the court held that explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is
disqualified from running from public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil
or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no

distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for
such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office.
A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed
in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the
accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence. And although the filing of
charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present
danger" that because the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty
from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.
A legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.
Igot's petition was meritorious.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable portion is
mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which
can stand by itself.
WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid. 2) That portion
of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared null and void, for being violative
of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.
CENIZA VS COMELEC
Equal Protection Gerrymandering
**Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to
give an unfair advantage to the party in power. **
Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which effectively bars voters
in chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities,
and component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the
other hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to
the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS
(Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution.
They said that the regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further,
petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96
of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and historically known as an
opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the entire
province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that
the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it
classifies cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the
provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial
distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of
suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.
HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of
local government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. The petitioners allegation of
gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional requirement that the creation,
division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to
the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new
requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot
affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on 21 June 1969.
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual income
is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and
development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has
sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically

situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the
continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances.
The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law since the voters in
other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of
allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in
another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voters right
of suffrage.

NUNEZ V SANDIGANBAYAN
Equal Protection Creation of the Sandiganbayan
Nuez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He was accused before
the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with
his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. It is the claim of Nuez that PD1486, as amended, is violative
of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. He claims that the Sandiganbayan
proceedings violates Nuezs right to equal protection, because appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a
mere matter of discretion; appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the
facts and trial evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC, instead of the
traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law
and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and thereafter to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeals would be
concerned.
HELD: The SC ruled against Nuez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a special court that shall
have original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials charged with graft and corruption. The constitution
specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem,
the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may
thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present
Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner
is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the
classification therein set forth met the standard requiring that it must be based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions
only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached
by a unanimous decision from 3 justices a showing that decisions therein are more conceivably carefully reached
than other trial courts.

Read full text

Justice Makasiar (concurring & dissenting)

Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to the government or any of its
instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right to appeal to two appellate courts first, to the CA, and
thereafter to the SC. Estafa and malversation of private funds are on the same category as graft and corruption
committed by public officers, who, under the decree creating the Sandiganbayan, are only allowed one appeal to the
SC (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court does not generate any
substantial distinction to validate this invidious discrimination. Three judges sitting on the same case does not ensure
a quality of justice better than that meted out by a trial court presided by one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are
the intellectual competence, industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by two appellate tribunals of the
same case certainly ensures better justice to the accused and to the people.

Then again, par 3 of Sec 7 of PD 1606, by providing that the decisions of the Sandiganbayan can only be reviewed by
the SC through certiorari, likewise limits the reviewing power of the SC only to question of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or conclusions of the trial court. In other criminal cases involving
offenses not as serious as graft and corruption, all questions of fact and of law are reviewed, first by the CA, and then
by the SC. To repeat, there is greater guarantee of justice in criminal cases when the trial courts judgment is subject
to review by two appellate tribunals, which can appraise the evidence and the law with greater objectivity, detachment
and impartiality unaffected as they are by views and prejudices that may be engendered during the trial.
Limiting the power of review by the SC of convictions by the Sandiganbayan only to issues of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion, likewise violates the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused, which presumption
can only be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution).
PASEI v. Drilon
G.R.
No.
(Labor

81958
Standards,

June

30,
Police

1988,
Power

Sarmiento,

J.
defined)

FACTS:

Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and
female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled
Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It
claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers
but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being
an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for
worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by
law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving
the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some
states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of police power.
RULING:
[Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty
or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely,
veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question
that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not
import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such
classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not
confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers rests on substantial
distinctions.
ISAE vs. QUISUMBING
OC TO BER 23, 2012 ~ VB DIAZ
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner, vs. HON. LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO
in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity
as the Superintendent of International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents.,
G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000

FACTS:

Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is a domestic educational institution
established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The decree
authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad,
from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations
attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. School
hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2)
local-hires.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25%
more than local-hires.
When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a legitimate labor union and the collective
bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between
foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the
appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.
ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB, the matter reached the DOLE which
favored the School. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires.

RULING:
NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is entitled to humane conditions of work.
These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace the factory, the office or the field but include as well
the manner by which employers treat their employees.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 248 declares it an unfair
labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization.
The Constitution enjoins the State to protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare, In Section 18, Article II
of the constitution mandates to afford labor full protection. The State has the right and duty to regulate the relations
between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that
labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.
However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.
A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and
duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine);
(2) affinity and unity of the employees interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of
compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and

(4) similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining units acceptability is whether or not it is
fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining
rights.
In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with
local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these
groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although
foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded
certain benefits not granted to local-hires such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel
allowances. These benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the
former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the
exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART.
Consti Topic: Police Power Tests of Valid Exercise Lawful Subject (public interest)
DECS v San Diego, G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
Key Word: NMAT
Facts:The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in
Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. 1 When he applied to
take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis:
MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972
h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive
failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.
He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test.
In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality
education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16,
1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged
the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal
protection.
After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and
granting the petition. Judge TeresitaDizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a
medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power. DECS appealed the decision, hence this case.
Issue: Is MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972 a valid exercise of police power by the state?
Held:The decision of the lower court dated January 13, 1989, is REVERSED and the petition is GRANTED.
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, the court ruled that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as
a means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of
"improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country and is recognized as a valid exercises of governmental
power. The country is entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of
legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially
deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease
or trauma.
Police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of
the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the
responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients
may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or
oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from
the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that
"every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable
admission and academic requirements.The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those
better prepared.

No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify
in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is that he is a probably
better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling that has not excited his interest.
It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the
student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be
"swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we
are a nation of misfits.
PHIL JUDGES ASSOC. VS PRADO
227 SCRA 703 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal Protection Franking Privilege of the Judiciary
Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) to withdraw franking privileges
from certain government agencies. Franking privilege is a privilege granted to certain agencies to make use of the
Philippine postal service free of charge.
In 1992, a study came about where it was determined that the bulk of the expenditure of the postal service comes
from the judiciarys use of the postal service (issuance of court processes). Hence, the postal service recommended
that the franking privilege be withdrawn from the judiciary. AS a result, the PPC issued a circular withdrawing the said
franking privilege.
The Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed the circular and questioned the validity of Section 35 of RA 7354. PJA
claimed that the said provision is violative of the equal protection clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is valid.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The judiciary needs the
franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the high expense allotted to the
judiciarys franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending that the removal of the franking
privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut
expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the franking privilege
all at once from all the other departments. If the problem is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the
remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the government, including those who do not need it. The
problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial
distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The
problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without
distinction (it is true that the postmaster withdraw the franking privileges from other agencies of the government but
still, the judiciary is different because its operation largely relies on the mailing of court processes). This might in fact
sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons,
regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of
persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed
the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the
Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a
similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.

TATAD V. SECRETARY OF ENERGY

(Taxpayers suit)

FACTS:
The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act Deregulating the
Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes." [1] R.A. No. 8180 ends twenty six (26) years of government regulation
of the downstream oil industry.
Prior to 1971- there was no government agency regulating the oil industry other than those dealing with ordinary
commodities. Oil companies were free to enter and exit the market without any government interference. There were
four (4) refining companies (Shell, Caltex, Bataan Refining Company and Filoil Refining) and six (6) petroleum
marketing companies (Esso, Filoil, Caltex, Getty, Mobil and Shell), then operating in the country. [2]
1971- the country was driven to its knees by a crippling oil crisis; hence enacted the Oil Industry Commission Act.Oil
Industry Commission was created to regulate the business, operations and trade practices of the industry. Until the
early seventies, the downstream oil industry was controlled by multinational companies. Ferdinand E. Marcos boldly
created the Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC) to break the control by foreigners of our oil industry. PNOC later
put up its own marketing subsidiary -- Petrophil. It operated under the business name PETRON CORPORATION.
1985- only three (3) oil companies were operating in the country -- Caltex, Shell and the government-owned PNOC.
1992- Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which created the Department of Energy. The thrust of the Philippine energy
program under the law was toward the deregulation of the power and energy industry and reduction of dependency on
oil-fired plants.
March 1996- Congress took audacious step of deregulating the downstream oil industry through enacting R.A. No.
8180, entitled the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996."
The deregulation process has two phases: the transition phase and the full deregulation phase.

During the transition phase, controls of the non-pricing aspects of the oil industry were to be
lifted. The following were to be accomplished: (1) liberalization of oil importation, exportation,
manufacturing, marketing and distribution, (2) implementation of an automatic pricing mechanism, (3)
implementation of an automatic formula to set margins of dealers and rates of haulers, water transport
operators and pipeline concessionaires, and (4) restructuring of oil taxes.
Upon full deregulation, controls on the price of oil and the foreign exchange cover were to be lifted
and the OPSF was to be abolished.

August 12, 1996- The first phase of deregulation commenced on.

February 8, 1997- The President implemented the full deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry through E.O. No.
372.
The petitions at bar assail the constitutionality of various provisions of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 372.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have the standing to assail the validity of the subject law and executive order.

RULING:
The effort of respondents to question the locus standi of petitioners must fall on barren ground. In language too lucid
to be misunderstood, this Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioner's locus standi where the petitioner is
able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people.
In KapatiranngmgaNaglilingkodsaPamahalaanngPilipinas, Inc. v. Tan.
"x xx
Objections to taxpayers' suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are, however, in the main
procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the
Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government
have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of
these petitions."

There is not a dot of disagreement between the petitioners and the respondents on the far reaching importance of the
validity of RA No. 8180 deregulating our downstream oil industry.Thus, there is no good sense in being hypertechnical

on the standing of petitioners for they pose issueswhich are significant to our people and which deserve
our forthright resolution.

PP V CAYAT
68 Phil. 12 Political Law Constitutional Law Equal Protection Requisites of a Valid Classification Bar from
Drinking Gin
In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any other liquor outside of
their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act.
He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt
but he challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal
protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or mark them as
inferior or less capable race and less entitled will meet with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and
classify native non-Christians from Christians.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: No. The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable classification. The SC
emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the characteristics that distinguish them from
others. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or
whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or parentage. The law, then, does not seek to mark the
non-Christian tribes as an inferior or less capable race. On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the
promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment
of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there
is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture
and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with
their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.

QUINTO vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, C.J.:
ETO DIGEST NG CASE PRIOR TO THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. RESOLUTION YUNG
ASSIGNED CASE SA ATIN
Facts:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678,
the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered
Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No.
8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in governmentowned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.

Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners
Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in
the coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the aforequoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No.
9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be
harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from
their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.
Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause
Held: Yes.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs,
but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates
against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions
and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional
norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated
differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and substantial
distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those
prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equala two-wheeled vehicle is less stable
and more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirementif it is not
germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the
problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would be
regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations
imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding
appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote ones
candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at
promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of
official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also
justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in
neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to
their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally
rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane
to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be
prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that
matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in
the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare
development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices,
there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present
state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position
during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the
inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by
a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The classification
simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the
second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal
protection clause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13
of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter moved to question an earlier
decision of the Supreme Court declaring the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the
basis of the COMELEC resolution, and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. The resolution
provides that, Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled

corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy. RA 9369 provides that
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of
registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this
period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of
the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or
-controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the
same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
Issue: Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause and therefore unconstitutional
Held: No
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth
requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive
officials vis--vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one holds an appointive
office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain."
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed
resigned provisions? There is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the people.
It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are
put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit
of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete
deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for
which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For
the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature,
whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet
equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents and the intervenors Motions for
Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Courts December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE
this Resolution declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
==============
Note: Not applicable sa barangay office: Any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or national official or
employee, or those in the civil or military service, including those in government-owned or-controlled corporations,
shall be considered automatically resigned upon the filing of certificate of candidacy for a barangay office.
Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under the present state of law, there
would be no occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and later
reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to any election other than a partisan one. For this reason, the
overbreadth challenge raised against Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the pertinent proviso in Section 13
of RA 9369 must also fail.
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., plaintiff-appellant
vs The Treasurer of Ormoc City, etc., defendants-appellees
Ponente: Bengzon
Facts:
January 29, 1964, the municipal board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 Series of 1964 imposing a municipal tax
for all productions of centrifugal sugar milled equivalent to 1
% per export sale to USA and other foreign countries. Payments were made under protest by Ormoc sugar Company.
Sugar Company filed before CFI of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc alleging that the ordinance is
unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation. In response,
defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within the city's power to enact under Local Autonomy Act and the
same did not violate constitutional limitations.
After pre-trial and submission of case memoranda, CFI declared the ordinance constitutional, that it is within the
charter of the city.

Appeal was then taken to SC by the Ormoc Sugar Company alleging the same statutory and constitutional violations.
Appellant questions the authority of the Municipal Board to levy such tax in view of the Revised dministrative Code
which denies municipal councils to impose export tax.
Issue: Whether constitutional limits on the power of taxation, and equal protection clause and rule of uniform taxation
were infringed?
Held:
We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a
reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the
classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to
those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only
centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing
ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the
classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should
not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff,
for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax
because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
The ordinance is unconstitutional.
ABAKADA

Guro

G.R.

Party

No.

List

168056

vs.

September

Ermita

1,

2005

FACTS:
Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition on May 27,
2005 questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108,
respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and
properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of
services and use or lease of properties. These questioned provisions contain a uniformp ro v is o authorizing the
President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006,
after specified conditions have been satisfied. Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
1.

Whether

or

not

there

is

violation

of

Article

VI,

Section

24

of

the

Constitution.

2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28(2) of the Constitution.
3. Whether or not there is a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article III Sec. 1 of the
Constitution.
RULING:
1. Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate
was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in
Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, and excise and franchise taxes.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is
constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what
job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently
the
only
way
in
which
the
legislative
process
can
go
forward.
3. The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been
established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to
be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the States power is entitled to presumption of validity.
As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination,
or arbitrariness.