Liwayway Vinzons-Chato v.

Fortune
FACTS: This is a case for damages under Article 32
of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway
as CIR. On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA
7654, which provided that locally manufactured
cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at
55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of 55%
provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than
Five Pesos per pack. Prior to effectivity of RA 7654,
Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying Champion,
Hope, and More (all manufactured by Fortune)
as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign
brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when
RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were
already covered. In a case filed against Liwayway
with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of
the rule violated its constitutional right against
deprivation of property without due process of law
and the right to equal protection of the laws. For her
part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss
that respondent has no cause of action against her
because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of
her official function and within the scope of her
authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an
agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the
one responsible for her acts. She also contended that
the complaint states no cause of action for lack of
allegation of malice or bad faith. The order denying
the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who
dismissed the case on the ground that under Article
32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not
act with malice or bad faith.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUES:
*Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued
in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection
with the discharge of the functions of his/her office
HELD: On the first issue, the general rule is that a
public officer is not liable for damages which a
person may suffer arising from the just performance
of his official duties and within the scope of his
assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his
authority to administer the affairs of the office which
he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have
been caused to another, as it would virtually be a
charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to
judgment for monetary claims without its consent.
However, a public officer is by law not immune from
damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in
bad faith which, being outside the scope of his
authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of
immunity for official actions. Specifically, under Sec.

38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may

arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross
negligence on the part of a superior public officer.
And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability
may arise where the subordinate public officers act
is characterized by willfulness or negligence. In
Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or
indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another,
may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of
the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted
with malice or bad faith. Thus, the rule in this
jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly
sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the
course of the performance of the functions of the
office, where said public officer: (1) acted with
malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the
public officer violated a constitutional right of the
plaintiff.
Garcia v. Salvador
Facts: Ranida D. Salvador started working as a
trainee in the Accounting Department of Limay Bulk
Handling Terminal, Inc. As a prerequisite for regular
employment, she underwent a medical examination at
the Community Diagnostic Center (CDC). Garcia
who is a medical technologist, conducted the HBs Ag
(Hepatitis B Surface Antigen) test and on October
22,1993, CDC issued the test result
5 indicating that Ranida was "HBs Ag: Reactive."
The result bore the name and signature of Garcia as
examiner and the rubber stamp signature of Castro as
pathologist. When Ranida submitted the test result to
Dr. Sto. Domingo, the Company physician, the latter
apprised her that the findings indicated that she is
suffering from Hepatitis B, a liver disease. Thus,
based on the medical report 6 submitted by Sto.
Domingo, the Company terminated Ranidas
employment for failing the physical examination.
When Ranida informed her father, Ramon, about her
ailment, the latter suffered a heart attack and was
confined at the Bataan Doctors Hospital. During
Ramons confinement, Ranida underwent another
HBs Ag test at the said hospital and the result
indicated that she is non-reactive. She informed Sto.
Domingo of this development but was told that the
test conducted by CDC was more reliable because it
used the Micro-Elisa Method. Ranida went back to
CDC for confirmatory testing, and this time, the AntiHBs test conducted on her indicated a "Negative"
result. Ranida also underwent another HBs Ag test at
the Bataan Doctors Hospital using the Micro-Elisa
Method. Result: non-reactive Ranida submitted the
test results from Bataan Doctors Hospital and CDC to
the Executive Officer of the Company who requested
her to undergo another similar test before her re-

employment would be considered. Thus, CDC

conducted another HBs Ag test on Ranida which
indicated a "Negative" result. Ma. Ruby G. Calderon,
Med-Tech Officer-in-Charge of CDC, issued a
Certification correcting the initial result and
explaining that the examining medical technologist
(Garcia) interpreted the delayed reaction as positive
or reactive. Company rehired Ranida July 25, 1994 Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint for damages
against petitioner Garcia and a purportedly unknown
pathologist of CDC, claiming that, by reason of the
erroneous interpretation of the results of Ranidas
examination, she lost her job and suffered serious
mental anxiety, trauma and sleepless nights, while
Ramon was hospitalized and lost business
opportunities. Castro was named as the pathologist
Garcia denied the allegations of gross negligence and
incompetence and reiterated the scientific explanation
for the "false positive" result of the first HBs Ag test
in his December 7,1993 letter to the respondents
Castro claimed that as pathologist, he rarely went to
CDC and only when a case was referred to him; that
he did not examine Ranida; and that the test results
bore only his rubber-stamp signature. TC dismissed
complaint respondents should have presented Sto.
Domingo and medical expert to testify on the
explanation given by Garcia CA reversed TC
decision Garcia maintains he is not negligent, thus
not liable for damages, because he followed the
appropriate laboratory measures and procedures as
dictated by his training and experience; and that he
did everything within his professional competence to
arrive at an objective, impartial and impersonal
result.
Issue: WON CDC is liable
Held: Yes, CDC is liable. Negligence is the failure to
observe for the protection of the interest of another
person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand,20 Whereby
such other person suffers injury. For health care
providers, the test of the existence of negligence is:
did the health care provider either fail to do
something which a reasonably prudent health care
provider would have done, or that he or she did
something that a reasonably prudent health care
provider would not have done; and that failure or
action caused injury to the patient; if yes, then he is
guilty of negligence.
Elements of an actionable conduct:1) Duty 2) Breach
3) Injury 4) Proximate causation Duty: Owners and
operators of clinical laboratories have the duty to
comply with statutes, as well as rules and regulations,
purposely promulgated to protect and promote the

health of the people by preventing the operation of

substandard, improperly managed and inadequately
supported clinical laboratories and by improving the
quality of performance of clinical laboratory
examinations Their business is impressed with public
interest, as such, high standards of performance are
expected from them. Violation of a statutory duty is
negligence. Where the law imposes upon a person the
duty to do something, his omission or nonperformance will render him liable to whoever may
be injured thereby. Violations of RA 4688 (The
Clinical Laboratory Law) committed by CDC:1)CDC
is not administered, directed and supervised by a
licensed physician as required by law, but by Ma.
Ruby C. Calderon, a licensed Medical Technologist.
Castro was named as head of CDC, but his infrequent
visits to the clinical laboratory barely qualifies as an
effective administrative supervision and control over
the activities in the laboratory.2) Garcia conducted
the HBs AG test of respondent Ranida without the
supervision of Castro, who admitted that he does not
know and has never met her.3) Disputed HBs AG test
result was released to respondent Ranida without the
authorization of Castro. Garcia may not have
intended to cause the consequences which followed
after the release of the HBs AG test result. However,
his failure to comply with the laws and rules
promulgated and issued for the protection of public
safety and interest is failure to observe that care
which a reasonably prudent health care provider
would observe. Thus, his act or omission constitutes a
breach of duty. Injury: Indubitably, Ranida suffered
injury as a direct consequence of Garcias failure to
comply with the mandate of the laws and rules
aforequoted. She was terminated from the service for
failing the physical examination; suffered anxiety
because of the diagnosis; and was compelled to
undergo several more tests. All these could have been
avoided had the proper safeguards been scrupulously
followed in conducting the clinical examination and
releasing the clinical report. Art. 20 provides legal
basis for the award of damages to a party who suffers
damage whenever one commits an act in violation of
some legal provision. Art. 20: Every person who,
contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same. Orlando Garcia guilty of gross negligence.
Lucas v. Tuano
Facts: Peter Lucas contracted sore eyes in his right
eye. He was referred to Dr. Tuano, an
ophthalmologist at St. Lukes. Upon consultation
with Dr . Tuano (9 days since the problems began),
he was already taking Maxitrol to address the
problem. Upon examination, Tuano diagnosed Peter

with conjunctivitis or sore eyes. He prescribed

Spersacet-C6 eye drops for Peter and told the latter to
return for follow -up after a week. A week later,
Tuano told Peter that the sore eyes in the latters
right eye had already cleared up and he could
discontinue the Spersacet-C. However, The same eye
developed Epidemic Kerato Conjunctivitis (EKC) so
Tuano prescribed to the former a steroid -based eye
drop called Maxitrol. On a later check-up, Tuano
instructed the former to taper down the dosage of
Maxitrol , because the EKC in his right eye had
already resolved . Dr. Tuano specifically cautioned
Peter that , being a steroid, Maxitrol had to be
withdrawn gradually; otherwise, the EKC might
recur. Peter would go back and forth to Tuanos clinic
to complain about the worsening condition of his
right eye. In these instances, Tuano would prescribe
different meds to counter the recurring EKC. On Dec.
1998, Peter had no vision in his right eye; right eye
appeared to be bloody and swollen. Tuano ordered
the immediate discontinuation of Maxitrol and
prescribed other meds. Peter went to see another
ophthalmologist , Dr. Batungbacal. Dr. Batungbacals
diagnosis was Glaucoma and recommended Laser
Trabeculoplasty . Dr. Tuano was at a loss as to how to
balance the treatment of Peters EKC vis -a-vis the
presence of glaucoma thus he referred Peter to Dr.
Agulto who concurred on Peters condition and
recommended the same medication. Also, Peter was
prodded by his friends to seek a second medical
opinion. Thus he consulted Dr. Mario V. Aquino who
specializes in the treatment of glaucoma. He
informed Peter that his eyes were relatively normal
except for the tubular vision in Peters right eye.
Petitioners claimed that Dr. Aquino essentially told
Peter that the latters condition would require lifetime
medication and follow-ups. Thus, he underwent 2
procedures of the laser trabeculoplasty. Claiming to
have steroid -induced glaucoma and blaming Tuano
for the same , Peter filed a complaint for damages
against Tuano. He averred that as the direct
consequence of hisprolonged use of Maxitrol, he
suffered from steroid induced glaucoma as well as
incurable impairment of vision which may lead to
permanent blindness . They prayed that prayed that
Tuano be adjudged liable for compensation for his
impaired vision , actual, moral and exemplary
damages plus attorneys fees. In his defense, Tuano
asserted that the drug-induced glaucoma is temporary
and curable and that Steroids are prescribed to treat
EKC. Contrary to Peters fallacious claim, he did
NOT continually prescribe the drug Maxitrol because
it was discontinued as soon as EKC disappeared and
was resumed only when EKC reappeared. He
stressed that Peters glaucoma can only be due to
other causes not attributable to steroids long

standing glaucoma; and that in fact steroids were in

fact beneficial as they provoked the latest glaucoma
to be revealed earlier. RTC dismissed the complaint
for insufficient evidence. Upon appeal, CA also
dismissed it. Issue: Did Lucas fail to prove that
Tuano ignored the standard medical procedure for
ophthalmologists as well as administered medication
with recklessness and exhibited an absence of
competence and skills expected of him? Held: YES.
The case at bar is a medical negligence case against a
physician based on the latters professional
negligence. In order to prevail, the petitioner is
required to prove by preponderance of evidence that
the physician failed to exercise that degree of skill,
care, and learning possessed by other persons in the
same profession; and that as a proximate result of
such failure, the patient or his heirs suffered damages.
Such claim for damages is almost always anchored
on the alleged violation of Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. In medical negligence/malpractice cases, there
exists a physician-patient relationship. To hold the
physician liable for damages, 4 elements must be
shown to co-exist: (1) duty (2) breach; (3) injury; and
(4) proximate causation. There is breach of duty of
care, skill and diligence, or the improper performance
of such duty when the patient is injured in body or in
health. Proof rests upon the testimony of an expert
witness that the treatment accorded to the patient
failed to meet the standard level of care, skill and
diligence which physicians in the same general line
of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like
cases. Proof of breach of duty on the part of the
attending physician is insufficient; there must be a
causal connection between said breach and the
resulting injury - injury for which recovery is sought
must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong
done. In other words, negligence must be the
proximate cause of the injury or that cause, which,
in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have
occurred. To establish the proximate cause, one must
similarly use expert testimony to present to the court
a realistic assessment of the likelihood that the
physicians alleged negligence caused the patients
injury. No question that a physician-patient
relationship developed between Dr. Tuano and Peter.
The onus probandi was on the patient to establish
before the trial court that the physicians ignored
standard medical procedure. Howecer, there was
absolute failure on the part of petitioners to present
any expert testimony to establish: ( 1) the standard of
care to be implemented by competent physicians 2)
that, in his treatment of Peter , Dr. Tuano failed in his
duty to exercise said standard of care that any other
competent physician would use, 3) that the injury or

his glaucoma was the result of his use of Maxitrol, as

prescribed by Dr .Tuano. Failure to prove the first
element alone is already fatal . Petitioners maintain
that Dr. Tuano failed to follow in Peters case the
required procedure for the prolonged use of
Maxitrol . Absent a definitive standard of care or
diligence required of Dr . Tuano under the
circumstances , we have no means to determine
whether he was able to comply with the same. The
Court has no yardstick upon which to evaluate or
weigh the attendant facts to state with confidence that
the acts complained of, indeed, constituted
negligence. Critical and clinching factor in a medical
negligence case is proof of the causal connection
between the negligence which the evidence
established and the plaintiffs injuries. It is necessary
to prove not only that he has been injured and
defendant has been at fault, but also that the
defendants fault caused the injury. Causation must
be proven within a reasonable medical probability
based upon competent expert testimony - proof that
Peters glaucoma would not have occurred but for Dr.
Tuanos supposed negligent conduct . What
constitutes proper medical treatment is a medical
question that should have been presented to experts.
If no standard is established the courts have no
standard by which to gauge the basic issue of breach.
Absent expert medical opinion, the courts would be
dangerously engaging in speculations.
Doctrine: Tuanos position, in sum, is that his
glaucoma is the direct result of Dr. Tuanos
negligence in his improper administration of the drug
Maxitrol. Clearly, the present controversy is a classic
illustration of a medical negligence case against a
physician based on the latters professional
negligence. In this type of suit, the patient or his
heirs, in order to prevail, is required to prove by
preponderance of evidence that the physician failed
to exercise that degree of skill, care, and learning
possessed by other persons in the same profession;
and that as a proximate result of such failure, the
patient or his heirs suffered damages. Just as with the
elements of duty and breach of the same, in order to
establish the proximate cause [of the injury] by a
preponderance of the evidence in a medical
malpractice action, the patient must similarly use
expert testimony, because the question of whether the
alleged professional negligence caused the patients
injury is generally one for specialized expert
knowledge beyond the ken of the average layperson;
using the specialized knowledge and training of his
field, the experts role is to present to the court a
realistic assessment of the likelihood that the
physicians alleged negligence caused the patients
injury. The deference of courts to the expert opinion

of qualified physicians or surgeons stems from the

formers realization that the latter possess unusual
technical skills which laymen in most instances are
incapable of intelligently evaluating; hence, the
indispensability of expert testimonies
OCEAN BUILDERS CONSTRUCTION CORP. v.
SPOUSES ANTONIO and ANICIA CUBACUB,
Respondents.
FACTS: Bladimir Cubacub (Bladimir) was employed
as maintenance man by petitioner company Ocean
Builders Construction Corp. at its office in Caloocan
City. Bladimir was afflicted with chicken pox. Thus,
he was advised by petitioner Dennis Hao (Hao), the
companys general manager, to rest for three days
which he did at the companys barracks where he
lives free of charge. Three days later, Bladimir went
about his usual chores of manning the gate of the
company premises and even cleaned the company
vehicles. Later in the afternoon, Hao gave Bladimir
P1,000.00 and ordered Silangga, a co-worker, to
bring Bladimir to the nearest hospital. Bladimir was
brought to the Caybiga Community Hospital
(Caybiga Hospital), a primary-care hospital around
one kilometer away from the office of the company.
He was then confined and was not permitted to leave
the hospital. He was then transferred to the Quezon
City General Hospital (QCGH) by his parents where
he was placed in the intensive care unit and died the
following day. The death certificate issued by the
QCGH recorded Bladimirs immediate cause of death
as cardio-respiratory arrest and the antecedent cause
as pneumonia. On the other hand, the death
certificate issued by Dr. Frias recorded the causes of
death as cardiac arrest, multiple organ system failure,
septicemia and chicken pox. Bladimirs parents filed
before the RTC complaint for damages against
petitioners, alleging that Hao was guilty of
negligence which resulted in the deterioration of
Bladimirs condition leading to his death. The court
dismissed the complaint and ruled that Hao was not
negligent. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of
the lower court and ruled that Haos failure to bring
Bladimir to a better-equipped hospital constituted a
violation of Article 161 of the Labor Code. Thus,
making them liable for damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not Hao exercised the diligence
more than what the law requires, hence, they are not
liable for damages.
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
CIVIL LAW: Damages
To successfully prosecute an action anchored on torts,

three elements must be present, viz: (1) duty (2)

breach (3) injury and proximate causation. The
assailed decision of the appellate court held that it
was the duty of petitioners to provide adequate
medical assistance to the employees under Art. 161 of
the Labor Code, failing which a breach is committed.
The Implementing Rules of the Code do not
enlighten what the phrase adequate and immediate
medical attendance means in relation to an
emergency. It would thus appear that the
determination of what it means is left to the
employer, except when a full-time registered nurse or
physician are available on-site as required, also under
the Labor Code.
The Court determined that the actions taken by
petitioners when Bladimir became ill, to take a 3-day
rest and to later have him brought to the nearest
hospital, amounted to the necessary assistance to
ensure adequate and immediate medical attendance
to Bladimir as required under Art. 161 of the Labor
Code, to provide to a sick employee in an emergency.
Chicken pox is self-limiting. Hao does not appear to
have a medical background. He may not be thus
expected to have known that Bladimir needed to be
brought to a hospital with better facilities than the
Caybiga Hospital, contrary to appellate courts ruling.
Moreover, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be
considered as the proximate cause of the death of
Bladimir. Proximate cause is that which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient
intervening cause, produces injury, and without
which, the result would not have occurred. An injury
or damage is proximately caused by an act or failure
to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the
case that the act or omission played a substantial part
in bringing about or actually causing the injury or
damage, and that the injury or damage was either a
direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of
the act or omission. Thus, the petitioners are not
guilty of negligence. Therefore, the petition is
granted and the Decision of the CA is reversed.
Barredo v. Garcia
Facts: A head on collision between a Malate Taxicab
driven by Fontanilla (owned by Barredo) and a
carretela occurred. The driver was speeding on the
wrong side of the road. The passenger of the
carratela, Faustino Garcia (16 y.o) was injured and
died 2 days later. The driver was convicted while the
right to file a separate civil action was reserved.
Thereafter, parents of Garcia filed an action under
Art. 1903 (old CC, quasi delict) against Barredo as
the proprietor and employer of Fontanilla. It was
contended that he did not exercise the diligence of a

good father when he employed Fontanilla who had

previously violated traffic laws. As such, the same
court awarded damages in favor of plaintiffs. In
Barredos defense, he contended that his liability
should only be subsidiary pursuant to the RPC. Also,
he claims that 1903 only applies to obligations
arising from wrongful or negligent acts/omissions not
punishable by law. Hence, since RPC punishes said
acts, 1903 no longer applies. Issue: Whether plaintiffs
may bring a separate civil action against Barredo,
thus making him primarily and directly liable under
1903 as Fontanillas employer. Held: Yes. Counsel
for defendant failed to recognize the distinction
between civil liability arising from crime (Penal
Code) and responsibility for quasi-delict (CC). A
quasi delict/culpa aquiliana is a separate and distinct
legal institution, independent from the civil
responsibility arising from criminal liability. The
same negligent act may produce either a civil liability
arising from a crime or a separate responsibility for
fault/negligence. Under 1903, an employer is
primarily and directly responsible for the employees
negligent acts.
Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil. 768 (1918)
Facts: Canco, a clerk of the defendant, was on his
way home via train. As the train was about to stop in
the station where Cangco usually deboards, Cangco,
alighted from the train as he and other passengers
always did. Unfortunately, due to the fact that it was
nighttime and that the station was dimly lighted,
Cangco was not able to see that there was a sack of
melons on the platform. Thus, he landed on said
melons and slipped. He was drawn under the train
and his arm was injured so severely that it had to be
amputated. Cangco sued defendant for damages due
to negligence of servants & employees in placing the
sack of melons which obstructed the passengers
egress.
Held: Manila Railroad is liable under the old civil
code. It is implied from the contract of carriage of the
defendant the duty to carry him safely and provide
him with a safe means to come in and out o the train.
Being contractual, that duty was direct and
immediate. Its nonperformance cannot be excused
due to the fault of defandants employees. Also, no
contributory negligence can be attributed to Cangco
because, as a public carrier, he had the right to
assume that the platform was clear. Cangco was also
very familiar with the place. As such, there can be no
uncertainty in his mind that what he was about to do
was indeed unsafe.
Elcano v. Hill

Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito

(son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against
Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for lack of
intent coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed a civil
action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for
damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his sons
acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his
civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the
fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by
reason of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held
civilly liable under Article 2180.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the
criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate
civil action. A separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if
accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred
to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for
the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not
as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration
in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has
not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated
upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes
place by the marriage of the minor child, it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really
full or absolute. Thus Emancipation by marriage or
by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the childs person. It shall enable the
minor to administer his property as though he were of
age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or
encumber real property without the consent of his
father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued
in court only with the assistance of his father, mother
or guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to
Marvin Hill the SC however ruled since at the time
of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvins
liability should be subsidiary only as a matter of
equity.
Andamo v. IAC.

Doctrine: It must be stressed that the use of ones

property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the
Civil Code provides that the owner of a thing cannot
make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the
rights of a third person. SIC UTERE TUO UT
ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.
Facts: Petitioner spouses Andamo owned a parcel of
land situated in Biga Silang, Cavite which is adjacent
to that of private respondent corporation,
Missionaries of Our lady of La Salette, Inc. Within
the land of the latter, waterpaths and contrivances,
including an artificial lake, were constructed, which
allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners land,
caused a young man to drown, damagaed petitioners
crops and plants, washed away costly fences,
endangered the livesofthepetitioners and their
laborers and some other destructions.
This prompted petitioner spouses to file a criminal
action for destruction by means of inundation under
Article 324 of the RPC and a civil action for
damages.
Issue: Whether petitioner spouses Andamo can claim
damages for destruction caused by respondents
waterpaths and contrivances on the basis of Articles
2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
Held: Yes. A careful examination of the aforequoted
complaint shows that the civil action is one under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasidelicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present,
to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault
or negligence of the defendant, or some other person
for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the
connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred
by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioners complaint, the waterpaths
and contrivances built by respondent corporation are
alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners.
There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection
between the act of building these waterpaths and the
damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if
proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be
the basis for the recovery of damages. It must be
stressed that the use of ones property is not without
limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides
that the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in
such a manner as to injure the rights of a third
person. SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON
LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have
mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each
must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as
not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others.
Although we recognize the right of an owner to build
structures on his land, such structures must be so
constructed and maintained using all reasonable care

so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining

landowners and can withstand the usual and expected
forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or
damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person,
the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or
damage suffered.
Gashem Shookat Baksh v. CA
FACTS: In August 1986, while working as a waitress
in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Marilou Gonzales, then
21 years old, met Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year
old exchange student from Iran who was studying
medicine in Dagupan. The two got really close and
intimate. On Marilous account, she said that Gashem
later offered to marry her at the end of the semester.
Marilou then introduced Gashem to her parents
where they expressed their intention to get married.
Marilous parents then started inviting sponsors and
relatives to the wedding. They even started looking
for animals to slaughter for the occasion. Meanwhile,
Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment
where they had sexual intercourse. But in no time,
their relationship went sour as Gashem began
maltreating Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked his
promise of marrying Marilou and he told her that he
is already married to someone in Bacolod City. So
Marilou went home and later sued Gashem for
damages. The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou
and awarded her P20k in moral damages. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed
marriage to Marilou and that he cannot be adjudged
to have violated Filipino customs and traditions since
he, being an Iranian, was not familiar with Filipino
customs and traditions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is
correct.
HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in
favor of Marilou not really because of his breach of
promise to marry her but based on Article 21 of the
Civil Code which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.
Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong per se. In this case, it is the deceit and fraud
employed by Gashem that constitutes a violation of
Article 21 of the Civil Code. His promise of marrying
Marilou was a deceitful scheme to lure her into
sexual congress. As found by the trial court, Marilou

was not a woman of loose morals. She was a virgin

before she met Gashem. She would not have
surrendered herself to Gashem had Gashem not
promised to marry her. Gashems blatant disregard of
Filipino traditions on marriage and on the reputation
of Filipinas is contrary to morals, good customs, and
public policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying the
hospitality of our country and even taking advantage
of the opportunity to study here he is expected to
respect our traditions. Any act contrary will render
him liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The
Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was
meant to expand the concepts of torts and quasi
delict. It is meant to cover situations such as this case
where the breach complained of is not strictly
covered by existing laws. It was meant as a legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which
is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books such as
the absence of a law penalizing a the breach of
promise to marry. The Supreme Court however
agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise to
marry was made and there was carnal knowledge
because of it, then moral damages may be recovered
(presence of moral or criminal seduction), Except if
there was mutual lust; or if expenses were made
because of the promise (expenses for the wedding),
then actual damages may be recovered.
Cinco v. Canonoy
Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a
Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu,
Branch II, for the recovery of damages on account of
a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a
jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by
Valeriana Pepito
and CarlosPepito, the last three being the private resp
ondents in this suit. Subsequent thereto, a criminal
case was filed against the driver, Romeo Hilot,
arising from the same accident. At the pre-trial in the
civil case,
counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the
civil action pending the final determination of the
criminal suit, invoking Rule 111,Section 3 (b) of the
Rules of Court, which provides: (b) After a criminal
action has been commenced. no civil action
arisingfrom the same offense can be prosecute, and th
e same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may
be found, until final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered;
The City Court of Mandaue City ordered
the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration thereof, having been denied,
petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the CFI
of Cebu, respondent Judge presiding, alleging that the

City Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion

in suspending the civil action for being contrary to
law and jurisprudence. On November 5, 1970,
respondent Judge dismissed the Petition for certiorari
on the ground that there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the City Court in suspending
the civil action inasmuch as damage to property is not
one of the instances when an independent civil action
is proper. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by respondent Judge.
ISSUE: W/N there can be an independent civil action
for damage to property during the pendency of the
criminal action.
HELD: From the Complaint filed by petitioner before
the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, it is evident
that the nature and character of his action was quasidelictual predicated principally on Articles 2176 and
2180 of the Civil Code, which provide: Art. 2176.
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contract
ual relationbetween the parties, is caned a quasidelict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
(1902a)Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article
2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions but also for those of persons for whom one
is responsible.
Employers shall be liable for the damages cause by
their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
FGU Insurance v. Sarmiento
Facts: At 3AM, 2 vehicles (Lancers) cruising
northward along EDSA figured in a traffic accident.
The car owned by Lydia F. Soriano was being driven
at the outer lane of the highway by Benjamin
Jacildone. The other car, owned by respondent
FILCAR Transport, Inc. (FILCAR), and driven by
Peter Dahl-Jensen as lessee, was at the center lane,
left of the other vehicle. Upon approaching the corner
of Pioneer Street, the car owned by FILCAR swerved
to the right hitting the left side of the car of Soriano.
Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, did not possess a
Philippine drivers license. FGU Insurance, in view
of its insurance contract with Soriano, paid the latter
P25,382.20. By way of subrogation, FGU sued DahlJensen and FILCAR as well as respondent Fortune
Insurance. The summons was not served on DahlJensen since he was no longer staying at his given
address, he was later dropped from the complaint. TC
dismissed for failure of FGU to substantiate its claim
of subrogation. CA affirmed but on a different

ground: only the fault or negligence of Dahl- Jensen

was sufficiently proved but not that of FILCAR. FGU
insists rely on the ruling in MYC-Agro-Industrial
Corporation v. Vda. de Caldo that the registered
owner of a vehicle is liable for damages suffered by
third persons although the vehicle is leased to
another. Issue: May an action based on quasi-delict
prosper against a rent-a-car company and,
consequently, its insurer for fault or negligence of the
car lessee in driving the rented vehicle? Held: NO. To
prove quasi-delict under Art. 2176, the following are
the requisites: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff;
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c)
connection of cause and damage. FGU failed to prove
the existence of the 2nd requisite, i.e., fault or
negligence of FILCAR, because only the fault or
negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently
established. The damage caused on the vehicle of
Soriano was due to the fact that Dahl-Jensen swerved
to the right while the vehicle he was driving was at
the center lane. Thus, negligence was solely
attributable to Dahl-Jensen and must be his personal
liability . FILCAR did not have any participation.
The liability under Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a
presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of
the persons made responsible thereunder for failure to
exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of
subordinates. Art. 2180 is not applicable. FILCAR
being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the
owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. There is no
vinculum juris between them as employer and
employee. FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible
for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not
being an employer of the latter. Correlating par. 5 of
Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 which provides that in
motor vehicle mishap, the owner is solidarily liable
with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle,
could have by the use of due diligence, prevented the
misfortune. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle,
the provisions of article 2180 are applicable. Such is
neither applicable because of the absence of masterdriver relationship between FILCAR and DahlJensen. FGU has no cause of action against
respondent FILCAR on the basis of quasi-delict.
Likewise, its claim against FORTUNE can neither
prosper. FGUs insistence on MYC-Agro-Industrial
Corporation is rooted in a misapprehension of our
ruling. In that case, the negligent and reckless
operation of the truck owned by petitioner
corporation caused injuries to several persons and
damage to property. Intending to exculpate itself from
liability, the corporation raised the defense that at the
time of the collision it had no more control over the
vehicle as it was leased to another; and, that the
driver was not its employee but of the lessee. The
court was not persuaded as it found that the true

nature of the alleged lease contract was nothing more

than a disguise effected by the corporation to relieve
itself of the burdens and responsibilities of an
employer
Calalas v. CA
Doctrine: The fact that Sunga was seated in an
extension seat placed her in a peril greater than
that to which the other passengers were exposed.
Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to
overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on
him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the
evidence shows he was actually negligent in
transporting passengers. We find it hard to give
serious thought to petitioners contention that
Sungas taking an extension seat amounted to an
implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that
the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in
our seas should not be compensated merely because
those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning
by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of
petitioners contention that the jeepney being bumped
while it was improperly parked constitutes caso
fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could not
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was
inevitable. This requires that the following
requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is
independent of the debtors will; (b) the event is
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as
to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor did
not take part in causing the injury to the creditor.
Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking
his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into
the highway.
Fores v. Miranda
Facts: Respondent was one of the passengers of a
jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga. While the vehicle
was descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive
speed, the driver lost control, and the jeepney
swerved to the bridge wall. Serious injuries were
suffered by the defendant. The driver was charged
with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of guilty
was sentenced accordingly. Petitioner denies liability
for breach of contract of carriage, contending that a
day before the accident, the jeepney was sold to a
certain Carmen Sackerman
ISSUE: To what damages is the respondent entitled?
HELD:

The P10,000 actual damages awarded by the Court of

First Instance of Manila were reduced by the Court of
Appeals to only P2,000, on the ground that a review
of the records failed to disclose a sufficient basis for
the trial court's appraisal, since the only evidence
presented on this point consisted of respondent's bare
statement that his expenses and loss of income
amounted to P20,000. On the other hand, "it cannot
be denied," the lower court said, "that appellee
(respondent) did incur expenses"' It is well to note
further that respondent was a painter by profession
and a professor of Fine Arts, so that the amount of
P2,000 awarded cannot be said to be excessive. The
attorney's fees in the sum of P3,000 also awarded to
the respondent are assailed on the ground that the
Court of First Instance did not provided for the same,
and since no appeal was interposed by said
respondent, it was allegedly error for the Court of
Appeals to award them motu proprio. Petitioner fails
to note that attorney's fees are included in the concept
of actual damages under the Civil Code and may be
awarded whenever the court deems it is just and
equitable. We see no reason to alter these awards.
Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the
respondent, the same must be discarded. We have
repeatedly ruled that moral damages are not
recoverable in damage actions predicted on a breach
of the contract of transportation. Where the injured
passenger does not die, moral damages are not
recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was
guilty of malice or bad faith. We think it is clear that
the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not
per se constitute of justify an inference of malice or
bad faith on the part of the carrier; and in the case at
bar there is no other evidence of such malice to
support the award of moral damages by the Court of
Appeals.
Consolidated Bank v. CA
L.C. Diaz, a professional partnership engaged in
practice of accounting, opened a savings account
with Solidbank. On August 1991, L.C. Diaz cashier,
Macaraya instructed their messenger, Calapre, to
deposit money with Solidbank. Calapre went to
Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the 2 deposit
slips and the passbook. Since the transaction took
time and Calapre had to make another deposit for
L.C. Diaz with Allied Bank, he left the passbook with
Solidbank. When Calapre returned to Solidbank to
retrieve the passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him that
somebody got the passbook. Calapre went back to
L.C. Diaz and reported the incident to Macaraya.
Macaraya and Calapre went to Solidbank. When
Macaraya asked for the passbook, Teller No. 6 told

Macaraya that someone got the passbook but she

could not remember to whom she gave the passbook.
Teller No. 6 handed to Macaraya a deposit slip dated
14 August 1991 (the same day the passbook was lost)
for the deposit of a check for P90,000 drawn on
Philippine Banking Corporation (PBC). It turns out
that this PBC check of L.C. Diaz was a check that it
had long closed. PBC subsequently dishonored the
check because of insufficient funds and because the
signature in the check differed from PBCs specimen
signature. (It was later found out that an impostor
deposited with Teller No. 6 the P90,000 PBC check,
which later bounced. The impostor apparently
deposited a large amount of money to deflect
suspicion from the subsequent withdrawal of a much
bigger amount of money.)
Failing to get back the passbook, Macaraya reported
the matter to the Personnel Manager of L.C. Diaz.
The following day, L.C. Diaz CEO called up
Solidbank to stop any transaction using the same
passbook until L.C. Diaz could open a new account.
L.C. Diaz also learned of the unauthorized
withdrawal the day before, 14 August 1991, of
P300,000 from its savings account. The withdrawal
slip for the P300,000 bore the signatures of the
authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz. Signatories,
however, denied signing the withdrawal slip. It was
later found out that a certain Noel Tamayo received
the P300,000.
L.C. Diaz charged its messenger, Ilagan and one
Verdazola with Estafa. This was eventually
dismissed. L.C. Diaz demanded from Solidbank the
return of its money. Solidbank refused so L.C. Diaz
filed a Complaint for Recovery of a Sum of Money
against Solidbank. for the unauthorized withdrawal of
the 300K.
The RTC held LC Diaz negligent and caused the
unauthorized withdrawal. Solidbank acted with care
and observed the rules of savings account when it
withdrew 300K in favor of the holder of the passbook
prior to its receipt of a notice of loss thereof. Upon
appeal, CA ruled against bank and held it guilty of
simple negligence which was the proximate cause for
the injury. CA stated that the teller, who was not
presented by Solidbank during trial, should have
called up the depositor because the money to be
withdrawn was a significant amount. Teller did not
even verify the identity of the impostor who made the
withdrawal. Thus, the CA found Solidbank liable for
its negligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees. CA ruled that while L.C. Diaz was also
negligent in entrusting its deposits to its messenger
and its messenger in leaving the passbook with the
teller, Solidbank could not escape liability because of
the doctrine of last clear chance.
Issue: Whether or not the bank was negligent.

Held: YES. The contract between the bank and its

depositor is governed by CC on simple loan. The
bank is the debtor and the depositor is the creditor.
Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to
negligence or culpa contractual.
The law imposes on banks high standards in view of
the fiduciary nature of banking. This means that the
banks obligation to observe high standards of
integrity and performance is deemed written into
every deposit agreement between a bank and its
depositor and that this requires banks to assume a
degree of diligence higher than that of a good father
of a family. Article 1172 of the CC provides that
responsibility arising from negligence in the
performance of every kind of obligation is
demandable. For breach of the savings deposit
agreement due to negligence, or culpa contractual,
the bank is liable to its depositor.
When the passbook is in the possession of
Solidbanks tellers during withdrawals, the law
imposes on Solidbank and its tellers an even higher
degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook. For
failing to return the passbook to Calapre, Solidbank
and Teller No. 6 presumptively failed to observe such
high degree of diligence in safeguarding the
passbook, and in insuring its return to the party
authorized to receive the same.
In culpa contractual, once plaintiff proves a breach of
contract, there is a presumption that the defendant
was at fault or negligent. The burden is on the
defendant to prove that he was not at fault or
negligent. In culpa aquiliana the plaintiff has the
burden of proving that the defendant was negligent.
In the present case, there is thus a presumption that
Solidbank was at fault and its teller was negligent in
not returning the passbook to Calapre. The burden
was on Solidbank to prove that there was no
negligence on its part or its employees. Solidbank
failed to discharge its burden. Solidbank did not
present to the trial court Teller No. 6, the teller with
whom Calapre left the passbook and who was
supposed to return the passbook to him. Solidbank is
bound by the negligence of its employees under the
principle of respondeat superior or command
responsibility. The defense of exercising the required
diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees is NOT a complete defense in culpa
contractual, unlike in culpa aquiliana.
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury and without
which the result would not have occurred. After
completion of the transaction, Solidbank had the
contractual obligation to return the passbook only to
Calapre. Solidbanks failure to return the passbook to
Calapre made possible the withdrawal of the

P300,000 by the impostor who took possession of the

passbook. It was the negligent act of Solidbanks
Teller No. 6 that gave the impostor presumptive
ownership of the passbook. Had the passbook not
fallen into the hands of the impostor, the loss of
P300,000 would not have happened.
The Doctrine of last clear chance is NOT applicable
in this case. Doctrine of last clear chance states that
where both parties are negligent but the negligent act
of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or
where it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last
clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so,
is chargeable with the loss.
It is apparent that L.C. Diaz was guilty of
contributory negligence in allowing a withdrawal slip
signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the
hands of an impostor (NBI report on authenticity of
signatures not presented in evidence). However, this
is a case of culpa contractual, where neither the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last
clear chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the
defendant from liability. Such contributory
negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff merely
serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the
plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant from
his breach of contract. The liability of Solidbank
should be reduced. L.C. Diaz must shoulder 40% of
the actual damages awarded by the CA. Solidbank
must pay the other 60%

to morals, good customs, public policy (Art. 21 CC).

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation.
They have a right to be treated by the carriers
employees with respect and kindness. Petitioners
contract is attended by a public duty and a violation
of which is considered a quasi delict wherein
damages may be awarded.

Air France v. Carrascoso

Art 2180, in conjunction with Art 2176 of the civil

code establishes the rule of in loco parentis, they can
not be held liable to the acts of Calitos assailants
which were not students of the PSBA and because of
the contractual relationship. The school and the
students, upon registration established a contract
between them, resulting in bilateral obligations. The
institution of learning must provide their students
with an atmosphere that promotes or assists its
primary undertaking of imparting knowledge, and
maintain peace and order within its premises.
The SC dismissed the petition and the case was
remanded to the trail court to determine if the school
neglected its obligation to perform based on
the contractual relation of them and the students.

Facts: Respondent bought First Class tickets from

petitioners agent (PAL) for a trip from Manila to
Lourdes. Upon confirmation of said tickets, he flew
first class to the first 2 legs of the trip (HK, BKK).
However, in Bangkok, after being seated, the
manager of the petitioner asked him to transfer to the
Tourist Class in lieu of another passenger (white
man). Reluctantly, he did. Respondent sued
petitioner for damages on the ground of wrongful
expulsion to which the Trial Court & the CA granted
and awarded him moral (25k), exemplary (10k), and
attorneys fees (10k). Petitioner appealed contending
that its contract with the passenger was subject for
confirmation.
Held: Air France is liable. The facts and
circumstances of the cases make it reasonable for
respondent to be awarded said damages. Neither the
captain nor any employee of the petitioner
intervened. There was also no evidence presented that
the white man had a prior right/reservation.
Respondent is entitled to said First Class seat. The
managers arbitrary act made respondent suffer
humiliation. Said manager acted in a manner contrary

PSBA v. CA
Facts: Carlitos Bautista was stabbed while on the
second floor premises of the schools by assailants
who were not members of the schools academic
community. This prompted the parents of the
deceased to file a suit in the RTC of Manila for
damages against PSBA and its corporate officers. The
defendant schools (now petitioner) sought to have the
suit dismissed on the ground of no cause of
action and not within the scope of the provision of
Art 2180 since it is an academic institution. The trial
court overruled the petitioners contention and its
decision was later affirmed by the appellate court.
Issue: Whether the decision of the appellate court
primarily anchored on the law of quasi-delicts is
valid.
Held: Although the Supreme Court agreed to the
decision of the Court of Appeals to deny the petition
of motion to dismiss by the PSBA, they do not agree
to the premises of the appellate courts ruling.

SYQUIA V CA (Mla Memorial Park)

NATURE
Petition for review of CA decision dismissing Syquia
familys complaint for damages against Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. (Mla Memorial)
FACTS

- Juan SYQUIA, father of the deceased Vicente

Syquia, authorized and instructed the defendant to
inter the remains of deceased.
- After about a month, preparatory to transferring the
remains to a newly purchased family plot also at the
same cemetery, the concrete vault encasing the coffin
of the deceased was removed from its niche
underground. As the concrete vault was being raised
to the surface, the Syquias discovered that the vault
had a hole approx 3 in. in diameter near the bottom
and it appeared that water drained out of the hole.
- Pursuant to an authority granted by the Municipal
Court of Paranaque, they caused the opening of the
concrete vault and discovered that:
(a) the interior walls showed evidence of total
flooding;
(b) coffin was entirely damaged by water, filth and
silt causing the wooden parts to separate and to crack
the viewing glass panel located directly above the
head and torso of the deceased;
(c) entire lining of coffin, clothing of the deceased,
and the exposed parts of the deceased's remains were
damaged and soiled.
- SYQUIAS base their claim for damages against
Mla Memorial on either: (1) breach of its obligation
to deliver a defect-free concrete vault;
(2) gross negligence in failing to seal the concrete
vault (Art. 2176)
- Whatever kind of negligence it has committed,
MLA MEMORIAL is deemed to be liable for
desecrating the grave of the dead.
Trial Courts Ruling
- Contract between the parties did not guarantee that
the cement vault would be waterproof.
- No quasi-delict because the defendant was not
guilty of any fault or negligence, and because there
was a pre-existing contractual relation between the
Syquias and Mla Memorial.
- The father himself, Juan Syquia, chose the gravesite
despite knowing that said area had to be constantly
sprinkled with water to keep the grass green and that
water would eventually seep through the vault.
- The act of boring a hole in the vault was necessary
so as to prevent the vault from floating away.
- CA affirmed judgment of dismissal; MFR was also
denied.
ISSUES
1. WON Mla Memorial breached its contract with
petitioners,
or alternatively
2. WON it can be liable for culpa aquiliana
HELD
1. NO

Ratio Parties are bound by the terms of their

contract, which is the law between them. A
contracting party cannot incur a liability more than
what is expressly specified in his undertaking. It
cannot be extended by implication, beyond the terms
of the contract. (RCBC v CA)
Reasoning
- They entered into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale
and Certificate of Perpetual Care." Mla Memorial
bound itself to provide the concrete box to be sent in
the interment.
- Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of MLA
MEMORIAL provides that: Every earth interment
shall be made enclosed in a concrete box, or in an
outer wall of stone, brick or concrete, the actual
installment of which shall be made by the employees
of the Association. Pursuant to this, a concrete vault
was installed and after the burial, the vault was
covered by a cement lid.
- Syquias claim that there was a breach of contract
because it was stated in the brochures that lot may
hold single or double internment underground in
sealed concrete vault."
- "Sealed" meant "closed." Standard dictionaries
define seal as any of various closures or fastenings
that cannot be opened without rupture and that serve
as a check against tampering or unauthorized
opening.
- "Sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof".
When the terms of the contract are clear and leave no
doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties,
then the literal meaning of the stipulation shall
control.
2. NO
Ratio Negligence is defined by law as the "omission
of that diligence which is required by the nature of
the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the
place." In the absence of stipulation or legal provision
providing the contrary, the diligence to be observed
in the performance of the obligation is that which is
expected of a good father of a family.
Reasoning
- Although a pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties does not preclude the existence of
a culpa aquiliana, circumstances of the case do not
show negligence. The reason for the boring of the
hole was explained by Henry Flores, Interment
Foreman, who said that: When the vault was placed
on the grave a hole was placed on the vault so that
water could come into the vault because it was
raining heavily then because the vault has no hole the
vault will float and the grave would be filled with
water.
- Private respondent has exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in preventing the

accumulation of water inside the vault which would

have resulted in the caving in of earth around the
grave. Finding no evidence of negligence, there is no
reason to award damages.
Dispositive CA decision affirmed in toto.
LRT v. Navidad
NATURE: APPEAL from CAs DECISION
- 14 Oct 1993, about 730pm, Nicanor Navidad, then
drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after
purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the
fare).
- While Navidad was standing on the platform near
the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard
assigned to the area approached Navidad.
- A misunderstanding or an altercation between the
two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight.
- No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how
the fight started or who, between the two, delivered
the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT
tracks.
- At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT
train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was
coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train,
and he was killed instantaneously.
- Marjorie Navidad (Nicanors widow), along with
their children, filed a complaint for damages against
Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the
Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and
Prudent for the death of her husband.
- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against
Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and
Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and
averred that it had exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its security guards.
- The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence
while Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting
evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad
had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his
assigned task.
- TC: Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against
the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the
latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the
following:
"a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00; 2)
Compensatory damages of P443,520.00; 3)
Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the
sum of P50,000.00; b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;
c) Attorneys fees of P20,000; d) Costs of suit.
- TC: dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA
and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit.
-Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals.
- CA: exonerated Prudent from any liability for the
death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the
LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the
following amounts:

a) P44,830.00 as actual damages; b) P50,000.00 as

nominal damages; c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the
deceased; and e) P20,000.00 as and for attorneys
fees.
-CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not
have then as yet boarded the train, a contract of
carriage theretofore had already existed when the
victim entered the place where passengers were
supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the
corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent
from liability, the court stressed that there was
nothing to link the security agency to the death of
Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that
Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the
evidence merely established the fact of death of
Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train
owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the
time by Roman. The appellate court faulted
petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence
to establish the fact that the application of emergency
brakes could not have stopped the train.
- CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in
its resolution of 10 October 2000. ISSUES:
WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS
LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR
NAVIDAD, JR.
WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT
RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA
AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF
NAVIDAD
LRTAs CLAIMS:
-Escartins assault upon Navidad, which caused the
latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a stranger
that could not have been foreseen or prevented.
- NO employer-employee relationship between
Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had
testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not
of the LRTA.
Navidads Contention:
- A contract of carriage was deemed created from the
moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and
entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to
all the rights and protection under a contractual
relation, and that the appellate court had correctly
held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of
Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence
imposed upon a common carrier.
HELD:
1. NO. The foundation of LRTAs liability is the
contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify
the victim arises from the breach of that contract by
reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence
required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its

commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a

carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail
itself of the services of an outsider or an independent
firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common
carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the
contract of carriage.
- PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for
tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related
provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180,13 of the
Civil Code. (But there wasnt any evidence shown
that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this
case- SC) The premise, however, for the employers
liability is negligence or fault on the part of the
employee.
- Once such fault is established, the employer can
then be made liable on the basis of the presumption
juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise
diligentissimi patris families in the selection and
supervision of its employees. The liability is primary
and can only be negated by showing due diligence in
the selection and supervision of the employee, a
factual matter that has not been shown.
- A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and
when the same act or omission causes the injury, one
resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa
aquiliana, Article 219414 of the Civil Code can well
apply.
- In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a
contract, where tort is that which breaches the
contract. Stated differently, when an act which
constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability
had no contract existed between the parties, the
contract can be said to have been breached by tort,
thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.
2. YES.
There is no showing that Rodolfo Roman himself is
guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also
be absolved from liability as Prudent is. Needless to
say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad
is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and
Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his
own fault or negligence.
REASONING:
- Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common
carrier, both from the nature of its business and for
reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of
exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of
passengers.
- The Civil Code, governing the liability of a
common carrier for death of or injury to its
passengers, provides:
"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry
the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of

very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the

circumstances.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to
passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."
"Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the
death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the formers employees,
although such employees may have acted beyond the
scope of their authority or in violation of the orders
of the common carriers.
"This liability of the common carriers does not cease
upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees."
"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for
injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the
willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of
strangers, if the common carriers employees through
the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
family could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission."
-The law requires common carriers to carry
passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons with due regard for all
circumstances.
- Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to
its passengers so obligates it not only during the
course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are
within its premises and where they ought to be in
pursuance to the contract of carriage
- The statutory provisions render a common carrier
liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through
the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on
account of wilful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers if the common carriers
employees through the exercise of due diligence
could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
- In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed
to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple
proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty
to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier
or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the
carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen
event or to force majeure. In the absence of
satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the
accident occurred, which LRTA and Roman,
according to the CA, have failed to show, the
presumption would be that it has been at fault, an
exception from the general rule that negligence must
be proved.
DISPOSITION: CAS DECISION AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of

nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner

Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. No costs.
______________
12
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
13
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176
is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by
the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the
minors or incapacitated persons who are under their
authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts
through a special agent, but not when the damage has
been caused by the official to whom the task done
properly pertains, in which case what is provided in
article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage.
14
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary
L.G. Foods vs. Philadelfa
The Case
Review on certiorari of a decision of the CA on 25
April 2003 affirming an order of Bacolod RTC,
which in turn
denied the petitioners motion to dismiss an action for
damages arising from a vehicular accident instituted
by the
Vallejera spouses.

The Facts
On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old
son of the Vallejera spouses, was hit by a Ford Fiera
van owned by LG Foods Corporation (LG Foods)
and driven by their employee, Vincent Norman
Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a result of
the accident. An information for reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide was filed against the driver
before the Bacolod MTCC. Before the trial could be
concluded, however, the accused driver committed
suicide. The case was then dismissed. On June 23,
1999, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint for
damages against LG Foods alleging that as
employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees. In their
defense, LG Foods denied liability by claiming to
have exercised such diligence and prayed for
dismissal for lack of cause of action. Also in their
motion to dismiss, they argued that the complaint was
a claim for subsidiary liability against an employer
under A1035, RPC and, as such, there must first be a
judgment of conviction against their driver to hold
them liable. Since such condition
was not fulfilled due to the latters death, they argued,
the spouses had no cause of action. The trial court
denied the motion for lack of merit. Also, it denied
the motion for reconsideration of the matter. LG
Foods then went on certiorari to the CA alleging
grave abuse of discretion of the part of the trial judge.
The CA, however, affirmed the RTC decision ruling
that the complaint by the spouses does not purport to
be based on subsidiary liability since the basic
elements of such liability, such as conviction and
insolvency of the accused employee, were not even
alleged in said complaint. It then said that the
complaint purports to exact responsibility for fault or
negligence under A2176, CC, which is entirely
separate and distinct from civil liability arising from
negligence under the A103, RPC. Liability under
A2180, CC is direct and immediate, and not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee or showing of insolvency.
The Issue
Whether the cause of action of the Vallejera spouses
is founded on CC or RPC.
The Ruling
The case is a negligence suit brought under A2176,
CC to recover damages primarily from LG Foods as
employers responsible for their negligent driver
pursuant to A2180, CC. The obligation imposed by
A2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible. Thus, the employer is liable for
damages caused by his employees.

The Ratio
First. Nothing in the allegations in the complaint
suggests that the LG Foods are being made to
account for their subsidiary liability under Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code. Plus, the complaint did
not even aver the basic elements for the subsidiary
liability of an employer under said provision.
Second. While not explicitly stated that the suit was
for damages based on quasi-delict, it alleged gross
fault and negligence on the part of the driver and the
failure of LG Foods, as employers, to exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees. It was further alleged that LG Foods is
civilly liable for the negligence/imprudence of their
driver since they failed to exercise the necessary
diligence required of a good father of the family in
the selection and supervision of their employees,
which diligence, if exercised, could have prevented
the vehicular accident that resulted to the death of
their 7-year old son. Third. Section 2, Rule 2, of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines cause of action
as the "act or omission by which a party violates the
right of another." Such act or omission gives rise to
an obligation which may come from law, contracts,
quasi contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts. Corollarily,
an act or omission causing damage to another may
give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the partof
the offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto, and 2)
independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not
arising from an act or omission complained of as
felony (e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising
from law; the intentionaltorts;14 and culpa
aquiliana15); or (b) where the injured party is granted
a right to file an action independent and distinct from

the criminal action. Either of these two possible

liabilities may be enforced against the offender.
Stated otherwise, victims of negligence or their heirs
have a choice between an action to enforce the civil
liability arising from culpa criminal under Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for quasidelict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194
of the Civil Code. This is illustrated in A1161, CC
providing that civil obligation arising from criminal
offenses shall be governed by penal laws subject to
the provision of A2177 and of the pertinent provision
of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relation,
and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages.
This means that A2177 provides an alternative
remedy for the plaintiff. The choice is with the
plaintiff. Fourth. Under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, the liability of the employer is direct or
immediate, not conditioned upon prior recourse
against the negligent employee and a prior showing
of insolvency. This was the recourse of the spouses
since there was no conviction in the criminal case
against the driver. Fifth. LG Foods has been alleging
that "they had exercised due diligence in the selection
and supervision of [their]employees." This defense is
an admission that indeed the petitioners
acknowledged the private respondents' cause of
action as one for quasi-delict under A2180, CC.
Sixth. Since it is as if there was no criminal case to
speak of due to its premature termination, the fact
that there was no prior reservation made to institute a
separate civil action is of no moment.